G.R. No. 113917 July 17, 1995
7 Private complainants were
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FELICIA CABACANG Y MAZAMBIQUE, accused-appellant.
PUNO, J.:
An Illegal Recruitment case was filed against appellant FELICIA
MAZAMBIQUE CABACANG for allegedly committing the
following act:
That in or about and during the period comprised from
March 22, 1990 to April 27, 1990, both dates inclusive,
in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused,
representing herself to have the capacity to contract,
enlist and transport Filipino workers for employment
abroad, did then and there willfully and unlawfully, for
a fee, recruit and promise employment/job placement
abroad to the following persons: Romeo Eguia, Ronnie
Reyes, Armando Castro and Dante Eguia, without first
having secured the required license or authority from
the Department of Labor and Employment.1
The case was raffled off to Branch 5 of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila,2 and docketed as Criminal Case No. 91-93606. A not
guilty plea was entered upon her arraignment on July 17, 1991.
The records reveal that the four private complainants are related.
DANTE3 and ROMEO EGUIA are brothers, and RONNIE
REYES4 and ARMANDO CASTRO are their brothers-in-law.
RAMON EGUIA and prosecution witness WILMA GREGORIO5 are
Dante's and Romeo's siblings.
The prosecution evidence show that appellant who is not a recruiter
licensed by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA),6 handled the processing of the papers of cousins Ramon
Eguia and Edgardo Santos. In June, 1988, the two were deployed to
Abu Dhabi for employment as janitors.
encouraged by their employment, and decided to apply for overseas
janitorial work as well.8
According to private complainant Ronnie Reyes, he was approached in
Lipa by appellant who represented herself as the Assistant Manager of
the Lakas Agency Management Corporation located near Robinson's
Department Store in Ermita, Manila. Appellant informed him that
there would be a second batch of overseas workers to be deployed to
Abu Dhabi. Ronnie relayed the information to Wilma, who made
further inquiries and verifications from appellant about the job
opportunity.9 Wilma then directly worked out with appellant, the
overseas job applications of private complainants.
Private complainants filed their applications and appellant assured
them that they would be able to leave for Abu Dhabi after the
processing of their paper.10 She instructed them to pay their processing
fees11 directly to her. During the period from March 3, 1990 to April
27, 1990, inclusive, private complainants through Wilma paid
appellant a total of THIRTY-TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED
PESOS (P32,500.00).12
Appellant assured private complainants they could leave for Abu
Dhabi on May 10, 1990, at 8:00 p.m.13 The date of departure came
without private complainants leaving Philippine soil. Thereafter,
appellant told them to stay put and wait for the arrival in the
Philippines of their prospective Middle Eastern employer. However,
no employer arrived, and the four complainants failed to be deployed
by appellant overseas.14
Private complainants and Wilma returned to the Lakas Agency to look
for appellant. They did not find her. It was then that they found out
from the agency's Manager, MR. NARCISO DELA FUENTE, that
appellant was merely renting a table in the office and was not,
employed with Lakas.15 The revelation moved private complainants to
file a complaint against appellant with the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI).16
The NBI was able to work out a settlement between the parties.
Appellant agreed in writing to pay back the processing fees of private
complainants.17 Nonetheless, appellant did not fully fulfill her
obligation under the agreement. She only refunded a total of SIX
THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED PESOS (P6,700.00) to private
complainants.18
For her part, appellant admits that she received from private
complainants, through Wilma Gregorio, the sum of THIRTY-TWO
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P32,500.00).19 She,
however, denied that she was merely renting a table at the office of the
Lakas Agency Management Corporation. She insisted that she was an
employee of that recruitment office owned and managed by Mr.
Narciso dela Fuente,20 and that she acted as its liaison officer and
messenger. As liaison officer, she assisted applicants in the processing
of their documents in the POEA. She also signed documents and
receipts in behalf of the recruitment agency.21
According to appellant, it is the Lakas Agency's policy that each
applicant be charged FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) as
processing fee, and that the airline fare of FIFTEEN THOUSAND
PESOS (P15,000.00) in cases of deployment to Abu Dhabi be
shouldered by the applicant.22 The agency adopted the policy as a
result of its alleged unfortunate experience with Ramon Eguia and
Edgardo Santos. The two, she claimed, refused to pay back the cost of
their tickets (THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS [P30,000.00]) which was
advanced by the agency.23
Appellant blamed private complainants for their failure to leave for
Abu Dhabi as they were unable to produce the money for their air
fare.24 Allegedly, Wilma insisted that the SIXTY THOUSAND PESOS
(60,000.00) for private complainants' tickets be advanced by Lakas
Agency and be repaid by the four once they start working in Abu
Dhabi. Her proposal did not sit well with the recruitment agency,
resulting in the shelving of private complainants' deployment abroad.25
Appellant further testified that private complainant Ronnie Reyes later
withdrew his application and demanded the refund of his processing
fees, plus SEVEN HUNDRED PESOS (P700.00) to cover
miscellaneous expenses.26 Since private complainants' papers had
already been processed in the POEA, Ronnie was informed that the
agency was not obliged to make the refund to him. He was, however,
insistent, so appellant took it upon herself to pay him back.27 As
guarantee for her promise to make the refund, Ronnie allegedly took
her Sony stereo worth FOUR THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED
PESOS (P4,700.00), which he never returned to her even after she had
given him SIX THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED PESOS
(P6,700.00).28
Appellant also alleged that no similar refunds were made to the three
other private complainants. Their processing fees were merely off-set
against the existing obligation of Romeo Eguia and Edgardo Santos
with the Lakas Agency.29
At trial's end, appellant was found guilty of illegal recruitment and
sentenced as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is
hereby rendered finding the accused Felicia Cabacang y
Mosambique (sic) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
illegal recruitment and hereby sentences her to suffer
the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and a fine of
One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos.30
Appellant now assails the trial court's Decision with the following
arguments:
1. The court a quo erred
by failing to appreciate
the facts (1) that
(appellant) never
represented herself as
licensed by the
Department of Labor and
Employment —
Philippine Overseas
Employment
Administration as labor
recruiter, (2) that what
she represented to the
applicants is that her
employer LAKAS
MANAGEMENT
AGENCY is a duly
licensed recruitment
agency with principals-
employers abroad, and (3)
that the accused told
applicants that she can
help them get employed
with the same employer
of their relatives who are
now working there
through her help.
2. The court a quo erred
in finding (appellant) at
fault and liable for the
failure or negligence of
her employer LAKAS
MANAGEMENT
AGENCY to register her
name as its employee at
the Philippine Overseas
Employment
Administration.
3. The court a quo erred
in finding (appellant) at
fault or liable for the
decision/policy of her
employer, LAKAS
MANAGEMENT
AGENCY, or requiring
the four (4) complaining
witnesses to pay the cost
of their plane tickets from
Manila to the jobsite
(Abu Dhabi, UAE);
4. The court a quo erred
in finding (appellant)
guilty of illegal
recruitment based on
(appellant's) receipt of the
P32,000.00 from Wilma
Eguia Gregorio intended
as placement fees of the
four (4) complaining
witnesses.
We affirm appellant's conviction with modifications.
The centerpiece of appellant's defense is two-fold: (1) that she cannot
be held liable for illegal recruitment since she never represented
herself to private complainants as a POEA-licensed recruiter; and (2)
that she was not the one responsible for the recruitment of private
complainants nor for their
non-deployment for work abroad, since she was merely an employee
of the POEA-licensed Lakas Agency Management Corporation. We
reject these contentions.
Firstly, it is incorrect to maintain that to be liable for illegal
recruitment, one must represent himself/herself to the victims as a
duly-licensed recruiter. Illegal recruitment is defined in Article 38 (a)
of the Labor Code, as amended, as "(a)ny recruitment activities,
including the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of this
Code, to be undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority."
Article 13 (b) of the same Code defines "recruitment and placement"
as referring to:
(A)ny act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting,
transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and
includes referrals, contract services, promising or
advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether
for profit or not: Provided, That any person or entity
 which in any manner, offers or promises for a fee
employment to two or more persons shall be deemed
engaged in recruitment and placement.
Clearly, to prove illegal recruitment, only two elements need to be
shown, viz.: (1) the person charged with the crime must have
undertaken recruitment activities (or any of the activities enumerated
in Article 34 of the Labor Code, as amended); and (2) said person does
not have a license31 or authority32 to do so. It is not required that it be
shown that such person wrongfully represented himself as a licensed
recruiter.
Secondly, appellant cannot successfully contend she merely performed
her duties as an employee of a licensed recruitment agency. Apart from
her uncorroborated testimony on the matter, she failed to present
credible evidence to buttress her claim of employment. Thus, she
failed to follow the immutable rule on burden of proof that "each party
must prove his own affirmative allegations by the amount of evidence
required by law.33
On the other hand, the documentary evidence of the prosecution show
that appellant received private complainants' processing fees from
Wilma Gregorio in her own behalf. The wordings of Exhibits "C" to
"G", inclusive, are strongly persuasive on this factual issue.
They read, as follows:
Exh. "C": "Received from Wilma
Gregorio the amount of 5,000 only";
Exh. "D": "Received from Romeo Eguia
amount 5,000";
Exh. "E": "Received from Wilma the
amount of 5,000 Wilma — only"
Exh. "F": "Received from Wilma
Gregorio amount 7,500 pesos only"; and
Exh. "G": "Received the amount of
10,000 pesos from Wilma Gregorio as
Deposit, 4 applicants."
These receipts — which are not written on Lakas agency stationary —
show no indication that the payments were accepted by appellant in
behalf of the
Lakas Agency Management Corporation. Exh. "J", which is the
Commitment/Agreement executed and signed by appellant before the
NBI further proves that she was acting in her own behalf in receiving
Wilma's payment. For, why else would she personally "promise to
return to Wilma Gregorio . . . the amount of P32,500.00" if said sum
was for the benefit of the Lakas Agency?
More importantly, the prosecution demonstrated reasonable doubt that
appellant performed recruitment activities without any license to do so.
She informed private complainant Ronnie Reyes that there would be a
second batch of janitors to be deployed to Abu Dhabi. After she
accepted private complainants' job applications, she assured them that
they would be able to fly to that Middle Eastern nation after their
papers are processed by the POEA. She told them, through Wilma, to
pay their processing fees directly to her, and later personally received
the same, in the total amount of THIRTY-TWO THOUSAND PESOS
(P32,000.00). She issued and signed the receipts evidencing payment
to her of such fees. She processed private complainants' papers at the
POEA, and she assured them that they were to fly to Abu Dhabi on
May 10, 1990, at 8:00 p.m. Throughout the entire transaction, private
complainants and Wilma Gregorio dealt with appellant, and with
appellant alone. The only time they talked to the manager of the Lakas
Agency was after their aborted flight to Abu Dhabi, when they were
trying to locate the whereabouts of appellant.
Clearly, it was appellant who directly recruited private complainants
within the meaning of Article 38 (a) and (b) the Labor Code. Since it is
undisputed that appellant is not a holder of a license or authority to
recruit from the Department of Labor, through the POEA, her acts
constitute illegal recruitment.
Illegal recruitment carries with it the penalty of life imprisonment, and
a fine which varies by degrees in accordance with the enumeration
made in
Article 39 of the Labor Code, as amended. In the case at bench, since
appellant was charged with and convicted of illegally recruiting four
(4) people, her crime is classified as having been committed in large
scale.34 As such, it is considered as involving economic sabotage, and
carries with it a fine of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(P100,000.00).35 In addition to these penalties, appellant must also be
ordered to indemnify private complainants the unrefunded portion of
their processing fees.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision, dated January 25, 1994, of the

Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 5, in Criminal Case No. 91-
93606 is AFFIRMED, subject to the modification that, in addition to
being sentenced to suffer LIFE IMPRISONMENT and pay a fine of
ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00), appellant
Felicia Mazambique Cabacang is likewise ordered to indemnify
private complainants in the amount of TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND
EIGHT HUNDRED PESOS (P25,800.00). Costs against appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Regalado and Mendoza, JJ., concur.


G.R. No. 179907 February 12, 2009
ARLENE N. LAPASARAN, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
NACHURA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, filed by petitioner Arlene N. Lapasaran, assails the Court of
Appeals Decision1 dated June 28, 2007 and its Resolution2 dated
September 12, 2007, in CA-G.R. CR No. 29898.
The facts of the case follow:
In September 2001, private complainant Menardo Villarin (Menardo)
and his sister Vilma Villarin (Vilma) met petitioner Arlene N.
Lapasaran, who worked at Silver Jet Travel Tours Agency (Silver Jet)
at SIMCAS Building, Makati. For a fee of ₱85,000.00, petitioner
undertook the processing of the papers necessary for the deployment
(under a tourist visa) and employment of Menardo in South Korea.
Petitioner informed Menardo that he would be employed as "factory
worker," which was, subsequently, changed to "bakery
worker."3 Thereafter, Menardo paid the said fee in installments, the
first in September 2001 in the amount of ₱10,000.00, which was
received by a certain Pastor Paulino Cajucom;4 the second installment
was ₱35,000.00; while the third and last payment was ₱40,000.00; the
last two installments were delivered to the petitioner.5
After two postponements in his flight schedule, Menardo finally left
for South Korea on November 25, 2001. Unfortunately, he was
incarcerated by South Korean immigration authorities and was
immediately deported to the Philippines because the travel documents
issued to him by the petitioner were fake.6 He immediately contacted
petitioner and informed her of what happened. Thereupon, petitioner
promised to send him back to South Korea, but the promise was never
fulfilled. Consequently, Menardo and his sister Vilma demanded the
return of the money they paid, but petitioner refused and even said,
"Magkorte na lang tayo."7 It was later found out that petitioner was no
longer connected with Silver Jet.
Hence, the separate charges for illegal recruitment and estafa against
petitioner before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. Raffled to
Branch 34, the cases were docketed as Criminal Case No. 03-215331
for Illegal Recruitment and Criminal Case No. 03-215332 for
Estafa.8 When arraigned, she pleaded not guilty to both charges.
In her defense, petitioner testified that she owned a travel agency
named A&B Travel and Tours General Services, engaged in the
business of visa assistance and ticketing. She averred that it was Vilma
who solicited her assistance to secure a tourist visa for Menardo. She
admitted transacting with the Villarins, but committed only to securing
a tourist visa and a two-way airplane ticket for Menardo, for which she
received ₱70,000.00 as payment. She denied having recruited
Menardo Villarin; she likewise denied having promised him
employment in South Korea.9
On February 15, 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision finding petitioner
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal recruitment and estafa.10
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC Decision with
a modification in the penalty imposed in Criminal Case No. 03-215332
for estafa.11
Petitioner now comes before this Court on the sole issue of:
WHETHER OR NOT THE LAWS ON ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT
AND ESTAFA ARE APPLICABLE IN THESE CASES.12
We deny the petition.
Both the trial and appellate courts found the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses credible and convincing. We are, therefore,
inclined to respect such finding. The best arbiter of the issue of the
credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies is the trial court.
When the inquiry is on that issue, appellate courts will not generally
disturb the findings of the trial court, considering that the latter was in
a better position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses
themselves and having observed their deportment and manner of
testifying during the trial.1avvphi1 Its finding thereon will not be
disturbed, unless it plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and
value which, if considered, may affect the result of the case. We find
no cogent reason to disturb the trial court’s conclusion, as affirmed by
the CA.13
In the first case, petitioner was charged with illegal recruitment,
defined and penalized by the Labor Code as amended by Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 8042.14 Illegal recruitment is committed when it is shown
that petitioner gave the complainant the distinct impression that she
had the power or ability to send the complainant abroad for work, such
that the latter was convinced to part with his money in order to be
employed.15 To be engaged in the practice of recruitment and
placement, it is plain that there must, at least, be a promise or an offer
of employment from the person posing as a recruiter whether locally
or abroad.16 Petitioner’s misrepresentations concerning her purported
power and authority to recruit for overseas employment, and the
collection from Menardo of various amounts, clearly indicate acts
constitutive of illegal recruitment.
Petitioner’s claim that she did not represent herself as a licensed
recruiter, but that she merely tried to help the complainants secure a
tourist visa could not make her less guilty of illegal recruitment, it
being enough that she gave the impression of having had the authority
to recruit workers for deployment abroad.17
As provided in Section 7(a)18 of R.A. No. 8042, the CA correctly
affirmed the imposition of the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years
and one (1) day to eight (8) years, and the payment of a fine of
₱200,000.00, in Criminal Case No. 03-215331.
In the second case, petitioner was charged with violation of Article
315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) which punishes estafa
committed as follows:
By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts
executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power,
influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or
imaginary transactions, or by means of other similar deceits.
The elements of the crime are: (a) the accused defrauded another by
abuse of confidence or by means of deceit; and (b) damage or
prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended
party.19
Here, it has been sufficiently proven that petitioner represented herself
to Menardo as capable of sending him to South Korea for employment,
even if she did not have the authority or license for the purpose.
Undoubtedly, it was this misrepresentation that induced Menardo to
part with his hard-earned money in exchange for what he thought was
a promising future abroad. The act of petitioner clearly constitutes
estafa under the above-quoted provision.20
It is well established in jurisprudence that a person may be convicted
of both illegal recruitment and estafa. The reason, therefore, is not hard
to discern: illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum, while estafa is
malum in se. In the first, the criminal intent of the accused is not
necessary for conviction. In the second, such an intent is imperative.21
Lastly, the CA correctly modified the penalty imposed by the RTC for
the crime of estafa in Criminal Case No. 03-215332.
Article 315 of the RPC fixes the penalty for Estafa, viz.:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to
prision mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over
12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; and if such amount
exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be
imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional WE CONCUR:
10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not
exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the Associate Justice
other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision Chairperson
mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.lawphil.net
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA- MINITA V. CHICO-
As the amount involved is ₱75,000.00 which exceeds ₱22,000.00, the MARTINEZ NAZARIO
penalty should be imposed in its maximum period which is six (6) Associate Justice Associate Justice
years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days to eight (8) years
adding one year for every additional ₱10,000.00, provided the total DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
penalty does not exceed 20 years. Hence, since the amount of the fraud Associate Justice
exceeds ₱22,000.00 by ₱53,000.00, then a total of five (5) years
should be added to the above-stated maximum period. ATT E S TAT I O N

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution were reached in
indeterminate penalty shall be that which could be properly imposed consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
under the RPC as discussed above. On the other hand, the minimum of the Court’s Resolution.
term of the indeterminate sentence should be within the range of the
penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by the Code, which is CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods ranging from Associate Justice
six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months. Chairperson, Third Division

Accordingly, in Criminal Case No. 03-215332, the CA correctly C E R T I F I CAT I O N

imposed the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eleven (11) years,
eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor, as
maximum.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack
of merit. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 28, 2007
and its Resolution dated September 12, 2007, in CA-G.R. CR No.
29898, are AFFIRMED.
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the
Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Resolution were reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

