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1. JURISDICTION
a. Batas Pambansa Blg. 129
SECTION 20. JURISDICTION IN CRIMINAL CASES. –
Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the
exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body,
except those now falling under the exclusive and
concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan which
shall hereafter be exclusively taken cognizance of by
the latter.
SECTION 22. APPELLATE JURISDICTION. – Regional
Trial Courts shall exercise appellate jurisdiction over
all cases decided by Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts in their respective territorial jurisdictions.
Such cases shall be decided on the basis of the entire
record of the proceedings had in the court of origin
and such memoranda and/or briefs as may be
submitted by the parties or required by the Regional
Trial Courts. The decision of the Regional Trial
Courts in such cases shall be appealable by petition
for review to the
Court of Appeals which may give it due course
only when the petition shows prima facie that the
lower court has committed an error of fact or law
that will warrant a reversal or modification of the
decision or judgment sought to be reviewed.
SECTION 23. SPECIAL JURISDICTION TO TRY SPECIAL
CASES. – The Supreme Court may designate certain
branches of the Regional Trial Courts to handle
exclusively criminal cases, juvenile and domestic
relations cases, agrarian cases, urban land reform
cases which do not fall under the jurisdiction of
quasi-judicial bodies and agencies, and/or such
other special cases as the Supreme Court may
determine in the interest of a speedy and efficient
administration of justice.
SECTION 32. JURISDICTION OF METROPOLITAN
TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS AND
MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS IN CRIMINAL
CASES. – Except in cases falling within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and of
the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts shall exercise:
(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all
violations of city or municipal ordinances committed
within their respective territorial jurisdiction; and
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all
offenses punishable with imprisonment not
exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of
fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or
other penalties, including the civil liability arising
from such offenses or predicated thereon,
irrespective of kind, nature, value, or amount
thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses
involving damage to property through criminal
negligence they shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction thereof. (as amended by R.A, No. 7691)
SECTION 37. PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION. – Judges
of Metropolitan Trial Courts, except those in the
National Capital Region, of Municipal Trial Courts,
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall have
authority to conduct preliminary investigation of
crimes alleged to have been committed within their
respective territorial jurisdictions which are
cognizable by the Regional Trial Courts.
The preliminary investigation shall be conducted
in accordance with the procedure prescribed in
Section 1, paragraphs (a), (b), (c), and (d), of
Presidential Decree No. 911: Provided, however, That
if after the preliminary investigation the Judge finds a
prima facie case, he shall forward the records of the
case to the Provincial/City Fiscal for the filing of the
corresponding information with the proper court.
No warrant of arrest shall be issued by the
Judge in connection with any criminal complaint filed
with him for preliminary investigation, unless after
an examination in writing and under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and his witnesses, he
finds that a probable cause exists.
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Any warrant of arrest issued in accordance herewith
may be served anywhere in the Philippines.
b. 1991 Rules on Summary Procedure
c. RA no. 8493
d. SC Circular No. 38-98
e. PD no. 1606
f. RA 8249
g. RA 6770
LEILA DE LIMA V GUERRERO
Procedural Issues:
A Whether or not petitioner is excused from compliance
with the doctrine on hierarchy of courts considering
that the petition should first be filed with the Court of
Appeals.
B. Whether or not the pendency of the Motion to
Quash the Information before the trial court renders
the instant petition premature.
C. Whether or not petitioner, in filing the present
petition, violated the rule against forum shopping given
the pendency of the Motion to Quash the Information
before the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City in
Criminal Case No. 17-165 and the Petition for Certiorari
filed before the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. SP No.
149097, assailing the preliminary investigation
conducted by the DOJ Panel.
Substantive Issues:
A. Whether the Regional Trial Court or the
Sandiganbayan has the jurisdiction over the violation of
Republic Act No. 9165 averred in the assailed
Information.
B. Whether or not the respondent gravely abused her
discretion in finding probable cause to issue the
Warrant of Arrest against petitioner.
C. Whether or not petitioner is entitled to a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Status Quo Ante Order in the
interim until the instant petition is resolved or until the
trial court rules on the Motion to Quash.
Ruling
It is immediately clear that petitioner De Lima did not
sign the Verification and Certification against Forum
Shopping and Affidavit of Merit in front of the notary
public. Such clear breach of notarial protocol is highly
censurable36 as Section 6, Rule II of the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice requires the affiant, petitioner De Lima
in this case, to sign the instrument or document in the
presence of the notary De Lima failed to sign the
Verification and Certification against Forum Shopping in
the presence of the notary, she has likewise failed to
properly swear under oath the contents thereof,
thereby rendering false and null the jurat and
invalidating the Verification and Certification against
Forum Shopping. Without the presence of the notary
upon the signing of the Verification and Certification
against Forum Shopping, there is no assurance that the
petitioner swore under oath that the allegations in the
petition have been made in good faith or are true and
correct, and not merely speculative.
