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Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, G.R. No. 115455, August 25, 1994
Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, G.R. No. 115455, August 25, 1994
Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, G.R. No. 115455, August 25, 1994
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note is that, as a result of the Senate action, a distinct bill may be produced.
To insist that a revenue statute—and not only the bill which initiated the
legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law—must
substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senate’s
power not only to “concur with amendments” but also to “propose
amendments.” It would be to violate the coequality of legislative power of
the two houses of Congress and in fact make the House superior to the
Senate.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Legislative power is vested in the Congress
of the Philippines, consisting of “a Senate and a House of Representatives,”
not in any particular chamber.—The contention that the constitutional
design is to limit the Senate’s power in respect of revenue bills in order to
compensate for the grant to the Senate of the treaty-ratifying power and
thereby equalize its powers and those of the House overlooks the fact that
the powers being compared are different. We are dealing here with the
legislative power which under the Constitution is vested not in any
particular chamber but in the Congress of the Philippines, consisting of “a
Senate and a House of Represen-tatives.” The exercise of the treaty-
ratifying power is not the exercise of legislative power. It is the exercise of a
check on the executive power. There is, therefore, no justification for
comparing the legislative powers of the House and of the Senate on the
basis of the possession of such nonlegislative power by the Senate. The
possession of a similar power by the U.S. Senate has never been thought of
as giving it more legislative powers than the House of Representatives.
Same; Same; Same; Same; There is really no difference between the
Senate preserving the House Bill up to the enacting clause and then writing
its own version following the enacting clause and, on the other hand,
separately presenting a bill of its own on the same subject matter.—It is
insisted, however, that S. No. 1630 was passed not in substitution of H. No.
11197 but of another Senate bill (S. No. 1129) earlier filed and that what the
Senate did was merely to “take [H. No. 11197] into consideration” in
enacting S. No. 1630. There is really no difference between the Senate
preserving H. No. 11197 up to the enacting clause and then writing its own
version following the enacting clause (which, it would seem, petitioners
admit is an amendment by substitution), and, on the other hand, separately
presenting a bill of its own on the same subject matter. In either case the
result are two bills on the same subject.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Constitution simply means that the
initiative for filing revenue, tariff, or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase
of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application
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must come from the House of Representatives and that it does not prohibit
the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the
bill from the House.—Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the
initiative for filing revenue, tariff, or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase
of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come
from the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are
from the districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more
sensitive to the local needs and problems. On the other hand, the senators,
who are elected at large, are expected to approach the same problems from
the national perspective. Both views are thereby made to bear on the
enactment of such laws. Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the
Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the
House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt
of the House bill.
Same; Same; Presidential certification on urgency of a bill dispenses
with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on
separate days.—The presidential certification dispensed with the
requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate
days. The phrase “except when the President certifies to the necessity of its
immediate enactment, etc.” in Art. VI, § 26(2) qualifies the two stated
conditions before a bill can become a law: (i) the bill has passed three
readings on separate days and (ii) it has been printed in its final form and
distributed three days before it is finally approved. In other words, the
“unless” clause must be read in relation to the “except” clause, because the
two are really coordinate clauses of the same sentence. To construe the
“except” clause as simply dispensing with the second requirement in the
“unless” clause (i.e., printing and distribution three days before final
approval) would not only violate the rules of grammar. It would also negate
the very premise of the “except” clause: the necessity of securing the
immediate enactment of a bill which is certified in order to meet a public
calamity or emergency. For if it is only the printing that is dispensed with by
presidential certification, the time saved would be so negligible as to be of
any use in insuring immediate enactment. It may well be doubted whether
doing away with the necessity of printing and distributing copies of the bill
three days before the third reading would insure speedy enactment of a law
in the face of an emergency requiring the calling of a special election for
President and Vice-President. Under the Constitution such a law is required
to be made within seven days of the convening of Congress in emergency
session.
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Same; Same; Judicial Review; While the sufficiency of the factual basis
of the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus or declaration of martial law
is subject to judicial review because basic rights of individuals may be at
hazard, the factual basis of presidential certification of bills, which involves
doing away with procedural requirements designed to insure that bills are
duly considered by members of Congress, certainly should elicit a different
standard of review.—It is nonetheless urged that the certification of the bill
in this case was invalid because there was no emergency, the condition
stated in the certification of a “growing budget deficit” not being an unusual
condition in this country. It is noteworthy that no member of the Senate saw
fit to controvert the reality of the factual basis of the certification. To the
contrary, by passing S. No. 1630 on second and third readings on March 24,
1994, the Senate accepted the President’s certification. Should such certifi-
cation be now reviewed by this Court, especially when no evidence has been
shown that, because S. No. 1630 was taken up on second and third readings
on the same day, the members of the Senate were deprived of the time
needed for the study of a vital piece of legislation? The sufficiency of the
factual basis of the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus or declaration of
martial law under Art. VII, § 18, or the existence of a national emergency
justifying the delegation of extraordinary powers to the President under Art.
VI, § 23(2), is subject to judicial review because basic rights of individuals
may be at hazard. But the factual basis of presidential certification of bills,
which involves doing away with procedural requirements designed to insure
that bills are duly considered by members of Congress, certainly should
elicit a different standard of review.
Same; Same; Bicameral Conference Committee; A third version of the
bill may result from the conference committee, which is considered an
“amendment in the nature of a substitute,” the only requirement being that
the third version be germane to the subject of the House and Senate bills.—
As to the possibility of an entirely new bill emerging out of a Conference
Committee, it has been explained: Under congressional rules of procedure,
conference committees are not expected to make any material change in the
measure at issue, either by deleting provisions to which both houses have
already agreed or by inserting new provisions. But this is a difficult
provision to enforce. Note the problem when one house amends a proposal
originating in either house by striking out everything following the enacting
clause and substituting provisions which make it an entirely new bill. The
versions are now altogether different, permitting a conference committee to
draft essentially a new bill . . . . The result is a third version, which is
considered an “amendment in the nature of a substitute,” the only
requirement for
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which being that the third version be germane to the subject of the House
and Senate bills.
Same; Same; Same; The report of the conference committee needs the
approval of both houses of Congress to become valid as an act of the
legislative department.—Indeed, this Court recently held that it is within the
power of a conference committee to include in its report an entirely new
provision that is not found either in the House bill or in the Senate bill. If the
committee can propose an amendment consisting of one or two provisions,
there is no reason why it cannot propose several provisions, collectively
considered as an “amendment in the nature of a substitute,” so long as such
amendment is germane to the subject of the bills before the committee.
After all, its report was not final but needed the approval of both houses of
Congress to become valid as an act of the legislative department. The charge
that in this case the Conference Committee acted as a third legislative
chamber is thus without any basis.
Same; Same; Same; Separation of Powers; It is common place in
Congress that conference committee reports include new matters which,
though germane, have not been committed to the committee, and if a change
is desired in the practice, it must be sought in Congress since this question
is not covered by any constitutional provision but is only an internal rule of
each house.—To be sure, nothing in the Rules limits a conference committee
to a consideration of conflicting provisions. But Rule XLIV, § 112 of the
Rules of the Senate is cited to the effect that “If there is no Rule applicable
to a specific case the precedents of the Legislative Department of the
Philippines shall be resorted to, and as a supplement of these, the Rules
contained in Jefferson’s Manual.” The following is then quoted from the
Jefferson’s Manual: The managers of a conference must confine themselves
to the differences committed to them . . . and may not include subjects not
within disagreements, even though germane to a question in issue. Note
that, according to Rule XLIX, § 112, in case there is no specific rule
applicable, resort must be to the legislative practice. The Jefferson’s Manual
is resorted to only as supplement. It is common place in Congress that
conference committee reports include new matters which, though germane,
have not been committed to the committee. This practice was admitted by
Senator Raul S. Roco, petitioner in G.R. No. 115543, during the oral
argument in these cases. Whatever, then, may be provided in the Jefferson’s
Manual must be considered to have been modified by the legislative
practice. If a change is desired in the practice it must be sought in Congress
since this question is not covered by any constitutional provision but is only
an internal rule of each house. Thus, Art. VI, §
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pointed out, there is no proof worthy of the name of any facts to justify its
reexamination and, possibly, disregard.
Same; Same; Bicameral Conference Committee; Both chambers of
Congress entrust the function of reconciling the bills to their delegates at a
conference committee with full awareness, and tacit consent, that new
provisions may be included even if not within the “disagreeing
provisions.”—The fact is that conference committees only take up bills
which have already been freely and fully discussed in both chambers of the
legislature, but as to which there is need of reconciliation in view of
“disagreeing provisions” between them; and both chambers entrust the
function of reconciling the bills to their delegates at a conference committee
with full awareness, and tacit consent, that conformably with established
practice unquestioningly observed over many years, new provisions may be
included even if not within the “disagreeing provisions” but of which,
together with other changes, they will be given detailed and sufficiently
explicit information prior to voting on the conference committee version.
Same; Same; Same; It is an unacceptable theorization that when the
BCC report and its proposed bill were submitted to the Senate and the
House, and the members thereof did not bother to read, or what is worse,
having read did not understand, what was before them.—In any case, all the
changes and revisions, and deletions, made by the conference committee
were all subsequently considered by and approved by both the Senate and
the House, meeting and voting separately. It is an unacceptable theorization,
to repeat, that when the BCC report and its proposed bill were submitted to
the Senate and the House, and the members thereof did not bother to read,
or what is worse, having read did not understand, what was before them, or
did not realize that there were new provisions in the reconciled version
unrelated to any “disagreeing provisions,” or that said new provisions or
revisions were effectively concealed from them. Moreover, it certainly was
entirely within the power and prerogative of either legislative chamber to
reject the BCC bill and require the organization of a new bicameral
conference committee. That this option was not exercised by either house
only proves that the BCC measure was found to be acceptable as in fact it
was approved and adopted by both chambers.
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amendments that would have been incorporated in House Bill No. 11197. Its
participation was in originating its own Senate Bill No. 1630, which was
not embodied in but merged with House Bill No. 11197. Senate Bill No.
1630 was not even an amendment by substitution, assuming this was
permissible. To “substitute” means “to take the place of; to put or use in
place of another.” Senate Bill No. 1630 did not, upon its approval, replace
(and thus eliminate) House Bill No. 11197. Both bills retained their separate
identities until they were joined or united into what became the enrolled bill
and ultimately R.A. No. 7716.
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Constitutional Law; Expanded VAT Law; R.A. 7716 did not originate
exclusively in the House.—Since R.A. No. 7716 is a revenue measure, it
must originate exclusively in the House—not in the Senate. As correctly
asserted by petitioner Tolentino, on the face of the enrolled copy of R.A.
No. 7716, it is a “CONSOLIDATION OF HOUSE BILL NO. 11197 AND
SENATE BILL NO. 1630.” In short, it is an illicit marriage of a bill which
originated in the House and a bill which originated in the Senate. Therefore,
R.A. No. 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House.
Same; Same; Origin of Revenue Bills; The Senate cannot amend by
substitution with an entirely new bill of its own any bill covered by Section
24 of Article VI which the House transmitted to it because such substitution
would indirectly violate Section 24.—Since the origination is not exclusively
vested in the House of Representatives of the United States, the Senate’s
authority to propose or concur with amendments is necessarily broader. That
broader authority is further confirmed by the phrase “as on other Bills,” i.e.,
its power to propose or concur with amendments thereon is the same as in
ordinary bills. The absence of this phrase in our Constitution was clearly
intended to restrict or limit the Philippine Senate’s power to propose or
concur with amendments. In the light of the exclusivity of origination and
the absence of the phrase “as on other Bills,” the Philippine Senate cannot
amend by substitution with an entirely new bill of its own any bill covered
by Section 24 of Article VI which the House of Representatives transmitted
to it because such substitution would indirectly violate Section 24.
Same; Same; Same; Presidential Certification of Bills; The only
revenue bill which could be properly certified on permissible constitutional
grounds is the bill that was introduced in the House.—I submit, however,
that the Presidential certification is void ab initio not necessarily for the
reason adduced by petitioner Kilosbayan, Inc., but because it was addressed
to the Senate for a bill which is prohibited from originating therein. The
only bill which could be properly certified on permissible
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process of legislation, and HB No. 11197 was not likewise passed by the
Senate on second and third readings, neither the Senate nor the House could
validly approve the bicameral conference committee report and the
proposed bill.
Same; Same; “Enrolled Bill” Doctrine; Invocation of the “enrolled
bill” doctrine is misplaced.—The majority opinion, however, invokes the
enrolled bill doctrine and wants this Court to desist from looking behind the
copy of the assailed measure as certified by the Senate President and the
Speaker of the House. I respectfully submit that the invocation is misplaced.
First, as to the issue of origination, the certification in this case explicitly
states that R.A. No. 7716 is a “consolidation of House Bill No. 11197 and
Senate Bill No. 1630.” This is conclusive evidence that the measure did not
originate exclusively in the House. Second, the enrolled bill doctrine is of
American origin, and unquestioned fealty to it may no longer be justified in
view of the expanded jurisdiction of this Court under Section 1, Article VIII
of our Constitution. Third, even under the regime of the 1935 Constitution
which did not contain the above provision, this Court, through Mr. Chief
Justice Makalintal, in Astorga vs. Villegas, declared that it cannot be truly
said that Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito has laid to rest the question of whether the
enrolled bill doctrine or the journal entry rule should be adhered to in this
jurisdiction. Fourth, even in the United States, the enrolled bill doctrine has
been substantially undercut. This is shown in the disquisitions of Mr. Justice
Reynato S. Puno in his dissenting opinion, citing Sutherland, Statutory
Construction.
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Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance
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circumstances in those cases were exactly the same as the ones at bench,
then the subject revenue or tariff bill may be upheld in this jurisdiction on
the principle of substantial compliance, as they were in the United States,
except possibly in instances where the House bill undergoes what is now
referred to as “amendment by substitutionn,” for that would be in derogation
of our Constitution which vests solely in the House of Representatives the
power to initiate revenue bills. A Senate amendment by substitution simply
means that the bill in question did not in effect originate from the lower
chamber but from the upper chamber and now disguises itself as a mere
amendment of the House version.
Same; Judicial Review; Courts will not decline the exercise of
jurisdiction upon the suggestion that action might be taken by political
agencies in disregard of the judgment of the judicial tribunals.—The rule is
fixed that the duty in a proper case to declare a law unconstitutional cannot
be declined and must be performed in accordance with the deliberate
judgment of the tribunal before which the validity of the enactment is
directly drawn into question. When it is clear that a statute transgresses the
authority vested in the legislature by the Constitution, it is the duty of the
courts to declare the act unconstitutional because they cannot shirk from it
without violating their oaths of office. This duty of the courts to maintain
the Constitution as the fundamental law of the state is imperative and
unceasing; and, as Chief Justice Marshal said, whenever a statute is in
violation of the fundamental law, the courts must so adjudge and thereby
give effect to the Constitution. Any other course would lead to the
destruction of the Constitutionn. Since the question as to the
constitutionality of a statute is a judicial matter, the courts will not decline
the exercise of jurisdiction upon the suggestion that action might be taken
by political agencies in disregard of the judgment of the judicial tribunals.
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their stance is categorically repudiated by the rules of both the Senate and
the House of Representatives which define with precision the parameters of
power of a Bicameral Conference Committee.
Same; Same; Same; The thesis that a Bicameral Conference Committee
can wield ex post veto power wages war against our settled ideals of
representative democracy.—But the thesis that a Bicameral Conference
Committee can wield ex post veto power does not only contravene the rules
of both the Senate and the House. It wages war againt our settled ideals of
representative democracy. For the inevitable, catastrophic effect of the thesis
is to install a Bicameral Conference Committee as the Third Chamber of our
Congress, similarly vested with the power to make laws but with the
dissimilarity that its laws are not the subject of a free and full discussion of
both Houses of Congress. With such a vagrant power, a Bicameral
Conference Com-mittee acting as a Third Chamber will be a constitutional
monstrosity.
