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Torts 1st Exam Case Digests
Torts 1st Exam Case Digests
RULING: NO RULING: NO
Where the plaintiff in a negligence action, by his own We find no error in the findings of the respondent
carelessness contributes to the principal occurrence, court in its original decision that the accident which
that is, to the accident, as one of the determining befell private respondents was due to the lack of
causes thereof, he cannot recover. This is equally diligence of respondent Antonio Esteban and was
true of the defendant; and as both of them, by their not imputable to negligent omission on the part of
negligent acts, contributed to the determining petitioner PLDT.
cause of the accident, neither can recover.
The findings clearly show that the negligence of
2. PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE CO., respondent Antonio Esteban was not only
INC., petitioner, vs COURT OF APPEALS and contributory to his injuries and those of his wife but
SPOUSES ANTONIO ESTEBAN and GLORIA goes to the very cause of the occurrence of the
ESTEBAN, respondents. accident, as one of its determining factors, and
thereby precludes their right to recover
FACTS: damages. 30 The perils of the road were known to,
hence appreciated and assumed by, private
An action for damages by private respondent respondents. By exercising reasonable care and
spouses against petitioner Philippine Long Distance prudence, respondent Antonio Esteban could have
Telephone Company (PLDT, for brevity) for the avoided the injurious consequences of his act, even
injuries they sustained in the evening of July 30, 1968 assuming arguendo that there was some alleged
when their jeep ran over a mound of earth and fell negligence on the part of petitioner.
into an open trench, an excavation allegedly
undertaken by PLDT for the installation of its The presence of warning signs could not have
underground conduit system. The complaint alleged completely prevented the accident; the only
1 |Torts Part 3 Case Digests
purpose of said signs was to inform and warn the which was afterwards amputated at about the
public of the presence of excavations on the site. knee.
The private respondents already knew of the
presence of said excavations. It was not the lack of
knowledge of these excavations which caused the
jeep of respondents to fall into the excavation but
the unexplained sudden swerving of the jeep from
the inside lane towards the accident mound. As
opined in some quarters, the omission to perform a
duty, such as the placing of warning signs on the site
of the excavation, constitutes the proximate cause
only when the doing of the said omitted act would
have prevented the injury. 31 It is basic that private
respondents cannot charge PLDT for their injuries This first point for the plaintiff to establish was that the
where their own failure to exercise due and accident happened through the negligence of the
reasonable care was the cause thereof. It is both a defendant. The detailed description by the
societal norm and necessity that one should exercise defendant's witnesses of the construction and
a reasonable degree of caution for his own quality of the track proves that if was up to the
protection. Furthermore, respondent Antonio general stranded of tramways of that character.
Esteban had the last clear chance or opportunity to
avoid the accident, notwithstanding the negligence It was admitted that there were no side pieces or
he imputes to petitioner PLDT. As a resident of Lacson guards on the car;
Street, he passed on that street almost everyday and
had knowledge of the presence and location of the The cause of the sagging of the tracks and the
excavations there. It was his negligence that breaking of the tie, which was the immediate
exposed him and his wife to danger, hence he is occasion of the accident, is not clear in the
solely responsible for the consequences of his evidence, but is found by the trial court and is
imprudence. admitted in the briefs and in the argument to have
been the dislodging of the crosspiece or piling under
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE the stringer by the water of the bay raised by a
recent typhoon. The superintendent of the company
3. M. H., RAKES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. THE attributed it to the giving way of the block laid in the
ATLANTIC, GULF AND PACIFIC sand. No effort was made to repair the injury at the
COMPANY, defendant-appellant. time of the occurrence. According to plaintiffs
witnesses, a depression of the track, varying from
one half inch to one inch and a half, was therafter
FACTS:
apparent to the eye, and a fellow workman of the
plaintiff swears that the day before the accident he
The plaintiff, an employ of the defendant, was at called the attention of McKenna, the foreman, to it
work transporting iron rails from a barge in the harbor and asked by simply straightening out the
to the company's yard near the malecon in Manila. crosspiece, resetting the block under the stringer
Plaintiff claims that but one hand car was used in this and renewing the tie, but otherwise leaving the very
work. The defendant has proved that there were two same timbers as before. It has not proven that the
immediately following one another, upon which company inspected the track after the typhoon or
were piled lengthwise seven rails, each weighing 560 had any proper system of inspection.
pounds, so that the ends of the rails lay upon two
crosspieces or sills secured to the cars, but without
In order to charge the defendant with negligence, it
side pieces or guards to prevent them from slipping
was necessary to show a breach of duty on its part
off. According to the testimony of the plaintiff, the
in failing either to properly secure the load on iron to
men were either in the rear of the car or at its sides.
vehicles transporting it, or to skillfully build the
According to that defendant, some of them were
tramway or to maintain it in proper condition, or to
also in front, hauling by a rope. At a certain spot at
vigilantly inspect and repair the roadway as soon as
or near the water's edge the track sagged, the tie
the depression in it became visible. It is upon the
broke, the car either canted(leaned) or upset, the
failure of the defendant to repair the weakened
rails slid off and caught the plaintiff, breaking his leg,
track, after notice of its condition, that the judge
below based his judgment.
2 |Torts Part 3 Case Digests
ISSUE: WON plaintiff can wholly recover for necessary for the employees moving it to get hold
damages sustained by the accident upon it as best they could, there is no specific finding
upon the instruction given by the defendant to its
RULING: NO employees to walk only upon the planks, nor upon
the necessity of the plaintiff putting himself upon the
The most controverted question in the case is that of ties at the side in order to get hold upon the car.
the negligence of the plaintiff, contributing to the Therefore the findings of the judge below leave the
accident, to what extent it existed in fact and what conduct of the plaintiff in walking along the side of
legal effect is to be given it. In two particulars is he the loaded car, upon the open ties, over the
charged with carelessness: depressed track, free to our inquiry.