PETITIONER DISREGARDED THE HIERARCHY OF COURTS
The rule on hierarchy of courts is an important
component of the orderly administration of justice and
not imposed merely for whimsical and arbitrary
reasons. Well-defined exceptions to the doctrine on
hierarchy of courts. Immediate resort to this Court may
be allowed when any of the following grounds are
present: (1) when genuine issues of constitutionality are
raised that must be addressed immediately; (2) when
the case involves transcendental importance; (3) when
the case is novel; (4) when the constitutional issues
raised are better decided by this Court; (5) when time is
of the essence; ( 6) when the subject of review involves
acts of a constitutional organ; (7) when there is no
other plain, speedy, adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law; (8) when the petition includes questions
that may affect public welfare, public policy, or
demanded by the broader interest of justice; (9) when
the order complained of was a patent nullity; and
(10) when the appeal was considered as an
inappropriate remedy. Unfortunately, none of these
exceptions were sufficiently established in the present
petition so as to convince this court to brush aside the
rules on the hierarchy of courts. This Court cannot thus
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allow a precedent allowing public officers assailing the
finding of probable cause for the issuance of arrest
warrants to be brought directly to this Court, bypassing
the appellate court, without any compelling reason.
THE PRESENT PETITION IS PREMATURE
Granting a writ of prohibition enjoining and prohibiting
respondent judge from conducting further proceedings
until and unless the Motion to Quash is resolved with
finality; Issuing a Status Quo Ante Order restoring the
parties to the status prior to the issuance of the Order
and Warrant of Arrest, both dated
February 23, 201 7, thereby recall in both processes and
restoring petitioner to her liberty and freedom
In the palpable absence of a ruling on the Motion to
Quash -- which puts the jurisdiction of the lower court
in issue -- there is no controversy for this Court to
resolve; there is simply no final judgment or order of
the lower court to review, revise, reverse, modify, or
affirm. As per the block letter provision of the
Constitution, this Court cannot exercise its jurisdiction
in a vacuum nor issue a definitive ruling on mere
suppositions.
2. SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS
a. 1987 Constitution Article 3
SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law, nor
shall any person be denied the equal protection of
the laws.
SECTION 2. The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons
or things to be seized.
SECTION 3. (1) The privacy of communication and
correspondence shall be inviolable except upon
lawful order of the court, or when public safety or
order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or
the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.
SECTION 4. No law shall be passed abridging the
freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or
the right of the people peaceably to assemble and
petition the government for redress of grievances.
SECTION 5. No law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of
religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference, shall forever be
allowed. No religious test shall be required for the
exercise of civil or political rights.
SECTION 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the
same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be
impaired except upon lawful order of the court.
Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except
in the interest of national security, public safety, or
public health, as may be provided by law.
SECTION 7. The right of the people to information on
matters of public concern shall be recognized.
Access to official records, and to documents, and
papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data
used as basis for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as
may be provided by law.
SECTION 8. The right of the people, including those
employed in the public and private sectors, to form
unions, associations, or societies for purposes not
contrary to law shall not be abridged.
SECTION 9. Private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation.
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SECTION 10. No law impairing the obligation of
contracts shall be passed.
SECTION 11. Free access to the courts and quasi-
judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall
not be denied to any person by reason of poverty.
SECTION 12. (1) Any person under investigation for
the commission of an offense shall have the right to
be informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of
his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one.
These rights cannot be waived except in writing and
in the presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat,
intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the
free will shall be used against him. Secret detention
places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar
forms of detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in
violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil
sanctions for violations of this section as well as
compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of
torture or similar practices, and their families.
SECTION 13. All persons, except those charged with
offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction,
be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right
to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive
bail shall not be required.
SECTION 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer
for a criminal offense without due process of law.
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved,
and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and
counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him, to have a speedy,
impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses
face to face, and to have compulsory process to
secure the attendance of witnesses and the
production of evidence in his behalf. However, after
arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the
absence of the accused provided that he has been
duly notified and his failure to appear is
unjustifiable.
SECTION 15. The privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of
invasion or rebellion when the public safety requires
it.
SECTION 16. All persons shall have the right to a
speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial,
quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.
SECTION 17. No person shall be compelled to be a
witness against himself.
SECTION 18. (1) No person shall be detained solely
by reason of his political beliefs and aspirations.
(2) No involuntary servitude in any form shall
exist except as a punishment for a crime whereof
the party shall have been duly convicted.
SECTION 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed,
nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment
inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed,
unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. Any
death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to
reclusion perpetua.
(2) The employment of physical, psychological,
or degrading punishment against any prisoner or
detainee or the use of substandard or inadequate
penal facilities under subhuman conditions shall be
dealt with by law.
SECTION 20. No person shall be imprisoned for debt
or non-payment of a poll tax.
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SECTION 21. No person shall be twice put in
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an
act is punished by a law and an ordinance,
conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute
a bar to another prosecution for the same act.
