QUALITY OF HAZOPS

1 GETTING THE FULL BENEFITS OF A HAZOP

A Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP) is a well-known risk analysis technique. It can be applied in any
industry, but is most widely used in the chemical, processing and energy industries. The method is based
on a structured, multi-discipline approach in a workshop setting, where the design, operation or system in
question is split into nodes (sub-systems), and a set of parameters and guidewords are used for
identification and evaluation of hazards. A HAZOP can be applied for a variety of systems and activities,
such as continuous or batch process systems, electrical systems, computer systems, modifications and
procedures. This article focuses on the application of HAZOP for process systems in the energy industry.

A HAZOP is a powerful tool, which can give valuable input about process risks in the design or operational
phase of a process facility. However, it is also evident that the outcome and success of the HAZOP
correlates with the skills and experience of the facilitation team and participants. The facilitation team,
consisting of a facilitator and scribe, is responsible for the efficiency, continuity, structure and quality of the
HAZOP. Through human interaction, a HAZOP combines process safety knowledge, operational experience,
and hazard identification expertise. Hence, it is important that the facilitation team is skilled and trained to
obtain highest possible quality of the HAZOP, focusing on process safety theory, knowledge about the
HAZOP methodology, and particularly workshop leadership skills to ensure that the expertise and
experience of the participants is fully utilized in a constructive manner.

Literature describing the HAZOP methodology is widely available, for instance through IEC 61882, “Hazard
and Operability studies (HAZOP studies) Application Guide” (2001-05), and through articles and books (e.g.
“HAZOP Guide to Best Practice”, 2nd ed. 2008, IChemE). This article presents experience-based advice on
how to ensure optimal outcome of a HAZOP with regards to effectiveness and brainstorming.

The article will focus on the three phases of a HAZOP where the facilitation team are usually involved
 The preparation phase
 The workshop
 The documentation and reporting phase

The article will not go into details regarding close-out and follow up of HAZOP actions.

PREPARATION PHASE
The quality of a HAZOP depends on the efforts made during the planning of the HAZOP. During the last two
weeks prior to the HAZOP, it is recommended to perform the following activities:
 Start-up meeting to agree on the battery limits and intention with the HAZOP. In the start-up
meeting, the participant list, agenda and venue for the HAZOP should be agreed. It is important that
the number of days for the HAZOP is set according to the scope of the HAZOP. Too limited time
available for a HAZOP can reduce the quality of the HAZOP.
 The design should be frozen in good time before the HAZOP to ensure that the P&IDs used in the
HAZOP contain a minimum of drawing errors and other minor issues that might draw focus from
the risk identification process.
 The facilitator should prepare or give input to a Terms of Reference (ToR), which should be
distributed to the HAZOP participants at least one week prior to the workshop. The ToR is an
agreement between the HAZOP participants on how to conduct the HAZOP. Hence, the document
describes the methodology, nodes, guidewords, participant list and agenda for the HAZOP. It is
important that all HAZOP participants read the ToR prior to the HAZOP, to be well prepared.

THE WORKSHOP
The HAZOP workshop is the core activity in a HAZOP process. The HAZOP workshop is a brainstorming
process, facilitated by the HAZOP facilitator, and documented by the HAZOP scribe. It should be both well

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prepared, organized and recorded in order to get the full benefits of the methodology. The following sections
gives guidance on how to optimize the outcome of a HAZOP.

Limiting the number of participants

A possible pitfall in a HAZOP is too many participants. In the workshop, all participants should be actively
sharing their experience and contributing in the risk assessment. Too many participants can limit the
discussions and creativity, as threshold to contribute increases. Further, it increases the likelihood for
participants not being focused. As a rule of thumb, a HAZOP should have a maximum of 15 participants,
including the facilitation team, to ensure a good group dynamic.