Same; “Enrolled Bill” Doctrine; The enrolled bill theory is a historical
relic that should not continuously rule us from the fossilized past.—
Respondents seek sanctuary in the conclusiveness of an enrolled bill to bar
any judicial inquiry on whether Congress observed our constitutional
procedure in the passage of R.A. No. 7716. The enrolled bill theory is a
historical relic that should not continuously rule us from the fossilized past.
It should be immediately emphasized that the enrolled bill theory originated
in England where there is no written constitution and where Parliament is
supreme. In this jurisdiction, we have a written constitution and the
legislature is a body of limited powers. Likewise, it must be pointed out that
starting from the decade of the 40’s, even American courts have veered
away from the regidity and unrealism of the conclusiveness of an enrolled
bill.
Same; Same; The previous rulings of the Supreme Court on the
conclusiveness of an enrolled bill are no longer good law.—I am not
unaware that this Court has subscribed to the conclusiveness of an enrolled
bill as enunciated in the 1947 lead case of Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, and
reiterated in subsequent cases. With due respect, I submit that these rulings
are no longer good law. Suffice to state that section 313 of the Old Code of
Civil Procedure as amended by Act No. 2210 is no longer in our statute
books. It has long been repealed by the Rules of Court. Mabanag also relied
on jurisprudence and authorities in the United States which are under severe
criticisms by modern scholars. Hence, even in the United States the
conclusiveness of an enrolled bill has been junked by most of the States.
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Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance
MENDOZA, J.:
I. Procedural Issues:
A. Does the law violate the following provisions in the Bill of Rights
(Art. III)?
1. § 1
2. § 4
3. § 5
4. § 10
These questions will be dealt in the order they are stated above. As
will presently be explained not all of these questions are judicially
cognizable, because not all provisions of the Constitution are self
executing and, therefore, judicially enforceable. The other
departments of the government are equally charged with the
enforcement of the Constitution, especially the provisions relating to
them.
I. PROCEDURAL ISSUES
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It appears that on various 1dates between July 22, 1992 and August
31, 1993, several bills were introduced in the House of
Representatives seeking to amend certain provisions of the National
Internal Revenue Code relative to the value-added tax or VAT. These
bills were referred to the House Ways and Means Committee which
recommended for approval a substitute measure, H. No. 11197,
entitled
The bill (H. No. 11197) was considered on second reading starting
November 6, 1993 and, on November 17, 1993, it was approved by
the House of Representatives after third and final reading.
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1 H. Nos. 253, 771, 2450, 7033, 8086, 9030, 9210, 9297, 10012 and 10100.
(Respondents’ Consolidated Memorandum, Annexes 3-12).
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It was sent to the Senate on November 23, 1993 and later referred by
that body to its Committee on Ways and Means.
On February 7, 1994, the Senate Committee submitted its report
recommending approval of S. No. 1630, entitled
AN ACT RESTRUCTURING THE VALUE-ADDED TAX (VAT)
SYSTEM TO WIDEN ITS TAX BASE AND ENHANCE ITS
ADMINISTRATION, AMENDING FOR THESE PURPOSES SECTIONS
99, 100, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108, AND 110 OF TITLE IV, 112 OF
TITLE V, AND 236, 237, AND 238 OF TITLE IX, AND REPEALING
SECTIONS 113, 114 AND 116 OF TITLE V, ALL OF THE NATIONAL
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES
It was stated that the bill was being submitted “in substitution of
Senate Bill No. 1129, taking into consideration P.S. Res. No. 734
and H.B. No. 11197.”
On February 8, 1994, the Senate began consideration of the bill
(S. No. 1630). It finished debates on the bill and approved it on
second reading on March 24, 1994. On the same day, it approved the
bill on third reading by the affirmative votes of 13 of its members,
with one abstention.
H. No. 11197 and its Senate version (S. No. 1630) were then
referred to a conference committee which, after meeting four times
(April 13, 19, 21 and 25, 1994), recommended that “House Bill No.
11197, in consolidation with Senate Bill No. 1630, be approved in
accordance with the attached copy of the bill as reconciled and
approved by the conferees.”
The Conference Committee bill, entitled “AN ACT
RESTRUCTURING THE VALUE-ADDED TAX (VAT) SYSTEM,
WIDENING ITS TAX BASE AND ENHANCING ITS
ADMINISTRATION AND FOR THESE PURPOSES AMENDING
AND REPEALING THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE
NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED,
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES,” was thereafter approved by the
House of Representatives on April 27, 1994 and by the Senate on
May 2, 1994. The enrolled bill was then presented to the President
of the Philippines who, on May 5, 1994, signed it. It became
Republic Act No. 7716. On May 12, 1994, Republic Act No. 7716
was published in two newspapers of general circulation and, on May
28, 1994, it took effect, although
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its implementation was suspended until June 30, 1994 to allow time
for the registration of business entities. It would have been enforced
on July 1, 1994 but its enforcement was stopped because the Court,
by the vote of 11 to 4 of its members, granted a temporary
restraining order on June 30, 1994.
First. Petitioners’ contention is that Republic Act No. 7716 did
not “originate exclusively” in the House of Representatives as
required by Art. VI, § 24 of the Constitution, because it is in fact the
result of the consolidation of two distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and S.
No. 1630. In this connection, petitioners point out that although2 Art.
VI, § 24 was adopted from the American Federal Constitution, it is
notable in two respects: the verb “shall originate” is qualified in the
Philippine Constitution by the word “exclusively” and the phrase “as
on other bills” in the American version is omitted. This means,
according to them, that to be considered as having originated in the
House, Republic Act No. 7716 must retain the essence of H. No.
11197.
This argument will not bear analysis. To begin with, it is not the
law—but the revenue bill—which is required by the Constitution to
“originate exclusively” in the House of Representatives. It is
important to emphasize this, because a bill originating in the House
may undergo such extensive changes in the Senate that the result
may be a rewriting of the whole. The possibility of a third version by
the conference committee will be discussed later. At this point, what
is important to note is that, as a result of the Senate action, a distinct
bill may be produced. To insist that a revenue statute—and not only
the bill which initiated the legislative process culminating in the
enactment of the law—must substantially be the same as the House
bill would be to deny the Senate’s power not only to “concur with
amendments” but also to “propose amendments.” It would be to
violate the coequality of legislative power of the two houses of
Congress and in fact make the House superior to the Senate.
The contention that the constitutional design is to limit the
Senate’s power in respect of revenue bills in order to compensate
________________
2 U.S. CONST., Art. 1, § 7, cl. 1: “All bills for raising revenue shall originate in
the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with
amendments, as on other bills.”
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Second. Enough has been said to show that it was within the power
of the Senate to propose S. No. 1630. We now pass to the next
argument of petitioners that S. No. 1630 did not8 pass three readings
on separate days as required by the Constitution because the second
and third readings were done on the same9 day, March 24, 1994. But
this was
10
because on February 24, 1994 and again on March 22,
1994, the President had certified S. No. 1630 as urgent. The
presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of
printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days. The phrase
“except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate
enactment, etc.” in Art. VI, § 26(2) qualifies the two stated
conditions before a bill can become a law: (i) the bill has passed
three readings on separate days and (ii) it has been printed in its final
form and distributed three days before it is finally approved.
In other words, the “unless” clause must be read in relation to the
“except” clause, because the two are really coordinate clauses of the
same sentence. To construe the “except” clause as simply dispensing
with the second requirement in the “unless” clause (i.e., printing and
distribution three days before final approval) would not only violate
the rules of grammar. It would also negate the very premise of the
“except” clause: the necessity of securing
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8 Although the 1935 Constitution did not expressly require that bills must pass
three readings in each House, this was clearly implied from its Art. VI, § 21(2) so that
the two Houses by their rules prescribed three readings for the passage of bills. Later
the requirement was expressly provided in the 1973 Constitution from which Art. VI,
§ 26(2) was taken. Art. VIII, § 19(2) of the 1973 document provided: No bill shall
become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies
thereof in its final form have been distributed to the Members three days before its
passage, except when the Prime Minister certifies to the necessity of its immediate
enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no
amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately
thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
9 Respondents’ Consolidated Reply, Annex 14.
10 Memorandum of Petitioner Arturo M. Tolentino, Supplement C.
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11 Art. VII, § 10 provides: “The Congress shall, at ten o’clock in the morning of
the third day after the vacancy in the offices of the President and Vice-President
occurs, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call and within seven
days enact a law calling for a special election to elect a President and a Vice-President
to be held not earlier than forty-five days nor later than sixty days from the time of
such call. The bill calling such special election shall be deemed certified under
paragraph 2, Section 26, Article VI of this Constitution and shall become law upon its
approval on third reading by the Congress. Appro-priations for the special election
shall be charged against any current appropriations and shall be exempt from the
requirements of paragraph 4, Section 25, Article VI of this Constitution. The
convening of the Congress cannot be suspended nor the special election postponed.
No special election shall be called if the vacancy occurs within eighteen months
before the date of the next presidential election.”
12 JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SIXTH CONGRESS,
FOURTH SESSION 398-399 (1968).
666
667
________________
668
________________
669
Rule XII:
§ 26. In the event that the Senate does not agree with the House of
Representatives on the provision of any bill or joint resolution, the
differences shall be settled by a conference committee of both Houses which
shall meet within ten days after their composition.
The President shall designate the members of the conference committee
in accordance with subparagraph (c), Section 3 of Rule III.
Each Conference Committee Report shall contain a detailed and
sufficiently explicit statement of the changes in or amendments to the
subject measure, and shall be signed by the conferees.
The consideration of such report shall not be in order unless the report
has been filed with the Secretary of the Senate and copies thereof have
been distributed to the Members.
(Emphasis added)
§ 85. Conference Committee Reports.—In the event that the House does
not agree with the Senate on the amendments to any bill or
________________
actually by conference committee. Any remedy found will probably take the form of
reducing the need for using conference committees at all; and the principal suggestion to that
end is that bills and resolutions be referred, not, as now, to separate committees of the two
houses, but to joint committees, which not only would hold single sets of hearings, but might
deliberate and report back bills to the two houses in such agreed form that further significant
differences would not be likely to develop. Arrangements of this nature yield excellent results
in the legislature of Massachusetts. But there are obstacles to adoption of the plan for Congress,
not the least of them being a natural aversion of House members to joint committees in which
senators seem likely to dominate; and, as indicated below, the outlook for the reform is
problematical.” F.A. OGG AND P.O. RAY, supra note 7 at 310-311.
670
671
This observation applies to the other contention that the Rules of the
two chambers were likewise disregarded in the preparation of the
Conference Committee Report because the Report did not contain a
“detailed and sufficiently explicit statement of changes in, or
amendments to, the subject measure.” The Report used brackets and
capital letters to indicate the changes. This is a standard practice in
bill-drafting. We cannot say that in using these marks and symbols
the Committee violated the Rules of the Senate and the House.
Moreover, this Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of
these internal Rules. To the contrary, as we have already ruled,
“parliamentary rules are merely procedural 19
and with their
observance the courts have no concern.” Our concern is with the
procedural requirements of the Constitution for the enactment of
laws. As far as these requirements are concerned, we are satisfied
that they have been faithfully observed in these cases.
Nor is there any reason for requiring that the Committee’s Report
in these cases must have undergone three readings in each of the two
houses. If that be the case, there would be no end to negotiation
since each house may seek modifications of the compromise bill.
The nature of the bill, therefore, requires that it be acted upon by
each house on a “take it or leave it” basis, with the only alternative
that if it is not approved by both houses, another conference
committee must be appointed. But then again the result would still
be a compromise measure that may not be wholly satisfying to both
houses.
Art. VI, § 26(2) must, therefore, be construed as referring only to
bills introduced for the first time in either house of Congress, not to
the conference committee report. For if the purpose of requiring
three readings is to give members of Congress time to study bills, it
cannot be gainsaid that H. No. 11197 was passed in the House after
three readings; that in the Senate it was considered on first reading
and then referred to a committee of that body; that although the
Senate committee did not report out the House bill, it submitted a
version (S. No. 1630) which it had prepared by “taking into
consideration” the House bill; that for its part the Conference
Committee consolidated the two bills and prepared a
_________________
672
________________
20 E.g., Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1 (1947); Casco (Phil.) Inc. v. Gimenez, 7
SCRA 347 (1963); Morales v. Subido, 27 SCRA 131 (1969).
21 Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, supra note 20.
22 Morales v. Subido, supra note 20.
23 Astorga v. Villegas, 56 SCRA 714 (1974).
673
Among the transactions exempted from the VAT were those of PAL
because it was exempted under its franchise (P.D. No. 1590) from
the payment of all “other taxes . . . now or in the near future,” in
consideration of the payment by it either of the corporate income tax
or a franchise tax of 2%.
As a result of its amendment by Republic Act No. 7716, § 103 of
the NIRC now provides:
674
24 See, e.g., Alalayan v. National Power Corp., 24 SCRA 172 (1968); Cordero v.
Cabatuando, 6 SCRA 418 (1962); Sumulong v. COMELEC, 73 Phil. 288 (1941).
675
676
Republic Act No. 7716 amended § 103 by deleting ¶ (f) with the
result that print media became subject to the VAT with respect to all
aspects of their operations. Later, however, based on a memorandum
of the Secretary of Justice, respondent Secretary of Finance issued
Revenue Regulations No. 11-94, dated June 27, 1994, exempting the
“circulation income of print media pursuant to § 4 Article III of the
1987 Philippine Constitution guaranteeing against abridgment of
freedom of the press, among others.” The exemption of “circulation
income” has left income from advertisements still subject to the
VAT.
It is unnecessary to pass upon the contention that the exemption
granted is beyond the authority of the Secretary of Finance to
________________
26 Art. VI, § 28(4) provides: “No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed
without the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the Congress.”
677
give, in view of PPI’s contention that even with the exemption of the
circulation revenue of print media there is still an unconstitutional
abridgment of press freedom because of the imposition of the VAT
on the gross receipts of newspapers from advertisements and on
their acquisition of paper, ink and services for publication. Even on
the assumption that no exemption has effectively been granted to
print media transactions, we find no violation of press freedom in
these cases.
To be sure, we are not dealing here with a statute that on its face
operates in the area of press freedom. The PPI’s claim is simply that,
as applied to newspapers, the law abridges press freedom. Even with
due recognition of its high estate and its importance in a democratic
society, however, the press is not immune from general regulation by
the State. It has been held:
_______________
27 Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132, 81 L.Ed. 953, 961 (1937).
678
678 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance
scheme to expand the base and the scope of the VAT system. The
law would perhaps be open to the charge of discriminatory treatment
if the only privilege withdrawn had been that granted to the press.
But that is not the case.
The situation in the case at bar is indeed a far cry from those
cited by the PPI in support of its claim that Republic Act No. 7716
subjects the press to discriminatory taxation. In the cases cited, the
discriminatory purpose was clear either from the background of the
law or from 28
its operation. For example, in Grosjean v. American
Press Co., the law imposed a license tax equivalent to 2% of the
gross receipts derived from advertisements only on newspapers
which had a circulation of more than 20,000 copies per week.
