THIRD DIVISION Una-Hinihiling ko na ako ay mailibing sa Sementerio del Norte, La Loma sang-ayong sa kaugalian at

patakaran ng simbahang katoliko at ang taga-pag-ingat (Executor) ng habiling ito ay magtatayo ng

G.R. No. 122880 April 12, 2006 bantayog upang silbing ala-ala sa akin ng aking pamilya at kaibigan;

FELIX AZUELA, Petitioner, Pangalawa-Aking ipinagkakaloob at isinasalin ang lahat ng karapatan sa aking pamangkin na si Felix Azuela,
vs. na siyang nag-alaga sa akin sa mahabang panahon, yaong mga bahay na nakatirik sa lote numero 28, Block
COURT OF APPEALS, GERALDA AIDA CASTILLO substituted by ERNESTO G. CASTILLO, Respondents. 24 at nakapangalan sa Pechaten Korporasyon, ganoon din ibinibigay ko ang lahat ng karapatan sa bahay
na nakatirik sa inoopahan kong lote, numero 43, Block 24 na pag-aari ng Pechaten Corporation.
DECISION Ipinagkakaloob kong buong buo ang lahat ng karapatan sa bahay at lupa na nasa 500 San Diego St., Lot 42,
Block 24, Sampaloc, Manila kay Felix Azuela at ang pagkakaloob kong ito ay walang pasubali’t at
TINGA, J.: kondiciones;

The core of this petition is a highly defective notarial will, purportedly executed by Eugenia E. Igsolo Pangatlo- Na ninunumbrahan ko si VART PAGUE na siyang nagpapatupad ng huling habiling ito at
(decedent), who died on 16 December 1982 at the age of 80. In refusing to give legal recognition to the kagustuhan ko rin na hindi na kailanman siyang mag-lagak ng piyansiya.
due execution of this document, the Court is provided the opportunity to assert a few important doctrinal
rules in the execution of notarial wills, all self-evident in view of Articles 805 and 806 of the Civil Code. Aking nilagdaan ang Huling Habilin na ito dito sa Maynila ika 10 ng Hunyo, 1981.

A will whose attestation clause does not contain the number of pages on which the will is written is fatally (Sgd.)
defective. A will whose attestation clause is not signed by the instrumental witnesses is fatally defective. EUGENIA E. IGSOLO
And perhaps most importantly, a will which does not contain an acknowledgment, but a mere jurat, is (Tagapagmana)
fatally defective. Any one of these defects is sufficient to deny probate. A notarial will with all three defects
is just aching for judicial rejection. PATUNAY NG MGA SAKSI

There is a distinct and consequential reason the Civil Code provides a comprehensive catalog of
imperatives for the proper execution of a notarial will. Full and faithful compliance with all the detailed
requisites under Article 805 of the Code leave little room for doubt as to the validity in the due execution
of the notarial will. Article 806 likewise imposes another safeguard to the validity of notarial wills — that
they be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses. A notarial will executed
with indifference to these two codal provisions opens itself to nagging questions as to its legitimacy.
Ang kasulatang ito, na binubuo ng ____ dahon pati ang huling dahong ito, na ipinahayag sa amin ni Eugenia
E. Igsolo, tagapagmana na siya niyang Huling Habilin, ngayon ika-10 ng Hunyo 1981, ay nilagdaan ng
nasabing tagapagmana sa ilalim ng kasulatang nabanggit at sa kaliwang panig ng lahat at bawa’t dahon, sa
harap ng lahat at bawa’t sa amin, at kami namang mga saksi ay lumagda sa harap ng nasabing
tagapagmana at sa harap ng lahat at bawa’t isa sa amin, sa ilalim ng nasabing kasulatan at sa kaliwang
panig ng lahat at bawa’t dahon ng kasulatan ito.

The case stems from a petition for probate filed on 10 April 1984 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of EUGENIA E. IGSOLO
Manila. The petition filed by petitioner Felix Azuela sought to admit to probate the notarial will of Eugenia address: 500 San Diego St.
E. Igsolo, which was notarized on 10 June 1981. Petitioner is the son of the cousin of the decedent. Sampaloc, Manila Res. Cert. No. A-7717-37
Issued at Manila on March 10, 1981.
The will, consisting of two (2) pages and written in the vernacular Pilipino, read in full:
QUIRINO AGRAVA
HULING HABILIN NI EUGENIA E. IGSOLO address: 1228-Int. 3, Kahilum
Pandacan, Manila Res. Cert. No. A-458365
SA NGALAN NG MAYKAPAL, AMEN: Issued at Manila on Jan. 21, 1981

AKO, si EUGENIA E. IGSOLO, nakatira sa 500 San Diego St., Sampaloc, Manila, pitongput siyam (79) na LAMBERTO C. LEAÑO
gulang, nasa hustong pagi-isip, pag-unawa at memoria ay nag-hahayag na ito na ang aking huling habilin address: Avenue 2, Blcok 7,
at testamento, at binabali wala ko lahat ang naunang ginawang habilin o testamento: Lot 61, San Gabriel, G.MA., Cavite Res.
Cert. No. A-768277 issued at Carmona, Cavite on Feb. 7, 1981
After a careful examination of the will and consideration of the testimonies of the subscribing and attesting
JUANITO ESTRERA witnesses, and having in mind the modern tendency in respect to the formalities in the execution of a will,
address: City Court Compound, i.e., the liberalization of the interpretation of the law on the formal requirements of a will with the end in
City of Manila Res. Cert. No. A574829 view of giving the testator more freedom in expressing his last wishes, this Court is persuaded to rule that
Issued at Manila on March 2, 1981. the will in question is authentic and had been executed by the testatrix in accordance with law.

Nilagdaan ko at ninotario ko ngayong 10 ng Hunyo 10, 1981 dito sa Lungsod ng Maynila. On the issue of lack of acknowledgement, this Court has noted that at the end of the will after the signature
of the testatrix, the following statement is made under the sub-title, "Patunay Ng Mga Saksi":
(Sgd.)
PETRONIO Y. BAUTISTA "Ang kasulatang ito, na binubuo ng _____ dahon pati ang huling dahong ito, na ipinahayag sa amin ni
Eugenia N. Igsolo, tagapagmana na siya niyang Huling Habilin, ngayong ika-10 ng Hunyo 1981, ay nilagdaan
Doc. No. 1232 ; NOTARIO PUBLIKO ng nasabing tagapagmana sa ilalim ng kasulatang nabanggit at sa kaliwang panig ng lahat at bawa’t dahon,
Page No. 86 ; Until Dec. 31, 1981 sa harap ng lahat at bawa’t sa amin, at kami namang mga saksi ay lumagda sa harap ng nasabing
Book No. 43 ; PTR-152041-1/2/81-Manila tagapagmana at sa harap ng lahat at bawa’t isa sa amin, sa ilalim ng nasabing kasulatan at sa kaliwang
Series of 1981 TAN # 1437-977-81 panig ng lahat at bawa’t dahon ng kasulatan ito."