First. That having noticed the depression in the track While the plaintiff and his witnesses swear that not
he continued his work; and only were they not forbidden to proceed in this way,
but were expressly directed by the foreman to do so,
both the officers of the company and three of the
Second. That he walked on the ends of the ties at
workmen testify that there was a general prohibition
the side of the car instead of along the boards, either
frequently made known to all the gang against
before or behind it.
walking by the side of the car, and the foreman
swears that he repeated the prohibition before the
As to the first point, the depression in the track night
starting of this particular load. On this contradiction
indicate either a serious or a rival difficulty. There is
of proof we think that the preponderance is in favor
nothing in the evidence to show that the plaintiff did
of the defendant's contention to the extent of the
or could see the displaced timber underneath the
general order being made known to the workmen. If
sleeper. The claim that he must have done so is a
so, the disobedience of the plaintiff in placing himself
conclusion drawn from what is assumed to have
in danger contributed in some degree to the injury
been a probable condition of things not before us,
as a proximate, although not as its primary cause.
rather than a fair inference from the testimony. While
the method of construction may have been known
Difficulty seems to be apprehended in deciding
to the men who had helped build the road, it was
which acts of the injured party shall be considered
otherwise with the plaintiff who had worked at this
immediate causes of the accident. The test is simple.
job less than two days. A man may easily walk along
Distinction must be between the accident and the
a railway without perceiving a displacement of the
injury, between the event itself, without which there
underlying timbers. The foreman testified that he
could have been no accident, and those acts of the
knew the state of the track on the day of the
victim not entering into it, independent of it, but
accident and that it was then in good condition,
contributing under review was the displacement of
and one Danridge, a witness for the defendant,
the crosspiece or the failure to replace it. this
working on the same job, swore that he never
produced the event giving occasion for damages —
noticed the depression in the track and never saw
that is, the shinking of the track and the sliding of the
any bad place in it. The sagging of the track this
iron rails. To this event, the act of the plaintiff in
plaintiff did perceive, but that was reported in his
walking by the side of the car did not contribute,
hearing to the foreman who neither promised nor
although it was an element of the damage which
refused to repair it. His lack of caution in continuing
came to himself. Had the crosspiece been out of
at his work after noticing the slight depression of the
place wholly or partly thorough his act of omission of
rail was not of so gross a nature as to constitute
duty, the last would have been one of the
negligence, barring his recovery under the severe
determining causes of the event or accident, for
American rule.
which he would have been responsible. Where he
contributes to the principal occurrence, as one of its
In respect of the second charge of negligence
determining factors, he can not recover. Where, in
against the plaintiff, the judgment below is not so
conjunction with the occurrence, he contributes
specific. While the judge remarks that the evidence
only to his own injury, he may recover the amount
does not justify the finding that the car was pulled by
that the defendant responsible for the event should
means of a rope attached to the front end or to the
pay for such injury, less a sum deemed a suitable
rails upon it, and further that the circumstances in
equivalent for his own imprudence.
evidence make it clear that the persons necessary
to operate the car could not walk upon the plank
between the rails and that, therefore, it was
Since both parties are at fault in this case, the The Court of Appeals, and the Court of First
doctrine of last clear chance applies. Instancetook the view that Hidaldo maintained an
attractive nuisance (the tanks), and neglected to
The doctrine of last clear chance states that where adopt the necessary precautions to avoid accidents
both parties are negligent but the negligent act of to persons entering its premises. It applied the
one is appreciably later than that of the other, or doctrine of attractive nuisance, of American origin,
where it is impossible to determine whose fault or recognized in this Jurisdiction in Taylor vs. Manila
negligence caused the loss, the one who had the Electric 16 Phil., 8.
last clear opportunity to avoid the loss but failed to
do so is chargeable with the loss. In this case, The doctrine may be stated, in short, as follows: One
Deocampo had the last clear chance to avoid the who maintains on his premises dangerous
collision. Since Deocampo was driving the rear instrumentalities or appliances of a character likely
vehicle, he had full control of the situation since he to attract children in play, and who fails to exercise
was in a position to observe the vehicle in front of ordinary care to prevent children from playing
him. Deocampo had the responsibility of avoiding therewith or resorting thereto, is liable to a child of
bumping the vehicle in front of him. A U-turn is done tender years who is injured thereby, even if the child
at a much slower speed to avoid skidding and is technically a trespasser in the premises. (See 65
overturning, compared to running straight ahead. C.J.S., p. 455.)
Deocampo could have avoided the vehicle if he
was not driving very fast while following the pick-up. The principle reason for the doctrine is that the
Deocampo was not only driving fast, he also condition or appliance in question although its
admitted that he did not step on the brakes even danger is apparent to those of age, is so enticing or
upon seeing the pick-up. He only stepped on the alluring to children of tender years as to induce them
brakes after the collision. to approach, get on or use it, and this attractiveness
is an implied invitation to such children (65 C.J.S., p.
458).
SAMBOY
ISSUE: Now, is a swimming pool or water tank an
ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE
instrumentality or appliance likely to attract the little
Therefore, as Hidalgo's tanks are not classified as ISSUE: WON the owner of the animal is liable when
attractive nuisance, the question whether Hidalgo damage is caused to its caretaker
had taken reasonable precautions becomes
RULING: NO
immaterial. And the other issue submitted by Hidalgo
— that the parents of the boy were guilty of This opinion, however, appears to have been
contributory negligence precluding recovery, rendered in a case where an animal caused injury to
because they left for Manila on that unlucky day a stranger or third person. It is therefore no authority
7 |Torts Part 3 Case Digests
for a case like the present where the person injured of oval shape known as the "Wading pool" and the
was the caretaker of the animal. "Beginners Pool." There are diving boards in the big
pools and the depths of the water at different parts
The distinction is important as to whether an animal are indicated by appropriate marks on the wall. The
caused injury to a stranger or to the caretaker. For care and supervision of the pools and the users
the statute names the possessor or user of the thereof is entrusted to a recreational section
animal as the person liable for "any damages it may composed of Simeon Chongco as chief, Armando
cause," and this for the obvious reason that the Rule, a male nurse, and six lifeguards who had taken
possessor or user has the custody and control of the the life-saving course given by the Philippine Red
animal and is therefore the one in a position to Cross at the YMCA in Manila. For the safety of its
prevent it from causing damage. patrons, defendant has provided the pools with a
ring buoy, toy roof, towing line, saving kit and a
In the present case, the animal was in custody and resuscitator. There is also a sanitary inspector who is
under the control of the caretaker, who was paid for in charge of a clinic established for the benefit of the
his work as such. Obviously, it was the caretaker's patrons. Defendant has also on display in a
business to try to prevent the animal from causing conspicuous place certain rules and regulations
injury or damage to anyone, including himself. And governing the use of the pools, one of which
being injured by the animal under those prohibits the swimming in the pool alone or without
circumstances, was one of the risks of the any attendant. Although defendant does not
occupation which he had voluntarily assumed and maintain a full-time physician in the swimming pool
for which he must take the consequences. compound, it has however a nurse and a sanitary
inspector ready to administer injections or operate
In a decision of the Spanish Supreme Court, cited by
the oxygen resuscitator if the need should arise.