G.R. Nos. 140067-71 August 29, 2002
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
NENITA MARIA OLIVIA GALLARDO (at large), and
REMEDIOS MALAPIT, accused,
REMEDIOS MALAPIT, accused-appellant.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Remedios Malapit and Nenita Maria Olivia Gallardo were charged
with one (1) count of illegal recruitment committed in large-scale,
three (3) counts of estafa, and one (1) count of simple illegal
recruitment before the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch
3.1 The Informations read as follows:
Criminal Case No. 15320-R (Illegal Recruitment Committed in Large
Scale)2
The undersigned (Public Prosecutor) accuses NENITA MARIA
OLIVIA GALLARDO and REMEDIOS MALAPIT of the crime of
ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT COMMITTED IN LARGE SCALE,
defined and penalized under Article 13(b) in relation to Article 38(b),
34, and 39 of P.D. No. 442, otherwise known as the New Labor Code
of the Philippines, as amended by P.D. No. 1693, 1920, 2018 and R.A.
No. 8042, committed as follows:
That during the period from January 1997 to June, 1997, in the City of
Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and
mutually aiding one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously for a fee, recruit and promise employment as contract
workers in Canada, to the herein complainants, namely: Rommel Suni,
Myrna Castro, Marilyn Mariano, Bryna Paul Wong, Mary Grace
Lanozo, Ana Liza Aquino, Marie Purificacion Abenoja, Florence
Bacoco and Lorna Domingo, without said accused having first secured
the necessary license or authority from the Department of Labor and
Employment.
Criminal Case No. 15323-R (Estafa)3
That in March 1997 in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding one another did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud one MARILYN
MARIANO by way of false pretenses, which are executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, as follows; to wit:
the accused knowing fully well that he/she they is/are not authorized
job recruiters for persons intending to secure work abroad convinced
said Marilyn Mariano and pretended that he/she/they could secure a
job for him/her abroad, for and in consideration of the sum of
P36,500.00, when in truth and in fact they could not; the said Marilyn
Mariano deceived and convinced by the false pretenses employed by
the accused parted away the total sum of P36,500.00, in favor of the
accused, to the damage and prejudice of the said Marilyn Mariano in
the aforementioned amount of THIRTY SIX THOUSAND FIVE
HUNDRED PESOS (P36,500.00), Philippine Currency.
Criminal Case No. 15327-R (Estafa)4
That on June 6, 1997 in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding one another, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud one MARIE
PURIFICACION ABENOJA by way of false pretenses, which are
executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud,
as follows, to wit: the accused knowing fully well that he/she they
is/are not authorized job recruiters for persons intending to secure
work abroad convinced said Marie Purificacion Abenoja and pretended
that he/she/they could secure a job for him/her abroad, for and in
consideration of the sum of P36,500.00, when in truth and in fact they
could not; the said Marie Purificacion Abenoja deceived and
convinced by the false pretenses employed by the accused parted away
the total sum of P36,500.00 in favor of the accused, to the damage and
prejudice of the said Marie Purificacion Abenoja in the
aforementioned amount of THIRTY SIX THOUSAND FIVE
HUNDRED PESOS (P36,500.00), Philippine currency.
Criminal Case No. 15570-R (Illegal Recruitment)5
The under signed (Public Prosecutor) accuses NENITA MARIA
OLIVIA-GALLARDO and REMEDIOS MALAPIT of the crime of
ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT, defined and penalized under Article
13(b) in relation to Article 38(b), 34, and 39 of Presidential Decree No.
442, otherwise known as the New Labor Code of the Philippines, as
amended by R.A. No. 8042, committed as follows:
That on or about the 6th day of June, 1997, in the City of Baguio,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding
one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
for a fee, recruit and promise employment as contract worker in
Canada, to the herein complainant ARACELI D. ABENOJA, without
said accused having first secured the necessary license or authority
from the Department of Labor and Employment.
Criminal Case No. 15571-R (Estafa)6
That on or about the 11th day of June, 1997 in the City of Baguio,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring, confederating & mutually aiding
one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
defraud one ARACELI D. ABENOJA by way of false pretenses, which
are executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the
fraud, as follows; to wit: the accused knowing fully well that
he/she/they is/are not authorized job recruiters for persons intending to
secure work abroad convinced said Araceli D. Abenoja and pretended
that he/she/they could secure a job for him/her abroad, for and in
consideration of the sum of P35,000.00, when in truth and in fact they
could not; the said Araceli D. Abenoja deceived and convinced by the
false pretenses employed by the accused parted away the total sum of
P35,000.00 in favor of the accused, to the damage and prejudice of the
said Araceli D. Abenoja in the aforementioned amount of THIRTY
FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P35,000.00), Philippine currency.
Only accused-appellant Remedios Malapit was brought to the
jurisdiction of the trial court. Her co-accused, Nenita Maria Olivia
Gallardo, remained at large.
Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded "not guilty" to all
charges. The five (5) cases were consolidated and tried jointly.
Marie Purificacion Abenoja and Marilyn Mariano met accused-
appellant at her beauty parlor in Lopez Building, Session Road,
Baguio City. Marie met accused-appellant sometime in January 1997
through her friend, Florence Bacoco. A month later, Marilyn was
introduced to accused-appellant by Grace Lanozo, a fellow nurse at the
PMA Hospital.
Marie claims that accused-appellant enticed her to apply for work as a
caregiver in Canada. Accused-appellant showed her a piece of paper
containing a job order saying that Canada was in need of ten (10)
caregivers and some messengers. Accused-appellant also promised her
that she will be receiving a salary of CN$2,700.00 (Canadian Dollars)
and will be able to leave for Canada in a month’s time. Heeding
accused-appellant’s guaranty, Marie eventually applied for the
overseas job opportunity.
On June 6, 1997, accused-appellant introduced Marie to co-accused
Nenita Maria Olivia-Gallardo in Tandang Sora, Quezon City. On the
same day, Marie submitted herself to a physical examination and
personally handed to Gallardo a partial payment of P18,000.00, for
which the latter issued a receipt.7 Marie made another payment in the
amount of P52,000.00, for which accused-appellant issued a
provisional receipt.8 This amount included the placement fee of her
sister, Araceli Abenoja, who became interested in the opportunity to
work abroad. Accused-appellant issued to Marie the receipt9 for
Araceli in the amount of P35,000.00, signed by Gallardo.
Three months lapsed without any news on Marie’s deployment to
Canada. Her sister, Araceli, had already left for work abroad through
the efforts of their other town-mate. The weekly follow-ups made by
Marie to accused-appellant pertaining to her application and that of
Araceli’s were to no avail. Accused-appellant just promised Marie that
she will return her money. Realizing that she had been hoodwinked,
Marie decided to file a complaint against the accused-appellant and
Gallardo with the National Bureau of Investigation. She no longer
verified the authority of both accused-appellant and Gallardo in
recruiting workers overseas because she was told by Gallardo that she
is a direct recruiter.10
Marilyn Mariano, on the other hand, was told by accused-appellant
that she was recruiting nurses from Baguio City and was looking for
one more applicant to complete the first batch to fly to Canada. After
giving her all the information about the job opportunity in Canada,
accused-appellant encouraged her to meet Gallardo. Not long after,
Grace Lanozo accompanied her to meet Gallardo at the latter’s house
in Quezon City.
Gallardo required her to undergo a medical check-up, to complete her
application papers within the soonest possible time and to prepare
money to defray the expenses for her deployment to Canada. Upon the
instruction of accused-appellant, Marilyn paid a total amount of
P36,000.00 to Gallardo, which was evidenced by a receipt. Of this
amount, the P1,500.0011 was for her medical check-up,
P20,000.0012 for processing of papers and P15,000.0013 for her visa.
Marilyn was further made to accomplish a form, prepared by both
accused-appellant and Gallardo, at the residence of accused-appellant
in Baguio City. Thereafter, she was informed that the processing of her
papers abroad shall commence within the next three months. She was
also made to attend a meeting conducted by both accused-appellant
and Gallardo at the former’s house in Baguio City, together with other
interested applicants.
After three months of waiting with no forthcoming employment
abroad, Marilyn and the other applicants proceeded to the Philippine
Overseas Employment Agency, Regional Administrative Unit, of the
Cordillera Administrative Region in Baguio City, where they learned
that accused-appellant and Gallardo were not authorized
recruiters.14Marilyn confronted accused-appellant about this,
whereupon the latter assured her that it was a direct hiring scheme.
Thereafter, Marilyn reported accused-appellant and Gallardo to the
NBI. 15
After trial on the merits, accused-appellant was found guilty of the
crimes of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale and Estafa on three (3)
counts. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Remedios Malapit GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt with the crimes of Illegal Recruitment in
Large Scale, and Estafa in three (3) counts, and she is hereby
sentenced as follows:
1. To suffer Life Imprisonment at the Correctional Institution
for Women, Mandaluyong City in Criminal Cases Nos. 15320-
R and 15770-R for Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale; to pay a
Fine to the Government in the amount of One Hundred
Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos; and to pay private
complainants, Marie Purificacion Abenoja, the amount of
Thirty Five Thousand (P35,000.00) Pesos; Araceli Abenoja
also the amount of Thirty Five Thousand (P35,000.00) Pesos;
and Marilyn Mariano, the amount of Thirty Six Thousand Five
Hundred (P36,500.00) Pesos, all amounts with legal interest.
2. To suffer Imprisonment at the same Institution from Six (6)
Years, Five (5) Months, and Eleven (11) Days as Minimum to
Seven (7) Years, Eight (8) Months, and Twenty (20) Days as
Maximum of Prision Mayor for each Estafa case in Criminal
Cases Nos. 15323-R, 15327-R, and 15571-R.
3. To pay costs of suit.16
Accused-appellant is now before us on the following assignment of
errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE
PROSECUTION SUCCEEDED IN PROVING THE GUILT OF
ACCUSED-APPELLANT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT FOR
THE CRIME OF ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE
PROSECUTION SUCCEEDED IN PROVING THE GUILT OF
ACCUSED-APPELLANT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT FOR
THREE COUNTS OF ESTAFA.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING CRIMINAL
CASES NOS. 15570-R AND 15571-R FOR ABSENCE OF
EVIDENCE RESULTING FROM THE FAILURE OF THE
COMPLAINING WITNESS TO APPEAR AND SUBSTANTIATE
HER COMPLAINT.
IV
GRANTING ARGUENDO THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT
COMMITTED ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT, THE TRIAL COURT
ERRED IN CONVICTING HER OF ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT IN
LARGE SCALE.
Accused-appellant maintains that she did not commit any of the
activities enumerated in the Labor Code on illegal recruitment in
connection with the applications of the private complainants. It was
Nenita Maria Olivia Gallardo who convinced and promised private
complainants employment overseas. It was also Gallardo who received
and misappropriated the money of private complainants. Accordingly,
she cannot be convicted of estafa.
We do not agree.
Illegal recruitment is committed when two (2) essential elements
concur:
(1) that the offender has no valid license or authority required
by law to enable him to lawfully engage in the recruitment and
placement of workers, and
(2) that the offender undertakes any activity within the meaning
of "recruitment and placement" defined under Article 13(b), or
any prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of the
Labor Code.17
Article 13(b) of the Labor Code defines recruitment and placement as:
Any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing,
hiring, or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services,
promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether
for profit or not: Provided, that any person or entity which, in any
manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more
persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.
In the case at bar, the first element is present. Nonette Legaspi-
Villanueva, the Overall Supervisor of the Regional Office of the POEA
in Baguio City, testified that per records, neither accused-appellant nor
Gallardo were licensed or authorized to recruit workers for overseas
employment in the City of Baguio or in any part of the Cordillera
Region.
The second essential element is likewise present. Accused-appellant
purported to have the ability to send Marie Purificacion Abenoja,
Araceli Abenoja and Marilyn Mariano for employment abroad through
the help of her co-accused Gallardo, although without any authority or
license to do so. Accused-appellant was the one who persuaded them
to apply for work as a caregiver in Canada by making representations
that there was a job market therefor.18 She was also the one who helped
them meet Gallardo in order to process their working papers and
personally assisted Marie, Araceli and Marilyn in the completion of
the alleged requirements.19 Accused-appellant even provided her house
in Baguio City as venue for a meeting with other applicants that she
and Gallardo conducted in connection with the purported overseas
employment in Canada.20 Accused-appellant, therefore, acted as an
indispensable participant and effective collaborator of co-accused
Gallardo, who at one time received placement fees21 on behalf of the
latter from both Marie and Araceli Abenoja. The totality of the
evidence shows that accused-appellant was engaged in the recruitment
and placement of workers for overseas employment under the above-
quoted Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code. Hence, she cannot now feign
ignorance on the consequences of her unlawful acts.
Accused-appellant’s claim that the other private complainants in
Criminal Case No. 15320-R, for illegal recruitment in large scale, have
executed their individual affidavits of desistance pointing to Gallardo
as the actual recruiter, deserves scant consideration. The several
Orders22 issued by the trial court show that the dismissal of the
complaints of the other private complainants were based on their
failure to substantiate and prosecute their individual complaints despite
due notice.*
The foregoing notwithstanding, the existence of the adverted affidavits
of desistance does not appear in the records of this case and, thus, may
not be given any probative weight by this Court. Any evidence that a
party desires to submit for the consideration of the court must be
formally offered by him, otherwise, it is excluded and
rejected.23Evidence not formally offered before the trial court cannot
be considered on appeal, for to consider them at such stage will deny
the other parties their right to rebut them.24 By opting not to present
them in court, such affidavits of desistance are generally hearsay and
have no probative value since the affiants thereof were not placed on
the witness stand to testify thereon.25 The reason for the rule
prohibiting the admission of evidence that has not been formally
offered is to afford the other party the chance to object to their
admissibility.26
All told, the evidence against accused-appellant has established
beyond a shadow of doubt that she actively collaborated with co-
accused Gallardo in illegally recruiting the complainants in this case.
As correctly pointed out by the trial court, the private complainants in
this case would not have been induced to apply for a job in Canada
were it not for accused-appellant’s information, recruitment, and
introduction of the private complainants to her co-accused Gallardo.
Likewise untenable are accused-appellant’s claims that she did not
represent herself as a licensed recruiter,27 and that she merely helped
complainants avail of the job opportunity. It is enough that she gave
the impression of having had the authority to recruit workers for
deployment abroad. In fact, even without consideration for accused-
appellant’s "services", she will still be deemed as having engaged in
recruitment activities, since it was sufficiently demonstrated that she
promised overseas employment to private complainants.28 Illegal
recruitment is committed when it is shown that the accused-appellant
gave the private complainants the distinct impression that she had the
power or ability to send complainants abroad for work such that the
latter were convinced to part with their money in order to be
employed.29 To be engaged in the practice and placement, it is plain
that there must at least be a promise or offer of an employment from
the person posing as a recruiter whether locally or abroad.30
Undoubtedly, the acts of accused-appellant showed unity of purpose
with those of co-accused Gallardo. All these acts establish a common
criminal design mutually deliberated upon and accomplished through
coordinated moves. There being conspiracy, accused-appellant shall be
equally liable for the acts of her co-accused even if she herself did not
personally reap the fruits of their execution.
While accused-appellant is guilty of illegal recruitment, we do not
agree with the trial court that the same qualifies as large scale.
Accused-appellant’s conviction of the illegal recruitment in large scale
was based on her recruitment of Marie Purificacion Abenoja and
Marilyn Mariano, private complainants in Criminal Case No. 15320-R,
and Araceli Abenoja, private complainant in Criminal Case No. 15570-
R. It was error for the trial court to consider the three private
complainants in the two criminal cases when it convicted accused-
appellant of illegal recruitment committed in large scale. The
conviction of illegal recruitment in large scale must be based on a
finding in each case of illegal recruitment of three or more persons,
whether individually or as a group. In People v. Reichl, et al.,31 we
reiterated the rule we laid down in People v. Reyes32 that:
x x x When the Labor Code speaks of illegal recruitment "committed
against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group," it must
be understood as referring to the number of complainants in each case
who are complainants therein, otherwise, prosecutions for single
crimes of illegal recruitment can be cumulated to make out a case of
large scale illegal recruitment. In other words, a conviction for large-
scale illegal recruitment must be based on a finding in each case of
illegal recruitment of three or more persons whether individually or as
a group. (Underscoring ours)
Accused-appellant likewise assails the decision of the trial court in
Criminal Cases Nos. 15570-R and 15571-R for simple illegal
recruitment and estafa, respectively, saying that these two criminal
cases should have been dismissed for lack of evidence. The only
evidence presented in these cases was the testimony of Marie
Purificacion Abenoja, Araceli Abenoja’s sister, on her alleged payment
of the placement fees for Araceli’s application. By Araceli’s failure to
testify, she failed to prove the facts and circumstances surrounding her
alleged recruitment and the person accountable therefor.
We are not persuaded. In People v. Gallarde,33 we held:
Direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only matrix
wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt.
The prosecution is not always tasked to present direct evidence to
sustain a judgment of conviction; the absence of direct evidence does
not necessarily absolve an accused from any criminal liability. Even in
the absence of direct evidence, conviction can be had on the basis of
circumstantial evidence, provided that the established circumstances
constitute an unbroken chain which leads one to one fair and
reasonable conclusion which points to the accused, to the exclusion of
all others, as the guilty person, i.e., the circumstances proved must be
consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the
accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with any other
hypothesis except that of guilty.
The rules on evidence and precedents sustain the conviction of an
accused through circumstantial evidence, as long as the following
requisites are present: (1) there must be more than one circumstance;
(2) the inference must be based on proven facts; and (3) the
combination of all circumstances produces a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused.
The circumstantial evidence in the case at bar, when scrutinized and
taken together, leads to no other conclusion than that accused-
appellant and co-accused Gallardo conspired in recruiting and
promising a job overseas to Araceli Abenoja. Moreover, Marie
Purificacion Abenoja had personal knowledge of the facts and
circumstances surrounding the charges filed by her sister, Araceli, for
simple illegal recruitment and estafa. Marie was privy to the
recruitment of Araceli as she was with her when both accused-
appellant and Gallardo required Araceli to undergo physical
examination to find out whether the latter was fit for the job
abroad.34 Accused-appellant even admitted that she was the one who
introduced Marie and Araceli to Gallardo when they went to the
latter’s house.35 Marie was the one who shouldered the placement fee
of her sister Araceli.36
Furthermore, the private complainants in this case did not harbor any
ill motive to testify falsely against accused-appellant and Gallardo.
Accused-appellant failed to show any animosity or ill-feeling on the
part of the prosecution witnesses which could have motivated them to
falsely accuse her and Gallardo. It would be against human nature and
experience for strangers to conspire and accuse another stranger of a
most serious crime just to mollify their hurt feelings.37 As such, the
testimony of private complainants that accused-appellant was the
person who transacted with them, promised them jobs and received
money therefor, was correctly given credence and regarded as
trustworthy by the trial court.
In sum, accused-appellant is only guilty of two (2) counts of illegal
recruitment. Under Section 7 of Republic Act No. 804238 otherwise
known as the "Migrant Workers Act of 1995," any person found guilty
of illegal recruitment shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not
less than six (6) years and one (1) day but not more than twelve (12)
years and a fine of not less than two hundred thousand pesos
(P200,000.00) nor more than five hundred thousand pesos
(P500,000.00).
The provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law are applicable, as
held in People v. Simon:39
It is true that Section 1 of said law, after providing for indeterminate
sentence for an offense under the Revised Penal Code, states that "if
the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the
accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which
shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum
shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same." We
hold that this quoted portion of the section indubitably refers to an
offense under a special law wherein the penalty imposed was not taken
from and is without reference to the Revised Penal Code, as discussed
in the preceding illustrations, such that it may be said that the "offense
is punished" under that law.
Guided by the foregoing principle, accused-appellant shall be made to
suffer a prison term of six (6) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to
twelve (12) years, as maximum, and to pay a fine of P200,000.00, for
each count of illegal recruitment.
The Court likewise affirms the conviction of accused-appellant for
estafa on three (3) counts. It is settled that a person may be charged
and convicted separately of illegal recruitment under the Labor Code
and estafa under the Revised Penal Code, Article 315, paragraph 2(a).
As we held in People v. Yabut:40
In this jurisdiction, it is settled that a person who commits illegal
recruitment may be charged and convicted separately of illegal
recruitment under the Labor Code and estafa under par. 2 (a) of Art.
315 of the Revised Penal Code. The offense of illegal recruitment
is malum prohibitum where the criminal intent of the accused is not
necessary for conviction, while estafa is malum in se where the
criminal intent of the accused is crucial for conviction. Conviction for
offenses under the Labor Code does not bar conviction for offenses
punishable by other laws. Conversely, conviction for estafa under par.
2 (a) of Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code does not bar a conviction
for illegal recruitment under the Labor Code. It follows that one’s
acquittal of the crime of estafa will not necessarily result in his
acquittal of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale, and vice
versa.1âwphi1
The prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt that accused-
appellant was guilty of estafa under the Revised Penal Code, Article
315 paragraph (2) (a), which provides that estafa is committed:
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts
executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name or falsely pretending to possess power,
influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or
imaginary transactions, or by means of other similar deceits.
The evidence is clear that in falsely pretending to possess the power to
deploy persons for overseas placement, accused-appellant deceived
Marie, Araceli and Marilyn into believing that the recruitment would
give them greener opportunities as caregivers in Canada. Accused-
appellant’s assurance constrained the private complainants to part with
their hard-earned money in exchange for a slot in the overseas job in
Canada. The elements of deceit and damage for this form of estafa are
indisputably present. Hence, the conviction of accused-appellant for
three (3) counts of estafa in Criminal Cases Nos. 15323-R, 15327-R
and 15571-R should be upheld.
Under the Revised Penal Code, an accused found guilty of estafa shall
be sentenced to:
x x x The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period
to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is
over 12,000 but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount
exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be
imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional
10,000 pesos; x x x.
In applying the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, we had
occasion to reiterate our ruling in People v. Ordono41 in the very recent
case of People v. Angeles,42 to wit:
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the
penalty shall be "that which, in view of the attending circumstances,
could be properly imposed" under the Revised Penal Code, and the
minimum shall be "within the range of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed for the offense." The penalty next lower should be based on
the penalty prescribed by the Code for the offense, without first
considering any modifying circumstances attendant to the commission
of the crime. The determination of the minimum penalty is left by law
to the sound discretion of the court and it can be anywhere within the
range of the penalty next lower without any reference to the periods
into which it might be subdivided. The modifying circumstances are
considered only in the imposition of the maximum term of the
indeterminate sentence.
Similarly, in People v. Saulo,43 we further elucidated on how to apply
the Indeterminate Sentence Law for the charge of estafa:
Since the penalty prescribed by law for the estafa charge against
accused-appellant is prision correccionalmaximum to prision
mayor minimum, the penalty next lower in degree is prision
correccional minimum to medium. Thus, the minimum term of the
indeterminate sentence should be anywhere within six (6) months and
one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months.
In fixing the maximum term, the prescribed penalty of prision
correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum should be divided
into three equal portions of time, each of which portion shall be
deemed to form one period, as follows —
Minimum Period: From 4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 5 years, 5
months and 10 days
Medium Period: From 5 years, 5 months and 11 days to 6 years, 8
months and 20 days
Maximum Period: From 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years
pursuant to Article 65, in relation to Article 64, of the Revised Penal
Code.
When the amounts involved in the offense exceeds P22,000, the
penalty prescribed in Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code shall be
imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional
P10,000.00, although the total penalty which may be imposed shall not
exceed twenty (20) years.
In Criminal Case No. 15323-R, Marilyn Mariano testified that upon
instruction of accused-appellant she gave accused Gallardo a total of
P36,500.00.
In Criminal Case Nos. 15327-R and 15571-R, Marie Purificacion
Abenoja testified that she gave the amounts of P18,000.00 and
P52,000.00 to accused Gallardo and accused-appellant. Out of the
amount of P52,000.00, P35,000.00 was intended to answer for the
placement fee of her sister Araceli Abenoja, the private complainant in
Criminal Case No. 15571-R. The remaining P17,000.00 formed part of
the balance of Marie’s placement fee. Accordingly, accused-appellant
shall be criminally liable for the amount of P35,000.00 in Criminal
Cases No. 15327-R and P35,000.00 in Criminal Case No. 15571-R.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appealed Decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 3 is AFFIRMED with
the following MODIFICATIONS:
(1) In Criminal Case No. 15320-R, accused-appellant
Remedios Malapit is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Simple Illegal Recruitment only, and is
sentenced to suffer a prison term of six (6) years and one (1)
day, as minimum, to twelve (12) years, as maximum, and to
pay a fine of P200,000.00.
(2) In Criminal Case No. 15323-R, accused-appellant
Remedios Malapit is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Estafa and sentenced to suffer a prison term of
four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as
minimum, to nine (9) years and four (4) months of prision
mayor, as maximum, and is ORDERED to indemnify Marilyn
Mariano the amount of P36,500.00.
 (3) In Criminal Case No. 15327-R, accused-appellant
Remedios Malapit is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Estafa and sentenced to suffer a prison term of
four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as
minimum, to nine (9) years and four (4) months of prision
mayor, as maximum, and is ORDERED to indemnify Marie
Purificacion Abenoja the amount of P35,000.00.

(4) In Criminal Case No. 15570-R, accused-appellant

Remedios Malapit is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Simple Illegal Recruitment and is sentenced to
suffer a prison term of six (6) years and one (1) day, as
minimum, to twelve (12) years, as maximum, and to pay a fine
of P200,000.00.

(5) In Criminal Case No. 15571-R, accused-appellant

Remedios Malapit is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Estafa and sentenced to suffer a prison term of
four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as
minimum, to nine (9) years and four (4) months of prision
mayor, as maximum, and is ORDERED to indemnify Araceli
Abenoja the amount of P35,000.00

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug, and Austria-Martinez, JJ., concur.