SECTION 22. No ex post facto law or bill of attainder
shall be enacted.
b. 1987 Constitution Article 8
SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the
following powers:
xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection
and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission
to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal
assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall
provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for
the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for
all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish,
increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of
procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies
shall remain effective unless disapproved by the
Supreme Court.
c. Rules on Criminal Procedure; RULE 115 (Rights of
Accused)
Section 1. Rights of accused at the trial. — In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be entitled
to the following rights:
(a) To be presumed innocent until the contrary
is proved beyond reasonable doubt.
(b) To be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him.
(c) To be present and defend in person and by
counsel at every stage of the proceedings, from
arraignment to promulgation of the judgment. The
accused may, however, waive his presence at the
trial pursuant to the stipulations set forth in his bail,
unless his presence is specifically ordered by the
court for purposes of identification. The absence of
the accused without justifiable cause at the trial of
which he had notice shall be considered a waiver of
his right to be present thereat. When an accused
under custody escapes, he shall be deemed to have
waived his right to be present on all subsequent trial
dates until custody over him is regained. Upon
motion, the accused may be allowed to defend
himself in person when it sufficiently appears to the
court that he can properly protect his right without
the assistance of counsel.
(d) To testify as a witness in his own behalf but
subject to cross-examination on matters covered by
direct examination. His silence shall not in any
manner prejudice him.
(e) To be exempt from being compelled to be a
witness against himself.
(f) To confront and cross-examine the witnesses
against him at the trial. Either party may utilize as
part of its evidence the testimony of a witness who
is deceased, out of or can not with due diligence be
found in the Philippines, unavailable or otherwise
unable to testify, given in another case or
proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the
same parties and subject matter, the adverse party
having the opportunity to cross-examine him.
(g) To have compulsory process issued to secure
the attendance of witnesses and production of other
evidence in his behalf.
(h) To have speedy, impartial and public trial.
(i) To appeal in all cases allowed and in the
manner prescribed by law. (1a)
d. RA 7483
e. DOJ-NPS Manial, Part XI
Sec 1, and Sec 2
f. RA 9344
SEC. 60. PROHIBITION AGAINST LABELING AND
SHAMING. - In the conduct of the proceedings
beginning from the initial contact with the child, the
competent authorities must refrain from branding
or labeling children as young criminals, juvenile
delinquents, prostitutes or attaching to them in any
manner any other derogatory names. Likewise, no
discriminatory remarks and practices shall be
allowed particularly with respect to the child's class
or ethnic origin.
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SEC. 61. Other Prohibited Acts. - The following and
any other similar acts shall be considered prejudicial
and detrimental to the psychological, emotional,
social, spiritual, moral and physical health and well-
being of the child in conflict with the law and
therefore, prohibited:
(a) Employment of threats of whatever kind and
nature;
(b) Employment of abusive, coercive and
punitive measures such as cursing, beating,
stripping, and solitary confinement;
(c) Employment of degrading, inhuman end
cruel forms of punishment such as shaving the
heads, pouring irritating, corrosive or harmful
substances over the body of the child in conflict with
the law, or forcing him/her to walk around the
community wearing signs which embarrass,
humiliate, and degrade his/her personality and
dignity; and
(d) Compelling the child to perform involuntary
servitude in any and all forms under any and all
instances.
3. EXECUTIVE BRANCH PROCEDURES
PART ONE: RULE 126 (SEARCH AND SEIZURE)
A. DEFINITION
1. 1987 PH Constitution
SECTION 2. The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
SECTION 3. (1) The privacy of communication and
correspondence shall be inviolable except upon
lawful order of the court, or when public safety
or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or
the preceding section shall be inadmissible for
any purpose in any proceeding.
2. RULES ON CRIM PRO (RULE 126)
SECTION 1. SEARCH WARRANT DEFINED. — A
search warrant is an order in writing issued in the
name of the People of the Philippines, signed by
a judge and directed to a peace officer,
commanding him to search for personal property
described therein and bring it before the court.
(1)
SECTION 2. COURT WHERE APPLICATION FOR
SEARCH WARRANT SHALL BE FILED. — An
application for search warrant shall be filed with
the following:
a) Any court within whose territorial
jurisdiction a crime was committed.
b) For compelling reasons stated in the
application, any court within the judicial region
where the crime was committed if the place of
the commission of the crime is known, or any
court within the judicial region where the
warrant shall be enforced.
However, if the criminal action has
already been filed, the application shall only be
made in the court where the criminal action is
pending. (n)
SECTION 3. PERSONAL PROPERTY TO BE SEIZED.
