Aquilino Pimentel vs Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita

G.R. No. 164978, October 13, 2005

Topic: Power of the Congress to prescribe qualifications

FACTS:
While Congress was in session, due to vacancies in the cabinet, then president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
(GMA) appointed Arthur Yap et al as secretaries of their respective departments. They were appointed in an
acting capacity only. Senator Aquilino Pimentel together with 7 other senators filed a complaint against the
appointment of Yap et al. Pimentel averred that GMA cannot make such appointment without the consent of
the Commission on Appointment; that, in accordance with Section 10, Chapter 2, Book IV of Executive Order
No. 292, only the undersecretary of the respective departments should be designated in an acting capacity
and not anyone else.
On the contrary, then Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita averred that the president is empowered by Section
16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution to issue appointments in an acting capacity to department secretaries
without the consent of the Commission on Appointments even while Congress is in session. Further, EO 292
itself allows the president to issue temporary designation to an officer in the civil service provided that the
temporary designation shall not exceed one year.
During the pendency of said case, Congress adjourned and GMA issued ad interim appointments re-appointing
those previously appointed in acting capacity.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appointments made by ex PGMA is valid.

HELD:
Yes. The argument raised by Ermita is correct. Further, EO 292 itself provided the safeguard so that such
power will not be abused hence the provision that the temporary designation shall not exceed one year. In
this case, in less than a year after the initial appointments made by GMA, and when the Congress was in
recess, GMA issued the ad interim appointments – this also proves that the president was in good faith.
It must also be noted that cabinet secretaries are the alter egos of the president. The choice is the president’s
to make and the president normally appoints those whom he/she can trust. She cannot be constrained to
choose the undersecretary. She has the option to choose. An alter ego, whether temporary or permanent,
holds a position of great trust and confidence. Congress, in the guise of prescribing qualifications to an office,
cannot impose on the President who her alter ego should be.
The office of a department secretary may become vacant while Congress is in session. Since a department
secretary is the alter ego of the President, the acting appointee to the office must necessarily have the
President’s confidence. That person may or may not be the permanent appointee, but practical reasons may
make it expedient that the acting appointee will also be the permanent appointee.
Anent the issue that GMA appointed “outsiders”, such is allowed. EO 292 also provides that the president
“may temporarily designate an officer already in the government service or any other competent person to
perform the functions of an office in the executive branch.” Thus, the President may even appoint in an acting
capacity a person not yet in the government service, as long as the President deems that person competent.
G.R. No. 146875 July 14, 2003

KAGAWADS JOSE G. MENDOZA, ROSARIO B. ESPINO, TERESITA S. MENDOZA, JORGE

BANAL, Chairman of the Special Investigation Committee on Administrative Cases Against
Elected Barangay Officials of the Quezon City Council and ISMAEL A. MATHAY, JR., City
Mayor of Quezon City, petitioners,
vs.
BARANGAY CAPTAIN MANUEL D. LAXINA, SR., respondent.

TOPIC: Oath of Office

Facts:

Manuel Laxina won in the 1997 as Barangay Captain of Batasan Hills, Quezon City and took his oath and
assumed office on May 27, 1997. Roque Fermo, his rival candidate, filed an election protest with the
MTC of Quezon City, and on 1999, he was declared as winner. Fermo filed a motion filed a motion for
execution pending appeal and this was granted by the RTC. As a result, Laxina vacated the position and
relinquished the same to Fermo. However, COMELEC En Banc annulled RTC’s order on the ground that
there existed no good reasons to justify execution. On October 27, 1999, COMELEC issued a writ of
execution directing Fermo to vacate the office of Barangay Chairman. On October 28, 1999, Laxina
appointed Godofredo Ramos as Barangay Secretary and on November 8, 1999 Rodel Liquido was
appointed as Barangay Treasurer. Laxina took his oath of office as Barangay Captain before Mayor
Ismael Mathay, Jr. on November 16, 1999 and the following day, Fermo turned over to Laxina all the
assets and properties of the barangay.

