CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 1
II. CRIMES AGAINST THE FUNDAMENTAL
LAWS OF THE STATE
A. ARBITRARY DETENTION AND
EXPULSION
Art. 124. Arbitrary detention. — Any public
officer or employee who, without legal grounds,
detains a person, shall suffer;
1. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum
period to prision correccional in its minimum
period, if the detention has not exceeded three
days;
2. The penalty of prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods, if the detention
has continued more than three but not more
than fifteen days;
3. The penalty of prision mayor, if the detention
has continued for more than fifteen days but
not more than six months; and
4. That of reclusion temporal, if the detention
shall have exceeded six months.
The commission of a crime, or violent insanity
or any other ailment requiring the compulsory
confinement of the patient in a hospital, shall
be considered legal grounds for the detention
of any person.
CONSTITUTION
SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of
life, liberty, or property without due process of
law, nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws.
SECTION 2. The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.
RULE 113, RULES OF COURT
Section 1. Definition of arrest. — Arrest is the
taking of a person into custody in order that he
may be bound to answer for the commission of
an offense. (1)
Section 2. Arrest; how made. — An arrest is
made by an actual restraint of a person to be
arrested, or by his submission to the custody of
the person making the arrest.
No violence or unnecessary force shall be
used in making an arrest. The person arrested
shall not be subject to a greater restraint than
is necessary for his detention. (2a)
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.
— A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed,
and he has probable cause to believe based
on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested
has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a
prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving
final judgment or is temporarily confined while
his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to
another.
Republic Act No. 7438 April 27, 1992
AN ACT DEFINING CERTAIN RIGHTS OF
PERSON ARRESTED, DETAINED OR
UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION AS
WELL AS THE DUTIES OF THE
ARRESTING, DETAINING AND
INVESTIGATING OFFICERS, AND

PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS
THEREOF
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
assembled::
Section 1. Statement of Policy. – It is the
policy of the Senate to value the dignity of
every human being and guarantee full respect
for human rights.
Section 2. Rights of Persons Arrested,
Detained or Under Custodial Investigation;
Duties of Public Officers.–
(a) Any person arrested detained or under
custodial investigation shall at all times be
assisted by counsel.
(b) Any public officer or employee, or anyone
acting under his order or his place, who
arrests, detains or investigates any person for
the commission of an offense shall inform the
latter, in a language known to and understood
by him, of his rights to remain silent and to
have competent and independent counsel,
preferably of his own choice, who shall at all
times be allowed to confer privately with the
person arrested, detained or under custodial
investigation. If such person cannot afford the
services of his own counsel, he must be
provided with a competent and independent
counsel by the investigating officer.lawphi1Ÿ
(c) The custodial investigation report shall be
reduced to writing by the investigating officer,
provided that before such report is signed, or
thumbmarked if the person arrested or
detained does not know how to read and write,
it shall be read and adequately explained to
him by his counsel or by the assisting counsel
provided by the investigating officer in the
language or dialect known to such arrested or
detained person, otherwise, such investigation
report shall be null and void and of no effect
whatsoever.
(d) Any extrajudicial confession made by a
person arrested, detained or under custodial
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 2
investigation shall be in writing and signed by
such person in the presence of his counsel or
in the latter's absence, upon a valid waiver,
and in the presence of any of the parents, elder
brothers and sisters, his spouse, the municipal
mayor, the municipal judge, district school
supervisor, or priest or minister of the gospel
as chosen by him; otherwise, such extrajudicial
confession shall be inadmissible as evidence in
any proceeding.
(e) Any waiver by a person arrested or
detained under the provisions of Article 125 of
the Revised Penal Code, or under custodial
investigation, shall be in writing and signed by
such person in the presence of his counsel;
otherwise the waiver shall be null and void and
of no effect.
(f) Any person arrested or detained or under
custodial investigation shall be allowed visits
by or conferences with any member of his
immediate family, or any medical doctor or
priest or religious minister chosen by him or by
any member of his immediate family or by his
counsel, or by any national non-governmental
organization duly accredited by the
Commission on Human Rights of by any
international non-governmental organization
duly accredited by the Office of the President.
The person's "immediate family" shall include
his or her spouse, fiancé or fiancée, parent or
child, brother or sister, grandparent or
grandchild, uncle or aunt, nephew or niece,
and guardian or ward.
As used in this Act, "custodial investigation"
shall include the practice of issuing an
"invitation" to a person who is investigated in
connection with an offense he is suspected to
have committed, without prejudice to the
liability of the "inviting" officer for any violation
of law.
Section 3. Assisting Counsel. – Assisting
counsel is any lawyer, except those directly
affected by the case, those charged with
conducting preliminary investigation or those
charged with the prosecution of crimes.

