The Donbas Rift

Russian Social Science Review
ISSN: 1061-1428 (Print) 1557-7848 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/mrss20
The Donbas Rift
Serhiy Kudelia
To cite this article: Serhiy Kudelia (2017) The Donbas Rift, Russian Social Science Review,
58:2-3, 212-234, DOI: 10.1080/10611428.2017.1316062
To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/10611428.2017.1316062
Published online: 11 May 2017.
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Download by: [Université de Genève] Date: 12 December 2017, At: 03:49

Russian Social Science Review, vol. 58, nos. 2--3 ,
March–June 2017, pp. 212–234.
© 2017 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
ISSN: 1061-1428 (print)/ISSN 1557-7848 (online)
DOI: 10.1080/10611428.2017.1316062
SERHIY KUDELIA
Downloaded by [Université de Genève] at 03:49 12 December 2017
The Donbas Rift
The “Russian Spring,” which was taken up in Donetsk and Luhansk as

the struggle for the Donbas, led to the loss of the territory for both
Ukraine and Russia. Although many blame Moscow for starting the war
in the region, the key role was played by processes that took place within
Ukraine. Violent revolution led to the government’s loss of its monopoly
on the use of force, polarized public opinion and produced counter-
mobilization among its opponents. Oligarchs in Donbas hedged their
bets trying to deal both with the new authorities and their local
challengers. Members of security forces from the Donbas considered the
new government illegal and supported separatism. Miscalculations by
the government allowed the separatist movement room to consolidate,
while the indiscriminate use of force by government troops increased
support for the movement among the population. Russia exploited these
developments, but did not play a determining role in them.
Until 2014, political competition and a lack of internal armed
conflicts distinguished Ukraine from other former Soviet republics.
Despite intense political disagreement and significant opposition,
the different parts of Ukrainian society had managed to avoid direct
violent conflict. The presence of viable democratic institutions
allowed political elites to find peaceful resolutions to previous
English translation q 2015 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC, from the Russian
text q 2015 “Kontrapunkt.” “Donbasskii razlom,” Kontrapunkt, 2015, no. 1,
pp. 1–13.
Translated by Peter Golub. Translation reprinted from Russian Politics aq nd Law,
vol. 54, no. 1, 2016, pp. 5--27. DOI: 10.1080/10611940.2015.1160707.
212
MARCH– JUNE 2017 213
crises. In the 1994 elections, the victory of “pro-Russian” opposition

candidate Leonid Kuchma helped stem the tide of separatism in
Crimea. The pact made by the elites during the 2004 Orange
Revolution, which transformed Ukraine into a parliamentary-
presidential republic, made it possible for President Kuchma and the
Donetsk contingent to accept the defeat of their candidate, Viktor
Yanukovych, while maintaining the hope of political revenge. Later,
when Yanukovych won the 2010 election (albeit by a small margin),

his victory as an opposition candidate was easily accepted by society
because the legitimacy of his election was doubted by nobody
except his defeated rival Yulia Tymoshenko. However, in the spring
of 2014 neither the dismantling of the super presidential model, nor
the abandonment by the Party of Regions of its former leader and
the recognition of the new government, nor the holding of early
presidential elections succeeded in preventing the first military
conflict in post-Soviet Ukrainian history.
For many observers, this sudden change in Ukraine’s political
logic signaled direct external interference. From this perspective,
the actions of the Russian leadership changed the trajectory of
Ukraine’s peaceful development and created a spiral of violence,
which quickly escalated into full-scale war. There is much
evidence to support this view—from the lies and incitement of
Russian TV propaganda to the “little green men” standing behind
civilians in Crimea or the former Federal Security Service (FSB)
officer at the head of the Donbas “people’s militia.” However, the
Kremlin and Russian agents did not act in a vacuum. The space for
these events was largely created by events inside Ukraine, which
were not only outside the direct control of Moscow, but often ran
counter to the interests of the Russian leadership.
The first of these was the failure of Euromaidan activists to
practice nonviolent methods of revolution, and their transition to
the direct use of violent force against the Yanukovych regime.
The second was the “show of force” by the new Ukrainian
government in an attempt to neutralize the separatist movement in
Donbas. The third constituted Kyiv’s decision to actively involve
members of nationalist groups in the fighting, and to provide the
Ukrainian military with “carte blanche” to use indiscriminate
214 RUSSIAN SOCIAL SCIENCE REVIEW
weaponry in densely populated areas. All these events were

superimposed on the Donbas’s recent political history, the
structure of patronage in the region, and the system of values and
political preferences of its residents. The result was the collapse of
the legitimacy of the Ukrainian authorities in the eyes of a
significant part of the local population, and this accelerated the
region’s militarization against Kyiv. Without question, Russia
exploited these events, but it did not define them.
Euromaidan on Fire
The first real threat of civil conflict in Ukraine came at the peak of
the Orange Revolution in December 2004. According to Viktor
Yushchenko, it was the fear of massive bloodshed and civil war
that forced him to compromise with Kuchma and support the
transfer of a significant portion of presidential power to
parliament.1 Yushchenko consistently insisted on exclusively
nonviolent methods of protest—as opposed to the radical wing of
the opposition, which called for the storming of the president’s
administration. Thanks to his efforts the transfer of power was
conducted without violence.
However, during the next revolution violence was used, and this
use of violence undermined the unity of the government and led to
its capitulation. In early December 2013, when it became clear that
the government was preparing to remove the protesters using
Berkut’s [Ukraine’s special police force—Trans.] cudgels, self-
defense groups began to form with the active support of opposition
leaders. In just a few weeks the most radical of these groups went
on the offensive, clashing with Berkut in Grushevsky Street next to
Maidan Square. When the progovernment parliament majority
adopted the January laws restricting freedom of assembly, it was
seen as evidence of the futility of both traditional methods of
nonviolent resistance and the failure of the moderate opposition
and its leaders. As a result, the further course of the protest
movement began to be largely determined by extreme right-wing
groups. Thanks to them, stones and incendiary grenades became
an integral part of the protesters’ arsenal. Later, they became
vanguard units that captured regional government offices in