Manresa in his Commentaries (Vol. 12, p. 578), the
death of an employee who was bitten by a feline
which his master had asked him to take to his In the afternoon of July 5, 1952, at about 1:00 o'clock,
establishment was by said tribunal declared to be "a Dominador Ong, a 14-year old high school student
veritable accident of labor" which should come and boy scout, and his brothers Ruben and Eusebio,
under the labor laws rather than under article 1905 went to defendant's swimming pools. This was not
of the Civil Code. The present action, however, is not the first time that the three brothers had gone to said
brought under the Workmen's Compensation Act, natatorium for they had already been there four or
there being no allegation that, among other things, five times before. They arrived at the natatorium at
defendant's business, whatever that might be, had about 1:45 p.m. After paying the requisite admission
a gross income of P20,000. As already stated, fee, they immediately went to one of the small pools
defendant's liability is made to rest on article 1905 of where the water was shallow. At about 4:35 p.m.,
the Civil Code. But action under that article is not Dominador Ong told his brothers that he was going
tenable for the reasons already stated. On the other to the locker room in an adjoining building to drink a
hand, if action is to be based on article 1902 of the bottle of coke. Upon hearing this, Ruben and
Civil Code, it is essential that there be fault or Eusebio went to the bigger pool leaving Dominador
negligence on the part of the defendants as owners in the small pool and so they did not see the latter
of the animal that caused the damage. But the when he left the pool to get a bottle of coke. In that
complaint contains no allegation on those points. afternoon, there were two lifeguards on duty in the
pool compound, namely, Manuel Abaño and Mario
Villanueva. The tour of duty of Abaño was from 8:00
to 12:00 in the morning and from 2:00 to 6:00 in the
LAST CLEAR CHANCE afternoon, and of Villanueva from 7:30 to 11:30 a.m.
and from 12:30 to 4:30 p.m. Between 4:00 to 5:00 that
9. MR. AND MRS. AMADOR C. ONG, vs. afternoon, there were about twenty bathers inside
METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT the pool area and Manuel Abaño was going around
the pools to observe the bathers in compliance with
FACTS:
the instructions of his chief.
Before closing, we wish to quote the following 1. YES. The SC found Calibo negligent because of the
observation of the trial court, which we find following it is alleged that at the time of the collision,
supported by the evidence: "There is (also) a strong the truck was occupying 25 cm of the jeep’s lane.
suggestion coming from the expert evidence However it was found out that the center stripe of
presented by both parties that Dominador Ong the road is misaligned and with the correct
might have dived where the water was only 5.5 feet calculation of the width of the road, the truck on still
deep, and in so doing he might have hit or bumped on its proper lane and it was actually the jeep who is
his forehead against the bottom of the pool, as a intruding the truck’s lane.
consequence of which he was stunned, and which
to his drowning. As a boy scout he must have
received instructions in swimming. He knew, or have Nor was the Appellate Court correct in finding that
known that it was dangerous for him to dive in that Paulino Zacarias had acted negligently in applying
part of the pool." his brakes instead of getting back inside his lane
upon qqqespying the approaching jeep. Being well
KARLO within his own lane, as has already been explained,
he had no duty to swerve out of the jeep's way as
10. GLAN PEOPLES LUMBER VS IAC said Court would have had him do. And even
supposing that he was in fact partly inside the
FACTS: opposite lane, coming to a full stop with the jeep still
thirty (30) meters away cannot be considered an
Engineer Orlando T. Calibo, Agripino Roranes, and unsafe or imprudent action, there also being
Maximo Patos were on the jeep owned by the uncontradicted evidence that the jeep was
Bacnotan Consolidated Industries, Inc., with Calibo "zigzagging” and hence no way of telling in which
at the wheel, as it approached from the South direction it would go as it approached the truck.
Lizada Bridge going towards the direction of Davao
City at about 1:45 in the afternoon of July 4,1979. At
about that time, the cargo track, loaded with Also clearly erroneous is the finding of the
cement bags, GI sheets, plywood, driven by Intermediate Appellate Court that Zacarias had no
defendant Paul Zacarias y Infants, coming from the driver's license at the time. The traffic accident report
opposite direction of Davao City and bound for attests to the proven fact that Zacarias voluntarily
Glan, South Cotabato, had just crossed said bridge. surrendered to the investigating officers his driver's
At about 59 yards after crossing the bridge, the license, valid for 1979, that had been renewed just
cargo truck and the jeep collided as a the day before the accident, on July 3, 1979. The
consequence of which Engineer Calibo died while Court was apparently misled by the circumstance
Roranes and Patos sustained physical injuries. that when said driver was first asked to show his
Zacarias was unhurt. As a result of the impact, the left license by the investigators at the scene of the
side of the truck was slightly damaged while the left collision, he had first inadvertently produced the
side of the jeep, including its fender and hood, was license of a fellow driver, Leonardo Baricuatro, who
extensively damaged. After the impact, the jeep fell had left said license in Davao City and had asked
and rested on its right side on the asphalted road a Zacarias to bring it back to him in Glan, Cotabato.
Further, petitioner faulted the appellate court for not Moreover, both the trial court and the Court of
applying the doctrine of the "last clear chance" Appeals found that at the time of the accident the
against the jeepney driver. Petitioner claims that Pantranco bus was speeding towards Manila [CA
under the circumstances of the case, it was the Decision, p. 2; Rollo, p. 45]. By the time David Ico
driver of the passenger jeepney who had the last must have realized that the bus was not returning to
clear chance to avoid the collision and was its own lane, it was already too late to swerve the
therefore negligent in failing to utilize with jeepney to his right to prevent an accident. The
reasonable care and competence his then existing speed at which the approaching bus was running
opportunity to avoid the harm. prevented David Ico from swerving the jeepney to
the right shoulder of the road in time to avoid the
collision. Thus, even assuming that the jeepney driver
ISSUE: WON the doctrine of last clear chance is perceived the danger a few seconds before the
applicable in the instant case? actual collision, he had no opportunity to avoid it.
This Court has held that the last clear chance
RULING: NO. doctrine "can never apply where the party charged
is required to act instantaneously, and if the injury
12 |Torts Part 3 Case Digests
cannot be avoided by the application of all means of the accident on December 31, 1970", likewise
at hand after the peril is or should have been appearing from the complaint and, therefore, the
discovered" [Ong v. Metropolitan Water District, action has already prescribed under Article 1146 of
supra]. the Civil Code.