The assisting counsel other than the
government lawyers shall be entitled to the
following fees;
(a) The amount of One hundred fifty pesos
(P150.00) if the suspected person is
chargeable with light felonies;lawphi1©alf
(b) The amount of Two hundred fifty pesos
(P250.00) if the suspected person is
chargeable with less grave or grave felonies;
(c) The amount of Three hundred fifty pesos
(P350.00) if the suspected person is
chargeable with a capital offense.
The fee for the assisting counsel shall be paid
by the city or municipality where the custodial
investigation is conducted, provided that if the
municipality of city cannot pay such fee, the
province comprising such municipality or city
shall pay the fee: Provided, That the Municipal
or City Treasurer must certify that no funds are
available to pay the fees of assisting counsel
before the province pays said fees.
In the absence of any lawyer, no custodial
investigation shall be conducted and the
suspected person can only be detained by the
investigating officer in accordance with the
provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code.
Section 4. Penalty Clause. – (a) Any arresting
public officer or employee, or any investigating
officer, who fails to inform any person arrested,
detained or under custodial investigation of his
right to remain silent and to have competent
and independent counsel preferably of his own
choice, shall suffer a fine of Six thousand
pesos (P6,000.00) or a penalty of
imprisonment of not less than eight (8) years
but not more than ten (10) years, or both. The
penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification
shall also be imposed upon the investigating
officer who has been previously convicted of a
similar offense.
The same penalties shall be imposed upon a
public officer or employee, or anyone acting
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 3
upon orders of such investigating officer or in
his place, who fails to provide a competent and
independent counsel to a person arrested,
detained or under custodial investigation for
the commission of an offense if the latter
cannot afford the services of his own counsel.
(b) Any person who obstructs, prevents or
prohibits any lawyer, any member of the
immediate family of a person arrested,
detained or under custodial investigation, or
any medical doctor or priest or religious
minister chosen by him or by any member of
his immediate family or by his counsel, from
visiting and conferring privately with him, or
from examining and treating him, or from
ministering to his spiritual needs, at any hour of
the day or, in urgent cases, of the night shall
suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not less
than four (4) years nor more than six (6) years,
and a fine of four thousand pesos
(P4,000.00).lawphi1©
The provisions of the above Section
notwithstanding, any security officer with
custodial responsibility over any detainee or
prisoner may undertake such reasonable
measures as may be necessary to secure his
safety and prevent his escape.
Section 5. Repealing Clause. – Republic Act
No. No. 857, as amended, is hereby repealed.
Other laws, presidential decrees, executive
orders or rules and regulations, or parts thereof
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are
repealed or modified accordingly.
Section 6. Effectivity. – This Act shall take
effect fifteen (15) days following its publication
in the Official Gazette or in any daily
newspapers of general circulation in the
Philippines.
Approved: April 27, 1992.lawphi1Ÿ
G.R. No. L-37007 July 20, 1987