Western and Central Ukraine.
If at first opposition leaders tried to stop the ultra-right
contingent, they eventually found their use of force useful. On the
one hand, it forced Yanukovych to make serious concessions for
the first time: to cancel “dictatorial laws,” to release arrested
activists, and to remove prime minister Nikolai Azarov. On the
other hand, the security forces’ stiff opposition produced the first
casualties among the activists, which fired up the protest
movement and intensified the antagonism between the state and
society. Selective repression by the authorities did not suppress the
protest movement, but only multiplied the number of those who
advocated radical methods of struggle.
At the same time, the seizure of government offices in Western
and Central Ukraine led to a gradual loss of Kyiv’s power.2 This
was particularly evident when local law enforcement offices
turned to the side of the demonstrators first in Lviv and Rivne, and
then Lutsk, Uzhgorod, Chernivtsi, Poltava, and other cities. At the
same time, representatives of the opposition continued to publicly
distance themselves from the radical groups. A striking example of
this duality became the decisive march along Institutskaya Street
on February 18, 2014. The march was declared by the opposition
as a “peaceful offensive” on parliament. However, the march was
led by self-defense regiments, many of whom belonged to right-
wing radical groups. It was this contingent that first hurled
incendiary devices, petards, and stones, and then resorted to
firearms to break the cordon of internal troops guarding the
perimeter of the government quarter. The ensuing street fighting
lasted three days, resulting in large-scale bloodshed and the
ousting of Yanukovych. The fighting in Kyiv’s city center was
accompanied by the raiding of police departments, prosecutor’s
offices, and the offices of the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) in
western regions of Ukraine. Self-defense groups seized weapons
caches and conveyed them to the Maidan. If opposition politicians
really wanted the march to have a peaceful outcome, they did
nothing to prevent the violence.
Pandora’s Box
The eruption of violence during the last days of Euromaidan had
irreparable consequences for the stability of the government, and
for the integrity of the Ukrainian state.
The flagrant use of force by protesters with the tacit support of
opposition parties removed the major constraint that had
previously kept the political struggle in Ukraine peaceful.
If norms among the political elites no longer restricted conflict to

peaceful methods, then now any civil protest had the potential
to become violent. Likewise, the new phenomenon of raiding
government buildings meant that society not only sought to
eliminate the state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of force, but
that it sought to deprive the state of its right to use force altogether.
Under such circumstances, a rally of discontented citizens could
freely enter a government institution and expect government
officials to unquestioningly fulfill their demands. Law enforce-
ment officers lost their status and became, at best, objects of
ridicule. The state ceased to exist not only as a mechanism serving
the public interest but also as a tool of enforcement. This
eliminated the main obstacle holding back the forces that sought to
dramatically reconfigure the Ukrainian government and the
country’s borders.
The nature of the victory attained at Maidan complicated the
restoration of the government’s legitimacy. The old government
led by Yanukovich had already lost much of its legitimacy after
the violent dispersal of the Maidan student protests in November
2013. However, the violent methods used by the protesters also
limited the legitimacy of the new Ukrainian leadership. Thus, full
recognition of the new government took place only in those
regions that actively supported Euromaidan. By contrast, nearly
two-thirds of Donbas residents refused to recognize the legality of
the transfer of power to the opposition—more than all other
southeast regions (with the exception of Crimea).3
The militarization of Euromaidan had its response in the
formation of paramilitary units determined to protect local
residents from nationalists. In the winter of 2013 – 14, the first
such units were already being established under the auspices of

the Party of Regions in Donetsk and Luhansk.4 After the fall of
Yanukovych, they began spreading throughout Donbas.
If initially the majority of these groups were composed of
activists of local pro-Russian organizations and “Cossacks,” by
March they were joined by sympathizers that included former
Afghan veterans and recently active Ukrainian law enforcement
officers. Alexander Khodakovsky, future commander of the

militia battalion Vostok, headed the Donetsk SBU special unit
Alfa and took part in the storming of the Trade Union House,
which was the headquarters of Euromaidan. His example was
followed by many from the ranks of the Donetsk and Luhansk
Berkut, who underwent more than one rotation at the Maidan—
some were afraid of being prosecuted by of the new government,
others were out for revenge. Local militias were being joined by
former anti-Maidan activists, who returned from Kyiv with new
experiences of violent struggle. As a result, a partisan core that
would become the epicenter of the military phase of the
confrontation began to form in the Donbas.
Another consequence of Euromaidan’s escalating violence was
the growing perception of threat posed by nationalists in the
Southeast of Ukraine. Again, this threat was felt most acutely in the
Donbas. At the beginning of April 2014, nearly two-thirds of the
region’s residents perceived the “Right Sector” as a powerful
organization, which “constituted a threat to citizens and the
integrity of the country.”5 Under these conditions, part of the local
population treated the formation of local paramilitary groups as a
kind of security guarantee, which they felt the state could no longer
provide. Militias began to work directly with local police in order
to organize patrols and to monitor roads.
Why the Donbas?

The region that led the separatist movement was not an obvious
candidate for the role. Until 2014, the Donbas had the reputation
of being politically inert, with a weak civil society and a strong
paternalistic culture. This is what ensured the complete
dominance of the Party of Regions (PR) for almost two decades.

Even at the time of Euromaidan, the camp of Yanukovych
supporters gathering around Verkhovna Rada [Ukrainian
Parliament—Trans.] was relatively small, and consisted mainly
of small-town residents from the Donbas who were bused in by
the government.6 This passivity gave the impression that the
Donbas would tolerate the Euromaidan victory as it had
previously accepted the triumph of the Orange Revolution.

