Recognition Tasks

In his early investigations of residents' images of Boston, Kevin Lynch also asked
participants to report whether they recognized photos of landmarks that were interspersed
in a collection of pictures of unfamiliar locations. Lynch seems to have included this
recognition task as a reliability check for his more familiar sketch map procedure. Milgram
and Jodelet (1976) revived this approach because it avoids many of the problems
inherent in having people with varying abilities draw sketch maps. Unfortunately, the
procedure limits our ability to compare the orientations and geographical distances
between spatial elements that are often evident both in various mapping techniques
and in direct-distance estimates as discussed in the next section. In addition, this
technique emphasizes recognition (the ability to recognize a place you have seen before)
over recall, which asks you to remember and reproduce as much as you can without the
assistance of photos to jog your memory_ To illustrate, would you typically draw and
label the location of your favorite dry cleaner on a sketch map of your hometown?
Probably not. Would you recognize the same dry cleaning establishment from a picture
of it? Probably. An emphasis on recognition over recall is not necessarily a liability. Some
(e.g., Passini, 1984) believe that recognition tasks more closely approximate the way
most of us deal with movement within familiar environments (we will return to this
issue in our discussion of wayfinding later in this chapter). Still, it should be clear that
these recognition tasks are quite different from the standard sketch map technique, and
thus, are not directly comparable.

Distance Estimates and Statistical Map Building

A number of researchers have also employed an approach that avoids sketch

mapping by asking people to simply estimate the distances between locations in a large-
scale environment. Of course, these distances probably represent some of the information
included in a person's sketch map, and being able to estimate distance is an important
tool for someone wanting to travel in his or her environment. We can distinguish between
at least three measures of distance (see Figure 3-14 ).

Figure 3-14 The functional distance from

point A to point B is considerably longer than
the euclidian (crow fly) path be -cause of the
need to cross a river at the bridge. The cognitive
distance may be longer still because of the
increased information created by the "clutter"
of street crossings and other environmental
changes.
First, there is a physical measurement of the distance between two points "as the crow
flies," often referred to as euclidian distance_ Manyyears ago, Festinger, Schachter, and
Back (1950) used the term functional distance to denote the actual travel distance for a
person walking or driving between locations in the target environment. Finally, cognitive
distance (Golledge, 1987; Hanyu & Itsukushima, 1995) can refer to either euclidian or
functional distance, but in either case, it is based upon a cognitive or perceptual estimate
rather than an actual measurement.

One well-known statistical approach to assessing cognitive estimates of euclidian

distance is multidimensional scaling (MDS). MDS is a statistical procedure in
which participantsestimate the distances between a number of buildings or other
locations in the environment. Given the distance between each point and each of a
number of other points, a computer can generate something resembling a map by
optimally placing each location on a two-dimensional map so as to minimize errors in dis-
tance estimates. You might be able to test an informal form of this scaling technique
without knowledge of the underlying mathematics. Ask a group of your friends to
estimate the distance between each pairing of 10 buildings. Now calculate the mean
(average) estimated distance between each pair of locations. Cut a piece of yarn to a
scaled length representing each mean distance, and stretch out all of the yarn pieces so
that they connect to tacks (representing the buildings). If all of your friends were
absolutely accurate for each distance estimate, the procedure should generate an accurate
map. Of course, consistent distortions are interesting, too. For instance, your friends
might consistently exaggerate the distance of unpleasant or uncommon travel paths.
Although multidimensional scaling eliminates some of the problems of other
methods (e.g., differences in drawing skills), it, too, has problems. Later in this chapter
we will encounter one of the most serious: There is increasing evidence that a person's
estimate of the distance from point A to point B is not necessarily the same as his or her
estimate of the distance from point B to point A!
Our description might have prompted you to consider other problems with
MDS. Unlike an unbounded sketch map, the procedure focuses not on what paths or
landmarks a person remembers but on the estimated distances between locations
presented by the researcher. In general, distance estimates may be more easily quantified
than sketch maps, but they also lack some of the intuitive ecological or face validities.

ERRORS IN COGNITIVE MAPS

Types of Errors
Cognitive maps are rough approximations rather than perfect representations of
the physical environment_ In fact, we can identify several sources of error that
frequently occur in them (e.g., Appleyard, 1970; Byrne, 1979; Evans, 1980; Downs &
Stea, 1973; Pinheiro, 1998). First, cognitive maps tend to be incomplete. We often leave
out minor paths and details, but sometimes we even omit districts and landmarks.
Second, we often distort our representation of the environment by placing things too
close together, too far apart, or aligning them improperly. Most errors in cognitive maps
of cities occur at street intersections, where people have a tendency to misestimate the size
of intersection angles. Acute intersection angles are often overestimated, and obtuse angles
are underestimated. Figure 3-15 shows an intersection in a small town. As you might
expect from our discussion, the intersection is depicted as a right angle in almost all
cognitive maps of the area. Perhaps the error was compounded in this example by the
designers of two of the buildings adjacent to the intersection. The building on the left (a
bowling alley) actually matches the acute angle of its side of the intersection, whereas the
building on the right matches the obtuse angle of its street boundaries. The irregularities of
the buildings come as a complete surprise to even long-time residents of the village. We
also tend to represent nonparallel paths as being parallel, nonperpendicular paths as being
perpendicular, and curved paths as being straight.
People also have a tendency to overestimate the size of familiar or liked areas in
their cognitive maps . For example, Milgram and Jodelet (1976) found that Parisians
seem to increase the size of their home neighborhood out of proportion with the rest of
Paris. These errors may be quite telling. For instance, Pinheiro (1998) asked Brazilian
students to draw sketch maps of the entire world. In addition to geographical size, the
size of the countries in the sketch maps (and whether they were even included) was
heavily influenced by indicators of geopolitical, military, and economic power. Affective
qualities assigned to environments also affect sketch maps. Seibert and Anooshian
(1993) report that participants across several age groups did not typically include
disliked items or areas on sketch maps.
Figure 3-15 A nonperpendicular
intersection in a small town that is
remembered as perpendicular by even
long-time residents.