RAMON S. MILO, in his capacity as
Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan,
and ARMANDO VALDEZ,petitioners,
vs.
ANGELITO C. SALANGA, in his capacity as
Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan (Branch IV), and JUAN
TUVERA, SR., respondents.
GANCAYCO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of an
order of the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan, Third Judicial District, in Criminal
Case No. D-529 entitled "The People of the
Philippines versus Juan Tuvera, Sr., et al.,"
granting the motion to quash the information
filed by accused Juan Tuvera, Sr., herein
respondent. The issue is whether a barrio
captain can be charged of arbitrary detention.
The facts are as follows:
On October 12, 1972, an information for
Arbitrary Detention was filed against Juan
Tuvera, Sr., Tomas Mendoza and Rodolfo
Mangsat, in the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan, which reads as follows:
The undersigned Assistant Provincial
Fiscal accuses Juan Tuvera, Sr., Tomas
Mendoza and Rodolfo Mangsat alias
Rudy, all of Manaoag, Pangasinan, of
the crime of ARBITRARY DETENTION,
committed as follows:
That on or about the 21st day of April
1973, at around 10:00 o'clock in the
evening, in barrio Baguinay, Manaoag,
Pangasinan, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused Juan Tuvera, Sr., a barrio
captain, with the aid of some other
private persons, namely Juan Tuvera,
Jr., Bertillo Bataoil and one Dianong,
maltreated one Armando Valdez by
hitting with butts of their guns and fists
blows and immediately thereafter,
without legal grounds, with deliberate
intent to deprive said Armando Valdez
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 4
of his constitutional liberty, accused
Barrio captain Juan Tuvera, Sr., Cpl.
Tomas Mendoza and Pat. Rodolfo
Mangsat, members of the police force of
Mangsat, Pangasinan conspiring,
confederating and helping one another,
did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, lodge and lock said
Armando Valdez inside the municipal jail
of Manaoag, Pangasinan for about
eleven (11) hours. (Emphasis supplied.)
CONTRARY TO ARTICLE 124 of the
R.P.C.
Dagupan City, October 12, 1972.
(SGD.) VICENTE C. CALDONA
Assistant Provincial Fiscal
All the accused, including respondent Juan
Tuvera, Sr., were arraigned and pleaded not
guilty.
On April 4, 1973, Tuvera filed a motion to
quash the information on the ground that the
facts charged do not constitute an offense and
that the proofs adduced at the investigation are
not sufficient to support the filing of the
information. Petitioner Assistant Provincial
Fiscal Ramon S. Milo filed an opposition
thereto.
Finding that respondent Juan Tuvera, Sr. was
not a public officer who can be charged with
Arbitrary Detention, respondent Judge Angelito
C. Salanga granted the motion to quash in an
order dated April 25, 1973.
Hence, this petition.
Arbitrary Detention is committed by a public
officer who, without legal grounds, detains a
person.1 The elements of this crime are the
following:
1. That the offender is a public officer or
employee.
2. That he detains a person.