Because the tax was not based on the volume of advertisement alone
but was measured by the extent of its circulation as well, the law
applied only to the thirteen large newspapers in Louisiana, leaving
untaxed four papers with circulation of only slightly less than 20,000
copies a week and 120 weekly newspapers which were in serious
competition with the thirteen newspapers in question. It was well
known that the thirteen newspapers had been critical of Senator
Huey Long, and the Long-dominated legislature of Louisiana
responded by taxing what Long described as the “lying newspapers”
by imposing on them “a tax on lying.” The effect of the tax was to
curtail both their revenue and their circulation. As the U.S. Supreme
Court noted, the tax was “a deliberate and calculated device in the
guise of a tax to limit the circulation of information to which 29
the
public is entitled in virtue of the constitutional guaranties.” The
case is a classic illustration of the warning that the power to tax is
the power to destroy.30
In the other case invoked by the PPI, the press was also found to
have been singled out because everything was exempt from the “use
tax” on ink and paper, except the press. Minnesota imposed a tax on
the sales of goods in that state. To protect the sales tax, it enacted a
complementary tax on the privilege of “using, storing or consuming
in that state tangible personal
_______________
679
________________
680
_________________
by the Secretary of Finance which shall not be less than Four hundred eighty
thousand pesos (P480,000.00) or more than Seven hundred twenty thousand pesos
(P720,000.00) subject to tax under Section 112 of this Code.”
34 297 U.S. at 250, 80 L.Ed. at 668.
35 460 U.S. at 581, 75 L.Ed.2d at 302.
36 493 U.S. 378, 107 L.Ed.2d 796 (1990).
37 § 107 of the NIRC provides: “Any person subject to a value added tax under
Sections 100 and 102 of this Code shall register with the appropriate Revenue District
Officer and pay an annual registration
681
________________
fee in the amount of One thousand pesos (P1,000.00) for every separate or distinct
establishment or place of business and every year thereafter on or before the last day
of January. Any person just commencing a business subject to the value-added tax
must pay the fee before engaging therein . . .”
38 101 Phil. 386 (1957).
39 319 U.S. 105, 113, 87 L.Ed. 1292 (1943).
40 319 U.S. at 114, 87 L.Ed. 1292 at 1298. For the same reason, in People v.
Korins, 385 N.Y.S. 2d 474 (1976) a decision of the city court of Utica, Oneida County
held that to apply an ordinance requiring a business license to be obtained before a
person could sell newspapers in the streets would be to impose a prior restraint on
press freedom because “a newspaper is not in the same category as pineapple or a
soap powder or a pair of shoes” whose sale may be conditioned on the possession of a
business license.
682
For the foregoing reasons, we find the attack on Republic Act No.
7716 on the ground that it offends the free speech, press and
freedom of religion guarantees of the Constitution to be without
merit. For the same reasons, we find the claim of the Philippine
Educational Publishers Association (PEPA) in G.R. No. 115931 that
the increase in the price of books and other educational materials as
a result of the VAT would violate the constitutional mandate to the
government to give priority to education, science and technology
(Art. II, § 17) to be untenable.
________________
683
_________________
42 Art. VI, § 28(1). Related to this argument is the claim that Republic Act No.
7716 likewise infringes the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Bill of
Rights, Art. III, § 1(1).
684
_______________
43 Neri, “In Support of the Expanded Value-Added Tax,” (CRC Economic Policy
Papers No. 5 1994) pp. 3-4.
44 Cf. Lutz v. Araneta, 98 Phil. 148, 153 (1955).
685
_________________
686
only where 47a tax exemption has been granted for a valid
consideration. Such is not the case of PAL in G.R. No. 115852, and
we do not understand it to make this claim. Rather, its position, as
discussed above, is that the removal of its tax exemption cannot be
made by a general, but only by a specific, law.
The substantive issues raised in some of the cases are presented
in abstract, hypothetical form because of the lack of a concrete
record. We accept that this Court does not only adjudicate
48
private
cases; that public actions by “non-Hohfeldian” or ideological
plaintiffs are now cognizable provided they meet the standing
requirement of the Constitution; that under Art. VIII, § 1, ¶ 2 the
Court has a “special function” of vindicating constitutional rights.
Nonetheless the feeling cannot be escaped that we do not have
before us in these cases a fully developed factual record
49
that alone
can impart to our adjudication the impact of actuality to insure that
decision-making is informed and well grounded. Needless to say, we
do not have power to render advisory opinions or even jurisdiction
over petitions for declaratory judgment. In effect we are being asked
to do what the Conference Committee is precisely accused of having
done in these cases—to sit as a third legislative chamber to review
legislation.
________________
687
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government.
_______________
688
____________________________________
689
SEPARATE OPINION
NARVASA, C.J.:
I fully concur with the conclusions set forth in the scholarly opinion
of my learned colleague, Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza. I write
this separate opinion to express my own views relative to the
procedural issues raised by the various petitions and dealt with by
some other Members of the Court in their separate opinions.
By their very nature, it would seem, discussions of constitutional
issues prove fertile ground for a not uncommon phenomenon: debate
marked by passionate partisanship amounting sometimes to
impatience with adverse views, an eagerness on the part of the
proponents on each side to assume the role of, or be perceived as,
staunch defenders of constitutional principles, manifesting itself in
flights of rhetoric, even hyperbole. The peril in this, obviously, is a
diminution of objectivity—that quality which, on the part of those
charged with the duty and authority of interpreting the fundamental
law, is of the essence of their great function. For the Court, more
perhaps than for any other person or group, it is necessary to
maintain that desirable objectivity. It must make certain that on this
as on any other occasion, the judicial function is meticulously
performed, the facts ascertained as comprehensively and as
accurately as possible, all the issues particularly identified, all the
arguments clearly understood; else, it may itself be accused, by its
own members or by others, of a lack of adherence to, or a careless
observance of, its own procedures, the signatures of its individual
members on its enrolled verdicts notwithstanding.
690
In the matter now before the Court, and whatever reservations some
people may entertain about their intellectual limitations or moral
scruples, I cannot bring myself to accept the thesis which necessarily
implies that the members of our august Congress, in enacting the
expanded VAT law, exposed their ignorance, or indifference to the
observance, of the rules of procedure set down by the Constitution
or by their respective chambers, or what is worse, deliberately
ignored those rules for some yet undiscovered purpose nefarious in
nature, or at least some purpose other than the public weal; or that a
few of their fellows, acting as a bicameral conference committee, by
devious schemes and cunning maneuvers, and in conspiracy with
officials of the Executive Department and others, succeeded in
“pulling the wool over the eyes” of all their other colleagues and
foisting on them a bill containing provisions that neither chamber of
our bicameral legislature conceived or contemplated. This is the
thesis that the petitioners would have this Court approve. It is a
thesis I consider bereft of any factual or logical foundation.
Other than the bare declarations of some of the petitioners, or
arguments from the use and import of the language employed in the
relevant documents and records, there is no evidence before the
Court adequate to support a finding that the legislators concerned,
whether of the upper or lower chamber, acted otherwise than in good
faith, in the honest discharge of their functions, in the sincere belief
that the established procedures were being regularly observed or, at
least, that there occurred no serious or fatal deviation therefrom.
There is no evidence on which reasonably to rest a conclusion that
any executive or other official took part in or unduly influenced the
proceedings before the bicameral conference committee, or that the
members of the latter were motivated by a desire to surreptitiously
introduce improper revisions in the bills which they were required to
reconcile, or that after agreement had been reached on the mode and
manner of reconciliation of the “disagreeing provisions,” had
resorted to stratagems or employed under-handed ploys to ensure
their approval and adoption by either House. Neither is there any
proof that in voting on the Bicameral Conference Committee (BCC)
version of the reconciled bills, the members of the Senate and the
House did so in ignorance of, or without understanding, the contents
thereof or the bills therein reconciled.
691
692
reading transmits its bill to the Senate, there is origination by (or in)
the House within the contemplation of the Constitution.
So it is entirely possible, as intimated, that in expectation of the
receipt of a revenue or tax bill from the House of Representatives,
the Senate commences deliberations on its own concept of such a
legislative measure. This, possibly to save time, so that when the
House bill reaches it, its thoughts and views on the matter are
already formed and even reduced to writing in the form of a draft
statute. This should not be thought illegal, as interdicted by the
Constitution. What the Constitution prohibits is for the Senate to
begin the legislative process first, by sending its own revenue bill to
the House of Representatives for its consideration and action. This is
the initiation that is prohibited to the Senate.
But petitioners claim that this last was what in fact happened, that
the bill that went through the legislative mill and was finally
approved as R.A. No. 7716, was the Senate version, SB 1630. This
is disputed by the respondents. They claim it was House Bill 11197
that, after being transmitted to the Senate, was referred after first
reading to its Committee on Ways and Means; was reported out by
said Committee; underwent second and third readings, was sent to
the bicameral conference committee and then, after appropriate
proceedings therein culminating in extensive amendments thereof,
was finally approved by both Houses and became the Expanded
VAT Law.
On whose side does the truth lie? If it is not possible to make that
determination from the pleadings and records before this Court, shall
it require evidence to be presented? No, on both law and principle.
The Court will reject a case where the legal issues raised, whatever
they may be, depend for their resolution on still unsettled questions
of fact. Petitioners may not, by raising what are concededly novel
and weighty constitutional questions, compel the Court to assume
the role of a trier of facts. It is on the contrary their obligation,
before raising those questions to this Court, to see to it that all issues
of fact are settled in accordance with the procedures laid down by
law for proof of facts. Failing this, petitioners would have only
themselves to blame for a peremptory dismissal.
Now, what is really proven about what happened to HB 11197
after it was transmitted to the Senate? It seems to be admitted on
693
all sides that after going through first reading, HB 11197 was
referred to the Committee on Ways and Means chaired by Senator
Ernesto Herrera.
It is however surmised that after this initial step, HB 11197 was
never afterwards deliberated on in the Senate, that it was there given
nothing more than a “passing glance,” and that it never went through
a proper second and third reading. There is no competent proof to
substantiate this claim. What is certain is that on February 7, 1994,
the Senate Committee on Ways and Means submitted its Report (No.
349) stating that HB 11197 was considered, and recommending that
SB 1630 be approved “in substitution
1
of S.B. No. 1129, taking into
consideration P.S. Res. No. 734 and H.B. No. 11197.” This Report
made known to the Senate, and clearly indicates, that H.B. No.
11197 was indeed deliberated on by the Committee; in truth, as
Senator Herrera pointed out, the BCC later “agreed to adopt (a
broader coverage of the VAT) which is closely adhering to the
Senate version ** ** with some new provisions or amendments.”
The plain implication is that the Senate Committee had indeed
discussed HB 11197 in comparison with the inconsistent parts of SB
1129 and afterwards proposed amendments to the former in the form
of a new bill (No. 1630) more closely akin to the Senate bill (No.
1129).
And it is as reasonable to suppose as not that later, during the
second and third readings on March 24, 1994, the Senators,
assembled as a body, had before them copies of HB 11197 and SB
1129, as well as of the Committee’s new “SB 1630” that had been
recommended for their approval, or at the very least were otherwise
perfectly aware that they were considering the particular provisions
of these bills. That there was such a deliberation in the Senate on HB
11197 in light of inconsistent portions of SB 1630, may further be
necessarily inferred from the request, made by the Senate on the
same day, March 24, 1994, for the convocation of a bicameral
conference committee to reconcile “the disagreeing provisions of
said bill (SB 1630) and House Bill No. 11197,” a
________________
1 Resolution “Urging the Senate Committee on Ways and Means to Study the
Proposal to Exempt Local Movie Producers from the Payment of the Value-Added
Tax as an Incentive to the Production of Quality and Wholesome Filipino Movies
Whenever they Feature an All-Filipino Cast of Actors and Actresses.”
694
request that could not have been made had not the Senators more or
less closely examined the provisions of HB 11197 and compared
them with those of the counterpart Senate measures.
Were the proceedings before the bicameral conference committee
fatally flawed? The affirmative is suggested because the committee
allegedly overlooked or ignored the fact that SB 1630 could not
validly originate in the Senate, and that HB 11197 and SB 1630
never properly passed both chambers. The untenability of these
contentions has already been demonstrated. Now, demonstration of
the indefensibility of other arguments purporting to establish the
impropriety of the BCC proceedings will be attempted.
There is the argument, for instance, that the conference
committee never used HB 11197 even as “frame of reference”
because it does not appear that the suggestion therefor (made by
House Panel Chairman Exequiel Javier at the bicameral conference
committee’s meeting on April 19, 1994, with the concurrence of
Senator Maceda) was ever resolved, the minutes being regrettably
vague as to what occurred after that suggestion was made. It is,
however, as reasonable to assume that it was, as it was not, given the
vagueness of the minutes already alluded to. In fact, a reading of the
BCC Report persuasively demonstrates that HB 11197 was not only
utilized as a “frame of reference” but actually discussed and
deliberated on. 2
Said BCC Report pertinently states:
________________
2 Italics supplied.
695
696
other words, that the latter chamber should have refused the Senate
request for a bicameral conference committee to reconcile the
“disagreeing provisions” of both bills, and should have required that
SB 1630 be first transmitted to it. This, seemingly, is nit-picking
given the urgency of the proposed legislation as certified by the
President (to both houses, in fact). Time was of the essence,
according to the President’s best judgment—as regards which
absolutely no one in either chamber of Congress took exception,
general acceptance being on the contrary otherwise manifested—and
that judgment the Court will not now question. In light of that
urgency, what was so vital or indispensable about such a transmittal
that its absence would invalidate all else that had been done towards
enactment of the law, completely escapes me, specially considering
that the House had immediately acceded without demur to the
request for convocation of the conference committee.
What has just been said should dispose of the argument that the
statement in the enrolled bill, that “This Act which is a consolidation
of House Bill No. 11197 and Senate Bill No. 1630 was finally
passed by the House of Representatives and the Senate on April 27,
1994 and May 2, 1994,” necessarily signifies that there were two (2)
bills separately introduced, retaining their independent existence
until they reached the bicameral conference committee where they
were consolidated, and therefore, the VAT law did not originate
exclusively in the House having originated in part in the Senate as
SB 1630, which bill was not embodied in but merely merged with
HB 11197, retaining its separate identity until it was joined by the
BCC with the house measure. The more logical, and fairer, course is
to construe the expression, “consolidation of House Bill No. 11197
and Senate Bill No. 1630” in the context of accompanying and
contemporaneous statements, i.e.: (a) the declaration in the BCC
Report, supra, that the committee met to reconcile the disagreeing
provisions of the two bills, “and after full and free conference” on
the matter, agreed and so recommended that “House Bill No. 11197,
in consolidation with Senate Bill No. 1630, be approved in
accordance with the attached copy of the bill as reconciled and
approved by the conferees;” and (b) the averment of Senator
Herrera, in the Report of the Ways and Means Committee, supra,
that the committee had actually “considered” (discussed)
697
_________________
698
699
700
A conference committee may deal generally with the subject matter or it may be
limited to resolving the precise differences between the two houses. Even where the
conference committee is not by rule limited in its jurisdiction, legislative custom
severely limits the freedom with which new subject matter can be inserted into the
conference bill. But occasionally a conference committee produces unexpected
results, results beyond its mandate. These excursions occur even where the rules
impose strict limitations on conference committee jurisdiction. This is symptomatic
of the authoritarian power of conference committee (Davies, Legislative Law and
Process: In A Nutshell, 1987 Ed., p. 81).
It is a matter of record that the Conference Committee Report on the
bill in question was returned to and duly approved by both the
Senate and the House of Representatives. Thereafter, the bill was
enrolled with its certification by Senate President Neptali A.
Gonzales and Speaker Ramon V. Mitra of the House of
Representatives as having been duly passed by both Houses of
Congress. It was then presented to and approved by President
Corazon C. Aquino on April 3, 1992.
Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court may not
inquire beyond the certification of the approval of a bill from the
presiding officers of Congress. Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v.
