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Peter Suber, - Stages of Argument
Peter Suber, - Stages of Argument
Peter Suber, - Stages of Argument
Contents
Stage 1
Stage 2
Stage 3
Stage 4
In General
Appendix for Logicians
Schopenhauer said that it helps to have common names for common fallacies. When we do, then we
can use them in conversation for quick and clear diagnoses of problems with reasoning. Then we
have a better chance to notice them, fix them, and move beyond them.
In that spirit I'd like to name four stages of sophistication in argument, and some associated informal
properties of argument. This is not profound. In fact, it's hokey. But I believe that teachers, and
others who talk about arguments and evaluate their strengths, will find it helpful to have these
names for rapid identification of where we are and where we could be instead.
These stages apply primarily to arguments for ethical and political conclusions. They have very
little relevance to arguments for mathematical and scientific conclusions. (For the reason why, see
the appendix below.)
Here are some terms to help us understand the stages to follow. Let us say that a positive argument
directly supports a conclusion, while a negative argument undermines an opposing conclusion. Let
us say that an argument is two-sided if it has both positive and negative components, and one-sided
otherwise. Finally, let us say that an argument is responsive if it answers objections to its positive
and negative components, and unresponsive otherwise.
Stage 1. To say nothing in support of your claim. To make an assertion without argument.
This is the absence of argument. If we need another term for it, we can call it
dogmatism.
Since there is no argument at all here, we could call it Stage 0. However, I'd like to
recognize that it is already an advance on the vagueness which does not assert anything
at all.
Stage 2. To offer a positive or negative argument, but not yet both. To argue one-sidedly.
Stage 2 arguments can be positive or negative. What's distinctive about them is that
they are not yet both.
We're not demanding that the positive or negative argument be sufficient, or strong, or
even relevant. Hence, these are all Stage 2 arguments:
Stage 2 arguments can be much stronger than these examples. But these weak examples
show well what is deficient in any argument limited to Stage 2. Anyone who is paying
attention to a controversy can say something positive on one side, or can say something
negative against the other. Hence, to hear something on one side of an issue doesn't get
us very far. We want to know the best that can be said on one side, and the best that can
be said on the other.
We would have the same problem if someone gave 50 distinct and detailed reasons why
assisted suicide should be legal. That would be impressive, but there may be 50 entirely
adequate rebuttals to these reasons, and then 100 reasons why assisted suicide should
be illegal.
In short, a Stage 2 argument for a certain conclusion might be strong, but for all we
know the arguments for an alternative conclusion are even stronger. We won't know
until we look at the arguments for alternative conclusions. That requires moving
beyond the one-sidedness of Stage 2 arguments.
I'm using the term "two-sidedness" as the alternative to the one-sidedness of Stage 2
arguments. But in fact there may be many more than two alternative positions on an
issue. Where there are many alternative positions, a Stage 3 argument criticizes at least
one of them. If it criticizes many of them, it could be called "many-sided", but I will
continue to call it "two-sided".
But if we're still not demanding sufficiency, strength, or relevance, then it's still true
that any observant person can say something pro and con on either side of a
controversy. Hence to hear something pro one side and something con the other doesn't
get us very far.
In short, if we make a two-sided argument and disregard objections to it, and disregard
defenses raised against our own objections, then our position might be strong and still
be weaker than an alternative position. Only by moving beyond two-sidedness to
responsiveness can we tell. We have to examine and answer the objections made
against our views, and examine and answer the defenses raised against our objections,
not disregard them, if we are to discover whether they have merit.
Another way to put this: the positive side of a Stage 3 argument might be strong, but
for all we know the positive arguments for contrary conclusions are even stronger. Our
positive argument might be strong, but for all we know the negative arguments against
it show its insufficiency or invalidity. Our negative argument might be strong, but for
all we know the position it criticizes can answer it adequately. We won't know whether
our strong Stage 3 argument is weaker than its rivals until we see how strong the rival
positions are. This requires that we respond to the positive and negative arguments for
rival positions.
Stage 4. To offer positive and negative arguments, to anticipate objections to those, and to respond
to those objections. To argue two-sidedly and responsively.
To respond to an objection or rebuttal is to take note of it, to assess its strength, and to
articulate the reasons why they do not suffice to overturn one's position or to extract a
concession one is not already making.
To respond to a negative argument against our own position, or a positive argument for
a contrary conclusion, calls upon us to uncover its weaknesses, admit its strengths, and
then to revise our own argument accordingly. In practice this argument-revision takes
many forms. It might mean retracting part of our thesis or one of our arguments for it. It
might mean adding an argument specifically against a previously unnoticed alternative,
or answering a previously unnoticed objection. It might mean qualifying an unqualified
or oversimplified thesis. It might mean acknowledging an exception. It might mean
making a concession. It will almost always mean making simple arguments and simple
conclusions complex.
