Ui vs.

Bonifacio
Facts:
On January 24, 1971 Leslie Ui married Carlos Ui. In 1987 Leslie found out that her
husband was carrying on an illicit relationship with Atty. Iris Bonifacio. In 1988, Leslie
introduced herself to Atty. Bonifacio as the legal wife of Carlos Ui and thereafter
believed that their confrontation would end the illicit affair. However sometime in
December 1988, Atty. Bonifacio had her second child with Carlos Ui and was
confronted once more by Leslie in 1989 to end the affair but to no avail. Atty. Bonifacio
raised the defense that Carlos Ui presented himself as single and only had children out
of wedlock with a woman from China and after becoming aware of the true civil status of
the latter broke all contacts with him. Furthermore, Atty. Bonifacio attached a photocopy
of her Marriage Certificate with an altered date in her Answer.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Bonifacio shall be disbarred?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled Respondents act of immediately distancing herself from
Carlos Ui upon discovering his true civil status belies just that alleged moral indifference
and proves that she had no intention of flaunting the law and the high moral standard of
the legal profession. On the matter of the falsified Marriage Certificate, it is highly
improbable that a bride, especially a lawyer can forget the year when she got married
so when she has personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances contained therein.
In attaching such Marriage Certificate the defense of good faith of Atty. Bonifacio cannot
stand The Supreme Court ruled that respondent be reprimanded for attaching to her
answer a photocopy of her Marriage Certificate with an altered date with a stern warning
that a more severe sanction will be imposed on her for any repetition of the same or
similar offense in the future.
Notes:

-Complainant appealed the said Resolution of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal to the Secretary of Justice, but the same was
dismissed [9] on the ground of insufficiency of evidence to prove her allegation that respondent and Carlos Ui lived together as
husband and wife at 527 San Carlos Street, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila.

-In the proceedings before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, complainant filed a Motion to Cite Respondent in Contempt of the
Commission [10] wherein she charged respondent with making false allegations in her Answer and for submitting a supporting
document which was altered and intercalated. She alleged that in the Answer of respondent filed before the Integrated Bar,
respondent averred, among others, that she was married to Carlos Ui on October 22, 1985 and attached a Certificate of Marriage to
substantiate her averment. However, the Certificate of Marriage [11] duly certified by the State Registrar as a true copy of the record
on file in the Hawaii State Department of Health, and duly authenticated by the Philippine Consulate General in Honolulu, Hawaii,
USA revealed that the date of marriage between Carlos Ui and respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio was October 22, 1987, and not
October 22, 1985 as claimed by respondent in her Answer. According to complainant, the reason for that false allegation was
because respondent wanted to impress upon the said IBP that the birth of her first child by Carlos Ui was within the wedlock. [12] It is
the contention of complainant that such act constitutes a violation of Articles 183[13] and 184[14] of the Revised Penal Code, and also
contempt of the Commission; and that the act of respondent in making false allegations in her Answer and submitting an
altered/intercalated document are indicative of her moral perversity and lack of integrity which make her unworthy to be a member of
the Philippine Bar.

-In her defense, respondent contends, among others, that it was she who was the victim in this case and not Leslie Ui because she
did not know that Carlos Ui was already married, and that upon learning of this fact, respondent immediately cut-off all her ties with
Carlos Ui. She stated that there was no reason for her to doubt at that time that the civil status of Carlos Ui was that of a bachelor
because he spent so much time with her, and he was so open in his courtship
-The practice of law is a privilege. A bar candidate does not have the right to enjoy the practice of the legal profession simply by
passing the bar examinations. It is a privilege that can be revoked, subject to the mandate of due process, once a lawyer violates his
oath and the dictates of legal ethics. The requisites for admission to the practice of law are:

a. he must be a citizen of the Philippines;

b. a resident thereof;

c. at least twenty-one (21) years of age;

d. a person of good moral character;

e. he must show that no charges against him involving moral turpitude, are filed or pending in court;

f. possess the required educational qualifications; and

g. pass the bar examinations.[25] (Italics supplied)

-WHEREFORE, the complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Iris L. Bonifacio, for alleged immorality, is hereby
DISMISSED.

However, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED for attaching to her Answer a photocopy of her Marriage Certificate, with an altered
or intercalated date thereof, with a STERN WARNING that a more severe sanction will be imposed on her for any repetition of the
same or similar offense in the future.

In re: Cunanan
Facts:
Rule 127, Section 14 of the Rules of Court requires that for a candidate to pass the Bar
he must obtain a general average of 75 without falling below 50 in any subject.
However, the Supreme Court deemed to have passed the bar candidates between 1946
and 1952 that obtained a grade lower than that required by Rule 127 Section 14 of the
Rules of Court taking into consideration R.A 972, the varying degrees of difficulty,
strictness and of the said examination and the handicap of the candidates caused by
the Japanese occupation.
Issue:
Whether the petitioners shall be granted the privilege to practice law?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that R.A. 972 is contrary to public interest because it qualifies
law graduates who confessedly had inadequate preparation for the practice of the
profession. To the legal profession is entrusted the protection of property, life, honor
and civil liberties. To approve officially those inadequately prepared individuals to
dedicate themselves to such a delicate mission is to create a serious social danger.
Moreover, it is not true that there was an insufficiency of legal reading materials
Decisions of this court alone in mimeographed copies were made available to the public
during those years and private enterprises had also published them in monthly
magazines and annual digests. The Official Gazette had been published continuously.
Books and magazines published abroad have entered without restriction since 1945.
Many law books, some even with revised and enlarged edi5ons have been printed
locally during those periods. A new set of Philippine Reports began to be published
since 1946, which continued to be supplemented by the addition of new
volumes.Therefore,Supreme Court ruled that R.A. 972 is unconstitutional and
petitioners who failed between 1946 to 1952 shall be denied the privilege to practice law
however due to the lack of unanimity of the eight justices all candidates in 1953 who
have acquired an average of 71.5 without having a grade below 50 shall be granted the
privilege to practice law.
Notes:

-Republic Act No. 972 cannot be assailed on the ground that it is unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, since this Court had already
adopted as passing averages 69 per cent for the 1947 bar examinations and 70 per cent for the 1948 examinations. Anyway, we
should not inquire into the wisdom of the law, since this is a matter that is addressed to the judgment of the legislators. This Court in
many instances had doubted the propriety of legislative enactments, and yet it has consistently refrained from nullifying them solely
on that ground.

To say that the admission of the bar candidates benefited under Republic Act 972 is against public interest, is to assume that the
matter of whether said Act is beneficial or harmful to the general public was not considered by the Congress. As already stated, the
Congress held public hearings, and we are bound to assume that the legislators, loyal, as do the members of this Court, to their
oath of office, had taken all the circumstances into account before passing the Act. On the question of public interest I may observe
that the Congress, representing the people who elected them, should be more qualified to make an appraisal. I am inclined to
accept Republic Act No. 972 as an expression of the will of the people through their duly elected representatives.

I would, however, not go to the extent of admitting that the Congress, in the exercise of its concurrent power to repeal, alter, or
supplement the Rules of Court regarding the admission to the practice of law, may act in an arbitrary or capricious manner, in the
same way that this Court may not do so. We are thus left in the situation, incidental to a democracy, where we can and should only
hope that the right men are put in the right places in our Government.

Wherefore, I hold that Republic Act No. 972 is constitutional and should therefore be given effect in its entirety.

In re: Mario Guarina

Facts:
Petitioner seeks admission to the bar without taking the prescribed examination on the
ground that he holds the office of provincial fiscal for the Province of Batanes by citing
Section 2 of Act 1597 which states that among others that any person who prior to the
passage of this Act or at any time thereafter shall have held under the authority of the
United States the position of provincial fiscal be licensed to practice law in the courts of
the Philippine Islands without an examination, upon motion before the Supreme Court
and establishing such fact to the satisfaction of said court
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner shall be granted admission to the bar?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the appointment of petitioner to the office of provincial
fiscal is in itself not a satisfactory proof of his possession of the necessary qualification
of learning and ability to practice law. However, the fact that petitioner fell only four
points short of the necessary grade to entitle him to a license to practice, the fact that he
held the responsible office of governor, the fact that the Chief Executive and the
Philippine Commission sought to retain him in the Government service, petitioner is
granted a special examination.
Notes:

-In view, however, of the fact that when he took the examination he fell only four points short of the necessary grade to entitle him to
a license to practice; and in view also of the fact that since that time he has held the responsible office of governor of the Province of
Sorsogon and presumably gave evidence of such marked ability in the performance of the duties of that office that the Chief
Executive, with the consent and approval of the Philippine Commission, sought to retain him in the Government service by
appointing him to the office of provincial fiscal, we think we would be justified under the above-cited provisions of Act No. 1597 in
waiving in his case the ordinary examination prescribed by general rule, provided he offers satisfactory evidence of his proficiency in
a special examination which will be given him by a committee of the court upon his application therefor, without prejudice to his right,
if he desires so to do, to present himself at any of the ordinary examinations prescribed by general rule. So ordered.

In the matter of Disqualification of Bar Examinee Meling

Facts:
Atty. Melendrez filed a petition to disqualify Haron S. Meling from taking the 2002 Bar
Examinations and impose on him the appropriate dsicplinary penalty as a member of
the Philippine Sharia Bar. Atty. Melendrez alleges that Meling did not disclose that he
has three pending criminal cases and that the latter used the title Attorney despite the
fact that he is not a member of the Bar.
Issue:
1) Whether or not Meling should be denied from taking the 2002 Bar examinations?
2) Whether or not appropriate disciplinary action shall be imposed upon Meling as a
member of the Philippine Sharia Bar?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that Meling’s concealment of the pending cases against him
flunks him in the test of moral fitness which is required of an applicant to take the Bar.
Moreover because of his lack of good moral character brought about by the 3 pending
criminal cases against him, the privilege bestowed upon him as a member of the Sharia
Bar shall be forfeited.
Notes:

- the above-mentioned cases arose from an incident which occurred on May 21, 2001, when Meling allegedly uttered
defamatory words against Melendrez and his wife in front of media practitioners and other people. Meling also purportedly attacked
and hit the face of Melendrez wife causing the injuries to the latter.

