Designing Institutions To Manage Conflict Principles For The Problem Solving Org

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WILLIAM GOLDMAN
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10/3/2011
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For Educational Use Only
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DESIGNING INSTITUTIONS TO MANAGE CONFLICT:..., 8 Harv. Negot. L. Rev....
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\u169\'3f 2011 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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8 Harv. Negot. L. Rev. 133
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Harvard Negotiation Law Review
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Spring 2003
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Articles
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DESIGNING INSTITUTIONS TO MANAGE CONFLICT: PRINCIPLES FOR THE PROBLEM SOLVING
ORGANIZATION
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Khalil Z. Shariff
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Copyright (c) 2003 Harvard Negotiation Law Review; Khalil Z. Shariff
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Can institutions be purposefully designed to do a better job at managing conflict?
The stakes are high in answering this question since the need for institutions that
allow peaceful, pluralist societies to flourish has never been clearer. In an era
of failed states, intractable ethnic conflict, and increasingly diverse societies,
the design of public institutions that enable people to solve problems collectively
is an ever-present challenge. The challenge is equally salient in the context of
the international system: globalization demands a whole new set of approaches to
international cooperation, where negotiated problem solving is often the only
viable option. This is indeed an age of institution building at all levels.
\par
}
}
}
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Imagine a society emerging from some sort of armed conflict. Though a peace
agreement has been negotiated to halt the violence, the more significant challenge
is to design a set of institutions that will allow this society to manage
peacefully the ongoing conflicts about the shape of political, economic, and social
life into the future. The commission charged with designing this set of political
institutions quickly realizes that although these institutions must achieve several
goals, their principal purpose is to create a permanent institutional capacity for
collective problem solving. They turn to the dispute resolution literature to seek
advice on the details of institutional design: how should the institutions be
structured, who should the
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*134
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members be, what processes should be centralized, how should decisions be made,
how should issue areas be disaggregated and assigned? Can they use the fruits of
dispute resolution literature to \u8220\'3fhardwire\u8221\'3f the institution in
ways that will maximize its chances for peacefully resolving disputes?
\par
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}
}
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A situation such as this was faced by the United Nations negotiators and parties to
the December 2001 Bonn Conference that sought to bring an end to years of civil war
in Afghanistan. Though a cease-fire had been achieved, the political situation
remained fragile. The task of the participants was thus not only to negotiate a
settlement to the conflict, but to create an institutional set-up that would allow
the various factions to work together in the future. The dispute resolution
literature would no doubt have been able to provide much advice to Ambassador
Lakhdar Brahimi, who chaired the talks, on negotiation strategies to arrive at a
settlement acceptable to all parties, but what advice was available on how best to
design the institutions that the settlement created to maximize the chances for
managing conflict in the future?
\par
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}
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The purpose of this article is to elaborate an answer to this question. It rests on
the premise that managing ongoing conflict peacefully is a task of many social
institutions, but that the prescriptions generated by the dispute resolution
literature have focused primarily on improving individual behavior. In Section I, I
present the case for adding an explicitly institutional focus to the prescriptive
agenda of dispute resolution scholarship. Institutions, after all, are an integral
part of modern life, and frequently managing conflict is an institution\rquote s
principal purpose and raison d\rquote etre. Public institutions, for example, exist
in large part to manage conflicts within political communities about the basic
issues of political, economic, and social life.
}
These institutions are vehicles for collective decision-making and problem
solving, where citizens or their representatives with different interests,
preferences, and ideals come together to agree on common solutions that allow them
to live together peacefully. In the modern, developed democracies, these
institutions take many forms: legislatures, administrative agencies, city councils,
and courts are all examples of attempts to create institutional responses to
ongoing social conflict. Other institutions-- business firms, for instance--may not
be created in response to such social conflict, but must nevertheless manage the
inevitable conflicts that emerge from the routine interactions between people
carrying out their tasks within the institutional setting. For these institutions
too, gleaning advice from the dispute resolution literature about how best to
design institutions
}
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*135
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to engender conflict-managing tendencies is valuable. But the literature remains
largely silent.
\par
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}
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The silence is not surprising because translating the findings of dispute
resolution and negotiation research into prescriptions for institutional design is
a challenging task. Section II confronts these challenges by first identifying five
key dimensions along which institutional design decisions are made, specifically
membership, scope of jurisdiction, centralization of activity, control over
decision-making, and flexibility. The second part of Section II then derives a set
of design principles along each dimension based on certain findings from the
literature. The principles are an attempt at contributing to a general theory of
institutional design and so provide broad guides to action rather than specific
design solutions.
}
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To demonstrate how these general principles might affect design decisions in a
concrete case, Section III applies the principles to the design of the
institutional settlement of post-Taliban Afghanistan as embedded in the Bonn
Agreement of 2001.
\par
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}
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Both in methodology and in result, the discussion is experimental and tentative: my
goal is to demonstrate what conflict management prescriptions aimed at institutions
could look like in the hope that it will launch a conversation which in turn will
elaborate and refine the principles. To this end, the paper ends with a series of
key questions that should guide further work in this area.
\par
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I. Institutions Matter
\par
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A. The Institutionalist Posture
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Scholars in several disciplines have increasingly turned their attention to the
role of institutions in modern life. This \u8220\'3fnew institutionalism\u8221\'3f
has attracted the attention of scholars in law,
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economics,
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*136
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political science,
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international relations,
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management,
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and sociology,
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among others. The central theme of this work--although diverse in its specifics--
has been, in short, that institutions matter: aggregations of individuals and
groups in formal and informal ways, bound by a set of regulations, norms, and
implicit understandings of the world, are a significant constituting social force,
affecting and being affected by individual behavior and the whole host of social
interactions spawning from that behavior. Thus, in describing social phenomena,
institutionalists insist that \u8220\'3frelatively enduring structures of human
conduct have shaped the existing arrays of resources, rules, and values instead of
taking that array as given\u8221\'3f
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and in advocating social change, they look to factors such as \u8220\'3fwhich
actors are engaged, what kinds of problems are debated, how those problems are
defined, and what kind of solutions are considered appropriate.\u8221\'3f
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\par
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In this way, the institutionalist perspective opens up a level of analysis between
the individual and society at large. It focuses on the way society is organized as
a point of leverage in understanding and changing social behavior. For dispute
resolution and conflict management scholars the opportunity is clear: creating
systematic approaches to the study of institutional behavior in managing conflict
in the same vein as the vast literature on individual behavior is a potentially
powerful avenue to transforming societal approaches to significant conflict.
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Peter Senge\rquote s analysis provides a lucid elaboration of the power of
institutionalist thinking and the potential it holds for improved conflict
management. He draws three lessons from the effort to uncover the influence of
broader systemic structures in human interactions. The first lesson is summarized
in the simple slogan that
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*137
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\u8220\'3fstructure influences behavior,\u8221\'3f
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meaning that different people tend to behave remarkably similarly when embedded in
the same structure of institutional relationships. Second, Senge notes that
\u8220\'3fstructure in human systems is subtle\u8221\'3f
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so that it incorporates not only explicit rules and organizing principles, but
also implicit values, norms and practices, as well as deep cognitive structures
that color the way that individuals see and interpret the world.
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Finally, Senge observes that leverage exists in learning to see and understand how
systemic structures affect the everyday behavior around us.
}
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{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F13294276119_ID0EPJ}{\*\bkmkend
co_footnoteReference_F13294276119_ID0EPJ}
13
}}}
}
Senge\rquote s three lessons are an apt summary of the fundamental
institutionalist posture that individual behavior is a result of more than simply
initial skills and endowments, and is shaped significantly by the institutional
structures in which actors are embedded. If this is indeed the case, then learning
how best to shape those structures to invite behavior that promotes healthy
conflict management presents a remarkable opportunity for large-scale change toward
more peaceful coexistence and collaboration.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b1
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0E2JAE_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0E2JAE_1}
B. Institutionalism and Dispute Resolution
\par
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EFKAE_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EFKAE_1}
The institutionalist project in dispute resolution is, of course, vast and of long
pedigree. In the context of legal disputes, alternate dispute resolution
(\u8220\'3fADR\u8221\'3f) has been focused on reforms to the structure of legal
institutions that incorporate the best understandings of legal conflicts to manage
them productively.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F14294276119_ID0EQK}{\*\bkmkend
co_footnoteReference_F14294276119_ID0EQK}
14
}}}
}
For instance, the call for a \u8220\'3fmulti-door courthouse\u8221\'3f is a now
familiar vision of legal institutions structured to triage legal disputes and
channel them to a form of resolution that is most appropriate to their character.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F15294276119_ID0EVK}{\*\bkmkend
co_footnoteReference_F15294276119_ID0EVK}
15
}}}
}
This is a classic example of robust institutional analysis and prescription. It
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf22 \f2 \b1
*138
}
}
begins with an insight from dispute resolution research--that conflicts vary in
their character along certain dimensions that suggest the best method of resolving
them--and translates it into an institutional implication, namely, to restructure
the court system to accommodate this variety in a systematic and deliberate
fashion. Since the institutionalist approach does not rely on changing the behavior
of individuals through personal training and education, it is able to have long-
term, sustained, and widespread impact in the way society organizes itself to
manage conflicts. It thus moves the analytic and prescriptive effort from personal
development to institutional inno- vation.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EMLAE_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EMLAE_1}
The dispute systems\rquote design literature has a similar institutional focus.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F16294276119_ID0EUL}{\*\bkmkend
co_footnoteReference_F16294276119_ID0EUL}
16
}}}
}
In some senses, much of this literature extends the ADR approach by applying it to
organizations outside of the legal system.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F17294276119_ID0EZL}{\*\bkmkend
co_footnoteReference_F17294276119_ID0EZL}
17
}}}
}
For instance, Constantino and Merchant develop a set of principles of design for
an ADR system in an organization based on findings of dispute research. One of
their principles, by way of example, is to \u8220\'3fallow disputants to maintain
control over the choice of ADR method and the selection of neutral\u8221\'3f
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F18294276119_ID0EIM}{\*\bkmkend
co_footnoteReference_F18294276119_ID0EIM}
18
}}}
}
and is based on the now common understanding that participant control over the
process of resolution is highly correlated with satisfaction with the eventual
outcome. Other dispute systems\rquote design efforts are based on intensive
empirical investigation of disputes in specific institutional contexts and suggest
a series of measures that an organization can take to resolve disputes more
effectively.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F19294276119_ID0EPM}{\*\bkmkend
co_footnoteReference_F19294276119_ID0EPM}
19
}}}
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EWMAE_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EWMAE_1}
This article seeks to build on this existing literature by addressing a broader
question of institutional design. Specifically, I am concerned not with how
institutions manage conflict per se, but rather with how they organize their work
to maximize the chances that actors will be able to work together productively to
address problems. It is not, therefore, a question principally of alternative
dispute resolution mechanisms applied to organizational conflict, although these
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf22 \f2 \b1
*139
}
}
methods will undoubtedly be useful. Rather, it is a broader inquiry into the
relationship between the substance of design decisions and conflict management. The
essence of institutional design is not about choosing from a portfolio of ADR
mechanisms, but is instead a process of identifying the purposes of the
institutions and then deciding on such issues as membership, jurisdiction, and
decision making processes that are most likely to help achieve those purposes. The
next section seeks to connect what we know about dispute resolution to these
essential questions.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \qc \b1
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EWNAE_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EWNAE_1}
II. Principles of Institutional Design to Improve Conflict Management
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b1
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EAOAE_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EAOAE_1}
A. A Framework for Design Principles
\par
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EKOAE_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EKOAE_1}
It is useful to begin with a short consideration of the notion of design that is so
central to the argument of this article. By \u8220\'3fdesign\u8221\'3f I have in
mind a process of shaping a given set of resources with a view to achieving
specified objectives. Design is, therefore, evaluated on the \u8220\'3fgoodness of
fit\u8221\'3f between the stated objectives and the results of the design.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F20294276119_ID0EYO}{\*\bkmkend
co_footnoteReference_F20294276119_ID0EYO}
20
}}}
}
On this interpretation, design has certain characteristics worth chronicling.
First, it is a deliberate and purposeful process: for something to occur by design
is for it to be a product of pragmatic calculation rather than serendipity or
chance. Here, our objective is managing social conflict and the resource at our
disposal is the capacity to shape the key characteristics of an institution.