The three named witnesses to the will affixed their signatures on the left-hand margin of both pages of The aforequoted declaration comprises the attestation clause and the acknowledgement and is
the will, but not at the bottom of the attestation clause. considered by this Court as a substantial compliance with the requirements of the law.

The probate petition adverted to only two (2) heirs, legatees and devisees of the decedent, namely: On the oppositor’s contention that the attestation clause was not signed by the subscribing witnesses at
petitioner himself, and one Irene Lynn Igsolo, who was alleged to have resided abroad. Petitioner prayed the bottom thereof, this Court is of the view that the signing by the subscribing witnesses on the left
that the will be allowed, and that letters testamentary be issued to the designated executor, Vart Prague. margin of the second page of the will containing the attestation clause and acknowledgment, instead of
at the bottom thereof, substantially satisfies the purpose of identification and attestation of the will.
The petition was opposed by Geralda Aida Castillo (Geralda Castillo), who represented herself as the
attorney-in-fact of "the 12 legitimate heirs" of the decedent.2 Geralda Castillo claimed that the will is a With regard to the oppositor’s argument that the will was not numbered correlatively in letters placed on
forgery, and that the true purpose of its emergence was so it could be utilized as a defense in several court upper part of each page and that the attestation did not state the number of pages thereof, it is worthy to
cases filed by oppositor against petitioner, particularly for forcible entry and usurpation of real property, note that the will is composed of only two pages. The first page contains the entire text of the testamentary
all centering on petitioner’s right to occupy the properties of the decedent.3 It also asserted that contrary dispositions, and the second page contains the last portion of the attestation clause and
to the representations of petitioner, the decedent was actually survived by 12 legitimate heirs, namely her acknowledgement. Such being so, the defects are not of a serious nature as to invalidate the will. For the
grandchildren, who were then residing abroad. Per records, it was subsequently alleged that decedent same reason, the failure of the testatrix to affix her signature on the left margin of the second page, which
was the widow of Bonifacio Igsolo, who died in 1965,4 and the mother of a legitimate child, Asuncion E. contains only the last portion of the attestation clause and acknowledgment is not a fatal defect.
Igsolo, who predeceased her mother by three (3) months.5
As regards the oppositor’s assertion that the signature of the testatrix on the will is a forgery, the
Oppositor Geralda Castillo also argued that the will was not executed and attested to in accordance with testimonies of the three subscribing witnesses to the will are convincing enough to establish the
law. She pointed out that decedent’s signature did not appear on the second page of the will, and the will genuineness of the signature of the testatrix and the due execution of the will.8
was not properly acknowledged. These twin arguments are among the central matters to this petition.
The Order was appealed to the Court of Appeals by Ernesto Castillo, who had substituted his since
After due trial, the RTC admitted the will to probate, in an Order dated 10 August 1992.6 The RTC favorably deceased mother-in-law, Geralda Castillo. In a Decision dated 17 August 1995, the Court of Appeals
took into account the testimony of the three (3) witnesses to the will, Quirino Agrava, Lamberto Leano, reversed the trial court and ordered the dismissal of the petition for probate.9 The Court of Appeals noted
and Juanito Estrada. The RTC also called to fore "the modern tendency in respect to the formalities in the that the attestation clause failed to state the number of pages used in the will, thus rendering the will void
execution of a will x x x with the end in view of giving the testator more freedom in expressing his last and undeserving of probate.10
wishes;"7 and from this perspective, rebutted oppositor’s arguments that the will was not properly
executed and attested to in accordance with law. Hence, the present petition.
 numbers at the top of the following sheets or pages. If, on the other hand, the total number of sheets is
Petitioner argues that the requirement under Article 805 of the Civil Code that "the number of pages used stated in the attestation clause the falsification of the document will involve the inserting of new pages
in a notarial will be stated in the attestation clause" is merely directory, rather than mandatory, and thus and the forging of the signatures of the testator and witnesses in the margin, a matter attended with much
susceptible to what he termed as "the substantial compliance rule."11 greater difficulty."16

The solution to this case calls for the application of Articles 805 and 806 of the Civil Code, which we The case of In re Will of Andrada concerned a will the attestation clause of which failed to state the number
replicate in full. of sheets or pages used. This consideration alone was sufficient for the Court to declare "unanim[ity] upon
the point that the defect pointed out in the attesting clause is fatal."17 It was further observed that "it
Art. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator cannot be denied that the x x x requirement affords additional security against the danger that the will
himself or by the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express may be tampered with; and as the Legislature has seen fit to prescribe this requirement, it must be
direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator considered material."18
and of one another.
Against these cited cases, petitioner cites Singson v. Florentino19 and Taboada v. Hon. Rosal,20 wherein
The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the will, the Court allowed probate to the wills concerned therein despite the fact that the attestation clause did
shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except the last, on the left margin, and all the not state the number of pages of the will. Yet the appellate court itself considered the import of these two
pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page. cases, and made the following distinction which petitioner is unable to rebut, and which we adopt with
approval:
The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is written, and the fact that the
testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under his Even a cursory examination of the Will (Exhibit "D"), will readily show that the attestation does not state
express direction, in the presence of the instrumental witnesses, and that the latter witnessed and signed the number of pages used upon which the will is written. Hence, the Will is void and undeserving of
the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another. probate.