However, during the first days following Yanukovych’s flight, it
became apparent that a smooth transition to the new regime
would not occur.
Rallies in support of federalizing Ukraine were held in most
major cities in the Southeast. However, the Donbas was the only
region where Kyiv was unable to regain control and prevent the
outbreak of an armed movement to join Donetsk and Luhansk
regions to Russia. This was facilitated by three factors.
First, the Donbas was significantly different from other
regions in terms of its politics and its level of integration into
the Ukrainian state. In contrast to all other regions, the majority
has traditionally supported the unification of Ukraine with
Russia (66 percent) and regretted the collapse of the Soviet
Union (61 percent).7 In April 2014, after Russia’s annexation of
Crimea, almost two-thirds of the region’s residents continued to
express a positive attitude toward Russian president Vladimir
Putin, while in other regions the level of support was no higher
than 20 percent. With the exception of Crimea, the Donbas was
the only territory where a majority (57 percent in 2013) stated
that it would not support the independence of Ukraine in the
case of a second referendum (i.e., the 1991 referendum, when
nearly 84 percent voted in favor of independence).8 While
before the revolution few people supported separatism (8
percent in 2012), recognition of the the Ukrainian government
was conditional. This is evidenced by the prevalence among
Donbas residents of a regional identity—in contrast to other
Ukrainian regions, Donbas residents primarily identify them-
selves with their city or region, rather than with the state as a
whole.
In the past ten years, a series of election campaigns helped to

strengthen conceptions of the Donbas’s exclusivity. To preserve its
political monopoly in the region, the Party of Regions actively
used the myth of the Donbas’s economic power and the outlook of
its inhabitants. For this reason, “the regionals” repeatedly called
their political opponents fascists and banderovites. The
animosity toward Ukrainian nationalists in the Donbas was
significantly higher than anywhere else in Ukraine, which

multiplied the effect of Russian television’s claims of a “fascist
junta” in Kyiv. As a consequence, in early April 2014, nearly a
third of the residents supported the Donbas’s secession from
Ukraine and only around 10 percent were willing to provide
resistance in case Russian troops entered the region.9 A quarter of
the population also expressed willingness to participate in pro-
Russian demonstrations.10 An active separatist core coupled with
the neutral attitude of the majority created favorable conditions for
further mobilization of the separatist movement.
The second factor that contributed to the armed uprising in the
Donbas was the position of the local political elites, heads of
security agencies, and ordinary law enforcement officers. After
the Euromaidan victory, the Party of Regions’ public statements
were limited to demands that greater power be given to local
authorities and that the rights of Russian-speaking people be
protected. However, the sudden departure of Yanukovych and his
supporters led the party to disintegrate into several factions
associated with large business groups (e.g., Rinat Akhmetov,
Dmitry Firtash, and Alexander Efremov). Each of these groups
had its own interests in the Donbas; some were more insistent
than others, and made tacit alliances with separatist leaders.
Leaders of some Donbas cities assisted in organizing regular
meetings under Soviet and Russian flags. Later these urban
leaders helped to organize the May 11 referendum. These
meetings and the “people’s guards” were financed by local
businesses operating under the protection of bosses from the Party
of Regions. Many of the “guards” included local deputies from
the Communist Party and the Progressive Socialist Party of
Ukraine. They were joined by anti-Maidan militants (the
“titushki”), who were mostly used for dispersing pro-Ukrainian

rallies and intimidation of their organizers. At the same time, the
heads of local police departments and SBU offices (who were part
of the patronage network of the Party of Regions) did not obstruct
the development of the separatist movement. In fact, the majority
of law enforcement authorities ceased to function, and seizures of
law enforcement agencies were committed with their sanction
or direct assistance. For example, during the storming of the

Luhansk SBU, the police refused to protect the building, while
the head of Internal Affairs insisted on the need to release the
detained separatist leaders.11 According to Alexander Petrule-
vich, the former head of the Luhansk SBU, most police officers in
the region came out of Maidan “with resentment and bruised
psyches, plus they were all threatened with criminal prosecution.”
As was later admitted by Anton Gerashchenko, adviser to the
Ukrainian minister of Internal Affairs, Luhansk and Donetsk
officials that spring committed “essentially a total betrayal.”12
The events in Severodonetsk were a striking illustration of
these processes, where armed militias led by the Cossack leader
Pavel Dremov and commander Alexei Mozgov appeared only in
early May. But by this time, the preparation of the referendum,
as directed by the self-proclaimed leadership of the Luhansk
People’s Republic, was being managed by city council
functionaries, while the leader of the local SBU went into
retirement, and law enforcement functions were carried out by
squads of Afghan war veterans associated with local businesses.
In the adjacent city of Alchevsk, responsibility for holding the
referendum was taken on by the regional mayor, Vladimir
Kosyuga, who later supported the recognition of the Luhansk
People’s Republic by the city council. Although formally the
Ukrainian government continued to exist in these cities, the
territory had already de facto separated from Kyiv’s authority back
in April without any military activity. This “quiet secession”
occurred in many cities in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, and
was possible only because of the cooperation of local authorities
and separatist leaders, and the nonformal allegiance of certain
security forces to the Party of Regions and big business.
The third factor that transformed the Donbas into a theater of

war was the choice of Slavyansk as a base for a group led by
former FSB officer Igor Strelkov. As Strelkov himself explained,
this choice was linked to his plan to gain a foothold in a city of
“average size [where] authority based on the support of the people
could be quickly established.”13 Slavyansk was important
because it was the northernmost Donetsk outpost, located at the
intersection of several highways connecting Donetsk, Luhansk,

and the Russian border.
By the time the “Strelkovtsy” appeared in the city, Slavyansk
was already in the process of a “quiet secession.” The local militia
consisted of some 300 people who had worked with local law
enforcement and created a joint council of five nearby towns.14
However, the show assault on the local offices of the SBU and
MVD by armed men in camouflage uniforms seemed to suggest the
launch of a “Crimean scenario” in the Donbas. Strelkov was well
aware of the effect of imitating the actions of the “little green men.”
According to him, the local people “openly expressed their
sympathies for us” as they believed that “everything would be
repeated as in Crimea.” Unlike in other cities, the city mayor,
Nelya Shtepa, was deposed despite her open support for the militia.
She was replaced by the “people’s mayor” Vyacheslav Ponomarev
(a local activist), but the actual control of the city was in Strelkov’s
hands. Hoisting the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) flag over
Slavyansk facilitated the nonviolent incorporation of nearby cities,
including Kramatorsk—one of the largest industrial centers of the
region. Strelkov’s key role in organizing DNR’s military
operations became apparent in late April, when the “republic’s”
leadership recognized him as commander of all the paramilitary
units in the region. However, the main result of his appearance was
a sharp change in Kyiv’s strategy toward the self-proclaimed
republics.
The Slavyansk Trap