Therefore, although institutions often grow and are shaped in organic and unplanned
ways as well as in a more deliberate manner, such organic processes would not be
considered design as understood here. Rather, design refers to the deliberate
manipulation of alternative arrangements along key institutional variables and
differing combinations across those variables to produce uniquely shaped
institutions to manage conflict.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0ENPAE_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0ENPAE_1}
Second, purposefulness of design suggests a certain quality of elegance and
ingenuity: it is not simply that the resources have been harnessed to meet an
objective, but that they have been marshaled with an economy and creativity that
render a solution uniquely or particularly well-suited to the task at hand.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F21294276119_ID0EVP}{\*\bkmkend
co_footnoteReference_F21294276119_ID0EVP}
21
}}}
}
The shaping of social
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf22 \f2 \b1
*140
}
}
institutions requires both rationality and imagination and the notion of design is
meant to capture both the necessary analysis and artistry.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EDQAE_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EDQAE_1}
To develop a set of principles based on this notion of design requires a framework
that identifies those key variables or constituent elements of institutions that
the designer can manipulate to shape an institution uniquely suited to managing
conflict. The literature in organizational sociology and management contains
several such frameworks, but many are too abstract to allow for obvious
translations into the practical decisions of institutional design. Scott, for
instance, develops a framework that disaggregates institutional characteristics
along three \u8220\'3fpillars\u8221\'3f: a regulatory pillar operating through the
coercive mechanisms of laws, rules, and regulations; a normative pillar, operating
through persuasive mechanisms of standards, professional obligations, and
expertise; and a cognitive pillar, operating through the tacit symbols and
cognitive structures through which we understand the world.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F22294276119_ID0ERQ}{\*\bkmkend
co_footnoteReference_F22294276119_ID0ERQ}
22
}}}
}
While Scott\rquote s analysis is elegantly comprehensive, it remains at a level of
generality that is too conceptual for prescriptive design purposes. Nor do other
more specific frameworks, such as Mintzberg\rquote s five elements of organization
structure (strategic apex, technostructure, support staff, middle line, and
operating core)
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F23294276119_ID0EXQ}{\*\bkmkend
co_footnoteReference_F23294276119_ID0EXQ}
23
}}}
}
or McKinsey\rquote s 7-S model (strategy, shared values, skills, structure,
systems, style, and staff)
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F24294276119_ID0E1Q}{\*\bkmkend
co_footnoteReference_F24294276119_ID0E1Q}
24
}}}
}
clearly lend themselves to actionable and discrete changes in the contours of an
institution\rquote s design.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EDRAE_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EDRAE_1}
Although not as comprehensive as these other frameworks, Koremenos et al. identify
five dimensions of institutional design that are useful for the purposes of
deriving principles of design because they are easily observable, lend themselves
to discrete design decisions, and have clear impacts on an institution\rquote s
behavior.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F25294276119_ID0ELR}{\*\bkmkend
co_footnoteReference_F25294276119_ID0ELR}
25
}}}
}
As such, the conflict management implications of each of the Koremenos\rquote
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf22 \f2 \b1
*141
}
}
dimensions can be interrogated separately, setting the stage for a series of
principles that cover many, although certainly not all, of the most important
choices faced by institutional designers. The five design variables are membership,
scope, centralization, control, and flexibility.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0E3RAE_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0E3RAE_1}
Membership refers to the number and identity of the institution\rquote s
constituent parts.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F26294276119_ID0EES}{\*\bkmkend
co_footnoteReference_F26294276119_ID0EES}
26
}}}
}
All institutions are an aggregation of individual elements-- sometimes those
elements are individual people, as in a business firm or a non-profit organization;
sometimes they are smaller groups of people, as in a university with a number of
schools and faculties; sometimes, they are larger groups, as in an international
organization whose membership consists of countries; and sometimes they are a mix
of individuals and groups as in the institution of the market economy. The choice
of \u8220\'3fwho\rquote s in and who\rquote s out\u8221\'3f is a significant design
feature and has important implications for an institution\rquote s effectiveness
and behavior.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EQSAE_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EQSAE_1}
Scope, like membership, is a boundary-defining institutional feature, answering the
question of \u8220\'3fwhat?\u8221\'3f rather than \u8220\'3fwho?\u8221\'3f
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F27294276119_ID0EYS}{\*\bkmkend
co_footnoteReference_F27294276119_ID0EYS}
27
}}}
}
Specifically, the element of scope refers to the jurisdiction or area of concern
of the institution. Scope can be defined in two dimensions: on the one hand, an
institution will have jurisdiction over a set of substantive issues
(\u8220\'3fbreadth\u8221\'3f), and on the other hand, it will be bounded by what it
can do in relation to those activities (\u8220\'3fdepth\u8221\'3f). The U.S.
federal courts, for instance, have jurisdiction over a very wide variety of issues,
but can only act to decide \u8220\'3fcases or controversies\u8221\'3f in relation
to them. Similarly, a business may confine its activities to a certain area of
commerce--high-technology or retail merchandising, for example--but as a private
business entity can only do certain types of things--buying and selling products,
or manufacturing goods for instance, but not issuing public regulations in that
area or even unlawfully colluding with competitors.
}
These boundaries can be a result of preference, expedience, technical necessity,
or cognitive association.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F28294276119_ID0EIT}{\*\bkmkend
co_footnoteReference_F28294276119_ID0EIT}
28
}}}
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EPTAE_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EPTAE_1}
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf22 \f2 \b1
*142
}
}
The third variable, centralization, refers to where activities take place in the
institution.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F29294276119_ID0E2T}{\*\bkmkend
co_footnoteReference_F29294276119_ID0E2T}
29
}}}
}
Institutions that are relatively centralized tend to coordinate activities by
delegating them to a single subset within the institution, often prohibiting others
from engaging in them. In the International Monetary Fund
(\u8220\'3fIMF\u8221\'3f), for instance, information collection and dissemination
about individual members\rquote balance of payments is centralized in the IMF
secretariat so that individual members do not have to duplicate efforts to gather
this information from each other; similarly unions centralize the activity of
bargaining with employers in the hands of union leadership. Relatively
decentralized institutions, on the other hand, allow activities to take place by
individual members. The market economy is a paradigmatic example of decentralized
activity, where any individual is permitted to engage in economic transactions.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0ENUAE_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0ENUAE_1}
The fourth design variable concerns where control over decision-making lies in the
institution.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F30294276119_ID0EVU}{\*\bkmkend
co_footnoteReference_F30294276119_ID0EVU}
30
}}}
}
It could rest in the hands of one member, all members, a subset of members, or
even a third-party representing the institution as a whole or another institution
altogether. The control variable is often embedded in the institution\rquote s
decision rules and voting procedures. In business firms, control often formally
rests with the CEO and the Board of Directors, but in practice may actually rest
with a smaller or larger group of executives and other managers. Control over
decisions made by the United Nations Security Council are heavily weighted in favor
of the permanent members because of their veto; in the General Assembly,
conversely, all member states have equal votes.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EHVAE_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EHVAE_1}
Finally, flexibility as a variable points to the way in which the institution
allows for change.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F31294276119_ID0EPV}{\*\bkmkend
co_footnoteReference_F31294276119_ID0EPV}
31
}}}
}
Circumstances may change, the preferences or needs of its members may change, or
the purposes for which the institution was created may have been achieved or become
irrelevant. Two broad types of flexibility are possible: some maintain the existing
institutional framework and create exceptions for exigencies, such as escape
clauses or opportunities to withdraw as a member, and others create opportunities
for the institutional structure itself to be re-conceived, such as sunset
provisions and manda- tory reviews.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F32294276119_ID0EWV}{\*\bkmkend
co_footnoteReference_F32294276119_ID0EWV}
32
}}}
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0E4VAE_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0E4VAE_1}
Taken together, these five variables provide a sufficiently broad picture of
institutional variation to allow a preliminary investigation
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf22 \f2 \b1
*143
}
}
into how they might be specifically manipulated to manage conflict more
productively in light of the results of dispute resolution research. The next
section develops a series of principles to guide the process of design when
institutions have conflict management as their social objective, using the five
variables of membership, scope, centralization, control, and flexibility as the raw
material for the effort.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b1
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0ERWAE_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0ERWAE_1}
B. Developing Design Principles
\par
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0E2WAE_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0E2WAE_1}
Along each of these five variables of institutional design, the dispute resolution
literature suggests particular principles that would enhance the problem solving
and conflict management character of an institution. In this section, I suggest
specific principles for each of the five variables based on dispute resolution
findings.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EKXAE_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EKXAE_1}
Membership. Perhaps the most important insight of dispute resolution literature,
implicit in almost the entire corpus, is that resolving conflict in a truly
sustainable way requires talking to each other in a fashion that reveals our mutual
interests and allows us to find joint solutions to problems.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F33294276119_ID0ESX}{\*\bkmkend
co_footnoteReference_F33294276119_ID0ESX}
33
}}}
}
The implication is that in order for disputes to be resolved, all parties must be
engaged in the process. The membership principle of design can thus be summarized
in an intuitive but nonetheless important way:
\par
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
Principle 1: Institutions should strive for inclusiveness by incorporating into
their structure all stakeholders likely to be affected by the institution\rquote s
work.
\par
}
}
}
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0ENYAE_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0ENYAE_1}
All other things equal, for an institution to solve problems robustly, it must
possess an institutional capacity for involving all stakeholders in its structures.
Several reasons for this principle emerge from the literature. First, one
institutional implication of the prescription to focus on interests rather than
positions is that parties must be willing to exchange information for the purposes
of revealing and discovering each other\rquote s interests. Though it is possible
to attempt to divine other parties\rquote interests in their absence, few
mechanisms will be as effective or efficient as direct engagement.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0ECZAE_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0ECZAE_1}
Second, legitimacy of outcomes in any process of conflict management often turns on
the involvement of all parties. Indeed, sometimes, even when parties may be
incompletely satisfied with a particular decision, the opportunity to be involved
can be a powerful
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf22 \f2 \b1
*144
}
}
factor mitigating disenchantment.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F34294276119_ID0ESZ}{\*\bkmkend
co_footnoteReference_F34294276119_ID0ESZ}
34
}}}
}
Moreover, to the extent that agreements require ongoing support and collaboration
from parties, involvement in processes of conflict resolution is often essential.
Often, the very involvement of parties in a process can moderate their stance
toward an agreement to which they otherwise may be hostile.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F35294276119_ID0EZZ}{\*\bkmkend
co_footnoteReference_F35294276119_ID0EZZ}
35
}}}
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EA1AE_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EA1AE_1}
Finally, the principle of inclusiveness can combat some cognitive and psychological
barriers to negotiation. Psychological literature has demonstrated convincingly,
for instance, the existence of significant egocentrism as a barrier to resolution
of conflict.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F36294276119_ID0EL1}{\*\bkmkend
co_footnoteReference_F36294276119_ID0EL1}
36
}}}
}
An important expression of egocentrism as a cognitive bias in negotiations is that
individuals tend to overvalue interpretations of fairness that favor themselves.
This self-serving interpretation is not motivated by crass self-interest; on the
contrary, what makes it an important barrier to resolving conflict is that it is
motivated by a genuine desire to act and appear fair. For instance, negotiators
exhibit a tendency to recall facts that favor themselves while systematically de-
emphasizing or forgetting facts that favor opponents. This is a cognitive bias
rather than a willful omission: all parties sincerely believe they are being fair,
even though each has unwittingly defined fairness in particularly self-serving
ways. This posture, in addition to reducing or eliminating any zone of possible
agreement, breeds mistrust, ill will, and bad faith between the parties. The result
is exacerbated conflict rather than collaborative problem solving.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F37294276119_ID0E51}{\*\bkmkend
co_footnoteReference_F37294276119_ID0E51}
37
}}}
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EF2AE_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EF2AE_1}
Because the finding is one of a systematic cognitive bias of individuals,
institutions can expect that individual actors encompassed
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf22 \f2 \b1
*145
}
}
within the institutional ambit will exhibit this characteristic. An institution
designed for better problem solving should attempt, through its design, to mitigate
the effects of this egocentrism as it relates to resolving conflict. The literature
suggests that improving communication between parties such that gaps between
notions of fairness held by different parties are narrowed during the process of
negotiation can powerfully mitigate egocentrism.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F38294276119_ID0EY2}{\*\bkmkend
co_footnoteReference_F38294276119_ID0EY2}
38
}}}
}
Communication, of course, requires the presence of parties, reinforcing the
importance of an institutional design principle that emphasizes inclusion.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EB3AE_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EB3AE_1}
A principle of inclusiveness such as this one raises two caveats which apply, with
more or less force, to all the principles. First, it underlines the nature of the
relationship between the principles and actual design solutions in specific cases.
The principles, because they aim to be general, can only aim to provide a guide and
general direction that express in institutional terms certain ideas about how best
to manage conflict. To say that all stakeholders must be included says nothing
about how they should be included, except that involvement must, of course, be
meaningful. When stakeholders are multiple and have varying degrees of interest, or
when they are fluid and change over time and vary with issues and problems,
institutional designers will need to create mechanisms for appropriate involvement.
The principle of inclusiveness, then, is not one of equal inclusiveness or
continuous inclusiveness; rather, it is the institutional implication of the need
to uncover parties\rquote underlying interests, confer legitimacy on outcomes, and
combat cognitive biases. Thus, each principle is capacious: there is plenty of room
within each principle for a broad portfolio of specific solutions. The application
of the principles in Section III illustrates this point more concretely.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EC4AE_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EC4AE_1}
Second, the principle of inclusiveness is, as all the principles will prove to be,
inherently self-limiting. A tension exists between the full application of the
principle and the complexity that would be its consequence. If all possible
constituents were included in every institution, for example, it is quite possible
that the resulting complexity of the conversations would quickly overwhelm the
capacity of individual members and the institution as a whole to solve problems
productively. This complexity limitation is a feature of all the principles and
reinforces the idea of design as some combination of analysis and artistry: a
certain measure of ingenuity is required to translate the principle into a response
to a specific context. In the case of the membership principle, one can imagine a
broad repertoire of alternative
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf22 \f2 \b1
*146
}
}
forms of membership. At the United Nations, for instance, different states have a
different involvement in the work of the institution, even though all are members.
All states are members of the General Assembly, five states have permanent
memberships on the Security Council with veto power, and then other states have a
temporary and rotating non-veto membership on the Security Council.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F39294276119_ID0EA5}{\*\bkmkend
co_footnoteReference_F39294276119_ID0EA5}
39
}}}
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EH5AE_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EH5AE_1}
Scope. The question of the jurisdiction of an institution, and of internal
institutional components, implicates several dispute resolution insights. With
respect to the first dimension of an institution\rquote s scope--the breadth of
issue coverage--an institutional design principle could be formulated as follows:
\par
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
Principle 2: Institutions should seek broad coverage of many related issues of
interest to the institutional membership rather than being limited to a specific or
narrow issue area.
\par
}
}
}
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EF6AE_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EF6AE_1}
The support for this principle rests on two dispute resolution findings. The first
finding suggests that the simultaneous presence of many issues on the table
enlarges the zone of possible agreement by creating possibilities for value-
creating trades.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F40294276119_ID0EQ6}{\*\bkmkend
co_footnoteReference_F40294276119_ID0EQ6}
40
}}}
}
The intuition behind the insight is simple to elaborate: when negotiations focus
on a single issue, it is more likely that impasse will occur because interests may
be diametrically opposed on that issue. However, fulfilling parties\rquote
interests on other issues may induce them to accept a lower level of satisfaction
on the initial issues.