If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall be interpreted to them. We are not impervious of the Decisions of the Supreme Court in "Manuel Singson versus Emilia Florentino,
et al., 92 Phil. 161 and Apolonio [Taboada] versus Hon. Avelino Rosal, et al., 118 SCRA 195," to the effect
Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses. The that a will may still be valid even if the attestation does not contain the number of pages used upon which
notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the will, or file another with the office of the Clerk the Will is written. However, the Decisions of the Supreme Court are not applicable in the aforementioned
of Court. appeal at bench. This is so because, in the case of "Manuel Singson versus Emilia Florentino, et al., supra,"
although the attestation in the subject Will did not state the number of pages used in the will, however,
The appellate court, in its Decision, considered only one defect, the failure of the attestation clause to the same was found in the last part of the body of the Will:
state the number of pages of the will. But an examination of the will itself reveals several more deficiencies.
"x x x
As admitted by petitioner himself, the attestation clause fails to state the number of pages of the will.12
There was an incomplete attempt to comply with this requisite, a space having been allotted for the The law referred to is article 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2645, which
insertion of the number of pages in the attestation clause. Yet the blank was never filled in; hence, the requires that the attestation clause shall state the number of pages or sheets upon which the will is
requisite was left uncomplied with. written, which requirement has been held to be mandatory as an effective safeguard against the possibility
of interpolation or omission of some of the pages of the will to the prejudice of the heirs to whom the
The Court of Appeals pounced on this defect in reversing the trial court, citing in the process Uy Coque v. property is intended to be bequeathed (In re Will of Andrada, 42 Phil. 180; Uy Coque vs. Navas L. Sioca, 43
Navas L. Sioca13 and In re: Will of Andrada.14 In Uy Coque, the Court noted that among the defects of the Phil., 405; Gumban vs. Gorcho, 50 Phil. 30; Quinto vs. Morata, 54 Phil. 481; Echevarria vs. Sarmiento, 66
will in question was the failure of the attestation clause to state the number of pages contained in the Phil. 611). The ratio decidendi of these cases seems to be that the attestation clause must contain a
will.15 In ruling that the will could not be admitted to probate, the Court made the following consideration statement of the number of sheets or pages composing the will and that if this is missing or is omitted, it
which remains highly relevant to this day: "The purpose of requiring the number of sheets to be stated in will have the effect of invalidating the will if the deficiency cannot be supplied, not by evidence aliunde,
the attestation clause is obvious; the document might easily be so prepared that the removal of a sheet but by a consideration or examination of the will itself. But here the situation is different. While the
would completely change the testamentary dispositions of the will and in the absence of a statement of attestation clause does not state the number of sheets or pages upon which the will is written, however,
the total number of sheets such removal might be effected by taking out the sheet and changing the the last part of the body of the will contains a statement that it is composed of eight pages, which
circumstance in our opinion takes this case out of the rigid rule of construction and places it within the
realm of similar cases where a broad and more liberal view has been adopted to prevent the will of the Caneda v. Court of Appeals26 features an extensive discussion made by Justice Regalado, speaking for the
testator from being defeated by purely technical considerations." (page 165-165, supra) (Underscoring Court on the conflicting views on the manner of interpretation of the legal formalities required in the
supplied) execution of the attestation clause in wills.27 Uy Coque and Andrada are cited therein, along with several
other cases, as examples of the application of the rule of strict construction.28 However, the Code
In "Apolonio Tabaoda versus Hon. Avelino Rosal, et al." supra, the notarial acknowledgement in the Will Commission opted to recommend a more liberal construction through the "substantial compliance rule"
states the number of pages used in the: under Article 809. A cautionary note was struck though by Justice J.B.L. Reyes as to how Article 809 should
be applied:
"x x x
x x x The rule must be limited to disregarding those defects that can be supplied by an examination of the
We have examined the will in question and noticed that the attestation clause failed to state the number will itself: whether all the pages are consecutively numbered; whether the signatures appear in each and
of pages used in writing the will. This would have been a fatal defect were it not for the fact that, in this every page; whether the subscribing witnesses are three or the will was notarized. All these are facts that
case, it is discernible from the entire will that it is really and actually composed of only two pages duly the will itself can reveal, and defects or even omissions concerning them in the attestation clause can be
signed by the testatrix and her instrumental witnesses. As earlier stated, the first page which contains the safely disregarded. But the total number of pages, and whether all persons required to sign did so in the
entirety of the testamentary dispositions is signed by the testatrix at the end or at the bottom while the presence of each other must substantially appear in the attestation clause, being the only check against
instrumental witnesses signed at the left margin. The other page which is marked as "Pagina dos" perjury in the probate proceedings.29 (Emphasis supplied.)
comprises the attestation clause and the acknowledgment. The acknowledgment itself states that "this
Last Will and Testament consists of two pages including this page" (pages 200-201, supra) (Underscoring The Court of Appeals did cite these comments by Justice J.B.L. Reyes in its assailed decision, considering
supplied). that the failure to state the number of pages of the will in the attestation clause is one of the defects which
cannot be simply disregarded. In Caneda itself, the Court refused to allow the probate of a will whose
However, in the appeal at bench, the number of pages used in the will is not stated in any part of the Will. attestation clause failed to state that the witnesses subscribed their respective signatures to the will in the
The will does not even contain any notarial acknowledgment wherein the number of pages of the will presence of the testator and of each other,30 the other omission cited by Justice J.B.L. Reyes which to his
should be stated.21 estimation cannot be lightly disregarded.