Furthermore, Melendrez alleges that Meling has been using the title Attorney in his communications, as Secretary to the
Mayor of Cotabato City, despite the fact that he is not a member of the Bar. Attached to the Petition is an indorsement letter which
shows that Meling used the appellation and appears on its face to have been received by the Sangguniang Panglungsod
of Cotabato City on November 27, 2001.

- In his Answer,[3] Meling explains that he did not disclose the criminal cases filed against him by Melendrez because retired Judge
Corocoy Moson, their former professor, advised him to settle his misunderstanding with Melendrez. Believing in good faith that the
case would be settled because the said Judge has moral ascendancy over them, he being their former professor in
the College of Law, Meling considered the three cases that actually arose from a single incident and involving the same parties as
closed and terminated. Moreover, Meling denies the charges and adds that the acts complained of do not involve moral turpitude.

- It has been held that good moral character is what a person really is, as distinguished from good reputation or from the opinion
generally entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held by the public in the place where he is known. Moral character is not a
subjective term but one which corresponds to objective reality. The standard of personal and professional integrity is not satisfied by
such conduct as it merely enables a person to escape the penalty of criminal law. Good moral character includes at least common
honesty.
The non-disclosure of Meling of the criminal cases filed against him makes him also answerable under Rule 7.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which states that a lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false statement or suppressing a
material fact in connection with his application for admission to the bar.[5]

- Although there is no showing that Meling is engaged in the practice of law, the fact is, he is signing his communications as Atty.
Haron S. Meling knowing fully well that he is not entitled thereto. As held by the Court in Bar Matter 1209, the unauthorized use of
the appellation attorney may render a person liable for indirect contempt of court.[

- Consequently, the OBC recommended that Meling not be allowed to take the Lawyers Oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys in
the event that he passes the Bar Examinations. Further, it recommended that Melings membership in the Sharia Bar be suspended
until further orders from the Court.[7]

We fully concur with the findings and recommendation of the OBC. Meling, however, did not pass the 2003 Bar
Examinations. This renders the Petition, insofar as it seeks to prevent Meling from taking the Lawyers Oath and signing the Roll of
Attorneys, moot and academic.

- The disclosure requirement is imposed by the Court to determine whether there is satisfactory evidence of good moral
character of the applicant.[10] The nature of whatever cases are pending against the applicant would aid the Court in determining
whether he is endowed with the moral fitness demanded of a lawyer. By concealing the existence of such cases, the applicant then
flunks the test of fitness even if the cases are ultimately proven to be unwarranted or insufficient to impugn or affect the good moral
character of the applicant.

Melings concealment of the fact that there are three (3) pending criminal cases against him speaks of his lack of the requisite
good moral character and results in the forfeiture of the privilege bestowed upon him as a member of the Sharia Bar.

- persons who pass the Sharia Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence, may only practice law before Sharia
courts. While one who has been admitted to the Sharia Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be
considered counselors, in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is an attorney. The
title attorney is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar
Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing; and it is
they only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction. [12]

- WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED insofar as it seeks the imposition of appropriate sanctions upon Haron S. Meling as a
member of the Philippine Sharia Bar. Accordingly, the membership of Haron S. Meling in the Philippine Sharia Bar is hereby
SUSPENDED until further orders from the Court, the suspension to take effect immediately. Insofar as the Petitionseeks to prevent
Haron S. Meling from taking the Lawyers Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys as a member of the Philippine Bar, the same is
DISMISSED for having become moot and academic.

Zoreta vs. Atty. Simpliciano

Facts:
MelanioZoreta filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Simpliciano for allegedly
notarizing several documents during the year 2002 after his commission as notary
public had expired.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Simpliciano shall be disbarred?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that Atty. Simpliciano for having notarized 590 documents
after the expiration of his commission as notary public without having renewed said
commission amounts to gross misconduct as a member of the legal profession. In the
case of Nunga v. Viray, if a member of the Philippine Bar, without authorization
notarizes a document he or she may be subjected to disciplinary action. Moreover, the
Atty. Simpliciano’s action of notarizing without authority violates Canon 1 and Canon 7
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Therefore, the Supreme Court ruled that
Atty. Simpliciano be barred permanently from commission as Notary Public and
suspended from the practice of law for 2 years.
Notes:
- A careful examination and evaluation of the evidence submitted by the petitioner showed that respondent notarized up to
Document No. 590, Page 118, Book No. II, Series of 2002 and his commission expires December 31, 2002 which referred to the
Affidavit of Service signed and executed by Joseph B. Aganan Legal Assistant of Simpliciano and Capela Law Office subscribed
and sworn to before Notary Public Heherson Alnor G. Simpliciano whose commission expires December 31, 2002.

- Another certification issued by the Clerk of Court of RTC Quezon City dated April 15, 2003 showed that as per records on file with
their office respondent was commissioned notary public for and in Quezon City from January 14, 2000 to December 31, 2001 and
for the year 2002 and 2003 he did not apply for notarial commission for Quezon City.

- Wherefore, in view of the foregoing the Undersigned respectfully recommends the revocation of respondents commission as
notary public permanently if he is commissioned as such at present and his suspension from the practice of law for a period of three
(3) months from receipt hereof furnishing the IBP Chapter where he is a registered member a copy hereof for implementation should
this recommendation be approved by the Honorable members of the Board of Governors.[15]

- The eight (8) notarized documents for the year 2002 submitted by complainant, consisting of affidavits of merit, certifications
and verifications against non-forum shopping, and affidavits of service, were used and presented in the Regional Trial Court of
Antipolo City, Branch 74, in Civil Case No. 01-6240, and in respondents petition for certiorari filed in the Court of Appeals.

Against the evidence presented by complainant, respondent did not even attempt to present any evidence. His counsel filed
an ex-parte motion for extension to file answer, which was granted, but no answer was forthcoming. Still, Hearing Commissioner
Lydia A. Navarro gave respondent a last chance to file his answer; which was again unheeded. Thus, respondent was unable to
rebut complainants evidence that he was not so commissioned for the year in question. His lack of interest and indifference in
presenting his defense to the charge and the evidence against him can only mean he has no strong and valid defense to offer.
Conclusively, respondent Atty. Simpliciano is not a duly commissioned Notary Public for and in Quezon City for the year 2002.

- The requirements for the issuance of a commission as notary public must not be treated as a mere casual formality. The Court has
characterized a lawyers act of notarizing documents without the requisite commission therefore as reprehensible, constituting as it
does not only malpractice but also x x x the crime of falsification of public documents. [25] For such reprehensible conduct, the Court
has sanctioned erring lawyers by suspension from the practice of law, revocation of the notarial commission and disqualification
from acting as such, and even disbarment.

- t the threshold, it is worth stressing that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show
that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege.[19] Membership in
the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A lawyer has the privilege and right to practice law only during good behavior and
can only be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained and declared by judgment of the court after opportunity to be heard has been
afforded him. Without invading any constitutional privilege or right, an attorneys right to practice law may be resolved by a
proceeding to suspend him, based on conduct rendering him unfit to hold a license or to exercise the duties and responsibilities of
an attorney. It must be understood that the purpose of suspending or disbarring him as an attorney is to remove from the profession
a person whose misconduct has proved him unfit to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to an office of
attorney, and thus to protect the public and those charged with the administration of justice, rather than to punish an
attorney.[20] Elaborating on this, we said in Maligsa v. Cabanting[21] that [t]he bar should maintain a high standard of legal proficiency
as well as of honesty and fair dealing. A lawyer brings honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to
the bar, to the courts and to his clients. To this end a member of the legal fraternity should refrain from doing any act which might
lessen in any degree the confidence and trust reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the legal
profession.[22] Towards this end, an attorney may be disbarred, or suspended for any violation of his oath or of his duties as an
attorney and counselor, which include statutory grounds enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, all of these
being broad enough to cover practically any misconduct of a lawyer in his professional or private capacity. [23]

- Needless to state, respondent cannot escape from disciplinary action in his capacity as a notary public and as a member of
the Philippine Bar. However, the penalty recommended by the Board of Governors of the IBP must be increased. Respondent must
be barred from being commissioned as a notary public permanently and suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years.

WHEREFORE, this Court hereby adopts the findings of Investigating Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro, which the Board of
Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines adopted and approved, but hereby MODIFIES the penalty recommended by the
Board of Governors. As modified, respondent ATTY. HEHERSON ALNOR G. SIMPLICIANO is hereby BARRED PERMANENTLY
from being commissioned as Notary Public. He is furthermore SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years, effective
upon receipt of a copy of this Decision.

Ducat vs. Villalon

Facts:
Atty. Villalon as counsel or the family of complainant spoke to the father of complainant
and asked that he be given the title over a property because he allegedly had to verify
the proper measurements of the subject property. Thereafter complainant and his family
were surprised when several people entered the property at hand and begun
constructing a piggery in the presence of armed men. Complainant filed a case of
ejectment against Canares however in the reply of the latter it appeared that the
property in question was already sold to the latter for the amount of PHP 450,o00.00.
Atty. Villalon raised the defense that the property in question was already given to him
by oral agreement
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Villalon shall be disbarred?
Ruling:
The defense of Atty. Villalon cannot stand, it is basic law that conveyance or transfer of
any titled real property must be in writing, signed by the registered owner or at least by
his attorney-in-fact. Atty. Villalon as a lawyer is presumed to know and ought to know
this process therefore his defense cannot stand. The Supreme Court ruled that Atty.
Villalon be suspended from the practice of law for 1 year and deliver TCT No. M-3023 to
complainant Jose Ducat Jr. covering the subject property within a period of 60 days
upon receipt of this Decision and failure to do so will result in his disbarment.
Notes:

- Before us is a verified letter-complaint[1] for disbarment against Attys. Arsenio C. Villalon, Jr.; Andres Canares, Jr. and Crispulo
Ducusin for deceit and gross misconduct in violation of the lawyers oath. Investigation proceeded only against respondent Villalon
because it was discovered that Andres Canares was not a lawyer while Atty. Crispulo Ducusin passed away on February 3, 1996. [

- Upon presenting the title covering the subject property, it was discovered that the property was registered in the name of Jose
Ducat, Jr. and not Jose Ducat, Sr., but the latter told respondents Villalon and Canares not to worry because the land was actually
owned by him and that he merely placed the name of his son, Jose Ducat, Jr. Jose Ducat, Sr. then suggested that the subject
property be transferred directly from Jose Ducat, Jr. to respondent Canares; hence, he (Ducat, Sr.) got the title and guaranteed that
he would return the document already signed and notarized, which he did the following day. According to respondent Canares, the
trouble began when Jose Ducat, Sr. came to his office demanding to know why he was not allowed to cut the trees inside the
subject property by the caretaker of respondent Canares.

