GovCon Syllabus Part III

GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS | SYLLABUS PART III
III. ARTICLE XI, 1987 CONSITUTION (A PUBLIC OFFICER IS A PUBLIC TRUST)

ARTICLE XI
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must, at all times, be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency;
act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
Section 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of
the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office on
impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft
and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and
employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.
Section 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of
impeachment.
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of
Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution or endorsement by any Member thereof,
which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the
proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a
majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days
from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared
for consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm
a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary
resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded.
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all
the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by
the Senate shall forthwith proceed.
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once
within a period of one year.
(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. When sitting
for that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the
Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote.
No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the
Senate.
(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and
disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted
shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment, according to law.
(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose
of this section.
Section 4. The present anti-graft court known as the Sandiganbayan shall continue to function
and exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law.
Section 5. There is hereby created the independent Office of the Ombudsman, composed of the
Ombudsman to be known as Tanodbayan, one overall Deputy and at least one Deputy each for
Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao. A separate Deputy for the military establishment may likewise be
appointed.
Section 6. The officials and employees of the Office of the Ombudsman, other than the Deputies,
shall be appointed by the Ombudsman, according to the Civil Service Law.
Section 7. The existing Tanodbayan shall hereafter be known as the Office of the Special
Prosecutor. It shall continue to function and exercise its powers as now or hereafter may be
provided by law, except those conferred on the Office of the Ombudsman created under this
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Constitution.
Section 8. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines,
and at the time of their appointment, at least forty years old, of recognized probity and
independence, and members of the Philippine Bar, and must not have been candidates for any
elective office in the immediately preceding election. The Ombudsman must have, for ten years or
more, been a judge or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines.
During their tenure, they shall be subject to the same disqualifications and prohibitions as
provided for in Section 2 of Article IX-A of this Constitution.
Section 9. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be appointed by the President from a list of at
least six nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council, and from a list of three nominees
for every vacancy thereafter. Such appointments shall require no confirmation. All vacancies
shall be filled within three months after they occur.
Section 10. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall have the rank of Chairman and Members,
respectively, of the Constitutional Commissions, and they shall receive the same salary which
shall not be decreased during their term of office.
Section 11. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall serve for a term of seven years without
reappointment. They shall not be qualified to run for any office in the election immediately
succeeding their cessation from office.
Section 12. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly on
complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees of the Government,
or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations, and shall, in appropriate cases, notify the complainants of the action taken and the
result thereof.
Section 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and duties:
(1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public
official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper, or inefficient.
(2) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any public official or employee of the
Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as of any government-
owned or controlled corporation with original charter, to perform and expedite any act or duty
required by law, or to stop, prevent, and correct any abuse or impropriety in the performance of
duties.
(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or employee at
fault, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and
ensure compliance therewith.
(4) Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate case, and subject to such limitations as may
be provided by law, to furnish it with copies of documents relating to contracts or transactions
entered into by his office involving the disbursement or use of public funds or properties, and
report any irregularity to the Commission on Audit for appropriate action.
(5) Request any government agency for assistance and information necessary in the discharge of
its responsibilities, and to examine, if necessary, pertinent records and documents.
(6) Publicize matters covered by its investigation when circumstances so warrant and with due
prudence.
(7) Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape, mismanagement, fraud, and corruption in the
Government and make recommendations for their elimination and the observance of high
standards of ethics and efficiency.
(8) Promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such other powers or perform such functions
or duties as may be provided by law.
Section 14. The Office of the Ombudsman shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Its approved annual
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appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released.

Section 15. The right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or
employees, from them or from their nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by prescription,
laches, or estoppel.
Section 16. No loan, guaranty, or other form of financial accommodation for any business
purpose may be granted, directly or indirectly, by any government-owned or controlled bank or
financial institution to the President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, the
Congress, the Supreme Court, and the Constitutional Commissions, the Ombudsman, or to any
firm or entity in which they have controlling interest, during their tenure.
Section 17. A public officer or employee shall, upon assumption of office and as often thereafter
as may be required by law, submit a declaration under oath of his assets, liabilities, and net
worth. In the case of the President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, the
Congress, the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Commissions and other constitutional offices,
and officers of the armed forces with general or flag rank, the declaration shall be disclosed to the
public in the manner provided by law.
Section 18. Public officers and employees owe the State and this Constitution allegiance at all
times and any public officer or employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the
status of an immigrant of another country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law.
Relevant Jurisprudence:
a) Amit vs. COA, 686 SCRA 10 (2012)
b) Seville vs. COA, 686 SCRA 28 (2012)
c) Gutierrez vs. House of Representatives Committee on Justice, G.R. No. 193459, 15 February
2011
d) Bolastig vs. Sandiganbayan, 235 SCRA 103
e) Fajardo vs. Office of the Ombudsman, 679 SCRA 97 (2012)
f) Diaz vs. Sandiganbayan, 219 SCRA 675
g) Ledesma vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 161629, 29 July 2005
h) Bagong Kapisanan vs. Dolot, 680 SCRA 164 (2012)
i) Corona vs. Senate, 676 SCRA 563 (2012)
j) Montallana vs. Ombudsman, 678 SCRA 458 (2012)
Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 176172 November 20, 2012
EFREN G. AMIT, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, REGIONAL OFFICE NO. VI, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN (VISAYAS),
and THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
decision2 dated July 18, 2006 and the resolution3 dated December 21, 2006 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01398, which affirmed the decision4 dated July 9, 2004 of the Office of
the Ombudsman (Visayas) (Ombudsman) in OMB-VIS-ADM-2001-0137. The Ombudsman found
petitioner Efren G. Amit guilty of five counts of grave misconduct and gross dishonesty for which he
was dismissed from the service, with forfeiture of benefits and disqualification from holding public
office.5
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The Facts
The special audit results, conducted by the respondent Commission on Audit (COA) on the Multi-
Purpose Drying Pavement (MPDP) projects, under the Grains Production Enhancement Program of
the Department of Agriculture Regional Field Unit No. (DA RFU) 6, are as follows:
1. Nineteen (19) MPDP projects in the Province of Iloilo do not exist, resulting to the loss of
P1,130,000.00 on the part of the government.
2. The construction of 101 MPDP projects in the Province of Iloilo falls short of the standard
measurement of 420 square meters as per approved plan and specifications of DA RFU 6,
Iloilo City, resulting in an estimated loss of P879,301.00 on the part of the government.
3. The checks representing the reimbursement for the cost of materials for the construction of
the MPDP projects were released to persons other than the payee, without authority from the
recipient, MCPI, in violation of COA Circular 92-386 and Article 1240 (sic) of the Revised Penal
Code.
4. The supplies and materials for the construction of the MPDP projects were procured by DA
RFU 6, in violation of the Memorandum of Agreement.6
For these irregularities, eleven (11) government employees (including Amit) – allegedly responsible for
the ghost projects and the misappropriation – were administratively charged before the Ombudsman.
Amit was a Senior Agriculturist of DA RFU 6, designated to hold the concurrent positions of Chief of
the Regional Agricultural Engineering Group, Iloilo City, and DA Provincial Coordinator of the
Province of Antique for Infrastructure Projects.7 He approved five issue slips of materials for the
construction of MPDP units in: 1) Poblacion Batad, Iloilo; 2) Barangay Ginomay, Alimodian, Iloilo; 3)
Barangay Lapayon, Leganes, Iloilo; 4) Barangay Cayos, Dumangas, Iloilo; and 5) Barangay San Diego,
Lemery, Iloilo; and signed the disbursement voucher for the MPDP project in Barangay Ginomay,
Alimodian, Iloilo.
The MPDP Project Processes and Procedure
The decision of the Ombudsman summarizes the MPDP project processes and procedures as follows:
In MPDP projects, the DA-6 and the beneficiary MCPI are required to enter into a Memorandum of
Agreement with the following terms:
The DA Regional Field Office shall:
1) Administer, manage and disburse the FUND in accordance with government accounting
and auditing rules and regulations;
2) Maintain separate books of account and record all transactions related to the FUND’S
utilization under trust fund, 200-07, and maintain a separate subsidiary ledger for each
grantee;
3) Reimburse through full payment the actual expenses incurred by the recipient for supplies
and materials relative to the construction of the pavement in the amount not exceeding
P60,000.00, and payment shall be released only upon recipient’s submission of official
receipt/s for actual expenses incurred for supplies and materials;
4) Prepare a monthly report of disbursement attested to by its resident auditor and submit the
same to the DA Central Office together with duplicate copies of the disbursement vouchers
and complete supporting documents, as liquidation of funds utilized for the implementation of
the project covered by the budget;
5) Furnish the Regional Auditor a copy of the Agreement and other pertinent documents;
6) Conduct periodic inspections to ascertain progress of work, proper fund utilization and the
recipient’s compliance with the specifications of the MPDP.
The recipient shall:
1) Acknowledge acceptance of payment upon receipt of the fund in the form prescribed by the
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DA regional office;
2) Provide labor for the clearing and preparation of the area and the construction of the MPDP;
3) Conduct a canvass of at least three (3) reputable suppliers in the area who can offer the
most beneficial terms for the supply of the materials required in the construction of the MPDP;
4) Advance the initial expenses for the supplies and materials relative to the project and finish
the construction of the MPDP in strict conformity with the project’s purpose and specifications
and, save for justifiable causes, within thirty (30) days from the signing of the Agreement;
5) Make available project records and related documents to the DA Regional Office’s
representative for inspection;
6) Ensure that the MPDP is at all times properly identified and labeled as a DA Multi-Purpose
Drying Pavement;
7) Whenever feasible and without, in any way, detracting from the grant’s major purpose and
the recipient’s priority of usage, allow the pavement’s use for the immediate community’s
social and other activities. To this end, the recipient shall promulgate rules relative to the
pavement’s usage, copy furnished the DA Regional Office and the community’s Barangay
Captain;
8) Assume/shoulder the cost of the required supplies and materials in excess of P60,000.00;
9) Desist/refrain from the introduction of any modification or the construction of any building
or structure on the MPDP which will defeat the grant’s purpose;
10) Refund/return to the DA Regional Office the total amount received from the DA in cases of
a) commission of fraud and/or misrepresentation thereof; b) Non-compliance with the
project’s specifications; and c) any other violation of the Agreement.8 (emphases ours)
There must also be a stipulation that in case of fraud or misappropriation of the fund granted to the
beneficiary, the latter, represented by its board of directors and officers, shall be subject to
administrative and penal sanctions.9
Under DA Special Order No. 165, issued on December 6, 1996, the following must be submitted by
the beneficiary Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. for the reimbursement of funds used in the
construction of an MPDP:
1) Requisition and issue voucher;
2) Canvass papers;
3) Abstract of canvass;
4) Purchase order;
5) CAF (COA);
6) COA Circular No. 76-34;
7) COA Memo. No. 83-333;
8) Charge invoice/bill of collection;
9) Inspection report by a DA and COA representative;
10) Inspection report by the LGU committee;
11) Memorandum of Agreement;
12) Two (2) copies of pictures (of the MPDP);
13) Deed of donation/usufruct;
14) Certificate of registration; and
15) Resolution.10 (emphasis ours)
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For the expenses and cost of materials related to the 1998 MPDP projects to be reimbursed to the
farmers’ organizations, the following must be submitted:
1) Project proposal;
2) Resolution;
3) Memorandum of agreement;
4) Approved plans and specifications;
5) Notices to commence;
6) Delivery/official receipts;
7) Request for inspection of supplies and materials from the beneficiary farmers’
organizations;
8) Inspection report of all specified materials procured and delivered;
9) Certificate of final completion to be signed by the chairman of the farmers’ organizations or
his duly authorized representatives;
10) Request from the beneficiary farmers’ organizations for inspection of completed projects
addressed to the DA-6 Inspection Committee and the COA;
11) Report of inspection by the DA-6 with a COA representative (a written manifestation is to
be made by the COA in the absence of its representative);
12) Two (2) copies of MPDP pictures with the farmers’ organization Chairman and marketing
(sic) label – "MPDP-DA-FO Project";
13) Certificate of acceptance from the farmers’ organizations, noted by the Municipal
Agriculture Officer.11 (emphasis ours)
The Findings of the Ombudsman
The Ombudsman found all the officials so charged guilty of grave misconduct and dishonesty for
conspiring in the falsification of documents to facilitate the disbursement and misappropriation of the
funds intended for the MPDP projects. It imposed on all of the officials the penalty of dismissal from
the public service, with forfeiture of benefits and disqualification from holding public office.12 This
conclusion was based on the following findings:
When the Audit Team, however, examined the vouchers covering the claims for reimbursements of
supplies and materials used for the MPDP’s, only the following documents were attached thereto:
1) Memoranda of Agreement;
2) Requests for obligation of allotment;
3) Certificates as to availability of fund;
4) Requisition Issue Vouchers;
5) Canvass of prices;
6) Abstracts of Canvass;
7) Purchase orders;
8) Reports of inspection of delivery of materials;
9) Reports of acceptance of delivery;
10) Request issue slips;
11) Supplier’s official receipts;
12) Duplicate copies of checks issued;
13) Acknowledgment receipts; [and]
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14) RAEG’s Inspection reports as to 100% completion of projects.