Gimenez (7 SCRA 347) laid down the rule that the enrolled bill is
conclusive upon the Judiciary (except in matters that have to be
entered in the journals like the yeas and nays on the final reading of
the bill) (Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1). The journals are
themselves also binding on the Supreme Court, as we held in the old
(but still valid) case of U.S. v. Pons (34 Phil. 729), where we
explained the reason thus:
To inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine legislature when
they are, as we have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both the
letter and spirit of the organic laws by which the Philippine Government
was brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and independent
department of the Government, and to interfere with the legitimate powers
and functions of the Legislature. Applying these principles, we shall decline
to look into the petitioners’
701
charges that an amendment was made upon the last reading of the bill that
eventually R.A. No. 7354 and that copies thereof in its final form were not
distributed among the members of each House. Both the enrolled bill and
the legislative journals certify that the measure was duly enacted i.e., in
accordance with Article VI, Sec. 26 (2) of the Constitution. We are bound
by such official assurances from a coordinate department of the government,
to which we owe, at the very least, a becoming courtesy.”
702
703
from them.
Moreover, it certainly was entirely within the power and
prerogative of either legislative chamber to reject the BCC bill and
require the organization of a new bicameral conference committee.
That this option was not exercised by either house only proves that
the BCC measure was found to be acceptable as in fact it was
approved and adopted by both chambers.
I vote to DISMISS the petitions for lack of merit.
SEPARATE OPINION
CRUZ, J.:
704
* * * From their very nature and object, the records of the legislature are as
important as those of the judiciary, and to inquire into the veracity of the
journals of the Philippine Legis-lature, when they are, as we have said, clear
and explicit, would be to violate both the letter and the spirit of the organic
laws by which the Philippine Government was brought into existence, to
invade a coordinate and independent department of the Govern-ment, and to
interfere with the legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature. But
counsel in his argument says that the public knows that the Assembly’s
clock was stopped on February 28, 1914, at midnight and left so until the
determination of the discussion of all pending matters. Or, in other words,
the hands of the clock were stayed in order to enable the Assembly to effect
an adjournment apparently within the fixed time by the Governor’s
proclamation for the expiration of the special session, in direct violation of
the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902. If the clock was, in fact, stopped, as
here suggested, “the resultant evil might be slight as compared with that of
altering the probative force and character of legislative records, and making
the proof of legislative action depend upon uncertain oral evidence, liable to
loss by death or absence, and so imperfect on account of the treachery of
memory.”
* * * The journals say that the Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight on
February 28, 1914. This settles the question, and the court did not err in
declining to go beyond the journals.
As one who has always respected the rationale of the separation of
powers, I realize only too well the serious implications of the
relaxation of the doctrine except only for the weightiest of reasons.
The lowering of the barriers now dividing the three major branches
of the government could lead to invidious incursions by one
department into the exclusive domains of the other departments to
the detriment of the proper discharge of the functions assigned to
each of them by the Constitution.
Still, while acknowledging the value of tradition and the reasons
for judicial non-interference announced in Pons, I am not disinclined
to take a second look at the ruling from a more pragmatic viewpoint
and to tear down, if we must, the iron curtain it has hung, perhaps
improvidently, around the proceedings of the legislature.
I am persuaded even now that where a specific procedure is fixed
by the Constitution itself, it should not suffice for Congress to
simply say that the rules have been observed and flatly consider the
matter closed. It does not have to be as final as that.
705
706
adventures in the byways of the law. The answer we seek, as I see it,
is not far afield. It seems to me that it can be found through a study
of the enrolled bill alone and that we do not have to go beyond that
measure to ascertain if R.A. No. 7716 has been validly enacted.
It is settled in this jurisdiction that in case of conflict between the
enrolled bill and the legislative journals, it is the former that should
prevail except only as to matters that the Constitution requires to be
entered in the journals. (Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1). These
are the yeas and nays on the final reading of a bill or on any question
at the request of at least one-fifth of the members of the House
(Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 16 [4]), the objections of the President to
a vetoed bill or item (Ibid, Sec. 27 [1]), and the names of the
members voting for or against the overriding of his veto (Id. Section
27 [1]). The origin of a bill is not specifically required by the
Constitution to be entered in the journals. Hence, on this particular
matter, it is the recitals in the enrolled bill and not in the journals
that must control.
Article VI, Section 24, of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase
of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate
exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or
concur with amendments.
This Act which is a consolidation of House Bill No. 11197 and Senate Bill
No. 1630 was finally passed by the House of Representatives and the Senate
on April 27, 1994, and May 2, 1994.
707
708
The certification in the enrolled bill says it all. It is clear that R.A.
No. 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives.
To go back to my earlier observations, this conclusion does not
require the reversal of U.S. vs. Pons and an inquiry by this Court
into the proceedings of the legislature beyond the recitals of its
journals. All we need to do is consider the certification in the
enrolled bill and, without entering the precincts of Congress, declare
that by its own admission it has, indeed, not complied with the
Constitution.
While this Court respects the prerogatives of the other
departments, it will not hesitate to rise to its higher duty to require
from them, if they go astray, full and strict compliance with the
fundamental law. Our fidelity to it must be total. There is no loftier
principle in our democracy than the supremacy of the Constitution,
to which all must submit.
I vote to invalidate R.A. No. 7716 for violation of Article VI,
Sec. 24, of the Constitution.
SEPARATE OPINION
PADILLA, J.:
_________________
709
“In any event, if petitioners seriously believe that the adoption and
continued application of the VAT are prejudicial to the general welfare or
the interests of the majority of the people, they should seek recourse and
relief from the political branches of the government. The Court, following
the time-honored doctrine of separation of powers, cannot substitute its
judgment for that of the President (and Congress)
3
as to the wisdom, justice
and advisability of the adoption of the VAT.”
________________
2 Bautista v. Salonga, G.R. No. 86439, 13 April 1989, 172 SCRA 160.
3 Kapatiran, supra at 385.
710
II
The procedure followed in the approval of Rep. Act No. 7716
Petitioners however posit that the present case raises a far-reaching
constitutional question which the Court is duty-bound4 to decide
under its expanded jurisdiction in the 1987 Constitution. Petitioners
more specifically question and impugn the manner by which the
expanded VAT law (Rep. Act No. 7716) was approved by Congress.
They contend that it was approved in violation of the Constitution
from which fact it follows, as a consequence, that the law is null and
void. Main reliance of the petitioners in their assault is Section 24,
Art. VI of the Constitution which provides:
“Sec. 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase
of the public debt, bill of local application, and private bills shall originate
exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or
concur with amendments.”
________________
4 Sec. 1, Art. VIII.
711
“SEC. 26. x x x
(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has
passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final
form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage,
except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate
enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of
a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be
taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.”
in that, when Senate Bill No. 1630 (the Senate counterpart of House
Bill No. 11197) was approved by the Senate, after it had been
reported out by the Senate Committee on Ways and Means, the bill
went through second and third readings on the same day (not
separate days) and printed copies thereof in its final form were not
distributed to the members of the Senate at least three (3) days
before its passage by the Senate. But we are told by the respondents
that the reason for this “short cut” was that the President had
certified to the necessity of the bill’s immediate enactment to meet
an emergency—a certification that, by leave of the same
constitutional provision, dispensed with the second and third
readings on separate days and the printed form at least three (3) days
before its passage.
We have here then a situation where the President did certify to
the necessity of Senate Bill No. 1630’s immediate enactment to meet
an emergency and the Senate responded accordingly. While I would
be the last to say that this Court cannot review the exercise of such
power by the President in appropriate cases ripe for judicial review, I
am not prepared however to say that the President gravely abused
his discretion in the exercise of such power as to require that this
Court overturn his action. We have
713
VOL. 235, AUGUST 25, 1994 713
Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance
‘A conference committee may deal generally with the subject matter or it may be
limited to resolving the precise differences
_______________
714
between the two houses. Even where the conference committee is not by rule limited
in its jurisdiction, legislative custom severely limits the freedom with which new
subject matter can be inserted into the conference bill. But occasionally a conference
committee produces unexpected results, results beyond its mandate. These
excursions occur even where the rules impose strict limitations on conference
committee jurisdiction. This is symptomatic of the authoritarian power of conference
committee (Davies, Legislative Law and Process: In A Nutshell, 1986 Ed., p. 81).’
“This Act (Rep. Act No. 7716) is a consolidation of House Bill No. 11197
and Senate Bill No. 1630 (w)as finally passed by the House of
Representatives and the Senate on April 27, 1994 and May 2, 1994
respectively.”
“Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court may not inquire
beyond the certification of the approval of a bill from the presiding officers
of Congress. Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez6
_______________
6 7 SCRA 347.
715
‘To inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine legislature when they
are, as we have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both the letter and spirit
of the organic laws by which the Philippine Government was brought into existence,
to invade a coordinate and independent department of the Government, and to
interfere with the legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature.’
III
Press Freedom and Religious Freedom and Rep. Act No. 7716
_______________
716
________________
717
IV
Petitions of CREBA and PAL and Rep. Act No. 7716
_______________
718
719
720
SEPARATE OPINION
VITUG, J.:
721
in its final form, has received the ultimate approval of both houses
of Congress. The finest rhetoric, indeed fashionable in the early part
of this closing century, would still be a poor substitute for tangibility.
I join, nonetheless, some of my colleagues in respectfully inviting
the kind attention of the honorable members of our Congress in the
suggested circumspect observance of their own rules.
A final remark. I should like to make it clear that this opinion
does not necessarily foreclose the right, peculiar to any taxpayer
adversely affected, to pursue at the proper time, in appropriate
proceedings, and in proper fora, the specific remedies prescribed
therefor by the National Internal Revenue Code, Republic Act 1125,
and other laws, as well as rules of procedure, such as may be
pertinent. Some petitions filed with this Court are, in essence,
although styled differently, in the nature of declaratory relief over
which this Court is bereft of original jurisdiction.
All considered, I, therefore, join my colleagues who are voting
for the dismissal of the petitions.
DISSENTING OPINION
REGALADO, J.:
722
_______________
1 In substitution of H.B. Nos. 253, 771, 2450, 7033, 8086, 9030, 9210, 9297,
10012 and 10100 which were filed over the period from July 22, 1992 to August 3,
1993.
2 P.S. Res. No. 734 had earlier been filed in the Senate on September 10, 1992,
while S.B. No. 1129 was filed on March 1, 1993.
723
_______________
724
the oral argument held in these cases, the attention of the Solicitor
General was called to the fact that the amendment in Flint consisted
only of a single item, that is, the substitution of a corporate tax for an
inheritance tax proposed in a general revenue bill; and that the text
of the decision therein nowhere contained the supposed doctrines he
quoted and ascribed to the court, as those were merely summations
of arguments of counsel therein. It is indeed a source of
disappointment for us, but an admission of desperation on his part,
that, instead of making a clarification or a defense of his contention,
5
the Solicitor General merely reproduced all over again the same
quotations as they appeared in his original consolidated comment,
without venturing any explanation or justification.
The aforestated dissemblance, thus unmasked, has further
undesirable implications on the contentions advanced by
respondents in their defense. For, even indulging respondents ex
gratia argumenti in their pretension that S.B. No. 1630 substituted
or replaced H.B. No. 11197, aside from muddling the issue of the
true origination of the disputed law, this would further enmesh
respondents in a hopeless contradiction.
In a publication authorized by the Senate and from which the
Solicitor General has liberally quoted, it is reported as an accepted
rule therein that “(a)n amendment by substitution when approved6
takes the place of the principal bill. C.R. March 19, 1963, p. 943.”
Stated elsewise, the principal bill is supplanted and goes out of
actuality. Applied to the present situation, and following
respondents’ submission that H.B. No. 11197 had been substituted
or replaced in its entirety, then in law it had no further existence for
purposes of the subsequent stages of legislation except, possibly, for
referential data.
Now, the enrolled bill thereafter submitted to the President of the
Philippines, signed by the President of the Senate and the Speaker of
the House of Representatives, carried this solemn certification over
the signatures of the respective secretaries of
________________
725
_______________
7 Black’s Law Dictionary, 4th Ed. (1951), 381, citing Fairview vs. Durham, 45
Iowa 56.
726
________________
727
________________
728
729
“(1) While the presumption is that the enrolled bill, as signed by the
legislative officers and filed with the secretary of state, is the bill as it
passed, yet this presumption is not conclusive, and when it is shown from
the legislative journals that a bill though engrossed and enrolled, and signed
by the legislative officers, contains provisions that have not passed both
houses, such provisions will be held spurious and not a part of the law. As
was said by Mr. Justice Cockrell in the case of Wade vs. Atlantic Lumber
Co., 51 Fla. 628, text 633, 41 So. 72, 73:
‘This Court is firmly committed to the holding that when the journals speak they
control, and against such proof the enrolled bill is not conclusive.’ ”
17 Brailsford vs. Walker, 31 S.E. 2d 385, 387, 388, 205 S.C. 228.
18 110 So. 343, 346.
19 602 South Western Reporter, 2d Series, 402-425, jointly deciding Carrollton
Wholesale Tobaccos, Inc. et al. vs. Department of Revenue, et al., and Bluegrass
Provisions Co., Inc., et al. vs. Department of Revenue, et al.
730
731
remove one of the original reasons for the rule. (5) The rule disregards the
primary obligation of the courts to seek the truth and to provide a remedy
for a wrong committed by any branch of government. In light of these
considerations, we are convinced that the time has come to re-examine the
enrolled bill doctrine.
“[2] This court is not unmindful of the admonition of the doctrine of
stare decisis. The maxim is “Stare decisis et non quieta movere,” which
simply suggests that we stand by precedents and not disturb settled points of
law. Yet, this rule is not inflexible, nor is it of such a nature as to require
perpetuation of error or logic. As we stated in Daniel’s Adm’r v. Hoofnel,
287 Ky 834, 155 S.W.2d 469, 471-72 (1941) (citations omitted):
The force of the rule depends upon the nature of the question to be decided and the
extent of the disturbance of rights and practices which a change in the interpretation
of the law or the course of judicial opinions may create. Cogent considerations are
whether there is clear error and urgent reasons ‘for neither justice nor wisdom
requires a court to go from one doubtful rule to another,’ and whether or not the evils
of the principle that has been followed will be more injurious than can possibly
result from a change.
732
Undeniably, the value-added tax system may have its own merits to
commend its continued adoption, and the proposed widening of its
base could achieve laudable governmental objectives if properly
formulated and conscientiously implemented. We would like to
believe, however, that ours is not only an enlightened democracy
nurtured by a policy of transparency but one where the edicts of the
fundamental law are sacrosanct for all, barring none. While the
realization of the lofty ends of this administration should indeed be
the devout wish of all, likewise barring none, it can never be
justified by methods which, even if unintended, are suggestive of
Machiavellism.
Accordingly, I vote to grant the instant petitions and to invalidate
Republic Act No. 7716 for having been enacted in violation of
Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution.
DISSENTING OPINION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
733
“No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed
three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form
have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except
when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to
meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no
amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken
immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.”
“SEC. 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase
of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate
exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or
concur with amendments.”
1
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary defines originate as
follows:
“vt 1: to cause the beginning of: give rise to: INITIATE . . . 2. to start (a
person or thing) on a course of journey . . . vi: to take or have
________________
1 1971 ed., 1592.
734
“Apart from all others; only; solely; substantially all or for the greater part.
To the exclusion of all others; without admission of others to participation;
in a manner to exclude.”
3
In City Mayor vs. The Chief of Philippine Constabulary, this Court
said:
“The term ‘exclusive’ in its usual and generally accepted sense, means
possessed to the exclusion of others; appertaining to the subject alone, not
including, admitting or pertaining to another or others, undivided, sole. (15
Words and Phrases, p. 510, citing Mitchel v. Tulsa Water, Light, Heat and
Power Co., 95 P. 961, 21 Okl. 243; and p. 513, citing Commonwealth v.
Superintendent of House of Correction, 64 Pa. Super. 613, 615).”
Indisputably then, only the House can cause the beginning or initiate
the passage of any appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, any bill
increasing the public debt, any bill of local application, or any
private bill. The Senate can only “propose or concur with
amendments.”