- FIRST, the registered owner of the subject property is complainant Jose Ducat, Jr. Accordingly, respondent (being a lawyer) knew
or ought to know that Jose Ducat, Sr. could not possibly give to him the said property unless the former is duly authorized by the
complainant through a Special Power of Attorney. No such authorization has been given. Moreover, Jose Ducat, Sr. has vigorously
denied having given the subject property to the respondent. This denial is not too difficult to believe considering the fact that he
(Jose Ducat, Sr.) is not the owner of said property.

SECOND, being a lawyer, respondent knew or ought to know that conveyance of a real property, whether gratuitously or for a
consideration, must be in writing. Accordingly, it is unbelievable that he would consider himself the owner of the subject property on
the basis of the verbal or oral giving of the property by Jose Ducat, Sr. no matter how many times the latter may have said that.

THIRD, the Deed of Sale of Parcel of Land (Exh. 1 for the respondent and Exh. A-2 for the complainant) allegedly executed by Jose
Ducat, Sr. in favor of respondent Atty. Arsenio Villalon and/or Andres Canares, Jr. covering the subject parcel of land which
respondent prepared allegedly upon instruction of Jose Ducat, Sr. is of dubious character. As earlier adverted to, Jose Ducat, Sr. is
not the owner of said property. Moreover, said Deed of Sale of Parcel of Land is a falsified document as admitted by the respondent
himself when he said that the signature over the typewritten name Maria Cabrido (wife of Jose Ducat, Sr.) was affixed by Jose
Ducat, Sr. Being a lawyer, respondent knew or ought to know that the act of Jose Ducat, Sr. in affixing his wifes signature is
tantamount to a forgery. Accordingly, he should have treated the said Deed of Sale of Parcel of Land has (sic) a mere scrap of
worthless paper instead of relying on the same to substantiate his claim that the subject property was given to him by Jose Ducat,
Sr. Again, of note is the fact that Jose Ducat, Sr. has vigorously denied having executed said document which denial is not too
difficult to believe in the light of the circumstances already mentioned.

FOURTH, the Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property (Exh. 2 for the respondent and Exh. A-3 for the complainant) allegedly
executed by Jose Ducat, Jr. in favor of Andres Canares, Jr. over the subject property (which respondent claims he prepared upon
instruction of Jose Ducat, Sr.) is likewise of questionable character. Complainant Jose Ducat, Jr. has vigorously denied having
executed said document. He claims that he has never sold said property to Andres Canares, Jr. whom he does not know; that he
has never appeared before Atty. Crispulo Ducusin to subscribe to the document; and that he has never received the amount of
P450,000.00 representing the consideration of said transaction. More importantly, the infirmity of the said Deed of Absolute Sale of
Real Property was supplied by the respondent no less when he admitted that there was no payment of P450,000.00 and that the
same was placed in the document only to make it appear that the conveyance was for a consideration. Accordingly, and being a
lawyer, respondent knew or ought to know the irregularity of his act and that he should have treated the document as another scrap
of worthless paper instead of utilizing the same to substantiate his defense.[8]

- After a careful consideration of the record of the instant case, it appears that the findings of facts and
observations of the Investigating Commissioner, Integrated Bar of the Philippines, which were all adopted by its Board
of Governors, are well-taken, the same being supported by the evidence adduced.

The ethics of the legal profession rightly enjoin lawyers to act with the highest standards of truthfulness, fair play
and nobility in the course of his practice of law. A lawyer may be disciplined or suspended for any misconduct, whether
in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, in probity and
good demeanor, thus rendering unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. [9] Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility mandates that a lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. The trust
and confidence necessarily reposed by clients require in the lawyer a high standard and appreciation of his duty to
them. To this end, nothing should be done by any member of the legal fraternity which might tend to lessen in any
degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the profession.[10]

- We find, however, the IBPs recommended penalty of two (2) years suspension to be imposed upon respondent Atty. Villalon too
severe in the light of the facts obtaining in the case at bar.

- WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. ARSENIO C. VILLALON, JR. is hereby found guilty of gross misconduct, and he is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of ONE (1) YEAR with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act will
be dealt with more severely. Respondent Villalon is further directed to deliver to the registered owner, complainant Jose Ducat Jr.,
the latters TCT No. M-3023 covering the subject property within a period of sixty (60) days from receipt of this Decision, at his sole
expense; and that failure on his part to do so will result in his disbarment.

Ronquillo vs. Cezar

Facts:
Complainants seek the disbarment or suspension of respondent from the practice of law
for unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful conduct. They allege that respondent sold
them a piece of property over which he has no right nor interest, and that he refuses to
return to them the amount they have paid him for it.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Attorney shall be disbarred?
Whether the money paid by complainants shall be returned?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that in the instant case, respondent may have acted in his
private capacity when he entered into a contract with complainant representing to have
rights to transfer title over the property in question. It was unlawful for respondent to
transfer property over which one has no legal right of ownership. Respondent was guilty
of dishonest and deceitful conduct when he concealed this lack of right from
complainant. His acceptance of the purchase price amounting to PHP 937,000.00
despite knowing he was not entitled to it made matters worse for him. The Supreme
Court ruled that respondent, Atty. Cezar be suspended for a period of three years
however this court cannot rule on the issue of the amount of money that should be
returned to complainants because this proceeding is solely for the determination
whether or not the Attorney in question is still fit to be allowed to continue as member of
the Bar.
Notes:

- Complainants seek the disbarment or suspension of respondent from the practice of law for unlawful, dishonest, immoral and
deceitful conduct. They allege that respondent sold them a piece of property over which he has no right nor interest, and that he
refuses to return to them the amount they have paid him for it.

- Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan, to whom the instant disciplinary case
was assigned for investigation, report and recommendation, found respondent guilty of dishonest and deceitful conduct proscribed
under Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. In her Report dated October 9, 2003, she recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of three (3) years. The IBP Board of Governors, through Resolution
No. XVI-2003-226, dated October 25, 2003, approved the recommendation of Commissioner San Juan.

- Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be disbarred or suspended on any of the
following grounds: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice or other gross misconduct in office; (3) grossly immoral conduct; (4) conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude; (5) violation of the lawyer’s oath; (6) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and
(7) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without authority. Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides that "A lawyer shall not engage inunlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." "Conduct," as used in this rule, does
not refer exclusively to the performance of a lawyer’s professional duties. This Court has made clear in a long line of cases 7 that a
lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be
wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor, or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.

- In the instant case, respondent may have acted in his private capacity when he entered into a contract with complainant Marili
representing to have the rights to transfer title over the townhouse unit and lot in question. When he failed in his undertaking,
respondent fell short of his duty under Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It cannot be gainsaid that it
was unlawful for respondent to transfer property over which one has no legal right of ownership. Respondent was likewise guilty of
dishonest and deceitful conduct when he concealed this lack of right from complainants. He did not inform the complainants that he
has not yet paid in full the price of the subject townhouse unit and lot, and, therefore, he had no right to sell, transfer or assign said
property at the time of the execution of the Deed of Assignment. His acceptance of the bulk of the purchase price amounting to Nine
Hundred Thirty-Seven Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P937,500.00), despite knowing he was not entitled to it, made matters worse
for him.

Respondent’s adamant refusal to return to complainant Marili Ronquillo the money she paid him, which was the fruit of her labor as
an Overseas Filipino Worker for ten (10) years, is morally reprehensible. By his actuations, respondent failed to live up to the strict
standard of morality required by the Code of Professional Responsibility and violated the trust and respect reposed in him as a
member of the Bar, and an officer of the court.

- The practice of law is not a right but a privilege. It is granted only to those of good moral character. 9 The Bar must maintain a high
standard of honesty and fair dealing.10 Lawyers must conduct themselves beyond reproach at all times, whether they are dealing
with their clients or the public at large,11 and a violation of the high moral standards of the legal profession justifies the imposition of
the appropriate penalty, including suspension and disbarment. 12

- IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent Atty. Homobono T. Cezar is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period ofTHREE (3)
YEARS, effective immediately. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and all courts for their information and guidance.

______________________________________________________________________
____

Bolivar v Manuel
Facts:
Bolivar and Atty. Simbol had executed a compromise agreement in a civil case of the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, the undersigned ceased to hear from Atty.
Simbol. Atty. Castro, upon receiving the letter of transmittal tried to get in touch with
Atty. Simbol in Manila and Dumaguetebut he was nowhere to be found. Complainant
was 27 yrs old at the time she took the stand. She had a relationship with the
respondent who convinced her promise to marry and lived in together. They had 1 child.
In 1957 the two separated. For, complainant learned from respondent's brother-in-law,
one Turing Mendoza, and others, that respondent married another girl, Lydia Lingat.
Complainant investigated. Her worst fears were confirmed. Respondent and Lydia
Lingat were really married in Angeles on 1957. When the two first met, respondent was
a jobless first year law student. He remained jobless during his student days. Since
June, 1953, complainant helped respondent in his studies, gave him money to buy his
books and to pay his matriculation fees and for "other things he needed in his studies".
Issue: WON the acts of Atty. Simbol a ground of his disbarment on moral grounds
Ruling:
SC ruled that respondents actuations and making a dupe complaint, living on her
bounty and allowing Bolivar to spend for his schooling and other personal necessities
while dangling before her the mirage of marriage, marrying another girl as soon as he
had finished his studies, keeping his marriage a secret while continuing to demand
money from complainant and trying to sponge on her and persuade her to resume their
broken relationship after the latter’s discovery of his perfidy, are indicative of a character
not worthy of member of the bar and is indeed guilty of grossly immoral conduct.

Notes:
-Respondent, we are persuaded to say, "has failed to maintain the highest degree of morality expected and required of a member of
the bar".9 He is, indeed, guilty of "grossly immoral conduct" within the meaning of Section 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court.

-In the light of the entire record, we vote to suspend respondent Abelardo Simbol y Manuel from the practice of law for a period of
five (5) years.