G.R. Nos. 116905-908 August 6, 2002

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
EDUARDO BALLESTEROS, accused-appellant.
 DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is an appeal from the Decision1 dated July 6, 1994 of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 49, in Criminal Cases Nos. 93-121321,
93-121322, 93-121323 and 93-121324, convicting appellant Eduardo
Ballesteros ("Appellant" for brevity) of the crimes of illegal
recruitment in large-scale and estafa. The trial court sentenced
appellant to life imprisonment plus three indeterminate penalties
ranging from two years, eleven months and ten days of prision
correccional as minimum to nine years, eight months and one day
of prision mayor as maximum.
The Charge
On May 26, 1993, the Assistant City Prosecutor of Manila filed an
Information2 charging appellant with the crime of illegal recruitment in
large-scale,3 docketed as Criminal Case No. 93-121321, as follows:
"That on or about May 23, 1992, November 27, 1992 and January 3,
1993, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused representing
himself to have the capacity to contract, enlist and transport Filipino
workers for employment abroad, did then and there wilfully and
unlawfully for a fee, recruit and promise employment job placement in
Japan to the following persons: Arnel Viloria y Viloria, Santiago
Ricamonte y Leocario and Nenita Sorita y Ramos, without first having
secured the required license or authority from the Department of
Labor.
Contrary to law."
The Assistant City Prosecutor also charged appellant, based on the
same incident, of three counts of estafacommitted on each of the
private complainants under Criminal Cases Nos. 93-121322,4 93-
1213235 and 93-121324.6 The Informations were identical, except for
the name of the private complainants, as follows:
"That on or about May 23, 1992, the accused, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud ARNEL VILORIA Y
VILORIA in the following manner, to wit: the said accused, by means
of false manifestations and fraudulent representation which
he/they/she made to said ARNEL VILORIA Y VILORIA to the effect
that he had the power and capacity to recruit and employ ARNEL
VILORIA Y VILORIA and could facilitate the processing of the
pertinent papers if given the necessary amount to meet the
requirements thereof, and by means of other similar deceits, induced
and succeeded in inducing said ARNEL VILORIA Y VILORIA to give
and deliver, as in fact he gave and delivered to said accused the
amount of P50,000.00 on the strength of said manifestations and
representations, said accused well knowing that the same were false
and fraudulent and were made solely, to obtain, as in fact he did obtain
the amount of P50,000.00 which amount once in his possession, with
intent to defraud, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
misappropriated, misapplied and converted to his own personal use
and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of said ARNEL VILORIA Y
VILORIA in the aforesaid amount of P50,000.00, Philippine Currency.
Contrary to law."
Arraignment and Plea
Upon arraignment on June 18, 1983 for each of the charges, appellant,
assisted by counsel de parte, entered a plea of "Not Guilty" to all the
charges. Trial then followed.
The Trial
The prosecution presented as its witnesses the three private
complainants, Arnel Viloria ("Viloria" for brevity), Santiago
Ricamonte ("Ricamonte" for brevity), and Nenita Sorita ("Sorita" for
brevity), as well as SPO4 Benjamin Lotivio. The defense presented
appellant as its lone witness.
Version of the Prosecution
The facts7 of the case are as follows:
Santiago Ricamonte, Arnel Viloria and Nenita Sorita all dreamt of
seeking "greener pastures" in foreign shores. It was most unfortunate
for them to have fallen into the deceptive acts and machinations of the
appellant who lured them into a false sense of security with promises
of foreign employment in Japan.
Santiago Ricamonte was a driver at the Monte Merchandizing when he
thought of applying as a construction worker in Japan. Ricky de la
Torre (hereinafter "dela Torre"), who was a cousin of Ricamonte’s
friend, introduced him to Engineer Jose Mendoza, a recruiter of
workers to Japan. On November, 1992, dela Torre and Mendoza
brought Ricamonte to an office in the Army and Navy Club, located at
T. M. Kalaw St., Manila, and introduced him to appellant, Cecilia
Legarbes Zabala (hereinafter "Zabala") and Alfredo Hunsayan, Jr.
(hereinafter "Hunsayan"). When inside the office, Ricamonte saw, on
one of the tables, a name plate bearing the name of ‘Judge Cornejo’.
He found out that the office belonged to a former fiscal named
Crisanto Cornejo, who was on vacation at that time, and who allowed
the appellant to hold office there while he was away.
Once introduced, Ricamonte was informed of each of the person’s
duties in that office. He found out that Zabala was in charge of
arranging papers of recruits to Japan while Hunsayan was the one who
had contacts in Japan and that both of them were associated in the
business of recruiting workers for employment in Japan. The appellant
told Ricamonte that there was a job offer in Japan and that Zabala
knew everything about the recruitment. The appellant also impressed
upon Ricamonte that the recruitment of persons for employment in
Japan was a transaction of people with money so that if he did not
have any money, he might as well forget setting foot in Japan. The
appellant added that Ricamonte needed to prepare P80,000.00 for the
processing of his employment papers and his plane ticket.
On November 23, 1992, in the office of the appellant, Ricamonte gave
P20,000.00, as the first installment of his payment, to de la Torre who
counted the money and thereafter gave it to Zabala who then issued a
receipt for the amount (Exhibits ‘A’ and ‘3’). The appellant and
Mendoza were present and witnessed the transaction. Ricamonte
thereafter signed an application for employment which would be
allegedly sent by Zabala to his prospective employer in Japan.
On another occasion, Ricamonte again went to the office of the
appellant to give an additional P50,000.00. The same process was
followed. The money was given to Zabala who issued a receipt for the
amount while the appellant, Mendoza, dela Torre, and Hunsayan were
present as witnesses. Zabala then told him that his visa would be
released soon and asked him to return on a specified date.
When Ricamonte returned to the office of the appellant on the
specified date, Zabala was nowhere to be found. He asked the
appellant, who was in the office at that time, where Zabala was, but the
appellant told him that he had nothing to do with Zabala and that it
was up to him to look for her. When Ricamonte returned to the office
of the appellant sometime in December 1992, he found the office
already padlocked.
Nenita Sorita was 56 years old and had already worked in Bahrain for
some time, when she, too, was promised an employment in Japan.
On April, 1992, Sorita’s nephew and niece borrowed money from her
and asked her to pay the money to a certain recruitment agency where
she met Engineer Mendoza. Mendoza offered Sorita a job in Japan but
she initially refused since she was not yet interested at that time.
However, it was not long after that first conversation when she gave in
to the offer of employment in a garment factory in Japan. Mendoza
showed her a letter of invitation from his contact in Japan for persons
to work there and assured her that this contact person would be
responsible for everything.
Convinced, Sorita paid P10,000.00 to Mendoza for the processing of
her papers and her visa for which Mendoza signed a receipt (Exhibits
‘G’ and ‘6’). He was able to get a passport for Sorita as a tourist but
still, after a long wait, failed to send her to Japan. Mendoza told Sorita
that he had a misunderstanding with his Japanese contact so he could
not procure employment for her in Japan but, nevertheless, assured her
that he had friends who could secure employment for her in Japan.
So, on November 20, 1992, Mendoza brought Sorita to the house of
the appellant in Singalong, Manila where she met Cecilia Legarbes
Zabala. The appellant and Zabala told Sorita that she would have to
pay P60,000.00 for the processing of her employment papers, visa and
her plane tickets to and from Japan. However, the P10,000.00 which
she had earlier paid Mendoza would be deducted from the amount.
After laying down the terms and conditions of their agreement, Sorita
was asked to deliver the money to the office of the appellant at the
Army and Navy Club.
On January 3, 1993, Sorita went to the office of the appellant with
only P21,500.00. This notwithstanding, the appellant and Mendoza
instructed her to give the money to Zabala. Once inside the office,
Sorita saw the name plate of "Judge Cornejo" on one table and that of
the appellant, "Captain" on another table. After giving them the
P21,000.00, Sorita told the three that she could not produce the rest of
the money because the person who was supposed to buy her personal
properties, the proceeds of which she would use to pay the balance of
her recruitment fee, failed to do so. Nevertheless, the three told Sorita
to bring her personal properties to the office so that they could buy
them from her for P30,000.00.
On the same day, Sorita brought her personal properties to the office of
the appellant consisting of: 1 Ladies’ ring with Tampok; 1 wedding
band; a 24 karat necklace; 1 14" colored TV (Goldmaster brand); and 1
Sony Walkman (Exhibits ‘5’ and ‘H’). The appellant, Zabala and
Mendoza were still there when Sorita arrived. Zabala then gave Sorita
a signed receipt for the cash amount of P21,000.00 and her personal
properties (Exhibits ‘H’ and ‘5’). However, Zabala instructed Sorita to
bring her Sony Walkman and television to the house of the appellant
where he himself received the items. Sorita, however, never got any
receipt for the items since Zabala assured her that there was no more
problem. Zabala then told her that she would procure a tourist visa for
her and enable her to work as a ‘TNT’ (tago ng tago) in Japan and
guaranteed her that she, together with the others, would endeavor to
bring her to Japan.
However, the day of Sorita’s departure never came. Like Ricamonte,
when she returned to the office of the appellant, the office was already
padlocked.
Arnel Viloria was a 5th year Engineering student at the Technological
Institute of the Philippines when he fell into the same "employment
trap."
Viloria’s mother and Nenita Sorita were close friends. On one occasion
when Viloria went to the house of Sorita, he met Engineer Jose
Mendoza. About a month thereafter, because of Mendoza’s incessant
efforts, Viloria was convinced to apply for a construction job in Japan.
It was also upon the prodding of Mendoza that Viloria no longer
enrolled for the incoming semester in school.
On November 23, 1992, Viloria, together with his parents and Sorita,
went to the office of the appellant at the Army and Navy Club to apply
as a construction worker in Japan. Once there, Mendoza introduced
Viloria to the appellant and Zabala and informed him that these people
were his associates and that Zabala was the one responsible for the
processing and approval of his employment application. The appellant
informed Viloria that he had to pay P80,000.00 for his employment
papers and plane ticket. Viloria paid the total amount of P50,000.00 in
three installments for which he was given receipts by Zabala (Exhibits
M-3, L, M, J) and was also given the same assurance that he would
soon be leaving for Japan.
However, as the same story goes, when Viloria returned to the office of
the appellant to claim his visa and employment papers, the office was
already closed. Viloria then inquired from the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration if the appellant, Zabala and Mendoza
were licensed to procure workers for employment in Japan and was
informed that they were not. Upon learning this, Viloria tried to
contact the appellant but, naturally, the latter refused to see him. When
Viloria finally managed to talk to the appellant over the telephone, the
appellant got mad at him and told him that he had nothing to do with
his problem.
Finally, Santiago Ricamonte, Arnel Viloria and Nenita Sorita, after
conferring with each other and realizing that they were defrauded,
executed a "Joint Affidavit of Complaint" against the appellant with
the Western Police District (Exhibit ‘D’) on May 11, 1993.
On the same date, members of the Western Police District arrested the
appellant. After the Inquest Investigation, the Investigator
recommended that the appellant be charged of estafa and illegal
recruitment (large-scale) (Exhibit ‘0-2’). Two days after the appellant
was arrested, Cecilia Zabala was also arrested upon information
received by the police that she was staying at the Arevalo Building in
Manila. The police found the passports of Arnel Viloria and Santiago
Ricamonte and the receipts signed by the appellant (Exhibits ‘E’ and
‘E-2’) in her possession and turned them over to Viloria and
Ricamonte. An Inquest Investigation was conducted on May 14, 1993.
However, a month thereafter, Zabala managed to escape from the
Western Police and is, up to now, still at large.
Version of the Defense
The facts,8 according to the defense, are as follows:
Appellant categorically denies having recruited or having been
involved in the recruitment of the offended parties to Japan. He,
however, admits that he and Mendoza were once close friends, having
worked together in a vessel, appellant as the Captain, and Mendoza, as
his Engineer. However, appellant claims that the relations between
them became strained when Mendoza refused to repay appellant for
his expenses in the baptism of Mendoza’s son.
Appellant narrates that he was the Chairman of the Board of Directors
of PSBN Marine Salvage, Inc., a company he established, with offices
at No. 2336 Espiritu St., Singalong, Manila, which was also his
residence at that time. Appellant claims that his relations with
Mendoza became further strained when he found out that the latter
tampered with his company’s Articles of Incorporation by erasing the
name of one of the Directors and replacing it with his own (Exhibits
19 and 19-B).
Appellant also states that he transferred his office to the Army and
Navy Club upon the permission of a former Assistant City Fiscal
Crisanto Cornejo, who originally rented the office, and who was on
vacation at that time. Appellant claims that he arranged to pay for the
rentals of the office, in exchange for its use since Cornejo was three
months in arrears in its payment.
Appellant narrates that sometime in November 1992, Mendoza,
Zabala, and Almonte arrived in his office and sought to rent one table
for a monthly rental of P2,000.00. He claims that Mendoza and Zabala
were brokers besides being engaged in the recruitment of workers for
employment abroad. However, appellant claims that he never meddled
in their business and tended to his own. Appellant also asserts that
Cornejo knew of this arrangement and insisted that money transactions
should not be done inside the office. Accordingly, whenever Mendoza,
Zabala and Almonte had business conferences with their clients, they
went to the canteen inside the club, about 25 meters away from the
office.
It was also in November 1992, on different occasions, that Sorita,
Viloria and Ricamonte, who were applicants for employment abroad,
were brought to the office by Mendoza and the other recruiters. In the
process, appellant admitted that "he advised the three that if they had
no money or somebody to finance their employment abroad they might
as well forget any plans of working abroad."
Appellant says that Mendoza and the others paid the rent for the use of
the table promptly for the first three months or until January 1993
(Exhibit Q-4). Appellant signed two receipts acknowledging the
payment of the rent. At one point, one of the applicants, Sorita,
delivered to his house a television set and a Sony walkman. Appellant
was surprised by this act, but claims, that on the same day, Zabala took
the said items. Sorita told him that Zabala had already signed the
receipt for the said goods.
Sometime in January or February of 1993, the office of the appellant
was padlocked for non-payment of rent for 6 months. Subsequently,
appellant entered into a contract for shipping services with a new
company.
On May 3, 1993, appellant claims that police operatives of the Western
Police District sought his help in locating Mendoza, Zabala, and
Alfredo Hunsayan, Jr., for defrauding Sorita, Viloria and Ricamonte.
Appellant agreed to help and informed them where Zabala could be
found. After two days, Zabala was arrested by the police but managed
to escape after a month. Appellant, however, claims that, in spite of the
help he gave to the police, he was still placed under arrest and charged
for the crime of illegal recruitment (large-scale) and estafa.
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court accorded full faith and credence to the testimony of the
private complainants. The trial court was "convinced, beyond a
shadow of doubt, that they testified in a spontaneous, straight-forward
and sincere manner, bereft of the affectations and tell-tale signs of
perjured and/or rehearsed witnesses."9 The trial court held that
appellant was in cahoots with Cecilia Legarbes Zabala, Jose Mendoza,
Perla Almonte, Ricky de la Torre and Alfredo Hunsayan, Jr. in
recruiting private complainants for employment in Japan. The trial
court found that appellant received various sums of money and
personal properties from the private complainants as placement fees,
expenses for processing of employment papers, issuance of visas to
Japan and for purchase of plane tickets.
After trial on the merits, the trial court convicted appellant of illegal
recruitment in large-scale and three counts of estafa, stating that:10
"In view of the foregoing disquisitions of the Court, judgment is
hereby rendered against the Accused as follows:
1. In ‘People versus Eduardo Ballesteros, Criminal Case No.
93-121321’, the Accused is hereby found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal recruitment defined in
Article 13 (b) in relation to Article 38 of the Labor Code as
amended and hereby meted the penalty of life imprisonment
and to pay a fine of P100,000.00 without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency;
2. In ‘People versus Eduardo Ballesteros, Criminal Case No.
93-121322’, the Accused is found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Estafa defined in Article 315, paragraph 2
(a) of the Revised Penal Code and hereby meted an
indeterminate penalty of from Two (2) Years, Eleven (11)
Months and Ten (10) Days of Prision Correccional as
Minimum, to Eight (8) Years, Eight (8) Months and One (1)
Day of Prision Mayor as Maximum, and ordered to refund to
Arnel Viloria the amount of P50,000.00, with interests thereon,
at the legal rate from November 23, 1992 until the said amount
is paid in full;
3. In ‘People versus Eduardo Ballesteros, Criminal Case
Number 93-121323’, the Accused is hereby found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa defined in
Article 315 (2) (a) of the Revised Penal Code and hereby
meted an indeterminate penalty of from Two (2) Years, Eleven
(11) Months and Ten (10) Days of Prision Correccional as
Minimum, to Eight (8) Years, Eight (8) Months and One (1)
Day of Prision Mayor as Maximum and ordered to refund to
Santiago Ricamonte the amount of P50,000.00 plus interests
thereon at the legal rate from November 27, 1992, until the said
amount is paid in full;
4. In ‘People versus Eduardo Ballesteros, Criminal Case
Number 93-121324’, the Court found the Accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa defined in
Article 315 (2) (a) of the Revised Penal Code and hereby
sentences the Accused to an indeterminate penalty of from Two
(2) Years, Eleven Months and Ten (10) Days of Prision
Correccional, as Minimum, to Nine (9) Years, Eight (8) Months
and One (1) Day of Prision Mayor, as Maximum, and to refund
to Nenita Sorita the amount of P31,000.00 and to return to her
the following described properties:
1 Ladies ring with tampok
1 Wedding band
 1 Necklace – 24 karat
1 TV colored 14" Goldmaster brand
1 Sony Walkman
and if he is unable to do so, or refuses to do so, to pay to her the value
thereof in the amount of P30,000.00, said amounts with interests
thereon at the legal rate from January 3, 1993, up to the time the said
amounts are paid in full.
The Accused shall be entitled to the full credit of his detention at the
City Jail of Manila provided that he agreed to abide by and comply
strictly with the rules and regulations of the said Jail. With costs
against the Accused.
SO ORDERED."
In view of the penalty of life imprisonment, the appellant filed his
appeal directly with this Court.
Issues
The appeal is anchored on the following assigned errors:
"I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE
ACCUSED CONSPIRED WITH CECILIA LEGARBES ZABALA,
ENGINEER JOSE MENDOZA, PERLA ALMONTE, RICKY DE LA
TORRE AND ALFREDO HUNSAYAN, JR., THE ALLEGED
RECRUITERS, IN COMMITTING THE CRIME OF ILLEGAL
RECRUITMENT ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATIONS.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE IS NO
EVIDENCE ON RECORD ADDUCED BY THE ACCUSED THAT
PRIVATE COMPLAINANTS ARNEL VILORIA, SANTIAGO
RICAMONTE AND NENITA SORITA, HAD ANY DEVIOUS OR
ILL-MOTIVE TO FABRICATE THE CHARGES AGAINST THE
ACCUSED.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING FULL FAITH AND
CREDIT TO THE TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE OF THE
PROSECUTION NOTWITHSTANDING THE INCREDIBLE AND
UNBELIEVABLE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION
WITNESSES.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE
COMPLAINTS BY THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANTS BROUGHT
AGAINST THE ACCUSED WERE MERELY AN
AFTERTHOUGHT, AND THAT THE COMPLAINANTS’
TESTIMONY IN SUPPORT OF THE SAME WERE
UNCONVINCING AND IMPLAUSIBLE AND FALL SHORT OF
THE REQUIRED PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
V
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING WEIGHT TO
ACCUSED’S CLAIM THAT THE FACT THAT THE GROUP OF
CECILIA LEGARBES ZABALA HAD SUBLEASED A PORTION
OF THE OFFICE AT THE ARMY AND NAVY CLUB FROM THE
ACCUSED AS CARETAKER OF THE OFFICE DOES NOT MEAN
THAT ACCUSED HAD KNOWLEDGE OR PARTICIPATION IN
THEIR BUSINESS ACTIVITIES AS THEIR TRANSACTIONS
WERE NOT DONE IN THE OFFICE BUT IN THE CANTEEN OF
THE CLUB.
VI
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PLACING HEAVY RELIANCE
ON THE RECEIPTS, EXHIBITS ‘E’ AND ‘E-2’, SHOWING THAT
ACCUSED RECEIVED COMMISSIONS FROM CECILIA
LEGARBES ZABALA AND OTHERS, AND IN NOT HOLDING
THAT THE SAID RECEIPTS WERE NOT FOR COMMISSIONS AS
INDICATED IN THE RECEIPTS BUT WERE ACTUALLY
RECEIPTS OF PAYMENT OF RENTALS OF THE SAID PERSONS
OF A PORTION OF THE OFFICE FOR ABOUT THREE (3)
MONTHS.
VII
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING, WITHOUT VALID,
SUFFICIENT, CONVINCING AND SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE,
THAT THE AFOREMENTIONED RECEIPTS, EXHIBITS ‘E’ AND
‘E-2’, CONFIRMED THE PROSECUTION’S CLAIM THAT THE
ACCUSED WAS DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN THE ILLEGAL
RECRUITMENT ACTIVITIES OF THE SAID CECILIA
LEGARBES ZABALA AND OTHERS CONSIDERING THAT
ACCUSED HAD NEVER ENGAGED AND HAD NOT ACTUALLY
ENGAGED IN ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT ACTIVITIES.
VIII
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT ACCUSED
WAS NOT GUILTY OF ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT (LARGE-
SCALE) CONSIDERING ITS ADMISSION THAT THE
PROSECUTION HAS NOT ADDUCED ANY EVIDENCE TO
PROVE THAT THE ACCUSED RECEIVED FROM CECILIA
LEGARBES ZABALA ANY CASH AMOUNT FROM THE
PAYMENTS OF PLACEMENT FEES BY PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT NENITA SORITA. MOREOVER, FURTHER
PROOF THAT ACCUSED HAD NEVER ENGAGED AND HAS
NOT ACTUALLY ENGAGED IN ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT IS
PLAIN AND EVIDENT FROM THE UNIFORM TESTIMONIES OF
THE COMPLAINANTS THAT ACCUSED HAD NEVER
RECEIVED MONEY AS ALLEGED PLACEMENT FEES
PERSONALLY FROM THE SAID COMPLAINING WITNESSES.
IX
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE
ACCUSED IS NOT GUILTY OF ESTAFA.
X
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED
OF THE CRIMES OF ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT (LARGE-SCALE)
AND THREE (3) COUNTS OF ESTAFA AND IN NOT
ACQUITTING HIM OF THE CRIMES CHARGED, THE SAME
NOT HAVING BEEN PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT."11
The thrust of the appeal is twofold. First, the trial court erred in finding
appellant responsible for the illegal recruitment of the complaining
witnesses and in finding that there was conspiracy between appellant
and his alleged cohorts. Second, the trial court erred in convicting
appellant of estafa despite the failure of the prosecution to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The Court’s Ruling
We find no reason to reverse appellant’s conviction. Hence, we affirm
but with modification.
Illegal Recruitment In Large-Scale
Article 13, par. (b), of the Labor Code defines recruitment and
placement as:
"(b) ‘Recruitment and placement’ refer to any act of canvassing,
enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring
workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or
advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or
not; Provided, that any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or
promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be
deemed engaged in recruitment and placement."
Illegal recruitment is specifically defined in Article 38 of the same
Code thus:
"Article 38. Illegal Recruitment:
(a) Any recruitment activities, including the prohibited
practices enumerated under Article 34 of this Code, to be
undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority shall
be deemed illegal and punishable under Article 39 of this Code.
x x x.
(b) Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in
large-scale shall be considered an offense involving economic
sabotage and shall be penalized in accordance with Article 39
hereof.
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out
by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring and/or
confederating with one another in carrying out any unlawful or illegal
transaction, enterprise or scheme defined under the first paragraph
hereof. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed in large-scale if
committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a
group."
We have held that to constitute illegal recruitment in large-scale, three
elements must concur:
1. The accused undertook any recruitment activity defined
under Art. 13 (b) or any prohibited practice enumerated under
Art. 34 of the Labor Code.
2. He did not have the license or the authority to lawfully
engage in the recruitment and placement of workers.
3. He committed the same against three or more persons,
individually or as a group.12
The prosecution sufficiently established the foregoing elements in the
instant case. First, as found by the trial court:
"The Accused represented to and assured Santiago Ricamonte that,
indeed, there was a job offer for a construction worker in Japan and
even told the latter to prepare and pay the amount of P80,000.00,
payable in installments for the processing of his papers for his
employment in Japan and his plane ticket to Japan. The Accused even
impressed on Santiago Ricamonte that the matter of employment of
workers in Japan was a transaction only of people with money and
unless the applicant has the amount demanded of him, he could not
possibly procure employment in Japan. Santiago Ricamonte gave and
paid to Cecilia Legarbes Zabala the amount of P20,000.00 on
November 23, 1992, and the amount of P30,000.00 on December 3,
1992, in the presence of the Accused in the latter’s office at the Army
and Navy Club where Cecilia Legarbes Zabala signed the Receipts
(Exhibits "A" and "B"). Santiago Ricamonte relied on the assurances
and representations of the Accused and his cohorts and was impressed
by the office of the Accused. After all, on one of the tables was the
name plate of ‘Judge Cornejo’. The Court cannot then begrudge
Santiago Ricamonte into trusting the Accused and his cohorts and in
believing that they would not deceive and defraud him."13
Second, there is no need to show that appellant represented himself as
a licensed recruiter since it is enough to show that he did not possess
the requisite authority or license to undertake recruitment
activities.14 The prosecution established that the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA) did not authorize or license
appellant and his cohorts to engage in recruitment Activities.15 Despite
the absence of such authority or license, appellant recruited the
complainants.
The appellant need not have expressly represented that he had
authority or license from POEA. It is sufficient that appellant gave the
impression that he could find jobs for complainants in Japan, inducing
complainants to agree to pay him recruitment fees.16 On several
occasions, this Court has held that there is illegal recruitment when
one, without authority or license to do so, represents to others that he
could send workers abroad for employment.17
Assuming arguendo that appellant did not actually receive any fee, his
representations that he had the capacity to secure employment for
private complainants made him liable for illegal recruitment since he
had no authority or license from the POEA.18 In the recent case
of People v. Arabia,19 we held that:
"While it may be true that complainants herein were not able to
present receipts to prove that they in fact paid the placement fee of
P16,000.00 each to accused Arabia with accused Tomas witnessing the
payment, it has been ruled that the absence of receipts in a criminal
case for illegal recruitment does not warrant acquittal of the
accused and is not fatal to the case of the prosecution. As long as
the witnesses had positively shown through their respective
testimonies that the accused is the one involved in the prohibited
recruitment, he may be convicted of the offense despite absence of
receipts. (People v. Goce 247 SCRA 780; People v. Senden 228 SCRA
489; People v. Naparan 225 SCRA 714; People v. Pabala 262 SCRA
553)." (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the actual receipt of a fee is not an element of the crime.
Third, since there are at least three victims in this case, appellant thus
committed large-scale illegal recruitment.
Appellant also argues that the prosecution failed to prove that he
conspired with the others in the commission of the crime of illegal
recruitment and estafa. We find no cogent reason to disturb the
findings of the lower court that there was conspiracy among appellant,
Cecilia Legarbes Zabala, Jose Mendoza, Perla Almonte, Ricky de la
Torre and Alfredo Hunsayan, Jr. The evidence on record indubitably
shows that there was a delineation of roles among the appellant and his
cohorts, but with a common design and a unity of purpose. As aptly
pointed out by the trial court:
"The Accused was at the forefront, not merely as a passive onlooker as
the Accused wanted the Court to believe in the recruitment of the
Private Complainants. xxx In November, 1992, the Accused, Cecilia
Legarbes Zabala and Jose Mendoza, agreed to the use the office (sic)
of former Assistant City Fiscal of Pasay City as their base of
operations or office in their recruitment activities. Jose Mendoza and
Ricky de la Torre looked for applicants who sought employment in
Japan, Cecilia Legarbes Zabala was the one tasked to receive the sums
of money paid by the recruits signed and issued Receipts for said
amounts. The Accused, on the other hand, fixed the amounts to be paid
by the recruits and directly negotiated and transacted with them and
received his commissions from Cecilia Legarbes Zabala from the
payments of the recruits. All the actuations of the Accused, Cecilia
Legarbes Zabala, Jose Mendoza, Perla Almonte and Ricky de la Torre,
were geared and designed to achieve a common purpose or objective –
the recruitment of persons for employment in Japan and eke out sums
of money from them although the Accused was not authorized to
recruit workers for employment abroad. Under the circumstances, it is
abundantly clear that the Accused conspired with Jose Mendoza,
Cecilia Legarbes Zabala, Perla Almonte, Ricky de la Torre and Alfredo
Hunsayan, Jr. and that, therefore, the Accused is liable for the
wrongful acts and its consequences."20
Direct proof of previous agreement to commit a crime is not
necessary. 21 Such previous agreement may be deduced from the mode
and manner in which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the
acts of the accused which point to a joint purpose and design,
concerted action and community of interest.22
In his attempt to exculpate himself, appellant denies having received
money from private complainants. However, as against the positive
assertion of complainants, the appellant’s denial is worthless and at
most self-serving. Private complainants testified that Cecilia Legarbes
Zabala signed and issued receipts for the cash amount and other
personal properties complainants turned over as payment for
processing their employment applications abroad. The documentary
evidence of the prosecution shows that appellant received his
commission from recruitment fees paid by the private complainants.
Exhibits "E" and "E-2", which bear appellant’s signature, establish this
fact, to wit:
"December 3, 1992
Received the amount of four thousand five hundred pesos (P4,500.00)
from Cely Zabala as commission."23(Emphasis supplied)
and
"December 7, 1992
Received the amount of Two Thousand Pesos from Cely Zabala
as commission (P2,000.00)."24 (Emphasis supplied)
These receipts show no indication that the amounts were accepted as
payment for the rental of the Army and Navy Club office space as
alleged by appellant. On the contrary, the testimonial and documentary
evidence establish beyond any doubt that appellant received the
amounts stated as "commission" for his participation in the illegal
recruitment activities. As correctly observed by the trial court:
"When he testified before the Court, the Accused resolutely claimed
that he was issued Receipts for the rentals of Jose Mendoza and
Cecilia Legarbes Zabala and the Accused readily referred to the
Receipts, Exhibits "E" And "E-2" bearing his signatures. Ironically,
instead of buttressing his stance, the Receipts, Exhibits "E" and "E-2",
in fact, belied said claim and placed his defense in a quagmire of
inconsistency. For, as can be easily gleaned from said Receipts, the
amounts of P4,500.00 and P2,000.00 mentioned therein were
the "commissions" of the Accused from Cecilia Legarbes Zabala
which he received from her and not rentals xxx.
xxx
The Court found the claim of the Accused puerile and preposterous.
The Accused is a businessman, a Captain of a vessel no less. If the
amounts were, in fact, rental payments, the Accused, for sure, should
have refused to sign the Receipt and should have insisted, before he
signed the Receipts, that the same be stated therein in unequivocal
terms. And then again, the Accused has not enlightened the Court why
Cecilia Legarbes Zabala would have the temerity and audacity to place
the word "commission" in the Receipts instead of placing the word
"rental" or the motive of Cecilia Legarbes Zabala in placing
"commission" in the Receipts. After all, the Accused even allowed her
and her companions to rent his office.
On the other hand, the Receipts, Exhibits "E" and "E-2" galvanized the
case of the Prosecution and confirmed its claim that, indeed, the
Accused was directly involved in the illegal recruitment activities of
Cecilia Legarbes Zabala, more particularly the recruitment of the
Private Complainants to Japan. This is so because, as the Receipts
indubitably show, the Accused received, from Cecilia Legarbes
Zabala, the said amounts of P4,500.00 and P2,000.00 as his
commission for the recruitment of Santiago Ricamonte and Arnel
Viloria. Indeed, the evidence of the Prosecution shows that Cecilia
Legarbes Zabala received, from Santiago Ricamonte, the amount of
P30,000.00 on December 3, 1992 (Exhibit "B"). Arnel Viloria paid to
Cecilia Legarbes Zabala, on December 7, 1992, the amount of
P10,000.00 (Exhibit "M"). The payments were made in the presence of
the Accused. It was precisely on December 3, 1992 when the Accused
received P4,500.00 from Cecilia Legarbes Zabala as his commission
and on December 7, 1992, when the Accused received, from Cecilia
Legarbes Zabala, the amount of P2,000.00 as his commission. The
only logical conclusion is that the amounts given to the Accused by
Cecilia Legarbes Zabala on those dates must have come from the
amounts paid by Santiago Ricamonte and Arnel Viloria on those dates
respectively. The Accused has not adduced a morsel of evidence that
the Accused transacted business with third persons as agent of Cecilia
Legarbes Zabala for which he was entitled to said amounts as
commissions from her."25
We find no reason to disturb the findings of the trial court, which is in
the best position to appreciate complainants’ truthfulness, honesty and
candor.26 As against the positive and categorical testimonies of the
complainants, appellant’s mere denial cannot prevail.27
In light of these established facts, appellant is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of one count of illegal recruitment in large-scale. The
appellant should suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of
One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) for the crime of illegal
recruitment in large-scale under Article 39(a) of the Labor Code.28
Conviction for Estafa
The trial court also did not err in finding appellant guilty of estafa. It is
well-settled that a person, for the same acts, may be charged and
convicted separately of the crime of illegal recruitment under the
Labor Code and estafa under paragraph 2(a) of Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code.29 Illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum where
the criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for conviction,
while estafa is malum in se where the criminal intent of the accused is
necessary for conviction.30 In other words, a person convicted under
the Labor Code may also be convicted of offenses punishable by other
laws for the same acts.
The elements of estafa are as follows: (1) the accused defrauded
another by abuse of confidence or by means of deceit; and (2) the
offended party or a third party suffered damage or prejudice capable of
pecuniary estimation.31 In the instant case, the prosecution proved
beyond reasonable doubt that appellant and his cohorts Cecilia
Legarbes Zabala, Jose Mendoza, Perla Almonte, Ricky de la Torre and
Alfredo Hunsayan, Jr. deceived private complainants into believing
that they had the authority and capability to send complainants to
Japan for employment. Because of the assurances given by appellant
and his cohorts, private complainants parted with their hard-earned
money in exchange for what they thought was a promising future
abroad. The acts of appellant and his cohorts
constitute estafa punishable under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the
Revised Penal Code.
The penalty for estafa depends on the amount of the
defraudation.32 Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa).- Any person who shall defraud another
by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period
to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is
over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such
amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph
shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each
additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed
shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with
the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of
the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision
mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
2nd. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium
periods, if the amount of the fraud is over 6,000 pesos but does not
exceed 12,000 pesos.
3rd. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period, if such amount is over 200 pesos
but does not exceed 6,000 pesos; and
4th. By arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods, if such
amount does not exceed 200 pesos, provided that in the four cases
mentioned, the fraud be committed by any of the following means:
xxx
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts
executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power,
influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or
imaginary transactions; or by means of other similar deceits.
xxx
We ruled in People v. Gabres33 that:
"The fact that the amounts involved in the instant case exceed
P22,000.00 should not be considered in the initial determination of the
indeterminate penalty; instead, the matter should be so taken as
analogous to modifying circumstances in the imposition of the
maximum term of the full indeterminate sentence. This interpretation
of the law accords with the rule that penal laws should be construed in
favor of the accused. Since the penalty prescribed by law for
the estafa charge against accused-appellant is prision
correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum, the penalty next
lower would then be prision correccional minimum to medium. Thus,
the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence should be anywhere
within six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2)
months while the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence should
at least be six (6) years and one (1) day because the amounts involved
exceeded P22,000.00, plus an additional one (1) year for each eleven (11) months and ten (10) days of prision correccional, as minimum,
additional P10,000.00." to eight (8) years and one day of prision mayor, as maximum, and ordered
to refund Arnel Viloria the sum of P50,000.00 with legal interest from
November 23, 1992 until the amount is fully paid.
In addition, appellant is liable to indemnify the private complainants in
the amounts which they respectively paid him and his cohorts: 2. In Criminal Case No. 93-121323 (for estafa involving P50,000.00),
P50,000.00 to Arnel Viloria; P50,000.00 to Santiago Ricamonte; and appellant is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of two (2) years,
P31,000.00 to Nenita Sorita plus P30,000.00 as reparation34 for her eleven (11) months and ten (10) days of prision correccional, as minimum,
unrecovered personal properties. Hence, pursuant to Article 315 of the to eight (8) years and one day of prision mayor, as maximum, and ordered
to refund Santiago Ricamonte the sum of P50,000.00 with legal interest
Revised Penal Code and our ruling in Gabres, the penalties imposed from November 27, 1992 until the amount is fully paid.
on appellant for estafa should be modified as follows:
3. In Criminal Case No. 93-121324 (for estafa involving a total of
In Criminal Case Nos. 93-121322 and 93-121323 (which pertain to P61,000.00), appellant is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
private complainant Arnel Viloria and Santiago Ricamonte), the two (2) years, eleven (11) months and ten (10) days of prision
amount involved is P50,000.00.35 The minimum term of the correccional, as minimum, to nine (9) years and one day of prision mayor,
as maximum, and ordered to pay Nenita Sorita the sum of P31,000.00 plus
indeterminate penalty, as fixed by the trial court, is two (2) years, P30,000.00 as reparation for the unrecovered personal properties, all with
eleven (11) months and ten (10) days of prision correccional, which is legal interest from January 3, 1993 until the amount is fully paid.
within the lawful range of the allowable minimum period of the
indeterminate sentence, while the maximum term is six (6) years and 4. In Criminal Case No. 93-121321 (for illegal recruitment in large-scale),
one (1) day of prision mayor plus a period of two (2) years (an appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment, and to pay
additional of one year for every P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00), a fine of P100,000.00.
or a maximum of eight (8) years and one day of prision mayor.
SO ORDERED.
In Criminal Case No. 93-121324 (pertaining to private complainant
Puno, (Chairman), Panganiban, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
Nenita Sorita), the total amount involved is P61,000.00. The minimum
term of the indeterminate penalty is two (2) years, eleven (11) months
and ten (10) days of prision correccional (which is within the lawful
range of the allowable minimum period of the indeterminate sentence)
while the maximum term is nine (9) years and one day of prision
mayor.
G.R. No. 146964 August 10, 2006
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated July 6, 1994 of the
ROSA C. RODOLFO, Petitioner,
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 49, finding appellant
vs.
EDUARDO BALLESTEROS guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
crimes of Illegal Recruitment in Large-Scale in Criminal Case No. 93-
121321 and of Estafa in Criminal Cases Nos. 93-121322 to 93-
DECISION
121324, is AFFIRMED with the following modifications:

1. In Criminal Case No. 93-121322 (for estafa involving P50,000.00),

CARPIO MORALES, J.:
appellant is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of two (2) years,
Petitioner was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Makati for illegal recruitment alleged to have been committed as
follows:
That in or about and during the period from August to September
1984, in Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the said accused representing herself to have
the capacity to contract, enlist and transport Filipino workers for
employment abroad, did then and there willfully and unlawfully, for a
fee, recruit and promise employment/job placement abroad to
VILLAMOR ALCANTARA, NARCISO CORPUZ, 1NECITAS R.
FERRE, GERARDO H. TAPAWAN and JOVITO L. CAMA, without
first securing the required license or authority from the Ministry of
Labor and Employment. 2
After trial on the merits, Branch 61 of the Makati RTC rendered its
Judgment on the case, 3 the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES ABOVE CONSIDERED, the Court finds
the accused ROSA C. RODOLFO as GUILTY of the offense of
ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT and hereby sentences her [to] a penalty of
imprisonment of EIGHT YEARS and to pay the costs. 4 (Underscoring
supplied)
In so imposing the penalty, the trial court took note of the fact that
while the information reflected the commission of illegal recruitment
in large scale, only the complaint of the two of the five complainants
was proven.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals correctly synthesized the evidence
presented by the parties as follows:
[The evidence for the prosecution] shows that sometime in August
and September 1984, accused-appellant approached private
complainants Necitas Ferre and Narciso Corpus individually
and invited them to apply for overseas employment in Dubai. The
accused-appellant being their neighbor, private complainants agreed
and went to the former’s office. This office which bore the business
name "Bayside Manpower Export Specialist" was in a building
situated at Bautista St. Buendia, Makati, Metro Manila. In that
office, private complainants gave certain amounts to appellant for
processing and other fees. Ferre gave P1,000.00 as processing fee
(Exhibit A) and another P4,000.00 (Exhibit B). Likewise, Corpus gave
appellant P7,000.00 (Exhibit D). Appellant then told private
complainants that they were scheduled to leave for Dubai on
September 8, 1984. However, private complainants and all the other
applicants were not able to depart on the said date as their employer
allegedly did not arrive. Thus, their departure was rescheduled to
September 23, but the result was the same. Suspecting that they were
being hoodwinked, private complainants demanded of appellant to
return their money. Except for the refund of P1,000.00 to Ferre,
appellant was not able to return private complainants’ money. Tired of
excuses, private complainants filed the present case for illegal
recruitment against the accused-appellant.
To prove that accused-appellant had no authority to recruit workers for
overseas employment, the prosecution presented Jose Valeriano, a
Senior Overseas Employment Officer of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Agency (POEA), who testified that accused-appellant
was neither licensed nor authorized by the then Ministry of Labor and
Employment to recruit workers for overseas employment.
For her defense, appellant denied ever approaching private
complainants to recruit them for employment in Dubai. On the
contrary, it was the private complainants who asked her help in
securing jobs abroad. As a good neighbor and friend, she brought the
private complainants to the Bayside Manpower Export Specialist
agency because she knew Florante Hinahon, 5 the owner of the said
agency. While accused-appellant admitted that she received money
from the private complainants, she was quick to point out that she
received the same only in trust for delivery to the agency. She denied
being part of the agency either as an owner or employee thereof. To
corroborate appellant’s testimony, Milagros Cuadra, who was also an
applicant and a companion of private complainants, testified that
appellant did not recruit them. On the contrary, they were the ones who
asked help from appellant. To further bolster the defense, Eriberto C.
Tabing, the accountant and cashier of the agency, testified that
appellant is not connected with the agency and that he saw appellant
received money from the applicants but she turned them over to the
agency through either Florantino Hinahon or Luzviminda
Marcos. 6 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In light thereof, the appellate court affirmed the judgment of the trial
court but modified the penalty imposed due to the trial court’s failure
to apply the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
The appellate court thus disposed:
WHEREFORE, finding no merit in the appeal, this Court DISMISSES
it and AFFIRMS the appealed Decision EXCEPT the penalty x x
x which is hereby changed to five (5) years as minimum to seven (7)
years as maximum with perpetual disqualification from engaging in
the business of recruitment and placement of workers. 7(Underscoring
supplied)
Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration having been denied, 8 the
present petition was filed, faulting the appellate court
I (c) Any person who is neither a licensee nor a holder of
x x x IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF THE
COMPLAINING WITNESSES, [AND]
II
x x x IN FINDING THE PETITIONER-ACCUSED GUILTY WHEN
THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO PROVE HER GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT. 9 (Underscoring supplied)
Petitioner bewails the failure of the trial court and the Court of Appeals
to credit the testimonies of her witnesses, her companion Milagros
Cuadra, and Eriberto C. Tabing who is an accountant-cashier of the
agency.
Further, petitioner assails the trial court’s and the appellate court’s
failure to consider that the provisional receipts she issued indicated
that the amounts she collected from the private complainants were
turned over to the agency through Minda Marcos and Florante
Hinahon. At any rate, she draws attention to People v.
Señoron 10 wherein this Court held that the issuance or signing of
receipts for placement fees does not make a case for illegal
recruitment.11
The petition fails.
Articles 38 and 39 of the Labor Code, the legal provisions applicable
when the offense charged was committed, 12provided:
ART. 38. Illegal Recruitment. – (a) Any recruitment activities,
including the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of this
Code, to be undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority
shall be deemed illegal and punishable under Article 39 of this Code. x
xx
Article 39. Penalties. – x x x x
authority under this Title found violating any provision thereof or its
implementing rules and regulations shall, upon conviction thereof,
suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not less than four years nor more
than eight years or a fine of not less than P20,000 nor more
than P100,000 or both such imprisonment and fine, at the discretion of
the court;
x x x x (Underscoring supplied)
The elements of the offense of illegal recruitment, which must concur,
are: (1) that the offender has no valid license or authority required by
law to lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of workers; and
(2) that the offender undertakes any activity within the meaning of
recruitment and placement under Article 13(b), or any prohibited
practices enumerated under Article 34 of the Labor Code. 13 If another
element is present  that the accused commits the act against three or
more persons, individually or as a group, it becomes an illegal
recruitment in a large scale. 14
Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code defines "recruitment and placement"
as "[a]ny act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting,
utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract
services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or
abroad, whether for profit or not." (Underscoring supplied)
That the first element is present in the case at bar, there is no doubt.
Jose Valeriano, Senior Overseas Employment Officer of the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration, testified that the records of the
POEA do not show that petitioner is authorized to recruit workers for
overseas employment. 15 A Certification to that effect was in fact
issued by Hermogenes C. Mateo, Chief of the Licensing Division of
POEA. 16
Petitioner’s disclaimer of having engaged in recruitment activities
from the very start does not persuade in light of the evidence for the
prosecution. In People v. Alvarez, this Court held:
Appellant denies that she engaged in acts of recruitment and placement
without first complying with the guidelines issued by the Department
of Labor and Employment. She contends that she did not possess any
license for recruitment, because she never engaged in such activity.
We are not persuaded. In weighing contradictory declarations and
statements, greater weight must be given to the positive testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses than to the denial of the defendant. Article
38 (a) clearly shows that illegal recruitment is an offense that is
essentially committed by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority.
A non-licensee means any person, corporation or entity to which the
labor secretary has not issued a valid license or authority to engage in
recruitment and placement; or whose license or authority has been
suspended, revoked or cancelled by the POEA or the labor secretary. A
license authorizes a person or an entity to operate a private
employment agency, while authority is given to those engaged in
recruitment and placement activities.
xxxx
That appellant in this case had been neither licensed nor authorized to
recruit workers for overseas employment was certified by Veneranda
C. Guerrero, officer-in-charge of the Licensing and Regulation Office;
and Ma. Salome S. Mendoza, manager of the Licensing Branch – both
of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration. Yet, as
complainants convincingly proved, she recruited them for jobs in
Taiwan. 17 (Italics in the original; underscoring supplied)
The second element is doubtless also present. The act of referral,
which is included in recruitment, 18 is "the act of passing along or
forwarding of an applicant for employment after an initial interview of
a selected applicant for employment to a selected employer, placement
officer or bureau." 19 Petitioner’s admission that she brought private
complainants to the agency whose owner she knows and her
acceptance of fees including those for processing betrays her guilt.
That petitioner issued provisional receipts indicating that the amounts
she received from the private complainants were turned over to
Luzviminda Marcos and Florante Hinahon does not free her from
liability. For the act of recruitment may be "for profit or not." It is
sufficient that the accused "promises or offers for a fee employment"
to warrant conviction for illegal recruitment. 20 As the appellate court
stated:
x x x Sec. 13(b) of P.D. 442 [The Labor Code] does not require that the
recruiter receives and keeps the placement money for himself or
herself. For as long as a person who has no license to engage in
recruitment of workers for overseas employment offers for a fee an
employment to two or more persons, then he or she is guilty of illegal
recruitment. 21
Parenthetically, why petitioner accepted the payment of fees from the
private complainants when, in light of her claim that she merely
brought them to the agency, she could have advised them to directly
pay the same to the agency, she proferred no explanation.
On petitioner’s reliance on Señoron, 22 true, this Court held that
issuance of receipts for placement fees does not make a case for illegal
recruitment. But it went on to state that it is "rather the undertaking of
recruitment activities without the necessary license or authority" that SO ORDERED.
makes a case for illegal recruitment. 23

A word on the penalty. Indeed, the trial court failed to apply the
Indeterminate Sentence Law which also applies to offenses punished
by special laws.

Thus, Section 1 of Act No. 4103 (An Act to Provide for an

Indeterminate Sentence and Parole for All Persons Convicted of
Certain Crimes by the Courts of the Philippine Islands; To Create A
Board of Indeterminate Sentence and to Provide Funds Therefor; and
for Other Purposes) provides:

SECTION 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense

punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court
shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum
term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending
circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the said
Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty
next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense; and if the
offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the
accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which
shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum
shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same. (As
amended by Act No. 4225) (Underscoring supplied)

While the penalty of imprisonment imposed by the appellate court is G.R. No. 180926 December 10, 2008
within the prescribed penalty for the offense, its addition of "perpetual
disqualification from engaging in the business of recruitment and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
placement of workers" is not part thereof. Such additional penalty vs.
must thus be stricken off. LOURDES VALENCIANO y DACUBA, accused-appellant.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and DECISION

Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION in that the accessory penalty imposed by it VELASCO, JR., J.:
consisting of "perpetual disqualification from engaging in the business
of recruitment and placement of workers" is DELETED. This is an appeal from the Decision1 dated July 24, 2007 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01390 which upheld the
Costs against petitioner.
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 116 in Pasay City
in Criminal Case No. 97-9851. The RTC convicted Lourdes
Valenciano of the crime of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale.
The Facts
In May 1996, Lourdes Valenciano, claiming to be an employee of
Middle East International Manpower Resources, Inc., went with one
Susie Caraeg to the house of Agapito De Luna, and told him he could
apply for a job in Taiwan. A week later, De Luna went to Valenciano’s
house, there to be told to undergo a medical examination, with the
assurance that if there were a job order abroad, he would be able to
leave. He was also told that the placement fee for his employment as a
factory worker in Taiwan was PhP 70,000.
After passing the medical examination, De Luna paid Valenciano at the
latter’s residence the following amounts: PhP 20,000 on June 21, 1996;
PhP 20,000 on July 12, 1996; and PhP 30,000 on August 21, 1996. The
first and last payments were turned over by Valenciano to Teresita
Imperial, who issued the corresponding receipts, and the second
payment was turned over by Valenciano to Rodante Imperial, who also
issued a receipt.
Also in May 1996, Valenciano visited the house of Allan De Villa,
accompanied by Euziel N. Dela Cuesta, Eusebio T. Candelaria, and De
Luna, to recruit De Villa as a factory worker in Taiwan. De Villa was
also asked for PhP 70,000 as placement fee. He paid Valenciano the
following amounts: PhP 20,000 on May 16, 1996 at Valenciano’s
residence; PhP 20,000 on May 30, 1996 at the Rural Bank of Calaca,
Batangas; PhP 20,000 on July 8, 1996 at Valenciano’s residence; and
PhP 10,000 on August 14, 1996, also at her residence. Valenciano
turned over the amounts to either Teresita or Rodante. Teresita issued
receipts for the May 16, July 8, and August 14, 1996 payments, while
Rodante issued a receipt for the payment made on May 30, 1996.
On May 20, 1996, Valenciano, accompanied by Rodante and Puring
Caraeg, went to the house of Dela Cuesta to recruit her for
employment as a factory worker in Taiwan. Dela Cuesta paid
Valenciano PhP 20,000 as initial payment on May 20, 1996. On May
30, 1996, she paid Valenciano another PhP 20,000. On August 12,
1996, she paid PhP 15,000, and on August 21, 1996, she paid PhP
7,000. Valenciano turned the May 20 and 30, 1996 payments over to
Rodante, who issued receipts for these payments. The payments made
on August 12 and 21, 1996 were turned over to Teresita, who also
issued receipts for them. These payments were to cover the placement
fee and other expenses for the processing of the requirements for the
employment of Dela Cuesta in Taiwan.
On May 1, 1996, Valenciano, with Rodante, Teresita, and Rommel
Imperial, went to Lian, Batangas to recruit workers for employment
abroad. Candelaria applied for a job as a factory worker in Taiwan
when Valenciano went to his residence in Lian. Valenciano asked him
for an initial payment of PhP 20,000. On May 30, 1996, Candelaria
paid Valenciano PhP 20,000 when she returned to Lian. He then paid
PhP 20,000 on June 24, 1996 and PhP 29,000 on July 17, 1996 at
Valenciano’s residence in Manila. These payments were to cover the
placement fee and the expenses for the processing of his passport and
other papers connected with his application for employment as a
factory worker in Taiwan. The payments made on May 30 and July 17,
1996 were turned over to Rodante, who issued a receipt for the said
payments. The payment made on June 24, 1996 was turned over by
Valenciano to Teresita.
After the payments were made, Valenciano brought the prospective
workers to the office of Middle East International Manpower
Resources, Inc. in Pasay City, where they were made to fill out
application forms for their employment as factory workers in Taiwan.
The complainants were introduced to Romeo Marquez, alias "Rodante
Imperial," Teresita Marquez, alias "Teresita Imperial," and Rommel
Marquez, alias "Rommel Imperial," whom Valenciano made to appear
as the owners of the employment agency. She assured the prospective
workers that they could leave for Taiwan within one month from the
filing of their applications. During the period material, they have not
yet found employment as factory workers in Taiwan.
Valenciano, Rodante, Teresita, and Rommel were charged with the
offense of illegal recruitment in large scale, as defined under Article
13(b) of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 442, otherwise known as the
Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended, in relation to Art. 38(a),
and penalized under Art. 39(c) of the Code, as amended by PD 1920
and PD 2018. The Information reads as follows:
That sometime in May, 1996 to August, 1996, or thereabout, in
the City of Pasay, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
representing to have the capacity, authority or license to
contract, enlist and deploy or transport workers for overseas
employment, conspiring, confederating, and mutually helping
each other, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
criminally recruit and promise to deploy the herein
complainants, namely, Agapito R. De Luna, Allan Ilagan De
Villa, Euziel N. Dela Cuesta and Eusebio T. Candelaria, as
factory workers in Taiwan, in exchange for placement,
processing and other fees ranging from P62,000.00 to
P70,000.00 or a total of P271,000.00, without first obtaining
the required license and/or authority from the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA).
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
Accused-appellant Valenciano pleaded not guilty and waived the pre-
trial. The other three accused remained at large.
The RTC found accused-appellant guilty, the dispositive portion of the
decision reading as follows:
WHEREFORE, accused Lourdes Valenciano y Dacuba is
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of illegal
recruitment in large scale as charged in the aforequoted
Information; and she is sentenced to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of P100,000.00.
She is also ordered to indemnify complainants Agapito R. de
Luna, Allan Ilagan de Villa, Euziel N. dela Cuesta and Eusebio
T. Candelaria the amounts of P70,000.00, P70,000.00,
P62,000.00 and P69,000.00, respectively, as reparation of the
damage caused.
No other civil liability may be adjudged against the accused for
lack of any factual or legal basis therefor.
SO ORDERED.4
Accused-appellant appealed to this Court, but the case was transferred
to the CA through a Resolution dated September 6, 2004,
following People v. Mateo.5
The CA, in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01390, affirmed the decision of the
trial court finding accused-appellant guilty of the offense charged.
Hence, we have this appeal.
The Issues
Accused-appellant raises the following assignment of errors: (1) the
lower court gravely erred in not acquitting accused-appellant on
reasonable doubt; and (2) the lower court gravely erred in holding that
a conspiracy exists between accused-appellant and her co-accused.
The Court’s Ruling
The appeal is without merit.
In her defense, accused-appellant claims that she was an ordinary
employee of Middle East International Manpower Resources, Inc.,
where her other co-accused were the owners and managers. She also
denies receiving payment from the complainants; that had she
promised employment in Taiwan, this promise was made in the
performance of her duties as a clerk in the company. She denies too
having knowledge of the criminal intent of her co-accused, adding that
she might even be regarded as a victim in the present case, as she was
in good faith when she made the promise.
Art. 13(b) of the Labor Code reads:
 "Recruitment and placement" refers to any act of canvassing,
enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or
procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services,
promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad,
whether for profit or not: Provided, That any person or entity
which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment
to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment
and placement.
Art. 38(a) and (b) of the Labor Code reads as follows:
(a) Any recruitment activities, including the prohibited
practices enumerated under Article 34 of this Code, to be
undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority shall
be deemed illegal and punishable under Article 39 of this Code.
xxx
(b) Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in
large scale shall be considered an offense involving economic
sabotage and shall be penalized in accordance with Article 39
hereof.
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if
carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring
and/or confederating with one another in carrying out any
unlawful or illegal transaction, enterprise or scheme defined
under the first paragraph hereof. Illegal recruitment is deemed
committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more
persons individually or as a group.
Art. 39(a) provides that the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of
PhP 100,000 shall be imposed if illegal recruitment constitutes
economic sabotage as defined above.
The claim of accused-appellant that she was a mere employee of her
other co-accused does not relieve her of liability. An employee of a
company or corporation engaged in illegal recruitment may be held
liable as principal, together with his employer, if it is shown that the
employee actively and consciously participated in illegal
recruitment.6 As testified to by the complainants, accused-appellant
was among those who met and transacted with them regarding the job
placement offers. In some instances, she made the effort to go to their
houses to recruit them. She even gave assurances that they would be
able to find employment abroad and leave for Taiwan after the filing of
their applications. Accused-appellant was clearly engaged in
recruitment activities, notwithstanding her gratuitous protestation that
her actions were merely done in the course of her employment as a
clerk.
Accused-appellant cannot claim to be merely following the dictates of
her employers and use good faith as a shield against criminal liability.
As held in People v. Gutierrez:
Appellant cannot escape liability by claiming that she was not
aware that before working for her employer in the recruitment
agency, she should first be registered with the POEA. Illegal
recruitment in large scale is malum prohibitum, not malum in
se. Good faith is not a defense.7
The claim of accused-appellant that she received no payment and that
the payments were handed directly over to her co-accused fails in the
face of the testimony of the complainants that accused-appellant was
the one who received the money. In spite of the receipts having been
issued by her co-accused, the trial court found that payments were
directly made to accused-appellant, and this finding was upheld by the
CA. Nothing is more entrenched than the rule that where, as here, the
findings of fact of the trial court are affirmed by the CA, these are final
and conclusive upon this Court.8 And even if it were true that no
money changed hands, money is not material to a prosecution for
illegal recruitment, as the definition of "recruitment and placement" in
the Labor Code includes the phrase, "whether for profit or not." We
held in People v. Jamilosa that it was "sufficient that the accused
promises or offers for a fee employment to warrant conviction for
illegal recruitment."9 Accused-appellant made representations that
complainants would receive employment abroad, and this suffices for
her conviction, even if her name does not appear on the receipts issued
to complainants as evidence that payment was made.
Neither accused-appellant nor her co-accused had authority to recruit
workers for overseas employment. The Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA), through its employee, Corazon
Aquino, issued on July 8, 1997 the following certification to that
effect:
This is to certify that per available records of this Office,
MIDDLE EAST INTERNATIONAL MANPOWER
RESOURCES INC., with office address at 2119 P. Burgos St.,
cor. Gil Puyat Ave., Pasay City represented by SAPHIA
CALAMATA ASAAD is a licensed landbased agency whose
license expired on October 13, 1996. Per record, said agency
has not filed any application for renewal of license.
Per available records, the names of RODANTE IMPERIAL
a.k.a. ROMEO MARQUEZ, TERESITA IMPERIAL a.k.a.
TERESITA MARQUEZ, ROMMEL MARQUEZ a.k.a.
ROMMEL IMPERIAL and LOURDES VALENCIANO do not
appear on the list of employees submitted by agency.
This certification is being issued for whatever legal purpose it
may serve.10
Another certification dated July 9, 1997 stated that accused-appellant
in her personal capacity was not licensed or authorized to recruit
workers for overseas employment and that any recruitment activities
undertaken by her are illegal.11 Accused-appellant could thus point to
no authority allowing her to recruit complainants, as she was not an
employee of Middle East International Manpower Resources, Inc. nor
was she allowed to do so in her personal capacity. Furthermore, she
undertook recruitment activities outside the premises of the office of a
licensed recruitment agency, which can only be done with the prior
approval of the POEA, and neither she nor her co-accused had
permission to do so, as testified by Aquino of the POEA.12
Accused-appellant was convicted of Illegal Recruitment in Large
Scale, and there could be no other result. As held in Jamilosa:
To prove illegal recruitment in large scale, the prosecution is
burdened to prove three (3) essential elements, to wit: (1) the
person charged undertook a recruitment activity under Article
13(b) or any prohibited practice under Article 34 of the Labor
Code; (2) accused did not have the license or the authority to
lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers;
and (3) accused committed the same against three or more
persons individually or as a group.13 x x x
The RTC found accused-appellant to have undertaken recruitment
activities, and this was affirmed by the CA. A POEA certification was
submitted stating that accused-appellant was not authorized to recruit
applicants for overseas employment, and she did not contest this
certification. In the present case, there are four complainants: De Luna,
De Villa, Dela Cuesta, and Candelaria. The three essential elements for
illegal recruitment in large scale are present. Thus, there can be no
other conclusion in this case but to uphold the conviction of accused-
appellant and apply the penalty as imposed by law.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we AFFIRM the appealed CA
Decision dated July 24, 2007 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01390, with no
costs.
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Court’s Division.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the

Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
G.R. No. 96621 October 21, 1992

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JOEY BODOZO y BULA, and NIMFA BODOZO y
NERI, accused-appellant.

CAMPOS, JR., J.:
This is an appeal 1 interposed by accused Joey Bodozo and Nimfa
Bodozo, husband and wife, from the decision 2 of the Regional Trial
Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch XLIX, Manila, in
Criminal Case Nos. 89-73608-SCC to 89-73613-SCC, finding them
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal recruitment
defined in and penalized by Article 13 in relation to Article 38 of the
Labor Code, as amended, and sentencing each of them to suffer the
penalty of Life Imprisonment.
Accused-appellants were charged before the Regional Trial Court with
five (5) counts of Estafa (docketed as Criminal Case No. 89-73609 to
89-73613) and a separate charge for Illegal Recruitment (docketed as
Criminal Case NO. 89-73608).
With regards to the charge of Estafa, accused-appellants were
acquitted of the crime charged. hence this appeal refers only to the
crime of illegal recruitment.
On May 30, 1989, the Assistant Prosecutor filed the following
information for illegal recruitment against Joey Bodozo and Nimfa
Bodozo, to wit:
The undersigned accused JOEY BODOZO y BULA
and NIMFA BODOZO y NERI of a violation of Article
38 (a), Presidential Decree No. 1412, amending certain
provisions of Book I, Presidential Decree No. 442 (New
Labor Code of the Philippines), in relation to Article 13
(b) and (c) of said Code, as further amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1693 and Presidential Decree
No. 1920, committed in a large scale, as follows:
That in or about and during the period comprised
between October 3, 1988 and April 8, 1989, in the City
of Manila, Philippines, the said accused conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping each other,
representing themselves to have the capacity to
contract, enlist and transport Filipino workers for
employment abroad, did then and there wilfully and
unlawfully, for a fee, recruit and promise
employment/job placement abroad to Domingo
Obiacoro y Gagtan, Ludivico Gagtan y Lopez,
Angelino Obiacoro y Aspiras, Prudencio Renon y
Lopez and Fernando Gagtan y Lopez, without first
having secured the required license or authority from
the Department of Labor and Employment.
Contrary to Law. 3
On arraignment, accused-appellants, Joey Bodozo and Nimfa Bodozo,
assisted by their counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty to the
information.
On July 6, 1990, the trial court rendered judgment, the decretal portion
of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in these
cases as follows:
1. In People versus Joey Bodozo and Nimfa Bodozo,
Criminal Case No. 89-73608, the Court finds both
Accused guilty, beyond reasonable doubt, of the crime
of illegal recruitment defined in and penalized by
Article 13 in relation to Article 38 of the Labor Code, as
amended, and hereby metes on each of them the penalty
of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and hereby condemns each
of them "to pay" a fine of P100,000.00, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
2. In People versus Joey Bodozo and Nimfa Bodozo,
Criminal Case Nos. 89-73609 to 89-73613, the Court
finds that the Prosecution failed to establish the guilt of
the Accused beyond reasonable doubt for the crimes
charged therein and hereby acquits them of said
charges.
 Both Accused are hereby ordered to refund, jointly and
severally, to the following Private Complainants the
amounts appearing opposite their respective names, as
follows:
1. Prudencio Renon P19,000.00
2. Fernando Gagtan 20,000.00
3. Angelino Obiacoro 20,000.00
4. Ludovico Gagtan 10,000.00
With costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED. 4
Hence the instant appeal by the accused Joey Bodozo and Nimfa
Bodozo.
Accused-appellants raised the following assignment of errors, to wit:
I The private complainant Prudencio Renon and
IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THE QUANTUM OF
EVIDENCE IN FAVOR OF THE CLAIM OF BOTH
ACCUSED THAT THEY ONLY HELPED THE
PRIVATE COMPLAINANTS APPLIED FOR JOB
ABROAD, THAT THEY WERE NOT RECRUITERS.
II
IN HOLDING THAT THE PROSECUTION HAS
MARSHALLED THE DEGREE OF PROOF WHICH
PRODUCED THE CONVICTIONS OF BOTH
ACCUSED.
The main thrust of this case hinges on whether or not the guilt of the
accused-appellants have been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
As found by the trial court, the facts as could be gleaned from the
evidence on record, were as follows:
When the accused Nimfa Bodozo was in Luna, La,
Union, she told the private complainants, who are
simple farmers, and at the time unemployed, that she
was recruiting workers for employment in Saudi Arabia
and Singapore. The accused Nimfa Bodozo required the
five (5) private complainants to submit to her, in
addition to their respective applications, NBI clearances
and medical certificates in connection with their
applications. The private complainants Prudencio
Renon and Fernando Gagtan were told by the accused
Nimfa Bodozo that their salary in Saudi Arabia was
US$200.00 a month, while the accused Nimfa Bodozo
assured private complainant, Angelino Obiacoro,
Ludovico Gagtan and Domingo Obiacoro that they
were going to be paid, by their respective employers, in
Singapore, the amount of Singapore 16.00 dollars a day.
Fernando Gagtan submitted their application forms,
duly filled up, passports, their NBI clearances and
medical certificates to the accused Nimfa Bodozo in
their residence at Quirino Avenue, Manila, Domingo
Obiacoro, Angelino Obiacoro and Ludovico Gagtan
likewise submitted to the accused their NBI clearances
and medical certificates as required by the accused.
Moreover, the accused demanded from the private
complainant Prudencio Renon the amount of
P19,000.00 in connection with his application for
employment abroad. Of the said amount, P15,000.00
was to be used by the accused as processing fee for the
application and papers of the private complainant for
his employment abroad Prudencio Renon paid to the
accused Nimfa Bodozo, on October 3, 1988, the
amount of P15,000.00 for which the said accused
signed a Receipt. 5 The mother of Prudencio Renon
paid the balance of P4,000.00 to the same accused but
the latter did not issue any receipt for said amount.
The accused Nimfa Bodozo demanded from the private
complainant Fernando Gagtan the amount of
P20,000.00 in connection with his application for
employment abroad. Fernando Gagtan paid to the
accused Nimfa Bodozo, also on October 3, 1988, the
amount of P12,000.00 for which the said accused
signed and issued Receipts 6 and the amount of
P8,000.00 through Maxima Gagtan the mother of
Fernando Gagtan, for which the accused Nimfa Bodozo
issued a Receipt dated April 8, 1989. 7
The accused Nimfa Bodozo demanded from Domingo
Obiacoro the amount of P20,000.00 in connection with
hi application for employment abroad. Of the amount,
P10,000.00 will be used for the purchase of a plane
ticket for the private complainant for Singapore and the
balance of P10,000.00 was to be used as placement fee
for the application of the private complainant for
employment abroad. Domingo Obiacoro paid
P10,000.00 to the accused Nimfa Bodozo in the house
of the friend of the accused in Luna, La Union but the
accused did not issue any Receipt for the amount at the
time. Domingo Obiacoro paid the balance of
P10,000.00 to the accused Nimfa Bodozo in the house
of the accused Joey Bodozo later signed and issued a
Receipt for the said amount of P20,000.00. 8
The accused Joey Bodozo demanded from Angelino
Obiacoro the payment of P20,000.00 in connection with
the latter's application for employment abroad.
Angelino Obiacoro gave to the accused Joey Bodozo
the amount of P10,000.00 in two (2) installments on
different occasion for which the accused Joey Bodozo
later signed and issued a Receipt. 9
The accused Joey Bodozo likewise demanded from
Ludovico Gagtan the payment of the amount of
P20,000.00 in connection with his application for
employment abroad. Ludovico Gagtan, through his
mother, Maxima Gagtan, gave to the accused Nimfa
Bodozo the amount of P10,000.00 but the latter failed
to issue any receipt at that time. However, considering
that the private complainant did not have the amount of
P10,000.00 to pay the balance of the P20,000.00
demanded by the accused, but the latter offered to
advance the amount for the account of private
complainant for which the latter and his mother,
Maxima Gagtan, signed a "Promissory Note" in favor
of the accused Joey Bodozo.10 However, the accused
added the amount of P4,000.00 to the P10,000.00
purportedly advanced by the accused for the private
complainant by the way of interests on said loan. The
accused Nimfa Bodozo later signed and issued a
Receipt 11 for the amount of P10,000.00 remitted to her
by the mother of Ludivico Gagtan. 12
After a careful scrutiny of the evidence, We found no cause to
disapprove the facts as stated above and we adopt the same as Our
findings of facts. In the absence of any substantial proof that the trial
court's decision was grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or
conjectures, the same must be accorded full consideration and respect.
After all, the trial court is in a much better position to observe and
correctly appreciate the respective parties' evidence as they were
presented. 13
The crime of illegal recruitment is defined under Article 38 (a) in
relation to Article 13 (b) and 34, and penalized under Article 39 of the
Labor Code as amended by PD 1920 and PD 2018.
Article 38 (a) of the Labor Code provides as follows:
Art. 38. Illegal Recruitment. — (a) Any recruitment
activities, including the prohibited practices enumerated
under Article 34 of this Code, to be undertaken by the
 non-licensees or non-holders of authority shall be
deemed illegal and punishable under Article 39 of this
Code. The Ministry of Labor and Employment or any
law enforcement officer may initiate complaints under
this Article. (Emphasis supplied.)
Under Article 13 (b) Recruitment and Placement is
defined as:
Any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting
transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers and
includes referrals, contract services, promising or
advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether
for profit or not. Provided that any person or entity
which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee
employment to two or more persons shall be deemed
engaged in recruitment and placement. (Emphasis
supplied.)
It should be noted that any of the acts mentioned in Article 13 (b) can
lawfully be undertaken only by the licensees or holders of authority to
engage in the recruitment and placement workers.
The crime of illegal recruitment has two elements:
1 The offender is a non-license or non-holder of
authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment or
placement of workers; and
2 That the offender undertakes either any recruitment
activities defined under Article 13 (b), or any prohibited
practices enumerated under Article 34 of the Labor
Code.
In this case at bar, it is undisputed that accused-appellants Joey
Bodozo and Nimfa Bodozo are neither licensed not authorized to
recruit workers for overseas employment as shown by the
certification 14 issued by the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA).
Accused-appellants want this Court to believe that they merely helped
private complainants apply for overseas employment. Evidences on
record, however, show otherwise. Accused-appellants not only asked
private complainants to fill up application forms but also to submit to
them their NBI clearances, passports and medical certificates. In
addition thereto, accused-appellants collected payment for processing
fee and other sundry expenses from private complainants, all which
constitutes acts of recruitment within the meaning of the law.
Accused-appellants point to a certain Belen Hernandez, a manager of
Mcgleo International Management and Service Contractor a duly
registered and licensed recruiter, and Jing Evangelista of Ultragen, Inc.
as the persons who were responsible for the recruitment of private
complainants. If such allegations were true, why did accused-
appellants not present any one of them as witness to corroborate their
claim? For reasons only known to them, they chose to suppress such
testimony as evidence and instead risked the adverse inference and
legal presumption that "evidence wilfully suppressed would be adverse
if
produced. 15
Besides, if it was Belen Hernandez and Jing Evangelista who were the
recruiters, why did accused-appellants issue the
receipts 16 acknowledging payments made by private complainants?
Accused-appellants Nimfa Bodozo alleged that she was forced to issue
and sign receipts marked as Exhibits J and N because private
complainants Prudencio Renon and Fernando Gagtan were mad and
refused to leave the house. On the other hand, accused-appellant Joey
Bodozo claimed that he, too, was forced to issue and sign Exhibits L
and E at Kalaw Street, Ermita, Manila because private complainants
Angelino Obiacoro and Domingo Obiacoro would kill him.
We find accused-appellants' alibi not convincing. Such allegations are
self-serving. No evidence of force was represented by accused-
appellant Nimfa Bodozo to bolster her claim that she was forced
except to state that she was afraid of private complainants' anger. In
the case of accused-appellant Joey Bodozo, it will be noted that the
alleged force happened in a busy public street. Neither did the
accused-appellants file any case against private complainants for
forcing them to sign and issue said receipts. At most, their claim of
force may be said to be merely an afterthought to exculpate themselves
from the charges levelled against them by private complainants.