3. That the detention is without legal
grounds.2
The ground relied upon by private respondent
Tuvera for his motion to quash the information
which was sustained by respondent Judge, is
that the facts charged do not constitute an
offense,3 that is, that the facts alleged in the
information do not constitute the elements of
Arbitrary Detention.
The Information charges Tuvera, a barrio
captain, to have conspired with Cpl. Mendoza
and Pat. Mangsat, who are members of the
police force of Manaoag, Pangasinan in
detaining petitioner Valdez for about eleven
(11) hours in the municipal jail without legal
ground. No doubt the last two elements of the
crime are present.
The only question is whether or not Tuvera,
Sr., a barrio captain is a public officer who can
be liable for the crime of Arbitrary Detention.
The public officers liable for Arbitrary Detention
must be vested with authority to detain or order
the detention of persons accused of a crime.
Such public officers are the policemen and
other agents of the law, the judges or mayors.4
Respondent Judge Salanga did not consider
private respondent Tuvera as such public
officer when the former made this finding in the
questioned order:
Apparently, if Armando Valdez was ever
jailed and detained more than six (6)
hours, Juan Tuvera, Sr., has nothing to
do with the same because he is not in
any way connected with the Police
Force of Manaoag, Pangasinan.
Granting that it was Tuvera, Sr., who
ordered Valdez arrested, it was not he
who detained and jailed him because he
has no such authority vested in him as a
mere Barrio Captain of Barrio Baguinay,
Manaoag, Pangasinan. 5
In line with the above finding of respondent
Judge Salanga, private respondent Tuvera
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 5
asserts that the motion to quash was properly
sustained for the following reasons: (1) That he
did not have the authority to make arrest, nor
jail and detain petitioner Valdez as a mere
barrio captain;6 (2) That he is neither a peace
officer nor a policeman,7 (3) That he was not a
public official;8 (4) That he had nothing to do
with the detention of petitioner Valdez;9 (5)
That he is not connected directly or indirectly in
the administration of the Manaoag Police
Force;10 (6) That barrio captains on April 21,
1972 were not yet considered as persons in
authority and that it was only upon the
promulgation of Presidential Decree No. 299
that Barrio Captain and Heads of Barangays
were decreed among those who are persons in
authority;11 and that the proper charge was
Illegal Detention and Not Arbitrary Detention.12
We disagree.
Long before Presidential Decree 299 was
signed into law, barrio lieutenants (who were
later named barrio captains and now barangay
captains) were recognized as persons in
authority. In various cases, this Court deemed
them as persons in authority, and convicted
them of Arbitrary Detention.
In U.S. vs. Braganza,13 Martin Salibio, a barrio
lieutenant, and Hilario Braganza, a municipal
councilor, arrested Father Feliciano Gomez
while he was in his church. They made him
pass through the door of the vestry and
afterwards took him to the municipal building.
There, they told him that he was under arrest.
The priest had not committed any crime. The
two public officials were convicted of Arbitrary
Detention.14
In U.S. vs. Gellada,15 Geronimo Gellada, a
barrio lieutenant, with the help of Filoteo
Soliman, bound and tied his houseboy Sixto
Gentugas with a rope at around 6:00 p.m. and
delivered him to the justice of the peace. Sixto
was detained during the whole night and until
9:00 a.m. of the next day when he was ordered
released by the justice of the peace because
he had not committed any crime, Gellada was
convicted of Arbitrary Detention.16

Under Republic Act No. 3590, otherwise known
as The Revised Barrio Charter, the powers and
duties of a barrio captain include the following:
to look after the maintenance of public order in
the barrio and to assist the municipal mayor
and the municipal councilor in charge of the
district in the performance of their duties in
such barrio;17 to look after the general welfare
of the barrio;18 to enforce all laws and
ordinances which are operative within the
barrio;19and to organize and lead an
emergency group whenever the same may be
necessary for the maintenance of peace and
order within the barrio.20
In his treatise on Barrio Government Law and
Administration, Professor Jose M. Aruego has
this to say about the above-mentioned powers
and duties of a Barrio Captain, to wit:
"Upon the barrio captain depends in the main
the maintenance of public order in the barrio.
For public disorder therein, inevitably people
blame him.
"In the event that there be a disturbing act to
said public order or a threat to disturb public
order, what can the barrio captain do?
Understandably, he first resorts to peaceful
measures. He may take preventive measures
like placing the offenders under surveillance
and persuading them, where possible, to
behave well, but when necessary, he may
subject them to the full force of law.
"He is a peace officer in the barrio considered
under the law as a person in authority. As
such, he may make arrest and detain persons
within legal limits.21 (Emphasis supplied.)
One need not be a police officer to be
chargeable with Arbitrary Detention. It is
accepted that other public officers like judges
and mayors, who act with abuse of their
functions, may be guilty of this crime.22 A
perusal of the powers and function vested in
mayors would show that they are similar to
those of a barrio captain23 except that in the
case of the latter, his territorial jurisdiction is
smaller. Having the same duty of maintaining
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 6
peace and order, both must be and are given
the authority to detain or order detention.
Noteworthy is the fact that even private
respondent Tuvera himself admitted that with
the aid of his rural police, he as a barrio
captain, could have led the arrest of petitioner
Valdez.24
From the foregoing, there is no doubt that a
barrio captain, like private respondent Tuvera,
Sr., can be held liable for Arbitrary Detention.
Next, private respondent Tuvera, Sr. contends
that the motion to quash was validly granted as
the facts and evidence on record show that
there was no crime of Arbitrary
25
Detention; that he only sought the aid and
assistance of the Manaoag Police Force;26 and
that he only accompanied petitioner Valdez to
town for the latter's personal safety.27
Suffice it to say that the above allegations can
only be raised as a defense at the trial as they
traverse what is alleged in the Information. We
have repeatedly held that Courts, in resolving a
motion to quash, cannot consider facts
contrary to those alleged in the information or
which do not appear on the face of the
information. This is because a motion to quash
is a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged
in the information.28 Matters of defense cannot
be proved during the hearing of such a motion,
except where the Rules expressly permit, such
as extinction of criminal liability, prescription,
and former jeopardy.29 In the case of U.S. vs.
Perez,30 this Court held that a motion to quash
on the ground that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense cannot allege new facts
not only different but diametrically opposed to
those alleged in the complaint. This rule admits
of only one exception and that is when such
facts are admitted by the prosecution.31 lawphi1
Lastly, private respondent claims that by the
lower court's granting of the motion to quash
jeopardy has already attached in his favor32 on
the ground that here, the case was dismissed
or otherwise terminated without his express
consent.
 CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 7