Abaigar v Paz
Facts:
Complainant Pilar Abaigar and David DC Dela Paz started developing a relationship
with each other since 1970 when complainant sought the aid of a legal counsel
regarding her divorce filed by her husband in USA. The 2 were engaged in a sexual
relationship. On 1971, Virginia Paz was introduced to the complainant by respondent
whom the respondent had 2 marriages with. Upon being confronted by the complainant,
the respondent made no explanation whatsoever and merely kept silent; that since that
time the respondent had done nothing to make amends for having deceived the
complainant and for taking advantage of her. Complainant then asks for the disbarment
of the respondent who is a member of Phil Bar and officer of the Court of Justice.
Issue: WON Paz is guilty on the grounds of deceit and grossly immoral conduct under
Sec. 27 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and shall be disbarred?
Ruling:
No.
The evidence adduced by the complainant has failed to establish any cause for
disciplinary action against the respondent. As Solicitor General said in his report “from
all indications, there is little room for doubt that she filed her disbarment case not in a
redress of wrong, for these was no wrong committed it was a voluntary indiscretion
between 2 consenting adults who were fully aware of the consequences of their deed
for which they were responsible only to their own private conscience.”
Notes:

-administrative case

-The evidence adduced by the complainant has failed to establish any cause for disciplinary action against the respondent. As the
Solicitor General said in his report, "From all indications, there is little room for doubt that she filed his disbarment case not in
redress of a wrong, for there was no wrong committed. It was a voluntary act of indiscretion between two consenting adults who
were fully aware of the consequences of their deed and for which they were responsible only to their own private consciences."

WHEREFORE, the administrative complaint for disbarment is hereby DISMISSED.

-It is worthwhile repeating that complainant was a fifth placer in the Board Examinations for Chemical Engineering.

-It is worthwhile repeating that complainant was a fifth placer in the Board Examinations for Chemical Engineering.

-Whether there was deceit hinges on whether complainant actually believed the representation of respondent that they could legally
marry

Moreno v Araneta
Facts:
Complaint was filed by Ma. Elena Moreno against Atty. Araneta for deceit and
nonpayment of debts on 2 causes of action 1. Treasury warrant issued by Land
Registration Commission on favor of Lira Inc. and indorsed by Araneta, purportedly as
president of the said corporation, to Moreno, in consideration of the amount of P2,177.
The complaint alleged that almost a year later, the warrant was dishonored. 2.
Araneta’snonpaymebt of debts in the amount of P11,000 in which Araneta issued 2
Bank of America checks. However, when Moreno tried to encash the checks, the same
were dishonored and returned to her marked Account Close. Araneta denied
accusations against him.

Issue: WON issuance of worthless checks constitutes gross misconduct

Ruling:
Yes.
Worthless checks constitutes gross misconduct as the effect transcends the private
interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of
the community at large. Act of a person in issuing a check knowing at the time of the
issuance that he or she does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee
bank for the payment of the checks in full upon its payment manifests moral turpitude.
Notes:
-Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.

-have held that the issuance of worthless checks constitutes gross misconduct, [18] as the effect transcends the private interests of
the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only
a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public since the circulation of valueless commercial papers can very well
pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public
interest. Thus, paraphrasing Black's definition, a drawer who issues an unfunded check deliberately reneges on his private duties he
owes his fellow men or society in a manner contrary to accepted and customary rule of right and duty, justice, honesty or good
morals.[19]

-n the instant case, however, herein respondent has, in the intervening time, apparently been found guilty by final judgment
of estafa thru falsification of a commercial document, a crime involving moral turpitude, for which he has been indefinitely
suspended.

-Moral turpitude includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. [24] It involves an act of
baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the
accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good
morals.[25]

-WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Ernesto S. Araneta is hereby DISBARRED and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll
of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the respondents record as a member of the Bar, and notice of the same be
served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the
country.

Soriano v Dizon
Facts:
Complaint-affidavit for the disbarment of Atty. Dizon was filed by Roberto Soriano with
CBD of the IBD. Complainant alleges that the conviction of respondent for a crime
involving moral turpitude, together with the circumstance surrounding the conviction
violates canon of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and constitutes
sufficient ground for his disbarment under sec 27 of Rule 138 of Rules of Court. Atty.
Dizon shot a taxi driver who overtaken his car while under the influence of alcohol. A
certain Antonio, the witness of the incident took the victim Soriano to the nearest
hospital. Atty. Dizon also shows dishonesty through fabricating facts and stories against
complainant.

Issue: WON Atty. Dizon acts constitutes sufficient grounds for disbarment
Ruling:
SC ruled that when lawyers are convicted of frustrated homicide, the attending
circumstances not the mere fact of the conviction would demonstrate their fitness to
remain in the legal profession. In the present case, the appalling vindictiveness,
treachery and brazen dishonesty of respondent clearly shows his unworthiness as a
member of the bar.
Notes:

-Complainant alleges that the conviction of respondent for a crime involving moral turpitude, together with the circumstances
surrounding the conviction, violates Canon 1 of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; [2] and constitutes sufficient
ground for his disbarment under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.[3]

-conviction of the latter for frustrated homicide,[7] which involved moral turpitude, should result in his disbarment.

-The accused was driving his brown Toyota Corolla and was on his way home after gassing up in preparation for his trip to
Concepcion, Tarlac with his wife. Along Abanao Street, a taxi driver overtook the car driven by the accused not knowing that the
driver of the car he had overtaken is not just someone, but a lawyer and a prominent member of the Baguio community who was
under the influence of liquor. Incensed, the accused tailed the taxi driver until the latter stopped to make a turn at [the] Chugum and
Carino Streets. The accused also stopped his car, berated the taxi driver and held him by his shirt. To stop the aggression, the taxi
driver forced open his door causing the accused to fall to the ground. The taxi driver knew that the accused had been drinking
because he smelled of liquor. Taking pity on the accused who looked elderly, the taxi driver got out of his car to help him get up. But
the accused, by now enraged, stood up immediately and was about to deal the taxi driver a fist blow when the latter boxed him on
the chest instead. The accused fell down a second time, got up again and was about to box the taxi driver but the latter caught his
fist and turned his arm around. The taxi driver held on to the accused until he could be pacified and then released him. The accused
went back to his car and got his revolver making sure that the handle was wrapped in a handkerchief. The taxi driver was on his way
back to his vehicle when he noticed the eyeglasses of the accused on the ground. He picked them up intending to return them to the
accused. But as he was handing the same to the accused, he was met by the barrel of the gun held by the accused who fired and
shot him hitting him on the neck. He fell on the thigh of the accused so the latter pushed him out and sped off. The incident was
witnessed by Antonio Billanes whose testimony corroborated that of the taxi driver, the complainant in this case, Roberto Soriano.

-The commissioner found that respondent had not only been convicted of such crime, but that the latter also exhibited an
obvious lack of good moral character, based on the following facts:

1. He was under the influence of liquor while driving his car;

2. He reacted violently and attempted to assault Complainant only because the latter, driving a taxi, had
overtaken him;
3. Complainant having been able to ward off his attempted assault, Respondent went back to his car, got a gun,
wrapped the same with a handkerchief and shot Complainant[,] who was unarmed;
4. When Complainant fell on him, Respondent simply pushed him out and fled;
5. Despite positive identification and overwhelming evidence, Respondent denied that he had shot
Complainant;
6. Apart from [his] denial, Respondent also lied when he claimed that he was the one mauled by Complainant
and two unidentified persons; and,
7. Although he has been placed on probation, Respondent has[,] to date[,] not yet satisfied his civil liabilities to
Complainant.[12]

-Under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for disbarment or
suspension. By such conviction, a lawyer is deemed to have become unfit to uphold the administration of justice and to be no longer
possessed of good moral character.[13] In the instant case, respondent has been found guilty; and he stands convicted, by final
judgment, of frustrated homicide. Since his conviction has already been established and is no longer open to question, the only
issues that remain to be determined are as follows: 1) whether his crime of frustrated homicide involves moral turpitude, and 2)
whether his guilt warrants disbarment.

-Moral turpitude has been defined as everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness,
vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty, or good morals

-The present case is totally different. As the IBP correctly found, the circumstances clearly evince the moral turpitude of respondent
and his unworthiness to practice law.

Atty. Dizon was definitely the aggressor, as he pursued and shot complainant when the latter least expected it. The act of
aggression shown by respondent will not be mitigated by the fact that he was hit once and his arm twisted by complainant. Under
the circumstances, those were reasonable actions clearly intended to fend off the lawyers assault.
-We also consider the trial courts finding of treachery as a further indication of the skewed morals of respondent. He shot the victim
when the latter was not in a position to defend himself. In fact, under the impression that the assault was already over, the unarmed
complainant was merely returning the eyeglasses of Atty. Dizon when the latter unexpectedly shot him. To make matters worse,
respondent wrapped the handle of his gun with a handkerchief so as not to leave fingerprints. In so doing, he betrayed his sly
intention to escape punishment for his crime.

-It is also glaringly clear that respondent seriously transgressed Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility through his
illegal possession of an unlicensed firearm [18] and his unjust refusal to satisfy his civil liabilities.

-awyers must be ministers of truth. No moral qualification for bar membership is more important than truthfulness. [29] The
rigorous ethics of the profession places a premium on honesty and condemns duplicitous behavior. [30] Hence, lawyers must not
mislead the court or allow it to be misled by any artifice. In all their dealings, they are expected to act in good faith.

-The purpose of a proceeding for disbarment is to protect the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this
important function be competent, honorable and reliable -- lawyers in whom courts and clients may repose confidence. [32] Thus,
whenever a clear case of degenerate and vile behavior disturbs that vital yet fragile confidence, we shall not hesitate to rid our
profession of odious members

-WHEREFORE, RESPONDENT MANUEL DIZON is hereby DISBARRED, and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of
Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in his record as a member of the Bar; and let notice of the same be served on the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
In re Del Rosario
Facts:
It is recommended by the city fiscal that Felipe Del Rosario be ordered surrender his
certificate that he be forever prohibited from taking bar exams. Felipe Del Rosario was a
candidate in the bar exam who failed thrice. On March 29, 1927, he authorized the filing
of a motion for the revision of his papers for 1925 based on an alleged mistake in the
computation of his grades. Felipe was readmitted to the bar but with justices dissenting.
Subsequently, during the general investigation of bar exam matters, a criminal charge
was lodged against Villaflor, a former employee of the court and Del Rosario. However,
Del Rosario pleaded not guilty and the conclusion of the trial was acquitted for lack of
evidence.