Both Uy Coque and Andrada were decided prior to the enactment of the Civil Code in 1950, at a time when Caneda suggested: "[I]t may thus be stated that the rule, as it now stands, is that omission which can be
the statutory provision governing the formal requirement of wills was Section supplied by an examination of the will itself, without the need of resorting to extrinsic evidence, will not
be fatal and, correspondingly, would not obstruct the allowance to probate of the will being assailed.
618 of the Code of Civil Procedure.22 Reliance on these cases remains apropos, considering that the However, those omissions which cannot be supplied except by evidence aliunde would result in the
requirement that the attestation state the number of pages of the will is extant from Section 618.23 invalidation of the attestation clause and ultimately, of the will itself."31 Thus, a failure by the attestation
However, the enactment of the Civil Code in 1950 did put in force a rule of interpretation of the clause to state that the testator signed every page can be liberally construed, since that fact can be checked
requirements of wills, at least insofar as the attestation clause is concerned, that may vary from the by a visual examination; while a failure by the attestation clause to state that the witnesses signed in one
philosophy that governed these two cases. Article 809 of the Civil Code states: "In the absence of bad faith, another’s presence should be considered a fatal flaw since the attestation is the only textual guarantee of
forgery, or fraud, or undue and improper pressure and influence, defects and imperfections in the form of compliance.32
attestation or in the language used therein shall not render the will invalid if it is proved that the will was
in fact executed and attested in substantial compliance with all the requirements of article 805." The failure of the attestation clause to state the number of pages on which the will was written remains a
fatal flaw, despite Article 809. The purpose of the law in requiring the clause to state the number of pages
In the same vein, petitioner cites the report of the Civil Code Commission, which stated that "the on which the will is written is to safeguard against possible interpolation or omission of one or some of its
underlying and fundamental objective permeating the provisions on the [law] on [wills] in this project pages and to prevent any increase or decrease in the pages.33 The failure to state the number of pages
consists in the [liberalization] of the manner of their execution with the end in view of giving the testator equates with the absence of an averment on the part of the instrumental witnesses as to how many pages
more [freedom] in [expressing] his last wishes. This objective is in accord with the [modern tendency] in consisted the will, the execution of which they had ostensibly just witnessed and subscribed to. Following
respect to the formalities in the execution of wills."24 However, petitioner conveniently omits the Caneda, there is substantial compliance with this requirement if the will states elsewhere in it how many
qualification offered by the Code Commission in the very same paragraph he cites from their report, that pages it is comprised of, as was the situation in Singson and Taboada. However, in this case, there could
such liberalization be "but with sufficient safeguards and restrictions to prevent the commission of fraud have been no substantial compliance with the requirements under Article 805 since there is no statement
and the exercise of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the testator."25 in the attestation clause or anywhere in the will itself as to the number of pages which comprise the will.
 "attested and subscribed by [the instrumental witnesses]." The respective intents behind these two classes
At the same time, Article 809 should not deviate from the need to comply with the formal requirements of signature are distinct from each other. The signatures on the left-hand corner of every page signify,
as enumerated under Article 805. Whatever the inclinations of the members of the Code Commission in among others, that the witnesses are aware that the page they are signing forms part of the will. On the
incorporating Article 805, the fact remains that they saw fit to prescribe substantially the same formal other hand, the signatures to the attestation clause establish that the witnesses are referring to the
requisites as enumerated in Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, convinced that these remained statements contained in the attestation clause itself. Indeed, the attestation clause is separate and apart
effective safeguards against the forgery or intercalation of notarial wills.34 Compliance with these from the disposition of the will. An unsigned attestation clause results in an unattested will. Even if the
requirements, however picayune in impression, affords the public a high degree of comfort that the instrumental witnesses signed the left-hand margin of the page containing the unsigned attestation clause,
testator himself or herself had decided to convey property post mortem in the manner established in the such signatures cannot demonstrate these witnesses’ undertakings in the clause, since the signatures that
will.35 The transcendent legislative intent, even as expressed in the cited comments of the Code do appear on the page were directed towards a wholly different avowal.
Commission, is for the fruition of the testator’s incontestable desires, and not for the indulgent admission
of wills to probate. The Court may be more charitably disposed had the witnesses in this case signed the attestation clause
itself, but not the left-hand margin of the page containing such clause. Without diminishing the value of
The Court could thus end here and affirm the Court of Appeals. However, an examination of the will itself the instrumental witnesses’ signatures on each and every page, the fact must be noted that it is the
reveals a couple of even more critical defects that should necessarily lead to its rejection. attestation clause which contains the utterances reduced into writing of the testamentary witnesses
themselves. It is the witnesses, and not the testator, who are required under Article 805 to state the
For one, the attestation clause was not signed by the instrumental witnesses. While the signatures of the number of pages used upon which the will is written; the fact that the testator had signed the will and
instrumental witnesses appear on the left-hand margin of the will, they do not appear at the bottom of every page thereof; and that they witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence
the attestation clause which after all consists of their averments before the notary public. of the testator and of one another. The only proof in the will that the witnesses have stated these
elemental facts would be their signatures on the attestation clause.
Cagro v. Cagro36 is material on this point. As in this case, "the signatures of the three witnesses to the will
do not appear at the bottom of the attestation clause, although the page containing the same is signed by Thus, the subject will cannot be considered to have been validly attested to by the instrumental witnesses,
the witnesses on the left-hand margin."37 While three (3) Justices38 considered the signature as they failed to sign the attestation clause.
requirement had been substantially complied with, a majority of six (6), speaking through Chief Justice
Paras, ruled that the attestation clause had not been duly signed, rendering the will fatally defective. Yet, there is another fatal defect to the will on which the denial of this petition should also hinge. The
requirement under Article 806 that "every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the
There is no question that the signatures of the three witnesses to the will do not appear at the bottom of testator and the witnesses" has also not been complied with. The importance of this requirement is
the attestation clause, although the page containing the same is signed by the witnesses on the left-hand highlighted by the fact that it had been segregated from the other requirements under Article 805 and
margin. entrusted into a separate provision, Article 806. The non-observance of Article 806 in this case is equally
as critical as the other cited flaws in compliance with Article 805, and should be treated as of equivalent
We are of the opinion that the position taken by the appellant is correct. The attestation clause is "a import.
memorandum of the facts attending the execution of the will" required by law to be made by the attesting
witnesses, and it must necessarily bear their signatures. An unsigned attestation clause cannot be In lieu of an acknowledgment, the notary public, Petronio Y. Bautista, wrote "Nilagdaan ko at ninotario ko
considered as an act of the witnesses, since the omission of their signatures at the bottom thereof ngayong 10 ng Hunyo 10 (sic), 1981 dito sa Lungsod ng Maynila."40 By no manner of contemplation can
negatives their participation. those words be construed as an acknowledgment. An acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed
a deed in going before some competent officer or court and declaring it to be his act or deed.41 It involves
The petitioner and appellee contends that signatures of the three witnesses on the left-hand margin an extra step undertaken whereby the signor actually declares to the notary that the executor of a
conform substantially to the law and may be deemed as their signatures to the attestation clause. This is document has attested to the notary that the same is his/her own free act and deed.
untenable, because said signatures are in compliance with the legal mandate that the will be signed on
the left-hand margin of all its pages. If an attestation clause not signed by the three witnesses at the It might be possible to construe the averment as a jurat, even though it does not hew to the usual language
bottom thereof, be admitted as sufficient, it would be easy to add such clause to a will on a subsequent thereof. A jurat is that part of an affidavit where the notary certifies that before him/her, the document
occasion and in the absence of the testator and any or all of the witnesses.39 was subscribed and sworn to by the executor.42 Ordinarily, the language of the jurat should avow that the
document was subscribed and sworn before the notary public, while in this case, the notary public averred
The Court today reiterates the continued efficacy of Cagro. Article 805 particularly segregates the that he himself "signed and notarized" the document. Possibly though, the word "ninotario" or "notarized"
requirement that the instrumental witnesses sign each page of the will, from the requisite that the will be
encompasses the signing of and swearing in of the executors of the document, which in this case would
involve the decedent and the instrumental witnesses.

Yet even if we consider what was affixed by the notary public as a jurat, the will would nonetheless remain
invalid, as the express requirement of Article 806 is that the will be "acknowledged", and not merely
subscribed and sworn to. The will does not present any textual proof, much less one under oath, that the
decedent and the instrumental witnesses executed or signed the will as their own free act or deed. The
acknowledgment made in a will provides for another all-important legal safeguard against spurious wills
or those made beyond the free consent of the testator. An acknowledgement is not an empty meaningless
act.43 The acknowledgment coerces the testator and the instrumental witnesses to declare before an
officer of the law that they had executed and subscribed to the will as their own free act or deed. Such
declaration is under oath and under pain of perjury, thus allowing for the criminal prosecution of persons
who participate in the execution of spurious wills, or those executed without the free consent of the
testator. It also provides a further degree of assurance that the testator is of certain mindset in making
the testamentary dispositions to those persons he/she had designated in the will.

It may not have been said before, but we can assert the rule, self-evident as it is under Article 806. A
notarial will that is not acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses is fatally
defective, even if it is subscribed and sworn to before a notary public.

There are two other requirements under Article 805 which were not fully satisfied by the will in question.
We need not discuss them at length, as they are no longer material to the

disposition of this case. The provision requires that the testator and the instrumental witnesses sign each
and every page of the will on the left margin, except the last; and that all the pages shall be numbered
correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page. In this case, the decedent, unlike the
witnesses, failed to sign both pages of the will on the left margin, her only signature appearing at the so-
called "logical end"44 of the will on its first page. Also, the will itself is not numbered correlatively in letters
on each page, but instead numbered with Arabic numerals. There is a line of thought that has disabused
the notion that these two requirements be construed as mandatory.45 Taken in isolation, these omissions,
by themselves, may not be sufficient to deny probate to a will. Yet even as these omissions are not decisive
to the adjudication of this case, they need not be dwelt on, though indicative as they may be of a general
lack of due regard for the requirements under Article 805 by whoever executed the will.