Moreover, We agree with the findings of the trial court that no

improper motives may be attributed to private complainants to charge
accused-appellants with a serious crime as illegal recruitment.

Records show that private complainants are simple farmers,

unemployed and natives of La Union, who see employment abroad as
a means to alleviate their living conditions, only to find out that they
have been the victims of illegal recruiters preying on poor workers. It
has been held that "the abscence of evidence as to an improper motive
actuating the principal witnesses of the prosecution strongly tends to
sustain no improper motive existed and their testimony is worthy of
full faith and credit. 17

Lastly , under Article 38 of the Labor Code, as amended, the crime of

illegal recruitment is qualified when the same is committed against
three (3) or more persons, individually or as a group. Accused-
appellant having committed the crime of illegal recruitment against
Prudencio Renon, Fernando Gagtan, Angelino Obiacoro and Ludovico
Gagtan, the penalty of life imprisonment and the fine of P100,000.00
(Article 39 (a) Labor Code of the Philippines as amended) was
correctly imposed by the trial court.

In the light of foregoing findings and for reasons indicated, We hold

that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the verdict finding the
accused guilty of the crime of illegal recruitment as charged.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court is hereby
AFFIRMED with no pronouncement to costs.
G.R. No. 181245 August 6, 2008
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
Feliciano, Regalado and Nocon, JJ., concur. vs.
JIMMY ANG @ ANG TIAO LAM and HUNG CHAO
Narvasa, C.J., is on leave. NAN, appellant.
 DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari assails the September 20, 2007
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02374,
affirming the Judgment2 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
12, in Crim. Case No. 00-184050, finding appellant Jimmy Ang @
Ang Tiao Lam & Hung Chao Nan guilty of illegal recruitment in large
scale and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and
to pay a fine of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) plus
actual damages,3 with the modification that appellant is further ordered
to pay legal interest on the award of actual damages from the time of
the filing of the Information until fully paid.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On June 28, 2000, appellant was charged with violation of Section 6
(l) and (m) of Republic Act No. 8042 or the Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995. The accusatory portion of the
Information reads:
That in or about and during the period comprised between
November 1999 and June 23, 2000, inclusive, in the City of
Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and
confederating with another whose true name, real identity and
present whereabouts is unknown and mutually helping each
other, representing themselves to have the capacity to contract,
hire, enlist and transport Filipino workers for employment
abroad, did then and there willfully and unlawfully, for a fee,
recruit and promise employment as factory workers in Taiwan,
and in consideration thereof charge and accept, directly or
indirectly from the following:
PHEX M. GARLEJO P 20,000.00 P50,000.00.
EDNA PARAGAS P115,000.00
SPOUSES MAGDALENO DIOSDADO P150,000.00
S.
ORDONIO & MARLENE G. ORDONIO
ELLEN B. CANLAS P 50,000.00
as placement and/or processing fee for overseas employment
which amounts are greater than that specified in the schedule of
allowable fees prescribed by the Secretary of Labor and
Employment and failed to actually deploy them without valid
reasons and failed to reimburse expenses incurred by them,
despite demands and in spite of the fact that the deployment of
the said PHEX M. GARLEJO, EDNA PARAGAS, Sps.
MAGDALENO DIOSDADO S. ORDONIO & MARLENE G.
ORDONIO and ELLEN B. CANLAS did not actually take
place without their fault.
Contrary to law.4
Appellant pleaded not guilty when arraigned.
Ellen Canlas testified that on January 17, 2000, she was introduced to
appellant who promised her a job as factory worker in Taiwan. Canlas
was interested in working abroad thus, she gave appellant the amount
of P50,000.00 which would be used allegedly to defray the expenses
for the processing of her papers. Appellant issued Canlas a receipt for
Edna Paragas also testified that she met appellant in November, 1999.
Lured by the promise of a job in Taiwan, Paragas gave appellant a total
amount of P115,000.00 for which she was issued a receipt. She was
told that the money would be spent for the processing of her papers.
Marlene Ordonio also applied for a job in Taiwan through appellant.
She gave him the amount of P150,000.00 to be used allegedly for the
processing of her papers. Appellant issued a receipt for the said
amount.
Phex M. Garlejo also paid P20,000.00 to appellant who promised him
a job as a factory worker in Taiwan.
When appellant failed to deploy the private complainants as factory
workers in Taiwan, they decided to file a complaint before the
Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA) who endorsed them
to the Philippine Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF). Since
appellant was asking for additional funds from Garlejo, an entrapment
operation was planned.
On June 23, 2000, Canlas, Paragas, Ordonio and Garlejo met appellant
inside Universal Restaurant along Rizal Avenue, Manila. After Garlejo
handed to appellant the envelope containing the marked money,
appellant issued a receipt for P30,000.00. Thereafter, he proceeded to
count the money whereupon he was arrested by the PAOCTF
operatives.
Appellant, who was the sole witness for the defense, testified that he
was a factory worker in Taiwan. Sometime in October 1999, he met
Erolyn Bello and Marlene Ordonio who requested him to look for a
broker in Taiwan who will affiliate with a local recruitment agency for
the deployment of factory workers. When he returned to Taiwan, he
allegedly met a certain Leo Liao who agreed to act as broker.
He admitted meeting private complainants and receiving money from
them. However, he alleged that the amounts were in payment for the
expenses he incurred in scouting for a broker in Taiwan. He also
argued that private complainants did not meet Liao, the alleged broker,
because during their scheduled meeting, the private complainants
suddenly felt shy.
Finally, he alleged that during the entrapment operation, he was forced
by the PAOCTF to sign the acknowledgement receipt; and that he
never received the money because he was handcuffed.
After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered judgment, the
dispositive portion of which provides:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, judgment
is hereby rendered finding accused JIMMY ANG also known
as ANG TIAO LAM and HUNG CHAO-NAN guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal Recruitment (in Large
Scale). Accordingly, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay a fine of One
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00). Moreover, he is
hereby ordered to pay actual damages, to the complainants in
the following amounts, to wit:
PHEX M. GARLEJO P 20,000.00
EDNA PARAGAS P115,000.00
SPOUSES MAGDALENO DIOSDADO P150,000.00
S.
ORDONIO & MARLENE G. ORDONIO
ELLEN B. CANLAS P 50,000.00
 SO ORDERED.5 WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED for lack of
merit. The judgment of the court a quo dated April 5, 2006 is
Appellant filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals raising the AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that accused-appellant
following as errors: is ORDERED to pay the private complainants legal interest on
the following amounts from the time of the filing of
I. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN the Information until fully paid:
CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE
CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE PROSECUTION’S
FAILURE TO ESTABLISH HIS GUILT BEYOND PHEX M. GARLEJO P 20,000.00
REASONABLE DOUBT.

II. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN

CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE EDNA PARAGAS P115,000.00
CRIME CHARGED SINCE NO EVIDENCE WAS
PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION SHOWING THAT
HE HAD NO LICENSE OR AUTHORITY TO RECRUIT BY
THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT SPOUSES MAGDALENO DIOSDADO P150,000.00
(DOLE).6 S.

In his Brief, appellant conceded that the prosecution satisfactorily ORDONIO & MARLENE G. ORDONIO
established that he engaged in the act of recruitment and placement of
workers for deployment abroad; however, he argued that he cannot be
held liable for illegal recruitment because it was not shown that he has
not secured a license or authority to recruit or deploy workers.7 ELLEN B. CANLAS P 50,000.00

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) countered that the

testimony of the PAOCTF agent’s that upon investigation with the
POEA, they discovered that appellant is a non-licensee or non-holder
of authority to recruit and deploy workers abroad, is sufficient proof
that indeed, he is not authorized to engage in recruitment activities.
The OSG also recommended that the penalty of fine imposed upon
appellant be increased from P100,000.00 to P500,000.00 and that the
award of actual damages should earn interest from the time of the
filing of the information until fully paid.
On September 20, 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered the herein
assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which provides:
SO ORDERED.8
Hence, the instant petition.
On March 5, 2008, this Court resolved to notify the parties to file their
respective supplemental briefs, if they so desire, within 30 days from
notice.9 On May 2, 2008, appellant filed a Manifestation and Motion
that he is dispensing with the filing of the supplemental brief.10 On
May 7, 2008, the OSG likewise manifested that it is no longer filing its
supplemental brief. Hence, this case is now deemed submitted for
resolution.
The petition lacks merit.
Appellant was charged with violation of Section 6 (l) and (m) of
Republic Act No. 8042 or the Migrant Workers and Overseas
Filipinos Act of 1995, which provides:
SEC. 6. Definition. – For purposes of this Act, illegal
recruitment shall mean any act of canvassing, enlisting,
contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers
and includes referring contract services, promising or
advertising for employment abroad, whether for profit of not,
when undertaken by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority
contemplated under Article 13(f) of Presidential Decree No.
442, as amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the
Philippines: Provided, That any such non-licensee or non-
holder who, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee
employment abroad to two or more persons shall be deemed
engaged. It shall likewise include the following acts, whether
committed by any person, whether a non-licensee, non
holder, licensee or holder of authority:
xxxx
(l) Failure to actually deploy without valid reason as
determined by the Department of Labor and Employment; and
(m) Failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the worker in
connection with his documentation and processing for purposes
of deployment, in cases where the deployment does not
actually take place without the worker’s fault.
x x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Appellant conceded in his Brief that the prosecution satisfactorily
established that he engaged in the act of recruitment and placement of
workers for deployment abroad. It was likewise proven that the private
complainants were never deployed to Taiwan as factory workers.
Moreover, it was also settled that he received certain amounts
allegedly to be used to cover the expenses for the documentation and
processing of the complainants’ papers, but said amounts were never
reimbursed to them despite their non-deployment and repeated
demands. However, appellant argued that he cannot be held liable for
illegal recruitment because it was not shown that he has not secured a
license or authority to recruit or deploy workers.
This contention lacks basis. It is clearly provided in Section 6 of
Republic Act No. 8042 that any person, whether a non-licensee,
non-holder, licensee or holder of authority may be held liable for
illegal recruitment for certain acts as enumerated in paragraphs (a) to
(m) thereof. Since appellant was charged with violation of Sec. 6 (l)
and (m), there is no more need to prove whether he is a licensee or not
because it is no longer an element of the crime. The trial court and the
Court of Appeals therefore correctly found appellant guilty as charged.
In the instant case, appellant is guilty of illegal recruitment in large
scale because it was committed against the four private complainants.
This is in accordance with the penultimate paragraph of Section 6 of
Republic Act No. 8042 which provides, thus:
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if
carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring
or confederating with one another. It is deemed committed in
large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons
individually or as a group.
The trial court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, imposed upon the
appellant the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of P100,000.00
plus actual damages, with interest thereon. However, the fine of
P100,000.00 should be increased to P500,000.00 pursuant to Section
7(b) of Republic Act No. 8042 which reads, thus:
(b) The penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less than
Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) nor more than One
million pesos (P1,000,000.00) shall be imposed if illegal
recruitment constitutes economic sabotage as defined therein.
Illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate or in large scale is
considered an offense involving economic sabotage.
 WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
the Court of Appeals dated September 20, 2007 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
No. 02374, affirming with modification the Judgment of the Regional of the Court’s Division.
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 12, in Crim. Case No. 00-184050,
finding appellant Jimmy Ang @ Ang Tiao Lam & Hung Chao Nan CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale and sentencing him to suffer Associate Justice
the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay actual damages with legal Chairperson, Third Division
interest thereon, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the
penalty of fine is INCREASED to P500,000.00.

SO ORDERED.
C E R T I FI CATI O N
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the
Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

WE CONCUR: REYNATO S. PUNO

Chief Justice

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice

ATT E STAT I O N
 The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses ROMULO
SAULO, AMELIA DE LA CRUZ and CLODUALDO DE LA CRUZ,
of the crime of ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT IN LARGE SCALE
(ART. 38(b) in relation to Art. 39(a) of the Labor Code of the
Philippines, as amended by P.D. No. 2018, committed as follows:

That on or about the period comprised from April 1990 to May 1990 in
Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together, confederating
with and mutually helping one another, by falsely representing
themselves to have the capacity to contract, enlist and recruit workers
for employment abroad, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously for a fee, recruit and promise employment/job placement
abroad to LEODEGARIO MAULLON, BENY MALIGAYA and
ANGELES JAVIER, without first securing the required license or
authority from the Department of Labor and Employment, in violation
of said law.

