Phil Gamefowl vs IAc

Facts:

The issue arose when Hee Acusar, who was operating the lone cockpit in Bogo, was ordered to
relocate the same pursuant to P.D. No. 449, the Cockfighting Law of 1974, on the ground that it was
situated in a tertiary commercial zone, a prohibited area. 1 Although the period of grace for such
relocation was extended to June 11, 1980 by P.D. 1535, Acusar failed to comply with the
requirement, as a result of which the Philippine Constabulary considered the cockpit phased
out. 2 To add to his troubles, the Court of First Instance of Cebu, in a petition to compel the municipal
mayor to issue Acusar a permit to operate a cockpit, declared that he had waived his right to a
renewal thereof because of his failure to relocate. 3

Issue:

Whether Phil Gamefowl or the LGU has the power to issue permits

HELD:

It is the municipal mayor with the authorization of the Sangguniang Bayan that has the primary
power to issue licenses for the operation of ordinary cockpits. Even the regulation of cockpits is
vested in the municipal officials, subject only to the guidelines laid down by the Philippine Gamefowl
Commission. Its power to license is limited only to international derbies and does not extend to
ordinary cockpits. Over the latter kind of cockpits, it has the power not of control but only of review
and supervision.

We have consistently held that supervision means "overseeing or the power or authority of an officer
to see that their subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, the
former may take such action or steps as prescribed by law to make them perform their
duties." 17 Supervision is a lesser power than control, which connotes "the power of the officer to alter
or modify or set aside what a subordinate had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. " 18 Review, on the other hand, is a
reconsideration or reexamination for purposes of correction. 19

US VS ANG TANG HO

FACTS:

At its special session of 1919, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 2868, entitled "An Act
penalizing the monopoly and holding of, and speculation in, palay, rice, and corn under extraordinary
circumstances, regulating the distribution and sale thereof, and authorizing the Governor-General,
with the consent of the Council of State, to issue the necessary rules and regulations therefor, and
making an appropriation for this purpose," the material provisions of which is the authority of the
Governwor General to issue and promulgate with the consent of the Council of State, temporary
rules and emergency measures for carrying out the purpose whenever, for any cause, conditions
arise resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn

Issue: Whether the Act is a delegation of the legislative power of the Legislature

Held:

A law must be complete, in all its terms and provisions, when it leaves the legislative branch of the
government, and nothing must be left to the judgement of the electors or other appointee or delegate
of the legislature, so that, in form and substance, it is a law in all its details.

The line of cleavage between what is and what is not a delegation of legislative power is pointed out
and clearly defined. As the Supreme Court of Wisconsin says:

That no part of the legislative power can be delegated by the legislature to any other
department of the government, executive or judicial, is a fundamental principle in
constitutional law, essential to the integrity and maintenance of the system of government
established by the constitution.

Where an act is clothed with all the forms of law, and is complete in and of itself, it may be
provided that it shall become operative only upon some certain act or event, or, in like
manner, that its operation shall be suspended.

The legislature cannot delegate its power to make a law, but it can make a law to delegate a
power to determine some fact or state of things upon which the law makes, or intends to
make, its own action to depend.

This opinion is confined to the particular question here involved, which is the right of the Governor-
General, upon the terms and conditions stated in the Act, to fix the price of rice and make it a crime
to sell it at a higher price, and which holds that portions of the Act unconstitutional. It does not decide
or undertake to construe the constitutionality of any of the remaining portions of the Act.

CABUNGCAL VS ALORENZO

Facts:

The SB of San Isidro NE issued a resolution declaring the reorganization of all offices of the
municipal government where all positions were deemed vacant and employees were ordered to
submit their application before January 10, 2002. Instead of submitting application, petitioners filed
with the CA a petition for prohibition and mandamus with application of writ of preliminary injunction
and restraining order. The CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
Issue: Whether the automatic recourse to CA is proper 2. Whether the case falls within the
exceptions toe the rules of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

HELD: Petitioners’ recourse should have been with the Civil Service Commission and not with the
Court of Appeals petitioners are former local government employees whose services were
terminated due to the reorganization of the municipal government under Resolution Nos. 27 and 80
of the Sangguniang Bayan of San Isidro, Nueva Ecija. Considering that they belong to the civil
service, the CSC has jurisdiction over their separation from office.

Even the laws upon which petitioners anchor their claim vest jurisdiction upon the CSC. Under RA
6656 and RA 7305, which were cited by the petitioners in their petition, it is the CSC which
determines whether an employee’s dismissal or separation from office was carried out in violation of
the law or without due process. Accordingly, it is also the CSC which has the power to reinstate or
reappoint an unlawfully dismissed or terminated employee.

The case does not fall under any of the exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of administrative
remedies

The rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies provides that a party must exhaust all
administrative remedies to give the administrative agency an opportunity to decide the matter and to
prevent unnecessary and premature resort to the courts.18 This, however, is not an ironclad rule as it
admits of exceptions,19 viz:

1. when there is a violation of due process;

2. when the issue involved is purely a legal question;

3. when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of

jurisdiction;

4. when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned;

5. when there is irreparable injury;

6. when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the
President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter;

7. when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable;

8. when it would amount to a nullification of a claim;

9. when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings;

10. when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy; and

11. when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.
The instant case does not fall under any of the exceptions. Petitioners’ filing of a petition for
mandamus and prohibition with the CA was premature. It bears stressing that the remedies of
mandamus and prohibition may be availed of only when there is no appeal or any other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.20 Moreover, being extraordinary
remedies, resort may be had only in cases of extreme necessity where the ordinary forms of
procedure are powerless to afford relief

BAGUNU VS AGGABAO

Facts:

The present controversy stemmed from a protest filed by the spouses Francisco Aggabao and
Rosenda Acerit (respondents) against the petitioners free patent application over a parcel of
unregistered land located in Caniogan, Sto. Tomas, Isabela (subject land), pending before the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Region II, Tuguegarao City, Cagayan (DENR
Regional Office).

Issue: Whether the CA erred in affirming the DENR Sec’s Jurisidiction ot resolve the conflicting
parties’ claim of ownership while it was pending in the RTC

Held: While these actions ordinarily fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC, the courts
jurisdiction to resolve controversies involving ownership of real property extends only to private
lands. In the present case, neither party has asserted private ownership over Lot 322. The resolution
of conflicting claims of ownership over real property is within the regular courts area of competence
and, concededly, this issue is judicial in character. However, regular courts would have no power to
conclusively resolve this issue of ownership given the public character of the land, since under C.A.
No. 141, in relation to Executive Order No. 192,[39] the disposition and management of public lands
fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Director of Lands, subject to review by the DENR
Secretary.

Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts must refrain from determining a controversy
involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to its resolution
by the latter, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring
the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical
and intricate matters of fact[36]

In recent years, it has been the jurisprudential trend to apply [the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction] to cases involving matters that demand the special competence of
administrative agencies. It may occur that the Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of
a particular case, which means that the matter involved is also judicial in character.
However, if the case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized skills
and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because technical matters or intricate
questions of facts are involved, then relief must first be obtained in an administrative
proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts even though the matter is within
the proper jurisdiction of a court. This is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.] It applies
where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever
enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory
scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an administrative body, in
such case the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the
administrative body for its view.[37]