The reaction of the Ukrainian authorities to the development of
the separatist movement in the Donbas was predicated on two
fatal errors. First, they strongly underestimated the degree of

support in the Donbas for altering relations with Kyiv. Second,
they regarded Strelkov’s armed group in Slavyansk as the main
threat to the integrity of the state. Therefore, almost all of
Ukraine’s forces were sent to besiege and capture the city. With
the support of local authorities, this allowed the separatists to
strengthen other regional centers, and to hold a referendum on
self-determination in most of Donetsk and Luhansk regions. The

successful holding of the referendum became a turning point in
the conflict.
Kyiv’s first response was an attempt to enter into negotiations.
Immediately after the capture of state institutions in Donetsk and
Luhansk, deputy prime minister Vitaly Yarema and secretary of
National Security and Defense Council Andriy Parubiy were sent
to the region. However, their main message—the promise of
decentralization—could no longer appease the leaders of the new
“republics.” Separatist leaders insisted that Kyiv had to accept the
results of the referendum concerning the status of the regions that
they intended to carry out. The referendum allowed them to
bargain for greater rights or else go the way of Crimea. According
to Sergei Taruta, former governor of the Donetsk region, it was
then that Kyiv should have made the decision to use special forces
to free the captured administrative buildings, as had been done in
Kharkiv.15 Instead, the central government continued to wait,
calculating that a handful of “marginals” barricaded in the
buildings would have no significant impact. Since the rallies
supporting the separatists were small, their eventual defeat seemed
inevitable. Meanwhile, the forceful liberation of the buildings
and resulting civilian casualties would likely trigger a wave of
indignation and strengthen the mobilization of local residents, just
as had recently occurred on the Maidan.
Counting on the containment of the conflict, the central
authorities did not consider several important factors. First, the
capture of the regional administration buildings in Donetsk and the
SBU in Luhansk contributed to the complete breakdown of law
enforcement in the region and led to the shift of a significant
number of security forces to the side of the separatists. This opened
access to armories and facilitated the forming of the first militia

battalions. The formal leadership of the two regions, two governors
appointed by Kyiv, lost any ability to influence the situation.
Second, many local deputies were co-opted into the governing
bodies of the self-proclaimed republics, and served as important
links in building informal relations between different cities. This
greatly simplified the organization of the referendum and helped
extend the influence of the DNR and LNR beyond Donetsk and
Luhansk. Third, the image of the “republic” became a symbolic
haven for many people in the region who felt a sense of rejection by
Ukraine after Euromaidan. Since the idea of the “republics”
remained deliberately blurred, they could be assigned as much
autonomy or sovereignty as anyone wished. As a result, republican
rhetoric dominated discourse and beat out the unity narrative
actively promoted by the Ukrainian media.
In contrast to Kyiv’s restrained reaction to DNR’s and LNR’s
proclamations, it quickly announced antiterrorist operations in
response to Strelkov’s capture of Slavyansk. The free movement
of “little green men” near the still troubled Kharkiv region was
seen as a direct challenge to the Ukrainian government and the
continuation of the Russian policy of dismembering Ukraine.
This was also the position of Ukraine’s Western allies. The U.S.
ambassador to the United Nations, Samantha Power, immediately
placed the responsibility for the preparation of the capture of
Slavyansk on Russia. For Kyiv, the presence of Russian citizens
who had recently participated in Crimean operations was a
sufficient casus belli.
Acting president Oleksandr Turchynov announced antiterrorist
operations with the involvement of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
In fact, he had begun a full-scale military campaign in order to
prevent the “repetition of the Crimean scenario in eastern
Ukraine.” At the time, Kyiv’s propaganda thesis to justify military
action was that the conflict in Donbas was not a “war of Ukrainians
against Ukrainians,” but a war against Russia for the sake of
preserving Ukraine. But for many in the region it sounded as
though the local residents had suddenly been deemed terrorists.
Was Kyiv’s fear of “creeping annexation” justified? This was

obviously the strategic objective of Strelkov, Alexander Borodai
(the future prime minister of the DNR), and the “Russian world”
ideologues in Moscow (in particular Alexander Prokhanov and
Alexander Dugin). The rapid secession of the “people’s republics”
in the Donbas was supposed to cause a chain reaction among other
areas of southeast Ukraine. For them, the Novorossiia project was
set up, so as to incorporate all of Ukraine’s breakaway territories.

At the end of March 2014, Strelkov predicted on his blog that “by
summer Ukraine will not exist in its current form—the East and
Southeast will declare independence, which Kyiv will not
recognize, but will be powerless to counter, because Russia will
stand behind the separatists.”16 According to Strelkov, the
weakness of the Ukrainian army would allow for the disintegration
of the country through a minimal “low-intensity civil war,” which
would end when the sovereign state of Ukraine is limited to the
territory of present-day Galicia.
In the short term, Strelkov tried to focus Kyiv’s attention on
himself, which would force the Ukrainian authorities to spend
the majority of their firepower on recapturing Slavyansk. In a
telephone conversation intercepted by the SBU immediately after
the capture of the city, Konstantin Malofeev (one of the financiers
of operations in the Donbas and Crimea) said that “the whole world
is now watching this geographical area, so there is no need for
antics.”17 Later, one of Strelkov’s associates admitted that
Strelkov “saw his task as covering for the May 11 referendums
in Donetsk and Luhansk, after which he was ready to move back
into the shadows and let events unfold according to the Crimean
scenario.”18 In essence, Strelkov and Borodai believed the
referendum would open the way for the full entry of Russian troops
into the Donbas.
Initially, Ukraine’s response fully justified Strelkov’s calcu-
lations. The first military units, hastily put together to occupy
Kramatorsk, were stopped by unarmed civilians standing in the
way of their progress, and a portion of the military vehicles and
weapons of a Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) airborne brigade
quickly fell into the hands of militias. This created the impression
that the militia had the support of the people, while the Ukrainian
army was incompetent. In subsequent months, the UAF and the
National Guard concentrated its efforts, using heavy armor and
artillery, around the axis of Slavyansk –Kramatorsk. However, the
only significant result of these assaults on the cities was the
capturing of mount Karachun, which became the key UAF firing
point. President Turchynov admitted that one of the main obstacles
to the advancement of the Ukrainian army was “the angry locals