Respondent's contention holds no water. An PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-

order granting a motion to quash, unlike one of appellee,
denial, is a final order. It is not merely vs.
interlocutory and is therefore immediately RUBEN BURGOS y TITO, defendant-
appealable. The accused cannot claim double appellant.
jeopardy as the dismissal was secured not only
with his consent but at his instance.33

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

Petition for certiorari is GRANTED. The
questioned Order of April 25, 1973 in Criminal
Case No. D-529 is hereby set aside. Let this
case be remanded to the appropriate trial court
for further proceedings. No pronouncement as
to costs.
SO ORDERED.
This is an appeal from the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Davao del Sur, 11 th
Judicial Region, Digos, Davao del Sur
convicting defendant- appellant Ruben Burgos
y Tito of The crime of Illegal Possession of
Firearms in Furtherance of Subversion. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, finding the guilt of

accused Ruben Burgos
sufficiently established beyond
reasonable doubt, of the offense
charges , pursuant to Presidential
Decree No. 9, in relation to
General Order No. 6, dated
September 22, 1972, and
General Order No. 7, dated
September 23, 1972, in relation
further to Presidential Decree No.
885, and considering that the
firearm subject of this case was
not used in the circumstances as
embraced in paragraph I thereof,
applying the provision of
indeterminate sentence law,
accused Ruben Burgos is hereby
sentenced to suffer an
imprisonment of twenty (20)
years of reclusion temporal
maximum, as minimum penalty,
to reclusion perpetua, as
maximum penalty, pursuant to
sub-paragraph B, of Presidential
Decree No. 9, as
aforementioned, with accessory
penalties, as provided for by law.

As a result of this judgment, the

G.R. No. L-68955 September 4, 1986 subject firearm involved in this
case (Homemade revolver,

caliber .38, Smith and Wesson,
with Serial No. 8.69221) is
hereby ordered confiscated in
favor of the government, to be
disposed of in accordance with
law. Likewise, the subversive
documents, leaflets and/or
propaganda seized are ordered
disposed of in accordance with
law.
The information charged the defendant-
appellant with the crime of illegal possession of
firearm in furtherance of subversion in an
information which reads as follows:
That in the afternoon of May 13,
1982 and thereabout at Tiguman,
Digos, Davao del Sur,
Philippines, within the jurisdiction
of this Court, the above- named
accused with intent to possess
and without the necessary
license, permit or authority issued
by the proper government
agencies, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
keep, possess, carry and have in
his possession, control and
custody one (1) homemade
revolver, caliber .38, make Smith
and Wesson, with Serial No.
8.69221, which firearm was
issued to and used by the
accused at Tiguman, Digos,
Davao del Sur, his area of
operations by one Alias
Commander Pol for the New
People's Army (NPA), a Immediately, upon receipt of said
subversive organization
organized for the purpose of
overthrowing the Government of
the Republic of the Philippines
through lawless and violent
means, of which the accused had
knowledge, and which firearm
was used by the accused in the
performance of his subversive
tasks such as the recruitment of
New Members to the NPA and
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 8
collection of contributions from
the members.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The evidence for the prosecution is
summarized in the decision of the lower court
as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
. . . Through the testimony of Pat.
Pepito Bioco, and Sgt. Romeo
Taroy, it appears that by virtue of
an intelligent information obtained
by the Constabulary and INP
units, stationed at Digos, Davao
del Sur, on May 12, 1982, one
Cesar Masamlok personally and
voluntarily surre0ndered to the
authorities at about 9:00 o'clock
A.M. at Digos, Davao del Sur
Constabulary Headquarters,
stating that he was forcibly
recruited by accused Ruben
Burgos as member of the NPA,
threatening him with the use of
firearm against his life, if he
refused.
Along with his recruitment,
accused was asked to contribute
one (1) chopa of rice and one
peso (P1.00) per month, as his
contribution to the NPA TSN,
page 5, Hearing-October 14,
1982).
information, a joint team of PC-
INP units, composed of fifteen
(15) members, headed by
Captain Melchesideck Bargio,
(PC), on the following day, May
13, 1982, was dispatched at
Tiguman; Davao del Sur, to
arrest accused Ruben Burgos.
The team left the headquarter at
1:30 P.M., and arrived at
Tiguman, at more or less 2:00