}
In other words, single-issue negotiations create more possibilities for winners
and losers than do multi-issue ones: \u8220\'3fsingle-issue protocols may prove
non-negotiable unless they can be combined with agreements on other issues that
offset the losses (or at least seem to distribute them fairly). A package deal may
offer the possibility of \u8216\'3ftrading\u8217\'3f across issues for joint gain--
thus breaking impasses resulting from treating issues separately.\u8221\'3f
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F41294276119_ID0EHA}{\*\bkmkend
co_footnoteReference_F41294276119_ID0EHA}
41
}}}
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EOAAG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EOAAG_1}
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf22 \f2 \b1
*147
}
}
Moreover, the psychological literature on egocentrism suggests that another way of
mitigating self-serving interpretations of fairness is to reduce or eliminate the
potential for asymmetrical payoffs in negotiated outcomes.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F42294276119_ID0E1A}{\*\bkmkend
co_footnoteReference_F42294276119_ID0E1A}
42
}}}
}
\u8220\'3fWhen . . . parties face identical payoffs, they tend to share common
perceptions of fairness; when payoffs are varied among . . . parties, perceptions
of fairness are divergent.\u8221\'3f
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F43294276119_ID0EIB}{\*\bkmkend
co_footnoteReference_F43294276119_ID0EIB}
43
}}}
}
One institutional implication of the benefits of avoiding asymmetric outcomes is
to create multiple opportunities for mutual benefit by expanding the scope of an
institution\rquote s mandate such that there is continually room to compensate
losers on one issue with gains on another issue. The knowledge that trades are
structurally available across a number of issues can reduce the asymmetry of
outcomes of any particular negotiation, thus decreasing actors\rquote
susceptibility to self-serving interpretations of fairness.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EUBAG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EUBAG_1}
Presumably, the same rationale holds for the second dimension of an
institution\rquote s scope, namely the depth or latitude to act within a particular
issue area. The parallel principle may be articulated as follows:
\par
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
Principle 3: Institutions should seek depth of jurisdiction on individual issues
areas such that they are empowered to take many kinds of action on issues within
their mandate.
\par
}
}
}
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0ESCAG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0ESCAG_1}
Building on the same insights, actors within institutions of deep jurisdiction
would be able to craft deals that took into account satisfactorily more interests
of more parties.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0E5CAG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0E5CAG_1}
The complexity limitation is present here as with all the principles: as the scope
of jurisdiction becomes broader, the institution\rquote s cognitive and procedural
capacity to deal with the sheer number of possible value creating trades, and the
implications for each for different parties and interests, becomes severely
strained. As a practical matter of institutional management, therefore, the full
application of the principle hinges on the ability to develop methods of dealing
with broad grants of jurisdiction. Moreover, other limits are likely to present
themselves, including the political sensitivities--associated principally with
public institutions--of charging any one political institution with too sweeping a
role in social and economic life.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EQDAG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EQDAG_1}
Centralization. The issue of centralization of activity is more complicated because
it only makes sense to speak of centralization in
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf22 \f2 \b1
*148
}
}
terms of particular functions that the institution performs. Accordingly, one can
imagine that appropriate design principles concerning centralization would vary
depending upon exactly what function was being considered. Again, while this
discussion cannot be exhaustive in canvassing all functions, some discrete
institutional functions are of particular importance to the practice of dispute
resolution and problem solving and can be considered.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EHEAG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EHEAG_1}
An important element of any dispute resolution process is gathering relevant facts
and information about the problems to be discussed and debated. A design principle
may be stated as follows:
\par
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
Principle 4: Institutions should seek to build central sources of information
gathering and dissemination.
\par
}
}
}
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EFFAG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EFFAG_1}
The importance of developing a common basis of information and facts as a
prerequisite to managing conflicts and solving problems is widely accepted. In the
first instance, a common basis of information avoids \u8220\'3fneedless arguments
about basic facts.\u8221\'3f
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F44294276119_ID0EQF}{\*\bkmkend
co_footnoteReference_F44294276119_ID0EQF}
44
}}}
}
It is thus a common technique to form joint fact-finding groups in many complex
disputes; joint fact-finding has the characteristic of involving all parties to
gather all relevant information in a centralized way as a mechanism of developing
this common fact base.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F45294276119_ID0EVF}{\*\bkmkend
co_footnoteReference_F45294276119_ID0EVF}
45
}}}
}
The centralization of the information gathering function has more than an
efficiency benefit by reducing duplication; from a dispute resolution perspective,
this technique holds benefits that include improving the credibility of ultimate
agreements based on this common fact-base, inspiring more creative agreements,
strengthening the durability of agreements, and improving commitment to reaching an
agreement.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F46294276119_ID0EZF}{\*\bkmkend
co_footnoteReference_F46294276119_ID0EZF}
46
}}}
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EAGAG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EAGAG_1}
Moreover, information asymmetry has been found to be a common barrier to resolving
conflict between parties.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F47294276119_ID0EIG}{\*\bkmkend
co_footnoteReference_F47294276119_ID0EIG}
47
}}}
}
Often opposing parties in a negotiation will hold different assessments of the
likely
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf22 \f2 \b1
*149
}
}
costs and benefits of not reaching an agreement based on different sets of
information about alternatives. To the extent that these differences can be bridged
with a common set of information, agreement becomes more likely. Every negotiation
occurs in the shadow of the consequences of a failure to reach an agreement.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F48294276119_ID0EYG}{\*\bkmkend
co_footnoteReference_F48294276119_ID0EYG}
48
}}}
}
When information about those consequences differs among the parties to a
negotiation, agreement is less likely because some parties will see a particular
negotiated outcome as desirable given their information about the consequences of
not agreeing, and other parties will find it undesirable given their different
information about those consequences. Establishing a common understanding of
consequences based on common information allows all parties to assess the
consequences of a failure to reach agreement in a similar way, thus promoting
agreement.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EEHAG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EEHAG_1}
Centralizing information collection and dissemination also allows for the
development of specialized institutional capacity. A great many barriers to
resolving conflict entail the tension between revealing sufficient information to
allow for creative, value-enhancing arrangements while still guarding against
exploitation by the other side. Generating creative techniques of inviting the
disclosure of appropriate information in mutually beneficial ways is a skill that
can be developed over time and through experience that can significantly enhance
the prospects of efficient and effective dispute resolution.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F49294276119_ID0ESH}{\*\bkmkend
co_footnoteReference_F49294276119_ID0ESH}
49
}}}
}
In addition to developing new techniques to generate better information flow
between parties, central information functions could gather and report information
that parties themselves may not think of, but can nonetheless facilitate agreement.
For instance, Raiffa complains that parties often do not spend sufficient time
collect- ing information about the uncertainties associated with the decision to
negotiate itself, resulting in sub-optimal behavior.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F50294276119_ID0E1H}{\*\bkmkend
co_footnoteReference_F50294276119_ID0E1H}
50
}}}
}
Moreover, developing pre-negotiation briefing reports or conflict
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf22 \f2 \b1
*150
}
}
assessments can likewise facilitate more efficient and effective negotiation.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F51294276119_ID0EDI}{\*\bkmkend
co_footnoteReference_F51294276119_ID0EDI}
51
}}}
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EKIAG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EKIAG_1}
Finally, central information functions hold the prospect for alleviating some
psychological barriers to conflict resolution, specifically the phenomenon of
reactive devaluation. Reactive devaluation describes the process by which a party
evaluates specific package deals and compromises less favorably as a consequence of
the knowledge that they have actually been offered, especially if the offers have
been made by an adversarial party.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F52294276119_ID0EVI}{\*\bkmkend
co_footnoteReference_F52294276119_ID0EVI}
52
}}}
}
The dispute resolution problem is obvious: a concession, even if genuinely made by
an opposing party, is immediately discounted by the other party in the negotiation,
thus narrowing rather than enhancing any zone of possible agreement. Central
information functions can serve to combat reactive devaluation in two ways. First,
to the extent that concessions can be \u8220\'3flaundered\u8221\'3f through a
central information function and disseminated to all parties, reactive devaluation
can be lessened. Second, a strategy of grounding offers in specific interests or
preferences elicited from the other party prior to making the offer can also dampen
the effect of reactive devaluation.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F53294276119_ID0ECJ}{\*\bkmkend
co_footnoteReference_F53294276119_ID0ECJ}
53
}}}
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EJJAG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EJJAG_1}
Another activity that is amenable to the centralization variable is informal
discussions and conversations among various institutional members. A principle
would be:
\par
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
Principle 5: Institutions should decentralize and proliferate discussions and
conversations among institutional members in multiple forums and forms.
\par
}
}
}
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EHKAG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EHKAG_1}
Whatever formal institutional mechanisms for arriving at decisions and agreements
exist, the function of exploratory conversations, discussions, and meetings should
be left to institutional sub-units and members to engage in freely and frequently.
Having articulated it thus, it sounds almost obvious, but it is a common fact of
institutional life that the only forums for interaction among some members and
units are formal and central.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EWKAG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EWKAG_1}
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf22 \f2 \b1
*151
}
}
Proliferating discussions among members as a regular feature of institutional life
has many important advantages that create robust conditions for conflict
management. First, regular communications across many forums build relationships
between members that are a resource for conflict management and dispute resolution.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F54294276119_ID0EFL}{\*\bkmkend
co_footnoteReference_F54294276119_ID0EFL}
54
}}}
}
Second, as a technique for resolving disputes, informal discussion among
participants outside of the context of formal negotiations has broad support and
application. It can be used to allow parties to gather information, generate
creative options and approaches to agreement, develop an understanding of what
issues are most contentious, and build coalitions.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F55294276119_ID0ENL}{\*\bkmkend
co_footnoteReference_F55294276119_ID0ENL}
55
}}}
}
The focus on creating opportunities for building coalitions is a frequent theme in
the literature on designing multi-party negotiations.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F56294276119_ID0ESL}{\*\bkmkend
co_footnoteReference_F56294276119_ID0ESL}
56
}}}
}
The theory is that allowing coalitions to be formed early on facilitates
conversations among smaller groups as more formal discussions commence. Moreover,
decentralizing conversations may also allow for new and \u8220\'3fcross-
cutting\u8221\'3f coalitions to emerge, ones that transcend typical coalition lines
and foster broader support for agreement.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F57294276119_ID0EZL}{\*\bkmkend
co_footnoteReference_F57294276119_ID0EZL}
57
}}}
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EAMAG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EAMAG_1}
Decentralized discussion forums are also a reasonable institutional implication of
insights from much ethnic conflict management literature. Research indicates that
it is a critical component of preventing violent conflict that the grievances and
issues of minority communities be raised and addressed as early as possible.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F58294276119_ID0ELM}{\*\bkmkend
co_footnoteReference_F58294276119_ID0ELM}
58
}}}
}
\u8220\'3fEthnic conflict usually begins with limited protests and clashes that
only gradually escalate into serious violence. Government responses in the early
stages are critical in whether and how escalation occurs.\u8221\'3f
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F59294276119_ID0E3M}{\*\bkmkend
co_footnoteReference_F59294276119_ID0E3M}
59
}}}
}
Decentralized discussions over a broad range of issues and with diverse
institutional members as an ongoing feature of institutional life hold the prospect
for many grievances and issues to be aired, even when only in embryonic form.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EFNAG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EFNAG_1}
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf22 \f2 \b1
*152
}
}
Moreover, especially when conflicts are widespread--such as in societies embroiled
in ethnic conflict--broad societal engagement in the ongoing processes of conflict
management is an important ingredient for preventing violence and successfully
resolving disputes.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F60294276119_ID0ERN}{\*\bkmkend
co_footnoteReference_F60294276119_ID0ERN}
60
}}}
}
This idea underlines that broad-based, decentralized conversations among
institutional members are significant institutional contributions to conflict
management.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0E1NAG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0E1NAG_1}
Control. In the same way that centralization is only pertinent in the context of
particular functions, perhaps as well, control over decision-making is only
usefully discussed in the context of particular decisions. Nonetheless, as a matter
of conflict management, since ultimate decisions seem to be such an integral part
of the overall process of dispute resolution, some general institutional principles
can be suggested for how best decision-making ought to be structured.
\par
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
Principle 6: Institutions should vest control over decisions in those most
interested and affected by them.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0ETOAG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0ETOAG_1}
This principle rests on the common intuition that decisions imposed by those who
will not be affected by them possess an illegitimate quality that frequently makes
them unacceptable as solutions to disputes. Though in any one circumstance
decisions of this nature may be acceptable, if they are a systematic fact of
institutional life, conflicts cannot be sustainably managed within the institution.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0ECPAG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0ECPAG_1}
The intuition plays out in other arenas of conflict management. The first is the
experience of federalism and power-sharing arrangements to provide robust
institutional solutions to ethnic conflict.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F61294276119_ID0ENP}{\*\bkmkend
co_footnoteReference_F61294276119_ID0ENP}
61
}}}
}
Where strong institutional structures that devolve control over key decisions to
those that are most affected exist, conflict has been managed within the
institutional structures, rather than leading to violence.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F62294276119_ID0ESP}{\*\bkmkend
co_footnoteReference_F62294276119_ID0ESP}
62
}}}
}
It bears repeating that the principle does not dictate a particular form of power
sharing or local control. Instead, the principle suggests a justification for a
repertoire of different possible ways of sharing power that are most suited to the
institution\rquote s work. Federalism, to take one example, can be manifested in a
virtually infinite
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf22 \f2 \b1
*153
}
}
variety of different structures,
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F63294276119_ID0EAQ}{\*\bkmkend
co_footnoteReference_F63294276119_ID0EAQ}
63
}}}
}
and should be designed with an eye to the situation at hand.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EJQAG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EJQAG_1}
Another example is apparent in the area of dispute systems\rquote design.