A third type of error involves augmentation, or the addition of features to a map

that are not there. Appleyard's Venezuelan study (1970) provides a classic example of
these augmentations. A European engineer included a nonexistent railroad line in his
sketch map because experience led him to predict a rail connection between a steel mill
and a mining port. In this instance, the engineer's experience led him to infer a logical,
but nonexistent, map component. Notice that this same phenomenon (sometimes referred
to as inferential structuring) may often lead individuals to make correct assumptions,
but these may properly be called augmentations if the person's cognitive map represents
features that have never actually been experienced. In these instances, the researcher is
unlikely to recognize the augmentation and will miscode an interesting error as an
accurate response.
 Altogether, then, our cognitive maps are clearly not always very accurate
representations of the physical environment. Understanding the sources of these errors
may well give us insights into the effect of individual differences in such factors as
experience, age, skill, or personality Furthermore, some researchers are using insights
gained from either the errors people make in spatial cognition tasks or differences in
the speeds at which features can be recalled to learn more about the basic processes
underlying human memory.

Familiarity and Socioeconomic Class

The types of errors in our maps, as well as the degree of detail in them, vary
according to several factors. As you might expect, a number of studies have shown that
the more familiar you are with an environment, the more accurate and detailed are your
cognitive maps of it (e.g., Appleyard, 1970, 1976; Evans, 1980; Garling et al., 1982).
Several authors report that familiarity probably explains the frequent observation that
people from higher socioeconomic status groups draw more thorough maps than the poor
(e.g., Appleyard, 1976; Ramadier & Moser, 1998). That is, upper- and middle-class
individuals probably have more experience with broader areas of a city than lower-class
individuals whosemobility is restricted, primarily by the lack of easy access to transportation.
In the classic study, Donald Appleyard reported that motorists (generally from the upper
class) had the most sophisticated maps of a Venezuelan town, whereas those forced to walk
produced less sophisticated sketches. In sum, those with more travel experience make better
sketch maps (Beck & Wood, 1976). Even more important than just being mobile, those
who must attend to the passing environment (drivers, for instance) are more likely to
process street names, directions, addresses, and distances. Thus, public transportation users
who may well travel great distances but attend only to the passing sequence of stops do not
produce the richness or accuracy of the cognitive maps of drivers. In sum, the longer we have
experience with an area and the more movable we are within it, the more thorough our
cognitive maps.

Ramadier and Moser (1998) broadened our understanding by introducing the term
social legibility to characterize the cultural distance between an individual and the
surroundings. In a study conducted in Paris, sketch maps and other measures for students
from sub-Saharan Africa differed from those of European students (Spain, Italy, and Portugal).
Apparently, for the Europeans, culturally derived expectations assisted the student's
understanding of the city, whereas the African students were less able to understand
culturally based physical cues. (See Figure 3-16.)

Perhaps it is only "common sense" that the quantity of information stored in memory
increases with exposure, and that the opportunity to experience an environment differs by
socioeconomic class, age, and perhaps, gender. It is important not to underestimate
the value of these observations, however, nor their usefulness for planners and
geographers. Nevertheless, perhaps a more interesting area for psychological research
centers not just on the importance of familiarity and experience in adding to the quantity
of stored information, but also on the qualitative changes in cognitive maps (and the
memory storage and retrieval processes underlying them). Some early suggestions of such
qualitative changes can be found in Appleyard's (1970) study in Venezuela. You will recall
that Appleyard distinguished between sequential sketch maps emphasizing paths and nodes
and spatial maps featuring a high proportion of landmarks and districts. Appleyard noted that
maps were more spatial for long-term residents than for newcomers, and that spatial ele-
ments were more prominent in familiar areas of the city. Later research systematically
investigated this phenomenon. Evans et al. (1981) reported that the basic path and node
structure appears to be learned first, and then as an individual spends more time in the
environment, he or she fills in other details such as landmarks. Thus, as an individual
becomes more familiar with an environment, his or her cognitive map of it becomes more
spatial.

On the other hand, Heft (1979) reported that adults rely more on landmarks to
learn a route through a novel path network the first time they traverse it as compared with
later occasions. This would seem to be the reverse of the path-primacy effect.
Figure 3-16 The role of cultural expectations in large-
scale maps. A far away planet? The so-called
"Continental Drip" view of a well-known land
mass (Hint: Turn the book upside down).

Perhaps elements such as landmarks are used for wayfinding, but are not always
represented in sketch maps. In support of this view are several comparisons between adults
and children that suggest that one important difference between the maps drawn by people
of different ages is that adults are more likely to attend to landmarks that lie at critical
points on a route, such as the point at which one has to make a turn, than are children.

Gender Differences
Do males and females differ in their cognitive mapping abilities? Several
researchers (e.g., Maccoby & jacklin, 1974) have reported that males may possess superior
visual and spatial skills, at least on paper-and-pencil tasks. If this generalization is true, one
might expect males to be superior in their ability to draw complete and accurate cognitive maps.
Perhaps having "a good sense of direction" is more important to the self-esteem of males than it
is for females (Bryant, 1982), consistent with the popular notion that "men don't like to ask
for directions." If so, one might expect males to be superior to females for motivational reasons,
even if they possess no native superiority in mapping.
Some earlier researchers found evidence for gender differences in the final
product of cognitive mapping exercises, although they concluded that these sex differences are
most likely due to differences in familiarity with an area (e.g., Evans, 1980). Appleyard
(1976), for example, found men's maps to be slightly more accurate and extensive than
women's but attributed this difference to the higher exposure of men to the city Abu-Obeid
(1998) reported that newcomer males learned new environments faster, but that with more
experience in the environment, females and males performed similarly on wayfinding tasks.
Even some researchers who have given individuals both cognitive maps and paper-and-pencil
tasks have found sex differences on the paper-and-pencil tasks, but not for spatial memory
(McNamara, 1986).
More theoretically interesting than simple measures of overall competence in drawing
cognitive maps are a limited number of studies suggesting that the cognitive maps of men
and women are about equally accurate, but stylistically different. Again, some hint of
differences between the maps of males and females appeared in Appleyard's early
investigations; females seemed to be somewhat more spatially oriented than males. Other
researchers have concluded that females are as accurate overall as males in their maps,
but that women emphasize districts and landmarks, whereas males are more likely to
emphasize the path structure (Galea & Kimura, 1993; McGuinness & Sparks, 1979; Pearce,
1977). In addition, Ward, Newcombe, and Overton (1986) have reported that males are
more likely to voluntarily give compass directions or distance estimates phrased in
measurements such as mileage than are females when asked to give directions based upon
a map. Nevertheless, when instructed to phrase their directions using these dimensions,
females were as successful as males.