On November 20, 1999, the Barangay Council issued a resolution ratifying the appointment of Ramos as
Secretary and Liquido as Treasurer effective November 1, 1999. However, the Secretary and Treasurer
appointed by Fermo objected the resolutions. In order to accommodate the same, Laxina agreed to
grant them allowances and renumerations for the period of November 1–7, 1999. The barangay payroll
which was issued on December 18, 1999 included Laxina, Ramos, and Liquido as among those entitled
to compensation for services rendered for the period November 8, 1999 to December 31, 1999.

Petitioners Jose G. Mendoza, Jr., Rosario E. Espino and Teresita S. Mendoza, who were barangay
councilors, refused to sign the payroll. In 2000, they filed with the Quezon City Council a complaint for
violation of the anti-graft and corrupt practices act and falsification of legislative documents against
Laxina and all other barangay officials who signed the questioned resolution and payroll. They contended
that Laxina et al. made it appear in the payroll that he and his appointees rendered services starting
November 8, 1999 when, in truth, they commenced to serve only on November 17, 1999 after Laxina
took his oath and assumed the office of barangay chairman. They further claimed that the effectivity
date of the barangay secretary and barangay treasurer's appointment, as approved in Resolution No.
001-S-1999, was November 16, 1999, but Laxina fraudulently antedated it to November 1, 1999. They
also contended that respondent connived with the other barangay officials in crossing out their names in
the payroll.

Laxina claimed that the taking anew of the oath of office as barangay chairman was a mere formality
and was not a requirement before he can validly discharge the duties of his office. He also contended
that his appointees are entitled to the remuneration for the period stated in the payroll as they
commenced to serve as early as October 28, 1999. He also added that the names of the 3 petitioner
barangay councilors who refused to sign the assailed resolution and daily wage payroll were crossed out
from the said payroll to prevent any further delay in the release of the salaries of all barangay officials
and employees listed therein.

The Quezon City Council adopted the decision of the Special Investigation Committee on Administrative
Cases of the City which ruled that Laxina had no power to make appointments prior to his oath taking. It
found Laxina guilty of grave misconduct and recommended the penalty of 2 months suspension.
However, the RTC ruled in favor of Laxina. It did not rule on the propriety of the re-taking of the oath
office, but nevertheless, exonerated him on the basis of the finding of the City Council that he did not act
in bad faith but merely "misread the law, as applied to the facts."

Issue:

1. WON the taking of an oath of office anew by Laxina is a condition sine qua non to the validity of
his re-assumption in office?

2. When is respondent considered to have validly re-assumed office — from October 28, 1999, the
date of service of the writ of execution to Roque Fermo and the date respondent actually
commenced to discharge the functions of the office, or from November 17, 1999, the date Roque
Fermo turned over to respondent the assets and properties of Barangay?

Ruling:

1. No. The re-taking of his oath of office on November 16, 1999 was a mere formality considering
that his oath taken on May 27, 1997 operated as a full investiture on him of the rights of the
office. When Laxina took his oath on May 27, 1997 and thereafter assumed office, he was
therefore vested with all the rights to discharge the functions of his office. Although in the
interim, he was unseated by virtue of a decision in an election protest decided against him, the
execution of said decision was annulled by the COMELEC. It was held therein that "[w]hen the
COMELEC nullified the writ of execution pending appeal in favor of FERMO, the decision of the
MTC proclaiming FERMO as the winner of the election was stayed and the 'status quo' or the last
actual peaceful uncontested situation preceding the controversy was restored . . ." The status
quo referred to the stage when respondent was occupying the office of Barangay Captain and
discharging its functions. For purposes of determining the continuity and effectivity of the rights
arising from respondent's proclamation and oath taken on May 27, 1997, it is as if the said writ
of execution pending appeal was not issued and he was not ousted from office.

An oath of office is a qualifying requirement for a public office; a prerequisite to the full
investiture with the office. It is only when the public officer has satisfied the prerequisite of oath
that his right to enter into the position becomes plenary and complete. However, once
proclaimed and duly sworn in office, a public officer is entitled to assume office and to exercise
the functions thereof. The pendency of an election protest is not sufficient basis to enjoin him
from assuming office or from discharging his functions. Unless his election is annulled by a final
and executory decision, or a valid execution of an order unseating him pending appeal is issued,
he has the lawful right to assume and perform the duties of the office to which he has been
elected.

