JUDGE ANTONIO C.

SUMALJAG v SPOUSES DIOSDIDIT and transfer may have actually taken place is immaterial to this
MENENDEZ M. LITERATO; and MICHAELES MAGLASANG
RODRIGO.
G.R. No. 149787 June 18, 2008
(substitution)
Facts:
Decedent Josefa (vendor) in her lifetime filed a case against her
sister (vendee) for nullity of the deed of sale of real property.
When she died, the counsel who represented her moved to have the
petitioner Sumaljag substitute decedent in the case alleging that
before Josefa died she had executed a Quitclaim Deed in favor of
Remismundo D. Maglasang who in turn sold it to petitioner.
conclusion, if only for the reason that it is not for counsel, after the
death of his client, to make such manifestation because he then has
lost the authority to speak for and bind his client. Thus, at most, the
petitioner can be said to be a transferee pendente lite whose status
is pending with the lower court.
Lastly, a close examination of the documents attached to the records
disclose that the subject matter of the Quitclaim allegedly executed
by Josefa in favor of Remismundo is Lot 1220-E, while the subject
matter of the deed of sale executed by Remismundo in the
petitioner's favor is Lot 1220-D. This circumstance alone raises the
possibility that there is more than meets the eye in the transactions
related to this case.

RTC denied motion for substitution and instead asked Michaeles,
heir of Josefa to appear.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner was subrogated to the rights of
Josefa over the property under litigation at the time she died.
Ruling:
For the protection of the interests of the decedent, this Court has in
previous instances recognized the heirs as proper representatives of
the decedent, even when there is already an administrator appointed
by the court. When no administrator has been appointed, as in this
case, there is all the more reason to recognize the heirs as the
proper representatives of the deceased.

Ratio:

The rule on substitution in case of death of a party is governed by

Section 16, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, which provides:
Section 16. Death of a party; duty of counsel. -Whenever a
party to a pending action dies, and the claim is not thereby
extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel to inform
the court within thirty (30) days after such death of the fact
thereof, and to give the name and address of his legal
representative or representatives. Failure of counsel to
comply with this duty shall be a ground for disciplinary
action.
The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be
substituted for the deceased, without requiring the
appointment of an executor or administrator and the
court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.
The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or
representatives to appear and be substituted within a
period of thirty (30) days from notice.
If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the
deceased party, or if the one so named shall fail to appear
within the specified period, the court may order the
opposing party, within a specified time, to procure the
appointment of an executor or administrator for the estate
of the deceased, and the latter shall immediately appear
for and on behalf of the deceased. The court charges in
procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing
party, may be recovered as costs.

First, the petitioner is not one of those allowed by the Rules to be a

substitute. Section 16, Rule 3 speaks for itself in this respect.

Second, the reason for the Rule is to protect all concerned who may
be affected by the intervening death, particularly the deceased and
her estate. We note in this respect that the Notice that counsel filed
in fact reflects a claim against the interest of the deceased through
the transfer of her remaining interest in the litigation to another party.
Interestingly, the transfer is in favor of the very same person who is
suggested to the court as the substitute. To state the obvious, the
suggested substitution effectively brings to naught the protection that
the Rules intend; plain common sense tells us that the transferee
who has his own interest to protect, cannot at the same time
represent and fully protect the interest of the deceased transferor.

Third, counsel has every authority to manifest to the court changes in

interest that transpire in the course of litigation. Thus, counsel could
have validly manifested to the court the transfer of Josefa's interests
in the subject matter of litigation pursuant to Section 19, Rule 3. But
this can happen only while the client-transferor was alive and while
the manifesting counsel was still the effective and authorized counsel
for the client-transferor, not after the death of the client when the
lawyer-client relationship has terminated. The fact that the alleged