— A search warrant may be issued for the search
and seizure of personal property:
(a) Subject of the offense;
(b) Stolen or embezzled and other
proceeds, or fruits of the offense; or
(c) Used or intended to be used as the
means of committing an offense. (2a)
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SECTION 4. REQUISITES FOR ISSUING SEARCH
WARRANT. — A search warrant shall not issue
except upon probable cause in connection with
one specific offense to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the things to be seized
which may be anywhere in the Philippines. (3a)
SECTION 5. EXAMINATION OF COMPLAINANT;
RECORD. — The judge must, before issuing the
warrant, personally examine in the form of
searching questions and answers, in writing and
under oath, the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce on facts personally known to
them and attach to the record their sworn
statements, together with the affidavits
submitted. (4a)
SECTION 6. ISSUANCE AND FORM OF SEARCH
WARRANT. — If the judge is satisfied of the
existence of facts upon which the application is
based or that there is probable cause to believe
that they exist, he shall issue the warrant, which
must be substantially in the form prescribed by
these Rules. (5a)
SECTION 7. RIGHT TO BREAK DOOR OR WINDOW
TO EFFECT SEARCH. — The officer, if refused
admittance to the place of directed search after
giving notice of his purpose and authority, may
break open any outer or inner door or window of
a house or any part of a house or anything
therein to execute the warrant or liberate himself
or any person lawfully aiding him when
unlawfully detained therein. (6)
SECTION 8. SEARCH OF HOUSE, ROOM, OR
PREMISE TO BE MADE IN PRESENCE OF TWO
WITNESSES. — No search of a house, room, or
any other premise shall be made except in the
presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any
member of his family or in the absence of the
latter, two witnesses of sufficient age and
discretion residing in the same locality. (7a)
SECTION 9. TIME OF MAKING SEARCH. — The
warrant must direct that it be served in the day
time, unless the affidavit asserts that the
property is on the person or in the place ordered
to be searched, in which case a direction may be
inserted that it be served at any time of the day
or night. (8)
SECTION 10. VALIDITY OF SEARCH WARRANT. —
A search warrant shall be valid for ten (10) days
from its date. Thereafter it shall be void. (9a)
SECTION 11. RECEIPT FOR THE PROPERTY SEIZED.
— The officer seizing property under the warrant
must give a detailed receipt for the same to the
lawful occupant of the premises in whose
presence the search and seizure were made, or in
the absence of such occupant, must, in the
presence of at least two witnesses of sufficient
age and discretion residing in the same locality,
leave a receipt in the place in which he found the
seized property. (10a)
SECTION 12. DELIVERY OF PROPERTY AND
INVENTORY THEREOF TO COURT; RETURN AND
PROCEEDINGS THEREON. — (a) The officer must
forthwith deliver the property seized to the judge
who issued the warrant, together with a true
inventory thereof duly verified under oath.
(b) Ten (10) days after issuance of the
search warrant, the issuing judge shall ascertain
if the return has been made, and if none, shall
summon the person to whom the warrant was
issued and require him to explain why no return
was made. If the return has been made, the
judge shall ascertain whether section 11 of this
Rule has been complained with and shall require
that the property seized be delivered to him. The
judge shall see to it that subsection (a) hereof
has been complied with.
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(c) The return on the search warrant shall
be filed and kept by the custodian of the log book
on search warrants who shall enter therein the
date of the return, the result, and other actions
of the judge.
A violation of this section shall constitute
contempt of court.(11a)
SECTION 13. SEARCH INCIDENT TO LAWFUL
ARREST. — A person lawfully arrested may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything
which may have been used or constitute proof in
the commission of an offense without a search
warrant. (12a)
STONEHILL V DIOKNO
20 SCRA 283 (1967)
Facts: Petitioners, who have prior deportation cases
pending, and the corporation they form were alleged to
committed "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and
Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised
Penal Code,” to which they were served 4 search
warrants, directing any peace officer to search
petitioners’ persons and/or premises of their offices,
warehouses and/or residences for: “books of accounts,
financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts,
ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters,
and other documents and/or papers showing all
business transactions including disbursements receipts,
balance sheets and profit and loss statements and
Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).”
The items allegedly illegally obtained can be classified
into two groups: (1) those found and seized in the
offices of aforementioned corporations, and (2) those
found in petitioners’ residences.
Petitioners aver that the warrant is illegal for, inter alia:
(1) they do not describe with particularity the
documents, books and things to be seized; (2) cash
money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually
seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence
against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation
cases filed against them; (4) the searches and seizures
were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the documents,
papers and cash money seized were not delivered to
the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in
accordance with law x x x.
Respondent-prosecutors invoke the Moncado vs
People’s Court ruling: even if the searches and seizures
under consideration were unconstitutional, the
documents, papers and things thus seized are
admissible in evidence against petitioners herein.
Issue: Validity of the search warrants.
Held: The SC ruled in favor of Stonehill et. al., reversing
the Moncado doctrine. Though Stonehill et. al. are not
the proper parties to assail the validity of the search
warrant issued against their corporation and thus they
have no cause of action (only the officers or board
members of said corporation may assail said warrant,
and that corporations have personalities distinct from
petitioners’ personalities), the 3 warrants issued to
search petitioners’ residences are hereby declared void.