Operations do often have valuable input to design, related to use of the system. Hence, it is critical that
operations are attending the HAZOP. The following disciplines should attend a process HAZOP (with other
disciplines being called upon as necessary):
 Process
 Safety
 Controls/Instrument
 Operations
 Facilitator
 Scribe

Facilitation ground rules

An important role of the HAZOP facilitator is to ensure progress, optimal group dynamics and focus on the
intention of the HAZOP. The following ground rules for facilitation should be applied:
 Always avoid more than one conversation at a time. It is the responsibility of the facilitator to stop
multiple participants from talking at once.
 Ensure that all parties are actively contributing, and avoid that one party or discipline dominates the
discussions.
 The facilitator should always summarize the discussions so that all participants can understand,
and agree, on the results from the HAZOP.
 Lengthy discussion of solutions shall not be part of a HAZOP. A HAZOP is a tool for identification
and evaluation of hazards. Evaluating solutions are typically part of the HAZOP closeout.
 The facilitator should facilitate the meeting, and avoid dominating it. This means that the
participants are responsible for the hazard identification, and suggesting actions for follow-up. The
HAZOP facilitator can stimulate the discussions using his/her own experience, but the facilitator
should not dictate hazards or actions without the participant’s acceptance. If the group cannot
reach consensus, the facilitator should however act as the final arbiter.
 Respect the structure and the Terms of Reference. It is important that the facilitator is aligned with
the Terms of Reference at all times, unless otherwise agreed in the workshop.
 It is the responsibility of the facilitator to ensure that the group is focused on the
parameter/guideword currently under review. It is normal that participants raise scenarios related
to guidewords/parameters not yet covered. This may especially be the case if the participant feels
that this scenario is a key scenario for the node. This impairs the structure of the HAZOP, and the
overall efficiency.
 Avoid that discussions are more related to design review, rather than identification of hazards.
 Discussions that are related to systems or hazards outside the scope for the meeting should be
aborted as fast as possible to avoid sidetracking.
 Stop the discussions in the correct time. If a discussion is stopped by the facilitator too early, the
HAZOP may lose important experiences and input. If a discussion is stopped too late, it will have
impact on the progress and concentration of the group. A rule of thumb is that a discussion should
be stopped when sufficient information is provided to describe the core cause, consequence and
safeguards.

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 The facilitator should ensure that the participants are sitting and staying focused during sessions.
The facilitator should stand in front of the group, and use a laser pen or pointer for guiding the
group through the nodes and P&IDs. Preferably, the group should be seated in a formation where all
participants can have eye contact, when discussing.
 Ensure that there are frequent breaks. The concentration of a group is normally not lasting for more
than 60 minutes without breaks. A rule of thumb is breaks of 5-10 minutes every hour. Frequent
breaks will also ensure that the participants are more likely to follow the ground rules for the
HAZOP. This means that the participants focus on the discussions, avoid using phones/laptops or
having off-topic conversations.
 A HAZOP-day should not last for more than 7 hours, as the assessment requires concentration and
creativity. It is also recommended that for longer HAZOPs to only schedule for 4 days of HAZOP per
week.

The role of the scribe

The scribe is a key role for a HAZOP. The progress, efficiency and quality of the HAZOP is highly dependent
on the skills and performance of the scribe. Further, the quality of the scribing in a HAZOP is depending on
the interactions between the facilitator and scribe.
 The scribe and facilitator should be trained in working together as facilitator-scribe team. A scribe
without experience in scribing for the facilitator in question is not expected to perform well. The
dynamics and interactions (e.g. structure, speed, dynamic) between the facilitator and scribe
requires training.
 The scribe should be experienced within process systems, to understand the discussions and to
quickly be able to document discussions and technical identifiers (e.g. tag numbers)
 The scribe should be a fast writer. If the speed in the HAZOP is limited due to the efficiency of the
scribe, it may also affect the quality of the session as it could negatively influence the creativity and
dynamics of the discussions.

It is important that the participants can familiarize and agree with the recordings from the HAZOP. If
worksheets shall be shown during the HAZOP, it is recommended to have dual screens, one with the P&IDs
and one with the HAZOP worksheet. If worksheets shall not be shown, it is recommended to summarize the
key results, and actions, by the end of each node.

THE DOCUMENTATION AND REPORTING PHASE

Independent on methods selected for recording of HAZOPs, the HAZOP should be documented to ensure
that all assumptions, results and discussions are understandable for persons not attending the HAZOP.
Hence, all HAZOPs should be documented to ensure an auditable trail. The following sections give guidance
on means for ensuring a proper documentation.