In a pair of related experiments, McGuinness and Sparks (1979) found that

women included fewer paths between landmarks, included more landmarks, were less
accurate in placing buildings with respect to the underlying spatial terrain, but were more
accurate than males in the placement of buildings with respect to their distance from one
another. Interestingly, the second experiment of the pair demonstrated that females actually
did know the locations of many roads and paths that they had not voluntarily included in
sketch maps. As was the case with Ward et al. (1986), it seems that women often remember
the location of these features, but do not always include them in their maps unless specifically
asked to do so. McGuinness and Sparks concluded that whereas females seem to
approach the organization of topographical space by grouping landmarks and establishing
their distance from one another, males are more likely to begin with a network of roads
and paths, which may provide a somewhat more accurate framework.
Affect may be one source of male—female differences. Males seem more confident in way-
finding (Devlin & Bernstein, 1995), and femalesexpress higher levels of anxiety when
wayfinding (Schmitz, 1997). Thus, many male—female differences may reflect that
anxious people generally do not do as well on mental rotation tasks and are likely to have
less complex knowledge of the orientation of the environment and underlying distances
(Lawton, 1996; Schmitz, 1997).
Holding (1992) examined the prediction that buildings in the same hierarchical
cluster are closer together than equidistant buildings belonging to different clusters.
For this task, distance estimates of females were more affected by cluster membership
than were those of males. In general, males may begin by setting up an organizational
framework of paths and nodes for their sketch maps and then superimpose features such
as landmarks and districts on this established framework. On the other hand, women may
be more likely to try to establish individual relationships between landscape elements or
clusters of elements without this organizing framework provided by path networks.

In conclusion, males and females are probably equally capable of mapping their
surroundings, but some stylistic differences await further investigation. Even if these
differences are valid, the source of them is unclear. They may be explained by differences
in experience, familiarity, or the socialization process, but a biological component cannot
yet be entirely eliminated.

ACQUISITION OF COGNITIVE MAPS

We have noted several instances in which spatial cognition does not match
cartographic maps. In general, cognitive maps become more similar to cartographic maps
as an environment becomes more familiar (e.g., Evans et al., 1981). The two most
common situations in which to observe this process are with children (for whom many
environments will be unfamiliar) and with adult newcomers.

Children's Maps
Much of the interest among developmental psychologists and others
investigating children's spatial cognition is based upon the implication that the changes
that occur in these maps reflect not only a change in the amount of information in
memory, but also a change in the type of information and the way it is used (see Heft &
Wohlwill, 1987). For example, differences between children and adults may reflect not
just less experience, but a very different approach to problem solving than that employed
by adults.

The most influential theory of cognitive development as applied to spatial

cognition may still be the one proposed by Jean Piaget and his colleagues (e.g., Piaget &
Inhelder, 1967). In one classic study, Piaget asked children to sit in a chair and to view a
table on which were placed three model mountains (see Figure 3-17). Three other chairs
were placed around the table, upon one of which was seated a doll. From a set of
drawings the child was asked to select a view of the scene as it would appear to the doll.
Children younger than 7 or 8 typically chose not the view from the doll's perspective, but
the view they themselves saw Piaget termed this egocentrism.
According to Piaget, during the egocentric phase, the child's frame of reference is centered
on his or her own activities. Environmental features in the child's spatial image are
disconnected and the environment is fragmented. Later, the child's map is oriented
around fixed places in the environment that the child has explored, but not necessarily the
place he or she now occupies. These known areas are, however, disjointed. Finally, the
child's frame of reference assumes the characteristics of a spatial survey map with a more
objective representation of the environment.
 Figure 3 17
- Piaget's three-mountain problem

Ironically, one effect of Piaget's conclusions may have been to reduce interest in
children's spatial abilities because his research led to the conclusion that children could
not understand and use maps until about the age of 7. Recent research leads us to temper
Piaget's conclusions from the three-mountain experiment (Matthews, 1992). For
example, although there are some changes in children's ability to interpret aerial
photographs between kindergarten and grade two (e.g., Blades & Spencer, 1987; Stea &
Blaut, 1973), children seem better able to make use of aerial photographs and maps than
Piaget would have predicted (e.g., Blades & Spencer, 1987 ; Rutland et al, 1993). Even
3-year-olds have at least some ability to form spatial representations (DeLoache,
1987), although this ability improves significantly with age (Heth, Cornell, & Alberts,
1997; Rutland et al., 1993).

Many studies support Piaget's observation of spatial egocentrism. Somewhat

more controversy surrounds whether these findings reflect a truly different way of thinking
(as Piaget would' imply) or a slow increase in the quantity of environmental information
and cognitive skills. Much of the research on children's cognitive maps is based upon
studies that have employed models to simulate environments. It may be that the relatively
poor mapping abilities demonstrated by children participating in studies that employ this
method may have resulted at least partly from the artificial methodology of the research
rather than actual mapping deficits (e.g., Cornell & Hay, 1984 ; Evans, 1980). One fairly
reliable difference between older children and adults and younger children seems to be
the way they make use of landmarks. Although even 8-year-olds notice and can remember
distinctive landmarks, older children and adults seem more likely to place the landmarks
into a reference system that integrates distinctive landmarks with other
environmental attributes (Cornell, Heth, & Skoczylas, 1999 ; Heth et al., 1997).