2. On October 28, 1999. The records show that the COMELEC served on October 28, 1999 a writ of
execution ordering Fermo to desist from performing the function of the Office of Barangay
Captain, but the latter refused to comply therewith. Undoubtedly, it was Fermo's defiance of the
writ that prevented Laxina from assuming office at the barangay hall. To reckon, therefore, the
effectivity of Laxina’s assumption in office on November 17, 1999, as petitioners insist, would be
to sanction dilatory maneuvers and to put a premium on disobedience of lawful orders which this
Court will not countenance. It is essential to the effective administration of justice that the
processes of the courts and quasi-judicial bodies be obeyed. It follows that all lawful acts of the
latter arising from his re-assumption in office on October 28, 1999 are valid. Hence, no grave
misconduct was committed by him in appointing Ramos and Liquido and in granting them
emoluments and renumerations for the period served.
 G.R. Nos. 210220-21

EDWARD THOMAS F. JOSON, Petitioner,

vs.
THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, GOV. AURELIO M. UMALI, ALEJANDRO R. ABESAMIS,
EDILBERTO M. PANCHO, MA. CHRISTINA G. ROXAS, and FERDINAND R.
ABESAMIS, Respondents.

Topic: Oath of Office

FACTS:

Joson filed a complaint against Gov. Umali, Alejandro Abesamis, Edilberto Panco, Christina Roxas and
Ferdinand Abesamis for Violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and Unlawful
Appointment (Article 244). This complaint stemmed from the alleged appointment of Ferdinand Abesamis as
Consultant - Technical Assistance in the Office of the Governor of Nueva Ecija.

One of the contentions of Joson is that the appointment of Ferdinand as consultant by Governor Umali in spite
of being disqualified to hold public office, and the payment of his monthly honorarium from the coffers of the
provincial government by the other respondents, were done with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence, giving unwarranted benefit to Ferdinand and causing great and irreparable damage
and prejudice to the taxpayers of the Province of Nueva Ecija. Joson added that Governor Umali should also
be held liable for violation of Article 244 of the RPC for knowingly extending appointments to Ferdinand as
legal consultant regardless of the latter’s lack of legal qualification to the said position. Lastly, Joson asserted
that Governor Umali’s act of illegally and unlawfully hiring the services of Ferdinand could be reasonably
viewed as gross misconduct in office because such act involved the transgression of some established and
definite rules.

On the other hand, Governor Umali responded that the consultancy services rendered by Ferdinand cannot be
considered as government service within the contemplation of law, hence, not governed by the Civil Service
Law, Rules and Regulations. He pointed out that under the twin contracts of consultancy, Ferdinand is
engaged to render lump sum consultancy services for a short duration of six (6) months on a daily basis and
is not paid any salary or given any benefits enjoyed by government employees such as PERA, COLA and
RATA, but merely paid honoraria as stipulated in the contracts. He averred that the consultancy contracts
were mere agreements to render service and do not in themselves create public office to which the Revised
Omnibus Rules on Appointments and other Personnel Actions would apply. To bolster his claim, he cited DILG
Opinion No. 100 series of 2004 wherein the DILG Secretary opined that a consultancy service was not covered
by the phrase "any office in the government." Ferdinand here also contended that his services cannot create a
public office since it falls within the ambit of contracts of service/job orders under Section 2(a), Rule XI of the
Civil Service Commission Circular No. 40 series of 1998.

The Ombudsman then dismissed Joson’s complaint.

ISSUE:

WON here is legal basis on the violation of Article 244 of the RPC by Governor Umali for the appointment of
Ferdinand to the public office through the contracts of consultancy?