Thus, the searches and seizures made therein are made
illegal.
The constitution protects the people’s right against
unreasonable search and seizure. It provides:
(1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause,
to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth
in said provision; and
(2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the
things to be seized.
In the case at bar, none of these are met. The warrant
was issued from mere allegation that petitioners
committed a “violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and
Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised
Penal Code.” As no specific violation has been alleged, it
was impossible for the judges who issued said warrants
to have found the existence of probable cause, for the
same presupposes the introduction of competent proof
that the party against whom it is sought has performed
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or committed violations of the law. In other words, it
would be a legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict
anybody of a “violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and
Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised
Penal Code,” — as alleged in the aforementioned
applications — without reference to any determinate
provision of said laws or codes. General warrants are
also to be eliminated, as the legality or illegality of
petitioners’ transactions is immaterial to the invalidity
of the general warrant that sought these effects to be
searched and seized: “Books of accounts, financial
records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts,
ledgers, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and
other documents and/or papers showing all business
transactions including disbursement receipts, balance
sheets and related profit and loss statements.”
The Court also holds that the only practical means of
enforcing the constitutional injunction against
unreasonable searches and seizures is, in the language
of the Federal Supreme Court: x x x If letters and private
documents can thus be seized and held and used in
evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the
protection of the 4th Amendment, declaring his rights
to be secure against such searches and seizures, is of no
value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned,
might as well be stricken from the Constitution. The
efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty
to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be
aided by the sacrifice of those great principles
established by years of endeavor and suffering which
have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental
law of the land.
KATZ V US
389 US 347 (1967)
Facts: The petitioner used a public telephone booth to
transmit wagering information from Los Angeles to
Boston and Miami in violation of federal law. After
extensive surveillance, the FBI placed a listening device
to the top of the telephone booth and recorded the
petitioner’s end of the telephone conversations which
was then used as evidence against him at his trial. The
petitioner moved to have the evidence suppressed
under the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution, and
that motion was denied. The Court of Appeals rejected
the contention that the evidence is inadmissible.
Certiorari was granted.
Issue: Whether the Fourth Amendment of the
Constitution protects telephone conversations
conducted in a phone booth and secretly recorded from
introduction as evidence against a person?
Held: Justice Potter Stewart filed the majority opinion.
The petitioner strenuously asserted that the phone
booth was a constitutionally protected area. However,
the Fourth Amendment protects persons and not places
from unreasonable intrusion. Even in a public place, a
person may have a reasonable expectation of privacy in
his person. Although the petitioner did not seek to hide
his self from public view when he entered the
telephone booth, he did seek to keep out the uninvited
ear. He did not relinquish his right to do so simply
because he went to a place where he could be seen. A
person who enters into a telephone booth may expect
the protection of the Fourth Amendment of the
Constitution as he assumes that the words he utters
into the telephone will not be broadcast to the world.
Once this is acknowledged, it is clear that the Fourth
Amendment of the Constitution protects persons and
not areas from unreasonable searches and seizures. The
Government’s activities in electron
ically listening to and recording the petitioner’s
telephone conversations constituted a search and
seizure under the Fourth Amendment and absent a
search warrant predicated upon sufficient probable
cause, all evidence obtained is inadmissible.
Dissent: Justice Hugo Black (“J. Black”) filed a dissenting
opinion. J. Black observed that eavesdropping was an
ancient practice that the Framers were certainly aware
of when they drafted the United States Constitution
(“Constitution”). Had they wished to prohibit this
activity under the Fourth Amendment of the
Constitution they would have added such language that
would have effectively done so. By clever wording, the
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Supreme Court finds it plausible to argue that language
aimed specifically at searches and seizures of things
that can be searched and seized may, to protect privacy,
be applied to eavesdropped evidence of conversations.
Concurrence. Justice John Harlan (“J. Harlan”) filed a
dissenting opinion. The Fourth Amendment of the
Constitution protects persons, not places. There is a
twofold requirement for what protection is afforded to
those people. First, that a person has exhibited an
actual expectation of privacy and, second, that the
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize
as reasonable. The critical fact in this case is that a
person who enters a telephone booth shuts the door
behind him, pays the toll, and is surely entitled to
assume that his conversation is not being intercepted.
On the other hand, conversations out in the open public
would not be protected against being overheard as the
expectation of privacy would not be reasonable.
B. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY BOUNDARIES;
LIMITATIONS ON STATE ACTION
1. Nature of right protected; waiver of protected
right
GUANZON V. DE VILLA
181 SCRA 623 (1990)
Facts: The 41 petitioners alleged that the "saturation
drive" or "aerial target zoning" that were conducted in
their place (Tondo Manila) were unconstitutional. They
alleged that there is no specific target house to be
search and that there is no search warrant or warrant of
arrest served. Most of the policemen are in their civilian
clothes and without nameplates or identification cards.