While responsiveness tends to strengthen arguments, some Stage 4 arguments will still
be stronger than others. However, to improve the weaker Stage 4 arguments, we must
stay at Stage 4 and improve our responsiveness. In this sense Stage 4 is the only stage
which is dialectically stable, or which does not push responsible inquirers beyond itself.
There is no Stage 5.
Another perspective on this. If you are paying attention to any controversy (assisted
suicide, gun control, the death penalty), then you can make Stage 1, 2, and 3 arguments
for either side at whim. You could pick your conclusion with the flip of a coin, and
instantly support your new conclusion at those levels of sophistication. All you need is
to listen to what people are saying. It may be sufficient or insufficient, strong or weak,
relevant or irrelevant. In this sense, Stages 1, 2, and 3 are compatible with the random
selection of belief. But a stage of argument is finally serious when it is not compatible
with the random selection of belief.
Another perspective on this. Since observant people can make Stage 1, 2, and 3
arguments on either side of any major controversy, these arguments do not help us
move beyond disagreement to possible truth, correctness, validity, wisdom, or justice. If
we want to know what position on gun control we ought to take, and not just what
positions can be argued, then we must move to Stage 4 arguments. If we want to use
argument as part of an inquiry for an ever-more adequate position, and not as a
decoration for a position with which we are already satisfied, then we must move to
Stage 4 arguments.
Another perspective on this. The Greek skeptics said that two arguments were
equipollent if they were equal in strength or acceptability. Every Stage 1, 2, and 3
argument can be opposed by an equipollent argument by anyone familiar with the
subject matter. With Stage 4 for the first time, we reach a level where this is not true.
My Stage 4 argument for gun control might, in fact, be equipollent with another one
against gun control, but I couldn't produce both arguments on the spot, as an academic
exercise, or from mere familiarity with the controversy. Making a Stage 4 argument is
my way of showing that I care about what I ought to believe, and the strength of my
argument, not merely about the form of argument regardless of strength. A stage of
argument is finally serious when we cannot make an equipollent counter-argument at a
moment's notice.
In General
I'm not saying that all arguments at the same stage are equally strong. For example, "Vote for Jones
because he has a nice smile" and "Vote for Smith because she will protect the envirionment" are
both Stage 2 arguments, and not at all equal in strength.
Some cynics complain that all argument is just verbal decoration. This position shows that they are
partially right. Stage 2 and 3 arguments are just verbal decoration, even if sincerely and passionately
put forward. The reason is that they establish nothing as long as equipollent arguments can be
concocted at will.
Assertion (Stage 1) is necessary but not sufficient for argument. Argument (Stage 2) is necessary
but not sufficient for two-sided argument. Two-sided argument (Stage 3) is necessary but not
sufficient for responsive argument. If it weren't for this last point, we could have switched the order
of Stages 3 and 4 (two-sidedness and responsiveness). Inquirers who become responsive at the same
time they become two-sided simply skip Stage 3.
Apart from the necessary and sufficient conditions enforcing this sequence in stages, it is my
experience that students usually learn the stages in the order presented here. In particular, they learn
responsiveness later than they learn two-sidedness. Since the primary purpose of articulating these
stages is to use them in teaching, it would matter if students pass through these phases
developmentally as well as logically. While we want to students to learn to compose and assess
Stage 4 arguments, we might be wrong to expect them to do it too early in their careers.
When students are ready, it may help move them from Stage 3 to Stage 4 to give an assignment
somewhat as follows. Take a stand on a moral or political controversy. Imagine a Stage 3 argument
against your position. It makes a positive case for a contrary conclusion and a negative case against
your conclusion. Now respond to it, amd show that it does not require any concessions from you
that you are not already making. If this is too easy, then don't settle for a random Stage 3 argument
against your position, but use the strongest arguments you can find against your position. (To
students who think this an exercise in "combat", you could reply that it is much more like an
exercise in "listening".)
Stage 4 arguments are necessary but not sufficient to make progress. We know they don't suffice
because on long-running disputes, like the relative merits of liberty and security, or liberty and
equality, or liberty and religious morality, we've had Stage 4 arguments on both sides for centuries
and we're no closer to social consensus. This history of sophisticated disputation might well have
produced progress in clarifying the issues, and showing which premises tend to favor which
conclusions. But it hasn't led us to know which premises we ought to affirm.
With the language of two-sidedness and responsiveness, we can see new logical virtues set in as we
advance from stage to stage. From Stage 1 to 2, we move from unargued to argued positions. From
Stage 2 to 3, we move from one-sided to two-sided arguments. From Stage 3 to 4, we move from
unresponsive to responsive arguments.