PRESCRIPTION RULING: NO
On July 21, 1975, RTC rendered judgment against It is true that the defense of
private respondents, finding that the minor Dennis prescription can only be considered if
Pfleider, was allowed by his parents to operate a the same is invoked as such in the
Ford pick-up car and because of his reckless answer of the defendant and that in
negligence caused the accident in question, this particular instance no such
resulting in injuries to Annette. defense was invoked because the
defendants had been declared in
Pfleiders asserted that the complaint shows on its default, but such rule does riot obtain
face "that it was filed only on January 6, 1975, or after when the evidence shows that the
the lapse of MORE THAN FOUR YEARS from the date cause of action upon which plaintiff's
13 |Torts Part 3 Case Digests
complaint is based is already barred determining the proximate cause of the maritime
by the statute of limitations. (Emphasis collision. On October 19, 1981, the Board concluded
supplied.) that the loss of the F/B Marjolea and its fish catch was
attributable to the negligence of the employees of
Again, in Philippine National Bank v. Pacific the Trans-Asia who were on board the M/V Asia
Commission House, 7 where the action sought to Philippines during the collision.
revive a judgment rendered by the Court of First
Instance of Manila on February 3, 1953 and it was On May 30, 1985, Kramers instituted a Complaint for
patent from the stamp appearing on the first page damages. Trans-Asia filed a Motion seeking the
of the complaint that the complaint was actually dismissal of the Complaint on the ground of
filed on May 31, 1963, this Court sustained the prescription. It was argued that under Article 1146 of
dismissal of the complaint on the ground of the Civil Code, the prescriptive period for instituting
prescription, although such defense was not raised a Complaint for damages arising from a quasi-delict
in the answer, overruling the appellants' invocation like a maritime collision is four years. It was
of Section 2 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court that maintained that the Kramers should have filed their
"defenses and objections not pleaded either in a Complaint within four years from the date when their
motion to dismiss or in tile answer are deemed cause of action accrued, i.e., from April 8, 1976
waived." We held therein that "... the fact that the when the maritime collision took place, and that
plaintiff's own allegation in tile complaint or the accordingly, the Complaint filed on May 30, 1985
evidence it presented shows clearly that the action was instituted beyond the four-year prescriptive
had prescribed removes this case from the rule period.
regarding waiver of the defense by failure to plead
the same." Kramers argued that the running of the prescriptive
period was tolled by the filing of the marine protest
In the present case, there is no issue of fact involved and that their cause of action accrued only on April
in connection with the question of prescription. The 29, 1982, the date when the Decision ascertaining
complaint in Civil Case alleges that the accident the negligence of the crew of the M/V Asia
which caused the injuries sustained by plaintiff Philippines had become final, and that the four-year
Annette Ferrer occured on December 31, 1970. It is prescriptive period under Article 1146 of the Civil
undisputed that the action for damages was only Code should be computed from the said date.
filed on January 6, 1975. Actions for damages arising Kramers concluded that inasmuch as the Complaint
from physical injuries because of a tort must be filed was filed on May 30, 1985, the same was seasonably
within four years. The four-year period begins from filed.
the day the quasi-delict is committed or the date of
the accident. The petition for Mandamus to compel ISSUE: WON a Complaint for damages instituted by
the immediate execution of the Decision dated July the Kramers against Trans-Asia arising from a marine
21, 1975, is dismissed collision is barred by the statute of limitations
FACTS:
The petition is devoid of merit. Under Article 1146 of
the Civil Code, an action based upon a quasi-delict
In the early morning of April 8, 1976, the F/B Marjolea, must be instituted within four (4) years. The
a fishing boat owned by Ernesto Kramer, Jr. and prescriptive period begins from the day the quasi-
Marta Kramer, was navigating its way from delict is committed. In Paulan vs. Sarabia, 16 this
Marinduque to Manila. Somewhere near Maricabon Court ruled that in an action for damages arising
Island and Cape Santiago, the boat figured in a from the collision of two (2) trucks, the action being
collision with an inter-island vessel, the M/V Asia based on a quasi-delict, the four (4) year prescriptive
Philippines owned by Trans-Asia Shipping Lines, Inc. period must be counted from the day of the collision.
As a consequence of the collision, the F/B Marjolea
sank, taking with it its fish catch.
In Espanol vs. Chairman, Philippine Veterans
Administration, 17 this Court held as follows-
After the mishap, the captains of both vessels filed
their respective marine protests with the Board of
The right of action accrues when
Marine Inquiry of the Philippine Coast Guard. The
there exists a cause of action, which
Board conducted an investigation for the purpose of
14 |Torts Part 3 Case Digests
consists of 3 elements, namely: a) a He went to encash two checks covering the wages
right in favor of the plaintiff by of the employees and the operating expenses of the
whatever means and under Project. He estimated that the money would be
whatever law it arises or is created; b) available by ten o'clock in the morning and that he
an obligation on the part of would be back in Ternate by about two o'clock in
defendant to respect such right; and the afternoon of the same day.
c) an act or omission on the part of
such defendant violative of the right For some reason, however, the processing of the
of the plaintiff ... It is only when the last checks was delayed and was completed only at
element occurs or takes place that it three o'clock that afternoon. He decided
can be said in law that a cause of nevertheless to encash them because the Project
action has arisen ... . employees would be waiting for their pay the
following day. He thought he had to do this for their
From the foregoing ruling, it is clear that the benefit as otherwise they would have to wait until
prescriptive period must be counted when the last the following Tuesday at the earliest when the main
element occurs or takes place, that is, the time of the office would reopen. He collected the cash value of
commission of an act or omission violative of the the checks and left the main office with not an
right of the plaintiff, which is the time when the cause insubstantial amount of money in his hands.
of action arises.
What would he do with the money in the meantime?