HELD:

NO.
In Posadas v. Sandiganbayan, the Court stated that a consultancy service is not considered government
service. Pursuant to CSC Resolution No. 93-1881 dated May 25, 1993, a contract for consultancy services is
not covered by Civil Service Law, rules and regulations because the said position is not found in the index of
position titles approved by DBM. Accordingly, it does not need the approval of the CSC. xxx A "consultant" is
defined as one who provides professional advice on matters within the field of his specific knowledge or
training. There is no employer-employee relationship in the engagement of a consultant but that of client-
professional relationship.

Here, Ferdinand did not take an oath of office prior to his rendition of consultancy services for the Provincial
Government of Nueva Ecija. All public officers and employees from the highest to the lowest rank are required
to take an oath of office which marks their assumption to duty. It is well-settled that on oath of office is a
qualifying requirement for public office, a prerequisite to the full investiture of the office. Ferdinand was not
required to take an oath of office because he rendered consultancy services for the provincial government not
by virtue of an appointment or election to a specific public office or position but by a contractual engagement.
In fine, those who have rendered services with the government, without occupying a public office or without
having been elected or appointed as a public officer evidenced by a written appointment and recorded with
the Civil Service Commission, did so outside the concept of government service. Thus, there is no legal basis
to support a finding that Governor Umali violated Article 244 of the RPC considering that Ferdinand was not
appointed to a government office
June 6, 2017
G.R. No. 226792
SOFRONIO B. ALBANIA, Petitioner
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS Promulgated: and EDGARDO A. TALLADO, Respondent

Topic: Three- term limit; term of office of elective local officials

Facts:

Edgardo A. Tallado and Jesus O. Typoco were both candidates for the position of Governor in Camarines Norte in the 2007
National Elections where the latter was proclaimed as the winner. Tallado questioned the proclamation by filing a petition
with the COMELEC which was decided in his favor leading to his assumption in office from March 22, 2010 to June 30,
2010 which was the end of the 2007-2010 term.

Tallado ran again in the 2010 and 2013 elections where he won and served for the same position, respectively.

Tallado filed his Certificate of Candidacy as Governor of Camarines Norte for the 2016 elections. However, Sofronio B.
Albania, a registered voter of Camarines Norte, filed a petition for Tallado’s disqualification from running as Governor
based on two grounds. One of which is that he violated the three term limit rule under Section 43 of the Local Government
Code of 1991 (RA No 7160). In his verified answer, Tallado denied violating the three-term limit rule as he did not fully
serve three consecutive terms since he only served as Governor for the 2007 elections from March 22, 2010 to June 30,
2010.

Issue:

WON Tallado violated the three-term limit rule.

Held:

No. The Court held that two conditions must concur for the application of the disqualification of a candidate based on
violation of the three-term limit rule, which are: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive
terms in the same local government post, and (2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.

In Aldovino, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, the Court said: As worded, the constitutional provision fixes the term of a
local elective office and limits an elective official's stay in office to no more than three consecutive terms. x x x

Significantly, this provision refers to a "term" as a period of time - three years - during which an official has title to office
and can serve.

A later case, Gaminde v. Commission on Audit, reiterated that the term means the time during which the officer may claim
to hold office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another.

In this case, while respondent ran as Governor of Camarines Norte in the 2007 elections, he did not win as such. It was
only after he filed a petition for correction of manifest error that he was proclaimed as the duly-elected Governor. He
assumed the post and served the unexpired term of his opponent from March 22, 2010 until June 30, 2010. Consequently,
he did not hold the office for the full term of three years to which he was supposedly entitled to. Thus, such period of time
that respondent served as Governor did not constitute a complete and full service of his term. The period when he was
out of office involuntarily interrupted the continuity of his service as Governor. As he had not fully served the 2007-2010
term, and had not been elected for three consecutive terms as Governor, there was no violation of the three-term limit
rule when he ran again in the 2016 elections.
Mayor Abelardo Abundo vs. COMELEC and Vega
GR No. 201716
January 8, 2013
Topic: Three- term limit; term of office of elective local officials

FACTS:

For four (4) successive regular elections, namely, the 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2010 national and local elections,
Petitioner Abelardo Abundo, Sr. (Abundo) vied for the position of municipal mayor. In both the 2001 and 2007
runs, he emerged and was proclaimed as the winning mayoralty candidate and accordingly served the
corresponding terms as mayor. In the 2004 electoral derby, however, the municipal board of canvassers
initially proclaimed as winner one Jose Torres (Torres), who, in due time, performed the functions of the office
of mayor. Abundo protested Torres election and proclamation. Abundo was eventually declared the winner of
the 2004 mayoralty electoral contest, paving the way for his assumption of office starting May 9, 2006 until
the end of the 2004-2007 term on June 30, 2007, or for a period of a little over one year and one month.
Then came the May 10, 2010 elections where Abundo and Torres again opposed each other. When Abundo
filed his certificate of candidacy for the mayoralty seat relative to this electoral contest, Torres sought the
formers disqualification to run.

The RTC declared Abundo as ineligible, under the three-term limit rule, to run in the 2010 elections for the
position of, and necessarily to sit as, mayor. To the RTC, the one year and 6 months service constitutes a
complete and full service of Abundo’s term as mayor. In its Resolution, the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) Second Division affirmed the decision of RTC, which affirmed by COMELEC en banc.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Abundo has consecutively served for three terms.

HELD:

The petition is partly meritorious.

The consecutiveness of what otherwise would have been Abundo’s three successive, continuous mayorship
was effectively broken during the 2004- 2007 term when he was initially deprived of title to, and was veritably
disallowed to serve and occupy, an office to which he, after due proceedings, was eventually declared to have
been the rightful choice of the electorate.

The declaration of being the winner in an election protest grants the local elected official the right to serve the
unexpired portion of the term. Verily, while he was declared winner in the protest for the mayoralty seat for
the 2004-2007 term, Abundo’s full term has been substantially reduced by the actual service rendered by his
opponent (Torres). Hence, there was actual involuntary interruption in the term of Abundo and he cannot be
considered to have served the full 2004-2007 term.

Prior to the finality of the election protest, Abundo did not serve in the mayor’s office and, in fact, had no legal
right to said position. During the pendency of the election protest, Abundo ceased from exercising power or
authority. Consequently, the period during which Abundo was not serving as mayor should be considered as a
rest period or break in his service because prior to the judgment in the election protest, it was Abundos
opponent, Torres, who was exercising such powers by virtue of the still then valid proclamation.

Petition is PARTLY GRANTED.

Aldovino VS COMELEC

Topic: Three- term limit; term of office of elective local officials

FACTS:

Lucena City councilor Wilfredo F. Asilo was elected to the said office for three consecutive terms: 1998-2001,
2001-2004, and 2004-2007. In September 2005, during his third term of office, the Sandiganbayan issued an
order of 90-day preventive suspension against him in relation to a criminal case. The said suspension order
was subsequently lifted by the Court, and Asilo resumed the performance of the functions of his office. Asilo
then filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position in 2007. His disqualification was sought by herein
petitioners on the ground that he had been elected and had served for three consecutive terms, in violation of
the three-term Constitutional limit.

ISSUE:

WON the suspensive condition interrupts the three-term limitation rule of COMELEC?

RULING:

NO. The preventive suspension of public officials does not interrupt their term for purposes of the three-term
limit rule under the Constitution and the Local Government Code (RA 7160).

The candidacy of Lucena City Councilor Wilfredo F. Asilo for a fourth term in the 2007 elections was in
contravention of the three-term limit rule of Art. X, sec. 8 of the Constitution since his 2004-2007 term was
not interrupted by the preventive suspension imposed on him, the SC granted the petition of Simon B.
Aldovino, Danilo B. Faller, and Ferdinand N. Talabong seeking Asilo’s disqualification. “Preventive suspension,
by its nature, does not involve an effective interruption of service within a term and should therefore not be a
reason to avoid the three-term limitation,” held the Court. It noted that preventive suspension can pose as a
threat “more potent” than the voluntary renunciation that the Constitution itself disallows to evade the three-
term limit as it is easier to undertake and merely requires an easily fabricated administrative charge that can
be dismissed soon after a preventive suspension has been imposed.