Two-
Stage Argued? Responsive?
Sided?
3 yes yes no
2 yes no no
1 no no no
Moreover, as teachers we are not comfortable judging a student argument for the truth of its
conclusion, but only for the strength of its supporting argument. So we can can comment
freely on validity, but tend to steer clear of soundness. Since arguments at all stages can be
sound or unsound, we can show students at what stage they are arguing and urge them to
advance, still without commenting on soundness. We can assign Stage 4 arguments and nudge
students toward this level of sophistication without committing ourselves to comment on the
truth of conclusions and without a detour to teach the requirements of validity and soundness.
In any case, if we do want to comment on validity and soundness, we already have the words
"valid", "true", and "sound" (and their negations) to use in conversation and comments on
papers. I wanted names for strategies apart from these kinds of strength and weakness. I often
want to tell students that their arguments may be valid, even sound, but that they are one-
sided or unresponsive.
Finally, if we are in a dispute with someone, say, about assisted suicide, then we will not be
able to apply the label "sound" or "unsound" to either party's arguments non-controversially.
The label will be just as contested as the contested conclusions, and for the same reason. I
wanted labels which can be applied almost non-controversially, just as we might apply the
names of common fallacies. I wanted labels which will draw our attention to features of our
arguments which could help us through an impasse. Labels which require us to settle our
dispute first would defeat this purpose.
2. Some logicians say that an argument is cogent if it is valid and sound and takes all relevant
evidence into account. On this usage, failure to reach Stage 4 does not undermine validity or
soundness, but cogency.
If we consider the failure to reach Stage 4 a fallacy of cogency, then we should be clear what
this means. This fallacy does not make an argument invalid or unsound. The fallacy consists
in persuading readers, and perhaps ourselves, that we have said enough to tilt the scale of
evidence, or that we have said enough to justify a judgment. But until we been responsive to
other viewpoints and their supporting arguments, we haven't said enough to justify a
judgment. The arguments for other conclusions may be stronger than our own arguments for
our own conclusion. We won't know until we examine and respond to them.
3. There are many virtues of strong arguments. Why bother putting them into stages? The
answer is to help teachers teach argument, not to illumnate argument as such. This is for
pedagogy, not logic. When we identify stages in the sophistication of argument, then we help
students identify what is strong, and what is weak, in their method or strategy of argument. If
the properties of the stages are already known, then students will know what it takes to
advance to higher levels of sophistication.
4. Similarly, there are many virtues of strong arguments, and many ways to put them in stages.
Apart from what I've already said about this method of putting them in stages, I can point out
that this method does not make the distinction between any two stages a matter of degree.
Hence it does not turn on the degree of effort in criticizing alternatives or responding to
criticism, or the degree of completeness in acknowleding alternatives or criticism. This is
desirable to the extent that it makes the application of the labels non-controversial. (While
responsiveness is a matter of degree, the distinction between responsiveness and two-
sidedness is not a matter of degree.)
Nor does the distinction between any two stages depend on being correct. This is desirable to
the extent that we want to comment on the sophistication of student arguments without
commenting on their correctness.
5. We cannot always distinguish positive and negative arguments. In some disputes, where there
are only two options, which are contradictory, an argument for one is also an argument against
the other. If my opponent has objected to my positive argument, then my reply has both
positive and negative elements —positive for supporting my view, negative for undermining
the contradictory view.
6. The reason why these stages of argument apply in ethics, but not mathematics, is that in
mathematics a one-sided and unresponsive argument can be perfect. To prove a theorem, you
needn't disprove all possible alternatives or answer any objections. At least if we are working
in a formal system with stipulated axioms and rules of inference, then we can construct a
positive argument without a negative, and without anticipating or answering criticism. In less
formalized mathematics, and in natural science, these stages get more traction, though still
much less than in ethics and politics. The reason is that in ethics and politics, our premises are
as much in dispute as our conclusions. Hence any argument is likely to be criticized for its
premises, even if its reasoning from them is impeccable. If ethics and politics had assured
premises or stipulated axioms, then the stages would apply to them as little as they do in
formal mathematics.
These stages apply, then, in any discipline where premises are just as much in dispute as the
conclusions. Ethics and politics are clearly fields of this kind. Philosophy is preeminently
such a field. Hence, it makes more sense to assign a Stage 4 argument in a philosophy paper
than in a mathematics paper.
Peter Suber, Department of Philosophy, Earlham College, Richmond, Indiana, 47374, U.S.A.
peters@earlham.edu. Copyright © 2000, Peter Suber.