It is therefore clear that in this action for damages The petitioner had two choices, to wit: (1) return to
arising from the collision of two (2) vessels the four (4) Ternate, Cavite, that same afternoon and arrive
year prescriptive period must be counted from the there in the early evening; or (2) take the money with
day of the collision. The aggrieved party need not him to his house in Marilao, Bulacan, spend the night
wait for a determination by an administrative body there, and leave for Ternate the following morning.
like a Board of Marine Inquiry, that the collision was He opted for the second, thinking it the safer one. He
caused by the fault or negligence of the other party took a passenger jeep bound for his house in
before he can file an action for damages. The ruling Bulacan.
in Vasquez does not apply in this case. Immediately
after the collision the aggrieved party can seek relief It was while the vehicle was along its way that two
from the courts by alleging such negligence or fault persons boarded with knives in hand and robbery in
of the owners, agents or personnel of the other mind. One pointed his weapon at the his side while
vessel. the other slit his pocket and forcibly took the money
he was carrying. The two then jumped out of the
jeep and ran. Hernandez, after the initial shock,
Thus, the respondent court correctly found that the
immediately followed in desperate pursuit. The
action of Kramer has prescribed. The collision
stolen money he took with him has not been
occurred on April 8, 1976. The complaint for
recovered.
damages was filed in court only on May 30, 1 985,
was beyond the four (4) year prescriptive period.
Hernandez filed a request for relief from money
accountability under Section 638 of the Revised
Administrative Code.
ADA
However, the Commission on Audit, through then
FORTUITOUS EVENT Chairman Francisco S. Tantuico, jr. denied the
petitioner's request, observing inter alia:
14. TEODORO M. HERNANDEZ vs. THE HONORABLE
CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON AUDIT In the instant case, the loss of the P10,175.00 under
the accountability of Mr. Hernandez can be
attributed to his negligence because had he
brought the cash proceeds of the checks
FACTS: (replenishment fund) to the Beach Park in Ternate,
Cavite, immediately after encashment for
Teodoro M. Hernandez was the officer-in-charge safekeeping in his office, which is the normal
and special disbursing officer of the Ternate Beach procedure in the handling of public funds, the loss of
Project of the Philippine Tourism Authority in Cavite. said cash thru robbery could have been aborted.
15 |Torts Part 3 Case Digests
his request for relief from accountability for the stolen
In the petition at bar, Hernandez claims that the money
Commission on Audit acted with grave abuse of
discretion in denying him relief and in holding him RULING: NO
negligent for the loss of the stolen money. He avers
he has done only what any reasonable man would (Pang MMK. You may exclude this paragraph pero
have done and should not be held accountable for sayang. Hahaha)
a fortuitous event over which he had no control. Hindsight is a cruel judge. It is so easy to say, after the
event, that one should have done this and not that
The Commission on Audit insists in this memorandum or that he should not have acted at all, or else this
that the petitioner should not be relieved from his problem would not have arisen at all. That is all very
money accountability because it was his own well as long as one is examining something that has
negligence that led to the loss of the cash he had already taken place. One can hardly be wrong in
sought to take not to Ternate in Cavite but to such a case. But the trouble with this retrospective
Marilao. assessment is that it assumes for everybody an
uncanny prescience that will enable him by some
The memorandum concludes that in deciding to mysterious process to avoid the pitfalls and hazards
take the money with him to Marilao after that he is expected to have foreseen. It does not
imprudently withdrawing it from the main office, the work out that way in real life. For most of us, all we
petitioner was assuming a risk from which he cannot can rely on is a reasoned conjecture of what might
now be excused after the loss of the money as a happen, based on common sense and our own
result of the robbery to which it was unreasonably experiences, or our intuition, if you will, and without
exposed. In any event, the burden of proof in any mystic ability to peer into the future. So it was
petitions for relief from money accountability rests with the petitioner.
with the petitioner, who has not clearly established
that the loss of the money was not the result of his It is pointless to argue that Hernandez should have
negligence. encashed the vouchers earlier because they were
dated anyway. He was not obliged to encash the
Section 638 of the Revised Administrative Code checks earlier and then again there might have
reads as follows: been any number of reasons why he did so only on
July 1, 1983. The point is that he did encash the
Section 638. Credit for loss occurring in transit or checks on that date and took the money to Marilao
due to casualty — Notice to Auditor. — When a loss and not Ternate in view of the lateness of the hour.
of government funds or property occurs while the
same is in transit or is caused by fire, theft, or other Hernandez was moved only by the best of motives
casualty, the officer accountable therefor or having when he encashed the checks so his co-employees
custody thereof shall immediately notify the Auditor in Ternate could collect their salaries and wages the
General, or the provincial auditor, according as a following day. Significantly, although this was a non-
matter is within the original jurisdiction of the one or working day, he was intending to make the trip to his
the other, and within thirty days or such longer period office the following day for the unselfish purpose of
as the Auditor, or provincial auditor, may in the accommodating his fellow workers. The other
particular case allow, shall present his application for alternative was to encash the check the next
relief, with the available evidence in support thereof. working day which would have meant a 5-day wait
An officer who fails to comply with this requirement for the payment of the said salaries and wages.
shall not be relieved of liability or allowed credit for Being a modest employee himself, Hernanez must
any such loss in the settlement of his accounts. have realized the great discomfort it would cause
the laborer who were dependent on their wages for
This provision has since then been reiterated, with their sustenance and were anxious to collect their
some slight modification, in Section 73 of P.D. No. pay as soon as possible.
1445, otherwise known as the "Government Auditing
Code of the Philippines," which was promulgated on For such an attitude, Hernandez should be
June 11. 1978. commended rather than faulted.
Issue: WON the loss of the money is attributable to As for Hernandez's choice between Marilao,
Hernandez' negligence so as to justify the denial of Bulacan, and Ternate, Cavite, one could easily
agree that the former was the safer destination,
16 |Torts Part 3 Case Digests
being nearer, and in view of the comparative Another factor and perhaps the most likely reason
hazards in the trips to the two places. It is true that for the dislodging of the roofings structural trusses is
the petitioner miscalculated, but the Court feels he the improper anchorage of the said trusses to the
should not be blamed for that. The decision he roof beams. The 1/2 diameter steel bars embedded
made seemed logical at that time and was one that on the concrete roof beams which serve as truss
could be expected of a reasonable and prudent anchorage are not bolted nor nailed to the trusses.
person. And if, as it happened, the two robbers Still, there are other steel bars which were not even
attacked him in broad daylight in the jeep while it bent to the trusses, thus, those trusses are not
was on a busy highway, and in the presence of other anchored at all to the roof beams.
passengers, it cannot be said that all this was the
result of his imprudence and negligence. This was It then recommended that to avoid any further loss
undoubtedly a fortuitous event covered by the said and damage to lives, limbs and property of persons
provisions, something that could not have been living in the vicinity, the fourth floor of subject school
reasonably foreseen although it could have building be declared as a structural hazard.
happened, and did.