Adult Map Acquisition

Although Piaget believed that children's strategies for spatial problem solving
differed from those of adults, many researchers conclude that the cognitive maps of
adults in new environments also develop from route to survey knowledge in a manner
much like the age-related changes observed in children (Golledge et al., 1985;
McDonald & Pellegrino, 1993). Individuals knit together a cognitive map from the ac-
cumulation of information acquired by traveling different routes in a new environment.
Eventually the person is able to take "shortcuts" like the one demonstrated in Figure 3-
18. McDonald and Pellegrino conclude that the processes may generally follow a
sequence from landmarks to routes to survey knowledge.
Adults are likely to have at least one advantage over children; they are more likely
to understand and have access to published printed maps. Of course, the purpose of most
maps is to provide an accessible and permanent record of spatial information, so maps
should be valuable aids for spatial learning. Is information learned from a map different
from that acquired from experience? People may learn from maps quite differently than
from actually moving through an environment (Thorndike & Hayes-Roth, 1982). Map
learners are privy to a bird's-eye view of the environment, and thus, may acquire survey
knowledge because a map provides direct access to global relationships of distance and
location. On the other hand, although spatial learning based on actual navigation in the
environment may be more difficult to obtain, it benefits from the advantages of
ecological context and, perhaps, more accurate representation of the travel distances for
each leg of a journey.
In their review, McDonald and Pellegrino (1993) differentiate between
primary and secondary spatial learning. Primary learning involves direct experience
moving through the environment, whereas secondary learning comes from studying
maps or other environmental descriptions. Over time, the spatial representations acquired
through actual navigation become more like that of survey knowledge.

Figure 3-18 The solid line

indicates the routes a person has
traveled between five landmarks.
If he or she has developed a
survey map, it will also be
possible to take a previously
untraveled shortcut indicated by
the dashed line.

In instances in which the environment is relatively simple with streets laid out in
rectangular grids, navigation may quickly lead to more accurate survey knowledge than
that gained from maps (Thorndyke & Hayes-Roth, 1982). Most maps present an aerial
view, and this perspective presumably facilitates the development of survey knowledge.
Despite these advantages, learning about an environment from maps sometimes
results in certain distortions that seem to appear in maps generated from primary
experiences. For instance, the orientation of a cartographic map you use to learn a new
environment may affect the orientation of your subsequent memory (MacEachren,
1992; Warren, 1994; Warren & Scott, 1993). If you study a map that is drawn and
labeled according to the convention that north is "up," you may always assume that loca-
tions east of the center of the map are "right" and those west are "left." This presents no
problem as long as you travel northward, but perhaps you have experienced the common
confusion of reorienting your mental map when you travel in a southerly direction.
Cognitive maps constricted from actual experience seem not to suffer from this
orientation specificity. In our discussion of wayfinding at the close of this chapter we will
revisit orientation problems as we consider "you-are-here" maps in places like airports
and shopping centers.
Although there are important individual differences, spatial skills eventually
decline for older adults (e.g., Arbuckle, Cooney, Milne, & Melchior, 1994). For both
younger and older adults, prior experience in similar environments can facilitate
cognitive mapping, but violations of typical expectations seem to have a more
detrimental effect on older persons. Although there are several possible explanations for
this effect, Arbuckle et al. conclude that this deficit primarily reflects an age-related
decline in ability to ignore irrelevant prior knowledge.

MEMORY AND COGNITIVE MAPS

We have seen some characteristics of sketch maps and other physical

representations of human cognition. Notice, however, that cognitive maps themselves
have no external physical existence ; they reside only in our minds. Let us turn now to a
fundamental question: Exactly how is a cognitive map represented in memory?
Psychologists have differing opinions on the matter (Evans, 1980; Searleman &
Hermann, 1994), and investigations of this representational question have sparked
sophisticated studies by both environmental and cognitive psychologists. Some of the most
interesting questions concern the exact form of the mental representation and the
organization and structure of a memory or retrieval process (McNamara, 1986).

The Form of the Representation

One of the fundamental issues is the form of the mental representation of spatial
knowledge. One view is that we have an image or mental "picture" of the environment
in our memory. This view, termed the analogical or analog representation (meaning the
mental map is an analogy of the real world), says that the cognitive map roughly
corresponds point for point to the physical environment, almost as if we have a file of slide
photographs of the environment stored in the brain (e.g., Cornoldi & McDaniel, 1991;
Kosslyn, 1980, 1983).

Another view, the propositional approach, advocates more of a meaning-based or

propositional storage of material. The environment is represented as a number of
concepts or ideas, each of which is connected to other concepts by testable
associations such as color, name, sounds, and height. When we call on this propositional
map we search our memory for various associations, and these are reconstructed and
represented as a mental "image" or in a sketch we draw ( Johnson-Laird, 1996; Pylyshyn,
1973, 1981).

Current thinking combines these two approaches, concluding that cognitive

maps contam both propositional and analogical elements (e.g., Evans, 1980; Garling et
al., 1984; Kosslyn, 1980, 1983; Tye, 1991). For example, most information about the
environment may be stored in memory through propositions, but we can use this
propositional network to very quickly mentally construct an analogical image that has
many of the qualities of a photograph. We may then use this image, rather than the
propositional network some researchers suppose to underlie it, to solve spatial cognition
problems.

Distance

Some understanding of the distances between locations is necessary if we are to

use a cognitive map for wayfinding. If maps are analogs of the real world, distance may
also be represented in the stored memory itself. For example, when people are asked to
judge whether a pair of states (e.g., Georgia and Mississippi) are closer together than
another pair (e.g., Michigan and Iowa), the more similar the distances within the two
pairs, the longer it takes to make a decision (Evans & Pezdek, 1980). Moreover, recall of
distance between two points takes longer the greater the distance on a map (Kosslyn, Ball,
& Reiser, 1978). From such evidence some have concluded that cognitive representations
of the environment require scanning in order for judgments to be made about them. The
more information we must scan, the longer it takes to make judgments about spatial
relationships (e.g., Kosslyn, 1983).