All told, the string of mortal defects which the will in question suffers from makes the probate denial
inexorable.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines issued in 1927. It is now covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 86 (T-10) of the registry of deeds of
SUPREME COURT Misamis Occidental (p. 7, Appellees' brief in L-27082).
Manila
The other parcel is Identified as Lot No. 1112. It has an area of 18.0291 hectares. It is covered by OCT No.
SECOND DIVISION P-8419 issued on November 21, 1961 in the name of the Heirs of Juan Pan , represented by Concepcion
Pan de Yamuta (p. 73, Record on Appeal in
G.R. No. L-27082 January 31, 1978 L-27082).

Intestate Estate of the Spouses Juan C. Pangilinan and Teresa Magtuba. FILOMENO COCA,
Administrator, PRIMA PANGILINAN, and HEIRS OF CONCEPCION PANGILINAN-YAMUTA, namely,
MARIA P. YAMUTA DE ATAY, EUSEBIO P. YAMUTA, and APOLINAR P. YAMUTA, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
GUADALUPE PIZARRAS VDA. DE PANGILINAN, HEIRS OF FRANCISCO PANGILINAN, namely, FRANCIS,
ALGERIAN, BENJAMIN, PERLA and FRANCISCO, JR., all surnamed PANGILINAN, and CRISPIN
BORROMEO, oppositors-appellees.
G.R. No. L-29545 January 31, 1978
FILOMENO COCA, administrator-appellant,
vs.
CRISPIN BORROMEO and GUADALUPE PIZARRAS VDA. DE PANGILINAN and her Children, claimants-
appellees.
According to Guadalupe Pizarras and her children, a third parcel, Lot No. 1920, with an area of eight
hectares which was surveyed in the name of Concepcion Pan and which adjoins Lots Nos. 1927 and 1112,
also forms part of the estate of the deceased Pangilinan spouses (pp. 61-64, Record on Appeal).
The Pangilinan spouses were survived by the following heirs: (1) Prima Pangilinan, (2) Maria, Eusebio and
Apolinar all surnamed Yamuta, the children of Concepcion Pangilinan Yamuta who died in 1961, and (3)
Francis, A Benjamin Perla and Francisco, Jr., all surnamed Pan the children of Francisco Pan who died in
1948 and who was also survived by his widow, Guadalupe Pizarras. (It is not clear whether Roseller,
Demosthenes and Eliza, all surnamed Japay, were the children of the deceased Helen Pangilinan,
presumably a daughter of Francisco Pangilinan and Teresa Magtuba. See pages 81-82, Record on Appeal).
Special Proceeding No. 508 of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental was instituted on
September 5, 1963 for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouses, Juan C. Pangilinan and Teresa
Magtuba.

Casiano U. Laput and Lorenzo D. de Guzman for appellants. On September 25, 1965 the administrator presented a project of partition wherein the combined areas of
Lots Nos. 1112 and 1927, or 22.0082 hectares, were partitioned as follows:
Paulino A. Conol and Felicidario M. Batoy for appellees.
(a) To Crispin Borromeo as payment of his attorney's fees in Civil Case No. 560 or CA-G.R. No. 6721-
R, February 27, 1952, Crispin Labaria vs. Juan C. Pangilinan, in accordance with the lower court's decision
AQUINO, J.: dated July 19, 1965 in Civil Case No. 2440. Borromeo vs. Coca (p. 11, Appellees' brief in L-27082), three
hectares which should be taken from Lot No. 1112 and designated as Lot No. 1112-A;
These two cases involve the question of whether the ownership of a parcel of land, whether belonging to
the deceased spouses or to their heirs, should be decided in the intestate proceeding or in a separate (b) To the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan (Mrs. Pizarras and children), 5.3361 hectares taken from Lot
action. Also in issue in these two cases is the liability of the decedents' estate for the litigation expenses No. 1112 and designated as Lot No. 1112-B;
allegedly incurred in a case regarding that same land.
(c) To Prima Pangilinan, 6.3361 hectares, taken from Lot No. 1112 and designated as Lot No. 1112-
Being related cases, their adjudication in a single decision was allowed in this Court's resolution of August C, and presumably a daughter of Francisco Pan 81-82, Record on Appeal).
13, 1969.
(d) To the heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan, 7.3360 hectares, consisting of Lot No. 1927 and the
The spouses Juan Pan and Teresa Magtuba died intestate in 1943 and 1948, respectively. They possession remainder of Lot No. 1112, which remainder is designated as Lot No. 1112-D.
a homestead, consisting of two parcels of land, located at Barrio Bunawan or Mauswagon, Calamba,
Misamis Occidental. It was also provided in the project of partition that the sum of P5,088.50, as the alleged debt of the estate
to Concepcion Pan should be divided equally among the three sets of heirs, or P1,696.16 for each set of
One parcel is Identified as Lot No. 1927. It has an area of 3.9791 hectares. It was covered by Original heirs, and that Prima Pangilinan and the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan should pay that amount to the heirs
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 10 of the registry of deeds of Oriental Misamis in the name of Juan Pangilinan of Concepcion Pangilinan.
 heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan as directed in its order of August 31, 1966 and in its approval of the
The heirs of Francisco Pangilinan (Guadalupe Pizarras, et al.) opposed that project of partition. They accounting of the special administrator.
contended that the proposed partition contravened the lower court's order of December 6, 1963 which
recognized the right of the heirs of Francisco Pan to a twelve-hectare portion of Lot No. 1112; that Prima The administrator, Filomeno Coca, Prima Pangilinan and the heirs of Concepcion Pan also appealed from
Pangilinan, who sold her share to Francisco Pan should be excluded from the partition; that the total share those two orders dated May 11, 1968 (L-29545).
of the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan in Lot No. 1112 is 12.6720 hectares, while that of the heirs of
Concepcion Pangilinan is 6.3360 hectares, and that the claim of the heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan for The appellant contend that the lower court, as a probate court, has no jurisdiction to decide the ownership
115,088.50 had not been properly allowed. of the twelve-hectare portion of Lot No. 1112. On the other hand, the appellees" or the heirs of Francisco
Pangilinan counter that the lower court did not decide the ownership of the twelve hectares when it
The lower court in its order of October 2, 1965 directed the administrator to pay the debt of the estate to ordered their exclusion from the project of partition. So, the problem is how the title to the twelve
the heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan. It deferred action on the project of partition until the ownership of the hectares should be decided, whether in a separate action or in the intestate. proceeding.
twelve hectares, which were claimed by the heirs of Francisco Pan and the six hectares, which were
claimed by Crispen Borromeo (eighteen hectares in all which were excluded from the inventory in the It should be clarified that whether a particular matter should be resolved by the Court of First Instance in
court's order of December 6, 1963) is determined in an ordinary action. the exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited probate jurisdiction is in reality not a jurisdictional
question. In essence, it is a procedural question involving a mode of practice "which may be waived"
On may 14,1966 the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan filed a supplemental opposition wherein they asked that (Cunanan vs. Amparo, 80 Phil. 227, 232. Cf. Reyes vs. Diaz, 73 Phil. 484 re jurisdiction over the issue).
Lot No. 1920, with an area of eight hectares, which lot was surveyed at should be included in the project
of partition. As a general rule, the question as to title to property should not be passed upon in the estate or intestate
proceeding. That question should be ventilated in a separate action. (Lachenal vs. Salas, L-42257, June 14,
On August 31, 1966 the lower court, apparently acting on its own volition, tackled once more the project 1976, 71 SCRA 262, 266). That general rule has qualifications or exceptions justified by expediency and
of partition. After noting that no separate action had been filed to determine the ownership of the twelve convenience.
hectares, it issued an order approving the project of partition but excluding the twelve hectares claimed
by the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan. Thus, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or testate proceeding the question of
inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property without prejudice to its final
That order on its face appears to be incomplete because, after excluding the twelve hectares, the lower determination in a separate action Lachenal vs. Salas, supra).
court did not bother to decide how the remainder should be partitioned and whether Prima Pangilinan
had a share in that remainder. Although generally, a probate court may not decide a question of title or ownership, yet if the interested
parties are all heirs or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the
That is the order under appeal in L-27082 by Filomeno Coca as administrator, Prima Pangilinan and the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of 'third parties are not impaired, then the
heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan. However, the said appellants in their brief also assail the lower court's probate court is competent to decide the question of ownership (Pascual vs. Pascual 73 Phil. 561; Alvarez
order of December 6, 1963, excluding eighteen hectares from the inventory, which order was sustained vs. Espiritu, L-18833, August 14, 1965, 14 SCRA 892; Cunanan vs. Amparo, supra; 3 Morans Comments on
by the Court of Appeals in its decision in Atay vs. Catolico, CA-G.R. Nos. 33165-R, and 3426-R, May 14,1964, the Rules of Court, 1970 Ed., p. 4731).
5 CAR 1200. This Court refused to review that decision in its resolution of July 29, 1964, in
L-23088-89, Atay vs. Court of Appeals. We hold that the instant case may be treated as an exception to the general rule that questions of title
should be ventilated in a separate action.
The other incident involves the lower court's order of May 11, 1968 which directed that the claim of the
heirs of Francisco Pangilinan for reimbursement of litigation expenses (apart from the sum of P1,459.49, Here, the probate court had already received evidence on the ownership of the twelve-hectare portion
as the value of the produce of the twelve hectares already mentioned, which was appropriated by the during the hearing of the motion for its exclusion from title inventory The only interested parties are the
special administrator), be referred to the clerk of court for reception of the evidence. heirs who have all appeared in the intestate proceeding.