who were no less a problem than the insurgents.”19 As the battle for
Slavyansk continued, separatist leaders became entrenched in
other Donbas cities and formed new battalions that comprised the
core of the militia during the summer campaign. Thus, Slavyansk
became a kind of trap for Kyiv, giving Luhansk and Donetsk time
to prepare their political and military platforms for further
resistance. In addition, the outskirts of Slavyansk were the scene of
the first significant losses for the Ukrainian army. By the end of
May, Ukraine had lost some thirty soldiers and volunteers, and
several military helicopters. This was the point at which the
Ukrainian military switched to the wide use of heavy armaments.
And with the completion of the presidential campaign in Ukraine,
the shelling of residential neighborhoods in Slavyansk and
Kramatorsk became commonplace.
After the results of the referendum were announced and the
independence of the “republic” declared, Strelkov, acting as the
commander in chief of DNR, urged the Russian leadership “to take
adequate measures to protect DNR’s population, including the
possibility of introducing peacekeeping forces.”20 But the Kremlin
refused to recognize the results of the referendum, and this was the
first signal that the annexation of the Donbas was not planned by
the Russian leadership.21 The next signal came when Russia
recognized the results of the Ukrainian presidential election—a
move that contradicted the main ideological assumptions of the
“republics.” By the middle of June, Strelkov began to accuse
the Russian government of “sabotaging Novorossiia” and spoke of
the gloomy prospects for the militia due to a shortage of arms and
volunteers. “Most of us will die, and the Russian Spring will be
aborted by the Ukrainian winter.”22 However, in July the situation
radically changed, and the initially asymmetric conflict gradually

“leveled off” to a more traditional military confrontation.
Hello, Arms
Despite Ukraine’s apparent military weakness, it had a significant
advantage over the militias in both numbers and weapons,
especially heavy arms. The militia brigade in Slavyansk did not

exceed 1,000 people and had only three pieces of artillery. At the
siege of Slavyansk, Ukraine employed the field rocket system
“Grad,” multiple batteries of howitzers, mortar and artillery units,
and dozens of armored vehicles. This imbalance began to change
gradually in the first weeks of the summer, after the militia took
control of the primary crossing points on the border with Russia.
By the middle of July, the militia moved from guerrilla raids and
infantry battles to tank battles and remote duels using rocket
artillery. The three factors that caused the transition from
asymmetrical conflict to full-fledged military engagement were
the successful recruitment of local volunteers, the mobilization of
Russian recruits, and the importation of heavy military equipment
from the so-called Russian PX. The first of these factors was
instrumental in not only prolonging the fighting but also
broadening domestic support for the “republics,” making the
conflict look more and more like a civil war.
According to various journalists, Donbas natives made up the
majority of the militias from the start of the fighting.23 This is
confirmed by the list of volunteer casualties (which is dominated
by Ukrainians), and the database of separatists created with the
support of Ukrainian law enforcement agencies, which shows that
two-thirds of the separatists are locals. Ukrainian authorities
explained the involvement of local residents purely as the result
of poor economic conditions, and considered the paramilitary
participants themselves primarily as social deviants or agents
recruited by Russia. However, various studies of civil conflict have
shown that insurgent motives are rarely one-dimensional and often
have, in addition to the rational component, an emotional one.24
Rational reasons for entering a conflict presume the reception of
certain benefits and the minimization of costs associated with the

avoidance of participation in the conflict.25 Emotional reasons, by
contrast, are associated with personal understandings of the rules
of justice and moral duty, reactions to political or economic
discrimination based on group affiliations or responses to external
threats.26 Exclusively ideological reasons rarely play a decisive
role.
My survey of fifty-five militia volunteers (all Ukrainian

citizens), selected by a random sample, shows the importance of
emotional factors for those who decided to join the ranks of the
militia.27 Of the multiple reasons given, the more frequent were the
desire to protect family, friends, and civilians (85.5 percent) and to
protect the homeland (70 percent), while the monetary incentive
was named as a motive by only one respondent. The primary
reason for joining the militia was to protect relatives (47 percent),
but the secondary reason was a more concrete perception of the
enemy—the need to stop Ukrainian nationalists (23 percent). This
was in part due to the active participation in the conflict of the
military wing of nationalist Maidan organizations, which received
funding from oligarchs and political support from the state. At the
same time, the purely political reason—that is, defending the
independence of the DNR and LNR—was important for only 10
percent of respondents, and the battle for the liberation of
Novorossiia was a key motive for only 7 percent.
The emotional component of the militia mentality is shown in
an interview with Pavel from Kramatorsk:
I joined the militia alone. I was at work in Kramatorsk when suddenly
I saw high-explosive 240 mm caliber rounds being firing from
Karachun and exploding. I saw it and I was horrified . . . these shells
did not hit the militias, but the playground, the factory crane, and the
booth with the night watchman . . . . I myself am a “Ukrainian lad,”
but I don’t condone genocide, fascism and nationalism.
Another militiaman, Anton from Kharkov, describes his reasons
for joining the resistance as follows: “Some bastards came to my
home and began to wreck it, and I had to do something. Show
them their place. Then I simply began to hate them. I was very
disturbed by the people in balaclavas, who acted as if they were

above the law because they were wrapped in the flag. They were
capable of anything.”
For many, the decision to join the militia was followed by
a fundamental review of their ties with Ukraine. Almost all
respondents (85 percent) acknowledged their complete or partial
allegiance to the Ukrainian state prior to 2014. More than half (54.5
percent) remained ambivalent on the issue of their identification