In their Complaint for damages based on culpa
Hernandez is entitled to be relieved from aquiliana, private respondents alleged that the
accountability for the money forcibly taken from damage to their house rendered the same
him. To impose such liability upon him would be to uninhabitable, forcing them to stay temporarily in
read the law too sternly when it should be softened others houses. And so they sought to recover from
by the proven facts. petitioner actual damages,moral damages,
exemplary damages and for and as attorneys fees;
plus costs.
15. SOUTHEASTERN COLLEGE, INC., petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS In its Answer, petitioner averred that subject school
building had withstood several devastating
FACTS: typhoons and other calamities in the past, without its
roofing or any portion thereof giving way; that it has
Private respondents are owners of a house while not been remiss in its responsibility to see to it that
petitioner owns a four-storey school building along said school building, which houses school children,
the same College Road. A powerful typhoon Saling faculty members, and employees, is in tip-top
hit Metro Manila. Buffeted by very strong winds, the condition; and furthermore, typhoon Saling was an
roof of petitioners building was partly ripped off and act of God and therefore beyond human control
blown away, landing on and destroying portions of such that petitioner cannot be answerable for the
the roofing of private respondents house. After the damages wrought thereby, absent any negligence
typhoon had passed, an ocular inspection of the on its part.
destroyed buildings was conducted by a team of
engineers headed by the city building official, Engr. TC:
Jesus L. Reyna. Giving credence to the ocular inspection report to
the effect that subject school building had a
The report provides that: defective roofing structure, found that, while
typhoon Saling was accompanied by strong winds,
One of the factors that may have led to this the damage to private respondents house could
calamitous event is the formation of the buildings in have been avoided if the construction of the roof of
the area and the general direction of the wind. [petitioners] building was not faulty.
Situated in the peripheral lot is an almost U-shaped
formation of 4-storey building. Thus, with the strong
winds having a westerly direction, the general ISSUE: WON the damage on the roof of the building
formation of the buildings becomes a big funnel-like of private respondents resulting from the impact of
structure, the one situated along College Road, the falling portions of the school buildings roof ripped
receiving the heaviest impact of the strong winds. off by the strong winds of typhoon Saling, was, within
Hence, there are portions of the roofing, those legal contemplation, due to fortuitous event
located on both ends of the building, which
remained intact after the storm. RULING: YES
Art 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the At the outset, it bears emphasizing that a person
law, or when it is otherwise declared by stipulation, claiming damages for the negligence of another
or when the nature of the obligation requires the has the burden of proving the existence of fault or
assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for negligence causative of his injury or loss. The facts
those events which could not be foreseen, or which, constitutive of negligence must be affirmatively
though foreseen, were inevitable. established by competent evidence,not merely by
presumptions and conclusions without basis in fact.
In order that a fortuitous event may exempt a person Private respondents, in establishing the culpability of
from liability, it is necessary that he be free from any petitioner, merely relied on the aforementioned
previous negligence or misconduct by reason of report submitted by a team which made an ocular
which the loss may have been occasion. An act of inspection of petitioners school building after the
God cannot be invoked for the protection of a typhoon. As the term imparts, an ocular inspection is
person who has been guilty of gross negligence in one by means of actual sight or viewing. What is
not trying to forestall its possible adverse visual to the eye though, is not always reflective of
consequences. When a persons negligence concurs the real cause behind. For instance, one who hears
with an act of God in producing damage or injury to a gunshot and then sees a wounded person, cannot
another, such person is not exempt from liability by always definitely conclude that a third person shot
showing that the immediate or proximate cause of the victim. It could have been self-inflicted or
the damage or injury was a fortuitous event. When caused accidentally by a stray bullet. The
the effect is found to be partly the result of the relationship of cause and effect must be clearly
participation of man whether it be from active shown.
intervention, or neglect, or failure to act the whole
occurrence is hereby humanized, and removed In the present case, other than the said ocular
from the rules applicable to acts of God. inspection, no investigation was conducted to
determine the real cause of the partial unroofing of
In the case under consideration, the lower court petitioners school building. Private respondents did
accorded full credence to the finding of the not even show that the plans, specifications and
investigating team that subject school buildings design of said school building were deficient and
roofing had no sufficient anchorage to hold it in defective. Neither did they prove any substantial
position especially when battered by strong winds. deviation from the approved plans and
Based on such finding, the trial court imputed specifications. Nor did they conclusively establish
negligence to petitioner and adjudged it liable for that the construction of such building was basically
damages to private respondents. flawed.
There is no question that a typhoon or storm is a On the other hand, petitioner elicited from one of
fortuitous event, a natural occurrence which may be the witnesses of private respondents, city building
foreseen but is unavoidable despite any amount of official Jesus Reyna, that the original plans and
foresight, diligence or care. In order to be exempt design of petitioners school building were approved
from liability arising from any adverse consequence prior to its construction. Engr. Reyna admitted that it
engendered thereby, there should have been no was a legal requirement before the construction of
human participation amounting to a negligent act. any building to obtain a permit from the city building
In other words, the person seeking exoneration from official (city engineer, prior to the passage of the
liability must not be guilty of negligence. Building Act of 1977). In like manner, after
Negligence, as commonly understood, is conduct construction of the building, a certification must be
which naturally or reasonably creates undue risk or secured from the same official attesting to the
harm to others. It may be the failure to observe that readiness for occupancy of the edifice. Having
degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the obtained both building permit and certificate of
circumstances justly demand, or the omission to do occupancy, these are, at the very least, prima facie
something which a prudent and reasonable man, evidence of the regular and proper construction of
guided by considerations which ordinarily regulate subject school building.
the conduct of human affairs, would do, From these
premises, we proceed to determine whether Furthermore, when part of its roof needed repairs of
petitioner was negligent, such that if it were not, the the damage inflicted by typhoon Saling, the same
18 |Torts Part 3 Case Digests
city official gave the go-signal for such repairs amount needed for the repair of the roof of their
without any deviation from the original design and subject building. What is more, whether the
subsequently, authorized the use of the entire fourth necessary repairs were caused ONLY by petitioners
floor of the same building. These only prove that alleged negligence in the maintenance of its school
subject building suffers from no structural defect, building, or included the ordinary wear and tear of
contrary to the report that its U-shaped form was the house itself, is an essential question that remains
structurally defective. Having given his unqualified indeterminable.
imprimatur, the city building official is presumed to
have properly performed his duties in connection
therewith.