Issue: WON criminal charges against Del Rosario is a bar to the proceedings
Ruling:
Yes.
The practice of the law is not an absolute right to be granted everyone who demands it,
but is a privilege to be extended or withheld in the exercise of a sound discretion. The
standards of the legal profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one
to escape the penalties of the criminal law. It would be a disgrace to the Judiciary to
receive one whose integrity is questionable as an officer of the court, to clothe him with
all the prestige of its confidence, and then to permit him to hold himself out as a duly
authorized member of the bar.
The recommendation contained in the special report pertaining to Felipe del Rosario is
approved, and within a period of ten days from receipt of notice, the respondent shall
surrender his attorney's certificate to the clerk of this court.
Notes:
-The recommendation contained in the special report pertaining to Felipe del Rosario is approved, and within a period of ten days
from receipt of notice, the respondent shall surrender his attorney's certificate to the clerk of this court.

-The acquittal of Felipe del Rosario upon the criminal charge is not a bar to these proceedings. The court is now acting in an entirely
different capacity from that which courts assume in trying criminal cases. It is asking a great deal of the members of the court to
have them believe that Felipe del Rosario was totally unaware of the illegal machinations culminating in the falsification of public
documents, of which he was the sole beneficiary. Indeed, the conviction of Juan Villaflor in itself demonstrates that Felipe del
Rosario has no legal right to his attorney's certificate. While to admit Felipe del Rosario again to the bar examination would be
tantamount to a declaration of professional purity which we are totally unable to pronounce.

DONTON VS TANSINGCO

FACTS:
The petitioner filed a complaint against the respondent for estafa thru falsification of
documents. The respondent, a lawyer, serves as a notary public who notarized the
Occupancy Agreement between the petitioner and certain Duane Stier. Duane Stier is
the owner and long-time resident of real property located in Murphy, Cubao, Quezon
City. Since Stier is a US citizen, he is thereby disqualified to own a property. He agreed
to transfer the property under the name of the petitioner. Aware of the prohibition, the
respondent prepared the documents needed for the transfer and recognition including
the Occupancy Agreementthat would guarantee Stier’s recognition as the actual owner
of the property despite its transfer in petitioner’s name. Due to this, the petitioner
averred that the act of the respondent on preparing the Occupancy Agreement, with full
knowledge of the prohibition, constitutes serious misconduct and deliberate violation of
the Code. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
WON the respondent has committed serious misconduct and violation of the Codeof
Professional Responsibility.
RULING:

Yes. The respondent violated Canon 1, Rule 1.02 of the Code which states that, “A
lawyer should not render any service or give advice to any client which will involve
defiance of the laws which he is bound to uphold and obey”. Respondent had sworn to
uphold the Constitution. Thus, he violated his oath and the Code when he prepared and
notarized the Occupancy Agreement which is clear violation of law against foreign
ownership of the lands.
Notes:

In his Complaint dated 20 May 2003, Peter T. Donton ("complainant") stated that he filed a criminal complaint for estafa thru
falsification of a public document4 against Duane O. Stier ("Stier"), Emelyn A. Maggay ("Maggay") and respondent, as the notary
public who notarized the Occupancy Agreement.

-The disbarment complaint arose when respondent filed a counter-charge for perjury5 against complainant

- On 28 July 2004, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration before the IBP. Respondent stated that he was already 76 years
old and would already retire by 2005 after the termination of his pending cases. He also said that his practice of law is his only
means of support for his family and his six minor children.

-Complainant averred that respondent’s act of preparing the Occupancy Agreement, despite knowledge that Stier, being a foreign
national, is disqualified to own real property in his name, constitutes serious misconduct and is a deliberate violation of the Code.
Complainant prayed that respondent be disbarred for advising Stier to do something in violation of law and assisting Stier in carrying
out a dishonest scheme.

In his Comment dated 19 August 2003, respondent claimed that complainant filed the disbarment case against him upon the
instigation of complainant’s counsel, Atty. Bonifacio A. Alentajan,7 because respondent refused to act as complainant’s witness in
the criminal case against Stier and Maggay. Respondent admitted that he "prepared and notarized" the Occupancy Agreement and
asserted its genuineness and due execution.

-In her Report dated 26 February 2004 ("Report"), Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan ("Commissioner San Juan") of the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline found respondent liable for taking part in a "scheme to circumvent the constitutional prohibition
against foreign ownership of land in the Philippines." Commissioner San Juan recommended respondent’s suspension from the
practice of law for two years and the cancellation of his commission as Notary Public.

In Resolution No. XVI-2004-222 dated 16 April 2004, the IBP Board of Governors adopted, with modification, the Report and
recommended respondent’s suspension from the practice of law for six months.

-By his own admission, respondent admitted that Stier, a U.S. citizen, was disqualified from owning real property. 11Yet, in his motion
for reconsideration,12 respondent admitted that he caused the transfer of ownership to the parcel of land to Stier. Respondent,
however, aware of the prohibition, quickly rectified his act and transferred the title in complainant’s name. But respondent provided
"some safeguards" by preparing several documents,13 including the Occupancy Agreement, that would guarantee Stier’s recognition
as the actual owner of the property despite its transfer in complainant’s name. In effect, respondent advised and aided Stier in
circumventing the constitutional prohibition against foreign ownership of lands 14 by preparing said documents.

-Respondent had sworn to uphold the Constitution. Thus, he violated his oath and the Code when he prepared and notarized the
Occupancy Agreement to evade the law against foreign ownership of lands. Respondent used his knowledge of the law to achieve
an unlawful end. Such an act amounts to malpractice in his office, for which he may be suspended. 1

-WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Emmanuel O. Tansingco GUILTY of violation of Canon 1 and Rule 1.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent Atty. Emmanuel O. Tansingco from the practice of law for SIX
MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision.

DULALIA VS CRUZ

FACTS:

Susan Soriano Dulalia, wife of petitioner Juan, applied for a permit in the Municipal
Government to build a high rise building in Bulacan. However, the permit was not
released due to the opposition of the respondent Atty. Cruz who sent a letter to the
Municipal Engineers office, claiming that the building impedes the airspace of their
property which is adjacent to the Dulalia’s property. The petitioner filed complaint for
disbarment against the respondent for immoral conduct, claiming that Cruz has illicit
relationship with a woman while being married, which is a violation of the Code. In his
defense, the respondent invokes good faith and claimed that he was not aware that the
Family Code already took effect on August 3, 1988 as he was in the United States from
1986 and stayed there until he came back to the Philippines together with his second
wife on October 9, 1990

ISSUE:

WONthe respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility

RULING:

Yes. The respondent was found to violate Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code, which states
that “A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct”.
The respondent’s act of contracting second marriage while his first marriage is still
subsisting constitutes immoral conduct.

Moreover, it is also clear that he violated Canon 5 of the Code which states that “A
lawyer shall keep abreast of legal developments, participate in continuing legal
education programs, support efforts to achieve high standards in law schools as well as
in the practical training of law students and assist in disseminating information regarding
the law and jurisprudence.” The respondent’s claim that he was not aware that the
Family Code already took effect on August 3, 1988 since he was in the United States is
not a valid excuse since “Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance
therewith.” It must be emphasized that the primary duty of lawyers is to obey the laws of
the land and promote respect for the law and legal processes. This duty carries with it
the obligation to be well-informed of the existing laws and to keep abreast with legal
developments, recent enactments and jurisprudence. It is imperative that they be
conversant with basic legal principles. Unless they faithfully comply with such duty, they
may not be able to discharge competently and diligently their obligations as members of
the bar. Worse, they may become susceptible to committing mistakes.

Notes:

-Atty. Pablo C. Cruz, Municipal Legal Officer of Meycauayan, Bulacan (respondent), is charged by Juan Dulalia, Jr. (complainant) of
violation Rules 1.01,1 6.02,2 and 7.033 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

-By complainant’s claim, respondent opposed the application for building permit because of a personal grudge against his wife
Susan who objected to respondent’s marrying her first cousin Imelda Soriano, respondent’s marriage with Carolina Agaton being
still subsisting.5

-Complainant maintains that respondent violated Rule 1.01 when he contracted a second marriage with Imelda Soriano on
September 17, 1989 while his marriage with Carolina Agaton, which was solemnized on December 17, 1967, is still subsisting.

Complainant further maintains that respondent used his influence as the Municipal Legal Officer of Meycauayan to oppose his wife’s
application for building permit, in violation of Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

And for engaging in the practice of law while serving as the Municipal Legal Officer of Meycauayan, complainant maintains that
respondent violated Rule 7.03.

-fter a review of the record of the case, this Court finds the dismissal of the charges of violating Rules 6.02 and 7.03 in order.

Indeed, complaint failed to prove that respondent used his position as Municipal Legal Officer to advance his own personal interest
against complainant and his wife.

As for respondent’s September 13, 2004 letter, there is nothing to show that he opposed the application for building permit. He just
inquired whether complainant’s wife fully complied with the requirements provided for by the National Building Code, on top of
expressing his concerns about "the danger and damages to their properties, health and safety" occasioned by the construction of
the building.

-Furthermore, as the Certification dated April 4, 200519 from the Office of the Municipal Engineer showed, complainant’s wife
eventually withdrew the application as she had not yet secured clearances from the Municipal Zoning Administrator and from the
barangay where the building was to be constructed.

-It is, however, with respect to respondent’s admitted contracting of a second marriage while his first marriage is still subsisting that
this Court finds respondent liable, for violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Respondent married Imelda Soriano on September 17, 1989 at the Clark County, Nevada, USA,21 when the Family Code of the
Philippines had already taken effect.22 He invokes good faith, however, he claiming to have had the impression that the applicable
provision at the time was Article 83 of the Civil Code.23 For while Article 256 of the Family Code provides that the Code shall have
retroactive application, there is a qualification thereunder that it should not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in
accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.

-In another vein, respondent violated Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:

CANON 5 – A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal developments, participate in continuing legal education programs, support efforts to
achieve high standards in law schools as well as in the practical training of law students and assist in disseminating information
regarding the law and jurisprudence.