with Ukraine—27.3 percent identifying themselves as primarily
Russian, 14.5 percent as residents of the Donbas, and 12.7 percent
with their city of origin. After a year of the conflict, only 7.5
percent continue to fully or partially associate themselves with
Ukraine. The changing attitudes toward the Ukrainian state come
from similar emotional causes. Many named the deaths of civilians
as the result of shelling by the Ukrainian army (38.9 percent) or the
burning of the Odessa Trade Unions House (20 percent). It is
noteworthy that the beginning of the antiterrorist campaign or the
blockade of Slavyansk did not alone influence the militia
members—only 18 percent said that these events forced them to
reconsider their stance toward Ukraine.
The road to full-scale war in Donbas consisted of several
stages. The protest stage consisted of mobilizing against the
results of Euromaidan and demanding special status for the
region. The lack of an intelligible reaction from the Ukrainian
government and its apparent weakness against the backdrop of
Russia’s resolution in Crimea created the conditions for the stage
in which force was used. The collapse of the state that occurred in
most of the Donbas opened the door to its isolation. While public
opinion still supported the preservation of the Donbas as part of
Ukraine, the locals did not trust the new Ukrainian government.
Kyiv’s attempt to suppress the opposition with the use of the army
and volunteer battalions launched the military stage of the
conflict, which produced the opposite of the expected effect.
Instead of a quick surrender, the militia began to form in other
cities and the local population began to identify with the self-
appointed authorities. The escalation of the conflict to the level of
indiscriminate use of weapons against large cities led to civilian
casualties and massive refugee flows. This only strengthened the

resistance against the Ukrainian state and greatly complicated the
prospect of the return of the lost territories. In this sense, the
conflict in the Donbas developed according to the logic of civil
war: each new stage of escalation was an answer to the previous
stage. The dynamics of violence led to a change in prewar
mentalities and the identities of those who directly experienced
hostilities, creating new group allegiances and lines of

opposition.28
The Donbas Rift

Toward the end of August 2014, when the attack on Donetsk and
Luhansk was stopped by the direct intervention of Russian troops,
the futility of a military solution to the conflict became apparent
to Kyiv and its Western allies. The Battle of Ilovaisk, in which
hundreds of Ukrainian soldiers died, marked the collapse of the
summer campaign. However, the leadership of Ukraine still had
no strategy for returning the eastern territories. Moreover, many
of Kyiv’s frenzied actions—for example, the complete denial of
social benefits to local residents, restrictions on movement of
people and the transportation of goods, and the continued shelling
of residential areas—only worsened the situation of the civilian
population. It is revealing, however, that half the residents of
DNR and LNR still support the preservation of the region as part
of Ukraine, and only 16 percent continue to advocate for Donbas
independence, and only one in four desires its annexation
according to the Crimean model.29 This leaves open the
possibility of reintegrating the territories back into Ukraine, but
only with substantial political compromise among all parties. Its
main obstacles are related to the internal political dynamics of
Ukraine, the specific interests of Russia, and the interests of the
leaders of the unrecognized “republics.”
Ukraine’s official rhetoric, which still represents the opposite
side as terrorists and supporters of Russian aggression, complicates
not only the negotiation process but also the model of conflict
resolution. Furthermore, the recognition of the leadership of the
“republics” and the legalization of the militia as a “people’s

militia” (key demands made by DNR and LNR) involve huge
political risks for President Petro Poroshenko. During a time of
failing reforms, a lack of real results in the fight against corruption,
and deep economic crisis, making concessions to the “external
enemy” could entirely undermine the authority of the government.
This would provide an opportunity for the new political players,
whom the war in Donbas has turned from fringe right-wing

extremists into the new national heroes. A strong opponent of
compromising with the DNR and LNR is Poroshenko’s main
parliamentary ally, Arseniy Yatsenyuk (Popular Front), for whom
the preservation of confrontation with Russia is a prerequisite for
political survival. In addition, the return of the DNR and LNR
would mean additional financial commitments, at a time when
Ukraine cannot pay its own foreign debts. The only acceptable
agreement for Kyiv would be to grant the DNR and LNR
provisional status with broad financial power and cultural rights.
However, even these minimal concessions do not suggest amnesty
for all the militia, which is a precondition for agreement for the
other side.
A deal with Kyiv also promises serious losses for the leadership
of the “republics.” In a year they have managed to legitimize their
authority, control financial inflows, and get rid of the most
independent “warlords.” The battalions now have a common
structure with a single command and are beginning to resemble a
regular army, which Ukrainian estimates put at nearly 40,000.30
Modern military technology now allows them to have relative
parity with the Ukrainian armed forces, while Russian patronage
protects them from economic bankruptcy, and allows part of the
population to continue to maintain the illusion that in the future the
Donbas will join the Russian Federation. In reality, the
“republics” are beginning to acquire the features of a military-
bureaucratic regime in which military personnel and officials
dominate society through coercion and the monopolization of the
distribution of wealth. Meanwhile, the impoverished and
intimidated population has no means of societal control and is in
complete economic dependence on the authorities. Any agreement
with Ukraine will impose restrictions on the leaders of the

“republics” and will deprive them of their key ideological thesis—
the incompatibility of the interests of the Donbas and the “fascists”
in Kyiv. Therefore, the conflict remains unsettled, and for both
sides, the situation of “neither war nor peace” seems preferable.
Paradoxically, of all the parties involved in the conflict, the
Kremlin is perhaps the least interested in maintaining the status
quo. The separatist movement in the Donbas not only failed to push
other areas of the Southeast toward independence, but margin-
alized pro-Russian forces in Ukrainian politics. Instead of
becoming exemplars, DNR and LNR came to symbolize a dead
end. The “Bosniazation” of Ukraine through the provision to the
Donbas of veto power on key political issues is politically
unacceptable for Kyiv’s leading players, and is therefore
completely unrealistic. At the same time, the preservation of the
DNR and LNR as a zone of “frozen conflict” looks too costly for
Moscow. Not only would it force the Kremlin to allocate
considerable financial resources to artificially subsidize the DNR
and LNR, but would leave Russia for an indefinite period under the
influence of Western sanctions.31 This is apparently too high a
price for the use of the Donbas as a buffer zone where Russia can
test new weapons and slow Ukraine’s movement toward the EU
and NATO. At the same time, the surrender of the territory back to
Ukraine on the old terms may be negatively perceived by the
Russian public. Only 11 percent of Russians consider it possible
for the Donbas to return to Ukraine without an extension of its
rights. The majority is either in favor of Donbas independence (35
percent) or its annexation by Russia (24 percent).32 Therefore,
while Russia seems to be trying to move the negotiation process
along, insisting on carrying out the Minsk agreement, the
negotiations seem incapable of resolving the conflict. The Kremlin
has found itself facing the prisoner’s dilemma in which the parties,
due to a lack of trust, choose conflict as the most rational strategy
and, as a result, suffer constant losses. As long as the risk of being
cheated remains too high, all parties will avoid real cooperation.
The current situation has caused a split between the residents of
the DNR and LNR and the rest of the population of the Donbas,
who are rapidly moving away from one another not only
politically but also psychologically. It is significant that President
Putin is supported by 58 percent of DNR and LNR residents, but
only by 13 percent of the residents of the Ukrainian part of the
Donbas.33 Russia’s right to interfere with the internal affairs of
Ukraine for the protection of Russian speakers is recognized by
42 percent of DNR and LNR residents, but only by 10 percent of
respondents in the Ukrainian Donbas. The “Russian Spring” that