That the crime described above is committed in large scale as the same
was perpetrated against three (3) persons individually or as [a] group
G.R. No. 125903 November 15, 2000 penalized under Articles 38 and 39 as amended by PD 2018 of the
Labor Code (P.D. 442).
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. CONTRARY TO LAW.2
ROMULO SAULO, AMELIA DE LA CRUZ, and CLODUALDO
DE LA CRUZ, accused. In addition, accused were charged with three counts of estafa
ROMULO SAULO, accused-appellant. (Criminal Case Nos. Q-91-21908, Q-91-21909 and Q-91-21910).
Except for the names of the complainants, the dates of commission of
DECISION the crime charged, and the amounts involved, the informations3 were
identical in their allegations –
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
CRIM. CASE NO. Q-91-21908
Accused-appellant, together with Amelia de la Cruz and Clodualdo de
la Cruz, were charged with violation of Article 38 (b) of the Labor The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses ROMULO
Code1 for illegal recruitment in large scale in an information which SAULO, AMELIA DE LA CRUZ AND CLODUALDO DE LA
states – CRUZ of the crime of ESTAFA (Art. 315, par. 2 (a) RPC), committed
as follows:
CRIM. CASE NO. Q-91-21911
That on or about the period comprised from April 1990 to May 1990,
in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together,
confederating with and mutually helping one another, with intent of
gain, by means of false pretenses and/or fraudulent acts executed prior
to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, did, then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud one BENY
MALIGAYA, in the following manner, to wit: on the date and in the
place aforementioned, accused falsely pretended to the offended party
that they had connection and capacity to deploy workers for overseas
employment and that they could secure employment/placement for
said Beny Maligaya and believing said misrepresentations, the
offended party was later induced to give accused, as in fact she did
give the total amount of P35,000.00, Philippine Currency, and once in
possession of the said amount and far from complying with their
commitment and despite repeated demands made upon them to return
said amount, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
and with intent to defraud, misappropriate, misapply and convert the
same to their own personal use and benefit, to the damage and
prejudice of said offended party in the aforementioned amount and in
such amount as may be awarded under the provisions of the Civil
Code.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to all the
charges against him. Meanwhile accused Amelia de la Cruz and
Clodualdo de la Cruz have remained at large.
During trial, the prosecution sought to prove the following material
facts and circumstances surrounding the commission of the crimes:
Benny Maligaya, having learned from a relative of accused-appellant
that the latter was recruiting workers for Taiwan, went to accused-
appellant’s house in San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, together
with Angeles Javier and Amelia de la Cruz, in order to discuss her
chances for overseas employment. During that meeting which took
place sometime in April or May, 1990, accused-appellant told
Maligaya that she would be able to leave for Taiwan as a factory
worker once she gave accused-appellant the fees for the processing of
her documents. Sometime in May, 1990, Maligaya also met with
Amelia de la Cruz and Clodualdo de la Cruz at their house in Baesa,
Quezon City and they assured her that they were authorized by the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) to recruit
workers for Taiwan. Maligaya paid accused-appellant and Amelia de la
Cruz the amount of P35,000.00, which is evidenced by a receipt dated
May 21, 1990 signed by accused-appellant and Amelia de la Cruz
(Exhibit A in Crim. Case No. Q-91-21908). Seeing that he had reneged
on his promise to send her to Taiwan, Maligaya filed a complaint
against accused-appellant with the POEA.4
Angeles Javier, a widow and relative by affinity of accused-appellant,
was told by Ligaya, accused-appellant’s wife, to apply for work abroad
through accused-appellant. At a meeting in accused-appellant’s
Quezon City residence, Javier was told by accused-appellant that he
could get her a job in Taiwan as a factory worker and that she should
give him P35,000.00 for purposes of preparing Javier’s passport.
Javier gave an initial amount of P20,000.00 to accused-appellant, but
she did not ask for a receipt as she trusted him. As the overseas
employment never materialized, Javier was prompted to bring the
matter before the POEA.5
On April 19, 1990, Leodigario Maullon, upon the invitation of his
neighbor Araceli Sanchez, went to accused-appellant’s house in order
to discuss his prospects for gaining employment abroad. As in the case
of Maligaya and Javier, accused-appellant assured Maullon that he
could secure him a job as a factory worker in Taiwan if he paid him
P30,000.00 for the processing of his papers. Maullon paid P7,900.00
to accused-appellant’s wife, who issued a receipt dated April 21, 1990
(Exhibit A in Crim. Case No. Q-91-21910). Thereafter, Maullon paid
an additional amount of P6,800.00 in the presence of accused-
appellant and Amelia de la Cruz, which payment is also evidenced by
a receipt dated April 25, 1990 (Exhibit B in Crim. Case No. Q-91-
21910). Finally, Maullon paid P15,700.00 to a certain Loreta Tumalig,
a friend of accused-appellant, as shown by a receipt dated September
14, 1990 (Exhibit C in Crim. Case No. Q-91-21910). Again, accused-
appellant failed to deliver on the promised employment. Maullon thus
filed a complaint with the POEA.6
The prosecution also presented a certification dated July 26, 1994
issued by the POEA stating that accused are not licensed to recruit
workers for overseas employment (Exhibit A in Crim. Case No. Q-91-
21911).7
In his defense, accused-appellant claimed that he was also applying
with Amelia de la Cruz for overseas employment. He asserts that it
was for this reason that he met all three complainants as they all went
together to Amelia de la Cruz’ house in Novaliches, Quezon City
sometime in May, 1990 in order to follow up their applications.
Accused-appellant flatly denied that he was an overseas employment
recruiter or that he was working as an agent for one. He also denied
having received any money from any of the complainants or having
signed any of the receipts introduced by the prosecution in evidence. It
is accused-appellant’s contention that the complainants were prevailed
upon by accused-appellant’s mother-in-law, with whom he had a
misunderstanding, to file the present cases against him.8
The trial court found accused-appellant guilty of three counts of estafa
and of illegal recruitment in large scale. It adjudged:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused Romulo Saulo:
A. In Criminal Case No. Q-91-21908, guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the
Revised Penal Code as amended, without any mitigating or
aggravating circumstances, and this Court hereby sentences the
accused Romulo Saulo to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment of three (3) years, four (4) months and one (1)
day of prision correccional as minimum to seven (7) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum, and to indemnify
the complainant Beny Maligaya in the amount of P35,000.00,
with interest thereon at 12% per annum until the said amount is
fully paid, with costs against the said accused.
B. In Criminal Case No. Q-91-21909, guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the
Revised Penal Code as amended, without any mitigating or
aggravating circumstances, and this Court hereby sentences the
accused Romulo Saulo to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day
of prision correccional as minimum to six (6) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor as maximum, and to indemnify the
complainant Angeles Javier in the amount of P20,000.00 with
interest thereon at 12% per annum until the said amount is fully
paid, with costs against said accused.
C. In Criminal Case No. Q-91-21910, guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the
Revised Penal Code as amended, without any mitigating or
aggravating circumstances, and this Court hereby sentences the
accused Romulo Saulo to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day
of prision correccional as minimum to six (6) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor as maximum, and to indemnify the
complainant Leodigario Maullon in the amount of P30,400.00
with interest thereon at 12% per annum until the said amount is
fully paid, with costs against said accused.
D. In Criminal Case No. Q-91-21911, guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale as defined and
punished under Article 38 (b) in relation to Article 39 (a) of the
Labor Code of the Philippines as amended, and this Court
sentences the accused Romulo Saulo to suffer the penalty of
life imprisonment and to pay a fine of One Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P100,000.00).
Being a detention prisoner, the accused Romulo Saulo shall be entitled
to the benefits of Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code as amended.
SO ORDERED.9
The Court finds no merit in the instant appeal.
The essential elements of illegal recruitment in large scale, as defined
in Art. 38 (b) of the Labor Code and penalized under Art. 39 of the
same Code, are as follows:
 (1) the accused engages in the recruitment and placement of
workers, as defined under Article 13 (b) or in any prohibited
activities under Article 34 of the Labor Code;
(2) accused has not complied with the guidelines issued by the
Secretary of Labor and Employment, particularly with respect
to the securing of a license or an authority to recruit and deploy
workers, whether locally or overseas; and
(3) accused commits the same against three (3) or more
persons, individually or as a group.10
Under Art. 13 (b) of the Labor Code, recruitment and placement refers
to "any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing,
hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services,
promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether
for profit or not; Provided, That any person or entity which, in any
manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more
persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement."
After a careful and circumspect review of the records, the Court finds
that the trial court was justified in holding that accused-appellant was
engaged in unlawful recruitment and placement activities. The
prosecution clearly established that accused-appellant promised the
three complainants - Benny Maligaya, Angeles Javier and Leodigario
Maullon – employment in Taiwan as factory workers and that he asked
them for money in order to process their papers and procure their
passports. Relying completely upon such representations,
complainants entrusted their hard-earned money to accused-appellant
in exchange for what they would later discover to be a vain hope of
obtaining employment abroad. It is not disputed that accused-appellant
is not authorized11 nor licensed12 by the Department of Labor and
Employment to engage in recruitment and placement activities. The
absence of the necessary license or authority renders all of accused-
appellant’s recruitment activities criminal.
Accused-appellant interposes a denial in his defense, claiming that he
never received any money from the complainants nor processed their
papers. Instead, accused-appellant insists that he was merely a co-
applicant of the complainants and similarly deceived by the schemes
of Amelia and Clodualdo de la Cruz. He contends that the fact that
Benny Maligaya and Angleles Javier went to the house of Amelia and
Clodualdo de la Cruz in Novaliches, Quezon City, to get back their
money and to follow-up their application proves that complainants
knew that it was the de la Cruz’ who received the processing fees, and
not accused-appellant. Further, accused-appellant argues that
complainants could not have honestly believed that he could get them
their passports since they did not give him any of the necessary
documents, such as their birth certificate, baptismal certificate, NBI
clearance, and marriage contract.
Accused-appellant’s asseverations are self-serving and uncorroborated
by clear and convincing evidence. They cannot stand against the
straightforward and explicit testimonies of the complainants, who have
identified accused-appellant as the person who enticed them to part
with their money upon his representation that he had the capability of
obtaining employment for them abroad. In the absence of any evidence
that the prosecution witnesses were motivated by improper motives,
the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of the witnesses shall not
be interfered with by this Court.13
The fact that accused-appellant did not sign all the receipts issued to
complainants does not weaken the case of the prosecution. A person
charged with illegal recruitment may be convicted on the strength of
the testimonies of the complainants, if found to be credible and
convincing.14 The absence of receipts to evidence payment does not
warrant an acquittal of the accused, and it is not necessarily fatal to the
prosecution’s cause.15
Accused-appellant contends that he could not have committed the
crime of illegal recruitment in large scale since Nancy Avelino, a labor
and employment officer at the POEA, testified that licenses for
recruitment and placement are issued only to corporations and not to
natural persons. This argument is specious and illogical. The Labor
Code states that "any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or
promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be
deemed engaged in recruitment and placement."16 Corrolarily,
a nonlicensee or nonholder of authority is any person, corporation or
entity which has not been issued a valid license or authority to engage
in recruitment and placement by the Secretary of Labor, or whose
license or authority has been suspended, revoked, or canceled by the
POEA or the Secretary.17 It also bears stressing that agents or
representatives appointed by a licensee or a holder of authority but
whose appointments are not previously authorized by the POEA fall
within the meaning of the term nonlicensee or nonholder of
authority.18 Thus, any person, whether natural or juridical, that engages
in recruitment activities without the necessary license or authority
shall be penalized under Art. 39 of the Labor Code.
It is well established in jurisprudence that a person may be charged
and convicted for both illegal recruitment and estafa. The reason for
this is that illegal recruitment is a malum prohibitum, whereas estafa
is malum in se, meaning that the criminal intent of the accused is not
necessary for conviction in the former, but is required in the latter.19
The elements of estafa under Art. 315, paragraph 2 (a), of the Revised
Penal Code are: (1) that the accused has defrauded another by abuse of
confidence or by deceit, and (2) that damage or prejudice capable of
pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or third
person.20 The trial court was correct in holding accused-appellant liable
for estafa in the case at bench. Owing to accused-appellant’s false
assurances that he could provide them with work in another country,
complainants parted with their money, to their damage and prejudice,
since the promised employment never materialized.
Under Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for the crime of
estafa is as follows:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period
to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is
over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such
amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph
shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each
additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed
shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with
the accessory penalties which may be imposed under the provisions of
this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion
temporal, as the case may be.
xxx xxx xxx
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the
penalty shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances,
could be properly imposed under the Revised Penal Code, and the
minimum shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed for the offense. Since the penalty prescribed by law for the
estafa charge against accused-appellant is prision
correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum, the penalty next
lower in degree is prision correccional minimum to medium. Thus, the
minimum term of the indeterminate sentence should be anywhere
within six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2)
months.
In fixing the maximum term, the prescribed penalty of prision
correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum should be divided
into three equal portions of time, each of which portion shall be
deemed to form one period, as follows –
Minimum Period : From 4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 5 years, 5
months and 10 days
Medium Period : From 5 years, 5 months and 11 days to 6 years, 8
months and 20 days
Maximum Period : From 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years
pursuant to Article 65, in relation to Article 64, of the Revised Penal
Code.
When the amounts involved in the offense exceeds P22,000, the
penalty prescribed in Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code shall be
imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional
P10,000.00, although the total penalty which may be imposed shall not
exceed twenty (20) years.21
Accordingly, the following penalties shall be imposed upon accused-
appellant:
In Criminal Case No. Q-91-21908 where accused-appellant defrauded
Benny Maligaya in the amount of P35,000.00, one year for the
additional amount of P13,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00 provided for
in Article 315 shall be added to the maximum period of the prescribed
penalty of prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum.
Thus, accused-appellant shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of four
(4) years, and two (2) months of prision correccional medium, as
minimum to nine (9) years of prision mayor as maximum.22 Accused-
appellant shall also pay Benny Maligaya P35,000.00 by way of actual
damages.
In Criminal Case No. Q-91-21909 where accused-appellant defrauded
Angeles Javier in the amount of P20,000.00, accused-appellant shall
suffer the indeterminate penalty of one (1) year, eight (8) months and
twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional minimum to five (5)
years, five (5) months and eleven (11) days of prision
correccionalmaximum. Accused-appellant shall also pay Angeles
Javier P20,000.00 by way of actual damages.
In Criminal Case No. Q-91-21910 where accused-appellant defrauded
Leodigario Maullon in the amount of P30,400.00, accused-appellant
shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional medium, as minimum to eight (8) years
of prision mayor, as maximum.23 Accused-appellant shall also pay
Leodigario Maullon P30,400.00 by way of actual damages.
In addition, for the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale (Criminal
Case No. Q-91-21911) and pursuant to Article 39 (a) of the Labor
Code, accused-appellant shall suffer the penalty of life imprisonment
and a fine of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00).
WHEREFORE, the March 6, 1996 Decision of the trial court finding
accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
illegal recruitment in large scale and estafa is hereby AFFIRMED
subject to the following modifications:
In Criminal Case No. Q-91-21908 where accused-appellant defrauded
Benny Maligaya in the amount of P35,000.00, one year for the
additional amount of P13,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00 provided for
in Article 315 shall be added to the maximum period of the prescribed
penalty of prision correccional maximum to prision mayorminimum.
Thus, accused-appellant shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of four
(4) years, and two (2) months of prision correccional medium, as
minimum to nine (9) years of prision mayor as maximum. Accused-
appellant shall also pay Benny Maligaya P35,000.00 by way of actual
damages.1âwphi1
In Criminal Case No. Q-91-21909 where accused-appellant defrauded
Angeles Javier in the amount of P20,000.00, accused-appellant shall
suffer the indeterminate penalty of one (1) year, eight (8) months and
twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional minimum to five (5)
years, five (5) months and eleven (11) days of prision
correccionalmaximum. Accused-appellant shall also pay Angeles
Javier P20,000.00 by way of actual damages.
In Criminal Case No. Q-91-21910 where accused-appellant defrauded
Leodigario Maullon in the amount of P30,400.00, accused-appellant
shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional medium, as minimum to eight (8) years
of prision mayor, as maximum. Accused-appellant shall also pay
Leodigario Maullon P30,400.00 by way of actual damages.
In addition, for the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale (Criminal
Case No. Q-91-21911) and pursuant to Article 39 (a) of the Labor
Code, accused-appellant shall suffer the penalty of life imprisonment
and a fine of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00).
Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 141221-36 March 7, 2002
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FRANCISCO HERNANDEZ (at large), KARL REICHL, and
YOLANDA GUTIERREZ DE REICHL, accused,
KARL REICHL and YOLANDA GUTIERREZ DE
REICHL, accused-appellants
PUNO, J.:
This is an appeal from the Joint Decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Batangas City in Criminal Case Nos. 6428, 6429, 6430, 6431, 6432,
6433, 6434, 6435, 6436, 6437, 6438, 6439, 6528, 6529, 6530 and 6531
finding accused-appellants, Spouses Karl Reichl and Yolanda
Gutierrez de Reichl guilty of five (5) counts of estafa and one (1)
count of syndicated and large scale illegal recruitment.1
In April 1993, eight (8) informations for syndicated and large scale
illegal recruitment and eight (8) informations for estafa were filed
against accused-appellants, spouses Karl and Yolanda Reichl, together
with Francisco Hernandez. Only the Reichl spouses were tried and
convicted by the trial court as Francisco Hernandez remained at
large.1âwphi1.nêt
The evidence for the prosecution consisted of the testimonies of
private complainants; a certification from the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA) that Francisco Hernandez, Karl
Reichl and Yolanda Gutierrez Reichl in their personal capacities were
neither licensed nor authorized by the POEA to recruit workers for
overseas employment;2 the receipts for the payment made by private
complainants; and two documents signed by the Reichl spouses where
they admitted that they promised to secure Austrian tourist visas for
private complainants and that they would return all the expenses
incurred by them if they are not able to leave by March 24, 1993,3 and
where Karl Reichl pledged to refund to private complainants the total
sum of P1,388,924.00 representing the amounts they paid for the
processing of their papers.4
Private complainant Narcisa Hernandez, a teacher, was first to testify
for the prosecution. She stated that Francisco Hernandez introduced
her to the spouses Karl and Yolanda Reichl at the residence of a certain
Hilarion Matira at Kumintang Ibaba, Batangas City. At the time, she
also saw the other applicants Melanie Bautista, Estela Manalo, Edwin
Coleng, Anicel Umahon, Analiza Perez and Maricel Matira. Karl and
Yolanda Reichl told Narcisa that they could find her a job as domestic
helper in Italy. They, however, required her to pay the amount
of P150,000.00 for the processing of her papers and travel documents.
She paid the fee in three installments. She paid the first installment
of P50,000.00 on July 14, 1992, the second installment of P25,000.00
on August 6, 1992 and the third in the amount of P75,000.00 on
December 27, 1992. She gave the money to Francisco Hernandez in
the presence of the Reichl spouses at Matira's residence. Francisco
Hernandez issued a receipt for the first and second installment5but not
for the third. Narcisa was scheduled to leave on December 17, 1992
but was not able to do so. Karl Reichl explained that she would get her
transit visa to Italy in Austria, but she could not yet leave for Austria
because the hotels were fully booked at that time because of the
Christmas season. Narcisa's departure was again scheduled on January
5, 1993, but it still did not push through. Narcisa stated that they went
to Manila several times supposedly to obtain a visa from the Austrian
Embassy and Karl Reichl assured her that she would be able to leave
once she gets her visa. The accused set the departure of Narcisa and
that of the other applicants several times but these proved to be empty
promises. In March 1993, the applicants met with the three accused at
the residence of private complainant Charito Balmes and asked them
to refund the payment if they could not send them abroad. The meeting
resulted in an agreement which was reduced into writing and signed by
Karl Reichl. Mr. Reichl promised to ensure private complainants'
departure by April, otherwise, they would return their payment.6
Private complainant Leonora Perez also gave the following testimony:
In July 1992, her sister, Analiza Perez, introduced her to Francisco
Hernandez at their residence in Dolor Subdivision, Batangas City.
Francisco Hernandez convinced her to apply for a job in Italy. When
she accepted the offer, Francisco Hernandez told her to
prepare P150,000.00 for the processing of her papers. In August 1992,
Leonora, together with her sister and Francisco Hernandez, went to
Ramada Hotel in Manila to meet with Karl and Yolanda Reichl. At said
meeting, Leonora handed her payment of P50,000.00 to Yolanda
Reichl. Yolanda assured her that she would be able to work in Italy.
Francisco Hernandez and the Reichl spouses told Leonora to wait for
about three weeks before she could leave. After three weeks, Francisco
Hernandez invited Leonora and the other applicants to the house of
Hilarion Matira in Batangas City to discuss some matters. Francisco
Hernandez informed the applicants that their departure would be
postponed to December 17, 1992. December 17 came and the
applicants were still unable to leave as it was allegedly a holiday.
Yolanda and Karl Reichl nonetheless assured Leonora of employment
as domestic helper in Italy with a monthly salary of $1,000.00.
Francisco Hernandez and the Reichl spouses promised the applicants
that they would leave for Italy on January 5, 1993. Some time in
January 1993, Francisco Hernandez went to the residence of Leonora
and collected the sum of P50,000.00 purportedly for the plane fare.
Francisco issued a receipt for the payment. When the applicants were
not able to leave on the designated date, Francisco Hernandez and the
spouses again made another promise. Tired of the recruiters'
unfulfilled promises, the applicants decided to withdraw their
application. However, Karl Reichl constantly assured them that they
would land a job in Italy because he had connections in Vienna. The
promised employment, however, never materialized. Thus, Karl Reichl
signed a document stating that he would refund the payment made by
the applicants plus interest and other expenses. The document was
executed and signed at the house of one of the applicants, Charito
Balmes, at P. Zamora St., Batangas City.7
Janet Perez, Leonora's sister, corroborated the latter's testimony that
she paid a total amount of P100,000.00 to the three accused.8
Private complainant Charito Balmes told a similar story when she
testified before the court. She said that Francisco Hernandez convinced
her to apply for the job of domestic helper in Italy and required her to
pay a fee of P150,000.00. He also asked her to prepare her passport
and other papers to be used to secure a visa. On November 25, 1992,
she gave P25,000.00 to Francisco Hernandez. They proceeded to
Kumintang Ibaba, Batangas City and Francisco Hernandez introduced
her to his business partners, spouses Karl and Yolanda Reichl.
Francisco Hernandez turned over the payment to the spouses so that
they could secure a visa for her. The Reichl spouses promised her an
overseas job. They said she and the other applicants would leave on
December 17, 1992. On December 11, 1992, Charito paid the amount
of P70,300.00 to Francisco Hernandez in the presence of the Reichls.
Francisco Hernandez again handed the money to the spouses. On
February 16, 1993, Charito paid P20,000.00 to Francisco Hernandez
who delivered the same to the spouses. Francisco Hernandez did not
issue a receipt for the payment made by Charito because he told her
that he would not betray her trust. Like the other applicants, Charito
was not able to leave the country despite the numerous promises made
by the accused. They gave various excuses for their failure to depart,
until finally the Reichls told the applicants that Karl Reichl had so
many business transactions in the Philippines that they would not be
able to send them abroad and that they would refund their payment
instead. Hence, they executed an agreement which was signed by Karl
Reichl and stating that they would return the amounts paid by the
applicants. The accused, however, did not comply with their
obligation.9
Mrs. Elemenita Bautista, the mother of private complainant Melanie
Bautista, also took the witness stand. She stated that in May 1992,
Melanie applied for an overseas job through Francisco Hernandez.
Francisco Hernandez told her to prepare P150,000.00 to be used for
the processing of her papers and plane ticket. On June 26, 1992,
Melanie made the initial payment of P50,000.00 to Francisco
Hernandez who was then accompanied by Karl and Yolanda
Reichl.10 Upon receipt of the payment, Francisco Hernandez gave the
money to Yolanda Reichl. Melanie made two other payments: one on
August 6, 1992 in the amount of P25,000.00,11 and another on January
3, 1993 in the amount of P51,000.00.12 Three receipts were issued for
the payments.13
Rustico Manalo, the husband of private complainant Estela Abel de
Manalo, testified that his wife applied for the job of domestic helper
abroad. In June 1992, Francisco Hernandez introduced them to Karl
and Yolanda Reichl who were allegedly sending workers to Italy.
Rustico and his wife prepared all the relevant documents, i.e.,
passport, police clearance and marriage contract, and paid a total
placement fee of P130,000.00.14 They paid P50,000.00 on June 5,
1992, P25,000.00 on August 8, 1992, and P55,000.00 on January 3,
1993. The payments were made at the house of Hilarion Matira and
were received by Francisco Hernandez who, in turn, remitted them to
the Reichl spouses. Francisco Hernandez issued a receipt for the
payment. The Reichls promised to take care of Estela's papers and to
secure a job for her abroad. The Reichls vowed to return the payment
if they fail on their promise. As with the other applicants, Estela was
also not able to leave the country.15
The defense interposed denial and alibi.
Accused-appellant Karl Reichl, an Austrian citizen, claimed that he
entered the Philippines on July 29, 1992. Prior to this date, he was in
various places in Europe. He came to the country on July 29, 1992 to
explore business opportunities in connection with the import and
export of beer and sugar. He also planned to establish a tourist spot
somewhere in Batangas. Upon his arrival, he and his wife, Yolanda
Reichl, stayed at the Manila Intercontinental Hotel. On August 3,
1992, they moved to Manila Midtown Hotel. They stayed there until
August 26, 1992. After they left Manila Midtown Hotel, they went to
another hotel in Quezon City. Karl Reichl returned to Vienna on
September 19, 1992.16
Mr. Reichl stated that he first met Francisco Hernandez through a
certain Jimmy Pineda around August 1992 at Manila Midtown Hotel.
Francisco Hernandez was allegedly looking for a European equipment
to be used for the quarrying operation of his friend. Before accepting
the deal, he made some research on the background of the intended
business. Realizing that said business would not be viable, Karl Reichl
advised Francisco Hernandez to instead look for a second-hand
equipment from Taiwan or Japan. He never saw Francisco Hernandez
again until he left for Vienna in September 1992.17
Karl Reichl returned to the Philippines on October 21, 1992. Francisco
Hernandez allegedly approached him and sought his help in securing
Austrian visas purportedly for his relatives. Karl Reichl refused and
told him that he was planning to stay permanently in the Philippines.
On one occasion, Francisco Hernandez invited him to an excursion at
Sombrero Island. Francisco Hernandez told him that he would also
bring some of his relatives with him and he would introduce him to
them. There he met Narcisa Hernandez and Leonora Perez. Leonora
Perez, together with Francisco Hernandez, later went to see Mr. Reichl
at the house of his in-laws at No. 4 Buenafe Road, Batangas City and
asked him if he could help her obtain an Austrian visa. Karl Reichl,
however, was firm on his refusal.18
In his testimony before the trial court, Karl Reichl denied any
knowledge about Francisco Hernandez's recruitment activities. He said
that Francisco Hernandez merely told him that he wanted to help his
relatives go to Europe. He further denied that he promised private
complainants that he would give them overseas employment.19 As
regards the document where Mr. Reichl undertook to
pay P1,388,924.00 to private complainants, he claimed that he signed
said document under duress. Francisco Hernandez allegedly told him
that private complainants would harm him and his family if he refused
to sign it. He signed the document as he felt he had no other option.20
Yolanda Gutierrez de Reichl corroborated the testimony of her
husband and denied the charges against her. She claimed that she was
in Manila on the dates alleged in the various informations, thus, she
could not have committed the acts charged therein. Yolanda Reichl
further stated that she did not know of any reason why private
complainants filed these cases against her and her husband. She said
that several persons were harassing her and pressuring her to pay
private complainants the sum of at least P50,000.00.21
After assessing the evidence presented by the parties, the trial court
rendered a decision convicting accused-appellants of one (1) count of
illegal recruitment in large scale and six (6) counts of estafa. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the
accused spouses KARL REICHL and YOLANDA
GUTIERREZ REICHL -
1. NOT GUILTY of the crime of syndicated and large-
scale illegal recruitment as charged in the above-
mentioned Criminal Cases Nos. 6435, 6437 and 6529;
2. NOT GUILTY of the crime of estafa as charged in
the above-mentioned Criminal Cases Nos. 6434, 6436
and 6528;
3. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
syndicated and large-scale illegal recruitment, as
charged, in the above-mentioned Criminal Cases Nos.
6429, 6431, 6433, 6439 and 6531;
4. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
estafa, as charged, in the above-mentioned Criminal
Cases Nos. 6428, 6430, 6432, 6438 and 6530.
The Court hereby imposes upon the accused-spouses KARL REICHL
and YOLANDA GUTIERREZ REICHL the following sentences:
1. For the 5 offenses, collectively, of syndicated and large-scale
illegal recruitment in Criminal Cases Nos. 6429, 6431, 6433,
6438 and 6531, to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment, and
to pay a fine of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00);
2. In Criminal Case No. 6428, there being no mitigating or
aggravating circumstance, to suffer the indeterminate sentence
of Six (6) Years of prision correctional, as minimum to Sixteen
(16) Years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to
indemnify the complainant Narcisa Hernandez in the amount
of P150,000.00;
3. In Criminal Case No. 6430, there being no mitigating or
aggravating circumstance, to suffer the indeterminate sentence
of six (6) years of prision correctional as minimum to eleven
(11) years of prision mayor, as maximum and to indemnify the
complainant Leonora Perez in the amount of P100,000.00;
4. In Criminal Case No. 6432, there being no mitigating or
aggravating circumstance, to suffer the indeterminate sentence
of six (6) years of prision correctional as minimum to sixteen
(16) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum and to
indemnify the complainant Melanie Bautista in the amount
of P150,000.00;
5. In Criminal Case No. 6438, there being no mitigating or
aggravating circumstance, to suffer the indeterminate sentence
of six (6) years of prision correctional as minimum to fourteen
(14) years of reclusion temporal as maximum and to indemnify
the complainant Estela Abel de Manalo in the amount
of P130,000.00;
6. In Criminal Case No. 6530, there being no mitigating or
aggravating circumstance, to suffer the indeterminate sentence
of six (6) years or prision correctional as minimum to thirteen
(13) years of reclusion temporal as maximum and to indemnify
the complainant Charito Balmes in the amount of P121,300.00;
and
7. To pay the costs.
 SO ORDERED."
Accused-appellants appealed from the decision of the trial court. They
raise the following errors:
"1. The trial court erred in finding accused-appellant Karl
Reichl guilty of the crimes of estafa and illegal recruitment
committed by syndicate and in large scale based on the
evidence presented by the prosecution which miserably failed
to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
2. The trial court erred in convicting the accused-appellant of
the crime of illegal recruitment on a large scale by
cummulating five separate cases of illegal recruitment each
filed by a single private complainant.
3. The trial court erred in rendering as a matter of course an
automatic guilty verdict against accused-appellant for the crime
of estafa after a guilty verdict in a separate crime for illegal
recruitment. It is submitted that conviction in the latter crime
does not ipso facto result in conviction in the former."22
The appeal is bereft of merit.
Article 38 of the Labor Code defines illegal recruitment as "any
recruitment activities, including the prohibited practices enumerated
under Article 34 of (the Labor Code), to be undertaken by non-
licensees or non-holders of authority." The term "recruitment and
placement" refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting,
transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, including referrals,
contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or
abroad, whether for profit or not, provided that any person or entity
which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two
or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and
placement.23The law imposes a higher penalty when the illegal
recruitment is committed by a syndicate or in large scale as they are
considered an offense involving economic sabotage. Illegal
recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a
group of three (3) or more persons conspiring and/or confederating
with one another in carrying out any unlawful or illegal transaction,
enterprise or scheme. It is deemed committed in large scale if
committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a
group.24
In the case at bar, the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable
doubt that accused-appellants engaged in activities that fall within the
definition of recruitment and placement under the Labor Code. The
evidence on record shows that they promised overseas employment to
private complainants and required them to prepare the necessary
documents and to pay the placement fee, although they did not have
any license to do so. There is illegal recruitment when one who does
not possess the necessary authority or license gives the impression of
having the ability to send a worker abroad.25
Accused-appellants assert that they merely undertook to secure
Austrian visas for private complainants, which act did not constitute
illegal recruitment. They cite the document marked at Exhibit "J"
stating that they promised to obtain Austrian tourist visas for private
complainants. We are not convinced. Private complainants Narcisa
Hernandez, Leonora Perez and Charito Balmes categorically stated
that Karl and Yolanda Reichl told them that they would provide them
overseas employment and promised them that they would be able to
leave the country on a specified date. We do not see any reason to
doubt the truthfulness of their testimony. The defense has not shown
any ill motive for these witnesses to falsely testify against accused-
appellants if it were not true that they met with the Reichl spouses and
the latter represented themselves to have the capacity to secure gainful
employment for them abroad. The minor lapses in the testimony of
these witnesses pointed out by accused-appellants in their brief do not
impair their credibility, especially since they corroborate each other on
the material points, i.e., that they met with the three accused several
times, that the three accused promised to give them overseas
employment, and that they paid the corresponding placement fee but
were not able to leave the country. It has been held that truth-telling
witnesses are not always expected to give error-free testimonies
considering the lapse of time and the treachery of human
memory.26 Moreover, it was shown that Karl Reichl signed a document
marked as Exhibit "C" where he promised to refund the payments
given by private complainants for the processing of their papers. We
are not inclined to believe Mr. Reichl's claim that he was forced by
Francisco Hernandez to sign said document. There is no showing,
whether in his testimony or in that of his wife, that private
complainants threatened to harm them if he did not sign the document.
Mr. Reichl is an educated man and it cannot be said that he did not
understand the contents of the paper he was signing. When he affixed
his signature thereon, he in effect acknowledged his obligation to
ensure the departure of private complainants and to provide them
gainful employment abroad. Such obligation arose from the promise of
overseas placement made by him and his co-accused to private
complainants. The admission made by accused-appellants in Exhibit
"J" that they promised to obtain Austrian visas for private
complainants does not negate the fact that they also promised to
procure for them overseas employment. In fact, in Exhibit "J",
accused-appellants admitted that each of the private complainants paid
the amount of P50,000.00. However, in Exhibit "C", which was
executed on a later date, accused-appellants promised to refund to each
complainant an amount exceeding P150,000.00. This is an
acknowledgment that accused-appellants received payments from the
complainants not only for securing visas but also for their placement
abroad.
Accused-appellants' defense of denial and alibi fail to impress us. The
acts of recruitment were committed from June 1992 until January 1993
in Batangas City. Karl Reichl was in Manila from July 29, 1992 until
September 19, 1992, and then he returned to the Philippines and stayed
in Batangas from October 21, 1992. Yolanda Reichl, on the other hand,
claimed that he was in Manila on the dates alleged in the various
informations. It is of judicial notice that Batangas City is only a few
hours' drive from Manila. Thus, even if the spouses were staying in
Manila, it does not prevent them from going to Batangas to engage in
their recruitment business. Furthermore, it appears that the three
accused worked as a team and they conspired and cooperated with
each other in recruiting domestic helpers purportedly to be sent to
Italy. Francisco Hernandez introduced Karl and Yolanda Reichl to the
job applicants as his business partners. Karl and Yolanda Reichl
themselves gave assurances to private complainants that they would
seek employment for them in Italy. Francisco Hernandez remitted the
payments given by the applicants to the Reichl spouses and the latter
undertook to process the applicants' papers. There being conspiracy,
each of the accused shall be equally liable for the acts of his co-
accused even if he himself did not personally take part in its execution.
Accused-appellants argue that the trial court erred in convicting
accused-appellants of illegal recruitment in large scale by
cummulating the individual informations filed by private
complainants. The eight informations for illegal recruitment are
worded as follows:
Criminal Case No. 6429
"That on or about July 14, 1992 and sometime prior and
subsequent thereto at Hilltop, Brgy. Kumintang Ibaba,
Batangas City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, knowing fully
well that they are non-licensees nor holders of authority from
the Department of Labor and Employment or any other
authorized government entity, conspiring and confederating
together, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously engage in syndicated and large scale recruitment
and placement activities by enlisting, contracting, procuring,
offering and promising for a fee to one Narcisa Autor de
Hernandez and to more than three other persons, job placement
abroad, by reason of which said Narcisa Autor de Hernandez
relying on these misrepresentations, paid and/or gave the
amount of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND
(P150,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, to said accused,
which acts constitute a violation of the said law.
Contrary to Law."
Criminal Case No. 6431
"That on or about July 1992 and sometime prior and
subsequent thereto at Dolor Subdivision, Batangas City,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, knowing fully well that they are
 non-licensees nor holders of authority from the Department of
Labor and Employment or any other authorized government
entity, conspiring and confederating together, did then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously engage in
syndicated and large scale recruitment and placement activities
by enlisting, contracting, procuring, offering and promising for
a fee to one Leonora Perez y Atienza and to more than three
other persons, job placement abroad, by reason of which said
Leonora Perez y Atienza relying on these misrepresentations,
paid and/or gave the amount of ONE HUNDRED
THOUSAND (P100,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, to
said accused, which acts constitute a violation of the said law.
Contrary to Law."
Criminal Case No. 6433
"That on or about June 26, 1992 and sometime prior and
subsequent thereto at Hilltop, Brgy. Kumintang Ibaba,
Batangas City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, knowing fully
well that they are non-licensees nor holders of authority from
the Department of Labor and Employment or any other
authorized government entity, conspiring and confederating
together, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously engage in syndicated and large scale recruitment
and placement activities by enlisting, contracting, procuring,
offering and promising for a fee to one Melanie Bautista y
Dolor and to more than three other persons, job placement
abroad, by reason of which said Melanie Bautista y Dolor
relying on these misrepresentations, paid and/or gave the
amount of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND
(P150,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, to said accused,
which acts constitute a violation of the said law.1âwphi1.nêt
Contrary to Law."
Criminal Case No. 6435
"That on or about July 12, 1992 and sometime prior and
subsequent thereto at Hilltop, Brgy. Kumintang Ibaba,
Batangas City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, knowing fully
well that they are non-licensees nor holders of authority from
the Department of Labor and Employment or any other
authorized government entity, conspiring and confederating
together, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously engage in syndicated and large scale recruitment
and placement activities by enlisting, contracting, procuring,
offering and promising for a fee to one Annaliza Perez y
Atienza and to more than three other persons, job placement
abroad, by reason of which said Annaliza Perez y Atienza
relying on these misrepresentations, paid and/or gave the
amount of ONE HUNDRED SIXTY THOUSAND
(P160,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, to said accused,
which acts constitute a violation of the said law.
Contrary to Law.
Criminal Case No. 6437
"That on or about August 15, 1992 and sometime prior and
subsequent thereto at Hilltop, Brgy. Kumintang Ibaba,
Batangas City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, knowing fully
well that they are non-licensees nor holders of authority from
the Department of Labor and Employment or any other
authorized government entity, conspiring and confederating
together, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously engage in syndicated and large scale recruitment
and placement activities by enlisting, contracting, procuring,
offering and promising for a fee to one Edwin Coling y Coling
and to more than three other persons, job placement abroad, by
reason of which said Edwin Coling y Coling relying on these
misrepresentations, paid and/or gave the amount of ONE
HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND (P150,000.00) PESOS,
Philippine Currency, to said accused, which acts constitute a
violation of the said law.
 Contrary to Law."
Criminal Case No. 6439
"That on or about June 5, 1992 and sometime prior and
subsequent thereto at Hilltop, Brgy. Kumintang Ibaba,
Batangas City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, knowing fully
well that they are non-licensees nor holders of authority from
the Department of Labor and Employment or any other
authorized government entity, conspiring and confederating
together, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously engage in syndicated and large scale recruitment
and placement activities by enlisting, contracting, procuring,
offering and promising for a fee to one Estela Abel de Manalo
and to more than three other persons, job placement abroad, by
reason of which said Estela Abel de Manalo relying on these
misrepresentations, paid and/or gave the amount of ONE
HUNDRED THIRTY THOUSAND (P130,000.00) PESOS,
Philippine Currency, to said accused, which acts constitute a
violation of the said law.
Contrary to Law."
Criminal Case No. 6529
"That on or about July 1992 and sometime prior and
subsequent thereto at Brgy. Sta. Rita Karsada, Batangas City,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, knowing fully well that they are
non-licensees nor holders of authority from the Department of
Labor and Employment or any other authorized government
entity, conspiring and confederating together, did then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously engage in
syndicated and large scale recruitment and placement activities
by enlisting, contracting, procuring, offering and promising for
a fee to one Anicel Umahon y Delgado and to more than three
other persons, job placement abroad, by reason of which said
Anicel Umahon y Delgado relying on these misrepresentations,
paid and/or gave the amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY
THOUSAND (P130,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, to
said accused, which acts constitute a violation of the said law.
Contrary to Law."
Criminal Case No. 6531
"That on or about November 25, 1992 and sometime prior and
subsequent thereto at No. 40 P. Zamora Street, Batangas City,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, knowing fully well that they are
non-licensees nor holders of authority from the Department of
Labor and Employment or any other authorized government
entity, conspiring and confederating together, did then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously engage in
syndicated and large scale recruitment and placement activities
by enlisting, contracting, procuring, offering and promising for
a fee to one Charito Balmes y Cantos and to more than three
other persons, job placement abroad, by reason of which said
Charito Balmes y Cantos relying on these misrepresentations,
paid and/or gave the amount of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY
ONE THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED PESOS
(P121,300.00), Philippine Currency, to said accused, which
acts constitute a violation of the said law.
Contrary to Law."
We note that each information was filed by only one complainant. We
agree with accused-appellants that they could not be convicted for
illegal recruitment committed in large scale based on several
informations filed by only one complainant. The Court held in People
vs. Reyes:27
"x x x When the Labor Code speaks of illegal recruitment
'committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as
a group,' it must be understood as referring to the number of
complainants in each case who are complainants therein,
otherwise, prosecutions for single crimes of illegal recruitment
 can be cummulated to make out a case of large scale illegal private complainants to pay a placement fee of P150,000.00. Such act
recruitment. In other words, a conviction for large scale illegal clearly constitutes estafa under Article 315 (2) of the Revised Penal
recruitment must be based on a finding in each case of illegal Code.
recruitment of three or more persons whether individually or as
a group."28 IN VIEW WHEREOF, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision
appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.
This, however, does not serve to lower the penalty imposed upon
accused-appellants. The charge was not only for illegal recruitment Cost against appellants.
committed in large scale but also for illegal recruitment committed by
a syndicate. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if SO ORDERED.
carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring and/or
confederating with one another in carrying out any unlawful or illegal Davide, Jr., C.J., Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
transaction, enterprise or scheme defined under the first paragraph of
Article 38 of the Labor Code. It has been shown that Karl Reichl,
Yolanda Reichl and Francisco Hernandez conspired with each other in
convincing private complainants to apply for an overseas job and
giving them the guaranty that they would be hired as domestic helpers
in Italy although they were not licensed to do so. Thus, we hold that
accused-appellants should be held liable for illegal recruitment
committed by a syndicate which is also punishable by life
imprisonment and a fine of one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00)
under Article 39 of the Labor Code.