An analogical storage of spatial information is not the only explanation for many
of the observed distance effects, however. Perhaps a longer pathway also provides
more opportunities to acquire the bits of knowledge that make up propositions.
Generally, the more information we must scan in our memory while making a "mental
journey" through an environment, the farther the distance we assume we have traversed.
For example, judgment of traversed distance, that is, the distance we have traveled over a
given period of time, is in part dependent upon the number of pieces of information
we encounter as we travel. Investigations of this so-called clutter effect reveal that
students walking a path designated by a line of tape placed on a floor judge a path to be
longer the more right-angle turns it contains (Sadalla & Magel, 1980; Thorndyke, 1981).
In general, the more intersections or objects a path crosses, the longer the path is judged
to be (Sadalla & Staplin, 1980a, 1980b).

As you may remember from our brief discussion of multidimensional scaling,

recent findings indicate that the estimated distance between point A and point B on a
cognitive map is not necessarily the same as the distance from point B to point A
(McNamara & Diwadkar, 1997; Newcombe, fluttenlocher, Sandberg, Lie, & Johnson,
1999). This irreversibility casts doubt on the regularity assumed by so-called euclidean
models, but has sparked a growing interest in other models of cognitive structure.

Structure
One line of reasoning begins with the assumption that humans are limited in their
ability to process incoming information. Too much information may tax our perceptual
and cognitive abilities, resulting in cognitive overload (see Chapter 4 for an additional
discussion of environmental load as a theoretical explanation for a variety of behaviors).

Figure 3-19 Relationships between clusters

and reference points may affect distance estimates
and knowledge of even well-known areas.

Figure 3-20 An example of a

semantic network as it might underlie a
person's cognitive map.

Perhaps you have read elsewhere that humans seem to benefit from strategies that
organize the complex information they wish to remember (lists of letters or numbers, for
instance) into a smaller number of meaningful "chunks." There is evidence that people also
divide spatial information in a manner similar to chunking (Allen, 1981 ; Allen & Kirasic,
1985). Although the criteria for inclusion in a chunk or cluster may differ, good candidates are
landmarks that are both near to each other and similar in architecture and use. Perhaps this
amounts to a "rediscovery" of what Lynch termed "districts." Let us resurrect our discussion
of cognitive distance. There is considerable evidence that landmarks within the same cluster
are judged to be closer to each other than to a third, equidistant point outside their cluster
(Hirtle & Jonides, 1985; Holding, 1992; McNamara et al., 1989). Moreover, each cluster may
itself be represented by a reference point, a sort of "best example" that symbolizes all the
locations within the cluster (Couclelis et a1.,1987; Ferguson & Hegarty, 1994; Sadalla et al.,
1980). As illustrated in Figure 3-19, we might imagine a world of well-known clusters or
districts within which distance estimates are fairly accurate, but between which knowledge is
less precise.

Perhaps clusters are organized in some orderly fashion in memory. Some time ago,
Collins and Quillian (1969) demonstrated that the retrieval of information from semantic
memory (memory for concepts) sometimes acts as if it is based upon a hierarchical
memory network. That is, information may be stored according to some organizational system
that is based on ordered categories. This is typically presented as a tree diagram illustrating
the relationships between concepts as branches like those in Figure 3-20. Presumably,
some sort of sequential search of levels in these categories occurs when one is asked to
determine relationships between concepts. The exact form of these semantic networks is
controversial and the subject of a great deal of research in cognitive psychology (see Best,
1998, for a readable review).

For our present purposes, what is most interesting is the idea that some form of a
network might also describe the way in which spatial information is represented in
memory. There is some evidence that for spatial memory at least, there may be an upper
limit to how much a person can remember (Byrne, 1979; Tversky, 1981). A networked
storage process would be a rather economical system in the memory space it requires
because information common to all members of a spatial cluster or category (perhaps
symbolized by the reference point) could be stored only once. All points in Nebraska
are west of all points in Ohio, for example. Although theoretically efficient, this storage
system might be subject to certain types of errors that would make some memories
more difficult or time consuming to retrieve than others.

An important study reported by Stevens and Coupe (1978) provides an

opportunity to experiment with an interesting example. First, draw a rough map of the
United States. Now indicate the locations of San Diego, California, and Reno, Nevada.
Do not read further until you have done so. Finished? Except for those living near the
West Coast, most people place San Diego west of Reno apparently because they think
of California, the superordinate category to which San Diego belongs, as being west of
Nevada. As you will see upon consulting a U.S. map, San Diego is actually east of
Reno! As is often the case, things probably are not so simple. A simple tree diagram or
hierarchical network cannot explain all of the phenomena we have observed in
cognitive maps. Some propose refinements of the network model; others propose quite
different memory structures that do not depend upon hierarchical storage. We will
have to leave the complexities of these arguments to cognitive psychologists (see Best,
1998). At the present time, however, versions of the network model (e.g., Garling et al.,
1984; Kaplan & Kaplan, 1982) remain popular within the cognitive mapping literature.
Perhaps McNamara's (1986) "partially hierarchical" structure represents the data as
well as any. This means that memories may be stored according to hierarchical
principles, but that there remain some interconnections between areas that cut across
this hierarchical structure. However the exact process occurs, most studies, whether they
are lab or field studies, indicate that spatial information is acquired quickly and that
forgetting is minimal.
WAYFINDING

Most of the research we have presented to this point has focused on a rather static,
plain-view map of the environment residing in memory. (For now, we will lay aside the
argument concerning the specific form of this representation.) Other authors (e.g., Cornell &
Hay, 1984; Gar-ling, Book, & Lindberg, 1986; Passini, 1984) are interested in wayfinding,
the process by which people actually navigate in their environments.
One of the most profoundly troubling experiences we can face is being lost. In such
an instance, our human capabilities of information processing and storage have deserted
us, and because most of us are dependent upon others and technology, our very survival
may be threatened. Being truly lost may be a relatively rare phenomenon, but
newcomers commonly experience the stress and anxiety that accompany disorientation
in both buildings and natural environments (e.g., Cohen et al., 1986; Hunt, 1984). For
some groups, this stress may be particularly serious, even life threatening (Heth & Cornell,
1998; Hunt, 1984).