Respondent Legaspi, himself, admits that the requirements he enumerated were not complied with.
In some vouchers, the signatures of the [MCPI] Chairmen and officers in the Memoranda of
Agreement greatly differ from the signatures attributed to them in the documents attached to the
vouchers, such as the:
1) Canvass papers;
2) Abstracts of canvass;
3) Reports of inspection;
4) Certificates of acceptance;
5) Acknowledgment receipts; and
6) Requisition and issue voucher.
According to the Chairmen and officers of some beneficiary cooperatives, they were given sets of
documents – MOA, canvass papers, abstracts of canvass, acknowledgment receipts, inspection
reports as to the delivery of materials, and certificates of acceptance of items delivered, by DA
personnel, Provincial and/or municipal agriculturists – for them to sign. All those documents, except
the MOA, were in blank.
A canvass was required to be made by the recipients of at least three (3) reputable suppliers in the
area who can offer the most beneficial terms in the purchase of materials necessary for the
construction of an MPDP. It is apparent, however, that no canvass were made by the recipients, and
in the canvass papers, only three (3) suppliers were involved, namely: AVV Marketing, Marietta
Marketing and Datsan Multi-Traders, all with business addresses in Iloilo City, and only one supplier
– the AVV Marketing of respondent Villaruz – was awarded the right to supply the materials in the
nineteen (19) MPDP projects.
The purchase orders were signed, and the supplies were paid for, not by the recipients but by
(officials of) the DA-6 despite the provisions of the Memoranda of Agreement that it was the recipients
who shall purchase the necessary materials, subject to reimbursement from the DA-6 upon
completion of all the requirements therefor.
According to respondents Gonzales and Josefa Majaducon, the "paper flow" for the processing of
claims for payment at the DA-6 is as follows:
a) The claim for payment starts at the office of the division chief concerned where the project
to be paid belongs. There, Box A of the Voucher is signed by the division chief concerned;
b) The voucher and the supporting documents are brought to the Budget Section for the
allocation of funds and the preparation and signature of the Request for Obligation of
Allotment (ROA);
c) The Budget Section sends the documents to the Office of the Accountant for processing and
preparation of the voucher for payment;
d) The Office of the Accountant sends the voucher and supporting documents to the Regional
Director for the approval of the voucher;
e) After approval of the voucher, the claim is sent to the Cashier’s Office for the preparation of
the check;
f) The check and the rest of the documents are then sent to the Office of the Regional Director
for counter-signature;
g) Thereafter, the check and the documents are sent to the Releasing Clerk in the Cashier’s
Office for release to the payee or his duly authorized representative.
Had there been no predisposition on the part of the respondents to release the funds, none of them
could have failed to notice the foregoing irregularities. Moreover, there is no evidence that efforts have
been exerted to recover the funds from the beneficiaries or make them answerable therefor as
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stipulated in the memoranda of agreement covering the subject projects. Worse, although the
vouchers and checks covering the subject MPDP projects were in the name of the beneficiary MCPI’s,
the Warrant Registry Book shows that the checks were released to Dan Villaruz, Jr. or his
representative, without written authority (such as special power of attorney) from the said
beneficiaries. None of the MCPI officers admits (sic) having received any check from the DA-6, and
even those few among them who received something for the construction of MPDP’s, what they
received were materials, not money or check. One could not help but conclude that there existed
conspiracy among the respondents and officers/members of some of the beneficiaries/cooperatives.
There is substantial evidence, therefore, that the respondents, conspiring and confederating with one
another, falsified documents to facilitate the disbursement of, and misappropriated, the funds
intended for the subject MPDP projects.13 (emphases and italics ours)
Amit moved to reconsider the decision, essentially objecting to the Ombudsman’s finding of
conspiracy. Amit argued that there was no evidence of an agreement between him and all the other
officials to commit the alleged fraud.
The Ombudsman denied the motion on the following reasoning:
As we have pointed out in the questioned Decision, Sixteen (16) of the subject MPDP projects were
not implemented, but the funds intended therefor were disbursed and released. In other words, these
projects turned out to be "ghosts". Not only that.
None of the respondents-movants disputed the findings of this Office and the COA-6 that so many of
the documents, including photographs of the MPDP’s with the MCPI’s chairman and a label – "MPDP-
DA-FO Project", which were required to be submitted by the beneficiary MCPI’s before the release of
the funds, were not submitted.
In some vouchers, the signatures of the MCPI chairpersons and officers affixed in the memoranda of
agreement differ from those attributed to them in the documents attached to the vouchers, such as
the canvass papers, abstracts of canvass, reports of inspection, certificates of acceptance,
acknowledgment receipts and requisition and issue vouchers.
A canvass was required to be done by the beneficiaries themselves from at least three (3) reputable
suppliers in the areas concerned. But it is apparent that no canvass was made by the beneficiaries.
Canvass papers were produced with the names of only Three (3) suppliers, all based in Iloilo City,
appearing thereon.
The purchase orders were signed, and the supplies were paid for, not by the recipients as required,
but by DA-6 officials.
Despite the provisions of the memoranda of agreement that the DA-6 must maintain separate books
of account and record all transactions related to the utilization of the MPDP funds under trust fund,
those funds were actually released under supplies and materials.
We wonder how the non-implementation or non-existence of not one but sixteen MPDP projects, and
the anomalies in the documents that supported the vouchers and the process by which the funds
were disbursed and released, could have escaped the notice of the officials responsible therefor.
Nevertheless, we did not just conclude from the foregoing facts that the respondents, including the
movants, are liable therefor. Our findings were based on the actual individual participation of the
respondents in the processes by which the funds intended for the non-existent MPDP’s were
disbursed, released and eventually, misappropriated.
The findings of this Office in OMB-V-C-02-0389-G that only ABUNDIO M. LEGASPI, JR. is liable for
the deficiencies in Thirty (30) other MPDP’s is irrelevant in this case. Suffice it to say that in those
MPDP’s, only deficiencies were found.
Instead of helping his defense, the allegations of respondent Amit that the Issue Slips were totally
unnecessary seem to strengthen the evidence against him. He knew that [the] Issue Slips were not
necessary, why did he not just tell the accounting section of the DA-6 that he was not signing those
documents because they were not necessary? That what was done – releasing the MPDP funds under
supplies and materials – was irregular? But considering that purchases made under supplies and
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materials expense must be released through the issuance of Issue Slips, the issuance by respondent
Amit of the Issue Slips of materials were intended to facilitate, as it facilitated, the disbursement and
release of the misappropriated funds.14 (emphases ours)
The Rule 43 Petition with the CA
Thereafter, Amit filed a petition for review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Court with the CA. The
CA denied the petition on the reasoning that the decision of the Ombudsman was supported by
substantial evidence – i.e., affidavits, special audit report, and COA inspection report – that are
entitled to great respect and credence.
The CA also ruled that the approval of the issue slips of construction materials for the MPDP projects
is not ministerial, but involves the determination of the propriety or impropriety of approving the
same, as well as the duty to verify whether the materials were actually issued and received by the
recipient farmers’ organizations; and that Amit is not obliged to approve them, but he did despite
knowledge that the DA was never in possession of construction materials because it was not involved
in the requisition, canvass and purchase thereof.15 It affirmed the Ombudsman’s ruling stated in the
order denying the motion for reconsideration.16
Amit moved to reconsider the denial of his petition but the CA denied the motion. Hence, the present
petition.
The Petition
Amit argues in his petition that he cannot be held liable for falsification because:
1. the issue slips, which were ordinarily used in the requisition and procurement of supplies and
materials by the DA RFU 6, were unnecessary in the implementation of the MPDP projects since the
DA merely reimburses the actual expenses incurred by the farmers’ organizations in the construction
of the MPDP;
2. due to the error in releasing funds under supplies and materials, the issue slips were required by
the Accounting Section for the purpose of dropping the entry of inventory for supplies and materials
in the Monthly Report of Supplies and Materials which he followed because he believed that the
Accounting Section was better equipped to determine the requirements for the disbursement of
funds;
3. in signing the issue slips, neither did he make it appear that the construction materials listed
therein have been issued and delivered to the farmers’ organizations since he had no participation in
the procurement, canvass, delivery, receipt and acceptance of materials, nor did he certify on the
delivery and acceptance of the materials, which functions pertained to the Reports of Inspection and
the Certificate of Acceptance by the farmers’ organizations concerned; and
4. the issue slips were not intended to facilitate the release of funds because under the memorandum
of agreement, full payment shall be released upon the recipient’s submission of official receipts for
the actual expenses incurred in the construction of the MPDP, subject to the issuance by the DA of
the Certificate of Inspection on the full completion of the projects, which he had no participation in
the issuance thereof.17
He also argues that there was no conspiracy between him and the other officials in the administrative
case to falsify documents to facilitate the disbursement and release of public funds and/or to
misappropriate the funds.18
The Court’s Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
First, Amit’s acts did not result from a mere failure to exercise the necessary prudence in complying
with the proper procedure. The performance of the complained acts was discretionary on his part.
Amit’s acts were done willfully and deliberately. They were done without regard to the high positions
that he occupied, which impose upon him greater responsibility, and obliged him to be more
circumspect in his actions or in the discharge of his official duties.
Amit, for instance, inexplicably signed the issue slips despite his alleged knowledge that these
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documents were unnecessary. With Amit’s signing of the documents, however, the immediate release
of the funds was facilitated. This indicates shortsightedness on the part of Amit which is so gross
that it cannot be considered a result of indifference or carelessness. Amit simply failed to conduct
himself in the manner expected of an occupant of a high office. In other words, he failed to act in
accordance with the demands of the responsibility that attaches to the office he was occupying.
Second, the Ombudsman’s finding of conspiracy reveals the crucial role which Amit played in the
commission of fraud with other officials. Amit’s acts were one of the more, if not the most,
indispensable, final, and operative acts that ultimately led to the consummation of the fraud. No
disbursement or release of government funds could happen without Amit’s imprimatur. Amit’s
participatory acts were, in other words, of a degree that their absence could have prevented the
completion of the acts complained of.
Amit’s role in the committed irregularities shows his concurrence – although based on
circumstantial, not direct, evidence – with the other officials’ objective to defraud the government. The
irregularities will not see their fruition if Amit and the other officials involved in the fraud did not
consent to its implementation by making it appear that there were valid requisitions, deliveries,
inspections, pre-auditing and approval of the vouchers and checks paid to the contractors/suppliers.
These acts pointed to one (1) criminal intent – with one participant performing a part of the
transaction and the others performing other parts of the same transaction to complete the whole
scheme, with a view of attaining the object which they were pursuing.19
In other words, there was the required concurrence of wills supporting the finding of conspiracy,
made more pronounced in the case of Amit because of his positions and peculiarly important role in
the completion of the acts.
Third, Amit’s defense – the alleged reliance on the acts of his subordinates in good faith – is simply
unacceptable.
Public office is a public trust and public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to
the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism
and justice and lead modest lives.20 This high constitutional standard of conduct is not intended to
be mere rhetoric; those in the public service are enjoined to fully comply with this standard or run
the risk of facing administrative sanctions ranging from reprimand to the extreme penalty of
dismissal from the service.
As such, Amit has the duty to supervise his subordinates – he must see to it that his subordinates
have performed their functions in accordance with the law. We cannot allow him to simply interpose
this defense, as he is precisely duty-bound to check whether these acts are regular, lawful and valid,
and his full reliance on the acts of his subordinates is antithetical to the duties imposed by his
position on them. The excuse or defense is totally unacceptable, too, given that the transaction
relates to disbursement of public funds, over which great responsibility attaches.
Fourth, Amit did not wholly rely on the acts of his subordinates. As earlier mentioned, he performed
functions using independent judgment. Amit signed the issue slips despite the absence of some of the
required documents for the release of government funds for the MPDP projects. By his admission too,
Amit voluntarily agreed to a system, per the Accounting Division’s prodding, that purportedly shows
disbursement of funds for supplies and materials, when in truth and in fact, the disbursement is
actually for reimbursement of advances by recipient farmers’ organizations.
Viewed in these lights, the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error of law in affirming the
Ombudsman’s decision. "Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of
action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer. As differentiated
from simple misconduct, in grave misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the
law or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be manifest."21 "Corruption as an element of grave
misconduct consists in the official’s unlawful and wrongful use of his station or character
[reputation] to procure some benefit for himself or for another person, contrary to duty and the rights
of others."22
In Manuel v. Judge Calimag, Jr.,23 we held:
By uniform legal definition, it is a misconduct such as affects his performance of his duties as an
Page 10 of 46
officer and not such only as affects his character as a private individual. In such cases, it has been
said at all times, it is necessary to separate the character of the man from the character of the officer
x x x It is settled that misconduct, misfeasance, or malfeasance warranting removal from office of an
officer must have direct relation to and be connected with the performance of official duties
amounting either to maladministration or willful, intentional neglect and failure to discharge the
duties of the office.24 (emphasis and italics ours)
We declared in Office of the Ombudsman v. Apolonio25 that "if a nexus between the public officer’s
acts and functions is established, such act is properly referred to as misconduct."
Amit's acts were well within the scope of his functions. There is no doubt that his inability to live up
to the standards so imposed on him in the performance of his duties is misconduct. In this case, the
misconduct cannot be considered simple misconduct; it is grave misconduct, considering the
presence of the qualifying elements of corrupt motive and flagrant disregard of the rules taken from a
collective consideration of the circumstances of the case.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 177657 November 20,
2012
SONIA V. SEVILLE, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, Regional Office VI, Iloilo City, Respondent.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case provides what it takes to make a government official or employee liable for ghost projects.
The Facts and the Case
The Commission on Audit (COA) Regional Office VI administratively charged 11 officials and
employees of the Department of Agriculture (DA) Regional Field Unit in Iloilo City, including petitioner
Sonia V. Seville, an Assistant Regional Director for Fisheries, before the Office of the Ombudsman-
Visayas.
The complaint alleged that, as a result of a special audit1 of the Post Harvest Component of the
Grains Production Enhancement Program of the DA, particularly the construction of Multi-Purpose
Drying Pavements (MPDPs) projects in Iloilo from January 1, 1995 to June 30, 1999, it was
discovered that she signed a ghost MPDP project in Sto. Rosario, Ajuy, Iloilo, out of the 120 such
projects that were subject of the audit.
She signed the disbursement voucher, as required by Memorandum Order 104, Series of 1998, in
view of the absence of the Regional Director and the Assistant Regional Director for Administration.
But she claimed that she acted in good faith, merely relying on the completeness and genuineness of
the supporting documents that were shown to her. She had no prior knowledge of the MPDPs, which
catered to rice production, since she was an Assistant Regional Director for Fisheries. She admitted,
however, not conducting an actual physical inspection of the project since she believed that it was
not her responsibility to do so.
The investigators filed a separate criminal complaint against petitioner Seville for violation of the anti-
graft and corrupt practices act before the Office of the Ombudsman to determine if she had any
criminal liability for her acts. Subsequently, the investigation resulted in her exoneration, absent any
Page 11 of 46
proof that she took part in a conspiracy to defraud the government.