galvanized Donetsk and Luhansk as the struggle for the interests
of the Donbas, led to its loss for both Ukraine and Russia. Any
new military stage will likely cement this new reality, and is
unlikely to change it.
Notes
1. V. Yushchenko, Nederzhavni taemnitsi: notatki na beregakh pam’iati
(Kharkiv: Folio, 2014), p. 472.
2. A. Higgins, “A Ukraine City Spins Beyond the Government’s Reach,”
New York Times, February 15, 2014.
3. “Mneniia i vzgliady zhitelei Iugo-Vostoka Ukrainy: Aprel’ 2004,”
Zerkalo nedeli, April 18, 2014 (http://zn.ua/UKRAINE/mneniya-i-vzglyady-
zhiteley-yugo-vostoka-ukrainy-aprel-2014-143598_.html) (all URLs accessed
August 19, 2015).
4. “V Luganskoi oblasti organizovyvaiut otriady samooborony,” SKHID.
INFO, January 27, 2014 (http://cxid.info/v-luganskoy-oblasti-organizovyvaut-
otryady-samooborony-n111731); “Donetsk patruliruiut otryady kazakov i
afgantsev,” Korrespondent.net, January 26, 2014 (http://korrespondent.net/
ukraine/politics/3297360-donetsk-patrulyruuit-otriady-kazakov-y-veteranov-
afhantsev); V Donetskoi oblasti sozdaiut narodnie druzhiny storonnikov
Ianukovicha,” Ukrainskaia pravda, January 28, 2014 (http://pravda.com.ua/rus/
news/2014/01/28/7011671/).
5. Quoted in “Mneniia i vzgliady zhitelei Iugo-Vostoka Ukrainy.”
6. “Ekonomika Antimaidanu: Infografika,” Ekonomika pravda, December
13, 2013 (www.epravda.com.ua/publications/2013/12/13/408504/).
7. “Nostal’giia za SRSR ta stavlennia do okremikh osobistostei,” Gruppa
Reiting, May 5, 2014 (http://ratinggroup.com.ua/products/politic/data/entry/
14092/).
8. “Dinamika patriotichnikh nastroiv,” Gruppa Reiting, August 15, 2014.
(http://ratinggroup.com.ua/products/politic/data/entry/14101/).
9. “Stavlennia ukraintsiv do teritorial’nogo ustroiu kraini ta statusu Krima,”
Gruppa Reiting, March 14, 2014 (http://ratinggroup.com.ua/products/politic/
data/entry/14083/).
10. See “Mneniia i vzgliady zhitelei Iugo-Vostoka Ukrainy.”
11. N. Dvali. “Eks-nachal’nik Luganskoi SBU Petrulevich: terroristicheskie

gruppy GRU Rossii uzhe v Kieve i zhdut signala,” Gordon.ua, July 2, 2014
(http://gordonua.com/publications/Petrulevich-Terroristicheskie-gruppy-GRU-
Rossii-uzhe-v-Kyive-i-zhdut-signala-29825.html).
12. P. Sheremet, “Anton Gerashenko Bliz’ko osib vvazhaiut’sia zniklimi
bezvisti,” Ukrainskaia pravda, September 30, 2014 (www.pravda.com.ua/arti
cles/2014/09/30/7039343/).
13. “Semnadtsat’ kilometrov my shli marshem cherez granitsu: Igor’
Strelkov otvechaet na voprosy Sergeia Shargunova,” Svobodnaia pressa,
November 11, 2014 (http://svpressa.ru/war21/article/103643/).