Under the Rules of the Senate, the first reading is the reading of
the title of the bill and its referral to the corresponding committee;
the second reading consists of the reading of the bill in the form
recommended by the corresponding committee; and the third
reading is the reading
4
of the bill in the form it will be after approval
on second reading. During the second reading, the following takes
place:
_______________
2 Sixth Edition (1990), 565, citing Standard Oil Co. of Texas vs. State, Tex. Civ.
App., 142 S.W.2d 519, 521, 522, 523.
3 21 SCRA 665, 673 [1967].
4 Sections 52 and 53, Rule XXIII.
735
VOL. 235, AUGUST 25, 1994 735
Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance
(3) If a debate ensues, turns for and against the bill shall be
taken alternately;
(4) The sponsor of the bill closes the debate;
(5) After the close of the debate, the period of amendments
follows;
(6) Then, after the period of amendments
5
is closed, the voting
on the bill on second reading.
At the third reading, the votes shall11 be taken immediately and the
yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
_______________
736
736 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance
Clearly, whether in the Senate or in the House, every bill must pass
the three readings on separate days, except when the bill is certified.
Amendments 12
to the bill on third reading are constitutionally
prohibited.
After its passage by one chamber, the bill should then be
transmitted to the other chamber for its concurrence. Section 83,
Rule XIV of the Rules of the House expressly provides:
(a) Upon its approval by the House, the bill shall be transmitted
to the Senate;
(b) The Senate may approve it with or without amendments;
(c) The Senate returns the bill to the House;
(d) The House may accept the Senate amendments; if it does
not, the Secretary General shall notify the Senate of that
action. As hereinafter be shown, a request for conference
shall then be in order.
The transmitted bill shall then pass three readings in the other
chamber on separate days. Section 84, Rule XIV of the
________________
737
and Section 51, Rule XXIII of the Rules of the Senate provides:
“SEC. 51. Prior to their final approval, bills and joint resolutions shall be
read at least three times.”
“SEC. 26. In the event that the Senate does not agree with the House of
Representatives on the provision of any bill or joint resolution, the
differences shall be settled by a conference committee of both Houses which
shall meet within ten days after its composition.”
and Section 85, Rule XIV of the Rules of the House which reads:
“SEC. 85. Conference Committee Reports.—In the event that the House
does not agree with the Senate on the amendments to any bill or joint
resolution, the differences may be settled by conference committees of both
Chambers.”
_________________
13 Volume I, Eight Edition, Chapter VI, 267. See Miller vs. Mardo, 2 SCRA 898
[1961]; Everlasting Pictures, Inc. vs. Fuentes, 3 SCRA 539 [1961].
738
738 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance
739
and Means in substitution of House Bills Nos. 253, 771, 2450, 7033,
8086,9030, 9210, 9397, 10012, 14
and 10100, and covered by its
Committee Report No. 367, was 15
approved on third reading16 by the
House on 17 November 1993. Interestingly, HB No. 9210, which
was filed by Representative Exequiel B. Javier on 19 May 1993, was
certified by the President
17
in his letter to Speaker Jose de Venecia, Jr.
of 1 June 1993. Yet, HB No. 11197, which substituted HB No.
9210 and the others abovestated, was not. Its certification seemed to
have been entirely forgotten.
On 18 November 1993, the Secretary-General of the House,
pursuant to Section 83, Rule XIV of the Rules of the House,
transmitted to the President of the Senate HB18 No. 11197 and
requested the concurrence of the Senate therewith.
However, HB No. 11197 had passed only its first reading in the
Senate by its referral to its Committee on Ways and Means. That
Committee never deliberated on HB No. 11197 19
as it should have. It
acted only on Senate Bill (SB) No. 1129 introduced by Senator
Ernesto F. Herrera on 1 March 1993. It then prepared and 20
proposed
SB No. 1630, and in its Committee Report21No. 349 which was
submitted to the Senate on 7 February 1994, it recommended that
SB No. 1630 be approved “in substitution of S.B. No. 1129, 22
taking
into consideration P.S. Res. No. 734 and H.B. No. 11197.” It must
be carefully noted that SB No. 1630 was proposed and submitted for
approval by the Senate in SUBSTITUTION of SB No. 1129, and not
HB No. 11197. Obviously, the principal measure which the
Committee deliberated
________________
740
because, according to him, (a) “Section 68, Rule XXIX of the Rules
of the Senate authorizes an amendment by substitution and the only
condition required is that ‘the text thereof is submitted in writing’;
and (b) ‘[I]n Flint vs. Stone Tracy Co. (220 U.S. 107) the United
States Supreme Court, interpreting the provision in the United States
Constitution similar to Section 24, Article VI of the Philippine
Constitution, stated that the power of the Senate to amend a revenue
bill includes substitution of an entirely new measure23 for the one
originally proposed by the House of Representatives.’ ”
This thesis is utterly without merit. In the first place, it reads into
the Committee Report something which it had not contemplated,
that is, to propose SB No. 1630 in substitution of HB No. 11197; or
speculates that the Committee may have committed an error in
stating that it is SB No. 1129, and not HB No. 11197, which is to be
substituted by SB No. 1630. Either, of course, is unwarranted
because the words of the Report, solemnly signed by the Chairman,
Vice-Chairman
24
(who dissented), seven members, and three ex-officio
members, leave no room for doubt that although SB No. 1129, P.S.
Res No. 734, and HB No. 11197 were referred to and considered by
the Committee, it had prepared the attached SB No. 1630 which it
recommends for approval “in
________________
741
“The Senate has the power to amend a revenue bill. This power to amend is
not confined to the elimination of provisions contained in the original act,
but embraces as well the addition of such provisions thereto as may render
the original act satisfactory to the body which is called upon to support it. It
has, in fact, been held that the substitution of an entirely new measure for
the one originally proposed can be supported as a valid amendment.
xxx xxx xxx
It is contended in the first place that this section of the act is
unconstitutional, because it is a revenue measure, and originated in the
Senate in violation of section 7 of article 1 of the Constitution, providing
that ‘all bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of
Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with the
amendments, as on other bills.’ ”
The first part is not a statement of the Court, but a summary of the
arguments of counsel in one of the companion cases (No. 425,
entitled, “Gay vs. Baltic Mining Co.”). The second part is the
second paragraph of the opinion of the Court delivered by Mr.
Justice Day. The misrepresentation that the first part is a statement
of the Court is highly contemptuous. To show such deliberate
misrepresentation, it is well to quote what actually are found in 55
L.Ed. 408, 410, to wit:
“Messrs. Charles A. Snow and Joseph H. Knight filed a brief for appellees
in No. 425:
_______________
742
x x x
The Senate has the power to amend a revenue bill. This power to amend
is not confined to the elimination of provisions contained in the original act,
but embraces as well the addition of such provisions thereto as may render
the original act satisfactory to the body which is called upon to support it. It
has, in fact, been held that the substitution of an entirely new measure for
the one originally proposed can be supported as a valid amendment.
Brake v. Collison, 122 Fed. 722.
Mr. James L. Quackenbush filed a statement for appellees in No. 442.
Solicitor General Lehmann (by special leave) argued the cause for the
United States on reargument.
Mr. Justice Day delivered the opinion of the court:
743
Note that in the former the word exclusively does not appear. And, in
the latter, the phrase “as on other Bills,” which is found in the
former, does not appear. These are very significant in determining
the authority of the upper chamber over the bills enumerated in
Section 24. Since the origination is not exclusively vested in the
House of Representatives of the United States, the Senate’s authority
to propose or concur with amendments is necessarily broader. That
broader authority is further confirmed by the phrase “as on other
Bills,” i.e., its power to propose or concur with amendments thereon
is the same as in ordinary bills. The absence of this phrase in our
Constitution was clearly intended to restrict or limit the Philippine
Senate’s power to
744
“the section in question is not void as a bill for raising revenue originating
in the Senate, and not in the House of Representatives. It appears that the
section was proposed by the Senate as an amendment to a bill for raising
revenue which originated in the House. That is sufficient.”
“Any bill may make its first appearance in either house, except only that
bills for raising revenue are required by the constitution to ‘originate’ in the
House of Representatives. Indeed, through its right to amend revenue bills,
even to the extent of substituting new ones, the
________________
745
_______________
29 At 317.
746
_______________
747
_______________
748
83, Rule XIV of the Rules of the House, it is only when the Senate
shall have approved with amendments HB No. 11197 and the House
declines to accept the amendments after having been notified thereof
that the request for a conference may be made by the House, not by
the Senate. Conversely, the Senate’s request for a conference would
only be proper if, following the transmittal of SB No. 1630 to the
House, it was approved by the latter with amendments but the
Senate rejected the amendments.
Indisputably then, when the request for a bicameral conference
was made by the Senate, SB No. 1630 was not yet transmitted to the
House for consideration on three readings and HB No. 11197 was
still in the Senate awaiting consideration on second and third
readings. Their referral to the bicameral conference committee was
palpably premature and, in so doing, both the Senate and the House
acted without authority or with grave abuse of discretion. Nothing,
and absolutely nothing, could have been validly acted upon by the
bicameral conference committee.
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION COMMITTED BY THE
BICAMERAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE.
749
Yes. That’s true for every revenue measure. There’s no other way.
The House Bill has got to be the base. Of course, for the record,
we know that this is an administration; this is certified by the
President and I was about to put into the recordsas I am saying
now that your problem about the impact on prices on the people
was already decided when the President and the administration
sent this to us and certified it. They have already gotten over that
political implication of this bill and the economic impact on
prices.
“CHAIRMAN JAVIER.
Yes. That’s true for every revenue measure. There’s no other way.
The House Bill has got to be the base. Of course, for the record,
we know that this is an administration; this is certified by the
President and I was about to put into the recordsas I am saying
now that your problem about the impact on prices on the people
was already decided when the President and the administration
sent this to us and certified it. They have already gotten over that
political implication of this bill and the economic impact on
prices.
First of all, what would be the basis, no, or framework para huwag
naman mawala yung personality namin dito sa bicameral, no,
because the bill originates from the House because this is a
revenue bill, so we would just want to ask, we make the House Bill
as the frame of reference, and then everything will just be
inserted?
HON. MACEDA.
CHAIRMAN HERRERA.
Yung concern mo about the bill as the reference in this discussion
is something that we can just . . .
CHAIRMAN JAVIER.
We will just . . . all the amendments will be coming from the
Senate.
(BICAMERAL CONFERENCE ON MAJOR DIFFERENCES
BETWEEN HB NO. 11197 AND SB NO. 1630 [Cte. on Ways &
Means] APRIL 19, 1994, II-6 and II-7; italics supplied)”
_______________
34 Page 22.
750
in fact withdrew the former suggestion and agreed that SB No. 1630,
which is the Senate version of the Value Added Tax (VAT) measure,
should be the “frame of reference.” But then SB No. 1630 was never
transmitted to the House for the latter’s concurrence. Hence, it
cannot serve as the “frame of reference” or as the basis for
deliberation. The posture taken by Representative Javier also
indicates that SB No. 1630 should be taken as the amendment to HB
No. 11197. This, too, is unfounded because SB No. 1630 was not
proposed in substitution of HB No. 11197.
Since SB No. 1630 did not pass three readings in the House and
HB No. 11197 did not pass second and third readings in the Senate,
it logically follows that no disagreeing provisions had as yet arisen.
The bicameral conference committee erroneously assumed the
contrary.
Even granting arguendo that both HB No. 11197 and SB No.
1630 had been validly approved by both chambers of Congress and
validly referred to the bicameral conference committee, the latter
had very limited authority thereon. It was
35
created “in view of the
disagreeing provisions of” the two bills. Its duty was limited to the
reconciliation of disagreeing provisions or the resolution of
differences or inconsistencies. The committee recognized 36
that
limited authority in the opening paragraph of its Report when it
said:
Under such limited authority, it could only either (a) restore, wholly
or partly, the specific provisions of HB No. 11197 amended by SB
No. 1630, (b) sustain, wholly or partly, the Senate’s amendments, or
(c) by way of a compromise, to agree that neither provisions in HB
No. 11197 amended by the Senate nor the latter’s amendments
thereto be carried into the final form of the former.
But as pointed out by petitioners Senator Raul Roco and
Kilosbayan, Inc., the bicameral conference committee not only
_______________
751
I cannot agree with the suggestion that since both the Senate and the
House had approved the bicameral conference committee report and
the bill proposed by it in substitution of HB No. 11197 and SB No.
1630, whatever infirmities may have been committed by it were
cured by ratification. This doctrine of ratification may apply to
minor procedural flaws or tolerable breaches of the parameters of
the bicameral conference committee’s limited powers but never to
violations of the Constitution. Congress is not above the
Constitution. In the instant case, since SB No. 1630 was introduced
in violation of Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, was passed
in the Senate in violation of the “three readings” rule, and was not
transmitted to the House for the completion of the constitutional
process of legislation, and HB No. 11197 was not likewise passed by
the Senate on second and third readings, neither the Senate nor the
House could validly approve the bicameral conference committee
report and the proposed bill.
In view of the foregoing, the conclusion is inevitable that for
non-compliance with mandatory provisions of the Constitution and
of the Rules of the Senate and of the House on the enactment of
laws, R.A. No. 7716 is unconstitutional and, therefore, null and
void. A discussion then of the intrinsic validity of some of its
provisions would be unnecessary.
The majority opinion, however, invokes the enrolled bill doctrine
and wants this Court to desist from looking behind the copy of the
assailed measure as certified by the Senate President and the
752
Third, even under the regime of the 1935 Constitution which did not
contain the above provision, this Court,
38
through Mr. Chief Justice
Makalintal, in Astorga vs. Villegas,39 declared that it cannot be truly
said that Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito has laid to rest the question of
whether the enrolled bill doctrine or the journal entry rule should be
adhered to in this jurisdiction, and stated:
_______________
37 ISAGANI A. CRUZ, Philippine Political Law, 1991 ed., 226; Daza vs. Singson, 180
SCRA 496 [1989]; Coseteng vs. Mitra, 187 SCRA 377 [1990]; Gonzales vs. Macaraig, 191
SCRA 452 [1990]; Llamas vs. Orbos, 202 SCRA 844 [1991]; Bengzon vs. Senate Blue Ribbon
Com- mittee, 203 SCRA 767 [1991]; Oposa vs. Factoran, 224 SCRA 792 [1993].
38 56 SCRA 714, 719, 723 [1974].
39 78 Phil. 1 [1947].
753
State Constitution, said that the same ‘makes it clear that the indispensable
step in the passage’ and it follows that if a bill, otherwise fully enacted as a
law, is not attested by the presiding officer, other proof that it has ‘passed
both houses will satisfy the constitutional requirement.’ ”
Fourth, even in the United States, the enrolled bill doctrine has been
substantially undercut. This is shown in the disquisitions of Mr.
Justice Reynato S. Puno in his dissenting opinion, citing Sutherland,
Statutory Construction.
Last, the pleadings of the parties have established beyond doubt
that HB No. 11197 was not acted on second and third readings in the
Senate and SB No. 1630, which was approved by the Senate on
second and third readings in substitution of SB No. 1129, was never
transmitted to the House for its passage. Otherwise stated, they were
only passed in their respective chamber of origin but not in the other.
In no way can each become a law under paragraph 2, Section 26,
Article VI of the Constitution. For the Court to close its eyes to this
fact because of the enrolled bill doctrine is to shirk
40
its duty to hold
“inviolate what is decreed by the Constitution.”
I vote then to GRANT these petitions and to declare R.A. No.
7716 as unconstitutional.