Respondent’s claim that he was not aware that the Family Code already took effect on August 3, 1988 as he was in the United
States from 1986 and stayed there until he came back to the Philippines together with his second wife on October 9, 1990 does not
lie, as "ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith."
-WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Pablo C. Cruz is guilty of violating Rule 1.01 and Canon 5 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one year. He is WARNED that a similar infraction will be dealt with
more severely.

________________________________________________________________________________

DIRECTOR OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS VS BAYOT

FACTS:

The respondentBayothad published an advertisement in a newspaper stating that he

helps people in securing marriage licenses, that he does it to avoid delays and publicity,
that he also makes marriage arrangements based on parties’ wishes, that legal
consultations are free for the poor and that everything is confidential. The petitioner
sued the respondent for Malpractice. In his defense, the respondent initially denied
having published the advertisement. But later on, he admitted it and prayed for the
court’s indulgence and mercy, promising to never repeat the act again.
ISSUE:
WONthe respondent violated Code of Professional Responsibility.
RULING:
Yes. Based on Canon 2, Rule 2.03, “A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act
designed primarily to solicit legal business.” The advertisement he caused to be
published is a brazen solicitation of business from the public. It is highly unethical for an
attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. The
Supreme Court again emphasized that best advertisement for a lawyer is the
establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust.
Notes:

- It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the respondent of the ethics of his profession, it being
a brazen solicitation of business from the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides among other things that "the practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is highly
unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a profession and not a trade. The
lawyer degrades himself and his profession who stoops to and adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or
offering them to the public. As a member of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice with mercenary activities as the money-changers
of old defiled the temple of Jehovah. "The most worth and effective advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, . . . is the
establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must be the
outcome of character and conduct."

- Considering his plea for leniency and his promise not to repeat the misconduct, the Court is of the opinion and so decided that the
respondent should be, as he hereby is, reprimanded.

4. LINSANGAN VS TOLENTINO

FACTS:

The petitioner filed a complaint against the respondent for solicitation of clients and
encroachment of professional services. It was alleged that the respondent, with the help
of his paralegal, convinced his clients to transfer legal representation, promising them
financial assistance and expeditious collection of their claims. It was supported by a
sworn affidavit of one of petitioner’s client affirming the said allegation and calling card
of the respondent. In his defense, the respondent denied knowing the paralegal Labiano
and authorizing the printing and circulation of the said calling card.

ISSUE:

WON the respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.

RULING:

Yes. The respondent violated Canon 3 of the Code which states that “A lawyer in
making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective
information or statement of facts.” Lawyers are reminded that the practice of law is a
profession and not a business; lawyers should not advertise their talents as merchants
advertise their wares.To allow a lawyer to advertise his talent or skill is to commercialize
the practice of law, degrade the profession in the public’s estimation and impair its
ability to efficiently render that high character of service to which every member of the
bar is called.

Moreover, he was also found to violate Rule 1.03 and Rule 2.03 of the Code. Although
the respondent initially denied knowing paralegal Labiano, he admitted that he actually
knew her later in the proceedings. It is thus clear that Labiano was connected to his law
office. Through Labiano’s actions, respondent’s law practice was benefited. Hapless
seamen were enticed to transfer representation on the strength of Labiano’s word that
the respondent could produce a more favorable result.

Notes:

- Based on testimonial and documentary evidence, the CBD, in its report and recommendation, [9] found that respondent had
encroached on the professional practice of complainant, violating Rule 8.02[10] and other canons[11] of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR). Moreover, he contravened the rule against soliciting cases for gain, personally or through paid agents or
brokers as stated in Section 27, Rule 138[12] of the Rules of Court. Hence, the CBD recommended that respondent be reprimanded
with a stern warning that any repetition would merit a heavier penalty.

- Time and time again, lawyers are reminded that the practice of law is a profession and not a business; lawyers should not
advertise their talents as merchants advertise their wares. [13] To allow a lawyer to advertise his talent or skill is to commercialize the
practice of law, degrade the profession in the publics estimation and impair its ability to efficiently render that high character of
service to which every member of the bar is called.[14]

- Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides:

RULE 2.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT DO OR PERMIT TO BE DONE ANY ACT DESIGNED PRIMARILY TO
SOLICIT LEGAL BUSINESS.

Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers.[15] Such actuation constitutes malpractice, a ground for disbarment.[16]

Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR which provides:

RULE 1.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT, FOR ANY CORRUPT MOTIVE OR INTEREST, ENCOURAGE ANY
SUIT OR PROCEEDING OR DELAY ANY MANS CAUSE.
This rule proscribes ambulance chasing (the solicitation of almost any kind of legal business by an attorney, personally or through
an agent in order to gain employment)[17] as a measure to protect the community from barratry and champerty. [18]
Complainant presented substantial evidence[19] (consisting of the sworn statements of the very same persons coaxed by Labiano
and referred to respondents office) to prove that respondent indeed solicited legal business as well as profited from referrals suits.
- With regard to respondents violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR, settled is the rule that a lawyer should not steal another lawyers
client nor induce the latter to retain him by a promise of better service, good result or reduced fees for his services. [20] Again the
Court notes that respondent never denied having these seafarers in his client list nor receiving benefits from Labianos referrals.
Furthermore, he never denied Labianos connection to his office.[21] Respondent committed an unethical, predatory overstep into
anothers legal practice. He cannot escape liability under Rule 8.02 of the CPR.

Moreover, by engaging in a money-lending venture with his clients as borrowers, respondent violated Rule 16.04:

Rule 16.04 A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the clients interests are fully protected by the
nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the
interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.
The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his client. The only exception is, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance
necessary expenses (such as filing fees, stenographers fees for transcript of stenographic notes, cash bond or premium for surety
bond, etc.) for a matter that he is handling for the client.
- A final word regarding the calling card presented in evidence by petitioner. A lawyers best advertisement is a well-merited
reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust based on his character and conduct. [27] For this reason, lawyers are only
allowed to announce their services by publication in reputable law lists or use of simple professional cards.

Professional calling cards may only contain the following details:

(a) lawyers name;

(b) name of the law firm with which he is connected;
(c) address;
(d) telephone number and
(e) special branch of law practiced.[28]

- Labianos calling card contained the phrase with financial assistance. The phrase was clearly used to entice clients (who already
had representation) to change counsels with a promise of loans to finance their legal actions. Money was dangled to lure clients
away from their original lawyers, thereby taking advantage of their financial distress and emotional vulnerability. This crass
commercialism degraded the integrity of the bar and deserved no place in the legal profession. However, in the absence of
substantial evidence to prove his culpability, the Court is not prepared to rule that respondent was personally and directly
responsible for the printing and distribution of Labianos calling cards.

- WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for violating Rules 1.03, 2.03, 8.02 and 16.04 and Canon 3 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of one year effective immediately from receipt of this resolution. He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or
similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

Pacana VS Atty Lopez

-This case stems from an administrative complaint[1] filed by Rolando Pacana, Jr. against Atty. Maricel
Pascual-Lopez charging the latter with flagrant violation of the provisions of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.[2] Complainant alleges that respondent committed acts constituting conflict of interest,
dishonesty, influence peddling, and failure to render an accounting of all the money and properties
received by her from complainant.

-Distraught, complainant sought the advice of respondent who also happened to be a member of
the Couples for Christ, a religious organization where complainant and his wife were also active
members. From then on, complainant and respondent constantly communicated, with the former
disclosing all his involvement and interests in Precedent and Precedents relation with Multitel.
Respondent gave legal advice to complainant and even helped him prepare standard quitclaims for
creditors. In sum, complainant avers that a lawyer-client relationship was established between him and
respondent although no formal document was executed by them at that time. A Retainer
Agreement[4] dated January 15, 2003 was proposed by respondent. Complainant, however, did not sign
the said agreement because respondent verbally asked for One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00)
as acceptance fee and a 15% contingency fee upon collection of the overpayment made by Multitel to
Benefon,[5] a telecommunications company based inFinland. Complainant found the proposed fees to be
prohibitive and not within his means.[6] Hence, the retainer agreement remained unsigned.[7]
 After a few weeks, complainant was surprised to receive a demand letter from
respondent[8] asking for the return and immediate settlement of the funds invested by respondents clients
in Multitel. When complainant confronted respondent about the demand letter, the latter explained that
she had to send it so that her clients defrauded investors of Multitel would know that she was doing
something for them and assured complainant that there was nothing to worry about.[9]

-Respondent also convinced complainant that in order to be absolved from any liability with respect to the
investment scam, he must be able to show to the DOJ that he was willing to divest any and all of his
interests in Precedent including the funds assigned to him by Multitel.[12]

-When complainant went to the United States (US), he received several messages from
respondent sent through electronic mail (e-mail) and short messaging system (SMS, or text messages)
warning him not to return to the Philippines because Rosario Baladjay, president of Multitel, was arrested
and that complainant may later on be implicated in Multitels failed investment system. Respondent even
said that ten (10) arrest warrants and a hold departure order had been issued against him. Complainant,
thereafter, received several e-mail messages from respondent updating him of the status of the case
against Multitel and promised that she will settle the matter discreetly with government officials she can
closely work with in order to clear complainants name.[16] In two separate e-mail messages,[17] respondent
again asked money from complainant, P200,000 of which was handed by complainants wife while
respondent was confined in Saint Lukes Hospital after giving birth, [18] and another P700,000 allegedly to
be given to the NBI.[19]

Through respondents persistent promises to settle all complainants legal problems, respondent
was able to convince complainant who was still in the US to execute a deed of assignment in favor of
respondent allowing the latter to retrieve 178 boxes containing cellular phones and accessories stored in
complainants house and inside a warehouse.[20] He also signed a blank deed of sale authorizing
respondent to sell his 2002 Isuzu Trooper.[21]

Sometime in April 2003, wary that respondent may not be able to handle his legal problems,
complainant was advised by his family to hire another lawyer. When respondent knew about this, she
wrote to complainant via e-mail, as follows:
-On November 9, 2004, fed up and dismayed with respondents arrogance and evasiveness,
complainant wrote respondent a letter formally asking for a full accounting of all the money, documents
and properties given to the latter.[27] Respondent rendered an accounting through a letter dated
December 20, 2004.[28] When complainant found respondents explanation to be inadequate, he wrote a
latter expressing his confusion about the accounting. [29] Complainant repeated his request for an audited
financial report of all the properties turned over to her; otherwise, he will be constrained to file the
appropriate case against respondent.[30] Respondent replied,[31] explaining that all the properties and cash
turned over to her by complainant had been returned to her clients who had money claims against
Multitel. In exchange for this, she said that she was able to secure quitclaim documents clearing
complainant from any liability.[32] Still unsatisfied, complainant decided to file an affidavit-
complaint[33] against respondent before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) seeking the disbarment of respondent.