In another order, also dated May 11, 1968, the lower court reiterated its order of October 2, 1965 that the As pointed out by the appellees, they belong to the poor stratum of society. They should not be forced to
administrator should pay the heirs of Concepcion Pan the. amount to be reimbursed to her estate. The incur additional expenses (such as filing fees) by bringing a separate action to determine the ownership of
court further directed the administrator to account for the income of the estate, to recover any amount the twelve-hectare portion.
due from the special administrator, and to pay the claim of Crispin Borromeo and the amount due to the
The just, expeditious and inexpensive solution is to require the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan to the in the
intestate, proceeding, Special Proceeding No. 568, a motion in the form of a complaint wherein they The case is remanded to the lower court for further proceedings in accordance with the guidelines already
should set forth their claim for the twelve hectares in question, stating the ultimate facts in support of set forth. No costs.
their claim, such as the partition made by Juan C. Pangilinan, their acquisition of the share of Prima
Pangilinan and the usufructuary rights of their parents, their long possession of the said portion, their SO ORDERED.
claim for the produce of the land, the expenses incurred by them in Civil Case No. 560, Labaria vs.
Pangilinan, and their contention that Lot No. 1920 forms part of the estate of the Pangilinan spouses.

Copies of that motion should be serves upon the administrator and upon Prima Pangilinan and the heirs
of Concepcion Pangilinan (who are all represented by the same lawyers). They should answer the motion
within fifteen days from service. In their answer the appellants should set forth the ultimate facts and the
defenses (such as the violation of section 118 of the Public Land Law) to support their theory that Lot No.
1112 still forms part of the estate of the spouses Juan C. Pangilinan and Teresa Magtuba and that the heirs
of Francisco Pangilinan should bear one-third of the expenses incurred by Concepcion Pan in Civil Case No.
560.

After the issues have been joined and in case no amicable settlement has been reached, the probate court
should receive evidence or, as indicated by the Court of Appeals in Atay vs. Catolico, supra a full-dress
hearing should be held.

Crispin Borromeo may set forth also his claim for the three hectares but only for the purpose of deciding
what portion of the estate should be given to him in satisfaction of his share. His claim for the sum of P416
had already been adjudicated by the lower court in its order of August 31, 1966 (pp. 26- 27, Record on
Appeal in L-29545). No appeal was interposed from that adjudication.

After trial the lower court's decision on the issues as to what constitutes the estate of the Pangilinan
spouses should include the partition thereof and should indicate what portion of the estate should be
allocated to Crispen Borromeo. If necessary, the validity of the donation or partition of Lot No. 1112, made
by Juan C. Pangilinan during his lifetime, should be passed upon.

Considering that the respective claims of the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan . and the heirs of Concepcion
Pangilinan for reimbursement of the litigation expenses allegedly incurred in Civil Case No. 560 will be
included in the trial, the two orders of the trial court dated May 11, 1968 regarding those matters (L-
29545) should not be enforced. They should be set aside.

WHEREFORE, (1) the lower court's amended order of August 31, 1966, excluding twelve hectares from the
partition of the estate of the deceased Pan spouses (L-27082) and (2) the two orders dated May 11, 1968,
regarding the claim of Guadalupe Pizarras and her children and the debt of the estate to Concepcion
Pangilinan (L-29545) are reversed and set aside.