In its Decision dated July 9, 2004,2 however, the Office of Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas found
those charged in connection with the ghost MPDPs, including petitioner, guilty of Grave Misconduct
and Gross Dishonesty, resulting in their dismissal from government service with forfeiture of benefits
and disqualification from holding public office.
Petitioner Seville filed a petition for review of the Deputy Ombudsman’s decision before the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB-SP 01492. On July 20, 2006 the CA rendered a decision, 3 holding that
her failure to verify the correctness and sufficiency of the documents presented to her for signing led
to the unrequited disbursement of public funds. She filed a motion for reconsideration but the CA
denied the same, hence, this petition for review.
The Issue Presented
The sole issue in this case is whether or not the CA correctly affirmed the Ombudsman’s decision
that found petitioner liable for grave misconduct and gross dishonesty for signing the disbursement
voucher for the particular ghost MPDP in Sto. Rosario, Ajuy, Iloilo.
The Court’s Rulings
In grave misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard
of an established rule must be evident.4 Misconduct, in the administrative sense, is a transgression
of some established and definite rule of action. On the other hand, dishonesty is intentionally making
a false statement in any material fact or the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive or defraud. 5 Both are
considered grave offenses for which the penalty of dismissal is meted even for first time offenders.6
Here, the COA charged petitioner Seville administratively because the government released funds for
that particular ghost project in Sto. Rosario, Ajuy, Iloilo. Seville anchors her innocence on good faith.
Good faith implies honest intent, free from any knowledge of circumstances that ought to have
prompted an individual to undertake an inquiry.
While Seville merely substituted for the absent Regional Director at that time, it is not an excuse for
lightly shirking from the latter’s duties and responsibilities. It was her responsibility when she signed
that disbursement voucher for the Regional Director to verify the accuracy and completeness of the
supporting documents presented to her. In the discharge of duties, a public officer must use
prudence, caution, and attention which careful persons use in the management of their affairs.
Public servants must show at all times utmost dedication to duty.
The Court finds, however, that Seville cannot be held liable for grave misconduct. Corruption, as an
element of grave misconduct, consists in the official or employee’s act of unlawfully or wrongfully
using his position to gain benefit for one’s self.7 Here, the Court is not convinced that under the
circumstances then present, she had depraved motives.
Seville signed on the rare happenstance that both the Regional Director and the Assistant Regional
Director for Administration were absent. That both signatories were absent when the Sto. Rosario
project was presented to her for signature was a coincidence that cannot be imputed to her for she
could not have orchestrated that for her gain, absent evidence to the contrary. She did not volunteer
for the position nor is there proof that she lobbied for the OIC designation, it being provided by a DA
internal regulation.8 She is but liable for the lesser offense of simple misconduct since she should
have exercised the necessary prudence to ensure that the proper procedure was complied with in the
release of government funds.9
The penalty for simple misconduct is suspension for one month and one day to six months for the
first offense.10 There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstances, Section 54(b) of the Uniform
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service provides that the medium of the penalty should be
imposed.
As for the offense of gross dishonesty, the Court also clears petitioner from liability.1âwphi1 Her
participation in the release of funds is brought upon by her OIC designation and not spurred by
corrupt intent. A post-harvest facility such as MPDP is related to rice farming and not within her
knowledge as Assistant Director for Fisheries. To a certain extent, leniency can be afforded for her
reliance on the credibility and expertise of her co-signatories namely the Chief of Crops Sector
Page 12 of 46
Division and Chief of Finance and Administrative Division. Her error in judgment cannot be equated
with gross dishonesty. The evidence does not prove conscious distortion of the truth or even an
inclination to it.
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CEB-SP 01492 dated July 20, 2006. In its place, the Court FINDS petitioner Sonia V. Seville
liable for SIMPLE MISCONDUCT and IMPOSES on her the penalty of three months suspension
without pay in accordance with Section 54(b) of the
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.11
SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 193459 March
8, 2011
MA. MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ Petitioner,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, RISA HONTIVEROS-
BARAQUEL, DANILO D. LIM, FELIPE PESTAÑO, EVELYN PESTAÑO, RENATO M. REYES, JR.,
SECRETARY GENERAL OF BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN (BAYAN); MOTHER MARY JOHN
MANANZAN, CO-CHAIRPERSON OF PAGBABAGO; DANILO RAMOS, SECRETARY-GENERAL OF
KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS (KMP); ATTY. EDRE OLALIA, ACTING SECRETARY
GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL UNION OF PEOPLE'S LAWYERS (NUPL); FERDINAND R. GAITE,
CHAIRPERSON, CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY, RECOGNITION AND ADVANCEMENT OF
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (COURAGE); and JAMES TERRY RIDON OF THE LEAGUE OF
FILIPINO STUDENTS (LFS), Respondents.
FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR., Respondent-Intervenor.
RESOLUTION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
For resolution is petitioner’s "Motion for Reconsideration (of the Decision dated 15 February 2011)"
dated February 25, 2011 (Motion).
Upon examination of the averments in the Motion, the Court finds neither substantial nor cogent
reason to reconsider its Decision. A plain reading of the Decision could very well dispose of
petitioner’s previous contentions, raised anew in the Motion, but the Court finds it proper, in writing
finis to the issue, to draw petitioner’s attention to certain markers in the Decision.
I
Contrary to petitioner’s assertion that the Court sharply deviated from the ruling in Francisco, Jr. v.
The House of Representatives,1 the Decision of February 15, 2011 reaffirmed and illuminated the
Francisco doctrine in light of the particular facts of the present case.
To argue, as petitioner does, that there never was a simultaneous referral of two impeachment
complaints as they were actually referred to the committee "separately, one after the other"2 is to
dismantle her own interpretation of Francisco that the one-year bar is to be reckoned from the filing
of the impeachment complaint. Petitioner’s Motion concedes3 that the Francisco doctrine on the
initiation of an impeachment proceeding includes the House’s initial action on the complaint. By
recognizing the legal import of a referral, petitioner abandons her earlier claim that per Francisco an
impeachment proceeding is initiated by the mere filing of an impeachment complaint.
Having uprooted her reliance on the Francisco case in propping her position that the initiation of an
impeachment proceeding must be reckoned from the filing of the complaint, petitioner insists on
Page 13 of 46
actual initiation and not "constructive initiation by legal fiction" as averred by Justice Adolfo Azcuna
in his separate opinion in Francisco.
In Justice Azcuna’s opinion which concurred with the majority, what he similarly found untenable
was the stretching of the reckoning point of initiation to the time that the Committee on Justice (the
Committee) report reaches the floor of the House.4 Notably, the provisions of the Impeachment Rules
of the 12th Congress that were successfully challenged in Francisco provided that an impeachment
proceeding was to be "deemed initiated" upon the Committee’s finding of sufficiency of substance or
upon the House’s affirmance or overturning of the Committee’s finding,5 which was clearly referred to
as the instances "presumably for internal purposes of the House, as to the timing of some of its
internal action on certain relevant matters."6 Definitely, "constructive initiation by legal fiction" did
not refer to the aspects of filing and referral in the regular course of impeachment, for this was
precisely the gist of Francisco in pronouncing what initiation means.
The Court adhered to the Francisco-ordained balance in the tug-of-war between those who want to
stretch and those who want to shrink the term "initiate," either of which could disrupt the provision’s
congruency to the rationale of the constitutional provision. Petitioner’s imputation that the Court’s
Decision presents a sharp deviation from Francisco as it defers the operability of the one-year bar rule
rings hollow.
Petitioner urges that the word "initiate" must be read in its plain, ordinary and technical meaning, for
it is contrary to reason, logic and common sense to reckon the beginning or start of the initiation
process from its end or conclusion.
Petitioner would have been correct had the subject constitutional provision been worded as "no
initiation process of the impeachment proceeding shall be commenced against the same official more
than once within a period of one year," in which case the reckoning would literally point to the "start
of the beginning." To immediately reckon the initiation to what petitioner herself concedes as the start
of the initiation process is to countenance a raw or half-baked initiation.
In re-affirming what the phrase "no impeachment proceedings shall be initiated" means, the Court
closely applied Francisco on what comprises or completes the initiation phase. Nothing can be more
unequivocal or well-defined than the elucidation of filing-and-referral in Francisco. Petitioner must
come to terms with her denial of the exact terms of Francisco.
Petitioner posits that referral is not an integral or indispensable part of the initiation of impeachment
proceedings, in case of a direct filing of a verified complaint or resolution of impeachment by at least
one-third of all the Members of the House.7
The facts of the case do not call for the resolution of this issue however. Suffice it to restate a footnote
in the Court’s Decision that in such case of "an abbreviated mode of initiation[, x x x] the filing of the
complaint and the taking of initial action [House directive to automatically transmit] are merged into
a single act."8 Moreover, it is highly impossible in such situation to coincidentally initiate a second
impeachment proceeding in the interregnum, if any, given the period between filing and referral.
Petitioner’s discussion on the singular tense of the word "complaint" is too tenuous to require
consideration. The phraseology of the one-year bar rule does not concern itself with a numerical
limitation of impeachment complaints. If it were the intention of the framers of the Constitution to
limit the number of complaints, they would have easily so stated in clear and unequivocal language.
Petitioner further avers that the demonstrated concerns against reckoning the period from the filing
of the complaint are mere possibilities based on a general mistrust of the Filipino people and their
Representatives. To her, mere possibility of abuse is not a conclusive argument against the existence
of power nor a reason to invalidate a law.
The present case does not involve an invalidation of a legal provision on a grant of power. Since the
issue precisely involves upholding an express limitation of a power, it behooves the Court to look into
the rationale behind the constitutional proscription which guards against an explicit instance of
abuse of power. The Court’s duty entails an examination of the same possible scenarios considered
by the framers of the Constitution (i.e., incidents that may prove to disrupt the law-making function
of Congress and unduly or too frequently harass the impeachable officer), which are basically the
same grounds being invoked by petitioner to arrive at her desired conclusion.
Page 14 of 46
Ironically, petitioner also offers the Court with various possibilities and vivid scenarios to grimly
illustrate her perceived oppression. And her own mistrust leads her to find inadequate the existence
of the pertinent constitutional provisions, and to entertain doubt on "the respect for and adherence of
the House and the respondent committee to the same."9
While petitioner concedes that there is a framework of safeguards for impeachable officers laid down
in Article XI of the Constitution, she downplays these layers of protection as illusory or inutile
without implementation and enforcement, as if these can be disregarded at will.1avvphi1
Contrary to petitioner’s position that the Court left in the hands of the House the question as to when
an impeachment proceeding is initiated, the Court merely underscored the House’s conscious role in
the initiation of an impeachment proceeding. The Court added nothing new in pinpointing the
obvious reckoning point of initiation in light of the Francisco doctrine. Moreover, referral of an
impeachment complaint to the appropriate committee is already a power or function granted by the
Constitution to the House.
Petitioner goes on to argue that the House has no discretion on the matter of referral of an
impeachment complaint and that once filed, an impeachment complaint should, as a matter of
course, be referred to the Committee.
The House cannot indeed refuse to refer an impeachment complaint that is filed without a subsisting
bar. To refer an impeachment complaint within an existing one-year bar, however, is to commit the
apparently unconstitutional act of initiating a second impeachment proceeding, which may be struck
down under Rule 65 for grave abuse of discretion. It bears recalling that the one-year bar rule itself is
a constitutional limitation on the House’s power or function to refer a complaint.
Tackling on the House floor in its order of business a clearly constitutionally-prohibited second
impeachment complaint on the matter of whether to make the appropriate referral goes precisely into
the propriety of the referral and not on the merits of the complaint. The House needs only to
ascertain the existence or expiry of the constitutional ban of one year, without any regard to the
claims set forth in the complaint.
To petitioner, the intervening days from the filing of the complaint to whatever completes the
initiation of an impeachment proceeding is immaterial in mitigating the influx of successive
complaints since allowing multiple impeachment charges would result to the same harassment and
oppression. She particularly cites Constitutional Commissioner Ricardo Romulo’s concerns on the
amount of time spent if "multiple impeachment charges"10 are allowed. She fails, however, to
establish whether Commissioner Romulo limited or quantified his reference to not more than one
complaint or charge.
IN SUM, the Court did not deviate from, as it did apply the twin rule of filing and referral in the
present case, with Francisco as the guiding light. Petitioner refuses to see the other half of that light,
however.
II
Petitioner, meanwhile, reiterates her argument that promulgation means publication. She again cites
her thesis that Commonwealth Act No. 638, Article 2 of the Civil Code, and the two Tañada v.
Tuvera11 cases mandate that the Impeachment Rules be published for effectivity. Petitioner raises
nothing new to change the Court’s stance on the matter.
To reiterate, when the Constitution uses the word "promulgate," it does not necessarily mean to
publish in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. Promulgation, as used in
Section 3(8), Article XI of the Constitution, suitably takes the meaning of "to make known" as it
should be generally understood.
Petitioner continues to misapply Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and
Investigations12 where the Court noted that the Constitution unmistakably requires the publication
of rules of procedure pertaining to inquiries in aid of legislation. If the Constitution warranted the
publication of Impeachment Rules, then it could have expediently indicated such requirement as it
did in the case of legislative inquiries.
The Constitution clearly gives the House a wide discretion on how to effectively promulgate its
Page 15 of 46
Impeachment Rules. It is not for this Court to tell a co-equal branch of government on how to do so
when such prerogative is lodged exclusively with it.
Still, petitioner argues that the Court erred when it ruled that "to require publication of the House
Impeachment Rules would only delay the impeachment proceedings and cause the House of
Representatives to violate constitutionally mandated periods…" She insists that the Committee, after
publishing the Impeachment Rules, would still have a remainder of 45 days out of the 60-day period
within which to finish its business.
Petitioner is mistaken in her assertion. Note that the Court discussed the above-mentioned scenario
only "in cases where impeachment complaints are filed at the start of each Congress." Section 3,
Article XI of the Constitution contains relevant self-executing provisions which must be observed at
the start of the impeachment process, the promulgation of the Impeachment Rules notwithstanding.
Petitioner rehashes her allegations of bias and vindictiveness on the part of the Committee
Chairperson, Rep. Niel Tupas, Jr. Yet again, the supposed actuations of Rep. Tupas partake of a keen
performance of his avowed duties and responsibilities as the designated manager of that phase in the
impeachment proceeding. Besides, the actions taken by the Committee were never its Chairperson’s
sole act but rather the collective undertaking of its whole 55-person membership. The Committee
members even took to voting among themselves to validate what actions to take on the motions
presented to the Committee.
Indubitably, an impeachment is not a judicial proceeding, but rather a political exercise. Petitioner
thus cannot demand that the Court apply the stringent standards it asks of justices and judges when
it comes to inhibition from hearing cases. Incidentally, the Impeachment Rules do not provide for any
provision regarding the inhibition of the Committee chairperson or any member from participating in
an impeachment proceeding. The Committee may thus direct any question of partiality towards the
concerned member only. And any decision on the matter of inhibition must be respected, and it is not
for this Court to interfere with that decision.
Except for the constitutionally mandated periods, the pacing or alleged precipitate haste with which
the impeachment proceeding against petitioner is conducted is beyond the Court’s control. Again,
impeachment is a highly politicized intramural that gives the House ample leg room to operate,
subject only to the constitutionally imposed limits.13 And beyond these, the Court is duty-bound to
respect the discretion of a co-equal branch of government on matters which would effectively carry
out its constitutional mandate.
FINALLY, the Court has, in its February 15, 2011 Decision, already lifted its September 14, 2010
Status Quo Ante Order14 which, as said Order clearly stated, was "effective immediately and
continuing until further orders from this Court."15 Such "further order" points to that part of the
disposition in the February 15, 2011 Decision that directs the lifting of the Status Quo Ante Order.
The lifting of the Status Quo Ante Order is effective immediately, the filing of petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration notwithstanding, in the same way that the Status Quo Ante Order was made effective
immediately, respondents’ moves to reconsider or recall it notwithstanding. There is thus no faulting
the Committee if it decides to, as it did proceed with the impeachment proceeding after the Court
released its February 15, 2011 Decision.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 110503 August 4,