DISSENTING OPINION
ROMERO, J.:
Few issues brought before this Court for resolution have roiled the
citizenry as much as the instant case brought by nine petitioners
which challenges the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7716 (to
be referred to herein as the “Expanded Value Added Tax” or EVAT
law to distinguish it from Executive Order No. 273 which is the VAT
law proper) that was enacted on May 5, 1994. A visceral issue, it has
galvanized the populace into mass action and strident protest even as
the EVAT proponents have taken to podia and media in a post facto
information campaign.
________________
754
_______________
755
_______________
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 L-81311, June 30, 1988, 163 SCRA 371 with Justice Teodoro R. Padilla as
ponente.
756
_______________
5 Ibid at 378.
6 Ibid at 385.
7 Senate Resolution No. 734 filed on September 10, 1992 was entitled “Resolution
Urging the House Committee on Ways and Means to Study the Proposal to Exempt
Local Movie Producers from the Payment of the Value-Added Tax as an Incentive to
the Production of Quality and Wholesome Filipino Movies, Whenever They Feature
an All-Filipino Cast of Actors and Actresses.”
8 SB No. 1129 sought to include under the VAT Law such items as lease of real
properties, excluding agricultural lands and residential properties with monthly
rentals of less than P10,000.00; hotels; restaurants, eating places, caterers; services by
persons in the exercise of their professions; actors, actresses, talents, singers and
professional athletes; and lawyers, accountants, doctors and other professionals
registered with the Philippine Regulatory Commission.
757
We now trace the course taken by H.B. No. 11197 and S.B. No.
1129.
HB/SB No.
HB No. 11197 was approved in the Lower House on — November
second reading 11, 1993
HB No. 11197 was approved in the Lower House on — November
third reading and voted upon with 114 Yeas and 12 17, 1993
Nays —
November
18, 1993
HB No. 11197 was transmitted to the Senate Senate — February
Committee on Ways and Means submitted Com. 7, 1994
Report No. 349 recommending for approval SB No.
1630 in substitution of SB No. 1129, taking into 11
consideration PS Res. No. 734 and HB No. 11197
_______________
758
Republic Act No. 7716 merely expanded the base of the VAT law
even as the tax retained its multi-stage character.
At the oral hearing held on July 7, 1994, this Court delimited
petitioners’ arguments to the following issues culled from their
respective petitions.
PROCEDURAL ISSUES
Does Republic13
Act No. 7716 violate Article VI, Section 24, of the
Constitution?
________________
12 Republic Act No. 7716 is entitled “An Act Restructuring The Value-Added Tax
(VAT) System, Widening Its Tax Base And Enhancing Its Administration, And For
These Purposes Amending And Repealing The Relevant Provisions Of The National
Internal Revenue Code, as amended, and for other purposes.”
13 Article VI, Section 24: “All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills authorizing
increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and
759
Does it violate
14
Article VI, Section 26, paragraph 2, of the
Constitution?
What is the extent of the power of the Bicameral Conference
Committee?
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
Does the law violate the following provisions in Article III (Bill of
Rights) of the Constitution:
15
1. Section 1
16
2. Section 4
17
3. Section 5
18
4. Section 10
_______________
private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the
Senate may propose or concur with amendments.”
14 Article VI, Section 26, paragraph 2: “No bill passed by either House shall
become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies
thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its
passage, except when the president certifies to the necessity of its immediate
enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no
amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately
thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.”
15 Article III, Section 1: “No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the
laws.”
16 Article III, Section 4: “No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech,
of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and
petition the government for redress of grievances.”
17 Article III, Section 5: “No law shall be made respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and
worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious
test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.”
18 Article III, Section 10: “No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be
passed.”
760
_______________
19 Article VI, Section 28, paragraph 1: “The rule of taxation shall be uniform and
equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation.”
20 Article VI, Section 28, paragraph 3: “Charitable institutions, churches and
parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-profit cemeteries, and all
lands, buildings, and improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively used for
religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation.”
21 Constitution, Article VIII, Section 1.
761
_______________
762
(a) The bill which became Republic Act No. 7716 did not
originate exclusively in the House of Representatives. The
Senate, after receiving H.B. No. 11197, submitted its own
bill, S.B. No. 1630, and proceeded to vote and approve the
same after second and third readings.
(b) The Senate exceeded its authority to “propose or concur
with amendments” when it submitted its own bill, S.B. No.
1630, recommending its approval “in substitution of S.B.
No. 1129, taking into consideration P.S. Res. No. 734 and
H.B. No. 11197.”
(c) H.B. No. 11197 was not deliberated upon by the Senate.
Neither was it voted upon by the Senate on second and third
readings, as what was voted upon was S.B. No. 1630.
Article VI, Section 24 is taken word for word from Article VI,
Section 18 of the 1935 Constitution which was, in turn, patterned
after Article I, Section 7 (1) of the Constitution of the United States,
which states:
“All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives,
but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other bills.”
“The constitutional requirement that all bills for raising revenue shall
originate in the House of Representatives stemmed from a remedial
outgrowth of the historic conflict between Parliament (i.e., Commons) and
the Crown, whose ability to dominate the monarchially appointive and
hereditary Lords was patent. See 1 Story, Constitution, S 875 et seq., 5th
Ed.; 1 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, pp. 267, 268, 8th Ed., 1
Sutherland, Statutory Construction, S 806, 3d Ed. There was a measure of
like justification for the insertion of the provision of articles I, S 7, cl. 1, of
the Federal Constitution. At that time (1787) and thereafter until the
adoption (in 1913) of the Seventeenth Amendment providing for the direct
election of senators, the members of the United States Senate were elected
for each state by the joint vote of both houses of the Legislature of the
respective states, and hence, were removed from the people. x x x”
________________
763
‘All bills appropriating public funds, revenue or tariff bills, bills of local application,
and private bills shall originate exclusively in the Assembly, but the Senate may
propose or concur with amendments. In case of disapproval by the Senate of any
such bills, the Assembly may repass the same by a two-thirds vote of all its
members, and thereupon, the bill so repassed shall be deemed enacted and may be
submitted to the President for corresponding action. In the event that the Senate
should fail to finally act on any such bills, the Assembly may, after thirty days from
the opening of the next regular sessions of the same legislative term, reapprove the
same with a vote of two-thirds of all the members of the Assembly. And upon such
reapproval, the bill shall be deemed enacted and may be submitted to the president
for corresponding action.’
764
25
38 and later of Resolution No. 73.” (Italics supplied)
________________
765
_______________
27 Remarks of Commissioner Eulogio Lerum: “At a time when we did not have a
lawmaking body after martial law was declared, there were tripartite conferences
called by the President for the purpose of acting as a recommendatory body regarding
settlement of labor and management disputes. During the said conferences, labor had
shown that it can act with maturity. As a result, in 1976, an amendment was
introduced in the Constitution providing for sectoral representation. In the
Constitution that was approved, the number of sectors was not indicated. However, in
the Election Code of 1978, it provided for three sectors; namely, industrial labor,
agricultural labor and the youth. The agricultural labor was given four seats; two for
Luzon, one for the Visayas and one for Mindanao. The same is true with the industrial
labor sector. As far as the youth are concerned, they were also given four seats: two
for Luzon, one for Mindanao and one for the Visayas, with the condition that there
will be an additional two at large. And so, the youth had six representatives plus four
from the agricultural labor sector and four from the industrial labor sector—we had
14 seats.
In 1981, the Constitution was again amended. In the course of the amendment, the
labor representatives in the Batasang Pambansa proposed that sectoral representation
be included as a permanent addition to the lawmaking body.
Again, in that Constitution which was approved in 1981, the number and the name
of the sectors were not indicated. However, in the Election Code that was approved
before the 1984 election, there was really a definition of who will constitute the
sectors and how they will be appointed. Let me quote from that law that was passed in
1984. Under Section 27 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, the scope of the sectors has
been defined as follows:
The agricultural labor sector covers all persons who personally and physically till
the land as their principal occupation. It includes agricultural tenants and lessees,
rural workers and farm employees, owner-cultivators, settlers and small fishermen.
The industrial labor sector includes all nonagricultural workers and employees.
766
“. . . In its usual and generally accepted sense, the term means possessed to
the exclusion of others; appertaining to the subject alone; 28not including,
admitting or pertaining to another or others; undivided, sole.”
When this writer, during the oral argument of July 7, 1994, asked the
petitioner in G.R. No. 115455 whether he considers the
________________
The youth sector embraces persons not more than twenty-five years of age.”
(Volume Two, CONCOM RECORD, p. 564).
28 City Mayor, et al. v. The Chief, Philippine Constabulary and Col. Nicanor
Garcia, L-20346, October 31, 1967, 21 SCRA 673.
767
word “exclusively”
29
to be synonymous with “solely,” he replied in
the affirmative.
A careful examination of the legislative history traced earlier in
this decision shows that the original VAT law, Executive Order No.
273, was sought to be amended by ten House bills which finally
culminated in House Bill No. 11197, as well as two Senate bills. It is
to be noted that the first House Bill No. 253 was filed on July 22,
1992, and two other House bills followed in quick succession on
August 10 and September 9, 1992 before a Senate Resolution,
namely, Senate Res. No. 734, was filed on September 10, 1992 and
much later, a Senate Bill proper, viz., Senate Bill No. 1129 on March
1, 1993. Undoubtedly, therefore, these bills originated or had their
start in the House and before any Senate bill amending the VAT law
was filed. In point of time and venue, the conclusion is ineluctable
that Republic Act No. 7716, which is indisputably a revenue
measure, originated in the House of Representatives in the form of
House Bill No. 253, the first EVAT bill.
Additionally, the content and substance of the ten amendatory
House Bills filed over the roughly one-year period from July 1992 to
August 1993 reenforce the position that these revenue bills,
pertaining as they do, to Executive Order No. 273, the prevailing
VAT law, originated in the Lower House.
________________
When you say that according to the Constitution such Revenue Bills should originate
exclusively from the House. In this instance, did it not originally originate exclusively from the
House?
The word used was not “solely”; if there were Bills later also introduced, let us say in the
Senate, but the House Bill came ahead.
So, are you using the two (2) words originate “exclusively” and “solely” synonymously?
SENATOR TOLENTINO:
A—The verb “originate” remains the same, Your Honor, but the word “exclusively,” as I
said, means “solely.” x x x
768
House Bill Nos. 253, 771, 2450, 7033, 8086, 9030, 9210, 9297,
10012 and 10100 were intended to restructure the VAT system by
exempting or imposing the tax on certain items or 30 otherwise
introducing reforms in the mechanics of implementation. Of these,
House Bill No. 9210 was favored with a Presidential certification on
the need for its immediate enactment to meet a public emergency.
Easily the most comprehensive, it noted that the revenue
performance of the VAT, being far from satisfactory since the
collections have always fallen short of projections, “the system is
rendered inefficient, inequitable and less comprehensive.” Hence,
the Bill proposed several amendments designed 31
to widen the tax
base of the VAT and enhance its administration.
That House Bill No. 11197 being a revenue bill, originated from
the Lower House was acknowledged, in fact was virtually taken for
granted, by the Chairmen of the Committee on Ways and Means of
both the House of Representatives and the Senate. Consequently, at
the April 19, 1994 meeting of the Bicameral Conference Committee,
the Members agreed to make the House Bill as the “frame of
reference” or “base” of the discussions of the Bicameral Conference
Committee with
32
the “amendments” or “insertions to emanate from
the Senate.”
________________
30 H.B. 771—exempting the sale of copra from VAT coverage; H.B. 2450—
exempting the lessors or distributors of cinematographic films from paying the VAT;
H.B. 7033—amending Sec. 103 of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended
by EO 273; H.B. 8086—exempting packaging materials of export products from the
VAT; H.B. 9030—amending Sec. 120 of the NIRC, as renumbered by EO 273; H.B.
9210—amending Title IV and Sections 237 and 238 of the NIRC; H.B. 9297—
restructuring the VAT system by expanding its tax base, and amending Sections 99,
100 (A), 102 (A), 103, 113, 114, 115 and 116 of the NIRC; H.B. 10012—reducing the
rate of VAT imposed on sale and importation of goods, and sale of services; H.B.
10100—amending certain provisions of the NIRC on VAT.
31 Explanatory Note of House Bill No. 9210.
32 Excerpts from the April 19, 1994 meeting of the Bicameral Conference
Committee: “CHAIRMAN Javier. First of all, what would be the basis, no, or
framework para huwag naman mawala yung personality namin dito sa bicameral, no,
because the bill originates from the House because this is a revenue bill, so we would
just want to ask, we make the House Bill as the frame of reference, and then
769
“HON. MACEDA. Yes, That’s true for every revenue measure. There’s no
other way. The House Bill has got to be the base. Of course, for the record, we
know that this is an administration bill; this is certified by the president and I was
about to put into the records as I am saying now that your problem about the
impact on prices on the people was already decided when the President and the
administration sent this to us and certified it. They have already gotten over that
political implication of this bill and the economic impact on prices.
“CHAIRMAN HERRERA. Yung concern mo about the bill as the reference in
this discussion is something that we can just. . . .
“CHAIRMAN JAVIER. We will just . . . all the amendments will be coming
from the Senate.”
770
remained, therefore, was no longer House Bill No. 11197 but Senate
Bill No. 1630. Thence, the Senate, instead of transmitting the bill to
the Lower House for its concurrence and amendments, if any, took a
“shortcut,” bypassed the Lower House and instead, approved Senate
Bill No. 1630 on both second and third readings on the same day,
March 24, 1994.
The first irregularity, that is, the failure to return Senate Bill No.
1630 to the Lower House for its approval is fatal inasmuch as the
other chamber of legislature was not afforded the opportunity to
deliberate and make known its views. It is no idle dictum that no less
than the Constitution ordains: “The legislative power shall be vested
in the Congress of the Philippines33 which shall consist of a Senate
and a House of Representatives ...” (Italics supplied)
It is to be pointed out too, that inasmuch as Senate Bill No. 1630
which had “taken into consideration” House Bill No. 11197 was not
returned to the Lower House for deliberation, the latter Chamber had
no opportunity at all to express its views thereon or to introduce any
amendment. The customary practice is, after the Senate has
considered the Lower House Bill, it returns the same to the House of
origin with its amendments. In the event that there may be any
differences between the two, the same shall then be referred to a
Conference Committee composed of members from both Chambers
which shall then proceed to reconcile said differences.
In the instant case, the Senate transmitted to the Lower House on
March 24, 1994, a letter informing the latter that it had “passed S.
No. 1630 entitled . . . (and) in view of the disagreeing provisions of
said bill and House Bill No. 11197, entitled . . . the Senate requests a
conference . . .” This, in spite of the fact that Com. Report No. 349
of the Senate Committee on Ways and Means had already
recommended for approval on February 7, 1994 “S.B. No. 1630 . . .
taking into consideration H.B. No. 11197.” Clearly, the Conference
Committee could only have acted upon Senate Bill No. 1630, for
House Bill No. 11197 had already been fused into the former.
At the oral hearing of July 7, 1994, petitioner in G.R. No. 115455
admitted, in response to this writer’s query, that he had
_______________
771
________________
35 The certification states: “This Act which is a consolidation of House Bill No.
11197 and Senate Bill No. 1630 was finally passed by the House of Representatives
and the Senate on April 7, 1994 and May 2, 1994, respectively.”
772
“It is a declaration by the two houses, through their presiding officers, to the
president, that a bill, thus attested, has received in due form, the sanction of
the legislative branch of the government, and that it is delivered to him in
obedience to the constitutional requirement that all bills which pass
Congress shall be presented to him. And when a bill, thus attested, receives
his approval, and is deposited in the public archives, its authentication as a
bill that has passed Congress should be deemed complete and
unimpeachable. As the President has no authority to approve a bill not
passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of State,
and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the President of the
United States, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and
executive departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the
duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The
respect due to coequal and independent departments requires the judicial
department to act upon that assurance, and to accept, as having passed
Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the courts to
determine, when the question properly arises, whether 37
the Act, so
authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution.”