Constantino and Merchant, for example, describe an analogous principle of design in
constructing dispute systems within organizations, namely, that disputants maintain
control over the choice of ADR process and the selection of a neutral.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F64294276119_ID0EUQ}{\*\bkmkend
co_footnoteReference_F64294276119_ID0EUQ}
64
}}}
}
In the field of public disputes as well, Susskind and others have persuasively
argued that public distributional conflicts should be removed from the normal
institutions of representative government and put directly in the hands of those
who will be most affected and interested in the decision so that they can come to
consensus.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F65294276119_ID0EYQ}{\*\bkmkend
co_footnoteReference_F65294276119_ID0EYQ}
65
}}}
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0E6QAG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0E6QAG_1}
In addition to these broadly recognized legitimacy benefits of sharing control over
decision-making, two effects suggest that significant technical benefits emerge
from the principle as well. First, some research has shown that many problems are
better solved in the context of devolved control because of the possibility for
experimentation within the institution, the results of which can be shared and
adopted by the institution as a whole.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F66294276119_ID0EKR}{\*\bkmkend
co_footnoteReference_F66294276119_ID0EKR}
66
}}}
}
Second, we would expect better solutions to emerge from difficult conflicts where
decisions could be taken by those most familiar with the interests and preferences
of the parties involved in the dispute. As a matter of institutional design,
delegating decision-making power to interested parties seems to harness the
interest-based lessons of all modern negotiation theory in the service of creating
environments more conducive to problem solving.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EWRAG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EWRAG_1}
To be sure, it may be the case that in some instances devolution of power
exacerbates rather than alleviates conflict within an institution. Greater conflict
could emerge from one of two sources. First, it
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf22 \f2 \b1
*154
}
}
could be that proliferating decision-making units within an institution would
create opposing and overlapping decisions that generated conflicts between units.
Indeed, one could make a similar argument that being inclusive of membership in the
institution will increase conflict because more members will be present. However,
we are not interested simply in some raw measure of the quantity of conflicts, but
are concerned rather with the capacity to manage them sustainably over time.
Excluding essential members or concentrating decision-making control may create the
appearance of less conflict, but over time, it simply moves conflict outside of
institutional barriers making sustained settlements less likely or suppressing
conflict for the present, only to have it reappear with increased intensity in the
future.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EWSAG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EWSAG_1}
Second, it could be the case that devolution creates a situation where individual
decision-making units, in optimizing for their own issues, compromise the
performance of the institution as a whole, thus creating
\u8220\'3fvertical\u8221\'3f conflicts. While this is an important caution, the
problem of coordinating institutional units can be addressed through the form of
devolution and the establishment of appropriate boundaries for decision-making
given the interests and priorities of the institution as a whole. Indeed,
coordinating organic, highly devolved, and fluid institutional forms has been the
subject of a great deal of organizational theory and practice.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F67294276119_ID0EET}{\*\bkmkend
co_footnoteReference_F67294276119_ID0EET}
67
}}}
}
Many of these vertical conflicts can thus be overcome by imaginative institutional
forms that alleviate the tensions between the conflict management aspirations
suggested by the principles and the practical imperatives of institutional
management.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0ENTAG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0ENTAG_1}
Flexibility. How institutions change and evolve over time is an important feature
of their design, and suggests that design is ongoing rather than definitively
concluded at a point in time. A principle might be as follows:
\par
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
Principle 7: Institutions should embed opportunities for regular review of
principal design decisions in order to integrate learning from experience.
\par
}
}
}
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0ELUAG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0ELUAG_1}
Institutions are complex systems of interacting people, processes, and structures,
and the outcome of those interactions is not always
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf22 \f2 \b1
*155
}
}
predictable and is frequently surprising. A process of design that casts in stone
an institutional structure, rendering it impervious to change based on experience,
new information, and evolving understanding would run counter to this fundamental
fact. This principle of flexibility suggests an alternative posture, one that is
based on creating a capacity for learning and evolutionary change in institutional
structures.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F68294276119_ID0E4U}{\*\bkmkend
co_footnoteReference_F68294276119_ID0E4U}
68
}}}
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EEVAG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EEVAG_1}
It is a common finding of the dispute resolution literature that openness to
changing circumstances is an important part of creative problem solving and
conflict management. From one perspective, many dispute resolvers see the
negotiation itself as process of personal transformation and learning, where each
side is educated about the other side\rquote s interests and ideals leading to
collaboration to develop a joint solution.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F69294276119_ID0EPV}{\*\bkmkend
co_footnoteReference_F69294276119_ID0EPV}
69
}}}
}
Moreover, the field itself has recognized that in focusing on the actual practice
of dispute resolution in real human contexts, \u8220\'3fan unending openness to
both skepticism and new ideas\u8221\'3f is essential to continually improving both
theory and practice.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F70294276119_ID0E3V}{\*\bkmkend
co_footnoteReference_F70294276119_ID0E3V}
70
}}}
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EDWAG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EDWAG_1}
In addition, several dispute resolution techniques emphasize the benefits of
creating opportunities for revision of settlements after formal negotiations are
concluded. Raiffa, for example, has pioneered the idea of the \u8220\'3fpost-
settlement settlement\u8221\'3f and others have recognized the power of creating
opportunities for revision into the future to create value and improve deals.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F71294276119_ID0EOW}{\*\bkmkend
co_footnoteReference_F71294276119_ID0EOW}
71
}}}
}
Resolving disputes with the knowledge that opportunities will exist to correct
failures, respond to uncertainties, and incorporate experience may also create a
willingness among parties to try solutions that otherwise would be too risky. In
this sense, it is also an institutional implication of the imperative to create
value from differences in predictions about the future or confidence in the
effectiveness of particular responses to problems.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F72294276119_ID0EVW}{\*\bkmkend
co_footnoteReference_F72294276119_ID0EVW}
72
}}}
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0E3WAG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0E3WAG_1}
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf22 \f2 \b1
*156
}
}
Finally, the principle of openness to changing fundamental design decisions in the
face of new information and experience also pays respect to fundamental commitments
to the ideas of inclusiveness and party control articulated in previous principles.
In this sense, developing institutional frameworks that ensure their own revision
and evolution through clear opportunities for institutional members to be involved
in continual redesign recognizes that design and re-design are simply extensions of
the same process.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \qc \b1
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EPXAG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EPXAG_1}
* * *
\par
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
Thus, the marriage of five variables with insights from the dispute resolution
literature has yielded seven preliminary principles for the design of institutions
faced with managing conflict. Table 1, below, summarizes them in preparation for
their elaboration in the context of a particular case.
\par
}
}
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \qc \b1
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EJYAG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EJYAG_1}
Table 1: Summary of Design Principles
\par
}
}
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{\*\bkmkstart co_anchor_tbl5_1}{\*\bkmkend co_anchor_tbl5_1}{
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\cellx4160
\clpadt20 \clpadft3 \clpadr20 \clpadfr3 \clbrdrt \clbrdrr \trql \clvertalt
\cellx10080
\intbl
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{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_g_ID0EKOAE_1" }{\fldrslt
Variable
}\i0 \fs20 \sa0 \cf5 \ul0 \f2 \strike0 \b0 \sb0 }}
}\i0 \ri50 \fs20 \ql \cf1 \f2 \li50 \b0 \intbl \cell \intbl
{\ri50 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li50 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_g_ID0EKOAE_1" }{\fldrslt
Principle
}\i0 \ri50 \fs20 \ql \cf1 \f2 \li50 \b0 \intbl \cell \row }
\clpadt20 \clpadft3 \clpadr20 \clpadfr3 \clbrdrl \trql \clvertalt \cellx4160
\clpadt20 \clpadft3 \clpadr20 \clpadfr3 \clbrdrr \trql \clvertalt \cellx10080
\intbl
{\ri50 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li50 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_g_ID0EWMAE_1" }{\fldrslt
Membership
{\ri50 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li50 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_g_ID0EWMAE_1" }{\fldrslt
Principle 1: Institutions should strive for inclusiveness by incorporating into
their structure all stakeholders likely to be affected by the institution\rquote s
work.
\intbl
{\ri50 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li50 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_g_ID0EDRAE_1" }{\fldrslt
Scope
{\ri50 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li50 \b0
Principle 2: Institutions should seek broad coverage of many related issues of
interest to the institutional membership rather than being limited to a specific or
narrow issue area. Principle 3: Institutions should seek depth of jurisdiction on
individual issues areas such that they are empowered to take many kinds of action
on issues within their mandate.
\intbl
{\ri50 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li50 \b0
Centralization
{\ri50 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li50 \b0
Principle 4: Institutions should seek to build central sources of information
gathering and dissemination. Principle 5: Institutions should decentralize and
proliferate discussions and conversations among institutional members in multiple
forums and forms.
\intbl
{\ri50 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li50 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_g_ID0EMLAE_1" }{\fldrslt
Control
{\ri50 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li50 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_g_ID0EMLAE_1" }{\fldrslt
Principle 6: Institutions should vest control over decisions in those most
interested and affected by them.
\clpadt20 \clpadft3 \clpadr20 \clpadfr3 \clbrdrb \clbrdrl \trql \clvertalt
\cellx4160
\clpadt20 \clpadft3 \clpadr20 \clpadfr3 \clbrdrb \clbrdrr \trql \clvertalt
\cellx10080
\intbl
{\ri50 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li50 \b0
Flexibility
{\ri50 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li50 \b0
Principle 7: Institutions should embed opportunities for regular review of
principal design decisions in order to integrate learning from experience.
}\i0 \ri50 \fs20 \ql \cf1 \f2 \li50 \b0 \intbl \cell \row }}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \qc \b1
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EP2AG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EP2AG_1}
III. Institutional Design of the Interim Administration in Post-Taliban Afghanistan
\par
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EZ2AG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EZ2AG_1}
Having described a set of principles of institutional design that would create an
organizational arrangement structurally biased toward managing conflict, in this
section I turn to elaborating the principles in the context of a concrete
situation. My aim here is a precise one: I hope to fill in the content of the
principles more fully by providing an example of what they may look like when
applied in the context of a specific moment of institutional design. I cannot claim
to offer proof of their efficacy; that is the task of detailed empirical analysis
with clear methodologies for establishing causality, well beyond the scope of this
preliminary foray into developing principles.
}
What the example can offer, however, is a fuller illustration of what the above
principles might mean in practice, what guidance they might offer to institutional
designers, and how they might change conventional or intuitive approaches.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EO3AG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EO3AG_1}
Post-Taliban Afghanistan seems an appropriate case for several reasons. First, its
salience as a conflict management challenge is highlighted by its currency and the
political attention which it is receiving internationally. Moreover, it presents an
instance of the design of a de novo institutional arrangement with the explicit aim
of managing internal societal conflicts with the hopes of bringing peace. This
offers an ideal laboratory for the principles developed here. Finally, the actual
design is unusually accessible through the relatively
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf22 \f2 \b1
*157
}
}
short text of the Bonn Agreement, negotiated by the Special Representative of the
UN Secretary-General, Lakhdar Brahimi in December 2001.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F73294276119_ID0EG4}{\*\bkmkend
co_footnoteReference_F73294276119_ID0EG4}
73
}}}
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EN4AG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EN4AG_1}
In applying the principles, two cautions are in order. First, as has been indicated
earlier, the principles are not meant to take the place of the detailed decisions
of institutional design, but rather to guide them in particular directions. Each
principle lends itself to a wide repertory of institutional techniques, structures,
and forms that must be developed so as to fit the unique circumstances of each
context. The principles cannot alleviate the need for imaginative design;
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf22 \f2 \b1
*158
}
}
they can only inspire and steward them in ways consistent with our collective
wisdom about conflict management. The intent here is to illustrate design
principles rather than design solutions.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EK5AG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EK5AG_1}
Second, conflict management is rarely the only purpose of an institution and even
when it is the predominant goal, the design project faces constraints posed by
political practicality, time limits, and other substantive and policy goals.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F74294276119_ID0ES5}{\*\bkmkend
co_footnoteReference_F74294276119_ID0ES5}
74
}}}
}
One can imagine very good reasons why, in a particular situation, a designer may
trade-off adherence to one of these design principles for other advantages. Design
is always a matter of judgment. For the purposes of this example, however, since my
interest is in elaborating the principles, I assess the design in light of the
principles as if none of these constraints existed. What would the solution have
looked like if we had been able to apply the principles unfettered?
\par
}
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b1
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EE6AG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EE6AG_1}
A. The Design Solution: The Bonn Agreement and the Interim Administration
\par
}
}
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{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EO6AG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EO6AG_1}
The Bonn Agreement was signed on December 5, 2001 after nine days of talks.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F75294276119_ID0EW6}{\*\bkmkend
co_footnoteReference_F75294276119_ID0EW6}
75
}}}
}
One can understand its institutional arrangement on two levels: it sets up both an
Interim Administration to govern Afghanistan for six months as well as a process
for political developments over approximately the next 30 months, as follows:
\par
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
\u8226\'3f 22 Dec 2001: Interim Administration inaugurated.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F76294276119_ID0EHA}{\*\bkmkend
co_footnoteReference_F76294276119_ID0EHA}
76
}}}
\par
}
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0ERABG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0ERABG_1}
\u8226\'3f By 22 Jun 2002: Emergency Loya Jirga convened; must decide on a
\u8216\'3fTransitional Authority\u8216\'3f to lead Afghanistan \u8216\'3funtil such
time as a fully representative government can be elected through free and fair
elections.\u8216\'3f The Interim Administration ceases to exist once the
Transitional Authority has been established.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F77294276119_ID0EEB}{\*\bkmkend
co_footnoteReference_F77294276119_ID0EEB}
77
}}}
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0ELBBG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0ELBBG_1}
\u8226\'3f Within 2 months of establishment of Transitional Authority:
Constitutional Commission convened to prepare for Constitutional Loya Jirga.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F78294276119_ID0ESB}{\*\bkmkend
co_footnoteReference_F78294276119_ID0ESB}
78
}}}
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EZBBG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EZBBG_1}
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf22 \f2 \b1
*159
}
}
\u8226\'3f Within 18 months of establishment of Transitional Authority:
Constitutional Loya Jirga convened to prepare new constitution.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F79294276119_ID0EEC}{\*\bkmkend
co_footnoteReference_F79294276119_ID0EEC}
79
}}}
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0ELCBG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0ELCBG_1}
\u8226\'3f No later than 22 Jun 2004: elections for a national government.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F80294276119_ID0ESC}{\*\bkmkend
co_footnoteReference_F80294276119_ID0ESC}
80
}}}
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EZCBG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EZCBG_1}
The focus of this analysis will be on the initial Interim Administration
(\u8220\'3fIA\u8221\'3f), as an attempt at confronting the detailed decisions of
institutional design in an environment of severe conflict.