1994
Page 16 of 46
ANTONIO M. BOLASTIG, petitioner,

vs.
HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Panganiban, Benitez, Parlade, Africa & Barinaga Law Office (Pablaw) for petitioner.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the resolution, dated March 18, 1993, of the
Sandiganbayan, granting the motion of the Special Prosecution Officer to suspend the accused from
office pendente lite and the resolution, dated March 29, 1993, denying reconsideration of the first
resolution.
Petitioner Antonio M. Bolastig is governor of Samar. On August 31, 1989, an information was filed
against him and two others for alleged overpricing of 100 reams of onion skin paper in violation of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019). The Information alleged:
That on or about June 24, 1986, in the Municipality of Catbalogan, Samar,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused ANTONIO M. BOLASTIG, PEDRO ASON and PRUDENCIO MACABENTA, all
public officers, duly appointed and qualified as such, being the OIC Governor,
Provincial Treasurer and Property Officer respectively, all of the Province of Samar, and
being members of Bids and Awards Committee responsible for the purchase of office
supplies for the Provincial Government of Samar and while in the performance of their
respective positions, confederating and mutually helping one another and through
manifest partiality and evident bad faith, did then and there wilfully and unlawfully
enter into a purchase contract with REYNALDO ESPARAGUERRA, a private citizen, for
the purchase of certain office supplies, namely: one hundred (100) reams of Onion
Skin size 11" x 17" at a unit price of Five Hundred Fifty pesos (P550.00) or a total price
of Fifty-Five Thousand Pesos (P55,000.00), which contract was manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the government as the prevailing unit price for said item was only
Fifty-Five Pesos (P55.00) or a total price of Five Thousand Five Hundred Pesos
(P5,500.00), thereby causing undue injury to the government in the total amount of
Forty-Nine Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P49,500.00).
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Petitioner was arraigned on January 5, 1993, whereupon he entered a plea of "not guilty."
On January 25, 1993, Special Prosecution Officer III Wilfredo Orencia moved for petitioner's
suspension, citing sec. 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 which provides in part:
Sec. 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. — Any incumbent public officer against whom
any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7,
Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government
or public funds or property, whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in
whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be
suspended from office.
Petitioner opposed the motion, arguing inter alia that:
2. Upon a bare invocation of the foregoing provision, the prosecution would have this
Honorable Court issue an Order suspending the accused, as if suspension of a public
officer is a mindless and meaningless exercise, and is imposed without regard to the
spirit and intent of the law upon which it is based.
3. Indeed, it cannot be simply assumed that laws are enacted and followed without a
particular purpose to be served, especially when a mechanical application shall injure
not only the public official concerned, but the entire electorate as well.1
The Sandiganbayan rejected petitioner's argument and ordered the suspension of petitioner from
office for a period of 90 days. It held that preventive suspension is mandatory under sec. 13, of Rep.
Page 17 of 46
Act No. 3019, pursuant to which all that is required is for the court to make a finding that the
accused stands charged under a valid information "for any of the above-described crimes for the
purpose of granting or denying the sought for suspension."2
Implementation of the resolution was held in abeyance to allow petitioner to file a motion for
reconsideration, which the Sandiganbayan, however, eventually denied on March 29, 1993.
Hence, this petition. It is contended that the Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of its
discretion in issuing its resolution
(a) despite the failure of the prosecution to show any public interest to be served, or
injury to be prevented, or any other compelling factual circumstance which justifies
the preventive suspension of petitioner; and
(b) despite the injury not only upon petitioner but also upon the people of Samar
whose political rights are trenched upon by the suspension for no valid reason of their
duly elected Governor.
To the Solicitor General's contention that upon the filing of a valid information suspension pendente
lite is mandatory as held in several decisions of this Court,3 petitioner replies that, while the
Sandiganbayan has the power to order preventive suspension, there is a "need [for the
Sandiganbayan] to go further, beyond the filing of the information, to a determination of the necessity
of the preventive suspension in accordance with the spirit and intent of the Anti-Graft Law."
Petitioner explains:
In other words, when the Anti-Graft Law gave the courts the authority to order the
preventive suspension of the accused, it never intended to impose a mindless and
meaningless exercise. The exercise of such authority must always be within the
confines of the legislative intent, for to go beyond it would be to exceed the bounds of
the law. Preventive suspension should therefore be ordered only when the legislative
purpose is achieved, that is, when "the suspension order . . . prevent(s) the accused
from using his office to influence potential witnesses or tamper with records which may
be vital in the prosecution of the case against him." Corollarily, when the legislative
purpose is not achieved, preventive suspension is improper and should not be
decreed."4
The petitioner's contention has no merit. It is now settled that sec. 13 of Republic Act No. 3019
makes it mandatory for the Sandiganbayan to suspend any public officer against whom a valid
information charging violation of that law, Book II, Title 7 of the Revised Penal Code, or any offense
involving fraud upon government or public funds or property is filed.5 The court trying a case has
neither discretion nor duty to determine whether preventive suspension is required to prevent the
accused from using his office to intimidate witnesses or frustrate his prosecution or continue
committing malfeasance in office. The presumption is that unless the accused is suspended he may
frustrate his prosecution or commit further acts of malfeasance or do both, in the same way that
upon a finding that there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and that the
accused is probably guilty thereof, the law requires the judge to issue a warrant for the arrest of the
accused. The law does not require the court to determine whether the accused is likely to escape or
evade the jurisdiction of the court.
It is indeed true that in some of our decisions6 the expression "the maximum period of ninety (90)
days" is used. But that is only for the purpose of emphasizing that the preventive suspension therein
involved, which were for more than ninety (90) days, were excessive and unreasonable. It is to be
noted that the ninety-day period of preventive suspension is not found in sec. 13 of Republic Act No.
3019 but was adopted from sec. 42 of the Civil Service Decree (P.D. No. 807), 7 which is now sec. 52
of the Administrative Code of 1987. This latter provision states:
Sec. 52. Lifting of Preventive Suspension Pending Administrative Investigation. — When
the administrative case against the officer or employee under preventive suspension is
not finally decided by the disciplining authority within the period of ninety (90) days
after the date of suspension of the respondent who is not a presidential appointee, the
respondent shall be automatically reinstated in the service: Provided, That when the
Page 18 of 46
delay in the disposition of the case is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the
respondent, the period of delay shall not be counted in computing the period of
suspension herein provided.
The duration of preventive suspension is thus coeval with the period prescribed for deciding
administrative disciplinary cases. If the case is decided before ninety days, then the suspension will
last less than ninety days, but if the case is not decided within ninety days, then the preventive
suspension must be up to ninety days only. Similarly, as applied to criminal prosecutions under
Republic Act No. 3019, preventive suspension will last for less than ninety days only if the case is
decided within that period; otherwise, it will continue for ninety days.
The duration of preventive suspension will, therefore, vary to the extent that it is contingent on the
time it takes the court to decide the case but not on account of any discretion lodged in the court,
taking into account the probability that the accused may use his office to hamper his prosecution.
Indeed, were the Sandiganbayan given the discretion to impose a shorter period of suspension, say,
80, 70 or 60 days, as petitioner asserts, it would lie in its power not to suspend the accused at all.
That, of course, would be contrary to the command of sec. 13 of Republic Act No. 3019.
Our holding that, upon the filing of a valid information charging violation of Republic Act No. 3019,
Book II, Title 7 of the Revised Penal Code, or fraud upon government or public property, it is the duty
of the court to place the accused under preventive suspension disposes of petitioner's other
contention that since the trial in the Sandiganbayan is now over with respect to the presentation of
evidence for the prosecution there is no longer any danger that petitioner would intimidate
prosecution's witnesses. The fact is that the possibility that the accused would intimidate witnesses
or otherwise hamper his prosecution is just one of the grounds for preventive suspension. The other
one is, as already stated, to prevent the accused from committing further acts of malfeasance while in
office.
Finally, the fact that petitioner's preventive suspension may deprive the people of Samar of the
services of an official elected by them, at least temporarily, is not a sufficient basis for reducing what
is otherwise a mandatory period prescribed by law. The vice governor, who has likewise been elected
by them, will act as governor.8 Indeed, even the Constitution authorizes the suspension for not more
than sixty days of members of Congress found guilty of disorderly behavior,9 thus rejecting the view
expressed in one case10 that members of the legislature could not be suspended because in the case
of suspension, unlike in the case of removal, the seat remains filled but the constituents are deprived
of representation.
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that in ordering the preventive suspension of petitioner, the
Sandiganbayan acted according to law.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 173268 August
23, 2012
ERNESTO A. FAJARDO, Petitioner,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION AND BUREAU OF
CUSTOMS, Respondents.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,*
REYES,**
PERLAS-BERNABE,***
Page 19 of 46
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Under the "threefold liability rule," any act or omission of any public official or employee can result in
criminal, civil, or administrative liability, each of which is independent of the other.1
This Petition for Review on Certiorari2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the Decision3
dated April 27, 2006 and the Resolution4 dated June 28, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. SP No. 91021.
Factual Antecedents
Petitioner Ernesto A. Fajardo was employed by respondent Bureau of Customs (BOC) as a Clerk I
from February 26, 1982 to February 29, 1988 and as a Clerk II from March 1, 1988.5 However, due
to the exigency of the service, he was designated as a Special Collecting Officer at the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport (NAIA) Customs House, Collection Division, Pasay City.6
In May 2002, Nancy Marco (Marco), a Commission on Audit (COA) State Auditor detailed at the NAIA
Customs House,7 was directed by her superior, Auditor Melinda Vega-Fria, to conduct a post audit of
the abstract of collection of all collecting officers of the NAIA Customs House.8 In the course of her
audit, State Auditor Marco noticed that in petitioner’s daily abstract of collection dated August 16,
2002, he received checks in the amounts of ₱ 295,000.00, ₱ 247,000.00, ₱ 122,000.00, ₱ 108,000.00
and ₱ 105,000.00.9 To verify whether it was possible for him to receive such amounts in one day, a
daily analysis of the sales of accountable forms with the corresponding documentary stamps was
made.10
In the Audit Observation Memorandum (AOM No. 2002-008)11 dated November 26, 2002, State
Auditor Prudencia S. Bautista (Bautista) reported that petitioner has an unremitted collection from
sales of accountable forms with money value and stamps in the amount of ₱ 20,118,355.00 for the
period January 2002 to October 2002.12 Upon further investigation by State Auditor Marco, it was
discovered that based on the analysis of the monthly sales of accountable forms and stamps,
petitioner failed to remit the total amount of ₱ 53,214,258.0013 from January 2000 to October
2002.14
On January 6, 2003, Customs Commissioner Antonio M. Bernardo requested respondent National
Bureau of Investigation-National Capital Region (NBI-NCR) to conduct an investigation on the
reported misappropriation of public funds committed by petitioner.15
On January 8, 2003, the resident auditors of NAIA Customs House, namely: Marco, Bautista, and
Filomena Tolorio, executed separate "Sinumpaang Salaysay"16 at the NBI. They stated under oath
that based on the Analysis of the Monthly Sales of Accountable Forms and Stamps for the years
200017 and 2001,18 and the period January 1, 2002 to October 31, 2002,19 and the Summary of
Analysis of Sale of Stamps and Accountable Forms for the period January 2000 to October 2002,20
petitioner failed to remit the total amount of ₱ 53,214,258.00.21
Thereafter, on January 10, 2003, an Information for violation of Republic Act (RA) No. 7080 (Plunder)
was filed against petitioner.22 The case was raffled to Branch 119 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pasay City and docketed as Criminal Case No. 03-0043.23
On February 8, 2003, Customs District Collector Celso P. Templo demanded from petitioner the
unremitted collection but the latter failed to return the money and duly account for the same.24
Finding sufficient basis to commence an administrative investigation, Mary Susan S. Guillermo, the
Director of the Administrative Adjudication Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman, in an Order25
dated February 11, 2003, directed petitioner to file his counter-affidavit.
On May 19, 2003, petitioner filed his Counter-Affidavit26 categorically denying the accusation hurled
against him. He claimed that there was no under remittance on his part because the sale of BOC
forms does not automatically result in the sale of documentary stamps from the Documentary Stamp
Metering Machine.27 He likewise assailed the validity of the AOM No. 2002-008 on the ground that it
was not referred to the COA Legal and Adjudication Office as mandated by Section 1, subsection 2 of
the General Guidelines of COA Memorandum No. 2002-053 dated August 26, 2003.28
Page 20 of 46
Ruling of the Ombudsman

On May 3, 2005, the Ombudsman rendered a Decision29 finding petitioner guilty of dishonesty and
grave misconduct.30 Pertinent portions of the Decision read:
The bulk of the evidence presented supports the finding that indeed respondent failed to
remit the collection from the sales of accountable forms with money value and of
documentary stamps of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport Custom House for the
years 2000 and 2001 and from January 01 to October 31, 2002 in the total sum of FIFTY
THREE MILLION SIX HUNDRED FIFTY EIGHT THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED SEVENTY-
ONE PESOS (₱ 53,658,371.00) despite demand on February 8, 2003 by the Customs
District Collector Celso P. Templo for him to return the same.
The above-mentioned unremitted amount was discovered after representatives from the
COA-NAIA Customhouse discovered discrepancies in the collections and remittances of
respondent Fajardo during the period covering January 1, 2002 to October 30, 2002
amounting to ₱ 20,118,355.00 which was initially communicated to District Collector
Celso Templo through an Audit Observation Memorandum No. 2002-008 dated November
26, 2002. This leads to a further investigation resulting to the analysis of Monthly Sales of
Accountable Forms and Stamps prepared by the COA State Auditors covering the period
January 1, 2000 to October 30, 2002, which showed that the total amount of unremitted
collections for the sale of accountable forms with money value and customs documentary
and BIR stamps amounted to ₱ 53,658,371.00.
The following table shows a comparison of collections and remittances per report of Mr.
Ernesto Fajardo and per audit by the team for the period January 2000 to October 30,
2002. As per audit report, the total amount of collections is ₱ 440,623,111.00, whereas
respondent’s report disclosed total collections in the amount of ₱ 387,913,381.00.
xxxx
The above-cited comparison focused on the examination and verification of documents

covering collections and remittances of Fajardo. The documents composed of liquidated
and unliquidated entries coming from the following offices:
1) Liquidation and Billing Division – which has the function of verifying,

reviewing and checking computation of formal entries;
2) Cashiers – who submit to COA all informal entries after they have collected
customs duties, taxes and other charges for the imported good; and also the
Bonds Division and Office of the Deputy Collector for Operations which also
have custody of various forms without money value such as bonds, clearances,
etc., where Customs Documentary Stamps (CDS) are required by regulations to
be affixed. The audit likewise concentrated on Confirmation with from Brokers
regarding the sale of CDS.
In fact, confirmation letters were sent to 212 brokers who purchased BOC Accountable
Forms from NAIA for the period January 2000 to October 2002. Selection was based on
the volume of purchases made by the brokers. The selected brokers had the highest
number of purchases of BOC Accountable Forms with money value requiring payment of
CDS.
From the existing procedural flowchart of the Collection Division, NAIA Customs House, it
appeared that the Collection Division has a Section in charge of the sale of BOC Forms
and CDS. Per Organizational Chart of the Collection Division, Mr. Fajardo is the
Collecting Officer assigned to perform such function. The organizational chart also shows
Page 21 of 46
that there are three (3) other personnel under Fajardo’s supervision such as the BC
Forms Clerk, CDS Clerk and the one in charge of the sale of BC Forms with CDS at Pair
Cargo, a Customs Bonded Warehouse. The Flow Chart of Accountable Forms submitted
by the Collection Division shows that it is the Collecting Officer (Fajardo) who is
authorized to accept payment for the sale of Forms and CDS. The assigned Clerk assists
him in the stamping on the forms of the required CDS, but returns the same to the
Collecting Officer already stamped for release to the brokers.
The Collecting Officer thereafter prepares Report of Collections and deposits collections to
the LBP. He also records transactions in his official cash book where he tallies his
collections with the remittances made for the day.
This flow of transactions is also supported by the Sworn Statements executed by Mr. Pica
and Ms. Caber who attested that they assisted Fajardo in the performance of his
functions. Ms. Caber stamps the forms with required CDS using the franking machine
while Mr. Pica has the following duties, among others:
1) Checks correctness of RIV of forms requisitions;
2) Checks serial number of entries to be sold for the day;
3) Assists in the issuance of OR and having it signed by Mr. Fajardo as

Collecting Officer.
Both of them further attested that payments are personally received by Fajardo. There are
times, however, that they receive the payment but turn the same over to Fajardo.
Since Fajardo is the only Collecting Officer authorized to receive payment from the Sale of
BOC Forms and CDS at the Collection Division, NAIA Customs House, he is accountable
for all the collections from the sale by NAIA Customs House of Bureau of Customs
Accountable Forms and Customs Documentary and BIR Stamps (CDS).
To explain how that total aggregate amount was arrived at, COA State Auditor Nancy
Marco said that from her Analysis on the Monthly Sales of Accountable Forms and
Stamps of respondent for the period January 1, 2002 to October 31, 2002, said
respondent was able to sell accountable forms with money value and stamps in the sum
of ₱ 157,612,585.00 but remitted only ₱ 137,494,230.00 to the LandBank, NAIA
Customs. On January 2001 – December 2001, respondent sold forms and stamps in the
sum of ₱ 237,905,834.00 but remitted only ₱ 123,753,065.00. For the year 2000 said
respondent sold the same forms and stamps in the sum of ₱ 145,320,000.00 but remitted
only ₱ 126,666,186.00. From her summary, the total forms and stamps which respondent
sold for said period was in the total sum of ₱ 441,127,739.00. However, respondent
remitted only the sum of ₱ 389,913,481.00. Therefore, the total sum which respondent
failed to remit amounted to ₱ 53,214,258.00.00, which was later on corrected in the COA
final audit report to ₱ 53,658,371.00 or an increase of ₱ 444,113.00.
A review of the above analysis initiated by COA State Auditors Filomena Bascon Tolorio
and Prudencia S. Bautista, confirmed the foregoing findings.
The investigating panel is, therefore, of the view that respondent ERNESTO A. FAJARDO,
being a special collecting officer of the NAIA Customs House, is duty bound to remit
collections of payments from the sale of Bureau of Customs (BOC) accountable forms with
money value as well as Customs Documentary Stamps, to the Government via Landbank,
the government’s authorized depositary bank. Respondent’s failure to remit the amount
he collected constitutes Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct.
Page 22 of 46
xxxx
FOREGOING CONSIDERED, pursuant to Section 52 (A-1) and (A-3), Rule IV of the

Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases (CSC Resolution No. 991936), dated August 31,
1999, respondent ERNESTO A. FAJARDO is hereby found guilty of DISHONESTY and
GRAVE MISCONDUCT and is meted the corresponding penalty of DISMISSAL FROM THE
SERVICE including all its accessory penalties and without prejudice to criminal
prosecution.
SO ORDERED.31
Petitioner moved for reconsideration32 which was denied in an Order33 dated July 22, 2005, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED and
the DECISION dated 03 May 2005, is hereby AFFIRMED with finality.
The Honorable ALEXANDER M. AREVALO, Commissioner, Bureau of Customs, is hereby

directed to implement the Decision dated 03 May 2005, with the request to promptly
submit to this Office, thru the Preliminary Investigation and Administrative Adjudication
Bureau – C, 4th Floor, Ombudsman Bldg., Agham Road, Government Center, North
Triangle, Diliman, Quezon City, a Compliance Report thereof, indicating therein the
subject OMB case number.
Compliance is respectfully enjoined consistent with Section 15 (3) of Republic Act No.
6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989).
SO ORDERED.34
Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Unfazed, petitioner elevated the case to the CA.
On April 27, 2006, the CA affirmed the dismissal of petitioner. The CA found substantial evidence to
support the Ombudsman’s finding that petitioner is guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct.35 It
brushed aside petitioner’s allegation that the report on the results of the audit was not lawfully
introduced into the records of the case since no evidence was presented to substantiate such
allegation.36 It likewise rejected petitioner’s contention that the Ombudsman only has
recommendatory powers, and thus, affirmed the power of the Ombudsman to remove erring public
officials or employees.37 The fallo of the CA Decision38 reads:
UPON THE VIEW WE TAKE OF THIS CASE, THUS, the petition for review on certiorari is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.39
Petitioner sought reconsideration40 but the same was unavailing.41
Issues
Hence, this petition raising the following issues:
A.
Whether x x x competent evidence was presented before the Office of the Ombudsman to
establish dishonesty and grave misconduct on the part of petitioner.
Page 23 of 46
B.
Whether x x x the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in failing to consider and

appreciate the following vital evidences [sic]:
1. At the Collecting Division of NAIA Customs House, there is only one

documentary stamp metered machine.
2. That documentary stamps are sold at the NAIA Customs House only thru the
use of this metered machine.
3. In Marco’s own analysis x x x, the proceeds from the actual sale of documentary
stamps per metered machine for the period from January 1, 2000 to October 30,
2002 were all remitted and accounted for by petitioner.
4. The testimony of Nancy Marco on the safeguards used to protect the integrity or
reliability of the metered machine.
5. Nancy Marco is not an expert when she testified.
6. The repeated admissions of Nancy Marco that her "Audit" sales can not be
possible for the load on the machine per month was less than her monthly "audit"
sale.
C.
Whether x x x the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in failing to consider and

appreciate the findings of the trial court in the related criminal case that the evidence of
guilt against petitioner was wanting and that there was no direct evidence to prove that
petitioner malversed and/or amassed government funds.
D.
Whether x x x the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in relying on documents which

were not introduced or offered in evidence before the Office of the Ombudsman.
E.
Whether x x x the Ombudsman can directly dismiss petitioner from government

service.42
Petitioner’s Arguments
Insisting on his innocence, petitioner claims that no competent evidence was presented before the
Ombudsman to show that he is guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct.43 He asserts that the
audit report of State Auditor Marco has no evidentiary weight as the figures stated therein are mere
speculations.44 He likewise contends that the CA and the Ombudsman erred in relying on the report
on the results of the audit, which was never formally submitted as evidence during the proceedings
before the Ombudsman.45 Instead, they should have considered the finding of the RTC in the related
criminal case that the evidence of guilt against petitioner is wanting.46 He points out that when State
Auditor Marco was cross-examined during the bail hearing in the criminal case filed against him, she
allegedly admitted that it was not possible for him to have sold more than the amount loaded in the
machine since there is only one metered machine at the Collecting Division of the NAIA Customs
House.47 Lastly, petitioner contends that the Office of the Ombudsman only has the power to
Page 24 of 46
recommend the removal of a public official.48