_______________
773
“Each house shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time
publish the same, excepting such parts as may, in its judgment, affect
national security; and the yeas and nays on any question shall, at the request
of one-fifth of the Members present, be entered in the Journal.
Each House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings.” (Italics
supplied)
The rationale behind the above provision and of the “journal entry
rule” is as follows:
“It is apparent that the object of this provision is to make the legislature
show what it has done, leaving nothing whatever to implication. And, when
the legislature says what it has done, with regard to the passage of any bill,
it negatives the idea that it has done anything else in regard thereto. Silence
proves nothing where one is commanded to speak. . . . Our constitution
commands certain things to be done in regard to the passage of a bill, and
says that no bill shall become a law unless these things are done. It seems a
travesty upon our supreme law to say that it guaranties to the people the
right to have their laws made in this manner only, and that there is no way of
enforcing this right, or for the court to say that this is law when the
constitution says it is not law. There is one safe course which is in harmony
with the constitution, and that is to adhere to the rule that the legislature
must show, as commanded by the constitution, that it has done everything
required by the constitution to be done in the serious and important matter
of making laws. This is the rule of evidence
_______________
774
_______________
775
“We believe that a more reasonable rule is the one which Professor
Sutherland describes as the ‘extrinsic evidence’ rule . . . . Under this
approach there is a prima facie presumption that an enrolled bill is valid, but
such presumption may be over-come by clear satisfactory and convincing 41
evidence establishing that constitutional requirements have not been met.”
“Passing over the question of whether the printed Act (No. 2381), published
by authority of law, is conclusive evidence as to the date when it was
passed, we will inquire whether the courts may go behind the legislative
journals for the purpose of determining
43
the date of adjournment when such
journals are clear and explicit.”
It is to be noted from the above that the Court “passed over” the
probative value to be accorded to the enrolled bill. Opting for the
journals, the Court proceeded to explain:
________________
41 602 S.W. 2d 420 (1980).
42 34 Phil. 729 (1916).
43 Ibid at 733.
776
“From their very nature and object, the records of the Legislature are as
important as those of the judiciary, and to inquire into the veracity of the
journals of the Philippine Legislature, when they are, as we have said clear
and explicit, would be to violate both the letter and the spirit of the organic
laws by which the Philippine Government was brought into existence, to
invade a coordinate and independent department of the Government, 44and to
interfere with the legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature.”
_______________
44 Ibid at 733-734.
45 Ibid at 735.
46 78 Phil. 1 (1947).
47 Ibid at 3.
777
_______________
48 Ibid at 18.
49 117 Phil. 363 (1963).
778
More recently,
52
in the 1993 case of Philippine Judges Association v.
Prado, this Court, in ruling on the unconstitutionality of Section 35
of Republic Act No. 7354 withdrawing the franking privilege from
the entire hierarchy of courts, did not so much adhere to the enrolled
bill rule alone as to both “enrolled bill and legislative journals.”
Through Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, we stated: “Both the enrolled
bill and the legislative journals certify that the measure was duly
enacted, i.e., in accordance with Article VI, Sec. 26 (2) of the
Constitution. We are bound by such official assurances from a
coordinate department of the government, to which we owe, at the
very least, a becoming courtesy.”
Aware of the shifting sands on which the validity and continuing
relevance of the “enrolled bill” theory rests, I have taken pains to
trace the history of its applicability in this jurisdiction, as influenced
in varying degrees by different Federal rulings.
As applied to the instant petition, the issue posed is whether or
not the procedural irregularities that attended the passage of House
Bill No. 11197 and Senate Bill No. 1630, outside of the
_______________
“Congress violated Section 26, par. 2, Article VI (of the 1987 Constitution)
when it approved the Bicameral Conference Committee Report which
embodied, in violation of Rule XII of the Rules of the Senate, a radically
altered tax measure containing provisions not reported out or discussed in
either House as well as provisions on which
_______________
780
780 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance
there was no disagreement between the House and the Senate and, worse,
provisions contrary to what
54
the House and the Senate had approved after
three separate readings.”
and
________________
781
VOL. 235, AUGUST 25, 1994 781
Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance
“SEC. 26. In the event that the Senate does not agree with the House of
Representatives on the provision of any bill or joint resolution, the
differences shall be settled by a conference committee of both Houses which
shall meet within ten days after their composition.
The President shall designate the members of the conference committee
in accordance with subparagraph (c), Section 8 of Rule III.
Each Conference Committee Report shall contain a detailed and
sufficiently explicit statement of the changes in or amendments to the
subject measure, and shall be signed by the conferees.
The consideration of such report shall not be in order unless the report
has been filed with the Secretary of the Senate and copies thereof have been
distributed to the Members.”
“SEC. 85. Conference Committee Reports.—In the event that the House
does not agree with the Senate on the amendments to any bill or joint
resolution, the differences may be settled by conference committee of both
Chambers.
The consideration of conference committee reports shall always be in
order, except when the journal is being read, while the roll is being called or
the House is dividing on any question. Each of the pages of such reports
shall contain a detailed, sufficiently explicit statement of the changes in or
amendments to the subject measure.
The consideration of such report shall not be in order unless copies
thereof are distributed to the Members: Provided, That in the last fifteen
days of each session period it shall be deemed sufficient that three copies of
the report, signed as above provided, are deposited in the office of the
Secretary General.”
782
________________
58 Page 261.
59 Page 268.
60 Davies, supra, at 65.
61 Sec. 764, p. 541.
62 Consolidated Memorandum for Respondents, p. 71.
783
“Their power lies chiefly in the fact that reports of conference committees
must be accepted without amendment or else rejected in toto. The impulse is
to get done with the matters and so the motion to accept has undue
advantage, for some members are sure to prefer swallowing unpalatable
provisions rather than prolong controversy. This is the more likely if the
report comes in the rush of business toward the end of a session, when to
seek further conference might result in the loss of the measure altogether. At
any time in the session there is some risk of such a result following the
rejection of a conference report, for it may not be possible to secure a
second conference, or delay may give opposition to the main proposal
chance to develop more strength.
xxx xxx xxx
Entangled in a network of rule and custom, the Representative who
resents and would resist this theft of his rights, finds himself helpless.
Rarely can he vote, rarely can he voice his mind, in the matter of any
fraction of the bill. Usually he cannot even record himself as protesting
against some one feature while accepting the measure as whole. Worst of
all, he cannot by argument or suggested change, try to improve what the
other branch has done.
This means more than the subversion of individual rights. It means to a
degree the abandonment of whatever advantage the bicameral system may
have. By so much it in effect transfers the lawmaking power to a small
group of members who work out in private a decision that almost always
prevails. What is worse, these men are not chosen in a way to ensure the
wisest choice. It has become the practice to name as conferees the ranking
members of the committee, so that the accident of seniority determines.
Exceptions are made, but in general it is not a question of who are most
competent to serve. Chance governs, sometimes giving way to favor, rarely
to merit.
xxx xxx xxx
Speaking broadly, the system of legislating by conference committee is
unscientific and therefore defective. Usually it forfeits the benefit of
scrutiny and judgment by all the wisdom available. Uncontrolled, it is
inferior to that process by which
63
every amendment is secured independent
discussion and vote. x x x.” (Italics supplied)
________________
784
(1) Under the HB, this section includes any person who, in the
course of trade or business, sells, barters or exchanges
goods OR PROPERTIES and any person who LEASES
PERSONAL PROPERTIES.
(2) The SB completely changed the said section and defined a
number of words and phrases. Also, Section 99-A was
added which included one who sells, exchanges, barters
PROPERTIES and one who imports PROPERTIES.
(3) The BICAM version makes LESSORS of goods OR
PROPERTIES and importers of goods LIABLE to VAT
(subject of petition in G.R. No. 115754).
________________
785
3. Section 102
786
5. Section 104
787
6. Section 107
Both House and Senate Bills provide for the payment of P500.00
VAT registration fee but this was increased by BICAM to P1,000.00.
7. Section 112
8. Section 115
9. Section 117
(a) The BICAM defers for only 2 years the VAT on services of
actors and actresses, although the SB defers it for 3 years.
(b) The BICAM uses the word “EXCLUDE” in the section on
deferment of VAT collection on certain goods and services.
The HB does not contain any counterpart provision and SB
only allows deferment for no longer than 3 years.
788
________________
65 See: 18 Words and Phrases 482 citing Kennedy v. Truss, Del. Super., 13 A. 2nd
431, 435, 1 Terry 424 (1940).
66 United States Gypsum Co. v. State, Dept. of Revenue, 110 N.W. 2d 698, 71,
363, Mich. 548 (1961).
789
_________________
67 BLACK’s DICTIONARY, 6th ed., p. 687 citing State ex. rel. Riley v. District
Court of Second Judicial Dist. in and for Silver Bow County, 103 Mont. 576, 64 P. 2d
115, 119 (1937).
68 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, May 3, 1952, p. 885 cited in Orquiola,
Annotated Rules of the Senate, 1991 ed., pp. 40-41.
790
5th Ed., 1979, which means “to change or modify for the better; to
alter by modification, deletion, or addition,” said insertions and
deletions constitute amendments. Consequently, these violated
Article VI, Section 26 (2) which provides inter alia: “Upon the last
reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed . . .” This
proscription is intended to subject all bills and their amendments to
intensive deliberation by the legislators and the ample ventilation of
issues to afford the public an opportunity to express their opinions or
objections issues to afford the public an opportunity to express their
opinions or objections thereon. The same rationale underlies the
three-reading requirement to the end that no surpises may be sprung
on an unsuspecting citizenry.
Provisions of the “now you see it, now you don’t” variety,
meaning those which were either in the House and/or Senate
versions but simply disappeared or were “bracketed out” of
existence in the BICAM Report, were eventually incorporated in
Republic Act No. 7716. Worse, some goods, properties or services
which were not covered by the two versions and, therefore, were
never intended to be so covered, suddenly found their way into the
same Report. No advance notice of such insertions prepared the rest
of the legislators, much less the public who could be adversely
affected, so that they could be given the opportunity to express their
views thereon. Well has the final BICAM report been described,
therefore, as an instance of “taxation without representation.”
That the conferees or delegates in the BICAM representing the
two Chambers could not possibly be charged with bad faith or
sinister motives or, at the very least, unseemly behavior, is of no
moment. The stark fact is that items not previously subjected to the
VAT now fell under its coverage without interested sectors or parties
having been afforded the opportunity to be heard thereon. This is not
to say that the Conference Committee Report should have undergone
the three readings required in Article VI, Section 26(2), for this
clearly refers only to bills which, after having been initially filed in
either House, negotiated the labyrinthine passage therein until its
approval. The composition of the BICAM including as it usually
does, the Chairman of the appropriate Committee, the sponsor of the
bill and other interested members ensures an informed discussion, at
least with respect to the disagreeing provisions. The same does not
obtain as regards completely new
791
________________
792
_______________
793
_______________
794
of Senate Bill No. 720 or of House Bill No. 4200 but only in the
Conference Committee Report, was violative of Article VI, Section
26 (2) of the Constitution. Likewise, that said Section 35, never
having been a subject of disagreement between both Houses, could
not have been validly added as an amendment before the Conference
Committee.
The majority opinion in said case explained:
“While it is true that a conference committee is the mechanism
for compromising differences between the Senate and the House, it
is not limited in its jurisdiction to this question. Its broader function
is described thus:
At the risk of being repetitious, I wish to point out that the general
rule, as quoted above, is: “Even where the conference committee is
not by rule limited in its jurisdiction, legislative custom severely
limits the freedom with which new subject matter can be inserted
into the conference bill.” What follows, that is, “occasionally a
conference committee produces unexpected results, results beyond
its mandate . . .” is the exception. Then it concludes with a
declaration that: “This is symptomatic of the authoritarian power of
conference committee.” Are we about to reinstall another institution
that smacks of authoritarianism which, after our past experience, has
become anathema to the Filipino people?
The ruling above can hardly be cited in support of the proposition
that a provision in a BICAM report which was not
________________
73 The Philippine Judges Association v. Hon. Pete Prado, G.R. No. 105371,
November 11, 1993, 227 SCRA 703, 709.
795
_________________
74 In Osmeña, Jr. v. Pendatun, (109 Phil. 863 [1960]), the Court held that
parliamentary rules are merely procedural and they may be waived or disregarded by
the legislative body. Hence, mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not
invalidate the action taken by a deliberative body when the requisite number of
members have agreed to a particular measure.
75 State v. Essling, 128 N.W. 2d 307, 316 (1964).
796
That these practices have remained unchallenged in the past does not
justify our closing our eyes and turning a deaf ear to them. Writ
large is the spectacle of a mechanism ensconced in the very heart of
the people’s legislative halls, that now stands indicted with the
charge of arrogating legislative powers unto itself through the use of
dubious “shortcuts.” Here, for the people to judge, is the “mother of
all shortcuts.”
In the petitions at bench, we are confronted with the enactment of
a tax law which was designed to broaden the tax base. It is rote
learning for any law student that as an attribute of sovereignty, the76
power to tax is “the strongest of all the powers of government.”
Admittedly, “for all its 77plenitude, the power to tax is not unconfined.
There are restrictions.” Were there none, then the oft-quoted 1803
dictum of Chief Justice
78
Marshall that “the power to tax involves the
power to destroy” would be a truism. Happily, we can concur with,
and the people can find comfort in, the reassuring words of Mr.
Justice Holmes:79“The power to tax is not the power to destroy while
this Court sits.”
Manakanakâ, mayroóng dumudulóg dito sa Kátaastaasang
Hukuman na may kamangha-mangháng hinaíng. Angkóp na
halimbawà ay ang mga petisyóng iniharáp ngayón sa amin.
Ang ilán sa kanilá ay mga Senadór na nais mapawaláng bisà ang
isáng batás ukol sa buwís na ipinasá mismo nilá. Diumanó itó ay
hindî tumalima sa mga itinatadhana ng Sáligang Batás. Bukód sa
rito, tutol silá sa mga bagong talatà na isiningit ng “Bicameral
Conference Committee” na nagdagdág ng mga bagong bagay bagay
at serbisyo na papatawan ng buwís. Ayon sa kanilá, ginampanán ng
komiténg iyán ang gawain na nauukol sa buóng Kongreso. Kung
kayá’t ang nararapat na mangyari ay ihatol ng Kátaastaasang
Hukuman na malabis na pagsasamantala sa sariling pagpapasiyá ang
ginawâ ng Kongreso.
Bagamá’t bantulót kamíng makialám sa isáng kapantáy na
sangáy ng Pamahalaán, hindî naman nararapat na kamí ay
________________
797
798
DISSENTING OPINION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
799
Representatives.”
Since the term “exclusively” has already been adequately defined
in the various opinions, as to which there seems to be no dispute, I
shall no longer offer my own definition.
Verily, the provision in our Constitution requiring that all revenue
bills shall originate exclusively from the Lower House is mandatory.
The word “exclusively” is an “exclusive word,” 1
which is indicative
of an intent that the provision is mandatory. Hence, all American
authorities expounding on the meaning and application of Sec. 7,
par. (1), Art. I, of the U.S. Constitution cannot be used in the
interpretation of Sec. 24, Art. VI, of our 1987 Constitution which
has a distinct feature of “exclusiveness” all its own. Thus, when our
Constitution absolutely requires—as it is mandatory—that a
particular bill should exclusively emanate from the Lower House,
there is no alternative to the requirement that the bill to become
valid law must originate exclusively from that House.