JONI
In addition, petitioner presented its vice president for
finance and administration who testified that an MISTAKE AND WAIVER
annual maintenance inspection and repair of
subject school building were regularly undertaken.
16. GATCHALIAN VS CA
Petitioner was even willing to present its
maintenance supervisor to attest to the extent of
Facts: July 11, 1973 noontime, petitioner Reynalda
such regular inspection but private respondents
Gatchalian boarded, as a paying passenger,
agreed to dispense with his testimony and simply
respondent's "Thames" mini bus at a point in San
stipulated that it would be corroborative of the vice
Eugenio, Aringay, La Union, bound for Bauang. On
presidents narration.
the way, while the bus was running along the
highway in Barrio Payocpoc, Bauang, Union, "a
Moreover, the city building official, who has been in
snapping sound" was suddenly heard at one part of
the city government service since 1974, admitted in
the bus and, shortly thereafter, the vehicle bumped
open court that no complaint regarding any defect
a cement flower pot on the side of the road, went
on the same structure has ever been lodged before
off the road, turned turtle and fell into a ditch.
his office prior to the institution of the case at bench.
Several passengers, including petitioner Gatchalian,
It is a matter of judicial notice that typhoons are
were injured. They were promptly taken to Bethany
common occurrences in this country. If subject
Hospital at San Fernando, La Union, for medical
school buildings roofing was not firmly anchored to
treatment. Upon medical examination, petitioner
its trusses, obviously, it could not have withstood long
was found to have sustained physical injuries on the
years and several typhoons even stronger than
leg, arm and forehead, specifically described as
Saling.
follows: lacerated wound, forehead; abrasion,
elbow, left; abrasion, knee, left; abrasion, lateral
In light of the foregoing, we find no clear and
surface, leg, left.
convincing evidence to sustain the judgment of the
appellate court. We thus hold that petitioner has not
Mrs. Adela Delim, wife of respondent, visited them
been shown negligent or at fault regarding the
and later paid for their hospitalization and medical
construction and maintenance of its school building
expenses of the passengers. She also gave petitioner
in question and that typhoon Saling was the
P12.00 with which to pay her transportation expense
proximate cause of the damage suffered by private
in going home from the hospital. However, before
respondents house.
Mrs. Delim left, she had the injured passengers,
including petitioner, sign an already prepared Joint
Petitioner cannot be made to answer for a purely
Affidavit which stated, among other things:
fortuitous event. More so because no bad faith or
willful act to cause damage was alleged and
proven to warrant moral damages. That we are no longer interested to file a
complaint, criminal or civil against the said
Private respondents failed to adduce adequate and driver and owner of the said Thames,
competent proof of the pecuniary loss they actually because it was an accident and the said
incurred. It is not enough that the damage be driver and owner of the said Thames have
capable of proof but must be actually proved with gone to the extent of helping us to be
a reasonable degree of certainty, pointing out treated upon our injuries.
specific facts that afford a basis for measuring
whatever compensatory damages are borne. Still, petitioner Gathalian filed an action extra
Private respondents merely submitted an estimated contractu to recover compensatory and moral
If we apply the standard used in Yepes and Early morning, October 27, 1978, at the height of
Susaya, we would have to conclude that the terms typhoon "Kading", a massive flood covered the
of the Joint Affidavit in the instant case cannot be towns near Angat Dam, particularly the town of
20 |Torts Part 3 Case Digests
Norzagaray, causing several deaths and the loss and or contravention in any manner of the tenor of the
destruction of houses, farms, plants, working animals obligation as provided in Article 1170 of the Civil
and other properties of the people residing near the Code which results in loss or damage.
Angat River. Private respondents recalled, they were
awakened by the sound of rampaging water all Petitioners contended that unlike in Juan F. Nakpil &
around them. The water came swiftly and strongly Sons, there was no privity of contract between
that before they could do anything to save their herein petitioners and private respondents. They
belongings, their houses had submerged, some even further alleged that they owed no specific duty to
swept away by the strong current. A number of private respondents in the same way that the
people were able to save their lives only by climbing architect of a building owed a specific duty to its
trees. owner. Petitioners, however, failed to consider that
even if there was no contractual relation between
Respondents blamed the sudden rush of water to themselves and private respondents, they are still
the reckless and imprudent opening of all the three liable under the law on quasi-delict. Article 2176 of
(3) floodgates of the Angat Dam spillway, without the Civil Code explicitly provides "whoever by act or
prior warning to the people living near or within the omission causes damage to another there being
vicinity of the dam. fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage
done."
Petitioners denied respondents' allegations and
contended that they have maintained the water in Neither can petitioners escape liability by
the Angat Dam at a safe level and that the opening invoking force majeure. Act of God or force
of the spillways was done gradually and after all majeure, by definition, are extraordinary events not
precautionary measures had been taken. Petitioner foreseeable or avoidable, events that could not be
further contended that it had always exercised the foreseen, or which, though foreseen, are inevitable.
diligence of a good father in the selection of its It is therefore not enough that the event should not
officials and employees and in their supervision. It have been foreseen or anticipated, as is commonly
also claimed that written warnings were earlier sent believed, but it must be one impossible to foresee or
to the towns concerned. At the time typhoon to avoid. As a general rule, no person shall be
"Kading" hit Bulacan with its torrential rain, a great responsible for those events which could not be
volume of flood water flowed into the dam's reservoir foreseen or which though foreseen, were inevitable.
necessitating the release of the water therein in
order to prevent the dam from collapsing and However, the principle embodied in the act of God
causing the loss of lives and tremendous damage to doctrine strictly requires that the act must be
livestock and properties. occasioned solely by the violence of nature. Human
intervention is to be excluded from creating or
Also, there was no direct causal relationship entering into the cause of the mischief. When the
between the alleged damages suffered by the effect is found to be in part the result of the
respondents and the acts and omissions attributed participation of man, whether due to his active
to the former. That it was the respondents who intervention or neglect or failure to act, the whole
assumed the risk of residing near the Angat River, occurrence is then humanized and removed from
and even assuming that respondents suffered the rules applicable to the acts of God.
damages, the cause was due to a fortuitous event
and such damages are of the nature and character So generally it cannot be said that
of damnum absque injuria, hence, respondents damage, injury or loss is due to an act
have no cause of action against them. of God where it was caused merely
by excessive or heavy rainfall, storms
ISSUE: WON petitioner was correct in saying that the and to weather conditions which are
damages suffered by the respondents was in the not unusual in character, those which
nature and character of damnun absque injuria could have been reasonably
anticipated or where the injury
Ruling: NO complained of is due rather to the
negligence or mismanagement of
The obligor cannot escape liability, if upon the man than to the disturbance of the
happening of a fortuitous event or an act of God, a elements or where such damage,
corresponding fraud, negligence, delay or violation injury or loss might have been
What more, when the evidence shows that The letter itself, addressed merely "TO ALL
as early as October 25, 1978 the newspapers CONCERNED", would not strike one to be of serious
had announced the expected occurrence importance, sufficient enough to set alarm and
of a powerful typhoon code-named cause people to take precautions for their safety's
"Kading". On October 26, Bulletin Today had sake.
as its headline the coming of the typhoon.