Respondents’ Arguments
The Solicitor General, as counsel for respondents, maintains that the CA and the Ombudsman
correctly found petitioner guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct as there is substantial evidence
to support such finding.49 Moreover, contrary to the view of petitioner, the Ombudsman has the
power to remove an erring public official or employee.50
Our Ruling
At the outset, it must be emphasized that questions of fact may not be the subject of an appeal by
certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Court as the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. 51 As
a rule, findings of fact of the Ombudsman, when affirmed by the CA, are conclusive and binding upon
this Court, unless there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman.52 In this case,
there is none.
Presumption of regularity was not
overturned.
Petitioner imputes irregularities in the proceedings before the Ombudsman. He claims that the CA
and the Ombudsman should not have relied on the report on the results of the audit because it was
not lawfully introduced or offered in evidence before the Office of the Ombudsman.53 Such allegation
deserves scant consideration. No evidence was presented by petitioner to prove such allegation. As we
have often said, in the absence of clear and convincing proof to the contrary, public officers or
employees are presumed to have performed their official duties regularly, properly and lawfully.54
Besides, the report on the results of the audit was not the sole basis for his dismissal from public
service. Affidavits and testimonies of witnesses taken during the bail hearing in the criminal case
were also submitted as evidence in the administrative case to prove the charges against him. 55 In
fact, the final report merely confirmed the contents of the audit report of State Auditor Marco as
pointed out by Assistant Ombudsman Pelagio S. Apostol in his marginal note in the Order dated July
22, 2005, which reads:
The findings of discrepancies as contained in the audit observation memorandum
prepared by State Auditor Nancy Marco was already verified and validated per COA final
audit report which was indubitably considered in the drafting of the questioned
Decision.56
There is substantial evidence to support

the finding that petitioner is guilty of
dishonesty and grave misconduct.
The audit report of State Auditor Marco revealed that petitioner’s remittance fell short of ₱
53,658,371.00.57 Said figure was arrived at by deducting the total amount remitted by petitioner
from the total "audit sales" of all the accountable forms. The "audit sales" of each accountable form
was computed by dividing the total sale of each form by the price of the form multiplied by the
corresponding amount of the documentary stamps.58 The computations were made in accordance
with Customs Memorandum Order (CMO) No. 19-7759 dated April 14, 1977 which provides that:
In order to simplify the processing of entry papers and other customs documents, it is
directed that metered customs documentary stamps be impressed beforehand and the
amount thereof added to the cost of the documents when sold. x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, contrary to the view of petitioner, the "audit sales" are not based on mere speculations but are
based on CMO No. 19-77. In fact, during the initial audit, petitioner and his staff confirmed that
"accountable forms, namely: BC 236, BC 177, BC 199, BC 43 and BC 242 are always sold with
documentary stamps."60
To disprove the correctness of the "audit sales," petitioner harps on the fact that the amount loaded
Page 25 of 46
on the machine per month was less than the monthly "audit sales" of State Auditor Marco. He insists
that this proves that there was no under remittance on his part. We do not agree. The mere fact that
the load in the machine is less than the "audit sale" does not prove his innocence. Rather, it only
means that either petitioner sold the accountable forms without the corresponding documentary
stamp, which is a clear violation of CMO No. 19-77, or that he used another machine, not authorized
by his office, as theorized by State Auditor Marco.61
To us, the discrepancy between the "audit sales" and the actual amount remitted by petitioner is
sufficient evidence of dishonesty and grave misconduct warranting his dismissal from public service.
We need not belabor the point that unlike in a criminal case where proof beyond reasonable doubt is
required, administrative proceedings only require substantial evidence or "such relevant evidence as
a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion."62
Neither do we find any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA in not considering the finding
of the RTC "that the evidence of guilt of petitioner is not strong."63 To begin with, the Order64 dated
January 6, 2004, granting petitioner’s application for bail, was not attached to the Petition 65 he filed
with the CA, nor was it submitted as evidence before the Ombudsman.66 It is likewise significant to
mention that the said Order merely resolved petitioner’s entitlement to bail. More important, the
Ombudsman and the CA are not bound by the RTC’s finding because as a rule, administrative cases
are independent from criminal proceedings.67 In fact, the dismissal of one case does not necessarily
merit the dismissal of the other.68
All told, we find that there is substantial evidence to show that petitioner failed to remit the amount
of ₱ 53,658,371.00 from the sale of accountable forms with money value and documentary stamps
for the period January 2000 up to October 2002.
The Ombudsman has the power to
dismiss erring public officials or
employees.
As a last ditch effort to save himself, petitioner now puts in issue the power of the Ombudsman to
order his dismissal from service. Petitioner contends that the Ombudsman in dismissing him from
service disregarded Section 13, subparagraph 3, Article XI of the Constitution as well as Section 15(3)
of RA No. 6770.69 which only vests in the Ombudsman the power to recommend the removal of a
public official or employee.
Petitioner's contention has no leg to stand on.
It is already well-settled that "the power of the Ombudsman to determine and impose administrative
liability is not merely recommendatory but actually mandatory."70 As we have explained in Atty.
Ledesma v. Court of Appeals,71 the fact "that the refusal, without just cause, of any officer to comply
with the order of the Ombudsman to penalize an erring officer or employee is a ground for
disciplinary action under Section 15(3) of RA No. 6770; is a strong indication that the Ombudsman's
'recommendation' is not merely advisory in nature but is actually mandatory within the bounds of
law."72
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. the Decision dated April 27, 2006 and the Resolution
dated June 28, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91021 are hereby AFFIRMED. SO
ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 125213 January 26, 1999