In the interpretation of constitutions, questions frequently arise as
to whether particular sections are mandatory or directory. The courts
usually hesitate to declare that a constitutional provision is directory
merely in view of the tendency of the legislature to disregard
provisions which are not said to be mandatory. Accordingly, it is the
general rule to regard constitutional provisions as mandatory, and
not to leave any discretion to the will of the legislature to obey or
disregard them. This presumption as to mandatory quality is usually
followed unless it is unmistakably manifest that the provisions are
intended to be merely directory. So strong is the inclination in favor
of giving obligatory force to the terms of the organic law that it has
even been said that neither by the courts nor by any other
department of the government may any provision of the Constitution
be regarded as merely directory, but that each and everyone of its
provisions should be treated as imperative and mandatory, without
reference to the rules and
2
distinguishing between the directory and
the mandatory statutes.
The framers of our 1987 Constitution could not have used the
term “exclusively” if they only meant to replicate and adopt in
_______________
800
Thus in 1883 the upper house struck out everything after the enacting clause
of a tariff bill and wrote its own measure, which the House eventually felt
obliged to accept. It likewise added 847 amendments to the Payne-Aldrich
tariff act of 1909, dictated the schedules of the emergency tariff act of 1921,
rewrote an extensive tax revision bill in the same year, and recast most of
the permanent tariff
________________
3 See Majority Opinion, p. 15, citing Rainey v. United States, 232 U.S., 309, 58 Law Ed.
617.
801
4
bill of 1922 —
which in fact suggests, very clearly, that the subject revenue bill
actually originated from the Lower House and was only amended,
perhaps considerably, by the Senate after it was passed by the
former and transmitted to the latter.
In the cases cited, where the statutes passed by the U.S. Congress
were upheld, the revenue bills did not actually originate from the
Senate but, in fact, from the Lower House. Thus, the Supreme Court
of the United States,
5
speaking through Chief Justice White in Rainey
v. United States upheld the revenue bill passed by Congress and
adopted the ruling of the lower court that—
_______________
4 Id., citing F.A. Ogg and P.O. Ray, Introduction to American Government, 302, n.
2 (1945).
5 See Note 3.
6 22 U.S. 107.
802
803
VOL. 235, AUGUST 25, 1994 803
Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance
_______________
804
DISSENTING OPINION
PUNO, J.:
805
_______________
806
The Report was approved by the House on April 27, 1994. The
Senate approved it on May 2, 1994. On May 5, 1994, the President
signed the bill into law as R.A. No. 7716.
There is no question that the Bicameral Conference Committee
did more than reconcile differences between House Bill No. 11197
and Senate Bill No. 1630. In several instances, it either added new
provisions or deleted provisions already approved in House Bill No.
11197 and Senate Bill No. 1630. These insertions/dele-tions
numbering twenty four2
(24) are specified in detail by petitioner
Tolentino as follows:
A. The H.B., S.B., and the BCC (R.A. 7716) all included sale of
PROPERTIES as subject to VAT.
The term GOODS or PROPERTIES includes the following:
________________
807
B. The HB and the BCC Bills has each a provision which includes
THE SALE OF GOLD TO BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS
as falling under the term Export Sales, hence subject to 0% VAT.
The Senate Bill does not contain such provision (See Section 102-
A thereof).
This section was amended to include as subject to a 10% VAT the gross
receipts derived from THE SALE OR EXCHANGE OF SERVICES,
INCLUDING THE USE OR LEASE OF PROPERTIES.
The SB, HB, and BCC have the same provisions on this.
However, on what are included in the term SALE OR EXCHANGE OF
SERVICES, the BCC included/inserted the following (not found in either
the House or Senate Bills):
808
The BCC deleted subsection (f) in its entirety, despite its retention in both
the House and Senate Bills, thus under RA 7716, the ‘printing, publication,
importation or sale of books and any newspaper, magazine, review, or
bulletin which appears at regular intervals with fixed prices for subscription
and sale and which is not devoted principally to the publication of
advertisements’ is subject to VAT.
Subsection (g) was amended by the BCC (both Senate and House Bills
did not) by changing the word TEN to FIVE, thus: “Importation of
passenger and/or cargo vessel of more than five thousand ton to ocean
going, including engine and spare parts of said vessel to be used by the
importer himself as operator thereof.” In short, importation of vessels with
tonnage of more than 5 thousand is VAT exempt.
Subsection L, was amended by the BCC by adding the qualifying phrase:
EXCEPT THOSE RENDERED BY PROFESSIONALS.
Subsection U which exempts from VAT “Transactions which are exempt
under special laws,” was amended by BCC by adding the phrase: EXCEPT
THOSE GRANTED UNDER PD Nos. 66, 529, 972, 1491, and 1590, and
NON-ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES under RA 6938. This is the reason
why cooperatives are now subject to VAT.
While the SALE OF REAL PROPERTIES was included in the exempt
transactions under the House Bill, the BCC made a qualification by stating:
809
V On Section 104
VI On Section 107
Both House and Senate Bills provide for the payment of P500.00 VAT
registration fee. The BCC provides for P1,000.00 VAT fee.
While both the Senate and House Bills provide that a person whose sales
or receipts and are exempt under Section 103[w] of the Code, and who are
not VAT registered shall pay a tax equivalent to THREE (3) PERCENT of
his gross quarterly sales or receipts, the BCC inserted the phrase: THREE
PERCENT UPON THE EFFECTIVITY OF THIS ACT AND FOUR
PERCENT (4%) TWO YEARS THEREAFTER.
810
IX On Section 117
This Section has not been touched by either Senate and House Bills. But
the BCC amended it by subjecting franchises on ELECTRIC, GAS and
WATER UTILITIES A TAX OF TWO PERCENT (2%) ON GROSS
RECEIPTS DERIVED x x x.
X On Section 121
XI Others
A) The House Bill does not contain any provision on the deferment of
VAT collection on Certain Goods and Services as does the Senate
Bill (Section 19, SB 1630). But although the Senate Bill authorizes
the deferment on certain goods and services for no longer than 3
years, there is no specific provision that authorizes the President to
EXCLUDE from VAT any of these. The BCC uses the word
EXCLUDE.
B) Moreover, the Senate Bill defers the VAT on services of actors and
actresses etc. for 3 years but the BCC defers it for only 2 years.
C) Section 18 of the BCC Bill (RA 7716) is an entirely new provision
not contained in the House/Senate Bills.
D) The period within which to promulgate the implementing rules and
regulations is within 60 days under SB 1630; No specific period
under the House Bill, within 90 days under RA 7716 (BCC).
E) The House Bill provides for a general repealing clause i.e., all
inconsistent laws etc. are repealed. Section 16 of the Senate Bill
expressly repeals Sections 113, 114, 116, 119 and 120 of the code.
The same Senate Bill however contains a general repealing clause
in Sec. 21
811
thereof.
RA 7716 (BCC’s Bill) expressly repeals Sections 113, 114 and 116 of the
NIRC; Article 39 (c) (d) and (e) of EO 226 and provides the repeal of Sec.
119 and 120 of the NIRC upon the expiration of two (2) years unless
otherwise excluded by the President.”
“In the event that the Senate does not agree with the House of
Representatives on the provision of any bill or joint resolution, the
differences shall be settled by a conference committee of both Houses
_______________
3 See p. 66 of the Consolidated Memorandum for Respondents where they refer to certain
statements from Canlan, Weightson and Beam but without citing their specific book or article.
812
“In the event that the House does not agree with the Senate on the
amendments to any bill or joint resolution, the differences may be settled by
a conference committee of both chambers.
x x x. Each report shall contain a detailed, sufficiently explicit statement
of the changes in or amendments to the subject measure.” (Emphasis
supplied)
4
The Jefferson’s Manual has been adopted as a supplement to our
parliamentary rules and practice. Section 456 of Jefferson’s Manual
5
similarly confines the powers of a conference committee, viz:
This rule of antiquity has been honed and honored in practice by the
Congress of the United States. Thus, it is chronicled by Floyd 6
Biddick, Parliamentarian Emeritus of the United States Senate, viz:
________________
813
________________
814
the House, it means the House “. . . composed of not more than two
hundred and fifty members x x x who shall be elected from
legislative districts x x x and those who x x x shall be elected
through a party-list system of registered
8
national, regional, and
sectoral parties or organizations.” The Constitution thus, did not
vest on a Bicameral Conference Committee with an ad hoc
membership the power to legislate for it exclusively vested
legislative power to the Senate and the House as co-equal bodies. To
be sure, the Constitution does not mention the Bicameral Conference
Committees of Congress. No constitutional status is accorded to
them. They are not even statutory creations. They owe their
existence from the internal rules of the two Houses of Congress. Yet,
respondents peddle the disconcerting idea that they should be
recognized as a Third Chamber of Congress and with ex post veto
power at that.
The thesis that a Bicameral Conference Committee can exercise
law making power with ex post veto power is freighted with
mischief. Law making his a power that can be used for good or for
ill, hence, our Constitution carefully laid out a plan and a procedure
for its exercise. Firstly, it vouchsafed that the power to make laws
should be exercised by no other body except the Senate and the
House. It ought to be indubitable that what is contemplated is the
Senate acting as a full Senate and the House acting as a full House.
It is only when the Senate and the House act as whole bodies that
they truly represent the people. And it is only when they represent
the people that they can legitimately pass laws. Laws that are not
enacted by the people’s rightful representatives subvert the people’s
sovereignty. Bicameral Conference Committees, with their ad hoc
character and limited membership, cannot pass laws for they do not
represent the people. The Constitution does not allow the tyranny of
the majority. Yet, the respondents will impose the worst kind of
tyranny—the tyranny of the minority over the majority. Secondly,
the Constitution delineated in deft strokes the steps to be followed in
making laws. The overriding purpose of these procedural rules is to
assure that only bills that successfully survive the searching scrutiny
of the proper committees of Congress and the full and
________________
815
________________
816
which were entirely new and which were made not to reconcile
inconsistencies between S.B. No. 1630 and H.B. No. 11197. The
members of the Bicameral Conference Committee did not have any
authority to add new provisions or delete provisions already
approved by both Houses as it was not necessary to discharge their
limited task of reconciling differences in bills. At that late stage of
law making, the Conference Committee cannot add/ delete
provisions which can become laws without undergoing the study and
deliberation of both chambers given to bills on 1st, 2nd, and 3rd
readings. Even the Senate and the House cannot enact a law which
will not undergo these mandatory three (3) readings required by the
Constitution. If the Senate and the House cannot enact such a law,
neither can the lesser Bicameral Conference Committee.
Moreover, the so-called choice given to the members of both
Houses to either approve or disapprove the said additions and
deletions is more of an optical illusion. These additions and
deletions are not submitted separately for approval. They are tucked
to the entire bill. The vote is on the bill as a package, i.e., together
with the insertions and deletions. And the vote is either “aye” or
“nay,” without any further debate and deliberation. Quite often,
legislators vote “yes” because they approve of the bill as a whole
although they may object to its amendments by the Conference
Committee.
10
This lack of real choice is well observed by Robert
Luce:
“Their power lies chiefly in the fact that reports of conference committees
must be accepted without amendment or else rejected in toto. The impulse is
to get done with the matter and so the motion to accept has undue
advantage, for some members are sure to prefer swallowing unpalatable
provisions rather than prolong controversy. This is the more likely if the
report comes in the rush of business toward the end of a session, when to
seek further conference might result in the loss of the measure altogether. At
any time in the session there is some risk of such a result following the
rejection of a conference report, for it may not be possible to secure a
second conference, or delay may give opposition to the main proposal
chance to develop more strength.”
________________
817
“x x x
a. Constitutional rules.
b. Statutory rules or charter provisions.
c. Adopted rules.
d. Judicial decisions.
e. Adopted parliamentary authority.
f. Parliamentary law.
g. Customs and usages.
2. The rules from the different sources take precedence in the order
listed above except that judicial decisions, since they are
interpretations of rules from one of the other sources, take the same
precedence as the source interpreted. Thus, for example, an
interpretation of a constitutional provision takes precedence over a
statute.
3. Whenever there is conflict between rules from these sources the
rule from the source listed earlier prevails over the rule from the
source
_______________
11 Legislative Law and Process in a Nut Shell, West Publishing Co., 1986 ed., p. 81.
12 Ibid.
13 Manual of Legislative Procedure for Legislative and other Governmental Bodies,
McGraw Hill Co., Inc., 1953 ed., pp. 32-33.
818
“x x x.
Where the failure of constitutional compliance in the enactment of
statutes is not discoverable from the face of the act itself but may be
demonstrated by recourse to the legislative journals, debates, committee
reports or papers of the governor, courts have used several conflicting
theories with which to dispose of the issue. They have held: (1) that the
enrolled bill is conclusive and like the sheriff’s return cannot be attacked;
(2) that the enrolled bill is prima facie correct and only in case the
legislative journal shows affirmative contradiction of the constitutional
requirement will the bill be held invalid, (3) that although the enrolled bill is
prima facie correct, evidence from the journals, or other extrinsic sources is
admissible to strike the bill down; (4) that the legislative journal is
conclusive and the enrolled bill is valid only if it
_______________
14 82 CJS 136.
15 Statutory Construction, 3rd ed., Vol. I., p. 223.
819
accords with the recital in the journal and the constitutional procedure.”
820
“x x x.
If for no other reason than that it conforms to the expressed policy of our
law making body, we choose to follow the rule. Section 313 of the old Code
of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2210, provides: ‘Official
documents’ may be proved as follows: * * * (2) the proceedings of the
Philippine Commission, or of any legislative body that may be provided for
in the Philippine Islands, or of Congress, by the journals of those bodies or
of either house thereof, or by published statutes or resolutions, or by copies
certified by the clerk or secretary, or printed by their order; Provided, That
in the case of Acts of the Philippine Commission or the Philippine
Legislature, when there is an existence of a copy signed by the presiding
officers and secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of the
provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof.”
________________
16 Op. cit., pp. 224-225 citing Barndall Refining v. Welsh, 64 S.D. 647, 269 N.W.
853, 859 [1936]. Jones, Constitutional Provisions Regulating the Mechanics of
Enactment in Iowa (1935), 21 Iowa Law Rev. 79, Charlton, Constitutional Regulation
of Legislative Procedure (1936), 21 Iowa Law Rev. 538; Note (1936) 21 Iowa Law
Rev. 573.
17 See Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. Rep. 1 [1947]; Casco Phil. Chemical Co. v.
Gimenez, L-17931, February 28, 1963; Morales v. Subido, No. L-29658, February 27,
1969, 27 SCRA 131; Phil. Judges Association v. Prado, G.R. No. 105371, November
11, 1993.
821
Suffice to state that section 313 of the Old Code of Civil Procedure
as amended by Act No. 2210 is no longer in our statute books. It has
long been repealed by the Rules of Court. Mabanag also relied on
jurisprudence and authorities in the United States which are under
severe criticisms by modern scholars. Hence, even in the United
States the conclusiveness of an enrolled bill has been junked by
most of the States. It is also true that as late as last year, in the case
of Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, op. cit., this Court still
relied on the conclusiveness of an enrolled bill as it refused to
invalidate a provision of law on the ground that it was merely
inserted by the bicameral conference committee of both Houses.
Prado, however, is distinguishable. In Prado, the alleged insertion
of the second paragraph of section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 repealing
the franking privilege of the judiciary does not appear to be an
uncontested fact. In the case at bench, the numerous
additions/deletions made by the Bicameral Conference Committee
as detailed by petitioners Tolentino and Salonga are not disputed by
the respondents. In Prado, the Court was not also confronted with
the argument that it can no longer rely on the conclusiveness of an
enrolled bill in light of the new provision in the Constitution
defining judicial power. More specifically, section 1 of Article VIII
now provides:
“Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in
such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the
duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.” (Emphasis supplied)
_______________
822
“x x x.
x x x In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question of
whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted
without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to
constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. This is
not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this
nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the
courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of this nature, by
claiming that such matters constitute political question.” (Emphasis ours)
_______________
823
_______________
824
825
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826
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