}
However, since the Interim Administration was conceived and designed as part of a
broader process (indeed, designed in the shadow of that process, as it were), this
process becomes an indispensable institutional feature of the Interim
Administration itself.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b1
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EIDBG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EIDBG_1}
B. Assessing the Design in Light of the Principles
\par
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0ESDBG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0ESDBG_1}
Membership. The first institutional feature to note would be membership. The IA is
composed of 30 members, including a chair and five vice-chairs.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F81294276119_ID0E4D}{\*\bkmkend
co_footnoteReference_F81294276119_ID0E4D}
81
}}}
}
The Bonn Agreement states that the selection of the individuals was made
\u8220\'3fon the basis of professional competence and personal integrity from lists
submitted by the participants in the UN Talks, with due regard to the ethnic,
geographic, and religious composition of Afghanistan and to the importance of the
participation of women.\u8221\'3f
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F82294276119_ID0ELE}{\*\bkmkend
co_footnoteReference_F82294276119_ID0ELE}
82
}}}
}
Of course, ultimately, the actual selection of the individuals was a process of
political negotiation and bargaining. In the end, the four groups represented at
the Bonn Conference all found representation, in varying degrees, in the IA.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EXEBG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EXEBG_1}
Inclusiveness was the design principle developed in the last section as it related
to ensuring an institutional capacity for conflict management. While the eventual
IA was inclusive of all the parties participating in the Bonn Conference,
significant interests were excluded. First, many internal constituencies were not
invited to the talks.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F83294276119_ID0EFF}{\*\bkmkend
co_footnoteReference_F83294276119_ID0EFF}
83
}}}
}
The most obvious omission were the Taliban: no Taliban
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf22 \f2 \b1
*160
}
}
representatives were invited to the conference, and no Taliban representatives
were included in the IA. Although this decision was likely driven by a set of
political imperatives, it raises significant questions from the perspective of
conflict management. The Taliban, after all, were a powerful force in the country
and continue to command support among some sectors of the population.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F84294276119_ID0EVF}{\*\bkmkend
co_footnoteReference_F84294276119_ID0EVF}
84
}}}
}
Evidence that they are regrouping to challenge the current political settlement
itself may vindicate the principle that incorporating them into the institutional
framework for political negotiation is an important ingredient for programming the
institution for dispute resolution.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F85294276119_ID0E1F}{\*\bkmkend
co_footnoteReference_F85294276119_ID0E1F}
85
}}}
}
Incorporating politically distasteful but powerful factions in peace agreements to
assure the stability of future institutional arrangements is not a novel
suggestion; the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, for example, despite their horrific human
rights record were incorporated into the UN-sponsored Paris Peace Accords out of a
recognition that excluding them, while politically expedient, would not allow for
an institutional arrangement that would be able to manage Cambodian political
conflicts into the future.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F86294276119_ID0E6F}{\*\bkmkend
co_footnoteReference_F86294276119_ID0E6F}
86
}}}
}
Nor are the Taliban alone as an excluded faction: other internal constituencies
that have been allegedly excluded include the generation of Afghans who fought
against the Soviet invasion
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F87294276119_ID0ECG}{\*\bkmkend
co_footnoteReference_F87294276119_ID0ECG}
87
}}}
}
and some ethnic groups in the country.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F88294276119_ID0EGG}{\*\bkmkend
co_footnoteReference_F88294276119_ID0EGG}
88
}}}
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0ENGBG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0ENGBG_1}
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf22 \f2 \b1
*161
}
}
A second category of stakeholders with no institutional role, yet critical to the
future of peace in Afghanistan, is other countries, especially neighbors. The
history of Afghanistan is replete with intervention by foreign powers, seeking to
conquer the territory to vindicate certain geostrategic ambitions.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F89294276119_ID0E3G}{\*\bkmkend
co_footnoteReference_F89294276119_ID0E3G}
89
}}}
}
Even in the last two decades, the involvement of other countries in Afghanistan
has served to fuel conflict, whether it is the Soviet Union; the USA through the
CIA; or neighbors such as Pakistan, Iran, and Uzbekistan.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F90294276119_ID0EBH}{\*\bkmkend
co_footnoteReference_F90294276119_ID0EBH}
90
}}}
}
Plenty of evidence exists that leaving these countries outside of the
institutional settlement could destabilize the prospects for peace.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F91294276119_ID0EFH}{\*\bkmkend
co_footnoteReference_F91294276119_ID0EFH}
91
}}}
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EMHBG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EMHBG_1}
There are practical objections that can be raised against the notion that all these
various stakeholders ought to have been included in some kind of institutional
arrangement. A cabinet of 30 members may seem unwieldy enough that the prospect of
adding further representation may appear more like a recipe for gridlock and more
conflict rather than less. Setting aside any number of political objectives that
may be achieved through exclusion of one group or another, from the perspective of
creating an institution effective at managing conflict, this objection seems
spurious. A large cabinet may well lead to more conflict, but the difference is
that the conflict would be contained within the institutional setting, rather than
being waged outside of it, where violence or other less productive mechanisms
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf22 \f2 \b1
*162
}
}
would be deployed. Moreover, it is not the case that greater inclusiveness
necessarily means a larger cabinet. How best to include members in an appropriate
way is an arena for imaginative responses, not dictated by the principle itself.
Indeed, alternative representation mechanisms had been suggested for some groups.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F92294276119_ID0ELI}{\*\bkmkend
co_footnoteReference_F92294276119_ID0ELI}
92
}}}
}
One can imagine a whole repertoire of alternatives that could provide some form of
inclusive representation without unduly encumbering the practical operations of the
IA.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EUIBG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EUIBG_1}
Another way to understand the membership issue is to place the IA in the context of
the broader political process of which it is a part. While the IA itself may not be
inclusive of all these actors, perhaps the aspiration for the Loya Jirga and the
future Transitional Administration was to be more inclusive. Understanding the
\u8220\'3finstitution\u8221\'3f in this broader way in fact is an example of
different tiers of institutional membership: some groups\rquote membership within
the IA itself, others through the Loya Jirga process, and still others through the
Transitional Administration.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EGJBG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EGJBG_1}
Scope. The second and third principles spoke to an institution\rquote s
jurisdictional scope, and enunciated a principle of breadth in order to accommodate
many deal making possibilities. The Bonn Agreement stipulates that the IA
\u8220\'3fshall be entrusted with the day-to-day conduct of the affairs of state,
and shall have the right to issue decrees for the peace, order, and good government
of Afghanistan.\u8221\'3f
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F93294276119_ID0E1J}{\*\bkmkend
co_footnoteReference_F93294276119_ID0E1J}
93
}}}
}
In this sense, the IA seems to have adhered to the principle of breadth of
jurisdiction. Presumably, all issues of Afghan governance are on the table and
negotiable by the IA membership.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EGKBG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EGKBG_1}
However, it is insufficient to simply look at the scope of the IA as a whole. To
understand the capacity for conflict management, it is important to look at how the
IA is internally organized. The IA has been divided up into 29 separate ministries,
each with its own minister. Since the ministers appear to be in control of much of
the country\rquote s resources, many decisions are made at the level of ministries
rather than at the level of the IA cabinet.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F94294276119_ID0EXK}{\*\bkmkend
co_footnoteReference_F94294276119_ID0EXK}
94
}}}
}
Powerful ministers will invariably seek to advance the causes of their own
narrowly defined ministries and are therefore bound to come into conflict with
opposed
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf22 \f2 \b1
*163
}
}
parties in the country. However, they will be unable to seek concessions from
opponents in exchange for other issues because their power is so substantively
delimited. An example may clarify this abstract idea.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0ELLBG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0ELLBG_1}
One of the ministries the Bonn Agreement creates is a Ministry of Women\rquote s
Affairs.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F95294276119_ID0ETL}{\*\bkmkend
co_footnoteReference_F95294276119_ID0ETL}
95
}}}
}
Politically, this was an important imperative, both because of the tragedies
against Afghan women during the war, as well as because much of the Western
liberation rhetoric used to justify the Afghan intervention was couched in terms of
combating the oppression of women.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F96294276119_ID0EYL}{\*\bkmkend
co_footnoteReference_F96294276119_ID0EYL}
96
}}}
}
Women\rquote s issues, however, continue to be deeply controversial in
Afghanistan. Cultural and traditional practices continue to sit uncomfortably, not
only with international norms, but more importantly with the aspirations of many
Afghan women themselves.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F97294276119_ID0EAM}{\*\bkmkend
co_footnoteReference_F97294276119_ID0EAM}
97
}}}
}
Creating a ministry solely concerned with an issue of such controversy in the
country seems to contravene the principle of breadth, because it creates a
situation where the Minister of Women\rquote s Affairs will have to advance
ostensibly controversial measures for women\rquote s development to remain faithful
to her mandate, while simultaneously robbing her of the power to negotiate
concessions with opponents in exchange for their gain on other issues. Perhaps a
particular community will be more open to the establishment of co-educational or
girls\rquote schools if the IA simultaneously upgrades the community\rquote s
irrigation or power systems. Isolating controversial issues such as this, however,
creates the opportunity for conflict to be concentrated in win-lose, distributive
bargaining, without creating natural opportunities for broad package deals that
could satisfy many parties simultaneously.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EPMBG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EPMBG_1}
Another example with slightly different dimensions would be security. Recent
conversations with Afghan civil society leaders in the region suggest that the
problems of physical insecurity (that is, threats to person and property) are the
result of much deeper economic, social, and environmental vulnerabilities.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F98294276119_ID0E1M}{\*\bkmkend
co_footnoteReference_F98294276119_ID0E1M}
98
}}}
}
In essence, many
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf22 \f2 \b1
*164
}
}
of the warlords and factional interests perpetuating armed violence are preying on
the economic vulnerabilities of local populations. The IA creates a Department of
the Interior
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F99294276119_ID0EFN}{\*\bkmkend
co_footnoteReference_F99294276119_ID0EFN}
99
}}}
}
to deal with internal security issues. But the Minister, Muhammad Qanooni, will be
left with fighting security with security forces, rather than having the natural
opportunity to make broader deals with warlords and others that put economic,
development, and reconstruction incentives on the table.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0ERNBG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0ERNBG_1}
Again, practical and political imperatives may require that governance areas be
disaggregated in some way to make their administration manageable. However, in
deciding how to divide up substantive duties at the highest levels, such as the
cabinet where ministers will be powerful decision makers, the principle of broad
scope can be applied to ensure that highly controversial and disputed issues are
placed within jurisdictions that give them wide latitude to make deals with
opponents. From a dispute resolution perspective, perhaps a Ministry of
Women\rquote s Affairs could be part of a larger department looking at social
development more broadly. Another model would do away with functional ministries
altogether and divide responsibilities by region instead: the result would be
multi-functional teams for regions or communities that could bring to bear the
entire scope of governance issues to manage policy development and administration
for a particular sub-population.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EGOBG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EGOBG_1}
Centralization. The first design principle in this area was to centralize the
information collection and dissemination function. The Bonn Agreement,
unsurprisingly, is silent on this, just as it is largely silent on the functioning
of the IA more generally. Nonetheless, a quick glance ahead at the substantive
agenda that the IA faced in its first few months suggests the central role that
information will play in generating agreement among various parties. For instance,
the disbursement of development aid across the country will likely be deeply
contentious;
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F100294276119_ID0EV}{\*\bkmkend
co_footnoteReference_F100294276119_ID0EV}
100
}}}
}
common information about needs and current resources will not only be essential to
high quality decisions, but also to facilitating agreement.
}
Moreover, the significant issues of constitutional design and Loya Jirga
composition and election will similarly depend on accurate, unbiased information
about the demographic make up of the country among other details.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EBPBG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EBPBG_1}
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf22 \f2 \b1
*165
}
}
Information ends up being an important element in these discussions because in the
absence of a centralized information collection function, individual parties and
factions collect and use their own facts. In this context, several classes of
institutional forms were possible. The Bonn Agreement could have delegated the
information function officially to the UN administration until such time as an
adequate national institution had been established. Alternatively, a separate,
independent, non-political function could have been created within the Agreement
for such a function.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
101
}}}
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0E3PBG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0E3PBG_1}
The other design principle on centralization concerns the need to decentralize
conversations among institutional members in multiple forums to proliferate
discussions on all types of issues. The Bonn Agreement stipulates only the
composition of the IA and some general decision making rules, but is silent on the
issue of meetings or other forums for discussion and conversation. The only
provision is that the \u8220\'3fChairman . . . or in his/her absence one of the
Vice Chairmen, shall call and chair meetings and propose the agenda for these
meetings.\u8221\'3f
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F102294276119_ID0ET}{\*\bkmkend
co_footnoteReference_F102294276119_ID0ET}
102
}}}
}
This represents a centralization of the convening function in the hands of the
Chair.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0E3QBG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0E3QBG_1}
Centralizing the convening function in this way seems counter to the design
principle. To be sure, the Bonn Agreement does not stipulate that formal meetings
of the IA are the only ones to take place. However, especially in the context of a
cabinet made up of individuals who have a history of hostile and conflictual
relations,
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F103294276119_ID0EI}{\*\bkmkend
co_footnoteReference_F103294276119_ID0EI}
103
}}}
}
this design principle suggests that the IA could have been designed to encourage
many more decentralized conversations among members of the IA. For instance, the
Agreement could have mandated subgroups of relevant ministers--drawn from the
different factional interests represented--to meet in preparation for full IA
meetings, without granting any formal power to decide. Indeed, given the
significant regional tensions that continue to exist in the country, encouraging
regional groupings to come together to discuss issues on the IA\rquote s agenda
could also have been fruitful.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EXRBG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EXRBG_1}
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf22 \f2 \b1
*166
}
}
More ambitiously, the Bonn Agreement could have created an institutional apparatus
to begin to involve either those not represented in the IA
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F104294276119_ID0EB}{\*\bkmkend
co_footnoteReference_F104294276119_ID0EB}
104
}}}
}
or to engage more broadly the populations who are directly represented by members
of the IA. For instance, one could imagine a tier of consultative councils, with
broad memberships to create space for conversations on the important work of
reconstruction. Indeed, conversations with community leaders in the region suggest
that a critical component of the overall process of social reconstruction and peace
building is to engage local communities in traditional and new mechanisms of
conversation and decision-making.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F105294276119_ID0EL}{\*\bkmkend
co_footnoteReference_F105294276119_ID0EL}
105
}}}
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0ESSBG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0ESSBG_1}
Control. The principle articulated in the last section focused on ensuring that
control over decisions rested with those most affected by their outcome. As noted
above, the full sovereign power of Afghanistan is vested in the IA and no
subsidiary bodies have been created. Three issues arise with respect to the
implementation of the design principle on the control variable.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EETBG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EETBG_1}
First, when an institution is designed to vest control in those most affected by a
decision, the control could be vested in the individuals themselves or in their
representatives.