The residents were rudely rouse from their sleep by
banging on the walls and windows of their houses. The
residents were at the point of high-powered guns and
herded like cows. Men were ordered to strip down to
their briefs for the police to examine their tattoo marks.
The residents complained that they're homes were
ransacked, tossing their belongings and destroying their
valuables. Some of their money and valuables had
disappeared after the operation. The residents also
reported incidents of maulings, spot-beatings and
maltreatment. Those who were detained also suffered
mental and physical torture to extract confessions and
tactical informations. The respondents said that such
accusations were all lies. Respondents contends that
the Constitution grants to government the power to
seek and cripple subversive movements for the
maintenance of peace in the state. The aerial target
zoning were intended to flush out subversives and
criminal elements coddled by the communities were the
said drives were conducted. They said that they have
intelligently and carefully planned months ahead for the
actual operation and that local and foreign media joined
the operation to witness and record such event.
Issue: Whether or Not the saturation drive committed
consisted of violation of human rights.
Held: It is not the police action per se which should be
prohibited rather it is the procedure used or the
methods which "offend even hardened sensibilities"
.Based on the facts stated by the parties, it appears to
have been no impediment to securing search warrants
or warrants of arrest before any houses were searched
or individuals roused from sleep were arrested. There is
no showing that the objectives sought to be attained by
the "aerial zoning" could not be achieved even as th
rights of the squatters and low income families are fully
protected. However, the remedy should not be brought
by a tazpaer suit where not one victim complaints and
not one violator is properly charged. In the
circumstances of this taxpayers' suit, there is no erring
soldier or policeman whom the court can order
prosecuted. In the absence of clear facts no permanent
relief can be given.
In the meantime where there is showing that some
abuses were committed, the court temporary restraint
the alleged violations which are shocking to the senses.
Petition is remanded to the RTC of Manila.
2. Scope of protection
a. 1987 PH Constitution (Article 3)
SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law, nor
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shall any person be denied the equal protection of
the laws.
BURGOS V CHIEF OF STAFF
133 SCRA 800 (1984)
Facts: On 7 December 1982, Judge Ernani Cruz-Paño,
Executive Judge of the then CFI Rizal [Quezon City],
issued 2 search warrants where the premises at 19,
Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City, and 784 Units C & D,
RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, business
addresses of the “Metropolitan Mail” and “We Forum”
newspapers, respectively, were searched, and office
and printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia,
motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing,
publication and distribution of the said newspapers, as
well as numerous papers, documents, books and other
written literature alleged to be in the possession and
control of Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the “We
Forum” newspaper, were seized. A petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary
mandatory and prohibitory injunction was filed after 6
months following the raid to question the validity of
said search warrants, and to enjoin the Judge Advocate
General of the AFP, the city fiscal of Quezon City, et.al.
from using the articles seized as evidence in Criminal
Case Q-022782 of the RTC Quezon City (People v.
Burgos).
Issue: Whether allegations of possession and printing of
subversive materials may be the basis of the issuance of
search warrants.
Held: Section 3 provides that no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined by the judge, or such other
responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after
examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized. Probable cause for a
search is defined as such facts and circumstances which
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed and that
the objects sought in connection with the offense are in
the place sought to be searched. In mandating that “no
warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined by the judge, after examination under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce”; the Constitution requires no less than
personal knowledge by the complainant or his
witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of a
search warrant may be justified. Herein, a statement in
the effect that Burgos “is in possession or has in his
control printing equipment and other paraphernalia,
news publications and other documents which were
used and are all continuously being used as a means of
committing the offense of subversion punishable under
PD 885, as amended” is a mere conclusion of law and
does not satisfy the requirements of probable cause.
Bereft of such particulars as would justify a finding of
the existence of probable cause, said allegation cannot
serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant.
Further, when the search warrant applied for is directed
against a newspaper publisher or editor in connection
with the publication of subversive materials, the
application and/or its supporting affidavits must contain
a specification, stating with particularity the alleged
subversive material he has published or is intending to
publish. Mere generalization will not suffice.
KATZ V US
389 US 347 (1967)**
b. RA 4200
c. RULE 126, CrimPro
SECTION 13. SEARCH INCIDENT TO LAWFUL ARREST.
— A person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may have
been used or constitute proof in the commission of
an offense without a search warrant. (12a)
C. TYPES
1. Through Search Warrant
a. Generally
Rule 126 CRIMPRO
SECTION 1. SEARCH WARRANT DEFINED. — A
search warrant is an order in writing issued in
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the name of the People of the Philippines,
signed by a judge and directed to a peace
officer, commanding him to search for personal
property described therein and bring it before
the court. (1)
MANALILI V CA
280 SCRA 400 (1997)
Facts: Police operatives Espiritu, Lumabas and driver
Enriquez conducted surveillance along the front of
Kalookan Cemetery based on the information that drug
addicts were roaming around in the area, saw a man
who appeared to be high on drugs and introduced
themselves as policemen. Said man avoided them and
tried to resist, when they asked what the man was
holding in his hand, the man held out his wallet and
allowed Espiritu to examine it, who found what he
suspected to be crushed mj leaves. The man was
brought to the Anti-Narcotics Unit and turned out to be
Manalili. The substance found on Manalili’s wallet was
sent to NBI Foresic Chemistry Section and was
confirmed as mj.