Despite these announcements, the water LADY
level in the dam was maintained at its
maximum from October 21, until midnight of EMERGENCY RULE
October 26, 1978.
18. MCKEE v. IAC
The defendants contended that the release FACTS:
of water had been "gradual". The lower court
did not find this true. What made the situation It was the 8th of January in 1977, at around 9:00 or
worse was that the opening of the spillways 10:00 in the morning, somewhere between Angeles
was made at the unholy hours when City and San Fernando, Pampanga. Jose Koh was
residents were asleep. The plaintiffs all driving his daughter, Araceli Koh McKee, and her
testified that they were never given any minor children, Christopher, George, and Kim, as well
warning that the spillways would be opened as Kim’s babysitter, Loida Bondoc, from San
to that extent. . . . Fernando, Pampanga in the direction of Angeles
City (northward) in a Ford Escort.
When the negligence of a person concurs with an
act of God producing a loss, such person is not Meanwhile, a cargo truck owned by Jaime Tayag
exempt from liability by showing that the immediate and Rosalinda Manalo, driven by Ruben Galang,
As the Escort approached one Pulong-Pulo Bridge Negligence is the omission to do something which a
from the southern portion, 2 boys suddenly ran from reasonable man, guided by those considerations
the right side of the road into the Escort’s lane. As the which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human
boys were going back and forth, unsure of whether affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a
to cross all the way or turn back, Jose blew his horn. prudent and reasonable man would not do. It is that
He was then forced to swerve left and into the lane want of the care required by the circumstances. It is
Galang was driving in. Jose switched his headlights a relative or comparative, not an absolute, term and
on, applied his brakes, and attempted to return to its application depends upon the situation of the
his lane. parties and the degree of care and vigilance which
the circumstances reasonably require. Where the
However, he failed to get back into the right lane, danger is great, a high degree of care is necessary,
and collided with the cargo truck. The collision and the failure to observe it is a want of ordinary care
occurred on the bridge. The collision resulted in the under the circumstances.
deaths of the driver, Jose, the one-year-old, Kim, and
her babysitter, Loida, on whose lap she was sitting. The test by which to determine the existence of
Loida was seated in the passenger seat. Araceli, negligence in a particular case may be stated as
Christopher, and George, who were sitting in the follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged
back of the Escort, received physical injuries from the negligent act use that (reasonable care and
collision. caution which an ordinarily prudent person would
have used in the same situation?) If not, then he is
An information was filed against Ruben Galang, guilty of negligence.
charging him for reckless imprudence resulting in
multiple homicide, physical injuries, and damage to On the basis of the foregoing definition, the test of
property. He was found guilty beyond reasonable negligence and the facts obtaining in this case, it is
doubt of the charges in the information. The manifest that no negligence could be imputed to
conviction was affirmed by the CA and achieved Jose Koh. Any reasonable and ordinary prudent
finality after the denial by the CA of his MR and the man would have tried to avoid running over the two
denial by the SC of his Petition for Review. boys by swerving the car away from where they
were even if this would mean entering the opposite
Two civil cases were filed. The first one, by the wife lane. Avoiding such immediate peril would be the
and children of Jose Koh, and the second one by natural course to take particularly where the vehicle
Araceli and her husband for the death of Kim and in the opposite lane would be several meters away
injuries to Araceli and her other children. The and could very well slow down, move to the side of
respondents were impleaded against as the the road and give way to the oncoming car.
employers of Ruben Galang – Galang was not
included. The cases here are based on quasi-delict. Moreover, under what is known as the Emergency
These cases were eventually consolidated. Rule, "one who suddenly finds himself in a place of
danger, and is required to act without time to
The trial court dismissed the civil cases and awarded consider the best means that may be adopted to
the respondents damages and attorney’s fees. On avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of
appeal to the Intermediate Appellate Court, the negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently
dismissal was reversed. This was based on its finding and upon reflection may appear to have been a
that it was Galang’s inattentiveness or reckless better method, unless the emergency in which he
imprudence that caused the accident. finds himself is brought about by his own
negligence."
However, upon filing by the respondents of an MR,
the IAC set aside its original decision and upheld that Considering the sudden intrusion of the two (2) boys
of the trial court because the fact that Koh’s car into the lane of the car, We find that Jose Koh
invaded the lane of the truck and the collision adopted the best means possible in the given
occurred while still in Galang’s lane gave rise to the situation to avoid hitting them. Applying the above
presumption that Koh was negligent.
Under the circumstances of the case, petitioner was INELCO FAILED TO EXERCISE EXTRAORDINARY
negligent in seeing to it that no harm is done to the DILIGENCE.
general public". . . considering that electricity is an
agency, subtle and deadly, the measure of care "When a storm occurs that is liable to prostrate the
required of electric companies must be wires, due care requires prompt efforts to discover
commensurate with or proportionate to the danger. and repair broken lines". The fact is that when
The duty of exercising this high degree of diligence Engineer Antonio Juan of the National Power
and care extends to every place where persons Corporation set out in the early morning of June 29,
have a right to be". 1967 on an inspection tour, he saw grounded and
disconnected lines hanging from posts to the ground
The negligence of petitioner having been shown, it but did not see any INELCO lineman either in the
may not now absolve itself from liability by arguing streets or at the INELCO office.
that the victim's death was solely due to a fortuitous
event. "When an act of God combines or concurs The foregoing shows that petitioner's duty to
with the negligence of the defendant to produce an exercise extraordinary diligence under the
injury, the defendant is liable if the injury would not circumstance was not observed, confirming the
have resulted but for his own negligent conduct or negligence of petitioner.
omission".