Finally, we hold that the prosecution also proved the guilt of accused-
appellants for the crime of estafa. A person who is convicted of illegal
recruitment may, in addition, be convicted of estafa under Art. 315 (2)
of the Revised Penal Code provided the elements of estafa are present.
Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code is
committed by any person who defrauds another by using a fictitious
name, or falsely pretends to possess power, influence, qualifications,
property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by
means of similar deceits executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud. The offended party must have relied on the
false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means of the accused-
appellant and as a result thereof, the offended party suffered
damages.29 It has been proved in this case that accused-appellants
represented themselves to private complainants to have the capacity to
send domestic helpers to Italy, although they did not have any
authority or license. It is by this representation that they induced
 maximum for each count of estafa, and pay each complainant the
amount of P40,000.00 as civil indemnity.

Accused, thru counsel, filed her Notice of Appeal, dated March 6,

1992, indicating her desire to elevate her case to this Court. 6 The
records of the case were, however, transmitted by the trial court to the
Court of Appeals. In its Decision7 dated November 26, 1993, the
appellate court affirmed appellant's conviction. However, it modified
the penalty for the three (3) estafa cases. The dispositive portion of the
decision of the appellate court states:

WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. 92-102377, the

G.R. No. 113547 February 9, 1995
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANITA BAUTISTA y LATOJA, accused-appellant.
PUNO, J.:
Four (4) separate Informations1 were filed before the Regional Trial
Court of Manila (Branch XLI) against accused ANITA BAUTISTA y
LATOJA, charging her with the crimes of Illegal Recruitment In Large
Scale2 and Estafa.3
Upon arraignment on January 29, 1992, accused pleaded NOT
GUILTY.4 The four (4) cases were tried jointly.
After trial, the court a quo found accused guilty as charged. 5 In the
illegal recruitment case, she was meted the penalty of life
imprisonment and ordered to pay P 100,000.00 as fine. In the estafa
cases, she was sentenced from two (2) years, eight (8) months and
twenty one (21) days of prision correccional as minimum, to six (6)
years, five (5) months and eleven (11) days of prision mayor as
Court finds accused Anita Bautista GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of illegal
recruitment, described and penalized under Article 13
(b), Article 38 (a) and (b) and Article 39 (a) of the
Labor Code, and imposes upon her the penalty of life
imprisonment and fine of P100,000.00. . . .
Insofar as Criminal Case No. 92-102378, Criminal Case
No. 92-102379 and Criminal Case No. 92-102380, the
Court renders judgment, finding accused Anita
Bautista GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of
the crime of estafa, described and penalized under
Article 315 par. 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code, and
sentencing her in each criminal case to the
indeterminate penalty of (sic) from FOUR (4) YEARS
and TWO (2) MONTHS of prision correccional, as
minimum, to NINE (9) YEARS of prision mayor, as
maximum, and to pay each complainants Remigio
Fortes, Anastacio Amor and Dominador Costales, the
amount of P40,000.00, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, with costs.
Accordingly, the penalty imposed upon accused by the
lower court is MODIFIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Pursuant to Section 13 of Rule 124, the appellate court elevated to us
the records of the case for review. Notice was given to appellant for
her to file additional Brief if she so desires. None was filed in her
behalf.
The facts are as found by the appellate court:
Sometime in August 1991, accused Anita Bautista
approached Romeo Paguio at the latter's restaurant at
565 Padre Faura St., Manila, and offered job openings
abroad. At that time, Paguio had relatives who were
interested to work abroad. Accused, who also operated
a restaurant nearby at Padre Faura, informed Paguio
that she knew somebody who could facilitate
immediate employment in Taiwan for Paguio's
relatives. Accused Anita Bautista introduced Rosa
Abrero to Paguio. Abrero informed him that the
applicants could leave for Taiwan within a period of
one-month from the payment of placement fees. They
informed Paguio that the placement fee was P40,000.00
for each person. Paguio contacted his relatives,
complainants Remigio Fortes and Dominador Costales
who were his brothers-in-law, and Anastacio Amor, a
cousin, who lost no time raising the needed money and
gave the same to Paguio. The three were to work as
factory workers and were to be paid $850.00 monthly
salary each. Paguio gave Rosa Abrero P20,000.00,
which would be used in following up the papers of the
complainants; later he gave accused P40,000.00 and
P60,000.00 in separate amounts, totalling P100,000.00,
as the remaining balance. Abrero and accused Bautista
promised Paguio and complainants that the latter could
leave for Taiwan before September 25, 1991. As
September 25, 1991 approached, accused Bautista
informed Paguio and complainants that there was a
delay in the latter's departure because their tickets and
visas had not yet been released. Accused re-scheduled
the complainants' departure to October 10, 1991. Came
October 10, 1991, and complainants were still not able
to leave. Paguio then required accused Bautista to sign
the "Acknowledgment Receipt," dated October 11,
1991, in which accused admitted having received the
sum of P100,000.00 from Paguio, representing payment
of plane tickets, visas and other travel documents
(Exhibit A). Paguio asked accused to return
complainants' money; accused, however, promised that
complainants could leave for Taiwan before Christmas.
From POEA, Paguio secured a certification, dated
January 9, 1992 attesting that Annie Bautista and Rosa
Abrero are not licensed or authorized to recruit workers
for overseas employment (Exhibit B). Complainants
Fortes, Amor and Costales, as well as Paguio, gave their
written statements at the Office of the Assistant Chief
Directorial Staff for Intelligence of the WPDC,
complaining about their being victims of illegal
recruitment by Rosa Abrero and Annie Bautista
(Exhibits C, D, E and F).
The issue boils down to whether or not reasonable doubt exists to
warrant the acquittal of appellant Anita Bautista.
We find none.
The Labor Code defines recruitment and placement as referring to
"any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing,
hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services,
promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether
for profit or not: Provided that any person or entity which, in any
manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more
persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement."8
It is settled that the essential elements of the crime of illegal
recruitment in large scale are: (1) the accused engages in the
recruitment and placement of workers, as defined under Article 13 (b)
or in any prohibited activities under Article 34 of the Labor Code; (2)
accused has not complied with the guidelines issued by the Secretary
of Labor and Employment, particularly with respect to the securing of
a license or an authority to recruit and deploy workers, either locally or
overseas; and (3) accused commits the same against three (3) or more
persons, individually or a group.9
For her exculpation, appellant denied she recruited complainants for
employment abroad. She claimed Romeo Paguio was the one who
approached her and asked for someone who could help his relatives
work abroad. She thus introduced Rosa Abrero, a regular customer at
her restaurant, to Paguio. In turn, Paguio introduced Abrero to
complainants in their subsequent meeting. Further, appellant testified
she was present during the recruitment of complainants since their
meeting with Abrero was held at her restaurant. Appellant likewise
stressed she did not receive the amount of P100,000.00, as stated in the
Acknowledgment Receipt, dated October 11, 1991, but merely
acknowledged that said sum was received by Rosa Abrero from
Romeo Paguio.
Appellant's defense does not persuade us.
Appellant's active participation in the recruitment process of
complainants belies her claim of innocence. Complainants' recruitment
was initiated by appellant during her initial meeting with Romeo
Paguio. She gave the impression to Romeo Paguio and the
complainants that her cohort, Rosa Abrero, could send workers for
employment abroad. She introduced Rosa Abrero to Romeo Paguio.
Both women assured the departure of complainants to Taiwan within
one month from payment of the placement fee of P40,000.00 per
person. They even claimed that complainants would work as factory
workers for a monthly salary of $850.00 per person. Moreover, it was
appellant who informed Romeo Paguio that complainants' scheduled
trip to Taiwan would be on October 10, 1991, instead of the original
departure date of September 25, 1991, due to some problems on their
visas and travel documents.
Her close association with Rosa Abrero is further strengthened by the
Acknowledgment Receipt, dated October 11, 1991, which was
prepared by Romeo Paguio for the protection of complainants. The
receipt reads:
ACKNOWLEDGMENT RECEIPT
P100,000.00 October 11, 1991
RECEIVED FROM: ROMEO PAGUIO, the amount of
ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P100,000.00) PESOS,
Philippine Currency, representing the payment (of)
plane ticket, visa and other travel documents.
CONFORME:
By:
(Sgd.) ROMEO PAGUIO (Sgd.) MRS. ANNIE
BAUTISTA
c/o Rosa Abrero
SIGNED IN THE PRESENCE OF:
(Sgd.) Anastacio Amor Remigio Fortes
Dominador Costales
Said receipt shows that appellant collected the P100,000.00 for and in
behalf of Rosa Abrero, and bolsters Romeo Paguio's allegation that he
gave P20,000.00 to Rosa Abrero, while the rest was received by
appellant. Notably, in its Decision, dated February 14, 1992, the trial
court observed:
The denial(s) made by the accused of any participation
in the recruitment of the complainants do not persuade.
The evidence at hand shows that she acknowledged in
writing the receipt of P100,000.00 from witness Romeo
Paguio who was all along representing the
complainants in securing employment for them in
Taiwan. Her denial of having actually received the
money in the sum of P100,000.00, the receipt of which
she voluntarily signed is not convincing. By her own
admission, she is a restaurant operator. In other words,
 she is a business woman. As such, she ought to know
the consequences in signing any receipt. That she
signed Exh. "A" only goes to show that fact, as claimed
by Romeo Paguio, that she actually received the same.
It is uncontroverted that appellant and Rosa Abrero are not authorized
or licensed to engage in recruitment activities.10 Despite the absence of
such license or authority, appellant participated in the recruitment of
complainants. Since there are at least three (3) victims in this case,
appellant is correctly held criminally liable for illegal recruitment in
large scale. 11
We shall now discuss appellant's culpability under the Revised Penal
Code, specifically Article 315 thereof, inasmuch as her conviction for
offenses under the Labor Code does not avert punishment for offenses
punishable by other laws. 12
The elements of estafa are as follows: (1) that the accused defrauded
another (a) by abuse of confidence, or (b) by means of deceit; and (2)
that damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused by
the offended party or third party.
In the case at bench, it is crystal clear that complainants were deceived
by appellant and Rosa Abrero into believing that there were, indeed,
jobs waiting for them in Taiwan. The assurances given by these two
(2) women made complainants part with whatever resources they have,
in exchange for what they thought was a promising job abroad. Thus,
they sold their carabaos, mortgaged or sold their parcels of land and
even contracted loans to raise the much needed money, the P40,000.00
placement fee, required of them by accused and Rosa Abrero.
The penalty for estafa depends on the amount defrauded. Article 315
of the Revised Penal Code provides: "the penalty of prision
correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum
period (or imprisonment ranging from 4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 8
years), if the amount of the fraud is over P12,000.00 but does
not exceed P22,000.00 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter
sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in
its maximum period (6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years), adding
one year for each additional P10,000.00 pesos; but the total penalty
which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such case,
and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed
and for the purpose of other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall
be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
The amount defrauded in such estafa case (Criminal Case Nos. 92-
102378, 92-102379, 92-102380) is P 40,000.00. As prescribed in
Article 315, supra, the penalty should be imposed in the maximum
period (6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years) plus one (1) year,
there being only one (1) P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00. Applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum penalty should be
taken from the aforesaid period, while the minimum term of the
indeterminate penalty shall be within the range of the penalty next
lower in degree, that is — prision correccional in its minimum and
medium periods which has a duration of 6 months, 1 day to 4 year and
2 months.
Considering the foregoing, the appellant court correctly imposed the
indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to nine (9) years of prision mayor, as
maximum.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Court of
Appeals, finding appellant ANITA BAUTISTA guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crimes of Illegal Recruitment in Large
Scale (Criminal Case Nos. 92-102377) and Estafa (Criminal Case Nos.
92-102378, 92-102379, 92-102380) is AFFIRMED. No Costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Bidin, Regalado and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 100285 August 13, 1992
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
NAPOLEON DUQUE, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Trinidad, Reverente, Makalintal, Cabrera and Monsod Law Office for
accused-appellant.
FELICIANO, J.:
Appellant Napoleon Duque was charged with and convicted of
violating Section 38 in relation to Section 39 of P.D. No. 442, as
amended, known as The Labor Code of the Philippines. The charge of
illegal recruitment was set out in the information in the following
terms:
That on or about and/or sometime in January 1986, at
Calamba, Laguna and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above named accused well
knowing that he is not licensed nor authorized by the
proper government agency (POEA) to engage in
recruitment of workers for placement abroad, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously recruit
Glicerio Teodoro, Agustin Ulat, Ernesto Maunahan,
Norma Francisco, Elmo Alcaraz and Marcelino
Desepida as workers abroad exacted and actually
received money from the above-named victims, to their
damage and prejudice.
Contrary to law. 1
The evidence in chief of the prosecution consisted principally of the
testimony of the following witnesses: Agustin Ulat, Elmo Alcaraz,
Marcelino Desepida and Norma Francisco. Their testimonies were
summarized in the trial court's decision as follows:
. . . sometime in January 1986, he (Agustin Ulat) was
invited by the accused to his house in Calamba,
Laguna. Thereat accused informed him that he was
recruiting workers for Saudi Arabia and that he was
interested in getting (sic) him. Accused likewise
presented to him that he (accused) was a licensed
recruiter (TSN, 22 Oct. 1990, pp. 6-7). The accused told
him to secure his birth certificate, an NBI clearance and
medical certificate. He was able to secure an NBI
clearance which he showed to the accused. The latter
thereafter told him that he would secure the rest of his
papers like passport, visa and medical certificate for
him and for this, accused asked him to prepare the
amount of P20,000.00. He did not have that money, so
he mortgaged his lot for P20,000.00 to the cousin of the
accused, Socorro Arlata. He immediately gave this
amount to the accused who assured him that he would
be able to leave within two months. The accused did
not issue a receipt for that amount despite his request.
He did not persist in asking the accused because he
trusted him, accused coming from an affluent family
and a member of a well-known Catholic organization,
the "Cursillo" (TSN, 22 Oct. 1990, pp. 4-9). However,
accused failed to employ him at Saudi Arabia within
two months despite repeated promise (sic) to do so.
Thus, he demanded the return of his money but accused
failed. Finally, he decided, together with the other
complainants, to file a complaint against accused before
the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA). .
..
Elmo Alcaraz, Marcelino Desepida and Norma
Francisco individually testified to the following:
sometime also in January 1986, they went to the house
of accused for work abroad as the latter had earlier told
them that he was recruiting workers for the Saudi
Arabia. The accused asked money to process their
papers. Alcaraz was able to give the accused on 22
February 1986 the amount of P5,000.00, but the
accused failed to issue him a receipt and he did not
persist in asking for it because he trusted the accused on
(TSN, 5 Nov. 1990, pp. 5-7). Desepida was able to give
the accused on 18 Feb. 1986, the amount of P7,000.00
as placement fee for which the accused did not issue a
receipt although he promised to issue one the next day.
However, the following day, when he reminded the
accused of the receipt, he refused saying that he
(Desepida) should trust [the accused]. Francisco was
able to give the accused P9,000.00 on 21 February 1986
in the presence of the other applicants (TSN, 26 Nov.
1990, p. 5). But, the accused again failed to issue a
receipt despite demand. She was told by the accused to
trust him (Ibid., p. 6). However, the accused failed to
return their money notwithstanding. Thus, all of them
decided to file a complaint with the POEA against the
accused. There, they executed a joint affidavit (Exh.
"A"). 2
During the trial, Duque denied the charges. He controverted the
allegation that he had recruited complainants for overseas
employment. He also denied that he had received any monies in
consideration of promised employment. However, he acknowledged
that his house had served as a meeting place for a certain Delfin and
one Engr. Acopado who allegedly were the persons who had promised
complainants, work abroad.
On the basis of the positive identification by private complainants of
appellant Duque as the person they had talked to for placement abroad,
the person who had collected fees from them and who had received
information from them needed for arranging their departure for abroad,
the trial court concluded that accused Duque was primarily responsible
for promising placement and inducing private complainants to part
with their money. The prosecution also submitted a certification from
the licensing branch of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration ("POEA") stating that no records existed whatsoever of
a grant to the accused of a license or authority to recruit for overseas
employment. The dispositive part of the decision reads:
Wherefore, this Court finds the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt, [of] violation of [Art.] 38 in relation
to [Art.] 39 of P.D. 442 otherwise known as the Labor
Code of the Philippines, and hereby sentences the
accused to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and
a fine of P100,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency and to indemnify the offended
parties: Agustin Ulat the amount of P20,000.00;
Marcelino Desepida the amount of P7,000.00; Norma
Francisco the amount of P9,000.00; and Elmo Alcaraz
the amount of P3,000.00 and the cost of suit. 3
Before this Court, appellant Duque raises only one (1) issue: that of
prescription of the criminal offense for which he was convicted.
The recruitment of persons for overseas employment without the
necessary recruiting permit or authority form the POEA constitutes a
crime penalized, not by the Revised Penal Code, but rather by a special
law, i.e., Article 38 in relation to Article 290 of the Labor Code. Article
290 of the Labor Code provides, in relevant part, that:
Art. 290. Offenses penalized under this Code and the
rules and regulations issued pursuant thereto shall
prescribe in three (3) years.
xxx xxx xxx
The Labor Code, however, does not contain any provisions on the
mode of computation of the three-year prescriptive period it
established.
The Solicitor General states, and we agree with him, that Act No.
3326, as amended, entitled "An Act to Establish Periods of
Prescription for Violations Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal
Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin to Run"
(emphasis supplied), supplied the applicable norm. 4 Section 2 of Act
No. 3326, as amended, reads as follows:
Section 2: . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the
commission of the violation of the law, and if the same
be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof
and institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment.
Examination of the abovequoted Section 2 shows that there are two (2)
rules for determining the beginning of the prescriptive period: (a) on
the day of the commission of the violation, if such commission be
known; and (b) if the commission of the violation was not known at
the time, then from discovery thereof and institution of judicial
proceedings for investigation and punishment. Appellant Duque
contends that the prescriptive period in the case at bar commenced
from the time money in consideration of promises for overseas
employment was parted with by complainants. Duque thus contends
that the prescriptive period began to run sometime in January 1986.
The information was, however, filed by the Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor of Laguna on 22 May 1990, i.e., more than four (4) years
later. Duque concludes that the offense of illegal recruitment had
accordingly prescribed by May 1990.
We are not persuaded. Article 38 of the Labor Code as amended reads
as follows:
Art. 38. Illegal Recruitment. — (a) Any recruitment
activities, including the prohibited practices enumerated
under Article 34 of this Code, to be undertaken by non-
licensees or non-holders of authority shall be deemed
illegal and punishable under Article 39 of this Code.
The Ministry of Labor and Employment or any law
enforcement officer may initiate complaints under this
Article.
(b) Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate
or in large scale shall be considered an offense
involving economic sabotage and shall be penalized in
accordance with Article 39 hereof.
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate
if carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons
conspiring and/or confederating with one another in
carrying out any unlawful or illegal transaction,
enterprise or scheme defined under the first paragraph
hereof. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed in
large scale if committed against three (3) or more
persons individually or as a group.
(c) The Minister of Labor and Employment or his duly
authorized representatives shall have the power to cause
the arrest and detention of such non-license or non-
holder of authority if after investigation it is determined
that his activities constitute a danger to national security
and public order or will lead to further exploitation of
job-seekers. The Minister shall order the search of the
 office or premises and seizure of documents,
paraphernalia, properties and other implements used in
illegal recruitment activities and the closure of
companies, establishments and entities found to be
engaged in the recruitment of workers for overseas
employment, without having been licensed or
authorized to do so. (Emphasis supplied)
It will be seen that illegal recruitment has two (2) basic elements, to
wit: (a) recruitment activities as listed in Articles 38 and 34 of the
Labor Code; and (b) the lack of the necessary license or authority from
the POEA to engage in such activities. Recruitment for overseas
employment is not in itself necessarily immoral or unlawful. It is the
lack of necessary license or permit that renders such recruitment
activities unlawful and criminal. Such lack of necessary permit or
authority, while certainly known to appellant Duque back in January
1986, was not known to private complainants at that time. Indeed,
private complainants discovered that appellant did not possess such
authority or permit only when they went to the offices of the POEA for
the purpose of filing a claim for return of the money they had
delivered to appellant Duque. Since good faith is always presumed, the
complainants were entitled to assume the appellant Duque was acting
in good faith when he presented himself as a recruiter for overseas
placement. Even if it be assumed arguendo that ordinary prudence
required that a person seeking overseas employment ought to check
the authority or status of persons pretending to be authorized or to
speak for a recruitment or placement agency, the offended parties'
failure to do so did not start the running of the prescriptive period. In
the nature of things, acts made criminal by special laws are frequently
not immoral or obviously criminal in themselves; for this reason, the
applicable statute requires that if the violation of the special law is not
known at the time, then prescription begins to run only from the
discovery thereof, i.e., discovery of the unlawful nature of the
constitutive act or acts.
Appellant Duque assails Section 2 of Act No. 3326 as illogical or
absurd. A literal reading of Section 2 appears to suggest that two (2)
elements must coincide for the beginning of the running of the
prescriptive period: first, the element of discovery of the commission
of the violation of the special law; and second, the "institution of
judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment." It is then
argued by appellant that because the co-existence of these two (2)
requirements is necessary under Section 2 of Act No. 3326, the
relevant prescriptive period would never begin to run.
Here appellant has a point. However, it should be noted, firstly, that the
literal reading that appellant suggests, does not benefit appellant, for
the prescriptive period in the case at bar had not in any case been
exhausted since prosecution of appellant commenced only a few
months after the POEA and the complainants had discovered that
appellant had no governmental authority to recruit for overseas work
and was merely pretending to recruit workers for overseas
employment and to receive money therefor, i.e., that appellant did not
even attempt to locate employment abroad for complainants. Secondly,
we do not think there is any real need for such a literal reading of
Section 2. As is well-known, initiation of proceedings for preliminary
investigation of the offense normally marks the interruption of the
period of prescription. Under appellant Duque's literal reading, the
prescription period would both begin and be interrupted by the same
occurrence; the net effect would be that the prescription period would
not have effectively begun, having been rendered academic by the
simultaneous interruption of that same period. A statute providing for
prescription of defined criminal offenses is more than a statute of
repose and constitutes an act of grace by which the State, after the
lapse of a certain period of time, surrenders its sovereign power to
prosecute the criminal act. A statute on prescription of crimes is an act
of liberality on the part of the State in favor of the offender. 5 The
applicable well-known principles of statutory interpretation are that
statutes must be construed in such a way as to give effect to the
intention of the legislative authority, 6 and so as to give a sensible
meaning to the language of the statute and thus avoid nonsensical or
absurd results, 7 departing to the extent unavoidable from the literal
language of the statute. Appellant's literal reading would make
nonsense of Section 2 of Act No. 3326.
In our view, the phrase "institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment" may be either disregarded as surplusage
or should be deemed preceded by the word "until." Thus, Section 2
may be read as:
Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the
commission of the violation of the law; and if the same
be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof;
or as:
Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the
commission of the violation of the law, and if the same
be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof
and until institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment. (Emphasis supplied)
We believe and so hold that the applicable prescriptive period in the
case at bar began to run from the time the recruitment activities of
appellant Duque were ascertained by the complainants and by the
POEA to have been carried out without any license or authority from
the government. The discovery by the complainants and by the POEA
was, as a practical matter, simultaneous in character and occurred
sometime in December 1989 when the complainants went to the POEA
with the complaint for recovery of the placement fees and expenses
they had paid to appellant Duque, and the POEA, acting upon that
complaint, discovered and informed the private complainants that
Duque had operated as a recruiter without the essential government
license or authority. Accordingly, the offense of illegal recruitment had
not prescribed when the complaint was filed with the Provincial
Prosecutor's Office in April 1990 and when the information was filed
in court in May 1990.
It is relevant to note that the same result would be reached by
giving supplemental effect to provisions of the Revised Penal Code in
the application of Article 290 of the Labor Code. 8 Article 91 of the
Revised Penal Code reads as follows:
Art. 91. Computation of the prescription of offenses. —
The period of prescription shall commence to run
from the day on which the crime is discovered by the
offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall
be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or
information, and shall commence to run again when
such proceedings terminate without the accused being
convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for
any reason not imputable to him.
The term of prescription shall not run when the
offender is absent from the Philippine Archipelago.
(Emphasis supplied)
Under the above-quoted Article 91, the prescriptive period in respect
of the offense of illegal recruitment began to run on the date of
discovery thereof by the private complainants and the authorities
concerned (POEA) sometime in December 1989 and was interrupted
on 16 April 1990 when the affidavit-sworn complaint was filed before
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, 9 and certainly by May 1990
when the criminal information was filed in court by the Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor of Laguna. Once more, the appellant's defense of
prescription must fail.
Under Section 39 of the Labor Code as amended, the penalty of life
imprisonment is properly imposable where the illegal recruitment is
committed "in large scale," i.e., where it is "committed against three
(3) or more persons individually or as a group." 10 In the case at bar,
private complainants are more than three (3) in number. Moreover,
appellant Duque had represented to the public at large, including
private complainants, that he was a licensed
recruiter.11 Duque's house served as his business office and he asked
the private complainants to see him in his house. 12 There,
complainants were "briefed" as to the requirements for overseas
employment before their supposed departure and were each required to
secure a clearance from the National Bureau of
Investigation. 13Considerable sums were collected from each of the
complainants supposedly to "facilitate" the processing of passports,
medical certificates and other working papers. 14 Complainants were,
in addition, shown documents which purported to be job placement
orders. This organized modus operandi was repeated in respect of each
of the complainants and presumably in respect of other persons who
were similarly victimized by appellant. There is no question that the
recruitment activities of Duque were organized and "large scale" in
nature. 15
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction rendered by the trial court
is hereby AFFIRMED, with the solemodification that the penalty
properly imposable and hereby imposed is life imprisonment and
not reclusion perpetua. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin, Davide, Jr. and Romero, JJ., concur.
G.R. Nos. 97044-46 July 6, 1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
GENER TURDA alias "Boy" (a.k.a. GUADALUPE TURDA,
JR.), accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Tan, Manzano & Velez for accused-appellant.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
GENER TURDA alias "Boy" (a.k.a. Guadalupe Turda, Jr.) together
with his wife Milagros Turda and Carmen Manera, was charged with
illegal recruitment in Crim. Case No. 57218 and two (2) counts of
estafa in Crim. Cases Nos. 57219 and 57220. However, Milagros
Turda and Carmen Manera were never apprehended so that only Gener
Turda could be arraigned and tried. As the three (3) cases involve the
same factual milieu, they were jointly tried.
In the first week of August 1986, appellant Gener Turda, his wife
Milagros Turda nicknamed "Mila," and Carmen Manera went to the
house of complainant Florante Rosales at 28 Ilocos Sur St., Bago
Bantay, Quezon City, to convince his family that the former could
secure an overseas job for Florante in Italy and another for his sister
Shirley Cabalu in France for a fee. Florante and Shirley accepted the
offer and their father, Roberto Rosales, paid P70,000.00 for both.
However, he did not ask for a receipt because of his trust in appellant
and his wife who were Shirley's "compadre" and "comadre" for the
past seventeen (17) years. 1
On 13 August 1986, the spouses Gener and Mila, together with
Carmen Manera, brought Florante and Shirley to the airport for their
supposed departure for abroad at five o'clock that afternoon. The
Turdas used their Volkswagen in bringing their two (2) "recruits" to the
airport for the customary "send-off." After a long wait, appellant and
his co-accused told Florante and Shirley that their passports had not
been released and that their departure had to be rescheduled, with the
assurance however that they could leave as soon as their papers were
released. 2
Despite several promises, Florante and Shirley were still unable to
leave. They visited the Turdas several times at their house but the
former were given more promises instead. Florante even went to the
agency of accused Carmen Manera, the International Friendship and
General Services, at Mabini St., Ermita, Manila, but was unable to talk
to her because at that time there were many applicants inside the
office. Complainant and his sister finally demanded the return of their
money, but the Turdas failed to give their money back. Consequently,
Florante Rosales went to the Office of the City Fiscal of Quezon City
to file the corresponding complaint.
Sometime before September 1987, another complainant, Celina
Andan, learned that her application for an immigrant visa with the
Canadian Embassy was denied. While her application was pending,
Celina's mother, Milagros Andan, was persuaded by Milagros Turda to
entrust to her the processing of Celina's papers since she (Milagros
Turda) had already been abroad and had gone through the application
process previously. The Andans and the Turdas had known each other
for more than ten (10) years as their stores which sold rice and LPG,
respectively, were near each other. 3
After the denial of Celina Andan's application, Gener and Mila
undertook the processing of Celina's travel papers for which they were
given a downpayment of P25,000.00 with the promise to refund the
amount if she would not be able to leave for Canada within 45 days.
However, should they succeed, Celina would have to pay them an
additional amount of P35,000.00 upon delivery to her of her visa.
On 14 September 1987, the mother of Celina gave a check in her store
for P14,500.00 and cash of P500.00 to Mila Turda for which the latter
gave a receipt in the presence of appellant Gener. On 22 September
1987, Celina's mother again gave a check to the Turdas in the amount
of P10,000.00 for which a receipt was likewise issued by Milagros
Turda.
After forty-five (45) days, Celina Andan was still unable to leave for
abroad. She went with her mother to the house of the Turdas where
they only met appellant. They were told that Mila went somewhere.
Celina wanted to get her passport and money back because nothing
happened to her visa application, but appellant told her that he would
just relay the message to his wife. Celina returned the following day
only to be told by the spouses that her passport had been sent to her
mother's store and that their downpayment of P25,000.00 could be
withdrawn from the person to whom they (Turdas) gave it. Celina
went back to the house of appellant but she never succeeded in talking
to the spouses. They were always out. Hence, she decided to charge
the Turda spouses with estafa and illegal recruitment. On 22 February
1989, Gener Turda, his wife Milagros Turda and Carmen Manera were
jointly charged with illegal recruitment and two (2) counts of estafa in
three (3) separate Informations.
Accused-appellant Gener Turda, on his part, denies having ever
engaged in illegal recruitment activities. He claims that he was himself
a victim of the illegal recruitment activities of his co-accused Carmen
Manera. Bienvenido Villanueva, brother-in-law of appellant's wife,
and Darlene Turda, appellant's daughter, corroborated appellant's
testimony that sometime in January 1986 his wife brought Carmen
Manera and the latter's secretary to their house where she told him that
Manera was engaged in recruitment for overseas jobs and was running
a recruitment agency in Ermita, Manila. His wife further told him that
she would be given a commission for every person sent abroad.
Appellant then informed Manera that he also wanted to apply for a job
in the United States.
One week later, Manera returned and told him to pay P100,000.00 so
he could go straight to the United States without passing through
another country. He then paid the agency an initial amount of
P30,000.00. At that time, Bienvenido Villanueva, Armando Revilla,
Shirley Cabalu and Florante Rosales were also there to pay their fees.
After a week, he gave Manera a diamond ring worth more than
P30,000.00.
Appellant further contended that when he could not leave for abroad,
he and his wife started to have fights which in fact resulted in their
eventual separation. He also denied any knowledge of the payments
made by complainant Celina Andan or that they were made in his
presence. He admitted however having made several trips to the
airport but explaining that he was also supposed to leave for abroad
himself, and on several occasions, drove for his wife in her recruitment
activities.
The court a quo sustained the prosecution. It found the following
circumstances supportive of the guilt of accused-appellant in the three
(3) cases: (a) Appellant was aware of the recruitment activities of his
wife and of Carmen Manera; (b) The meetings between the three (3)
accused and the complainants were held at the Bago Bantay residence
of appellant where he was always around to provide the "moral
support" by "seconding" whatever Mila or Carmen would say about
their capability of sending applicants for overseas employment; (c)
The amounts of P25,000.00 and P70,000.00 paid by Celina and
Florante, respectively, were received by his wife in their residence in
the presence of appellant; (d) Appellant took active part in making it
appear that complainant Rosales and his sister Shirley were to take
their departure flight by driving them to the airport in his Volkswagen
car and waiting along with them at the terminal and, on the pretext that
their passports were not yet released, brought them back to their house
in Quezon City to await their scheduled flight, which never
materialized.
In its joint decision dated 30 August 1990, the trial court thus found
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt in Crim. Case No. 57218 of
illegal recruitment under Art. 39, par. (a), in relation to Art. 38 of P.D.
No. 442, as amended, and sentenced him to life imprisonment and to
pay a fine of P100,000.00. In Crim. Case No. 57219, the court a
quo convicted appellant of estafa under Art. 315, 1st par., in relation to
4th par., subpar. 2(a), of the same article, and imposed upon him an
indeterminate prison term of two (2) years, four (4) months and one
(1) day as minimum, to six (6) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one
(21) days as maximum. The trial court further ordered appellant to
refund the amount of P25,000.00 to complainant Celina Andan. In
Crim. Case No. 57220, the trial court found appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of estafa under the same penal provision and
imposed upon him an indeterminate prison term of eight (8) years and
one (1) day as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and
one (1) day as maximum. The court also directed appellant to refund
the amount of P70,000.00 to complainant Florante Rosales. 4
Appellant now assails the trial court for not acquitting him since not all
the requisites of criminal conspiracy were present, and for imposing a
penalty under a statute enacted in 1990 for an act done in 1986. He
argues that nothing in the record shows that he and his two (2) co-
accused had come to an agreement concerning the commission of
illegal recruitment and/or estafa and that they decided to commit the
crime thereafter; that he even disapproved of his wife's recruitment
activities that led to frequent altercations between them; that his
presence during the transactions between his wife and complainants
was only natural as these took place in his house; that his supposed
active part in the aborted departure of complainant Florante Rosales
and Shirley Cabalu was sufficiently explained by him during the cross-
examination, i.e., that he was even among those slated to leave for
employment abroad so he rode with them to the airport; that as stated
in the Information, the unlawful acts of illegal recruitment were
committed sometime between August 1986 and September 1987 at
which time the law on illegal recruitment only imposed a penalty of
imprisonment for not less than four (4) years nor more than eight (8)
years; and, thus the trial court erred in imposing upon him a life
sentence based on the new law on illegal recruitment which was not
yet in force at the time the alleged acts were committed.
The pertinent portions of Art. 38 of the Labor Code, as amended by
P.D. No. 2018, read —
Art. 38. Illegal recruitment. — (a) Any recruitment
activities, including the prohibited practices enumerated
under Article 34 of this Code, to be undertaken by non-
licensees or non-holders of authority shall be deemed
illegal and punishable under Article 39 of this code. The
Ministry of Labor and Employment or any law
enforcement officer may initiate complaints under this
Article.
(b) Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate
or in large scale shall be considered an offense
involving economic sabotage and shall be penalized in
accordance with Article 39 hereof.
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate
if carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons
conspiring and/or confederating with one another in
carrying out any unlawful or illegal transaction,
enterprise or scheme defined under the first paragraph
hereof. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed in
large scale if committed against three (3) or more
persons individually or as a group.
Article 13, par. (b), of the same Code defines recruitment as "any act
of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or
procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising
or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or
not; provided, that any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or
promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be
deemed engaged in recruitment and placement."
A review of the testimonies of complainants leads us to no other
conclusion than that appellant, his wife, and Manera were conspirators
in the illegal recruitment business by contributing acts in pursuance of
the financial success of their joint venture for their mutual benefit. All
the complainants have testified that in every recruitment transaction,
appellant was always present with the other accused. With respect to
the recruitment of Rosales and Shirley Cabalu, both testified that the
three (3) accused went to their house to induce them to apply for
overseas work for a fee, and that appellant was likewise around when
the amount of P70,000.00 was quoted by the other accused as the
recruitment service fee. For her part, complainant Celina Andan
categorically testified that appellant and his wife were together when
the latter was paid the downpayment in check for her trip to Canada.
Celina further asserted that the Turdas were always together in their
recruitment transactions; in fact, all the complainants confirmed that
appellant even drove them to the airport for the supposed trip abroad
not only once but thrice.
Appellant's explanation that his reason for driving the complainants to
the airport was because he himself was also scheduled to leave for
abroad, is weak and uncorroborated. It is a self-serving negative
evidence which cannot prevail over his positive identification by the
complaining witnesses as one of those who actively participated in
recruiting them. Besides, how could he be driving his Volkswagen to
the airport if he himself was leaving for abroad, unless he was ready to
abandon his car after taking off?
The findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are
entitled to the highest degree of respect and will not be disturbed on
appeal in the absence of any showing that said court overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight
and substance which do not obtain in the present case. There is no
doubt that the acts of appellant and his wife conclusively established a
common criminal design mutually deliberated upon and accomplished
through coordinated moves. Such acts constitute enlisting, contracting
or procuring workers or promising them overseas employment under
Art. 13, par. (b), of the Labor Code. 5 Since appellant did not have the
license or authority to recruit 6 and yet recruited at least three (3)
persons, he is guilty of large-scale illegal recruitment under Art. 38,
penalized under Art. 39, of the Labor Code.
We are not persuaded by appellant's argument that the trial court erred
in imposing upon him the penalty of life imprisonment because this
was imposed by a new law not in force when the offense was allegedly
committed. P.D. No. 2018 7 has increased the penalty to life
imprisonment if the illegal recruitment constitutes economic sabotage.
As defined in Art. 38, as amended, illegal recruitment constitutes
economic sabotage if undertaken by a group of three (3) or more
persons conspiring and/or confederating with one another in carrying
out any unlawful or illegal transaction, enterprise or scheme defined
under the first paragraph of Art. 38.
As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, Sec. 2 of P.D. No.
2018, promulgated on 26 January 1986, has provided for its immediate
effectivity. It was published on 10 February 1986 in Vol. 82, No. 6,
Page 922, of the Official Gazette. Hence, when appellant committed
the acts of illegal recruitment from August 1986 to September 1987,
the amendments to the law, which took effect on 28 July 1986, 8 were
already in force and effect.
The rule is settled that the recruitment of persons for overseas
employment without the necessary recruiting permit or authority from
the POEA constitutes illegal recruitment; however, where some other
crimes or felonies are committed in the process, conviction under the
Labor Code does not preclude punishment under other statutes.
In People v. Alvarez 9 we said:
. . . the test for determining whether or not a
prosecution for one crime constitutes an obstacle to a
subsequent action for another distinct crime upon the
same facts, is to inquire whether the facts alleged in the
second information, if proven, would have been
sufficient to support the former information, of which
the accused may have been acquitted or convicted. The
 gist of the question is whether or not the same evidence
supports the two actions.
Stated in another way . . . . where two different laws
define two crimes, the conviction of one of them is no
obstacle to that of the other, although both offenses
arise from the same facts, if each crime involves some
important act which is not an essential element of the
other . . . . "The safest general rule is that the two
offenses must be in substance precisely the same or of
the same nature or of the same species, so that the
evidence which proves the one would prove the other;
or if this is not the case, then the one crime must be an
ingredient of the other" (16 C.J., 264, sec. 444) . . . . "A
single act may be an offense against two statutes, and, if
each statute requires proof of an additional act which
the other does not, an acquittal or conviction under
either statute does not exempt the defendant from
prosecution and punishment under the other. And there
is no doubt that it is within the power of the legislature
to create two or more offenses which may be
committed by a single act, each of which is punishable
by itself. A conviction or acquittal in such case under
either statute would be no bar to a conviction under the
other, for the accused would not be twice in jeopardy
for one offense, but only once in jeopardy for each
offense" (8 R.C.L., 149, sec. 135).
Applying the foregoing principle, not all acts which constitute estafa
necessarily establish illegal recruitment, for estafa is wider in scope
and covers deceits whether or not related to recruitment activities.
More importantly, the element of damage, which is essential in estafa
cases, is immaterial in illegal recruitment; 10 and, while estafa
is malum in se, illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum.
Hence, as to the two (2) counts of estafa, we need only reiterate our
ruling in People v. Romero 11 —
The elements of estafa in general are: (1) that the
accused defrauded another (a) by abuse of confidence,
or (b) by means of deceit; and (2) that damage or
prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to
the offended party or third party (People vs. Ong, 204
SCRA 942 [1991]).
In the instant case, all the elements of estafa are present
because complainant Doriza Dapnit gave the total
amount of P21,000.00 to accused-appellant on the
latter's promise that she will be sent to Taiwan as a
factory worker as soon as she paid the placement fee. It
will be observed that accused-appellant gave
complainant the distinct impression that she had the
power or ability to send people abroad for work so that
complainant was convinced to give her the money she
demanded to enable her to be employed as a factory
worker in Taiwan . . . .
While we also affirm the conviction of the accused for estafa in Crim.
Cases Nos. 57219 and 57220, we modify however the penalties
imposed by particularly denominating them in accordance with the
Revised Penal Code as well as amend accordingly the penalty imposed
in Crim. Case No. 57220.
Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code provides the penalty for estafa
—
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum
period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the
amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not
exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the
latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall
be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for
each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty
which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years.
In such cases, and in connection with the accessory
penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of
the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be
 termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case
may be.
In Crim. Case No. 57219, the amount defrauded was P25,000.00. The
imposable penalty under Art. 315 is prision correccional in its
maximum period, the range of which is four (4) years, two (2) months
and one (1) day to six (6) years, to prision mayor in its minimum
period, the range of which is six (6) years and one (1) day to eight (8)
years. Dividing the range of the penalty prescribed for the offense,
i.e., prision correccional maximum to prision mayorminimum into
three (3) periods in accordance with Art. 65, the minimum period
should be from four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day, to five
(5) years, five (5) months and ten (10) days, the medium period from
five (5) years, five (5) months and eleven (11) days to six (6) years,
eight (8) months and twenty (20) days, and the maximum period from
six (6) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one days (21) to eight (8)
years. Considering the amount defrauded, the maximum penalty
should be taken from the maximum period prescribed by law,
i.e., prision mayorminimum, the range of which is six (6) years, eight
(8) months and twenty-one (21) days to eight (8) years, while the
minimum should be taken from the penalty next lower in degree,
i.e., prision correccional minimum and medium, the range of which is
six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) year and two (2) months, in
any of its periods. From the facts of the case, the trial court is correct
in the imposition of the proper penalty except that the minimum
should be taken from prision correccional minimum and medium,
while the maximum from the maximum period of prision
correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum.
As regards Crim. Case No. 57220 where the amount defrauded was
P70,000.00, the same principle as in the preceding case should apply,
except that for every P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00 a prison term
of one (1) year should be additionally imposed. Since there are four (4)
P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00, and any excess below P10,000.00
not being considered, the proper penalty should be the maximum of
the imposable penalty plus four (4) years. Consequently, the maximum
penalty to be imposed in Crim. Case No. 57220 should be six (6)
years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days, to eight (8) years,
plus four (4) years, i.e., ten (10) years, eight (8) months and twenty-
one (21) days to twelve (12) years as maximum, while the minimum
should be taken from the penalty next lower in degree as aforesaid, or
six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months
ofprision correccional minimum and medium. Apparently, in Crim.
Case No. 57220, the trial court erred in imposing the maximum
penalty on the accused.
WHEREFORE, the conviction of the accused GENER TURDA for
ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT ON LARGE SCALE in Crim. Case No.
57218 (G.R. No. 97044), for ESTAFA in Crim. Case No. 57219 (G.R.
No. 97045) and Crim. Case No. 57220 (G.R. No. 97046) is
AFFIRMED except that in Crim. Case No. 57219 (G.R. No. 97045)
the penalty should read: "two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1)
day of prision correccional medium as minimum, to six (6) years,
eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor minimum
as maximum," while the penalty in Crim. Case No. 57220 (G.R. No.
97046) is modified to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccionalmedium as minimum, to twelve (12) years of prision
mayor maximum as maximum.
Appellant Gener Turda is further directed to refund to Celina Andan
and Florante Rosales the amounts of P25,000.00 and P70,000.00
respectively, which appellant unlawfully collected from them.
In the service of the prison terms herein imposed on appellant, Art. 70
of The Revised Penal Code should be strictly observed.
Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Davide, Jr., Quiason and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
 1997.1 The deployment was with the assistance of a Taiwanese broker,
Edmund Wang, President of Jet Crown International Co., Ltd.