-In her Answer-Affidavit,[34] respondent vehemently denied being the lawyer for Precedent. She
maintained that no formal engagement was executed between her and complainant. She claimed that
she merely helped complainant by providing him with legal advice and assistance because she personally
knew him, since they both belonged to the same religious organization.[35]

-Respondent insisted that she represented the group of investors of Multitel and that she merely mediated
in the settlement of the claims her clients had against the complainant. She also averred that the results
of the settlement between both parties were fully documented and accounted for. [36] Respondent believes
that her act in helping complainant resolve his legal problem did not violate any ethical standard and was,
in fact, in accord with Rule 2.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.[3

-After due hearing, IBP Investigating Commissioner Patrick M. Velez issued a Report and
Recommendation[40] finding that a lawyer-client relationship was established between respondent and
complainant despite the absence of a written contract. The Investigating Commissioner also declared that
respondent violated her duty to be candid, fair and loyal to her client when she allowed herself to
represent conflicting interests and failed to render a full accounting of all the cash and properties
entrusted to her. Based on these grounds, the Investigating Commissioner recommended her
disbarment.

-The case now comes before this Court for final action.

We affirm the findings of the IBP.

Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional responsibility provides:

Rule 15.03 A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of
all concerned given after full disclosure of the facts.

-This prohibition is founded on principles of public policy, good taste [43] and, more importantly, upon
necessity. In the course of a lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer learns all the facts connected with the
clients case, including its weak and strong points. Such knowledge must be considered sacred and
guarded with care. No opportunity must be given to him to take advantage of his client; for if the
confidence is abused, the profession will suffer by the loss thereof. [44] It behooves lawyers not only to
keep inviolate the clients confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double ─ dealing
for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is paramount in
the administration of justice.[45] It is for these reasons that we have described the attorney-client
relationship as one of trust and confidence of the highest degree.

-The absence of a written contract will not preclude the finding that there was a professional
relationship between the parties. Documentary formalism is not an essential element in the
employment of an attorney; the contract may be express or implied. To establish the
relation, it is sufficient that the advice and assistance of an attorney is sought and received in any
matter pertinent to his profession.[50] (Emphasis supplied.)
-Given the situation, the most decent and ethical thing which respondent should have done was
either to advise complainant to engage the services of another lawyer since she was already
representing the opposing parties, or to desist from acting as representative of Multitel investors
and stand as counsel for complainant. She cannot be permitted to do both because that would
amount to double-dealing and violate our ethical rules on conflict of interest.
-Indubitably, respondent took advantage of complainants hapless situation, initially, by giving him
legal advice and, later on, by soliciting money and properties from him. Thereafter, respondent
impressed upon complainant that she had acted with utmost sincerity in helping him divest all the
properties entrusted to him in order to absolve him from any liability. But simultaneously, she was
also doing the same thing to impress upon her clients, the party claimants against Multitel, that
she was doing everything to reclaim the money they invested with Multitel. Respondent herself
admitted to complainant that without the latters help, she would not have been able to earn as
much and that, as a token of her appreciation, she was willing to share some of her earnings with
complainant.[53] Clearly, respondents act is shocking, as it not only violated Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility,[54] but also toyed with decency and good taste.
-WHEREFORE, respondent Attorney Maricel Pascual-Lopez is hereby DISBARRED for
representing conflicting interests and for engaging in unlawful, dishonest and deceitful conduct in
violation of her Lawyers Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.

KHAN VS SIMBILLO

FACTS:

A paid advertisement in the Philippine Daily Inquirer was published which reads:
“Annulment of Marriage Specialist.” Espeleta, a staff of the Supreme Court, called up
the number but it was Mrs. Simbillo who answered. She claims that her husband,
respondent Atty. Simbillo was an expert in handling annulment cases and can
guarantee a court decree within 4-6mos provided the case will not involve separation of
property and custody of children. It appears that similar advertisements were also
published.

The petitioner, in his capacity as Assistant Court Administrator and Chief of Public
Information Office, filed an administrative complaint against respondent for improper
advertising and solicitation of his legal services. In his defense, respondent admitted the
acts imputed against him but argued that advertising and solicitation per se are not
prohibited acts. He said that it was time to lift the absolute prohibition against
advertisement because the interest of the public isn’t served in any way by the
prohibition.

ISSUE:
WON the respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility

RULING:
Yes. Under Rule 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code, it was stressed that practice of law is not a
business --- it is a profession in which the primary duty is public service and money.
Gaining livelihood is a secondary consideration while duty to public service and
administration of justice should be primary. Lawyers should subordinate their primary
interest.

Respondent’s act of advertising himself as an “annulment of marriage specialist” erodes

and undermines the sanctity of an institution still considered as sacrosanct --- he in fact
encourages people otherwise disinclined to dissolve their marriage bond.

Solicitation of business is not altogether proscribed but for it to be proper it must be

compatible with the dignity of the legal profession. Note that the law list where the
lawyer’s name appears must be a reputable law list only for that purpose --- a lawyer
may not properly publish in a daily paper, magazine…etc., nor may a lawyer permit his
name to be published the contents of which are likely to deceive or injure the public or
the bar.

Notes:
- There is no question that respondent committed the acts complained of. He himself admits that he caused the publication of the
advertisements. While he professes repentance and begs for the Courts indulgence, his contrition rings hollow considering the fact
that he advertised his legal services again after he pleaded for compassion and after claiming that he had no intention to violate the
rules. Eight months after filing his answer, he again advertised his legal services in the August 14, 2001 issue of the Buy & Sell Free
Ads Newspaper.[17] Ten months later, he caused the same advertisement to be published in the October 5, 2001 issue of Buy &
Sell.[18] Such acts of respondent are a deliberate and contemptuous affront on the Courts authority.

- What adds to the gravity of respondents acts is that in advertising himself as a self-styled Annulment of Marriage Specialist, he
wittingly or unwittingly erodes and undermines not only the stability but also the sanctity of an institution still considered sacrosanct
despite the contemporary climate of permissiveness in our society. Indeed, in assuring prospective clients that an annulment may
be obtained in four to six months from the time of the filing of the case,[19] he in fact encourages people, who might have otherwise
been disinclined and would have refrained from dissolving their marriage bonds, to do so.

- The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere supplemental feature of a paper,
magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published principally for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly
publish his brief biographical and informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society program. Nor may a
lawyer permit his name to be published in a law list the conduct, management, or contents of which are calculated or likely to
deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower dignity or standing of the profession.

The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain only a statement of his name, the name of
the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone number and special branch of law practiced. The publication of a simple
announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership, associates, firm name or office address, being for the
convenience of the profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed in a telephone directory but not under a
designation of special branch of law. (emphasis and italics supplied)

- WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO is found GUILTY of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for ONE (1) YEAR effective upon receipt of this Resolution. He is likewise STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or
similar offense will be dealt with more severely.

Dacanay VS Baker & Mckenzie

Facts: In November 1979, Atty. Vicente Torres sent a letter to one Rosie Clurman,
represented by Atty. Adriano Dacanay, asking Clurman to release some shares to Torres’
client. The letterhead contained the name “Baker & McKenzie”. Dacanay denied Clurman’s
liability and at the same time he asked why is Torres using the letterhead “Baker &
McKenzie”, a foreign partnership established in Chicago, Illinois. No reply was received so
Dacanay filed an administrative complaint enjoining Torres from using “Baker & McKenzie”.
Later, Torres said that he is an associate of the law firm Guerrero & Torres; that their law
firm is a member of Baker & McKenzie; that the said foreign firm has members in 30 cities
all over the world; that they associated with them in order to make a representation that they
can render legal services of the highest quality to multinational business enterprises and
others engaged in foreign trade and investment.
ISSUE: Whether or not the use of a foreign law office name is allowed.
HELD: No. Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law firm, cannot practice law in the
Philippines. Such use of foreign law firm name is unethical therefore Torres and his law firm
are enjoined from using “Baker & McKenzie” in their practice of law.
Notes:
WHEREFORE, the respondents are enjoined from practising law under the firm name Baker & McKenzie.

In Re: Tagorda
In 1928, Luis Tagorda was a provincial board member of Isabela. Before his election, he
campaigned that he is a lawyer and a notary public; that as a notary public he can do
notarial acts such as execution of deeds of sale, etc.; that as a lawyer, he can help clients
collect debts; that he offers free consultation; that he is willing to serve the poor.
When he won, he wrote a letter to the barrio lieutenant of Echague, Isable advising the
latter that even though he was elected as a provincial board member, he can still practice
law; that he wants the lieutenant to tell the same to his people; that he is willing to receive
works regarding preparations of sales contracts and affidavits etc.; that he is willing to
receive land registration cases for a charge of three pesos.
ISSUE: Whether or not Tagorda is guilty of malpractice.
HELD: Yes. Tagorda admitted doing the foregoing acts. The practice of soliciting cases at
law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice.
The most worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, and
especially with his brother lawyers, is the establishment of a well- merited reputation for
professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced, but must be the outcome of
character and conduct. Solicitation of business by circulars or advertisements, or by
personal communications or interviews not warranted by personal relations, is
unprofessional. It is equally unprofessional to procure business by indirection through
touters of any kind, whether allied real estate firms or trust companies advertising to secure
the drawing of deeds or wills or offering retainers in exchange for executorships or
trusteeships to be influenced by the lawyer. Indirect advertisement for business by
furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments concerning the manner of their conduct, the
magnitude of the interests involved, the importance of the lawyer’s position, and all other
like self-laudation, defy the traditions and lower the tone of our high calling, and are
intolerable.
It is unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer advice to bring a lawsuit, except in rare cases
where ties of blood, relationship or trust make it his duty to do so.
Tagorda’s liability is however mitigated by the fact that he is a young inexperienced lawyer
and that he was unaware of the impropriety of his acts. So instead of being disbarred, he
was suspended from the practice of law for a month.