14. “Narodnyi mer Slavyanska: ‘My ne dumali chto, doidet do voiny tak kak
nadeialis’ na pomoshch’ Rossii,” Regnum, October 20, 2014 (www.regnum.ru/
news/polit/1858546.html).
15. “Sergiu Taruta: ‘Mi namagalisia domovitis’ z Moskvoiu shche do
prezidents’kikh viboriv,’” Gromads’ke TB, February 23, 2015 (www.youtube.
com/watch?v¼ExyZWfjHbRs).
16. “Voennye svodki s Iugo-Zapadnogo fronta” (https://forum-antikvariat.
ru/index.php/topic/204348-voennye-svodki-s-yugo-zapadnogo-fronta/?
p ¼ 2120939).
17. “Slaviansk. 13.04.2014. SBU perekhvatila peregovory separatistov v
Slavianske” (www.youtube.com/watch?v¼duCSkkE6XX8).
18. “Zapis’ v ‘Zhivom zhurnale’ El’Myurida,” May 11, 2015 (http://el-murid.
livejournal.com/2368663.html).
19. “‘Tak nachinalas’ voina: Interv’iu s Aleksandrom Turchinovym,”
Tsenzor.Net. October 24, 2014. (http://censor.net.ua/resonance/308694/
tak_nachinalas_voyina_intervyu_s_aleksandrom_turchinovym).
20. “Separatisty ‘Donetskoi respubliki’ prosiatsia v Rossiiu,” Russkaia
sluzhba BBC, May 12, 2014 (http://bbc.com/russian/international/2014/05/
140506_donetsk_separatists_sovereignty_proclaimed).
21. “Moskva vospriniala referendumy v Ukraine s uvazheniem,” Russkaia
sluzhba BBC, May 12, 2014 (http://bbc.com/russian/russia/2014/05/
140512_russia_east_ukraine_plebiscit_reax.shtml).
22. “Strelkov: teper’ ia prizyvaiu k srochnomu okazaniiu masshtabnoi
voennoi pomoshchi,” Zavtra, July 16, 2014 (http://zavtra.ru/content/view/s
trelkov-teper-ya-prizyivayu-k-srochnomu-okazaniyu-masshtabnoj-voennoj-
pomoschi/).
23. T. Judah, “Looking for Ukraine,” New York Review of Books, June 19,
2014; M. Franchetti, “Pinned to the Ground by the Blizzard of Bullets,” Sunday
Times, June 8, 2104; J. Ioffe, “My Mind-Melting Week on the Battlefields of
Ukraine,” New Republic, June 16, 2014; J. Marson, “Donbas Diary: On the
Frontlines in Eastern Ukraine,” Wall Street Journal, June 2, 2014; A. Luhn,
“Volunteers or Paid Fighters? The Vostok Battalion Looms Large in War with
Kiev,” Guardian, 2014.
24. See S. Gates, “Recruitment and Allegiance: The Microfoundations of
Rebellion,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2002. vol. 46, no. 1. pp. 111–30;
M. Humphreys and J Weinstein, “Who Fights?” American Journal of Political
Science, 2008, vol. 52, no. 2, pp. 436–55.
25. M. Lichbach, “Contending Theories of Contentious Politics and the

Structure-Action Problem of Social Order,” Annual Review of Political Science,
1998, no.1, pp. 401–24.
26. R. Petersen, Understanding Ethnic Violence: Fear, Hatred, and
Resentment in Twentieth-Century Eastern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2002); E. Wood, Insurgent Collective Action and Civil War in
El Salvador (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); L.E. Cederman,
A. Wimmer, and B. Min, “Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel? New Data and
Analysis,” World Politics, 2010. vol. 62, no. 1, pp. 87–119.
27. The results of my research are based on an online poll conducted from
April 30 to May 15, 2015. The survey participants were selected by a random
sample of profiles on social networks from the database “Peacemaker” created
with the assistance of the Security Service and the Interior Ministry of Ukraine
(https://psb4ukr.org/criminal/). Invitations to participate in the survey were sent
to 204 militia members, of whom 55 responded. Before the outbreak of
hostilities 65.3 percent of the respondents lived in the Donetsk region, and 28.5
percent in the Luhansk region. At the time of the survey, the vast majority of
participants (86.1 percent) were over forty years old.
28. S. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil Wars (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2006).
29. See Steven Kull, Clay Ramsay, “The Ukrainian People on the Current
Crisis.” Program for Public Consultation/Kiev International Institute of
Sociology March 09, 2015 (http://www.cissm.umd.edu/publications/ukrainian-
people-current-crisis).
30. “Komanduvannia ATO nazvalo kil’kist’ boyovikiv,” Zahid.net, May 11,
2015 (http://zaxid.net/news/showNews.do?komanduvannya_ato_nazvalo_kilkist_
boyovikiv_i_rosiyskih_viyskovih_na_donbasi&objectId¼1350936).
31. I. Golunov and A. Artemev, “Na ch’i den’gi zhivet Donbas,” RBK, July
15, 2015 (http://daily.rbc.ru/investigation/politics/15/06/2015/5579b4b99a
7947b063440210).
32. J. Poushter. “Key Findings from Our Poll on the Russia –Ukraine
Conflict,” Pew Research Center, June 10, 2015 (www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2015/06/10/key-findings-from-our-poll-on-the-russia-ukraine-conflict/).
33. See “The Ukrainian People on the Current Crisis.”

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The Donbas Rift

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The Donbas Rift

The “Russian Spring,” which was taken up in Donetsk and Luhansk as

crises. In the 1994 elections, the victory of “pro-Russian” opposition

when Yanukovych won the 2010 election (albeit by a small margin),

weaponry in densely populated areas. All these events were

exploited these events, but it did not define them.

vanguard units that captured regional government offices in

If norms among the political elites no longer restricted conflict to

such units were already being established under the auspices of

officers. Alexander Khodakovsky, future commander of the

Why the Donbas?

dominance of the Party of Regions (PR) for almost two decades.

previously accepted the triumph of the Orange Revolution.

In the past ten years, a series of election campaigns helped to

significantly higher than anywhere else in Ukraine, which

“titushki”), who were mostly used for dispersing pro-Ukrainian

or direct assistance. For example, during the storming of the

The third factor that transformed the Donbas into a theater of

intersection of several highways connecting Donetsk, Luhansk,

The Slavyansk Trap

fatal errors. First, they strongly underestimated the degree of

self-determination in most of Donetsk and Luhansk regions. The

access to armories and facilitated the forming of the first militia

Was Kyiv’s fear of “creeping annexation” justified? This was

set up, so as to incorporate all of Ukraine’s breakaway territories.

to the advancement of the Ukrainian army was “the angry locals

radically changed, and the initially asymmetric conflict gradually

especially heavy arms. The militia brigade in Slavyansk did not

certain benefits and the minimization of costs associated with the

My survey of fifty-five militia volunteers (all Ukrainian

disturbed by the people in balaclavas, who acted as if they were

percent) remained ambivalent on the issue of their identification

casualties and massive refugee flows. This only strengthened the

hostilities, creating new group allegiances and lines of

The Donbas Rift

“republics” and the legalization of the militia as a “people’s

whom the war in Donbas has turned from fringe right-wing

with Ukraine will impose restrictions on the leaders of the

respondents in the Ukrainian Donbas. The “Russian Spring” that

11. N. Dvali. “Eks-nachal’nik Luganskoi SBU Petrulevich: terroristicheskie

November 11, 2014 (http://svpressa.ru/war21/article/103643/).

25. M. Lichbach, “Contending Theories of Contentious Politics and the

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