ACTION PLANS AND WAYFINDING

Garling et al. (1986) propose one model of way- finding that may prove useful in
organizing our discussion (see Figure 3-21).

Figure 3-21 Wayfinding:

A hypothetical example of a
trip to retrieve one's laundry.

We will provide a hypothetical example to illustrate the different steps of the

model. Imagine that a friend has asked you to drop off some clothes at a dry cleaning
establishment. First, we determine a destination. Should you take your friend's dry
cleaning to your favorite establishment, or to one closer to your friend's home for
his or her convenience? Assuming that you decided to choose a dry cleaner near your
friend's home, the second step requires the new target destination to be localized; that is,
you must determine the general location of the target environment. If you are unfamiliar
with your friend's neighborhood, you may need to use a telephone book or some other
source to pinpoint the target. Third, you choose a route between your present location
and the dry cleaner, again requiring you to ask directions or to refer to a map if you are
unfamiliar with the neighborhood. Finally, you must make a choice of travel mode,
depending upon factors such as the distance to the destination and the availability of
transportation.
 Notice that the model emphasizes an internal psychological process that lets us
anticipate or rehearse what will eventually be our actual behavior in moving through the
environment. Thus, CAI-ling et al. have adopted the concept of action plans (Russell &
Ward, 1982) as links between stored environmental information and wayfinding behavior.
Like cognitive maps, action plans for way-finding often reveal spatial asymmetries. For ex-
ample, many people use one route traveling to or from work, school, or home, and a
different route for the return journey. These differences may be quite practical. One of
your authors avoids a steep hill that imposes itself on the bicycle route into his office by
taking a more gradual path. On the way home, however, he delights in a route that ends in
a swooping, more direct ride down the hill. Not all route asymmetriesare so obvious,
however. Bailenson, Shum, and Uttal (1998) propose that cognitive "road climbing"
explains many asymmetries. Road climbing is a cognitive heuristic (mental shortcut) by
which people select a long and straight route from the point of origin instead of
alternate paths. In fact, Bailenson et al.'s participants preferred a path that was initially
long and straight over alternatives that were up to 50% shorter!
A good cognitive map would be one excellent wayfinding aid (Abu-Obeid,
1998), but some authorities doubt whether a person actually needs a detailed map,
either mental or on paper, to find a travel goal. For example, Passini (1984) suggests that
wayfinding might best be viewed as a sequence of problem-solving tasks that require a
certain amount of stored environmental information. This may be an easier task than
drawing your route on a sketch map for at least two reasons. First (assuming you have at
least some experience in the environment in question), you are facing a task of
recognition. Instead of recalling a cognitive map, you may need only to recognize a
particular environmental feature such as a landmark as you encounter it, and to make a
correct decision (such as to turn, left) when in its presence. Second, wayfinding is in some
way self-correcting. If you find yourself suddenly moving into unfamiliar terrain, you
may retrace your steps to the point where you erred and try again. Thus, errors in
wayfinding need not be cumulative. You may have slightly misjudged the distance or
direction from one building to another. Once you do manage to find your way to this key
decision point, minor errors earlier in the journey are no longer of any consequence.
Traditional cognitive maps are less forgiving.
Thus, the process of wayfinding may be based on a series of unfolding
expectancies (Cornell et al., 1994, 1999). Incidentally, the process of route planning and
encoding may not have to be purposeful. Familiarity and incidental route learning may
occur even when one's attention is directed elsewhere.
You may recall that Byrne (1979) demonstrated that intersections between
roads are typically remembered as right angles, even when the actual angle varies from
60° to 90°. Byrne suggested, in fact, that precise information concerning the shape of
intersections may be missing from memory entirely. Perhaps, for way-finding purposes at
least, it is sufficient to have a network map that preserves only the cornicetions between
steps along a route, but which requires neither knowledge of the distances between
choice points nor the precise angle at which routes join. On the other hand, it may be
that although one can travel successfully along a predetermined route by recognizing a
succession of choice points, a more sophisticated navigation system would allow a person
to arrive at the same location via a number of different (perhaps shorter) routes and to find
a new location based upon its location with reference to some known landmarks. This
more sophisticated type of wayfinding may require the richer spatial understanding
characteristic of cognitive maps.

SETTING CHARACTERISTICS THAT FACILITATE WAYFINDING

Earlier in this chapter we noted Kevin Lynch's (1960) emphasis on legibility, which
largely determines the degree to which an environment facilitates cognitive mapping.
Although legibility has long had a place in the literature of both behavioral science and
planning, relatively little sustained effort has addressed the need to create more
legible buildings (Abu-Ghazzeh, 1996). Carling et al. (1986) and Abu-Ghazzeh describe
three characteristics of physical settings that are likely to affect wayfinding: the degree
of differentiation, the degree of visual access, and the complexity of the spatial layout.

Differentiation refers to the degree to which parts of the environment look

the same or are distinctive. In general, buildings that are distinctive in shape, easily
visible, well maintained, and free-standing are better remembered. In the context of
interior environments, for example, Evans et al. (1980) demonstrated the effectiveness
of color coding in improving wayfinding in a building's interior.