Manalili’s version of the story was that early afternoon
he was riding in a tricycle when 3 policemen stopped
the tricycle and informed them of the suspected
possession of mj, the policemen bodily searched both
Manalili and the driver and upon finding nothing illegal
on their persons, let the driver go but brought Manalili
along to the police station. Manalili while on the way to
the station saw a neighbor whom he signaled to follow
them and when he was again searched in the station, he
was asked to strip his pants where they found nothing
illegal. Said neighbor then asked the policemen to let
Manalili go seeing as they had not found anything illegal
but Manalili was put on a cell who was brought to a
fiscal later that day and was told not to say anything
despite his saying that the policemen had not found mj
on his person. Said tricycle driver and neighbor testified
on court as to how the 2 searches yielded nothing illegal
on Manalili’s person.
Issues: (1) W/N evidence seized during a stop-and-frisk
is admissible; (2) W/N Manalili’s actions constituted a
waiver of his rights; (3) W/N the evidence is sufficient to
prove Manalili’s guilt.
Ruling: (1) In Terry vs Ohio, a stop-and-frisk was defined
as the vernacular designation of the right of a police
officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him
and pat him for weapons: W)here a police officer
observes an unusual conduct which leads him
reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that
criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with
whom he is dealing may be armed and presently
dangerous, where in the course of investigating this
behavior he identified himself as a policeman and
makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the
initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his
reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is
entitled for the protection of himself and others in the
area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer
clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover
weapons which might be used to assault him. Such a
search is a reasonable search under the Fourth
Amendment, and any weapon seized may properly be
introduced in evidence against the person from whom
they were taken.
It did not, however abandon the rule that the police
must, whenever practicable, obtain advance judicial
approval of searches and seizures through the warrant
procedure, excused only by exigent circumstances. As
People vs Lacerna enumerated 5 recognized exceptions
to the rule against warrantless searches and seizures: 1)
search incidental to lawful arrest; 2) search of moving
vehicles; 3) seizure in plain view; 4) customs search; 5)
waiver of the accused of his rights against unreasonable
searches and seizures. From Espiritu’s experience as a
member of the Anti-Narcotics Unit of Caloocan City
Police, Manalili’s suspicious behavior was characteristic
of drug addicts who were high.
(2) SG’s contention that Manalili effectively
waived the inadmissibility of the evidence illegally
obtained when he failed to raise this issue or object
during trial. A valid waiver of right against unreasonable
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searches and seizures require the concurrence of these
requisites: 1) the right to be waived existed; 2) the
person waiving it had knowledge; and 3) he/she had
actual intention to relinquish the right. In this case
however, it is deemed that Manalili has waived such
right for failure to raise its violation before the trial
court, at the earliest opportunity possible. Issues not
raised below cannot be pleaded for the first time on
appeal.
(3) Manalili’s contention that the charge was
trumped up to extort money and testimonies of the
arresting officers were inconsistent, it held that the trial
court’s assessment of the credibility of the witnesses
particularly when affirmed by CA is accorded great
weight and respect as it had opportunity to observe
their demeanor and deportment as they testified before
it.
The elements of illegal possession of mj are: a)
the accused is in possession of an item or object which
is identified to be a prohibited drug; b) such possession
is not authorized by law; and c) the accused freely and
consciously possessed the said drug. The substance
found on Manalili’s wallet was identified as mj which
was prohibited and knowingly without authority.
Considering that he was high and tried to avoid and
resist, such behavior clearly shows that he knew he was
holding mj and it was prohibited by law.
b. Venue of application; jurisdiction of court
Rule 126 CRIMPRO
SECTION 2. COURT WHERE APPLICATION FOR
SEARCH WARRANT SHALL BE FILED. — An
application for search warrant shall be filed with
the following:
a) Any court within whose territorial
jurisdiction a crime was committed.
b) For compelling reasons stated in the
application, any court within the judicial region
where the crime was committed if the place of
the commission of the crime is known, or any
court within the judicial region where the
warrant shall be enforced.
However, if the criminal action has
already been filed, the application shall only be
made in the court where the criminal action is
pending. (n)
BP 129
SECTION 21. ORIGINAL JURISDICTION IN OTHER
CASES. – Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
original jurisdiction:
(1) In the issuance of writs of certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas
corpus and injunction which may be enforced in
any part of their respective regions; and
(2) In actions affecting ambassadors and
other public ministers and consuls.