}
Thus, an important question to ask in assessing the IA\rquote s fidelity to this
design principle is whether the people most affected by the IA\rquote s decisions
feel adequately represented by the IA. This is an empirical question whose answer
can only really be known by asking affected parties. Nonetheless, some indicators
suggest that several groups feel excluded from the IA, and given the historical
cleavage between Kabul and the country\rquote s rural areas,
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F106294276119_ID0ET}{\*\bkmkend
co_footnoteReference_F106294276119_ID0ET}
106
}}}
}
it is likely that many Afghans do not feel that any administration in Kabul would
adequately represent them. If this is the case, then the Bonn Agreement has done a
poor job of adhering to this design principle of delegating control over decisions
to those affected by them.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0E6TBG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0E6TBG_1}
Second, the unique context of the IA as an interim body seems implicated in the
question of control. The design principle suggests that power sharing will be an
important part of any sustainable approach to conflict management. Thus, as the
constitutional design process proceeds, the standard repertoire of institutional
approaches
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf22 \f2 \b1
*167
}
}
(federalism, separation of powers, etc.) will no doubt be considered. In this
sense, perhaps control has been delegated more widely than is at first apparent.
The Loya Jirga will be the body that is charged with constitutional design, and it
will have members drawn from all parts of the country through a process of election
in each administrative unit.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F107294276119_ID0EY}{\*\bkmkend
co_footnoteReference_F107294276119_ID0EY}
107
}}}
}
In this sense, through its broader membership, control over the important issues
of design of ongoing governance institutions has been shared with a group much
broader than the IA.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EBVBG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EBVBG_1}
Finally, it is nonetheless true that the IA will be making a host of decisions that
will have a deep impact on people across the country who do not feel represented.
Perhaps most obviously, but certainly not exclusively, is the disbursement of the
$4.5 billion in aid pledged to Afghanistan by international donors.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F108294276119_ID0EM}{\*\bkmkend
co_footnoteReference_F108294276119_ID0EM}
108
}}}
}
In this context, simply relying on the Loya Jirga as the mechanism for power
sharing seems disingenuous. In the absence of more local control over the use of
the funds, for instance, one can imagine a set of serious conflicts emerging
outside of the institutional structure of the IA, with many disgruntled local
actors speaking out. As it is, the IA does not appear able to impose its will on
warlords and powerful leaders across the country,
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
109
}}}
}
and so it remains important to involve them in the institutional process of
decision-making.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0E5VBG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0E5VBG_1}
Flexibility. Embedding opportunities to change and develop the institutional
structure seems to be a major feature of the IA, given its predominant character as
an interim administration. The Bonn Agreement\rquote s major mechanism for review
is the Loya Jirga, which meets within six months of the agreement\rquote s signing
to decide on a \u8220\'3fTransitional Administration\u8221\'3f that will serve for
up to two years.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F110294276119_ID0EJ}{\*\bkmkend
co_footnoteReference_F110294276119_ID0EJ}
110
}}}
}
Presumably, the processes of deliberation within the Loya Jirga will allow for a
review of the functioning of the IA with a view to incorporating major lessons
learned into the design and structure of the Transitional Administration.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0ESWBG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0ESWBG_1}
The real challenge, therefore, will rest in the design of the Transitional
Administration--will it incorporate similar opportunities for review that allow for
evolution of the basic governing framework at
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf22 \f2 \b1
*168
}
}
the level of fundamental design decisions without disrupting the necessary
formation of a dependable and predictable set of routines? One can imagine
mandating a process of review once every five years, for instance, where all such
elements of the framework are explicitly reviewed with a view to recommending
changes.
}
Another alternative would be to create an ongoing process of review that looks at
different variables over time. It could be imagined as either an internal process,
whereby its exclusive interlocutors are institutional members themselves, or a more
external process through which individuals and perspectives from other countries
are invited to infuse the review process with ideas and experiences gleaned from
elsewhere. This latter approach would see the entire global repertoire of
institutional variation as the pertinent realm of experimentation and learning.
Instead of looking outward and beyond the frontiers of Afghanistan, another design
would look inward to propose the unleashing of many decentralized experiments with
local institutional structures, whose experiences and lessons were then shared,
aggregated, and fed into a process of experimentation and learning at the national
level.
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F111294276119_ID0EO}{\*\bkmkend
co_footnoteReference_F111294276119_ID0EO}
111
}}}
}
All these options suggest the potential of an embedded flexibility in the
institutional structure of governance in post-Taliban Afghanistan.
\par
}
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \qc \b1
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EXXBG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EXXBG_1}
* * *
\par
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
Thus, along each of the five variables, an entire portfolio of institutional design
options that adhere to the principles present themselves once situated in the
context of a particular design challenge such as post-Taliban Afghanistan.
Introducing a particular context can raise at least as many questions as it
addresses about the principles and how they can be further elaborated. In
recognition of some of these open questions, the concluding section turns to the
implications for future research and inquiry on this path.
\par
}
}
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \qc \b1
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EUYBG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EUYBG_1}
IV. Conflict Management as Institutional Design: Next Steps?
\par
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0E5YBG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0E5YBG_1}
The case study of the Afghan Interim Administration suggests how institutional
design principles derived from the dispute resolution literature might guide actual
efforts at constructing institutional responses to managing conflicts. In conflicts
such as the one in Afghanistan, institutional responses are an essential element
for achieving a sustained peace. If the institutions break down because they are
unable to manage the underlying social conflicts to which
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf22 \f2 \b1
*169
}
}
they were a response, it is at least partly a failure of the field of dispute
resolution to think carefully about how best those institutions can be designed so
that conflict can be productively addressed through joint problem solving and
collaboration within the actual workings of the institution.
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EVZBG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EVZBG_1}
This article has been a first attempt at articulating general principles that may
provide support and inspire institutional designers. It has been largely
conjectural, representing an effort to demonstrate a particular approach rather
than a finely tuned prescription. As an early step, then, it is only proper to end
by acknowledging and previewing some steps that may lie ahead. With this purpose, I
conclude with a few questions that continue to puzzle me and that would benefit
from further study in order to elaborate and sophisticate this effort:
\par
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
\u8226\'3f What is the connection between the principles at this level of
generality and actual design decisions in specific contexts? Is it possible to
provide either more specific guidance or to elaborate a more systematic methodology
to arrive at a specific institutional intervention from a given principle?
\par
}
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0E41BG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0E41BG_1}
\u8226\'3f What further data and evidence from dispute resolution literature can be
brought to bear on the formulation of the principles? What is the evidence that
runs counter to the principles formulated here, and how can they be reconciled to
develop modified, and perhaps, more precise principles?
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EM2BG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EM2BG_1}
\u8226\'3f What are the other dimensions of design that bear on an
institution\rquote s conflict management capacities beyond the five variables
explored here? How can variables such as an institution\rquote s culture, symbols,
rituals, leadership, group process, knowledge management, etc. be the subject of
design principles? What is the overarching institutional or organizational theory
that can provide the basis for a more systematic approach to institutional
variables?
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
\u8226\'3f How can the existing variables be explored further? For instance, what
other functions can be analyzed for the centralization variable? What other types
of decisions can be considered under the control variable?
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\*\bkmkstart co_g_ID0EQ3BG_1}{\*\bkmkend co_g_ID0EQ3BG_1}
\u8226\'3f What is the empirical basis for the application for these design
principles? Can we demonstrate the effectiveness of these principles through a
series of empirical experiments or cases?
\par
}
}
}
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
{\ri0 \i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li0 \b0 \qj
We live in an era when institutional responses to widespread social conflict are
being understood to be indispensable partners to responses grounded more in
changing and enhancing individual behavior in the face of conflict. We must not
\u8220\'3fpretend not to know
}
{\i1 \fs20 \cf22 \f2 \b1
*170
}
}
what we know\u8221\'3f
}
{\i0 \fs16 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnoteReference_F112294276119_ID0EW}{\*\bkmkend
co_footnoteReference_F112294276119_ID0EW}
112
}}}
}
about dispute resolution and conflict management when we engage in the crucial
project of designing institutions that will allow us to live together peacefully
and to solve our joint problems together. Rather, the challenge is to translate
what we do know into prescriptions for creating the institutional arrangements that
will unleash our individual and collective capacities for energetic, creative, and
peaceful collaboration. Our destiny is intimately connected with our capacity for
imagining institutions that can be the repositories and vehicles for these
aspirations and ideals. Perhaps these design principles can inspire us to just such
a richer institutional imagination.
\par
}
}
}
}
}{
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Footnotes
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{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
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Associate, McKinsey & Company; J.D., 2002, Harvard Law School; B.A., 1997,
University of British Columbia. The research and writing of this paper was funded
by a Hewlett Fellowship, provided by the Harvard Negotiation Research Project at
Harvard Law School. I would like to thank Robert Bordone, John Kelleher, Naz
Modirzadeh, Michael Moffit, Robert Mnookin, Guhan Subramanian and the other Harvard
Law School Hewlett Fellows (2001/2002) for their helpful comments on earlier drafts
of this article, as well as the Hewlett Foundation forits generous support. I would
also like to thank the Harvard Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research
and its Director, Claude Bruderlein, for sponsoring a mission to Afghanistan that
provided important perspectives for this paper.
\par
}
}
}
}\i0 \ri20 \fs18 \sa0 \ul0 \cf1 \strike0 \f2 \li20 \b0 \sb0 \qj \intbl \cell \row }
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\*\bkmkstart co_footnote_F1294276119_1}{\*\bkmkend co_footnote_F1294276119_1}
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F1294276119_ID0EEEA" }
{\fldrslt
1
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
I do not mean to deny that there are differences between kinds of institutions and
their contexts that would be pertinent to the purpose of this article. Even in the
face of these differences, however, I am seeking here the first elements of a
general theory, because I believe that it can be powerful and inspire efforts that
are more specifically contextual. See Roger Fisher, Beyond YES, in Negotiation
Theory and Practice 123, 125 (J. William Breslin & Jeffrey Z. Rubin eds., 1991)
[hereinafter Negotiation Theory and Practice] for an analogous position on the role
of general theory in the prescriptive literature on individual negotiation
behavior.
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F2294276119_ID0EZFA" }
{\fldrslt
2
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See, e.g., Roberto Mangabeira Unger, Legal Analysis as Institutional Imagination,
59 Mod. L. Rev. 1 (1996); Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel,
}
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "http://www.westlaw.com/Link/Document/FullText?
findType=Y&serNum=0108765872&pubNum=3050&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cblt
1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)" }{\fldrslt
A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 267 (1998)
.
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F3294276119_ID0E3FA" }
{\fldrslt
3
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See, e.g., Oliver E. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms,
Markets, Relational Contracting (1985); Eirik G. Furubotn, The New Institutional
Economics and the Theory of the Firm, 45 J. Econ. Behav. & Org. 133 (2001); Malcolm
Rutherford, Institutional Economics: Then and Now, 15 J. Econ. Persp. 173 (2001).
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F4294276119_ID0EEGA" }
{\fldrslt
4
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See, e.g., James G. March & Johan P. Olsen, The New Institutionalism:
Organizational Factors in Political Life, 78 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 734 (1984); R. M.
Smith, Political Jurisprudence, the New Institutionalism, and the Future of Public
Law, 82 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 89 (1988).
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F5294276119_ID0EHGA" }
{\fldrslt
5
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See, e.g., Barbara Koremenos et al., The Rational Design of International
Institutions, 55 Int\rquote l Org. 761 (2001).
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F6294276119_ID0EKGA" }
{\fldrslt
6
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See, e.g., Peter M. Senge, The Fifth Discipline: The Art & Practice of the Learning
Organization (1990).
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F7294276119_ID0ENGA" }
{\fldrslt
7
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See, e.g., W. Richard Scott, Institutions and Organizations (1995); Mark
Granovetter, Economic Action and Social Structure: the Problem of Embeddedness, 91
Am. J. Soc. 481 (1985).
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F8294276119_ID0E6GA" }
{\fldrslt
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{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Smith, Political Jurisprudence, supra note 4, at 98.
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F9294276119_ID0EMHA" }
{\fldrslt
9
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Andrew J. Hoffman & Marc J. Ventresca, The Institutionalist Framing of Policy
Debates: Economics Versus the Environment, 42 Am. Behav. Scientist 1368, 1368
(1999).
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F10294276119_ID0EWI" }
{\fldrslt
10
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Senge, supra note 6, at 40.
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F11294276119_ID0EFJ" }
{\fldrslt
11
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Id.
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F12294276119_ID0EKJ" }
{\fldrslt
12
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See Scott, supra note 7, at 34-45 (discussing the three pillars of institutional
analysis, including the regulative, involving the coercive mechanisms of law,
rules, and sanctions; the normative, involving non-binding standards, professional
accreditations, and expert opinions; and the cognitive, involving tacit symbols and
cognitive structures largely taken for granted but determining in large measure the
way information and events are interpreted).