After her 12-month contract expired on February 1, 1998, Divina

continued working for her Taiwanese employer, Hang Rui Xiong, for
two more years, after which she returned to the Philippines on
February 4, 2000.

Shortly after her return or on February 14, 2000, Divina filed a

complaint2 before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
against Sunace, one Adelaide Perez, the Taiwanese broker, and the
employer-foreign principal alleging that she was jailed for three
months and that she was underpaid.

The following day or on February 15, 2000, Labor Arbitration

Associate Regina T. Gavin issued Summons3 to the Manager of
Sunace, furnishing it with a copy of Divina’s complaint and directing it
to appear for mandatory conference on February 28, 2000.

The scheduled mandatory conference was reset. It appears to have

G.R. No. 161757 January 25, 2006 been concluded, however.

SUNACE INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT SERVICES, On April 6, 2000, Divina filed her Position Paper4 claiming that under
INC.Petitioner, her original one-year contract and the 2-year extended contract which
vs. was with the knowledge and consent of Sunace, the following amounts
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, Second representing income tax and savings were deducted:
Division; HON. ERNESTO S. DINOPOL, in his capacity as Labor
Arbiter, NLRC; NCR, Arbitration Branch, Quezon City and Year Deduction for Income Tax Deduction for Savings
DIVINA A. MONTEHERMOZO,Respondents. 1997 NT10,450.00 NT23,100.00
1998 NT9,500.00 NT36,000.00
DECISION 1999 NT13,300.00 NT36,000.00;5
CARPIO MORALES, J.: and while the amounts deducted in 1997 were refunded to her, those
deducted in 1998 and 1999 were not. On even date, Sunace, by its
Petitioner, Sunace International Management Services (Sunace), a Proprietor/General Manager Maria Luisa Olarte, filed its Verified
corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Answer and Position Paper,6claiming as follows, quoted verbatim:
Philippines, deployed to Taiwan Divina A. Montehermozo (Divina) as
a domestic helper under a 12-month contract effective February 1,
COMPLAINANT IS NOT ENTITLED FOR THE REFUND OF
HER 24 MONTHS SAVINGS
3. Complainant could not anymore claim nor entitled for the refund of
her 24 months savings as she already took back her saving already last
year and the employer did not deduct any money from her salary, in
accordance with a Fascimile Message from the respondent
SUNACE’s employer, Jet Crown International Co. Ltd., a xerographic
copy of which is herewith attached as ANNEX "2" hereof;
COMPLAINANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO REFUND OF HER 14
MONTHS TAX AND PAYMENT OF ATTORNEY’S FEES
4. There is no basis for the grant of tax refund to the complainant as
the she finished her one year contract and hence, was not illegally
dismissed by her employer. She could only lay claim over the tax
refund or much more be awarded of damages such as attorney’s fees as
said reliefs are available only when the dismissal of a migrant worker
is without just valid or lawful cause as defined by law or contract.
The rationales behind the award of tax refund and payment of
attorney’s fees is not to enrich the complainant but to compensate him
for actual injury suffered. Complainant did not suffer injury, hence,
does not deserve to be compensated for whatever kind of damages.
Hence, the complainant has NO cause of action against respondent
SUNACE for monetary claims, considering that she has been totally
paid of all the monetary benefits due her under her Employment
Contract to her full satisfaction.
6. Furthermore, the tax deducted from her salary is in compliance with
the Taiwanese law, which respondent SUNACE has no control and
complainant has to obey and this Honorable Office has no
authority/jurisdiction to intervene because the power to tax is a
sovereign power which the Taiwanese Government is supreme in its
own territory. The sovereign power of taxation of a state is recognized
under international law and among sovereign states.
7. That respondent SUNACE respectfully reserves the right to file
supplemental Verified Answer and/or Position Paper to substantiate its
prayer for the dismissal of the above case against the herein
respondent. AND BY WAY OF -
x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Reacting to Divina’s Position Paper, Sunace filed on April 25, 2000 an
". . . answer to complainant’s position paper"7alleging that Divina’s 2-
year extension of her contract was without its knowledge and consent,
hence, it had no liability attaching to any claim arising therefrom, and
Divina in fact executed a Waiver/Quitclaim and Release of
Responsibility and an Affidavit of Desistance, copy of each document
was annexed to said ". . . answer to complainant’s position paper."
To Sunace’s ". . . answer to complainant’s position paper," Divina filed
a 2-page reply,8 without, however, refuting Sunace’s disclaimer of
knowledge of the extension of her contract and without saying
anything about the Release, Waiver and Quitclaim and Affidavit of
Desistance.
The Labor Arbiter, rejected Sunace’s claim that the extension of
Divina’s contract for two more years was without its knowledge and
consent in this wise:
We reject Sunace’s submission that it should not be held responsible
for the amount withheld because her contract was extended for 2 more
years without its knowledge and consent because as Annex
"B"9 shows, Sunace and Edmund Wang have not stopped
communicating with each other and yet the matter of the contract’s
extension and Sunace’s alleged non-consent thereto has not been
categorically established.
What Sunace should have done was to write to POEA about the
extension and its objection thereto, copy furnished the complainant
herself, her foreign employer, Hang Rui Xiong and the Taiwanese
broker, Edmund Wang.
And because it did not, it is presumed to have consented to the
extension and should be liable for anything that resulted thereform
(sic).10 (Underscoring supplied)
The Labor Arbiter rejected too Sunace’s argument that it is not liable
on account of Divina’s execution of a Waiver and Quitclaim and an
Affidavit of Desistance. Observed the Labor Arbiter:
Should the parties arrive at any agreement as to the whole or any part
of the dispute, the same shall be reduced to writing and signed by the
parties and their respective counsel (sic), if any, before the Labor
Arbiter.
The settlement shall be approved by the Labor Arbiter after being
satisfied that it was voluntarily entered into by the parties and after
having explained to them the terms and consequences thereof.
A compromise agreement entered into by the parties not in the
presence of the Labor Arbiter before whom the case is pending shall be
approved by him, if after confronting the parties, particularly the
complainants, he is satisfied that they understand the terms and
conditions of the settlement and that it was entered into freely
voluntarily (sic) by them and the agreement is not contrary to law,
morals, and public policy.
And because no consideration is indicated in the documents, we strike
them down as contrary to law, morals, and public policy.11
He accordingly decided in favor of Divina, by decision of October 9,
2000,12 the dispositive portion of which reads:
Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondents
SUNACE INTERNATIONAL SERVICES and its owner ADELAIDA
PERGE, both in their personal capacities and as agent of Hang Rui
Xiong/Edmund Wang to jointly and severally pay complainant
DIVINA A. MONTEHERMOZO the sum of NT91,950.00 in its peso
equivalent at the date of payment, as refund for the amounts which she
is hereby adjudged entitled to as earlier discussed plus 10% thereof as
attorney’s fees since compelled to litigate, complainant had to engage
the services of counsel.
SO ORDERED.13 (Underescoring supplied)
On appeal of Sunace, the NLRC, by Resolution of April 30,
2002,14 affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s decision.
Via petition for certiorari,15 Sunace elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals which dismissed it outright by Resolution of November 12,
2002,16 the full text of which reads:
The petition for certiorari faces outright dismissal.
The petition failed to allege facts constitutive of grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the public respondent amounting to lack of
jurisdiction when the NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s finding that
petitioner Sunace International Management Services impliedly
consented to the extension of the contract of private respondent Divina
A. Montehermozo. It is undisputed that petitioner was continually
communicating with private respondent’s foreign employer (sic). As
agent of the foreign principal, "petitioner cannot profess ignorance of
such extension as obviously, the act of the principal extending
complainant (sic) employment contract necessarily bound it."
Grave abuse of discretion is not present in the case at bar.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DENIED DUE
COURSE and DISMISSED.17
SO ORDERED.
(Emphasis on words in capital letters in the original; emphasis on
words in small letters and underscoring supplied)
Its Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by the appellate
court by Resolution of January 14, 2004,18Sunace filed the present
petition for review on certiorari.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the Labor Arbiter and NLRC’s finding
that Sunace knew of and impliedly consented to the extension of
Divina’s 2-year contract. It went on to state that "It is undisputed that
[Sunace] was continually communicating with [Divina’s] foreign
employer." It thus concluded that "[a]s agent of the foreign principal,
‘petitioner cannot profess ignorance of such extension as obviously,
the act of the principal extending complainant (sic) employment
contract necessarily bound it.’"
Contrary to the Court of Appeals finding, the alleged continuous
communication was with the Taiwanese brokerWang, not with the
foreign employer Xiong.
The February 21, 2000 telefax message from the Taiwanese broker to
Sunace, the only basis of a finding of continuous communication,
reads verbatim:
xxxx
Regarding to Divina, she did not say anything about her saving
in police station. As we contact with her employer, she took
back her saving already last years. And they did not deduct any
money from her salary. Or she will call back her employer to
check it again. If her employer said yes! we will get it back for
her.
Thank you and best regards.
(Sgd.)
Edmund Wang
President19
The finding of the Court of Appeals solely on the basis of the above-
quoted telefax message, that Sunace continually communicated with
the foreign "principal" (sic) and therefore was aware of and had
consented to the execution of the extension of the contract is
misplaced. The message does not provide evidence that Sunace was
privy to the new contract executed after the expiration on February 1,
1998 of the original contract. That Sunace and the
Taiwanese broker communicated regarding Divina’s allegedly
withheld savings does not necessarily mean that Sunace ratified the
extension of the contract. As Sunace points out in its Reply20 filed
before the Court of Appeals,
As can be seen from that letter communication, it was just an
information given to the petitioner that the private respondent had
t[aken] already her savings from her foreign employer and that no
deduction was made on her salary. It contains nothing about the
extension or the petitioner’s consent thereto.21
Parenthetically, since the telefax message is dated February 21, 2000,
it is safe to assume that it was sent to enlighten Sunace who had been
directed, by Summons issued on February 15, 2000, to appear on
February 28, 2000 for a mandatory conference following Divina’s
filing of the complaint on February 14, 2000.
Respecting the Court of Appeals following dictum:
As agent of its foreign principal, [Sunace] cannot profess ignorance of
such an extension as obviously, the act of its principal extending
[Divina’s] employment contract necessarily bound it,22
it too is a misapplication, a misapplication of the theory of imputed
knowledge.
The theory of imputed knowledge ascribes the knowledge of the agent,
Sunace, to the principal, employer Xiong, not the other way
around.23 The knowledge of the principal-foreign employer cannot,
therefore, be imputed to its agent Sunace.
There being no substantial proof that Sunace knew of and consented to
be bound under the 2-year employment contract extension, it cannot be
said to be privy thereto. As such, it and its "owner" cannot be held
solidarily liable for any of Divina’s claims arising from the 2-year
employment extension. As the New Civil Code provides,
Contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns, and heirs, Associate Justice Asscociate Justice
except in case where the rights and obligations arising from the
contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by ATT E S TAT I O N
provision of law.24
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
Furthermore, as Sunace correctly points out, there was an implied consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
revocation of its agency relationship with its foreign principal when, of the Court’s Division.
after the termination of the original employment contract, the foreign
principal directly negotiated with Divina and entered into a new and LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
separate employment contract in Taiwan. Article 1924 of the New Associate Justice
Civil Code reading Chairperson

The agency is revoked if the principal directly manages the business C E R T I F I CAT I O N
entrusted to the agent, dealing directly with third persons.
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the
thus applies. Division Chairman’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before
In light of the foregoing discussions, consideration of the validity of the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
the Waiver and Affidavit of Desistance which Divina executed in favor
of Sunace is rendered unnecessary. ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged
resolutions of the Court of Appeals are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The complaint of respondent Divina A. Montehermozo
against petitioner is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ANTONIO T. CARPIO DANTE O. TINGA