In addition to differentiation, the ability to learn a new environment may dep end
upon the degree of visual access. This is the extent to which different parts of the
setting can be seen from other vantage points. Of course, Lynch (1960) recognized the
importance of visual access in what he termed landmarks. Evans et al. (1982) also speak
of transition, or direct access from a building to the street. Finally, complexity of
spatial layout refers to the amount and difficulty of information that must be processed
in order to move around in an environment. Too much complexity undermines both
navigation and learning. For example, VITeisman (1981) found that simple floor plans
facilitated way-finding in campus buildings. Simplicity was even more important than
familiarity with the setting in predicting wayfinding difficulties. Taken to an extreme, no
amount of familiarity may be able to compensate for extreme architectural complexity
(Moeser, 1988). We hasten to distinguish between the complexity of a route or route net-
work, as the term is used here, and the complexity of a particular facade, which
should contribute to differentiation as discussed above.

MAPS

Map learners are privy to a bird's-eye view of the environment, and thus, may
acquire what we have called survey knowledge. Thus, a map provides direct access to
global relationships of distance and location. On the other hand, spatial learning based
upon direct learning (actually navigating in the environment) may be more difficult to
obtain, but it does benefit from the advantages of ecological context and perhaps yields
a more accurate representation of the travel distances for each leg of a journey. Com-
plexity of the environment is one important variable, so if the environment is relatively
simple, with streets or hallways laid out in rectangular grids, navigation may quickly
lead to more accurate survey knowledge than that gained from maps (Thorndyke &
Hayes-Roth, 1982). On the other hand, for complex environments with many
nonperpendicular paths, maps may remain the most efficient method of route learn-
ing (Moeser, 1988). As a rule, people who learn from maps acquire better survey
knowledge, whereas direct learning facilitates route knowledge (Rossano, West,
Robertson, Wayner, & Chase, 1999; Taylor & Tversky, 1996).

You-Are-Here Maps
One problem with maps is that people sometimes have difficulty translating
maps into usable navigation tools ( Butler, Acquino, Hissong, & Scott, 1993; Levine,
1982; Thorndyke & Hayes-Roth, 1982). For example, have you ever consulted a you-
are-here map in a shopping center, museum, or subway terminal? Was the map easy
to read and understand, or did you find yourself nearly as confused after reading the
map as when you began? As we will see in Chapter 11, legibility is an important
attribute of architectural design, and we might expect maps or signs to be important
wayfinding aids. At least one study shows maps to be inferior to hallway signs (Butler
et al., 1993), apparently because maps require more study time and require more memory
store as opposed to a simple directional sign.

Given their advantages in providing a more flexible "bird's-eye view," can posted
maps be made more usable? Marvin Levine and his associates (Levine, 1982; Levine,
Marchon, & Hanley, 1984) have explored the design and placement of you-are-here
maps and have outlined several simple principles that dramatically improve the
usefulness of these orientation aides.

Structure Matching The first problem faced by a you-are-here map user is

structure matching, that is, the need to pair known points in the environment with
their corresponding map coordinates. If a person reading the map is unable to
accomplish this task, even an accurately drawn map will not be very useful. Technically;
Levine argues, two known points on both the map and in the terrain provide the
minimum amount of information necessary for a person
 Figure 3-22 Structure matching in
you-are-here maps. In this map,
labels and caricature map
symbols allow the user to match
the map with the surrounding
terrain.

to relate any object in the environment with its map symbol. A viewer must
know not only where he or she is (as would a person viewing Figure 3-22), but also the
location of a second pair of points. For example, the figure shows buildings that can be
easily identified both on the map and in the environment visible to the visitor.
Although in the future this is accomplished by attaching a sign to Building L, we note
that the same end might be achieved by using a caricature map symbol that resembles the
building as it would be seen from the position of the person reading the map (rather than
an aerial or blueprint perspective).

A second way of providing two-point correspondence is to carefully place the map

near an asymmetrical feature. This allows the visitor to pinpoint his or her location and
that of nearby features. In addition, Levine encourages the use of a bipart you-are-here
symbol (also in Figure 3-22). Here both the map the viewer is reading and the position of
the visitor are indicated, technically fulfilling the need for two points and allowing the
viewer to correctly bring the map and the environment into correspondence.
Orientation As former Boy or Girl Scouts may know, a map is most easily used if it
is placed parallel to the ground and turned so that it is oriented with the terrain. Thus, a
goal that is ahead of you on the map is ahead in the terrain, and something to the right
on the map is to your right in the environment. In some instances, you-are-here maps in a
building can be displayed horizontally so that the map is properly oriented. In most cases,
however, practical reasons require the map to be hung vertically on the wall. Although it
may not be obvious, correct alignment of these maps may be critical to ensuring that they
are easily understood and used by visitors. Levine, Marchon, and Hanley (1984) propose
that wayfinding maps are best when what is forward on the ground is up on the map
(Figure 3-23). This forward-up equivalence also ensures that what is to the right in the
terrain is to the right on the map, and so forth. Levine et al.'s experimental data (1984)
show that misalignment of you-are-here maps by 90° or more seriously misleads people,
even those who have been alerted to the misalignment!
 Unfortunately, the Levine et al. (1984) study also showed that this principle is
regularly violated in airports, offices, and other buildings. The severity of the violation
may range from being a small inconvenience to shoppers, to potentially life-threatening in
the case of fire evacuation maps in an office complex.

SIMULATIONS FACILITATING SPATIAL LEARNING

Although some have expressed concern that even carefully prepared

photographic simulations of routes may be inferior to actual walks as
wayfinding training aids (Cornell & Hay, 1984), other studies have successfully
employed slide photographs as environmental simulations (e.g., Cohen et al.,
1986; Hunt, 1984). In fact, casually acquired familiarity may sometimes never
achieve the level of spatial understanding achieved by individuals given planned
instruction (Moeser, 1988). It also follows that if some method could be found to
accelerate spatial familiarity, some of the distress associated with relocation
could be reduced. Some have focused on the need to assist children in
adjusting to new spatial environments. For example, Cohen and his associates
(Cohen et al., 1986) investigated the effect of two spatial familiarization ex-
periences on the attitudes of 5- and 6-year-old kindergarten boys. Two weeks
before the start of school, some of the boys were given either an on-site tour or a
simulated tour accompanied by a scale model of their school. Boys vvho received
either familiarization treatment felt more secure and comfortable several weeks
after the start of school than a control group that received no training.