MILAGROS L. DIAZ, petitioner,
vs.
Page 26 of 46
SANDIGANBAYAN, respondent.
VITUG, J.:p
Milagros L. Diaz, erstwhile postmistress of Tandag, Surigao del Sur, was found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of malversation of public funds defined by Article 217, paragraph 4, of
the Revised Penal Code, in a decision rendered by the Sandiganbayan on 15 March 1996 in Criminal
Case No. 11295. The Sandiganbayan adjudged:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court hereby finds the accused Milagros
L. Diaz GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of malversation of public funds
as described and penalized in Art. 217 of the Revised Penal Code for the amount of
P9,813.99, and after considering the mitigating circumstance of full restitution in her
favor and applying the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, hereby sentences
her to suffer the following penalties:
1. imprisonment for an indeterminate period ranging from a minimum of six (6)
years and one day of prision mayor to a maximum of ten (l0) years and one (1)
day of reclusion temporal;
2. fine in the amount of P9,813.99, the amount equal to the amount malversed;
and
3. perpetual special disqualification for public office.
She is likewise ordered to pay the Bureau of Posts the amount of P6.70 only to
complete the restitution made by the accused.
SO ORDERED. 1
In her petition for review before this Court, Milagros Diaz assails her conviction by the
Sandiganbayan and continues to profess her innocence.
The case against petitioner sprung from the implementation of Office Order No. 83-15, dated 03
March 1983, issued by Provincial Auditor Diosdado Lagunday, Surigao del Sur, that directed Auditor
II Dominico L. Quijada and Auditing Examiners I Victor B. Tecson and Zenaida C. Cueto to examine
the cash and other accounts of petitioner Milagros L. Diaz, then postmistress of Tandag, Surigao del
Sur. The following day of 04 March 1983, Quijada required petitioner Diaz to produce all "cash,
treasury warrants, checks, money orders, paid vouchers, payrolls and other cash items" that she was
officially accountable for. Petitioner, who was bonded for P100,000.00, was found to have made cash
payments in the total amount of six thousand one hundred seventy-one pesos and twenty-three
centavos (P6,171.23), hereunder itemized:
Nature of Claims Date Amount
Telephone Rental Nov. 1980 P250.00
Office Rental, S. Haguisan Mar. 1981 570
TEV, Milagros L. Diaz Dec. 1980 385.2
Spare parts, Phil. Mail Jun. 1979 50.5
Gasoline, Phil. Mail Aug. 1979 1,020.20
Spare parts, Phil. Mail Dec. 1979 684.8
Page 27 of 46
Spare parts, Phil. Mail Jan. 1980 353.55
Repair, Phil. Mail Oct. 1980 64
Repair, Phil. Mail Dec. 1980 46
Registration Fee; Phil. Mail Dec. 1980 25.5
Office Rental, S. Haguisan Aug. 1981 640
TEV, Milagros L. Diaz Nov. 1981 468.5
Repair, Phil. Mail Jan. 1982 32
Mail Carriage, Postmaster Jan. 1982 6
Gasoline, Phil. Mail Sept. 1982 228.44
Mail Carriage, Postmaster Feb. 1982 12.5
Gasoline, Phil. Mail Feb. 1982 238.95
Fare, Pedro D. Sindo Oct. 1982 5
TEV, Milagros L. Diaz Nov. 1982 250.5
Salary, Carlos M. Acevedo 839.59
————
TOTAL P6,171.23 2
=======
The audit team also found petitioner to have sold postage stamps in the sum of P8,020.40 which she
had failed to record in her cash book, and since Quijada neither considered the cash items in the
aforesaid amount of P6,171.23 as having been validly disbursed, he reported that petitioner had
incurred a total "cash shortage" of P14,191.63. He then referred the matter to the Regional Director of
the Bureau of Posts.
In a letter, dated 15 April 1983, Quijada asked petitioner to explain why criminal and administrative
charges should not be instituted against her. Petitioner did not respond. On 24 May 1985, Quijada
executed an affidavit attesting to the incurrence by petitioner of a cash shortage of P14,191.63 and
her failure to make a restitution thereof. On 05 March 1986, an information for malversation of
public funds was filed against petitioner with the Sandiganbayan; it read:
That on March 4, 1983 or for sometime prior thereto, in the Municipality of Tandag,
Province of Surigao del Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, said accused Milagros L. Diaz, a public officer being then the Postmaster III of
the Bureau of Posts of Tandag, Surigao del Sur and as such is responsible and
Page 28 of 46
accountable for the public funds entrusted to her by reason of her position, with grave
abuse of confidence and taking advantage of her public position as such, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, embezzle and take from said
public funds the amount of P14,191.63, Philippine Currency, which he (sic)
appropriated and converted to her own personal use, to the damage and prejudice of
the government in the aforementioned amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 3
Petitioner was arrested by virtue of a warrant of arrest issued by the Sandiganbayan. On 24 March
1986, she posted bail in the amount of P20,000.00; she was forthwith ordered released from custody
by the Regional Trial Court of Tandag, Surigao del Sur, Branch XXVII.
The arraignment of petitioner scheduled for 15 May 1986 was reset to 16 June 1986 due to
petitioner's illness and later to the following month at her request. Meanwhile, petitioner filed a
motion for reinvestigation with the Sandiganbayan contending that the Acting Provincial Fiscal of
Tandag, Surigao del Sur, who had conducted the preliminary investigation ultimately recommended
the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that petitioner was able to fully account for the alleged
shortage of P14,191.63. The motion was granted. The Tanodbayan reinvestigated the case. On 24
April 1987, Mariflor Punzalan-Castillo, the investigating prosecutor, issued an order dismissing the
complaint on the basis of her finding that there was "no showing of bad faith on the part of the
accused when she defrayed the expenses subject of the audit," 4 that the shortage was incurred to
defray operational expenses for the Tandag post office and that the shortage in cash should instead
be blamed on the failure, or delay, of the Regional Office of the Bureau of Posts in replenishing the
amount spent for office operation. The investigating prosecutor said:
Only the amount of P1,786.89 has so far been replenished by the Regional Office. The
accountant of the Regional Office, Bureau of Posts, Davao City, issued a certification
that the amount of P4,384.34 representing claims of Mrs. Diaz were listed in the
statement of payable but unbooked in their book of accounts due to lack of funds. The
remaining shortage in the amount of P9,807.29 was paid by the accused also pending
replenishment from the Regional Office.
Lastly, the new Postmaster of Tandag, Surigao del Sur issued a certification that Mrs.
Milagros Diaz has already been cleared of her money accountability.5
The prosecutor thereupon filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion to withdraw the information
against petitioner from which the Commission on Audit ("COA"), through its General Counsel,
excepted when directed by the Sandiganbayan to comment. On 19 August 1987, the
Sandiganbayan denied the motion to withdraw the information and held that the restitution
made by petitioner would not exculpate her from liability.
On 01 December 1987, petitioner was arraigned. She pleaded not guilty to the indictment.
A pre-trial was conducted on 03 December 1987 during which petitioner's counsel informed the
Sandiganbayan that the Regional Office of the Bureau of Posts had reimbursed the entire amount for
which petitioner was held accountable thereby confirming that the assailed disbursements were truly
legitimate. On 18 December 1987, petitioner wrote Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena a letter
7 submitting to the Sandiganbayan a carbon copy of the certification of Eduardo F. Cauilan, Chief of
the Finance Section of Region XI of the Bureau of Posts, to the following effect:
CERTIFICATION
To Whom It May Concern:
This is to certify that according to the records of this office, the following expenses
forming part of the accountability of former Postmaster Milagros L. Diaz of Tandag,
Post Office, Tandag, Surigao del Sur, were legitimate expenses having to do with postal
operations of said post office all incurred in the exigencies and interest of public
service, which were all considered and taken cognizance by this office, details of which
are listed in separate statement forming a part of this certification covering the total
amount of P14,503.31.
Page 29 of 46
This certification is issued upon request and representation by said Milagros Diaz for
whatever legal purpose it may serve on her behalf.
Issued this 18th day of December, 1987 at Davao City, Philippines.
(Sgd.)
EDUARDO F. CAUILAN
Chief, Finance Section.
NOTED:
(Sgd.)
DIOSCORO A. GELITO
Asst. Regional Director
Officer-In-charge 8
The statement referred to in the certificate indicated that the expenses incurred had, in fact,
been liquidated. On 08 February 1988, Special Prosecutor Fidel D. Galindez informed the
Sandiganbayan of the advice he had received from the Bureau of Posts that the questioned
items were "appropriate expenses by the Bureau." 9 On 22 March 1988, the prosecutor
manifested that with the aforequoted certification of the Chief of the Finance Section of Region
XI of the Bureau of Posts, holding to be legitimate expenses the amount covered by the
supposed shortage incurred by petitioner, there was no prima facie case of malversation. The
motion drew observation from COA, through Assistant Director Jose G. Molina, that the
statement of petitioner's total accountability of P14,503.31 was inaccurate.
On 17 June 1988, the Sandiganbayan again denied the motion to withdraw the information and
ruled that the withdrawal of the information was not justified because petitioner had already been
arraigned and that the resolution of the conflict on the propriety of the disbursements made by
petitioner was a matter of evidence that should instead be threshed out during trial.
Trial ensued with the prosecution and the defense presenting their respective versions of the case.
On 15 March. 1996, following the submission of evidence, the Sandiganbayan promulgated its
decision convicting petitioner of the crime of malversation. Touching base on the evidence of
petitioner that the expenses she had incurred were "office related," the Sandiganbayan said that the
ruling in Villacorta vs. People, 10 where such expenses were held to be "payments made in good faith,
thus destroying in these instances the presumption of peculation in Art. 217 of the Revised Penal
Code," would only give "the accused the benefit of the doubt" by allowing her to show that the
expenses were "indeed office related expenses, and thus valid cash items" requiring thereby "for
presentation at audit of the required receipts accompanied by the duly accomplished and approved
vouchers, as well as a demonstration that these claims had not been reimbursed and were still
outstanding" at the time of audit. Conceding that the amounts of P1,081.00 and P3,296.64, or a total
of P4,377.64, were allowable, the Sandiganbayan said that petitioner was "still short of funds by
P9,813.99" which petitioner would be "presumed to have malversed . . . there being no satisfactory
proof presented to substantiate the legitimate disbursement thereof.
In tackling the claim of petitioner that she had liquidated rather than restituted the cash items, the
Sandiganbayan explained:
The distinction between liquidation and restitution, of course, is important. A
liquidation of a cash item means the validation of the transaction, while restitution
means that the accountable officer had to dig from his or her private resources to cover
the amount involved. The amount paid by the accused as evidenced by the official
receipts she presented in court represented amounts which she had already received
but which she never turned over until long after the audit. This only meant that she
has paid these amounts to cover her cash shortage. Thus these items do not represent
liquidation but restitution. 11
It likewise noted that restitution is merely "recognized in jurisprudence (to be) a mitigating
circumstance in malversation cases." l2
Page 30 of 46
In her petition for review before this Court, petitioner insists that she did not appropriate or convert
to her personal use the final sum of P9,813.99 held by the Sandiganbayan to have been malversed by
her; that the amount has been used to defray the expenses for office rentals, telephone rentals, spare
parts, gasoline and registration fees, and that she did have the corresponding authority to pay those
items of expenses.
The crime of malversation for which petitioner has been indicted is defined and penalized under
Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code; its pertinent provisions read:
Art. 217. Malversation of public funds or property — Presumption of malversation. —
Any public officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public
funds or property, shall appropriate the same, or shall take or misappropriate or shall
consent, or through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to take
such public funds or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the
misappropriation of malversation of such funds or property, shall suffer:
xxx xxx xxx
4. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods, if the
amount involved is more than twelve thousand pesos but is less than twenty-two
thousand pesos. If the amount exceeds the latter, the penalty shall be reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua.
In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual
special disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of the funds malversed or equal
to the total value of the property embezzled.
The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property
with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be
prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal uses.
The felony involves breach of public trust, and whether it is committed through dolo or culpa the law
makes it punishable and prescribes a uniform penalty therefor. Even when the information charges
willful malversation, conviction for malversation through negligence may still be adjudged if the
evidence ultimately proves that mode of commission of the offense. 13 The elements of malversation
of public funds are that (a) the offender is a public officer, (b) he has custody or control of the funds
or property by reason of the duties of his office, (c) the funds or property are public funds or property
for which he is accountable, and, most importantly, (d) he has appropriated, taken, misappropriated
or consented, or, through abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to take them. 14
Concededly, the first three elements are present in this case. It is the last element, i.e., whether or
not petitioner really has misappropriated public funds, where the instant petition focuses itself. In
convicting petitioner, the Sandiganbayan cites the presumption in Article 217 of the Revised Penal
Code that the "failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds with which he is
chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has
put such missing funds or property to personal uses." The presumption is, of course, rebuttable.
Accordingly, if the accused is able to present adequate evidence that can nullify any likelihood that
he had put the funds or property to personal use, then that presumption would be at an end and the
prima facie case is effectively negated. This Court has repeatedly said that when the absence of funds
is not due to the personal use thereof by the accused, the presumption is completely destroyed; in
fact, the presumption is deemed never to have existed at all. 15
The prosecution, upon whose burden was laden the task of establishing by proof beyond reasonable
doubt that petitioner had committed the offense charged, mainly relied on the statutory presumption
aforesaid and failed to present any substantial piece of evidence to indicate that petitioner had used
the funds for personal gain. The evidence submitted, just to the contrary, would point out that not a
centavo of the so-called "missing funds" was spent for personal use, a matter that was later
acknowledged by the Special Prosecutor who thereupon recommended the withdrawal of the
information earlier filed against petitioner. The alleged shortages in the total amount of P14,191.63
claimed by Auditor Quijada had been explained by petitioner. On the day of the audit, she presented
a list of cash items showing that she had spent the amount of P6,171.23 for telephone and office
Page 31 of 46
rentals, spare parts of the vehicle being utilized for the delivery of mails, registration and repair of
that vehicle, gasoline, fare of an employee, the salary of another employee and petitioner's travel
expense voucher. l6 The auditor disallowed these cash items only because at the time of audit, these
payments were not yet approved by the Regional Office. 17 The records, nevertheless, would show
that petitioner's use of the cash in her possession for operational expenses was founded on valid
authority. COA Circular No. 76-37 allowed postmasters to make payments for gasoline, spare parts
and minor repairs of vehicles subject to reimbursement by the Regional Office. She advanced
payments of salaries of employees on the basis of Circular No. 82-21 issued by the Postmaster
General. The Regional Office, through the chief of the finance section, certified that all the payments
made by petitioner were legitimate operational expenses. Exhibit 7-a, attached to the certificate of 18
December 1987, disclosed that thirty-two items of the operational expenses were later approved and
liquidated with checks bearing dates between 07 November 1982 and 28 February 1983. It would
appear that somehow the Sandiganbayan failed to consider the fact that, on 20 November 1982,
petitioner had to vacate her post upon her promotion. Notably, while the thirty-two checks were
issued prior to the audit, there was nothing to suggest that she already had the checks in her
possession at the time.
Liquidation of obligations incurred by accountable public officials involves a long process; pertinent
government accounting principles, require the (a) preparation of the disbursement voucher, (b)
processing of the request for allotment supported by such documents as payrolls, disbursement
vouchers, purchase/job orders, requisitions for supplies/materials, etc., and (c) issuance of the
corresponding check. 18 Each time, when accomplished, the corresponding amount is debited or
deducted from the available funds of the agency which would then consider the claim settled and
paid although there may have yet been no actual transfer of cash involved from the government to
the payee of the check. The term "to liquidate" means to settle, to adjust, to ascertain or to reduce to
precision in amount. 19 "Liquidation" does not necessarily signify payment, 20 and "to liquidate an
account," can mean to ascertain the balance due, to whom it is due, and to whom it is payable, 21
hence, an account that has been "liquidated" can also mean that the item has been made certain as
to what, and how much, is deemed to be owing.22
It would indeed be folly and too restrictive a usage to construe the word "liquidated" as being solely
the "receipt of checks by petitioner or encashment of the check by petitioner," and to thereby
conclude that she should be held to have malversed the amount of P5,600.84 merely for her "failure"
to transfer the sum either to her successor the day she was promoted or to the auditor on the day the
audit was made. 23 The defense evidence, the authenticity and genuineness of which were not
controverted by the prosecution, would show that the Regional Office issued thirty checks bearing
dates between 07 November 1982 and 21 March 1984. The checks were not issued forthrightly. The
probability that ineptitude on the part of the personnel taking charge of the issuance of the checks,
not to mention the commonly-experienced long trail of red tape in government transactions, had
engendered delay in such issuance should not be discounted. According to petitioner, again not
contested by the prosecution, after substantiating her claim that the "shortage" represented
legitimate operational expenses, she followed up the approval of the cash items with the Regional
Office. Upon finally receiving the thirty-three checks, with her as payee, she encashed them and
immediately turned the cash over to the Bureau of Posts of Tandag. 24 Forthwith, on 01 July 1983,
petitioner paid the amount of P5,652.15 to the Bureau of Posts under O.R. No. 6645668 25 which
amount, incidentally, is even slightly over the total amount of P5,600.84 found by the
Sandiganbayan.
The payment by postal employees who made "vales" from petitioner were deposited by her to the
account of the Bureau of Posts of Tandag under O.R. No. 6645670, dated 06 July 1983, in the
amount of P4,155.14. Petitioner explained that this sum was P294.69 less than the total amount of
the salaries due the employees because the employees did not always make "vales" for the full
amount of their salaries. 26 While this Court would consider the practice of disbursing public funds
under the "vale" system to be unmeritorious where the disbursing officer had not been authorized to
grant "vales" or to make advances of salaries, 27 in this case, however, the conditions appended to
the authority granted by the Postmaster General to advance salaries of employees under Circular No.
82-21 sanctioned the practice.
The conclusion made by the Sandiganbayan that the amounts paid by petitioner to the Bureau of
Page 32 of 46
Posts under O.R. No. 6645668 and No. 6645670 were "restitution's" would seem to be less than
accurate. The amounts were "replenishments" 28 coming from the Regional Office in checks issued
out in petitioner's name which she paid, after encashment, to the Bureau of Posts. The sum of
P9,807.29 that was replenished, when added to the ten items certified to be accounts payable and to
two items replenished by checks issued after 04 March 1983, approved as operational expenses in
the amount of P4,377.64, totalled P14,284.43, or even P92.80 more than the supposed "shortage" of
P14,161.63.
While it was not made clear which of the office expenses had been taken from the proceeds of the
postage stamp sales, the fact still remained, nevertheless, that the Regional Office cleared petitioner
of such accountabilities, indicating at the very least that she did not spend the amount for personal
use. The Court had heretofore recognized situations that could necessitate the use by accountable
public officials of cash on hand for pertinent expenditures in the conduct of official business. In
Bugayong vs. People, 29 the Court acquitted an accused government physician of malversation for a
shortage in cash account upon audit examination because the collections in the hospital were found
to have been used as its revolving fund for such official expenditures. In Palma Gil vs. People, 30
where donated logs were disposed of to construct municipal projects, the Court held that if funds or
property entrusted to a public officer were validly used for public purposes he should not be held
liable for malversation.
The Sandiganbayan noticeably depended on the recommendations of COA in convicting appellant.
The Court could not help but observe that upon being informed that the Bureau of Posts had
reimbursed the entire amount alleged to be her shortage, Auditor Quijada opined that his audit
report had to be altered to reflect that fact. Auditor Quijada's acquiescence to the alteration of his
report to conform to the advice would somehow manifest that the audit was not conducted with
sufficient thoroughness. In Tinga vs. People, 31 the Court said:
At this juncture, it may not be amiss to state that considering the gravity of the offense
of Malversation of Public Funds, just as government treasurers are held to strict
accountability as regards funds entrusted to them in a fiduciary capacity, so also
should examining COA auditors act with greater care and caution in the audit of the
accounts of such accountable officers to avoid the perpetration of any injustice.
Accounts should be examined carefully and thoroughly 'to the last detail,' 'with
absolute certainty' in strict compliance with the Manual of Instructions. Special note
should be taken of the fact that disallowance's for lack of pre-audit are not necessarily
tantamount to malversation in law. Imperative it is likewise that sufficient time be
given examined officers to reconstruct their accounts and refute the charge that they
had put government funds to their personal uses. Access to records must be afforded
them within a reasonable time after audit when disbursements are still fresh in their
minds and not years after when relevant official records may no longer be available and
the passage of time has blurred human memory.32
In Dumagat vs. Sandiganbayan 33 where the ruling in Tinga was reiterated, the Court added:
Since the audit examination left much to be desired in terms of thoroughness and
completeness as there were accounts which were not considered, the same can not be
made the basis for holding petitioner liable for malversation.34
Hopefully, the Court is not being impertinent if it were to urge COA, in the exercise of its awesome
powers, to act with extreme care and judicious consideration of all attendant circumstances in order
to ensure that innocent public officials may not have to undergo the trial and the pains that always
go with an indictment for an offense.
Generally, the factual findings of the Sandiganbayan are conclusive upon this Court but there are
established exceptions to that rule, such as, sans preclusion, when (1) the conclusion is a finding
grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjecture; (2) the inference made is manifestly an
error or founded on a mistake; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on
misapprehension of facts; and (5) the findings of fact are premised on a want of evidence are
contradicted by evidence on record. 35 In these instances, this Court is bound to review the facts in
order to avoid a miscarriage of justice. The case at bar, as may be gleaned from the foregoing
Page 33 of 46
disquisition, is one such instance.1âwphi1.nêt

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Sandiganbayan appealed from is SET ASIDE, and petitioner
Milagros Diaz ACQUITTED of the crime of malversation of public funds for insufficiency of proof
beyond reasonable doubt. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 161629 July 29, 2005
ATTY. RONALDO P. LEDESMA, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman, HON.
ABELARDO L. APORTADERA, in his capacity as Assistant Ombudsman, and Ombudsman’s Fact
Finding and Intelligence Bureau, represented by Director AGAPITO ROSALES,Respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the decision1 dated August 28,
2003 and the resolution2 dated January 15, 2004 of the Court of Appeals3 in CA-G.R. SP No. 58264
which affirmed with modification public respondents’ (1) Joint Resolution dated January 22, 1999,
which ordered, among other things, petitioner’s suspension for one (1) year for conduct prejudicial to
the service; and (2) Order dated February 8, 2000, as reiterated in a Memorandum dated March 17,
2000, which denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration but reduced his suspension to nine (9)
months without pay. The Court of Appeals modified the above issuances by further reducing
petitioner’s suspension from nine (9) months to six (6) months and one (1) day without pay.4
Petitioner Atty. Ronaldo P. Ledesma is the Chairman of the First Division of the Board of Special
Inquiry (BSI) of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID). In a letter-complaint filed by
Augusto Somalio with the Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FIIB) of the Office of the
Ombudsman, an investigation was requested on alleged anomalies surrounding the extension of the
Temporary Resident Visas (TRVs) of two (2) foreign nationals. The FIIB investigation revealed seven (7)
other cases of TRV extensions tainted with similar irregularities.
As a result, the FIIB, as nominal complainant, filed before the Administrative Adjudication Bureau
(AAB) of the Office of the Ombudsman a formal complaint against herein petitioner. Also charged
administratively were Atty. Arthel Caronongan and Ma. Elena P. Ang, Board Member and Executive
Assistant, respectively, in petitioner’s division. With respect to petitioner, the complaint was treated
as both a criminal and an administrative charge and docketed as OMB-0-98-0214 (criminal aspect),
for nine (9) counts of violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and for falsification of
public documents, and OMB-ADM-0-98-0038 (administrative aspect), for nine (9) counts of
Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, Falsification of Public Documents and Gross Neglect of Duty.
The complaint against petitioner, Caronongan and Ang alleged the following illegal acts: (a) irregularly
granting TRVs beyond the prescribed period; and (b) using "recycled" or photocopied applications for
a TRV extension without the applicants affixing their signatures anew to validate the correctness and
truthfulness of the information previously stated therein. Specifically, petitioner and Caronongan
allegedly signed the Memorandum of Transmittal to the Board of Commission (BOC) of the BID,
forwarding the applications for TRV extension of several aliens whose papers were questionable.
In a Joint Resolution5 dated January 22, 1999, Graft Investigation Officer Marlyn M. Reyes resolved
the administrative cases filed against petitioner, Caronongan and Ang, as follows:
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, it is respectfully recommended that:
1. Respondent ATTY. RONALDO P. LEDESMA be SUSPENDED from the service for one (1) year for
Page 34 of 46
Conduct Prejudicial to the Interest of the Service;