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F13294276119_ID0EPJ" }
{\fldrslt
13
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Id.
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F14294276119_ID0EQK" }
{\fldrslt
14
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See, e.g., Stephen B. Goldberg et al., Dispute Resolution: Negotiation, Mediation,
and Other Processes (1999); Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
}
Introduction: What Will We Do When Adjudication Ends? A Brief Intellectual History
of ADR, 44 UCLA L. Rev. 1613 (1997)
.
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F15294276119_ID0EVK" }
{\fldrslt
15
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See Frank E. A. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, 70 F.R.D. 111, 130-31
(1976); see also Kessler & Finklestein, The
}
Evolution of a Multi-Door Courthouse, 37 Cath. U.L. Rev. 577 (1988)
.
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F16294276119_ID0EUL" }
{\fldrslt
16
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See, e.g., Cathy A. Constantino & Christina Sickles Merchant, Designing Conflict
Management Systems: A Guide to Creating Productive and Healthy Organizations
(1996); William L. Ury et al., Getting Disputes Resolved: Designing Systems to Cut
the Costs of Conflict (1988).
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F17294276119_ID0EZL" }
{\fldrslt
17
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See Deborah M. Kolb & Susan S. Silbey, Enhancing the Capacity of Organizations to
Deal with Disputes, in Negotiation Theory & Practice 315 (\u8220\'3fDispute systems
design is an extension of such alternative dispute resolution processes as
mediation and other forms of assisted negotiation into the instructional and
programmatic realm.\u8221\'3f).
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F18294276119_ID0EIM" }
{\fldrslt
18
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Constantino & Merchant, supra note 16, at 121.
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F19294276119_ID0EPM" }
{\fldrslt
19
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See, e.g., Patrick Field et al., Using Mediation in Canadian Environmental
Tribunals: Opportunities and Best Practices, 22 Dalhousie L.J. 51 (1999).
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F20294276119_ID0EYO" }
{\fldrslt
20
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See Robert E. Goodin, Institutions and Their Design, in The Theory of Institutional
Design 1, 33-34 (1996) for a similar approach.
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F21294276119_ID0EVP" }
{\fldrslt
21
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Design, after all, has deep aesthetic connotations. The vision of the architect,
merging form and function with effortless ease comes to mind. For a good example of
elegant physical design meeting important social purposes, see Curtis Sittenfeld,
No Place Like Home, Fast Company, May 2002, at 38, at
http://www.fastcompany.com/online/58/architect.html (reporting the work of
\u8220\'3ftwo New York architects [who] are using design to address pressing social
challenges--for the homeless, for war refugees, even for public-school
kids\u8221\'3f).
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F22294276119_ID0ERQ" }
{\fldrslt
22
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Scott, supra note 7, at 34-45.
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F23294276119_ID0EXQ" }
{\fldrslt
23
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Henry Mintzberg, The Structuring of Organizations: A Synthesis of the Research 18-
34 (1979).
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F24294276119_ID0E1Q" }
{\fldrslt
24
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Peggy D. Brewer et al., Strategic Planning for Continuous Improvement in a College
of Business, 36 Mid-Atlantic J. Bus. 123, 126-28 (2000).
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F25294276119_ID0ELR" }
{\fldrslt
25
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See Koremenos et al., supra note 5, at 763, 770-73. They utilize this set of
variables to organize their own empirical research to explain the observed
variation in the design of international institutions.
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F26294276119_ID0EES" }
{\fldrslt
26
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Id. at 770.
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F27294276119_ID0EYS" }
{\fldrslt
27
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Id.
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F28294276119_ID0EIT" }
{\fldrslt
28
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Id. at 770-71 on technical necessity or cognitive association (\u8220\'3fIn the Law
of the Sea negotiations ... [t]echnological interactions required that
[jurisdiction over ocean territories and coastal environmental and fishing rights
issues] be dealt with together in a comprehensive settlement. But other Law of the
Sea issues seemed to have little in common. Here linkage was more cognitive--a
result of how issues were framed ....\u8221\'3f).
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F29294276119_ID0E2T" }
{\fldrslt
29
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Koremenos, et al., supra note 5, at 771-72.
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F30294276119_ID0EVU" }
{\fldrslt
30
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Id. at 772.
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F31294276119_ID0EPV" }
{\fldrslt
31
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See id. at 773.
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F32294276119_ID0EWV" }
{\fldrslt
32
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See id.
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F33294276119_ID0ESX" }
{\fldrslt
33
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See, e.g., Roger Fisher et al., Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without
Giving In (2d ed. 1991).
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F34294276119_ID0ESZ" }
{\fldrslt
34
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Cf. Chris Carlson, Convening, in The Consensus Building Handbook 169, 185 (Lawrence
Susskind et al. eds., 1999) (\u8220\'3fThe legitimacy of consensus building
processes ... depends on whether they are viewed by stakeholders and the public at
large as representative of all interests and points of view. A bedrock principle of
consensus-based processes, therefore, is that everyone with a stake in the decision
should be represented at the table. This principle helps to ensure that any
consensus agreement reached will be seen as legitimate by all relevant
parties ....\u8221\'3f).
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F35294276119_ID0EZZ" }
{\fldrslt
35
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See, e.g., David Malone, Decision Making in the United Nations Security Council:
The Case of Haiti, 1990-1997 176 (1998) (\u8220\'3fMembership in the UNSC [United
Nations Security Council] influences the national position of its members. Had it
not been a member of the Council, Brazil would probably have denounced the terms of
[Security Council Resolution] 940 as virulently as did Mexico and Colombia.
However, its collegial ties to other members and its acknowledgement that some of
its concerns were addressed ... led it to adopt a more nuanced public
position.\u8221\'3f).
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F36294276119_ID0EL1" }
{\fldrslt
36
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See Max Bazerman et al., Death and Rebirth of the Social Psychology of Negotiation,
in Blackwell Handbook of Social Psychology: Interpersonal Processes 196, 205-09 (G.
Fletcher & M. Clark. Malden eds., 2000).
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F37294276119_ID0E51" }
{\fldrslt
37
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See id.
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F38294276119_ID0EY2" }
{\fldrslt
38
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See id. at 207.
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F39294276119_ID0EA5" }
{\fldrslt
39
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See U.N. Charter chapters 4, 5.
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F40294276119_ID0EQ6" }
{\fldrslt
40
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See James K. Sebenius, Designing Negotiations Toward a New Regime: The Case of
Global Warming, 15 Int\rquote l Security 110, 124-25 (Spring 1991) (\u8220\'3fit is
easy to imagine that separate protocols calling on different groups to undertake
painful and costly measures will ... be rejected unless they can be packaged in
ways that offer sufficient joint gains to key players.\u8221\'3f); see also
Lawrence Susskind & Gerard McMahon, The
}
findType=Y&serNum=0101302256&pubNum=101266&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cb
lt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_sp_101266_139" }
{\fldrslt
Theory and Practice of Negotiated Rulemaking, 3 Yale J. on Reg. 133, 139-40 (1985)
(noting that as a precondition for success of negotiated rulemakings that
\u8220\'3fthere must be two or more issues \u8216\'3fon the table\u8217\'3f so that
parties can maximize their overall interests by trading or bundling
issues\u8221\'3f).
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F41294276119_ID0EHA" }
{\fldrslt
41
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Sebenius, Designing Negotiations, supra note 40, at 124.
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F42294276119_ID0E1A" }
{\fldrslt
42
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See Bazerman, supra note 36, at 207.
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F43294276119_ID0EIB" }
{\fldrslt
43
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Id.
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F44294276119_ID0EQF" }
{\fldrslt
44
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Robert H. Mnookin, A New Direction: Transforming Labor Relations in the San
Francisco Symphony 20 (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F45294276119_ID0EVF" }
{\fldrslt
45
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See id. at 20 for an example of this technique applied in a labor dispute.
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F46294276119_ID0EZF" }
{\fldrslt
46
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See John R. Ehrmann and Barbara L. Stinson, Joint Fact-Finding and the Use of
Technical Experts, in The Consensus Building Handbook, supra note 34, at 375, 377-
80; see also John T. Dunlop, The Creation of New Processes for Conflict Resolution
in Labor Disputes, in Barriers to Conflict Resolution 273, 286 (Kenneth J. Arrow et
al. eds., 1995) (\u8220\'3fMutual respect for a set of data is often an important
step in the process of dispute resolution that saves time.\u8221\'3f); Sebenius,
supra note 40, at 142 (describing the central role of a joint computer model
prepared by MIT in facilitating negotiations during the Law of the Sea conference).
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F47294276119_ID0EIG" }
{\fldrslt
47
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See, e.g., Robert B. Wilson, Strategic and Informational Barriers to Negotiation,
in Barriers to Conflict Resolution, supra note 46, at 109, 119
(\u8220\'3f[D]ifferences in information can prevent settlements. Or such
differences can require costly delays as each party tries to exploit his or her
private information or to communicate it credibly via the offers he or she
makes\u8221\'3f).
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F48294276119_ID0EYG" }
{\fldrslt
48
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Cf.
}
Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case
of Divorce, 88 Yale L.J. 950 (1979)
.
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F49294276119_ID0ESH" }
{\fldrslt
49
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See, e.g., Howard Raiffa, The Art and Science of Negotiation: How to Resolve
Conflicts and Get the Best Out of Bargaining 58-65 (1982) (discussing theoretical
approaches for inducing mutually beneficial truth disclosure, some of which still
need the development of practical techniques for their realization).
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F50294276119_ID0E1H" }
{\fldrslt
50
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See Howard Raiffa, Analytical Barriers, in Barriers to Conflict Resolution, supra
note 46, at 133, 137.
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F51294276119_ID0EDI" }
{\fldrslt
51
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See id. at 145 (elaborating the technique of pre-negotiation briefing reports); see
also Lawrence Susskind and Jennifer Thomas-Larmer, Conducting a Conflict
Assessment, The Consensus Building Handbook supra note 34, at 99, 99.
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F52294276119_ID0EVI" }
{\fldrslt
52
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See Lee Ross and Andrew Ward, Na\u239\'3fve Realism in Everyday Life: Implications
for Social Conflict and Misunderstanding, in Values and Knowledge 103, 126
(Terrance Brown et al. eds., 1997).
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F53294276119_ID0ECJ" }
{\fldrslt
53
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See Lee Ross, Reactive Devaluation in Negotiation and Conflict Resolution, in
Barriers to Conflict Resolution, supra note 46, at 27, 39.
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F54294276119_ID0EFL" }
{\fldrslt
54
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See generally Roger Fisher & Scott Brown, Getting Together: Building Relationships
as We Negotiate (1989).
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F55294276119_ID0ENL" }
{\fldrslt
55
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See, e.g., Lawrence Susskind, Environmental Diplomacy: Negotiating More Effective
Global Agreements 124-26 (1994) (discussing the recommendation of the Salzburg
Initiative to \u8220\'3fbuild decentralized alliances\u8221\'3f as mechanism for
improving the functioning of global environmental treaty negotiations).
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F56294276119_ID0ESL" }
{\fldrslt
56
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See id.; see also Sebenius, supra note 40, at 143.
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F57294276119_ID0EZL" }
{\fldrslt
57
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See Sebenius, supra note 40, at 143.
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F58294276119_ID0ELM" }
{\fldrslt
58
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See Ted Robert Gurr, Why Do Minorities Rebel? The Worldwide Geography of
Ethnopolitical Conflicts and Their Challenge to Global Security, in Federalism
Against Ethnicity? Institutional, Legal, and Democratic Instruments to Prevent
Violent Minority Conflicts 3, 11, 13 (Gunther Bachler ed., 1997).
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F59294276119_ID0E3M" }
{\fldrslt
59
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Id. at 11.
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F60294276119_ID0ERN" }
{\fldrslt
60
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See Randa M. Slim & Harold Saunders, Managing Conflict in Divided Societies:
Lessons from Tajikistan, 12 Negot. J. 31, 43-44 (Jan. 1996).
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F61294276119_ID0ENP" }
{\fldrslt
61
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See Gurr, supra note 58, at 13 (\u8220\'3f[B]e prepared to devolve some state
powers to people who are regionally concentrated .... [B]e prepared to negotiate
power sharing arrangements at the center with politically organized communal
groups.\u8221\'3f).
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F62294276119_ID0ESP" }
{\fldrslt
62
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See id. at 11 (noting how the \u8220\'3fadvanced industrial democracies are the
only group of countries to register a decline in ethnopolitical conflict\u8221\'3f
and was a result of reforms including \u8220\'3flimited empowerment\u8221\'3f
and \u8220\'3fprovisions for greater autonomy for regional nationalists\u8221\'3f).
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F63294276119_ID0EAQ" }
{\fldrslt
63
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See, e.g., Monty G. Marshall, Social Disintegration and Arrested Development: A
Systemic View, in Federalism Against Ethnicity?, supra note 58, at 15, 68
(discussing different forms of conventional and complex federalism, including
asymmetric, regional, aggregated, and municipal).
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F64294276119_ID0EUQ" }
{\fldrslt
64
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Constantino & Merchant, supra note 16, at 121.
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F65294276119_ID0EYQ" }
{\fldrslt
65
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See Lawrence Susskind and Jeffrey Cruikshank, Breaking the Impasse: Consensual
Approaches to Resolving Public Disputes 76-77 (1987) (arguing that \u8220\'3f[w]e
have put effective tools, including our three branches of government, to
inappropriate tasks\u8221\'3f and proposing a process for resolving disputes that
is, inter alia, ad hoc and focused on the particular parties interested in the
dispute rather than on typical public institutions); see also Carlson, Convening,
supra note 34; Lawrence Susskind, A Negotiation Credo for Controversial Siting
Disputes,
}
findType=Y&pubNum=206508&cite=6NEGOTIATIONJ309&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&r
s=cblt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_sp_206508_310"
}{\fldrslt
6 Negotiation J. 309, 310-11 (Oct. 1990)
.