INTERIM RULES RELATIVE TO THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE JUDICIARY
REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1980
A. GENERAL PROVISIONS
xxx
3. Writs and processes. —
(a) Writs of certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and
injunction issued by a regional trial court may be
enforced in any part of the region.
(b) All other processes, whether issued by
a regional trial court or a metropolitan trial
court, municipal trial court or municipal circuit
trial court may be served anywhere in the
Philippines, and, in the last three cases, without a
certification by the judge of the regional trial
courts.
MALALOAN V CA
232 SCRA 249 (1994)
FACTS: Lt. Absalon V. Salboro of the CAPCOM filed with
the RTC of Kalookan City an application for search
warrant. The search warrant was sought for in
connection with an alleged violation of P.D. 1866 (Illegal
Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions). Firearms,
explosive materials and subversive documents were
seized and taken during the search. Petitioners
presented a Motion for Consolidation, Quashal of
Search Warrant and For the Suppression of All Illegally
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Acquired Evidence. However, the court denied the
quashal of the search warrant and the validity of which
warrant was upheld invoking paragraph 3(b) of the
Interim Rules and Guidelines which provides that search
warrants can be served not only within the territorial
jurisdiction of the issuing court but anywhere in the
judicial region of the issuing court.
ISSUE: W/N a court may take cognizance of an
application for a search warrant in connection with an
offense committed outside its territorial boundary and,
thereafter, issue the warrant to conduct a search on a
place outside the court's supposed territorial
jurisdiction
HELD: A warrant, such as a warrant of arrest or a search
warrant, merely constitutes process. A search warrant is
defined in our jurisdiction as an order in writing issued
in the name of the People of the Philippines signed by a
judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding him
to search for personal property and bring it before the
court. A search warrant is in the nature of a criminal
process akin to a writ of discovery. It is a special and
peculiar remedy, drastic in its nature, and made
necessary because of a public necessity.
A judicial process is defined as a writ, warrant ,
subpoena, or other formal writing issued by authority of
law. It is clear, therefore, that a search warrant is
merely a judicial process designed by the Rules to
respond only to an incident in the main case, if one has
already been instituted, or in anticipation thereof. Since
a search warrant is a judicial process, not a criminal
action, no legal provision, statutory or reglementary,
expressly or impliedly provides a jurisdictional or
territorial limit on its area of enforceability. Moreover,
in our jurisdiction, no period is provided for the
enforceability of warrants of arrest, and although within
ten days from the delivery of the warrant of arrest for
execution a return thereon must be made to the issuing
judge, said warrant does not become functus officio but
is enforceable indefinitely until the same is enforced or
recalled.
The following are the guidelines when there are
possible conflicts of jurisdiction where the criminal case
is pending in one court and the search warrant is issued
by another court for the seizure of personal property
intended to be used as evidence in said criminal case:
1. The court wherein the criminal case is pending shall
have primary jurisdiction to issue search warrants
necessitated by and for purposes of said case. An
application for a search warrant may be filed with
another court only under extreme and compelling
circumstances that the applicant must prove to the
satisfaction of the latter court which may or may
not give due course to the application depending on
the validity of the justification offered for not filing
the same in the court with primary jurisdiction
thereover.
2. When the latter court issues the search warrant, a
motion to quash the same may be filed in and shall
be resolved by said court, without prejudice to any
proper recourse to the appropriate higher court by
the party aggrieved by the resolution of the issuing
court. All grounds and objections then available,
existent or known shall be raised in the original or
subsequent proceedings for the quashal of the
warrant, otherwise they shall be deemed waived.
3. Where no motion to quash the search warrant was
filed in or resolved by the issuing court, the
interested party may move in the court where the
criminal case is pending for the suppression as
evidence of the personal property seized under the
warrant if the same is offered therein for said
purpose. Since two separate courts with different
participations are involved in this situation, a
motion to quash a search warrant and a motion to
suppress evidence are alternative and not
cumulative remedies. In order to prevent forum
shopping, a motion to quash shall consequently be
governed by the omnibus motion rule, provided,
however, that objections not available, existent or
known during the proceedings for the quashal of
the warrant may be raised in the hearing of the
motion to suppress. The resolution of the court on
the motion to suppress shall likewise be subject to
any proper remedy in the appropriate higher court.
4. Where the court which issued the search warrant
denies the motion to quash the same and is not
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otherwise prevented from further proceeding

thereon, all personal property seized under the
warrant shall forthwith be transmitted by it to the
court wherein the criminal case is pending, with the
necessary safeguards and documentation therefore.
5. These guidelines shall likewise be observed where
the same criminal offense is charged in different
informations or complaints and filed in two or more
courts with concurrent original jurisdiction over the
criminal action. Where the issue of which court will
try the case shall have been resolved, such court
shall be considered as vested with primary
jurisdiction to act on applications for search
warrants incident to the criminal case.

WHEREFORE, on the foregoing premises, the instant

petition is DENIED

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