Figure 3-23 Forward-up

equivalence aids in orienting you-
are-here maps.

In another study with a quite different population, Hunt (1984) investigated

procedures for improving the wayfinding abilities of senior citizen volunteers in an
unfamiliar nursing home. One group was given a site visit in which they individually
received a guided tour through the experimental building. Members of the second
experimental group were individually shown photographs of the building ordered in the
same sequence as experienced by those on the guided tour. As they viewed the slide
photographs, this group could also inspect three-dimensional models of the building's
floor plan and exterior. Participants in both treatment conditions were generally superior
to a control group on a variety of on-site wayfinding tasks. This result was not surprising;
it confirms the usefulness of some prior exposure to an environment, whether simulated or
in the form of a tour. More interesting, however, are the differences between the simu-
lation- and site-visit groups. The groups were similar in their ability to find their way to
places along a previously learned route, but members of the simulation group were
superior in their ability to find new locations, in their ability to identify photographs of
building landmarks, and in their understanding of the exterior shape and the spatial
configuration of the building. In sum, both groups could learn sequential routes, but the
simulation group apparently had a richer and more flexible mental image (presumably
because of their exposure to the bird's-eye views provided by the scale models).
The advent of inexpensive and powerful computers promises to offer new ways
to learn unfamiliar environments. Some researchers have demonstrated that virtual
reality through an environment can be effective, even more than maps (Rossano et al.,
1999). Hirtle and Sorrows (1998) reported an ambitious campus wayfinding project that
may soon be widely adopted. They created a highly interactive World Wide Web site that
provided redundant map-like, verbal, and pictorial information that users could tailor to
their own needs and styles.
Of course, much of the wayfinding information we acquire comes directly from
other people— our friends, acquaintances, or a helpful stranger. Information may
include oral instructions, simple sketch maps, or more complex drawings. Interestingly,
verbatim instructions (either written or oral) seem superior to more complex or graphic
maps that emphasize the overall geography or survey knowledge (Kovach, Surrette, &
Aamodt, 1988). Just as not everyone is equally successful in wayfinding, not everyone
is equally skilled in giving spatial information. Vanetti and Allen (1988) suggest that the
ability to give useful route instructions depends upon both spatial skills and verbal ability.
Unless a person knows a spatial layout, he or she is not likely to give useful
instructions. On the other hand, if that person is unable to express those instructions
clearly, pure spatial knowledge will not be of much use. To examine these ideas, Vanetti
and Allen divided participants into high and low spatial ability and high and low verbal
ability groups. Interestingly, there was little difference between the groups in the ability
to follow route instructions, but those with high spatial ability were more likely to
suggest a more efficient route to others.

WHEN WAYFINDING FAILS: LOST AND FOUND

Sometimes, thankfully rarely, a person becomes disoriented in an environment that is

so remote that authorities must form a search-and-rescue party. In these life-threatening
situations, finding the lost person quickly is critical. A study of lost persons in Canadian
wilderness areas (Heth & Cornell, 1998) revealed that a knowledge of the underlying
geography and the recreational activity the lost person was engaged in (mountain bikers
versus hikers, for instance) were important in defining the size of the search area. Another
factor was the psychological state of the lost person because those who are despondent or
who walk away to avoid others behave differently from most recreationists.
CONCLUSION

We will conclude our discussion of wayfinding by noting that people are generally
more successful at wayfinding than in cognitive mapping. This observation may be most
clearly seen at the extremes of the age spectrum. In spite of the data we reviewed
regarding possible deficiencies in children's cognitive maps, particularly their tendency
for environmental egocentrism, children beyond kindergarten age seem quite competent
at wayfinding. We have already characterized wayfinding as primarily a recognition task
and distinguished it from sketch maps that emphasize recall. In addition, many measures of
cognitive mapping ability such as sketch maps depend upon skills such as drawing ability
that are not so clearly or so often demanded as way-finding skills in the real world. Finally,
perhaps some individuals, particularly children, are intimidated or overwhelmed by the
complexity of the task requested by many cognitive map studies, but perform well when
faced with an ecologically valid situation.

SUMMARY

Whereas the conventional approach to perception examines the way the brain
interprets messages from the sensory organs concerning specific elements in the
environment, environmental perception views the perceptual experience as more
encompassing, including cognitive, affective, interpretive, and evaluative responses.
Moreover, environmental perception is likely to consider the person–environment
relationship from a holistic systems or transactional perspective. Environmental
perception involves activity on our part, especially in terms of exploring the environment
to determine what needs it meets. In addition, exposure to a particular environment
may result in adaptation or habituation—the weakening of a response following repeated
exposure to a stimulus.

The line between perception and cognition is a hazy one. Cognition integrates
memory and experience with a judgment of the present derived from perception to help
us think about, recognize, and organize the layout of an environment. Cognitive maps
are our mental representations of this layout and can be analyzed through a variety of
methods. The best-known approach to cognitive mapping is that of Kevin Lynch, who
emphasized the major elements: paths, landmarks, nodes, edges, and districts.

Cognitive maps are not perfectly accurate representations of the environment;

they contain distortions, omissions, and other errors. These errors often reflect the
importance of familiarity with an environment. Current thinking suggests that cognitive
maps may be stored as images, propositions, or both. Propositions, in particular, are often
thought of as organized into networks, but the specific form of storage remains
controversial.

Action plans serve as the bridge between stored mental images or facts and
actual behavior in the environment. The process of using stored spatial information
along with maps and other aids is called wayfinding. It seems that wayfinding may
involve both recognition of landmarks and other features at choice points, and the
recall of a more sophisticated survey or spatial map. Architectural features that make an
environment more distinctive or simpler to understand may improve wayfinding. Other
attempts to convey spatial information, such as signs and training programs, are likely
to improve wayfinding abilities and to reduce the stress of disorientation.