A new trial should be held on those matters after the filing of the proper pleadings and in case no amicable
settlement is reached. The heirs of Francisco Pangilinan should file their motion within thirty days from
notice of the entry of judgment in this case.
 Republic of the Philippines of Teresa Garin "to reconvey immediately the fishpond in question * * to the intestate Estate of the
SUPREME COURT Spouses. 7
Manila
The Order was predicated upon the Court's factual findings mainly derived from the testimony of the two
FIRST DIVISION administrators that:

G.R. No. L-56504 May 7, 1987 1. the fishpond originally belonged to the Government, and had been given in lease to Rafael Valera
in his lifetime;
POMPILLO VALERA and EUMELIA VALERA CABADO, petitioners,
vs. 2. Rafael Valera ostensibly sold all his leasehold rights in the fishpond to his daughter, Teresa Garin;
HON. JUDGE SANCHO Y. INSERTO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Iloilo, but the sale was fictitious, having been resorted to merely so that she might use the property to provide
Branch 1, and MANUEL R. FABIANA, respondents. for her children's support and education, and was subject to the resolutory term that the fishpond should
revert to Rafael Valera upon completion of the schooling of Teresa Garin's Children; and
Nos. L-59867-68 May 7, 1987
3. with the income generated by the fishpond, the property was eventually purchased from the
EUMELIA V. CABADO, POMPILLO VALERA and HON. MIDPANTAO L. ADIL, petitioners-appellants, Government by the Heirs of Teresa Garin, collectively named as such in the Original Certificate of Title
vs. issued in their favor.
MANUEL FABIANA, JOSE GARIN and HON. COURT OF APPEALS (Tenth Division), respondents-
appellants. Upon these facts, Judge Adil ruled that an implied trust had been created, obligating Teresa Garin's heirs
to restore the property to the Valera Spouses' Estate, in accordance with Articles 1453 and 1455 of the
NARVASA, J.: Civil Code providing as follows:

Conflicting claims over a fishpond asserted by the administrators of the estate of deceased spouses, on Article 1453. When property is conveyed to a person in reliance upon his declared intentions to hold it for,
the one hand, and by the heirs of a daughter of said spouses and their lessee, on the other, have given rise or transfer it to another or the grantor, there is an implied trust in favor of the person for whose benefit
to the proceedings now docketed in this Court as (1) G.R. No. 56504 and (2) G.R. Nos. 59867-68. it is contemplated.

Sp. Proc. No. 2223, CFI, Iloilo Article 1455. When any trustee, guardian or other person holding a fiduciary relationship uses trust funds
for the purchase of property and causes a conveyance to be made to him or to a third person, a trust is
In the proceedings for the settlement of the intestate estate of the decedent spouses, Rafael Valera and established by operation of law in favor of the person to whom the fund belongs.
Consolacion Sarrosa 1 — in which Eumelia Cabado and Pompiro Valera had been appointed administrators
2 — the heirs of a deceased daughter of the spouses, Teresa Garin, filed a motion asking that the The Court also held that the action for reconveyance based on constructive trust had not yet prescribed,
Administratrix, Cabado, be declared in contempt for her failure to render an accounting of her Cabado's motion for the fishpond's reversion to the estate having been filed well within ten (10) years
administration. 3 Cabado replied that no accounting could be submitted unless Jose Garin, Teresa's from June 30, 1980, the date on which Teresa Garin's heirs allegedly acquired title over it. 8
husband and the movant heirs' father, delivered to the administrator an 18-hectare fishpond in Baras,
Barotoc Nuevo, Iloilo, belonging to the estate and she in turn moved for the return thereof to the estate, There seems little doubt, however, that the Court's pronouncement regarding the estate's title to the
4 so that it might be partitioned among the decedents' heirs. Jose Garin opposed the plea for the fishpond was merely provisional in character, made solely to determine whether or not the fishpond
fishpond's return to the estate, asserting that the property was owned by his children and this was why it should be included in the inventory of estate assets. So it was evidently understood by the administrators
had never been included in any inventory of the estate. who have more than once asserted that "the probate court has jurisdiction to determine the ownership
of the fishpond for purposes of inclusion in the inventory of the properties. 9 So it was made clear by the
The Court, presided over by Hon. Judge Midpantao Adil, viewed the Garin Heirs' motion for contempt, as Probate Court itself which, at the outset, stated that the hearing on the matter 10 was meant "merely to
well as Cabado's prayer for the fishpond's return to the estate, as having given rise to a claim for the determine whether or not the fishpond should be included as part of the estate and whether or not the
recovery of an asset of the estate within the purview of Section 6, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court. 5 It person holding it should be made to deliver and/or return ** (it) to the estate. 11 And so it was emphasized
accordingly set said incidents for hearing during which the parties presentee evidence in substantiation of in another Order, denying reconsideration of the Order of September 17, 1980, which states that:
their positions. 6 Thereafter, the Court issued an Order dated September 17, 1980 commanding the Heirs
**(i)t is never the intendment of this court to write a finish to the issue of ownership of the fishpond in G.R. Nos. 59867-68
dispute. The movants may pursue their claim of ownership over the same in an ordinary civil action.
Meanwhile, however, it is the finding of this probate court that the fishpond must be delivered to the In the meantime, Jose Garin — having filed a motion for reconsideration of the above mentioned order of
estate. Judge Adil (declaring the estate to be the owner of the fishpond), in which he asserted that the Probate
Court, being of limited jurisdiction, had no competence to decide the ownership of the fishpond,22 which
Clearly, there is no incompatibility between the exercise of the power of this probate court under Section motion had been denied 23-filed a notice of appeal from said Order.24 But he quickly abandoned the
6 in relation to Section 7, both of Rule 87, and the contention of the movants that the proper forum to appeal when, as aforestated 25 Judge Adil authorized execution of the order pending appeal, instead, he
settle the issue of ownership should be in a court of general jurisdiction. 12 initiated a special action for certiorari prohibition and mandamus )with prayer for preliminary injunction)
in the Court of Appeals, therein docketed as CA-G. R. No. SP-1154-R.
Judge Adil afterwards granted the administrators' motion for execution of the order pending appeal, and
directed the sheriff to enforce the direction for the Garin Heirs to reconvey the fishpond to the estate. 13 Fabiana followed suit. He instituted in the same Court of Appeals his own action for certiorari and
The corresponding writ was served on Manuel Fabiana, the supposed encargado or caretaker. Voicing no injunction, docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP-11577-R; this, notwithstanding the pendency in judge Inserto's sala
objection to the writ, and declaring to the sheriff that he was a mere lessee, 14 Fabiana voluntarily of the case he had earlier filed. 26
relinquished possession of the fishpond to the sheriff. The latter, in turn, delivered it to the administrators.
15 These two special civil actions were jointly decided by the Court of Appeals. The Court granted the
petitions and ruled in substance that:
Later however, Fabiana filed a complaint-in-intervention with the Probate Court seeking vindication of his
right to the possession of the fishpond, based on a contract of lease between himself, as lessee, and Jose 1. The Probate Court indeed possessed no jurisdiction to resolve the issue of ownership based
Garin, as lessor. 16 But Judge Adil dismissed his complaint on the following grounds, to wit: merely on evidence adduced at the hearing of a "counter-motion" conducted under Section 6, Rule 87;