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F66294276119_ID0EKR" }
{\fldrslt
66
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See Ken Kollman et al.,
}
findType=Y&serNum=0117077503&pubNum=100920&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=cb
lt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)" }{\fldrslt
Decentralization and the Search for Policy Solutions, 16 J.L. Econ. & Org. 102
(2000)
(demonstrating the benefits of decentralized experimentalism for solving some
classes of problems).
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F67294276119_ID0EET" }
{\fldrslt
67
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See, e.g., Mintzberg, supra note 23, at 431-67 (describing adhocracy as a viable
organizational form and outlining strategies for coordination); see also Ron
Ashkenas et al., The Boundaryless Organization: Breaking the Chains of
Organizational Structure (1995); Robert H. Waterman, Jr., Adhocracy: The Power to
Change (1992).
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F68294276119_ID0E4U" }
{\fldrslt
68
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
On learning organizations, see generally, Chris Argyris, On Organizational Learning
(2d ed. 1999); David A. Garvin, Building a Learning Organization, 71 Harv. Bus.
Rev. 78 (Jul.-Aug. 1993); Senge, supra note 6.
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F69294276119_ID0EPV" }
{\fldrslt
69
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See Fisher, supra note 33 (providing a good example of the application of this
underlying theoretical posture).
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F70294276119_ID0E3V" }
{\fldrslt
70
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Fisher, supra note 1.
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F71294276119_ID0EOW" }
{\fldrslt
71
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See Howard Raiffa, Post-Settlement Settlements, in Negotiation Theory and Practice,
supra note 1, at 315; see also Max H. Bazerman et al., Post-Settlement Settlements
in Two-Party Negotiations, in Negotiation Theory and Practice, supra note 1, at 331
(noting that \u8220\'3fthe success of the ongoing two-party ... relationship often
depends largely on the propensity and ability of the negotiators to handle the PSS
[post-settlement settlement] process\u8221\'3f).
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F72294276119_ID0EVW" }
{\fldrslt
72
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See Robert H. Mnookin et al., Beyond Winning: Negotiating to Create Value in Deals
and Disputes 14 (2000) (identifying \u8220\'3fdifferent forecasts\u8221\'3f as a
source of value creation between parties).
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F73294276119_ID0EG4" }
{\fldrslt
73
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
UN Talks in Bonn Culminate in Accord on Interim Afghan Government, UN News Center
(Dec. 5, 2001), at http://www.un.org/apps/news/storyAr.asp?
NewsID=2337&Cr=afghan&Cr1=brahimi.
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F74294276119_ID0ES5" }
{\fldrslt
74
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See
}
findType=Y&pubNum=100920&cite=7JLECONORG106&originationContext=document&vr=3.0&rs=c
blt1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)" }{\fldrslt
Terry Moe, Politics and the Theory of Organization, 7 J.L. Econ. & Org. 106 (1991)
(an analysis of the different considerations taken into account in the design of
political institutions).
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F75294276119_ID0EW6" }
{\fldrslt
75
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-
Establishment of Permanent Government Institutions, Dec. 5, 2001 [hereinafter Bonn
Agreement], at http:// www.uno.de/frieden/afghanistan/talks/agreement.htm.
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F76294276119_ID0EHA" }
{\fldrslt
76
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Id. at \u167\'3f I (1).
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F77294276119_ID0EEB" }
{\fldrslt
77
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Id. at \u167\'3f I (4).
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F78294276119_ID0ESB" }
{\fldrslt
78
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Id. at \u167\'3f I (6).
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F79294276119_ID0EEC" }
{\fldrslt
79
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Bonn Agreement, supra note 78, at \u167\'3f I (6).
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F80294276119_ID0ESC" }
{\fldrslt
80
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Id. at \u167\'3f I (4). The provision actually requires elections to be held no
later than two years from the date of the convening of the Loya Jirga.
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F81294276119_ID0E4D" }
{\fldrslt
81
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Id. at \u167\'3f III (A)(1).
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F82294276119_ID0ELE" }
{\fldrslt
82
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Id. at \u167\'3f III (A)(3).
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F83294276119_ID0EFF" }
{\fldrslt
83
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See generally Bonn Talks: Who is Being Heard?, BBC News On-Line (Nov. 28, 2001)
(\u8220\'3fDespite hopes of a breakthrough at the conference, there are fears that
the meeting is too selective in admitting some groups, and not listening to the
voices of others.\u8221\'3f), at http://
news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/south_asia/newsid_1681000/1681329.stm; see also
Peter Baker, Afghan Factions Criticize Accord; Some Leaders Vow To Boycott Regime,
Wash. Post, Dec. 7, 2001, at A32 (\u8220\'3fWith copies of the 10-page document
still churning out of fax machines, several key figures, including a powerful
northern warlord and the current de facto finance minister, complained that the
U.N.-brokered pact did not include all the factions in Afghan society. Without
broad support, they warned, the agreement could be doomed to failure.\u8221\'3f).
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F84294276119_ID0EVF" }
{\fldrslt
84
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See Artie McConnel, Ex-Taliban Officials Form New Political Group, Eurasia Insight
(Dec. 27, 2001), at http://
www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav122701.shtml.
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F85294276119_ID0E1F" }
{\fldrslt
85
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See id.
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F86294276119_ID0E6F" }
{\fldrslt
86
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See
}
1.0&transitionType=DocumentItem&contextData=(sc.Search)#co_pp_sp_3263_5" }{\fldrslt
Steven R. Ratner, The Cambodian Settlement Agreements, 86 AJIL 1, 5 (1993)
. The situation of Cambodia during the peace negotiations and Afghanistan today
have several similarities. Professor Ratner\rquote s description of the context of
the Paris Accords could have just as easily been written after the conclusion of
the Bonn Agreement:
\par
}
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
The long, sad history of the Cambodian conflict required any comprehensive
settlement to address numerous elements: a civil war among four factions, each of
which had taken a turn at governing the country since its independence from France;
invasion by a neighboring state seeking regional hegemony; external assistance to
the factions; support of the belligerents by the major powers; a history of gross
violations of human rights; a vast refugee problem; and a devastated economy
requiring massive reconstruction. The settlement agreements confront these problems
through reliance on, and reaffirmation of, existing norms of international law and
through the creation of new regimes and institutions that could form important
precedents for future conflicts. Id. at 1.
\par
}
}
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F87294276119_ID0ECG" }
{\fldrslt
87
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See Charles Recknagel, Afghanistan: Rabbani Says UN Forced Cabinet Choices, Eurasia
Insight (Dec. 13, 2001) (\u8220\'3f[T]he Bonn accord sidestepped this older
generation of Afghan leaders--many of whom have fought each other in factional
wars--in favor of a younger generation of cabinet leaders.\u8221\'3f), at
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/pp121301.shtml.
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F88294276119_ID0EGG" }
{\fldrslt
88
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See Charles Recknagel, Afghanistan: Ethnic Turkmen Seek Peace-Building Role,
Eurasia Insight (Jan. 4, 2002) (\u8220\'3fWith no warlords or power brokers to
represent them on the national scene, the ethnic Turkmen had no voice in the Bonn
peace deal in early December.\u8221\'3f), at http://
www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/pp010602.shtml.
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F89294276119_ID0E3G" }
{\fldrslt
89
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See Karl E. Meyer & Shareen Blair Brysac, Tournament of Shadows: The Great Game and
the Race for Empire in Central Asia (1999).
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F90294276119_ID0EBH" }
{\fldrslt
90
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See Ahmed Rashid, Back with a Vengeance: Proxy War in Afghanistan, 52 World Today
60 (Mar. 1996) (stating that \u8220\'3fregional countries are pumping in
unprecedented amounts of arms and ammunition to their various proxies, undermining
United Nations attempts to broker a peace settlement\u8221\'3f).
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F91294276119_ID0EFH" }
{\fldrslt
91
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See, e.g., Tajik Special Forces Commander Cautious on Afghan Peace Prospects: Q&A
with General Sukhrob Kasymov, EurasiaNet Q&A (Jan. 3, 2001) (\u8220\'3fI am not
that optimistic [about peace]. It\rquote s been 20 years, and the war still goes on
there. In my opinion, the war will assume a partisan form and will last for very
long.\u8221\'3f), at http://
www.eurasianet.org/departments/qanda/articles/eav010302.shtml; see also Sergei
Blagov, Russia Strives to Maintain Political Clout in Afghanistan, Eurasia Insight
(Feb. 12, 2002), at http://
www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav021202a.shtml; Todd Diamond,
Suspicions of Iranian Meddling Becloud Bid for Afghan Peacekeepers, Eurasia Insight
(Jan. 30, 2002) at http://
www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav013002a.shtml; Artie McConnell,
Iranian Conservatives Seek to Influence Developments in Afghanistan, Eurasia
Insight (Feb. 14, 2002) at http://
www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav021402.shtml.
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F92294276119_ID0ELI" }
{\fldrslt
92
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See, e.g., Recknagel, supra note 87 (noting suggestion of a Supreme Council of ten
to twenty members to represent past fighters).
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F93294276119_ID0E1J" }
{\fldrslt
93
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Bonn Agreement, supra note 75, at \u167\'3f C(1).
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F94294276119_ID0EXK" }
{\fldrslt
94
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See Philip Smucker, Split Grows in Afghan Government, Dawn Internet Edition (Feb.
21, 2002) (reporting on power struggles within the IA), at
http://www.dawn.com/2002/02/21/int15.htm.
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F95294276119_ID0ETL" }
{\fldrslt
95
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Bonn Agreement, supra note 75, at Annex IV.
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F96294276119_ID0EYL" }
{\fldrslt
96
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See, e.g., Elizabeth Bumiller, White House Letter: The Politics of Plight and the
Gender Gap, N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 2001, at B2 (\u8220\'3fThe Bush administration, in
a worldwide offensive ... was not only publicizing the brutality toward women under
the Taliban ... but promising that the United States would insist that women have
power in a post-Taliban Afghanistan.\u8221\'3f).
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F97294276119_ID0EAM" }
{\fldrslt
97
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See Ilene R. Prusher, For Woman Minister, Rebuilding Afghanistan is a Personal
Quest, Christian Science Monitor (Feb. 7, 2002) available at 7,
http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/0207/p07s02-wosc.html.
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F98294276119_ID0E1M" }
{\fldrslt
98
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See Securing Communities for Reconstruction in Afghanistan: A Summary of
Discussions with Community and NGO Leaders, Harv. Program on Humanitarian
Pol\rquote y and Conflict Res. Pol\rquote y Brief 2 (Apr. 16, 2002), at http://
www.preventconflict.org/portal/centralasia/Brief5vol1.pdf.
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F99294276119_ID0EFN" }
{\fldrslt
99
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See Bonn Agreement, supra note 75, at Annex IV.
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F100294276119_ID0EV" }
{\fldrslt
100
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See National Development Framework: Draft--For consultation (April 2002), at
http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/sar/sa.nsf/Attachments/frame/ $File/ndf.pdf.
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\fldrslt
101
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See Bonn Agreement, supra note 75, at \u167\'3f I(2). The IA is formally only one
of three entities that together make up the Interim Authority. The other two
entities are the Loya Jirga Commission and the Supreme Court. One could, therefore,
imagine another entity to perform information gathering.
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F102294276119_ID0ET" }
{\fldrslt
102
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Id. at \u167\'3f B(1).
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F103294276119_ID0EI" }
{\fldrslt
103
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See Afghan Cabinet Begins Work, BBC News (Dec. 23, 2001) (reporting that
\u8220\'3fsome ministers turned up to the first meeting [of the cabinet] with their
own militia men\u8221\'3f), at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/south_asia/newsid_ 1725000/1725871.stm.
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F104294276119_ID0EB" }
{\fldrslt
104
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See supra text accompanying notes 83, 89, 90, 92, and 93.
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F105294276119_ID0EL" }
{\fldrslt
105
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See Securing Communities for Reconstruction in Afghanistan, supra note 98, at 2.
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F106294276119_ID0ET" }
{\fldrslt
106
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See The Role of Islam in Shaping the Future of Afghanistan, Harv. Program on
Humanitarian Pol\rquote y and Conflict Res. Pol\rquote y Brief 2 (Oct. 15, 2001) at
http://www.preventconflict.org/portal/centralasia/brief2_final1106.pdf.
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F107294276119_ID0EY" }
{\fldrslt
107
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Procedures for the Election of the Members of the Emergency Loya Jirga, at arts. 4-
6, at http://www.un.org.pk/latest-dev/key-doc-loyerjirga.htm (last visited Apr. 28,
2002).
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F108294276119_ID0EM" }
{\fldrslt
108
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Howard W. French, More Nations Join Afghan Aid Effort, N.Y. Times, Jan. 22, 2002,
at A1.
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\fldrslt
109
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See Wali Jan, Central Authority Breaking Down?, Institute for War and Peace
Reporting (Apr. 11, 2002), at http://www.iwpr.net/index.pl?
archive/rca/rca_200204_114_3_eng.txt.
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F110294276119_ID0EJ" }
{\fldrslt
110
}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Bonn Agreement, supra note 75, at \u167\'3f I (4).
\par
}
}
}
\intbl
{\ri120 \i0 \ql \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \li120 \b0
{\i0 \fs20 \cf1 \f2 \b0
{\field {\*\fldinst HYPERLINK "#co_footnoteReference_F111294276119_ID0EO" }
{\fldrslt
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}
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 2, for a proposal that is similar, in spirit if not in
details, but directed toward the American constitutional process.
\par
}
}
}
\clpadfr3 \clbrdrb \clbrdrl \trql \clvertalt \cellx600
\clbrdrb \clbrdrr \trql \cellx10080
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{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
{\ri20 \i0 \fs18 \cf1 \f2 \li20 \b0 \qj
Carl Glickman, Pretending Not to Know What We Know, 48 Educ. Leadership 4 (May
1991) (lamenting the fact that so much of what is known about teaching and learning
is not translated into practice on schools).
\par
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}
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End of Document
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\u169\'3f 2011 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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