2. The instant case against ATTY. ARTHEL B. CARONONGAN be DISMISSED, the same having been
rendered moot and academic; and
3. The instant case against respondent MA. ELENA P. ANG be DISMISSED for lack of sufficient
evidence.
SO RESOLVED.6
Respondent Assistant Ombudsman Abelardo L. Aportadera, Jr. reviewed the Joint Resolution which
was approved by respondent Ombudsman Desierto on December 29, 1999.7
In the meantime, on July 9, 1999, respondent Ombudsman approved a Resolution8 dated June 22,
1999 of Graft Investigation Officer Marilou B. Ancheta-Mejica, dismissing the criminal charges
against petitioner for insufficiency of evidence.9
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration10 in the administrative case alleging that the BOC
which reviews all applications for TRVs extension, approved the TRVs in question, hence, petitioner
argued that it effectively declared the applications for extension regular and in order and waived any
infirmity thereon.
In an Order11 dated February 8, 2000, Graft Officer Reyes recommended the denial of the motion for
reconsideration which was approved by respondent Ombudsman on March 24, 2000 but reduced the
period of suspension from one (1) year to nine (9) months without pay.
On April 13, 2000, petitioner filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals, which included a
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary prohibitory mandatory injunction and/or temporary
restraining order to enjoin public respondents from implementing the order of suspension. The Court
of Appeals issued the TRO on April 19, 2000.
In its Decision dated August 28, 2003, the Court of Appeals affirmed petitioner’s suspension but
reduced the period from nine (9) months to six (6) months and one (1) day without pay.12
With the denial of his motion for reconsideration, petitioner filed the instant petition for review on the
following grounds:
I.
IN PROMULGATING ITS ASSAILED DECISION, RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS MANIFESTLY
OVERLOOKED THE FOLLOWING RELEVANT FACTS AND MATTERS WHICH, IF PROPERLY
CONSIDERED, WOULD HAVE JUSTIFIED A DIFFERENT CONCLUSION IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER:
...
II.
THE PRONOUNCEMENT OF RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE FINDING OF THE
OMBUDSMAN IS NOT MERELY ADVISORY ON THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION (BI) IS CONTRARY
TO THE PERTINENT PROVISION OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION AND APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF
THE HONORABLE COURT.
III.
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ALSO FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT THE OMBUDSMAN’S
RESOLUTION FINDING PETITIONER ADMINISTRATIVELY LIABLE CONSTITUTES AN INDIRECT
ENCROACHMENT INTO THE POWER OF THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION OVER IMMIGRATION
MATTERS.13
Petitioner insists that it was the BOC which approved the questioned applications for the extension of
the TRVs. He denies that he misled or deceived the BOC into approving these applications and argues
that the BOC effectively ratified his actions and sanctioned his conduct when it approved the subject
applications. Petitioner adds that he acted in good faith and the government did not suffer any
damage as a result of his alleged administrative lapse.
Page 35 of 46
We are not persuaded. In his attempt to escape liability, petitioner undermines his position in the
BID and his role in the processing of the subject applications. But by his own admission, 14 it
appears that the BSI not only transmits the applications for TRV extension and its supporting
documents, but more importantly, it interviews the applicants and evaluates their papers before
making a recommendation to the BOC. The BSI reviews the applications and when it finds them in
order, it executes a Memorandum of Transmittal to the BOC certifying to the regularity and propriety
of the applications.
In Arias v. Sandiganbayan,15 we stated that all heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable extent on
their subordinates. Practicality and efficiency in the conduct of government business dictate that the
gritty details be sifted and reviewed by the time it reaches the final approving authority. In the case at
bar, it is not unreasonable for the BOC to rely on the evaluation and recommendation of the BSI as it
cannot be expected to review every detail of each application transmitted for its approval. Petitioner
being the Chairman of the First Division of the BSI has direct supervision over its proceedings. Thus,
he cannot feign ignorance or good faith when the irregularities in the TRV extension applications are
so patently clear on its face. He is principally accountable for certifying the regularity and propriety of
the applications which he knew were defective.
Petitioner could not validly claim that he was singled out for prosecution. It is of record that
administrative cases were also filed against Caronongan and Ang, but extraneous circumstances
rendered the case against Caronongan moot while the case against Ang was dismissed because it was
proven that she merely implemented the approved decision of the BOC.
Equally untenable is the contention that the BOC’s approval of the defective applications for TRV
extension cured any infirmities therein and effectively absolved petitioner’s administrative lapse. The
instant administrative case pertains to the acts of petitioner as Chairman of the First Division of the
BSI in processing nine (9) defective applications, independent of and without regard to the action
taken by the BOC. It does not impugn the validity of the TRV extensions as to encroach upon the
authority of the BID on immigration matters. The main thrust of the case is to determine whether
petitioner committed any misconduct, nonfeasance, misfeasance or malfeasance in the performance
of his duties.
Anent the second and third grounds, petitioner essentially puts in issue the import of the
Ombudsman’s findings. Petitioner questions the Court of Appeals’ pronouncement that the findings
of the Ombudsman "may not be said to be merely recommendatory" upon the Immigration
Commissioner. He argues that to uphold the appellate court’s ruling expands the authority granted
by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman and runs counter to prevailing jurisprudence on
the matter, particularly Tapiador v. Office of the Ombudsman.16 Petitioner submits that the
Ombudsman’s findings that the TRV applications were illegal constitutes an indirect interference by
the Ombudsman into the powers of the BOC over immigration matters.
We do not agree. The creation of the Office of the Ombudsman is a unique feature of the 1987
Constitution.17 The Ombudsman and his deputies, as protectors of the people, are mandated to act
promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against officers or employees of the Government,
or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations.18 Foremost among its powers is the authority to investigate and prosecute cases
involving public officers and employees, thus:
(1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official,
employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or
inefficient.
Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as The Ombudsman Act of 1989, was passed into law on
November 17, 1989 and provided for the structural and functional organization of the Office of the
Ombudsman. RA 6770 mandated the Ombudsman and his deputies not only to act promptly on
complaints but also to enforce the administrative, civil and criminal liability of government officers
and employees in every case where the evidence warrants to promote efficient service by the
Government to the people.19
Page 36 of 46
The authority of the Ombudsman to conduct administrative investigations as in the present case is
settled.20 Section 19 of RA 6770 provides:
SEC. 19. Administrative Complaints. – The Ombudsman shall act on all complaints relating, but not
limited to acts or omissions which:
(1) Are contrary to law or regulation;
(2) Are unreasonable, unfair, oppressive or discriminatory;
(3) Are inconsistent with the general course of an agency’s functions, though in accordance with law;
(4) Proceed from a mistake of law or an arbitrary ascertainment of facts;
(5) Are in the exercise of discretionary powers but for an improper purpose; or
(6) Are otherwise irregular, immoral or devoid of justification.
The point of contention is the binding power of any decision or order that emanates from the Office of
the Ombudsman after it has conducted its investigation. Under Section 13(3) of Article XI of the 1987
Constitution, it is provided:
...
(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or employee at
fault, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure
compliance therewith. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner insists that the word "recommend" be given its literal meaning; that is, that the
Ombudsman’s action is only advisory in nature rather than one having any binding effect, citing
Tapiador v. Office of the Ombudsman,21 thus:
... Besides, assuming arguendo, that petitioner were administratively liable, the Ombudsman has no
authority to directly dismiss the petitioner from the government service, more particularly from his
position in the BID. Under Section 13, subparagraph (3), of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the
Ombudsman can only "recommend" the removal of the public official or employee found to be at fault,
to the public official concerned.22
For their part, the Solicitor General and the Office of the Ombudsman argue that the word
"recommend" must be taken in conjunction with the phrase "and ensure compliance therewith". The
proper interpretation of the Court’s statement in Tapiador should be that the Ombudsman has the
authority to determine the administrative liability of a public official or employee at fault, and direct
and compel the head of the office or agency concerned to implement the penalty imposed. In other
words, it merely concerns the procedural aspect of the Ombudsman’s functions and not its
jurisdiction.
We agree with the ratiocination of public respondents. Several reasons militate against a literal
interpretation of the subject constitutional provision. Firstly, a cursory reading of Tapiador reveals
that the main point of the case was the failure of the complainant therein to present substantial
evidence to prove the charges of the administrative case. The statement that made reference to the
power of the Ombudsman is, at best, merely an obiter dictum and, as it is unsupported by sufficient
explanation, is susceptible to varying interpretations, as what precisely is before us in this case.
Hence, it cannot be cited as a doctrinal declaration of this Court nor is it safe from judicial
examination.
The provisions of RA 6770 support public respondents’ theory. Section 15 is substantially the same
as Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution which provides for the powers, functions and duties of
the Ombudsman. We draw attention to subparagraph 3, to wit:
SEC. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. – The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following
powers, functions and duties:
...
Page 37 of 46
(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public officer or employee at fault
or who neglects to perform an act or discharge a duty required by law, and recommend his removal,
suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith; or enforce its
disciplinary authority as provided in Section 21 of this Act: Provided, That the refusal by any officer
without just cause to comply with an order of the Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote, fine,
censure, or prosecute an officer or employee who is at fault or who neglects to perform an act or
discharge a duty required by law shall be a ground for disciplinary action against said officer;
(Emphasis supplied)
We note that the proviso above qualifies the "order" "to remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure, or
prosecute" an officer or employee – akin to the questioned issuances in the case at bar. That the
refusal, without just cause, of any officer to comply with such an order of the Ombudsman to
penalize an erring officer or employee is a ground for disciplinary action, is a strong indication that
the Ombudsman’s "recommendation" is not merely advisory in nature but is actually mandatory
within the bounds of law. This should not be interpreted as usurpation by the Ombudsman of the
authority of the head of office or any officer concerned. It has long been settled that the power of the
Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute any illegal act or omission of any public official is not an
exclusive authority but a shared or concurrent authority in respect of the offense charged. 23 By
stating therefore that the Ombudsman "recommends" the action to be taken against an erring officer
or employee, the provisions in the Constitution and in RA 6770 intended that the implementation of
the order be coursed through the proper officer, which in this case would be the head of the BID.
It is likewise apparent that under RA 6770, the lawmakers intended to provide the Office of the
Ombudsman with sufficient muscle to ensure that it can effectively carry out its mandate as
protector of the people against inept and corrupt government officers and employees. The Office was
granted the power to punish for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court.24 It was given
disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the government and its subdivisions,
instrumentalities and agencies (with the exception only of impeachable officers, members of Congress
and the Judiciary).25 Also, it can preventively suspend any officer under its authority pending an
investigation when the case so warrants.26
The foregoing interpretation is consistent with the wisdom and spirit behind the creation of the Office
of the Ombudsman. The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission27 reveal the
following:
MR. MONSOD:
Madam President, perhaps it might be helpful if we give the spirit and intendment of the Committee.
What we wanted to avoid is the situation where it deteriorates into a prosecution arm. We wanted to
give the idea of the Ombudsman a chance, with prestige and persuasive powers, and also a chance to
really function as a champion of the citizen.
However, we do not want to foreclose the possibility that in the future, The Assembly, as it may see
fit, may have to give additional powers to the Ombudsman; we want to give the concept of a pure
Ombudsman a chance under the Constitution.
MR. RODRIGO:
Madam President, what I am worried about is if we create a constitutional body which has neither
punitive nor prosecutory powers but only persuasive powers, we might be raising the hopes of our
people too much and then disappoint them.
MR. MONSOD:
I agree with the Commissioner.
MR. RODRIGO:
Anyway, since we state that the powers of the Ombudsman can later on be implemented by the
legislature, why not leave this to the legislature?28
MR. MONSOD:
Yes, because we want to avoid what happened in 1973. I read the committee report which
Page 38 of 46
recommended the approval of the 27 resolutions for the creation of the office of the Ombudsman, but
notwithstanding the explicit purpose enunciated in that report, the implementing law – the last one,
P.D. No. 1630—did not follow the main thrust; instead it created the Tanodbayan, ...
...
MR. MONSOD: (reacting to statements of Commissioner Blas Ople):
May we just state that perhaps the honorable Commissioner has looked at it in too much of an
absolutist position, The Ombudsman is seen as a civil advocate or a champion of the citizens against
the bureaucracy, not against the President. On one hand, we are told he has no teeth and he lacks
other things. On the other hand, there is the interpretation that he is a competitor to the President,
as if he is being brought up to the same level as the President.
With respect to the argument that he is a toothless animal, we would like to say that we are
promoting the concept in its form at the present, but we are also saying that he can exercise such
powers and functions as may be provided by law in accordance with the direction of the thinking of
Commissioner Rodrigo. We did not think that at this time we should prescribe this, but we leave it up to
Congress at some future time if it feels that it may need to designate what powers the Ombudsman
need in order that he be more effective. This is not foreclosed.
So, his is a reversible disability, unlike that of a eunuch; it is not an irreversible disability. (Emphasis
supplied)29
It is thus clear that the framers of our Constitution intended to create a stronger and more effective
Ombudsman, independent and beyond the reach of political influences and vested with powers that
are not merely persuasive in character. The Constitutional Commission left to Congress to empower
the Ombudsman with prosecutorial functions which it did when RA 6770 was enacted. In the case of
Uy v. Sandiganbayan,30 it was held:
Clearly, the Philippine Ombudsman departs from the classical Ombudsman model whose function is
merely to receive and process the people’s complaints against corrupt and abusive government
personnel. The Philippine Ombudsman, as protector of the people, is armed with the power to
prosecute erring public officers and employees, giving him an active role in the enforcement of laws
on anti-graft and corrupt practices and such other offenses that may be committed by such officers
and employees. The legislature has vested him with broad powers to enable him to implement his
own actions. ...31
In light of the foregoing, we hold that the Court of Appeals did not commit any error in finding the
petitioner guilty of conduct prejudicial to the interest of the service and reducing petitioner’s period of
suspension to six (6) months and one (1) day without pay, taking into account the education and
length of service of petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated August 28, 2003 and the
Resolution dated January 15, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 58264 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
DIVISION
[ GR No. 179677, Aug 15, 2012 ]
ROMEO M. MONTALLANA v. OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN ]
DECISION
692 Phil. 617
PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision[1] dated May 28, 2007 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 93898 denying the petition filed by petitioner Romeo M. Montallana and
the Resolution[2] dated September 17, 2007 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Page 39 of 46
The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:
In the early hours of August 18, 2001, fire struck and engulfed the Manor Hotel in Kamias Road,
Quezon City, claiming the lives of seventy-four people and seriously injuring several others.
To determine the officials and persons responsible for this tragedy, an investigation was conducted by
the Fact-Finding & Intelligence Bureau (FFIB) of the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB). The FFIB
found that the fire that consumed the Manor Hotel was attributable to the hotel's faulty electrical
wiring systems. It concluded that, had it not been for the gross negligence of the public officials of the
local government of Quezon City, who were in charge in the licensing operations of the Manor Hotel,
the incident would not have happened.
Consequently, a formal complaint was filed against petitioner, with several other public officials,
before the Administrative Adjudication Bureau of the OMB, for Grave Misconduct, Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Sendee and Gross Negligence docketed as OMB-ADM-0-01-0376
(OMB-0-01-0659) and for Violation of Section 4, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713, docketed as OMB-
ADM-O-Oi-0390 (OMB-0-01-0679).
The complaint alleged, among other things, that:

1. From 1995 up to 2000, the Electrical Division, Engineering Department did not
conduct an annual inspection of the electrical systems of Manor Hotel.
2. The Electrical Division does not even have a copy of the electrical plans and
specifications of Manor Hotel as required under Rule II, 3.2.2.4 of the Rules
Implementing the Building Code.
3. There was an unreadable Certificate of Inspection No. 90-11814 which was made
as an attachment to the application of Manor Hotel for business/mayor's permit
for 2001.
4. The Annual Notice of Electrical Inspection dated February 15, 2001 conducted by
Gerardo R. Villasenor, Electrical Inspector, concurred by Engr. Rodel A. Mesa and
petitioner, shows that Manor Hotel has only 89 air-conditioning units at the time
of inspection disclosing a great disparity as to the true electrical load of the Manor
Hotel at the time of the incident.
5. The Electrical Division likewise negligently or deliberately failed to indicate in its

report that as of September 25, 2000, four (4) electrical meters of the Manor Hotel
were disconnected by MERALCO due to jumper connections.[3]
Pending investigation, petitioner and his co-respondents were preventively suspended. On September
24, 2001, petitioner filed his Counter-Affidavit.[4] On February 20, 2002, petitioner filed his
Consolidated Memorandum.[5]
For his part, petitioner raised the following defenses:

1. [D]uring his incumbency as Chief of the Electrical Division, the mandatory
electrical inspections were regularly conducted and made annually by the assigned
inspector(s) in all business establishments within the jurisdiction of Quezon City,
including the Manor Hotel.
2. For year 2000, Electrical Inspector Villasenor inspected the electrical systems of
Manor Hotel and submitted to him the Notice of Annual Inspection dated
February 15, 2001 with No. 01-00896, with a Certification by Edgardo M.
Page 40 of 46
Merida, a licensed electrical contractor, to the effect that the electrical installations
and equipments at the hotel were inspected and tested by the latter and found to
be in safe condition. He (Montallana) signed and approved the same based on the
facts set forth therein, relying in good faith on the correctness of the entries made
by his inspectors.
3. The requested official records which could prove that mandatory annual electrical
inspection were conducted at the Manor Hotel from 1995 to 2000 cannot be
produced as these could have been lost due to frequent transfers of office and lack
of storage rooms or were among those damaged by the fire that razed the Quezon
City Hall main building sometime in August 1998.
4. Assuming there was misrepresentation as to the true electrical status of the Manor
Hotel on the latest inspection conducted six (6) months prior to the subject fire
incident, as a superior officer, he cannot be held liable for the acts of his
subordinates as he only based his approval on their reports.[6]
On June 17, 2003, the Investigating Panel of the OMB rendered a Decision[7] finding petitioner liable
for Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and Gross Neglect of Duty and meted upon
him the penalty of dismissal from the service with all its accessory penalties, the decretal portion on
which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we rule and so hold as follows:
1). OMB-ADM-0-01-0376:
a). x x x x
b). x x x x
c). Respondents x x x ROMEO M. MONTALLANA x x x, are hereby found GUILTY OF