(1) it was filed out of time because not only had judgment been rendered, but execution as regards 2. The original and transfer certificates of title covering the fishpond stand in the names of the Heirs
transfer of possession had already taken place; and of Teresa Garin as registered owners, and therefore no presumption that the estate owns the fishpond is
warranted to justify return of the property on the theory that it had merely been borrowed; and
(2) the lease contract had not been registered and hence was not binding as against the estate. 17
3. Even assuming the Probate Court's competence to resolve the ownership question, the estate
G.R. No. 56504 administrators would have to recover possession of the fishpond by separate action, in view of the lessee's
claim of right to superior possession, as lessee thereof.
Fabiana thereupon instituted a separate action for injunction and damages, with application for a
preliminary injunction. This was docketed as Civil Case No. 13742 and assigned to Branch I of the Iloilo CFI, From this joint judgment, the administrators have taken separate appeals to this Court by certiorari,27
Hon. Sancho Y. Inserto, presiding. 18 Judge Inserto issued a temporary restraining order enjoining estate docketed as G.R. Nos. 59867 and 59868. They ascribe to the Appellate Court the following errors, viz: Page
administrators from disturbing Fabiana in the possession of the fishpond, as lessee. 19 542

The estate administrators filed a motion to dismiss the complaint and to dissolve the temporary restraining 1) in holding that the Probate Court (Judge Adil, Presiding) had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of
order, averring that the action was barred by the Probate Court's prior judgment which had exclusive and decide the issue of title covering a fishpond being claimed by an heir adversely to the decedent
jurisdiction over the issue of the lease, and that the act sought to be restrained had already been spouses;
accomplished, Fabiana having voluntarily surrendered possession of the fishpond to the sheriff. 20 When
Judge Inserto failed to act on their motion within what the administrators believed to be a reasonable 2) in ruling that it was needful for the administrators to file a separate action for the recovery of the
time, considering the circumstances of the Case, the administrators filed with the Supreme Court a special possession of the fishpond then in the hands of a third person; and
civil action for certiorari and mandamus, with a prayer for Preliminary mandatory injunction and
temporary restraining order, which was docketed as G.R. No. 56504. 21 In their petition, the 3) in sanctioning the act of a CFI Branch in interfering with and overruling the final judgment of
administrators contended that Branch I of the Iloilo CFI (Judge Inserto, presiding) could not and should not another branch, acting as probate Court, and otherwise frustrating and inhibiting the enforcement and
interfere with the Probate Court (Branch I I, Judge Adil, presiding) in the legitimate exercise of its j implementation of said judgment.
jurisdiction over the proceedings for the Settlement of the estate of the Valera Spouses.
Jurisdiction of Probate Court
 having been made only for purposes of in. conclusion in the inventory and upon evidence adduced at the
As regards the first issue, settled is the rule that a Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court), acting hearing of a motion, it cannot and should not be subject of execution, as against its possessor who has set
as a Probate Court, exercises but limited jurisdiction, 28 and thus has no power to take cognizance of and up title in himself (or in another) adversely to the decedent, and whose right to possess has not been
determine the issue of title to property claimed by a third person adversely to the decedent, unless the ventilated and adjudicated in an appropriate action. These considerations assume greater cogency where,
claimant and all the Other parties having legal interest in the property consent, expressly or impliedly, to as here, the Torrens title to the property is not in the decedents' names but in others, a situation on which
the submission of the question to the Probate Court for adjudgment, or the interests of third persons are this Court has already had occasion to rule.
not thereby prejudiced, 29 the reason for the exception being that the question of whether or not a
particular matter should be resolved by the Court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited In regard to such incident of inclusion or exclusion, We hold that if a property covered by Torrens title is
jurisdiction as a special court (e.g., probate, land registration, etc., is in reality not a jurisdictional but ininvolved, the presumptive conclusiveness of such title should be given due weight, and in the absence of
essence of procedural one, involving a mode of practice which may be waived. 30 strong compelling evidence to the contrary, the holder thereof should be consider as the owner of the
property in controversy until his title is nullified or modified in an appropriate ordinary action, particularly,
The facts obtaining in this case, however, do not call for the application of the exception to the rule. As when as in the case at bar, possession of the property itself is in the persons named in the title. 35
already earlier stressed, it was at all times clear to the Court as well as to the parties that if cognizance was
being taken of the question of title over the fishpond, it was not for the purpose of settling the issue Primary Jurisdiction over Title issue in
definitely and permanently, and writing "finis" thereto, the question being explicitly left for determination
"in an ordinary civil action," but merely to determine whether it should or should not be included in the Court Taking Cognizance of Separate Action
inventory. 31 This function of resolving whether or not property should be included in the estate inventory
is, to be sure, one clearly within the Probate Court's competence, although the Court's determination is Since, too, both the Probate Court and the estate administrators are one in the recognition of the
only provisional in character, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action that proposition that title to the fishpond could in the premises only be appropriately determined in a separate
may be instituted by the parties. 32 action, 36 the actual firing of such a separate action should have been anticipated, and should not
therefore have come as a surprise, to the latter. And since moreover, implicit in that recognition is also
The same norm governs the situation contemplated in Section 6, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court, expressly the acknowledge judgment of the superiority of the authority of the court in which the separate action is
invoked by the Probate Court in justification of its holding a hearing on the issue arising from the parties' filed over the issue of title, the estate administrators may not now be heard to complain that in such a
conflicting claims over the fishpond. 33 The examination provided in the cited section is intended merely separate action, the court should have issued orders necessarily involved in or flowing from the
to elicit evidence relevant to property of the decedent from persons suspected of having possession or assumption of that jurisdiction. Those orders cannot in any sense be considered as undue interference
knowledge thereof, or of having concealed, embezzled, or conveyed away the same. Of course, if the latter with the jurisdiction of the Probate Court. Resulting from the exercise of primary jurisdiction over the
lays no claim to the property and manifests willingness to tum it over to the estate, no difficulty arises; the question of ownership involving estate property claimed by the estate, they must be deemed superior to
Probate Court simply issues the appropriate direction for the delivery of the property to the estate. On the otherwise contrary orders issued by the Probate Court in the exercise of what may be, regarded as merely
other hand, if the third person asserts a right to the property contrary to the decedent's, the Probate Court secondary, or provisional, jurisdiction over the same question.
would have no authority to resolve the issue; a separate action must be instituted by the administrator to
recover the property. 34 WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 56504 is DISMISSED, for lack of merit. The petitions in G.R. No. 59867
and G.R. No. 59868 are DENIED, and the judgment of the Appellate Court, subject thereof, is affirmed in
Parenthetically, in the light of the foregoing principles, the Probate Court could have admitted and taken toto. The temporary restraining order dated April 1, 1981 is lifted. Costs against petitioners.
cognizance of Fabiana's complaint in intervention after obtaining the consent of all interested parties to
its assumption of jurisdiction over the question of title to the fishpond, or ascertaining the absence of Yap (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano, Gancayco and Sarmiento, JJ., concur
objection thereto. But it did not. It dismissed the complaint in intervention instead. And all this is now
water under the bridge.

Possession of Fishpond Pending

Determination of Title Thereto

Since the determination by the Probate Court of the question of title to the fishpond was merely
provisional, not binding on the property with any character of authority, definiteness or permanence,