o'clock PM where through the
help of Pedro Burgos, brother of
accused, the team was able to
locate accused, who was plowing
his field. (TSN, pages 6-7,
Hearing-October 14, 1982).
Right in the house of accused,
the latter was caned by the team
and Pat. Bioco asked accused
about his firearm, as reported by
Cesar Masamlok. At first accused
denied possession of said firearm
but later, upon question
profounded by Sgt. Alejandro
Buncalan with the wife of the
accused, the latter pointed to a
place below their house where a
gun was buried in the ground.
(TSN, page 8, Hearing-October
14, 1982).
Pat. Bioco then verified the place
pointed by accused's wife and
dug the grounds, after which he
recovered the firearm, Caliber .38
revolver, marked as Exhibit "A"
for the prosecution.
After the recovery of the firearm,
accused likewise pointed to the
team, subversive documents
which he allegedly kept in a stock
pile of qqqcogon at a distance of
three (3) meters apart from his
house. Then Sgt. Taroy
accordingly verified beneath said
cogon grass and likewise
recovered documents consisting
of notebook colored maroon with
spiral bound, Exhibit "B" for the
prosecution; a pamphlet
consisting of eight (8) leaves,
including the front and back
covers entitled Ang Bayan,
Pahayagan ng Partido Komunista
ng Pilipinas, Pinapatnubayan ng
Marxismo, Leninismo Kaisipang
Mao qqqZedong dated December
31, 1980, marked as Exhibit "C",
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 9
and another pamphlet Asdang
Pamantalaang Masa sa
Habagatang Mindanao, March
and April 1981 issue, consisting
of ten (10) pages, marked as
Exhibit "D" for the prosecution.
Accused, when confronted with
the firearm Exhibit "A", after its
recovery, readily admitted the
same as issued to him by Nestor
Jimenez, otherwise known as a
certain Alias Pedipol, allegedly
team leader of the sparrow unit of
New People's Army, responsible
in the liquidation of target
personalities, opposed to NPA
Ideological movement, an
example was the killing of the late
Mayor Llanos and Barangay
Captain of Tienda Aplaya Digos,
Davao del Sur. (TSN, pages 1-
16, Hearing-October 14,1982).
To prove accused's subversive
activities, Cesar Masamlok, a
former NPA convert was
presented, who declared that on
March 7, 1972, in his former
residence at Tiguman Digos,
Davao del Sur, accused Ruben
Burgos, accompanied by his
companions Landrino Burgos,
Oscar Gomez and Antonio
Burgos, went to his house at
about 5:00 o'clock P.M. and
called him downstair. Thereupon,
accused told Masamlok, their
purpose was to ask rice and one
(1) peso from him, as his
contribution to their companions,
the NPA of which he is now a
member. (TSN, pages 70, 71, 72,
Hearing-January 4, 1983).
Accused and his companions told
Masamlok, he has to join their
group otherwise, he and his
family will be killed. He was also
warned not to reveal anything
 CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 10
with the government authorities.
Because of the threat to his life
and family, Cesar Masamlok
joined the group. Accused then
told him, he should attend a
seminar scheduled on April 19,
1982. Along with this invitation,
accused pulled gut from his
waistline a .38 caliber revolver
which Masamlok really saw,
being only about two (2) meters
away from accused, which make
him easily Identified said firearm,
as that marked as Exhibit "A" for
the prosecution. (TSN, pages 72,
73, and 74, Hearing-January 4,
1983).
On April 19, 1982, as previously
invited, Masamlok, accompanied
by his father, Matuguil Masamlok,
Isabel Ilan and Ayok Ides went to
the house of accused and
attended the seminar, Those
present in the seminar were:
accused Ruben Burgos, Antonio
Burgos, Oscar Gomez, Landrino
Burgos, alias Pedipol and one
alias Jamper.
The first speaker was accused
Ruben Burgos, who said very
distinctly that he is an NPA
together with his companions, to
assure the unity of the civilian.
That he encouraged the group to
overthrow the government,
emphasizing that those who
attended the seminar were
already members of the NPA,
and if they reveal to the
authorities, they will be killed.
Accused, while talking, showed to
the audience pamphlets and
documents, then finally shouted,
the NPA will be victorious.
Masamlok likewise Identified the
pamphlets as those marked as
Exh. exhibits "B", "C", and "D" for
the prosecution. (TSN, pages 75,
76 and 77, Hearing-January 4,
1983)
Other speakers in said meeting
were Pedipol, Jamper and Oscar
Gomez, who likewise expounded
their own opinions about the
NPA. It was also announced in
said seminar that a certain Tonio
Burgos, will be responsible for
the collection of the contribution
from the members. (TSN, pages
78-79, Hearing- January 4, 1983)
On May 12, 1982, however,
Cesar Masamlok surrendered to
Captain Bargio of the Provincial
Headquarters of the Philippine
Constabulary, Digos, Davao del
Sur.
Assistant Provincial Fiscal Panfilo
Lovitos was presented t prove
that on May 19, 1982, he
administered the subscription of
th extra-judicial confession of
accused Ruben Burgos, marked
as Exhibit "E " for the
prosecution, consisting of five (5)
pages.
Appearing voluntarily in said
office, for the subscription of his
confession, Fiscal Lovitos,
realizing that accused was not
represented by counsel,
requested the services of Atty.
Anyog, whose office is adjacent
to the Fiscal's Office, to assist
accused in the subscription of his
extra-judicial statement.
Atty. Anyog assisted accused in
the reading of his confession
from English to Visayan
language, resulting to the
deletion of question No. 19 of the
document, by an inserted
certification of Atty. Anyog and