CONDUCT PREJUDICIAL TO THE BEST INTEREST OF THE SERVICE AND GROSS
NEGLECT OF DUTY, and for which they are hereby meted the penalty of DISMISSAL
FROM THE SERVICE WITH ALL ITS ACCESSORY PENALTIES.
x x x x
The Honorable Mayor of Quezon City, and the Honorable
Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government are hereby directed to
implement this DECISION upon finality thereof and in accordance with law.
SO ORDERED.[8]
On July 26, 2004, the Office of the Special Prosecutor of the OMB issued a Memorandum[9] which
modified .the Joint Decision insofar as petitioner and the other respondents are concerned. In the
said Memorandum, petitioner was also found guilty of gross negligence and conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service. It was also stated therein that since petitioner was already separated from
the service due to his retirement, the benefits he received by virtue thereof must be returned to the
government as declared in the Affidavit of Undertaking which he executed before his retirement. The
said Memorandum was approved by then Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo on November 26, 2004.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration.[10] On March 2, 2006, the Office of the
Special Prosecutor issued a Memorandum[11] denying the motion. The said Memorandum was
approved by then Ombudsman Ma. Merceditas Navarro-Gutierrez on March 13, 2006,[12] the
Page 41 of 46
dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, there having been no cogent and convincing
arguments and pieces of evidence to set aside the assailed Memorandum, the
undersigned prosecution officers respectfully recommend that the motions for
reconsideration filed by herein accused be DENIED for utter lack of merit. It is further
recommended that findings and recommendation contained in the Memorandum dated 26
July 2004 be AFFIRMED in toto.[13]
Not satisfied, petitioner sought recourse before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 93898. On May
28, 2007, the CA rendered a Decision[14] denying the petition, the decretal portion of which reads:
In light of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The Joint Decision dated
June 17, 2003 and Memorandum dated July 26, 2004 of the Office of Ombudsman, in so
far as herein petitioner is concerned, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.[15]
In ruling against petitioner, the CA ratiocinated that between petitioner's unsubstantiated denials of
the irregularities made in the electrical inspection of the Manor Hotel and the categorical findings of
the investigators, there is no room for a contrary conclusion that petitioner is indeed administratively
liable for his negligence. The CA held that petitioner cannot attribute the fault to his subordinates.
As head of office and the final approving authority of the Electrical Division, it behooves petitioner to
see to it that his subordinate engineers and inspectors are performing their respective duties
effectively. Petitioner should have made appropriate measures that can verify the veracity of their
reports.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[16] but it was denied in the Resolution[17] dated
September 17, 2007.
Hence, the petition assigning the following errors:

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONER'S PETITION AND
IN AFFIRMING [THE] OMBUDSMAN'S DECISION DISMISSING PETITIONER FROM THE
SERVICE, IT APPEARING THAT THE QUESTIONED DECISION IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH
LAW AND APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE OF THIS HONORABLE COURT CONSIDERING
THAT:
A. PUBLIC OFFICERS ARE IMMUNE FROM LIABILITY FOR THE ACTS

AND OMISSIONS OF THEIR SUBORDINATES.
B. THE FINDINGS OF RESPONDENTS OMBUDSMAN AND COURT OF

APPEALS ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE LIABILITY OF PETITIONER ARE
BASED ON ASSUMPTION AND SPECULATION.[18]
Petitioner maintains that prior to the incident at the Manor Hotel, the
Electrical Division, Engineering Department of Quezon City conducted an
electrical inspection on the electrical systems and load of the said hotel. The
inspection was conducted by Electrical Inspectors Gerardo Villasenor and
Edgardo Merida, which caused the issuance of the Notice of Annual
Inspection[19] dated February 15, 2001 to the owner of Manor Hotel. The
notice bore the signature of the two inspectors, who both certified that the
electrical installations and equipment at the Manor Hotel were inspected and
tested by them and found to be in safe condition. Petitioner then affixed his
Page 42 of 46
signature thereon signifying his approval of the reports made by his

subordinates.
Petitioner insists that he signed the Notice of Annual Inspection in good faith.
His act of signing the notice is incidental to his function as Acting Chief of the
Electrical Division. By affixing his signature on the notice, petitioner relied in
good faith on the correctness of the entries made therein by his subordinates.
Petitioner contends that his reliance on the veracity of the report and entries
made in the said notice is not constitutive of gross negligence.
Petitioner also posits that the Ombudsman and CA erred in concluding that
no annual electrical inspections were conducted on the Manor Hotel prior to
2001. Petitioner submits that his failure to present copies of prior notice of
inspection reports made on the Manor Hotel was due to the fact that the hotel
was constructed and completed prior to the creation of the Electrical Division;
it was only in 1996 that he became the Officer-in-Charge of the Electrical
Division; that most of the records of the Electrical Division were lost or
destroyed when a fire razed the 5th floor of the Quezon City Hall and when the
Office of the Electrical Division was transferred several times to different parts
of the Quezon City Hall.
Based on the foregoing, petitioner argues that he could not be held

administratively liable based on the principle of command responsibility.
On its part, respondent maintains that the evidence presented before the
Ombudsman showed that petitioner failed to live up to the exacting demands
of public office. Petitioner was unmindful and indifferent of his duties and
responsibilities. The negligent acts of petitioner clearly show that he failed to
perform his official duties with the highest degree of responsibility and
integrity, which eventually contributed to the tragic incident.
The petition is bereft of merit.
Gross neglect of duty or gross negligence refers to negligence characterized by

the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where
there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with a
conscious indifference to consequences, insofar as other persons may be
affected. It is-the omission of that care which even inattentive and thoughtless
men never fail to give to their own property. In cases involving public officials,
there is gross negligence when a breach of duty is flagrant and palpable.[20]
True, this Court has held in several cases that in the absence of substantial
evidence of gross negligence of the petitioner, administrative liability could not
be based on the principle of command responsibility.[21] However, in the case
at bar, the findings of the Office of the Ombudsman, as affirmed by the CA,
clearly establish the negligence of petitioner in the performance of his duties
as head of the Electrical Division.
Among the duties and responsibilities attached to the Electrical Division of

Quezon City is to conduct annual inspection of existing electrical installations
within the jurisdiction of Quezon City. Section 3 (B) of Ordinance No. SP-33,
S-92, or the Ordinance Creating an Electrical Division Under the Engineering
Department of Quezon City and Providing for its Personnel Requirements,
Duties and Functions, as well as Appropriating the Necessary Funds Therefor,
[22] provides that:
Section 3. The Electrical Division shall have the following duties and functions:
Page 43 of 46
A. Formulate, evaluate and supervise the electrical aspects of the construction

projects undertaken by the city;
B. Inspect the electrical installations of the newly constructed structures in the City
and undertake annual inspections of existing electrical installations;
C. Evaluate and process applications for wiring permits and electrical certificates;
and
D. Perform other related functions as may be required by the practice of Electrical
Engineering as per requirements of the Philippine Electrical Code, the R.A. 184
and other related laws arid ordinances.[23]
Thus, it was incumbent on petitioner as head of the Electrical Division to see to it that proper annual
inspections are conducted on the existing electrical installations in Quezon City. Records would
disclose that the charges against petitioner were supported by the evidence on record. It has been
sufficiently established by the FFIB and concurred to by the Ombudsman as well as the CA that:
1. Records of the Business Permit & License Office revealed that Manor Hotel was issued
a Certificate of Electrical Inspection only on its first year of operation in 1991. Manor
Hotel was able to secure its business permits for years 1995, 1999, 2000 and 2001,
without the necessary requirements for obtaining the same such as a Certificate of
Electrical Inspection. Thus, for these years, there was no electrical inspection conducted.
Further, the hotel did not apply and secure a business permit for year 1996, 1997, 1998
and it has no business permit at the time of the incident. Since there was no application
for a business permit, there was likewise no referral for an electrical inspection to the
Electrical Division, which is a Standard Operating Procedure in processing applications
for business permits. Thus, for these years, there can be no electrical inspection
conducted.
2. The logbook presented reflected an entry that in 1998, Manor Hotel obtained
wiring/electrical permit and Certificate of Electrical Inspection, but it was not clear
therefrom if the inspection was indeed conducted as Manor Hotel did not secure a
business permit for that year, too.
3. The Electrical Division does not have a copy of the approved electrical plans and
specifications of the Manor Hotel, supposedly to be on active file, as required under Rule
II, 3.2.2,4 of the Rules Implementing the Building Code. Such plan is a vital document
which must come in handy for the Electrical Division as it is a guide necessary in carrying
out electrical inspections of any establishment or building. The excuse that the Electrical
Division did not exist yet at the time of the construction/completion of the Manor
Hotel, is lame. Petitioner, being the Chief thereat, should have taken initiatives to secure
a copy for his file to aid him in determining the veracity of the reports submitted to him
by his subordinates. Absent such plan and specifications, it weakens his defense that
inspections were done accordingly.
4. The Notice of Annual Inspection dated February 15, 2001 does not per se prove that an
inspection was indeed conducted. If it were so, the excess on the electrical load and the
jumper connections would have been discovered that could have prevented the incident,
the proximate cause of which was the electrical overload.
5. The Answer of Manuel S. Baduria, Sr. - Fire Marshall I stated that the fire was caused
by electrical ignition and that it was not his duty to regulate/inspect the installation of
electrical wirings in buildings and establishments as it is incumbent upon the Electrical
Division to conduct the same.
6. The Answer of Alfredo Macapugay - City Engineer and concurrent Local Building
Official of Quezon City stated that if there was any negligence committed, it should be
solely directed against the Electrical Division of Quezon City as it is their direct
Page 44 of 46
responsibility to conduct the annual inspection of the electrical installations of all the
business establishments within the city.
7. The Answer of Engr. Rodel A. Mesa, Inspector Engineer II, Electrical Division,
confirmed that the Notice of Annual Inspection dated February 15, 2001 did not pass
through the normal channel and was processed and issued without his knowledge and
recommendation. He stressed that the payment of fees corresponding to the electrical
loads and the issuance of the Certificate were all done in the same day, April 16, 2001
and was presented to him for his initial only on April 17, 2001, after it was already
issued. Such incident is not an isolated case as there were other instances that the
annual notice did not pass through him for reasons known only to his colleagues. He
tried to convey such practice to his superior (referring to petitioner) but no positive action
was taken thereon.
8. The Electrical Report No. 08-29-01 of Engr. David R. Aoanan, Chief. Electrical Section,
National Bureau of Investigation, established that the overuse of electrical gadgets and
appliances within the hotel caused the overloading of the electrical installation which
ignited the ceiling of the stockroom of the third floor of the hotel.
9. The Notice of Annual Inspection dated February 15, 2001 does not categorically prove
that the inspection was conducted considering that it contains misrepresentations as to
the true electrical status of Manor Hotel.
10. Petitioner made conflicting statements about his hand in the approval and signing of
such Notice. In this petition and in the Consolidated Memorandum he stated that he
signed and approved the Notice of Annual Inspection while in his Motion for
Reconsideration he stated that he did not sign nor initial said Notice, but it was Engr.
Rodel A. Mesa who did so. This only shows that petitioner was not sure as to his stand as
to whether an inspection was conducted.
11. While denying his participation in the Notice of Annual Inspection dated February 15,
2001, petitioner nevertheless used this Notice as his only proof that inspection were
regularly conducted.[24]
The purpose of administrative proceedings is mainly to protect the public service, based on the time-
honored principle that a public office is a public trust.[25] From the foregoing, petitioner's negligence
in the performance of his duties as a public servant was well established. In administrative
proceedings, the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt is substantial evidence, i.e., that
amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.[26]
Suffice it to state that in this jurisdiction the well-settled rule is that the findings of fact of
administrative bodies, if based on substantial evidence, are controlling on the reviewing authority. It
is settled that it is not for the appellate court to substitute its own judgment for that of the
administrative agency on the sufficiency of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses.
Administrative decisions on matters within their jurisdiction are entitled to respect and can only be
set aside on proof of grave abuse of discretion, fraud or error of law.[27] Consequently, the CA
correctly affirmed the conclusion of the Office of the Ombudsman.
Moreover, the issue of whether petitioner's guilt on the administrative charges against him is
supported by substantial evidence is factual in nature, the determination of which is beyond the
ambit of this Court. The task of this Court in an appeal by petition for review on certiorari as a
jurisdictional matter is limited to reviewing errors of law that might have been committed by the CA.
[28] The Supreme Court cannot be tasked to go over the proofs presented by the petitioner in the
proceedings below and analyze, assess and weigh them to ascertain if the court a quo and the
appellate court were correct in their appreciation of the evidence.[29] This Court has time and again
Page 45 of 46
refrained from interfering with the Ombudsman's exercise of its constitutionally mandated
investigatory and prosecutory powers. This is in recognition of the Office of the Ombudsman's
independence and initiative in prosecuting or dismissing a complaint filed before it.[30] More so, in
the case at bar, where the CA affirmed the factual findings and conclusion of the Office of the
Ombudsman. Although there are exceptions to this rule, none of which exists in the present case.
It is worth to reiterate that, a public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must, at all
times, be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.[31] As a public servant, petitioner is
tasked to provide efficient, competent, and proper service to the public. Public officials and employees
are under obligation to perform the duties of their offices honestly, faithfully, and to the best of their
ability.[32] In the case at bar, petitioner miserably failed to perform his duties as a public servant.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated May 28, 2007 and
the Resolution dated September 17, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 93898 are
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Page 46 of 46

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GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS | SYLLABUS PART III

III. ARTICLE XI, 1987 CONSITUTION (A PUBLIC OFFICER IS A PUBLIC TRUST)

appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released.

Republic of the Philippines

14) RAEG’s Inspection reports as to 100% completion of projects.

Republic of the Philippines

proof that she took part in a conspiracy to defraud the government.

Republic of the Philippines

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 110503 August 4,

ANTONIO M. BOLASTIG, petitioner,

Republic of the Philippines

Ruling of the Ombudsman

The above-cited comparison focused on the examination and verification of documents

1) Liquidation and Billing Division – which has the function of verifying,

1) Checks correctness of RIV of forms requisitions;

2) Checks serial number of entries to be sold for the day;

3) Assists in the issuance of OR and having it signed by Mr. Fajardo as

FOREGOING CONSIDERED, pursuant to Section 52 (A-1) and (A-3), Rule IV of the

The Honorable ALEXANDER M. AREVALO, Commissioner, Bureau of Customs, is hereby

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Petitioner sought reconsideration40 but the same was unavailing.41

Hence, this petition raising the following issues:

Whether x x x the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in failing to consider and

1. At the Collecting Division of NAIA Customs House, there is only one

5. Nancy Marco is not an expert when she testified.

Whether x x x the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in failing to consider and

Whether x x x the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in relying on documents which

Whether x x x the Ombudsman can directly dismiss petitioner from government

recommend the removal of a public official.48

There is substantial evidence to support

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 125213 January 26, 1999

Telephone Rental Nov. 1980 P250.00

Office Rental, S. Haguisan Mar. 1981 570

TEV, Milagros L. Diaz Dec. 1980 385.2

Spare parts, Phil. Mail Jun. 1979 50.5

Gasoline, Phil. Mail Aug. 1979 1,020.20

Spare parts, Phil. Mail Dec. 1979 684.8

Spare parts, Phil. Mail Jan. 1980 353.55

Repair, Phil. Mail Oct. 1980 64

Repair, Phil. Mail Dec. 1980 46

Registration Fee; Phil. Mail Dec. 1980 25.5

Office Rental, S. Haguisan Aug. 1981 640

TEV, Milagros L. Diaz Nov. 1981 468.5

Repair, Phil. Mail Jan. 1982 32

Mail Carriage, Postmaster Jan. 1982 6

Gasoline, Phil. Mail Sept. 1982 228.44

Mail Carriage, Postmaster Feb. 1982 12.5

Gasoline, Phil. Mail Feb. 1982 238.95

Fare, Pedro D. Sindo Oct. 1982 5

TEV, Milagros L. Diaz Nov. 1982 250.5

Salary, Carlos M. Acevedo 839.59

disquisition, is one such instance.1âwphi1.nêt

Republic of the Philippines

Conduct Prejudicial to the Interest of the Service;

Republic of the Philippines

The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:

The complaint alleged, among other things, that:

5. The Electrical Division likewise negligently or deliberately failed to indicate in its

For his part, petitioner raised the following defenses:

c). Respondents x x x ROMEO M. MONTALLANA x x x, are hereby found GUILTY OF

The Honorable Mayor of Quezon City, and the Honorable