HAZOP Worksheet
A HAZOP is documented using a worksheet (MS Excel, Word or a specific HAZOP software). The worksheet
should contain the following columns:
 Node description: The node description should include clear boundaries for the node, and describe
relevant design and operating parameters within the node.
 ID. Each identified deviation shall have a unique identifier.
 Guideword / Parameter: Forming a meaningful deviation from the design intent.
 Cause. Describes the initial cause for the deviations (E.g. Closure of a valve)
 Consequence. As a base case, consequences should be described without taking safeguards into
account, unless there are inherent protection features (e.g. design pressure above maximum
possible pressure) If so, the consequence column should explain why there is no consequence from
the identified deviation to ensure an auditable trail (i.e why the design is considered inherently safe).

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 Safeguards. All relevant safeguards should be listed for each deviation. It is important that
safeguards are properly discussed to ensure that they actually give some risk reduction for the
hazard considered. If a LOPA is planned subsequent to the HAZOP, it is recommended to spend
some time to define whether safeguards qualify as independent protection layers. E.g,, Alarms
should not be specified as safeguards unless the operator has time and instruction for a dedicated
response to mitigate the hazard. Normal operating procedures, normal inspection and maintenance
should not be recorded as safeguards in a HAZOP. However if special operating procedures or
inspection/maintenance routines are required, it should be noted.
 Actions. Description of actions for follow-up.
 Responsible: Responsible Company/Department/Person for following up and closing out the
HAZOP action
 Comments. Important discussions, which do not fit in the other columns, shall be documented in
the comments field.

Methods of recording
The outcome and value of a HAZOP is linked to the accuracy and completeness of the recordings from the
HAZOP. As a rule of thumb, the HAZOP should be recorded such that persons not attending the HAZOP can
understand and relate to all identified hazards and deviations, to ensure an auditable trail of the HAZOP.

There are three main level of details for recording of a HAZOP:

 HAZOP documented by exception
o HAZOP items (unique rows) are only created when actions are identified. This should not
be confused with HAZOP by exception, which means that only one out of two, or more,
identical process trains are HAZOPed completely, while the other train is HAZOPed by
exception from the first process train.
 Intermediate recording
o All credible deviations and hazards are recorded. Causes that have the same consequence
and safeguards can be grouped.. To ensure an auditable trail, all parameters/guidewords
should be recorded, and “No credible scenarios identified” should be added for
parameters/guidewords without credible scenarios.
 Full recording
o All causes for deviations or hazards are recorded, even if there is no significant causes or
consequences. Further, all causes should have a separate row (e.g. each valve that could
cause blockage, and therefore high pressure/low flow).

To ensure an auditable trail, performing HAZOPs documented by exception should be avoided. The decision
regarding intermediate or full recording depends on the phase/type of the project and time available for the
study. Full recording is more time consuming than intermediate recording.

Independent of selected level of recording, it is important that the recording follow key principles:
 All actions/recommendations should be recorded such that they are understandable without
assessing all columns of the worksheet. This means that the record should specify what is the
action and why the action is raised.
 All actions should be recorded such that they are possible to close-out, meaning that they should
have a defined point of closure.
 The worksheet should always specify tag numbers
 The P&IDs shall be marked-up with pointers for all action IDs to ease action close-out.

Drawing errors usually capture the focus of some participants even though they should not be discussed as
part of the HAZOP. A useful way to prevent spending much time on this is to have a project engineer mark
drawing errors on a clean set of P&IDs. Using this methodology, there is no need to describe the drawing

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errors in the HAZOP worksheet, but scanned versions of the P&IDs can be attached the HAZOP report to
ensure an auditable trail.

ENSURING A HIGH QUALITY HAZOP

A well-documented HAZOP should give clear recommendations for improving safety and optimizing design
where possible, and give a clear and auditable description of identified hazards of the system, design or
operation considered. However, it is important to emphasize that no matter how well executed a HAZOP is,
it can never be a “catch-it-all” for all conceivable hazards in a system, design or operation. As the HAZOP is
based on the expertise and experience of the participants, there may always be hazards that the team are
not able to identify (i.e. “unknown unknowns”), no matter how experienced the team is. Also, due to the
nature of the HAZOP, usually focusing particularly on design as represented on PFDs, mass and energy
balances, P&IDs, and C&Es, there will be hazard types that are more suitable to consider in other types of
risk assessments. Such hazards could be related to dropped objects, impacts, external fires, location of F&G
detectors and specific layout issues). Hence, the focus of a HAZOP should be process and operational
hazards.

The article is written jointly by Morten Nilstad Pettersen, Thomas Solberg Fylking and Richard Forss.

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