Notes:
-It becomes our duty to condemn in no uncertain terms the ugly practice of solicitation of cases by lawyers. It is destructive of the
honor of a great profession. It lowers the standards of that profession. It works against the confidence of the community in the
integrity of the members of the bar. It results in needless litigation and in incenting to strife otherwise peacefully inclined citizens.

The solicitation of employment by an attorney is a ground for disbarment or suspension. That should be distinctly understood.

- But as mitigating, circumstances working in favor of the respondent there are, first, his intimation that he was unaware of the
impropriety of his acts, second, his youth and inexperience at the bar, and, third, his promise not to commit a similar mistake in the
future. A modest period of suspension would seem to fit the case of the erring attorney. But it should be distinctly understood that
this result is reached in view of the considerations which have influenced the court to the relatively lenient in this particular instance
and should, therefore, not be taken as indicating that future convictions of practice of this kind will not be dealt with by disbarment.

- In view of all the circumstances of this case, the judgment of the court is that the respondent Luis B. Tagorda be and is hereby
suspended from the practice as an attorney-at-law for the period of one month from April 1, 1929,
Ulep VS Clinic Inc
In 1984, The Legal Clinic was formed by Atty. Rogelio Nogales. Its aim, according to
Nogales was to move toward specialization and to cater to clients who cannot afford the
services of big law firms. Now, Atty. Mauricio Ulep filed a complaint against The Legal Clinic
because of the latter’s advertisements which contain the following:

SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE. ANNULMENT. VISA.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC.
Please call: 521-0767; 521-7232; 522-2041
8:30am – 6:00pm
7th Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Manila
GUAM DIVORCE
DON PARKINSON
An attorney in Guam is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic
beginning Monday to Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota
Res. & Special Retiree’s Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees.
Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children.
Call Marivic.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC.
7th Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Manila nr. US Embassy
Tel. 521-7232, 521-7251, 522-2041, 521-0767
It is also alleged that The Legal Clinic published an article entitled “Rx for Legal Problems”
in Star Week of Philippine Star wherein Nogales stated that they The Legal Clinic is
composed of specialists that can take care of a client’s problem no matter how complicated
it is even if it is as complicated as the Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion situation. He said
that he and his staff of lawyers, who, like doctors, are “specialists” in various fields, can take
care of it. The Legal Clinic, Inc. has specialists in taxation and criminal law, medico-legal
problems, labor, litigation and family law. These specialists are backed up by a battery of
paralegals, counselors and attorneys.
As for its advertisement, Nogales said it should be allowed in view of the jurisprudence in
the US which now allows it (John Bates vs The State Bar of Arizona). And that besides, the
advertisement is merely making known to the public the services that The Legal Clinic
offers.
ISSUE: Whether or not The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law; whether such is
allowed; whether or not its advertisement may be allowed.
 HELD: Yes, The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law however, such practice is not
allowed. The Legal Clinic is composed mainly of paralegals. The services it offered include
various legal problems wherein a client may avail of legal services from simple
documentation to complex litigation and corporate undertakings. Most of these services are
undoubtedly beyond the domain of paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers
engaged in the practice of law. Under Philippine jurisdiction however, the services being
offered by Legal Clinic which constitute practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals.
Only a person duly admitted as a member of the bar and who is in good and regular
standing, is entitled to practice law.
Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true,
honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts. The standards of the
legal profession condemn the lawyer’s advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot,
without violating the ethics of his profession, advertise his talents or skills as in a manner
similar to a merchant advertising his goods. Further, the advertisements of Legal Clinic
seem to promote divorce, secret marriage, bigamous marriage, and other circumventions of
law which their experts can facilitate. Such is highly reprehensible.
The Supreme Court also noted which forms of advertisement are allowed. The best
advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and
fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome of character and conduct. Good and
efficient service to a client as well as to the community has a way of publicizing itself and
catching public attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of effective service which is
right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and
to magnify his success. He easily sees the difference between a normal by-product of able
service and the unwholesome result of propaganda. The Supreme Court also enumerated
the following as allowed forms of advertisement:

1. Advertisement in a reputable law list

2. Use of ordinary simple professional card
3. Listing in a phone directory but without designation as to his specialization

Notes:

- ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN herein respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., from issuing or causing
the publication or dissemination of any advertisement in any form which is of the same or similar tenor and purpose as Annexes "A"
and "B" of this petition, and from conducting, directly or indirectly, any activity, operation or transaction proscribed by law or the
Code of Professional Ethics as indicated herein. Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the
Office of the Bar Confidant and the Office of the Solicitor General for appropriate action in accordance herewith.

De Roy VS CA
The firewall of a burned out building owned by Felisa De Roy collapsed and destroyed the
tailoring shop occupied by the family of Luis Bernal resulting in injuries and even to the
death of Bernal’s daughter. De Roy claimed that Bernal had been warned prior hand but
that she was ignored.
In the RTC, De Roy was found guilty of gross negligence. She appealed but the Court of
Appeals affirmed the RTC. On the last day of filing a motion for reconsideration, De Roy’s
counsel filed a motion for extension. It was denied by the CA. The CA ruled that pursuant to
the case of Habaluyas Enterprises vs Japzon (August 1985), the fifteen-day period for
appealing or for filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be extended.
De Roy’s counsel however argued that the Habaluyas case should not be applicable
because said ruling was never published in the Official Gazette.
ISSUE: Whether or not Supreme Court decisions must be published in the Official Gazette
before they can be binding.
HELD: No. There is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decision in the
Official Gazette before they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming effective. It
is bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of
the Supreme Court particularly where issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated and
published in the advance reports of Supreme Court decisions and in such publications as
the SCRA and law journals.

Notes:
- In the instant case, however, petitioners' motion for extension of time was filed on September 9, 1987, more than a year after the
expiration of the grace period on June 30, 1986. Hence, it is no longer within the coverage of the grace period. Considering the
length of time from the expiration of the grace period to the promulgation of the decision of the Court of Appeals on August 25, 1987,
petitioners cannot seek refuge in the ignorance of their counsel regarding said rule for their failure to file a motion for reconsideration
within the reglementary period.

Abad VS Bleza
There are two administrative cases against Judge Ildefonso Bleza here.
Case 1
In 1981, a shooting incident in a cockpit occurred where Gregorio Abad, a colonel escaped
death. In that incident, Abad had an argument with one Potenciano Ponce and the latter’s
bodyguard, Francisco Sabater Jr. Sabater shot Abad and due to medical intervention, Abad
survived. Abad filed two separate criminal cases against Ponce and Sabater. Ponce was
acquitted due to insufficiency of evidence (because there were conflicting testimonies) while
Sabater was found guilty of frustrated homicide but with mitigating circumstances of
voluntary surrender and lack of intent to kill.
Abad, not satisfied with Bleza’s decisions filed an administrative case against Bleza,
Case 2
Pacifico Ocampo was an employee of the Manila International Airport Authority. He filed an
administrative case against one Ricardo Ortiz.
After that, Ocampo alleged that Crisanto Cruz (perhaps a friend of Ortiz? – not mentioned in
the case), tried to persuade Ocampo not to continue with the administrative case against
Ortiz. Ocampo did not accede so allegedly, Cruz filed a separate administrative complaint
against Ocampo. In turn, Ocampo filed a civil case against Cruz before Judge Bleza.
Ocampo alleged that the administrative case against him was baseless and the same made
him suffer embarrassment, mental shock, anxieties, sleepless nights, and loss of appetite.
Ocampo won and Bleza ordered Cruz to pay for damages. Cruz filed an administrative case
against Bleza for allegedly knowingly rendering a wrongful decision as Cruz averred that the
administrative case was based on Ocampo’s absenteeism, inefficiency and tardiness which
were all on record and same were presented as evidence which were even (allegedly)
uncontroverted.
ISSUE: Whether or not Bleza should be disciplined.
HELD: No (in both cases). In the first case, Bleza erred in appreciating the mitigating
circumstance of lack of intent to kill in favor of Sabater – but such error does not hold him
administratively liable.
In Criminal Law, in cases of frustrated homicide there is inherently an intention to kill for if
otherwise, it would have been a case of physical injuries. Bleza found Sabater guilty of
frustrated homicide hence it is error for him to appreciate lack of intention to kill as a
mitigating circumstance.
But as a matter of public policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts
of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action, even though such
acts are erroneous. Even on the assumption that the judicial officer has erred in the
appraisal of the evidence, he cannot be held administratively or civilly liable for his judicial
action. A judicial officer cannot be called to account in a civil action for acts done by him in
the exercise of his judicial function, however erroneous. Not every error or mistake of a
judge in the performance of his duties makes him liable therefor. To hold a judge
administratively accountable for every erroneous ruling or decision he renders, assuming
that he has erred, would be nothing short of harassment and would make his position
unbearable.
In the second case, the Supreme Court took notice of the fact that it is on appeal before the
Court of Appeals hence it is premature to decide upon it. Only after the appellate court
holds in a final judgment that a trial judge’s alleged errors were committed deliberately and
in bad faith may a charge of knowingly rendering an unjust decision be leveled against him.
Notes:

- The administrative complaint filed by Cruz alleged that the respondent judge disregarded the defendant's incontrovertible evidence
and knowingly rendered a wrong judgment against him.

In his comment, the respondent judge alleged that the decision, subject matter of this case, is pending appeal before the
Intermediate Appellate Court. This allegation was not refuted by the complainant. Thus, any action we can take in this case would
be premature. For only after the appellate court holds in a final judgment that a trial judge's alleged errors were committed
deliberately and in bad faith may a charge of knowingly rendering an unjust decision be levelled against him. This is the
pronouncement of this Court in several cases (See Garcia v. Alconcel, 111 SCRA 178; Sta. Maria v. Ubay, 87 SCRA 179; and
Gahol v. Riodique, 64 SCRA 494). In the meantime, the presumption is that official duty was regularly performed.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the administrative cases are hereby, DISMISSED. The recommendation dated
June 6, 1984 submitted by the Court Administrator that the respondent judge be retired from office due to hypertensive heart
disease and congestive heart failure with cardiomegally (enlarged left ventricle) under Permanent Total Disability, as endorsed by
Dr. Antonio Valero of this Court, is hereby APPROVED.