signature of accused, indicating
his having understood, the
allegations of his extra-judicial
statement.
Fiscal Lovitos, before accused
signed his statement, explained
to him his constitutional rights to
remain silent, right to counsel and
right to answer any question
propounded or not.
With the aid of Atty. Anyog,
accused signed his confession in
the presence of Atty. Anyog and
Fiscal Lovitos, without the
presence of military authorities,
who escorted the accused, but
were sent outside the cubicle of
Fiscal Lovitos while waiting for
the accused. (TSN, pages 36-40,
nearing November 15, 1982)
Finally, in order to prove illegal
possession by accused of the
subject firearm, Sgt. Epifanio
Comabig in-charge of firearms
and explosives, NCO
Headquarter, Philippine
Constabulary, Digos, Davao del
Sur, was presented and testified,
that among the lists of firearm
holders in Davao del Sur, nothing
was listed in the name of
accused Ruben Burgos, neither
was his name included among
the lists of persons who applied
for the licensing of the firearm
under Presidential Decree No.
1745.
After the above-testimony the
prosecution formally closed its
case and offered its exhibits,
which were all admitted in
evidence, despite objection
interposed by counsel for
accused, which was accordingly
overruled.
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 11
On the other hand, the defendant-appellant's
version of the case against him is stated in the
decision as follows:
From his farm, the military
personnel, whom he said he
cannot recognize, brought him to
the PC Barracks at Digos, Davao
del Sur, and arrived there at
about 3:00 o'clock, on the same
date. At about 8:00 o'clock P.M.,
in the evening, he was
investigated by soldiers, whom
he cannot Identify because they
were wearing a civilian attire.
(TSN, page 14 1, Hearing-June
15, 1983)
The investigation was conducted
in the PC barracks, where he was
detained with respect to the
subject firearm, which the
investigator, wished him to admit
but accused denied its
ownership. Because of his refusal
accused was mauled, hitting him
on the left and right side of his
body which rendered him
unconscious. Accused in an
atmosphere of tersed solemnity,
crying and with emotional
attachment, described in detail
how he was tortured and the
ordeals he was subjected.
He said, after recovery of his
consciousness, he was again
confronted with subject firearm,
Exhibit "A", for him to admit and
when he repeatedly refused to
accept as his own firearm, he
was subjected to further prolong
(sic) torture and physical agony.
Accused said, his eyes were
covered with wet black cloth with
pungent effect on his eyes. He
was undressed, with only
blindfold, pungent water poured
in his body and over his private
parts, making his entire body,
 CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 12
particularly his penis and testicle,
terribly irritating with pungent
pain.
All along, he was investigated to
obtain his admission, The
process of beating, mauling, pain
and/or ordeal was repeatedly
done in similar cycle, from May
13 and 14, 1982. intercepted only
whenever he fell unconscious
and again repeated after
recovery of his senses,
Finally on May 15, 1982, after
undergoing the same torture and
physical ordeal he was seriously
warned, if he will still adamantly
refuse to accept ownership of the
subject firearm, he will be
salvaged, and no longer able to
bear any further the pain and
agony, accused admitted
ownership of subject firearm.
After his admission, the mauling
and torture stopped, but accused
was made to sign his affidavit
marked as Exhibit "E" for the
prosecution, consisting of five (5)
pages, including the certification
of the administering officer, (TSN,
pages 141-148, Hearing-June 15,
1983)
In addition to how he described
the torture inflicted on him,
accused, by way of explanation
and commentary in details, and
going one by one, the allegations
and/or contents of his alleged
extrajudicial statement, attributed
his answers to those questions
involuntarily made only because
of fear, threat and intimidation of
his person and family, as a result
of unbearable excruciating pain
he was subjected by an
investigator, who, unfortunately
he cannot Identify and was able
to obtain his admission of the
subject firearm, by force and
violence exerted over his person.
To support denial of accused of
being involved in any subversive
activities, and also to support his
denial to the truth of his alleged
extra-judicial confession,
particularly questions Nos. 35,
38, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46 and 47,
along with qqqs answers to those
questions, involving Honorata
Arellano ahas Inday Arellano,
said Honorata Arellano appeared
and declared categorically, that
the above-questions embraced in
the numbers allegedly stated in
the extrajudicial confession of
accused, involving her to such
NPA personalities, as Jamper,
Pol, Anthony, etc., were not true
because on the date referred on
April 28, 1982, none of the
persons mentioned came to her
house for treatment, neither did
she meet the accused nor able to
talk with him. (TSN, pages 118-
121, Hearing-May 18, 1983)
She, however, admitted being
familiar with one Oscar Gomez,
and that she was personally
charged with subversion in the
Office of the Provincial
Commander, Philippine
Constabulary, Digos, Davao del
Sur, but said charge was
dismissed without reaching the
Court. She likewise stated that
her son, Rogelio Arellano, was
likewise charged for subversion
filed in the Municipal Trial Court
of Digos, Davao del Sur, but was
likewise dismissed for lack of
sufficient evidence to sustain his
conviction. (TSN, pages 121-122,
in relation to her cross-
examination, Hearing-May 18,
1983)

To support accused's denial of
the charge against him, Barangay
Captain of Tiguman, Digos,
Davao del Sur, Salvador
qqqGalaraga was presented, who
declared, he was not personally
aware of any subversive activities
of accused, being his neighbor
and member of his barrio. On the
contrary, he can personally attest
to his good character and
reputation, as a law abiding
citizen of his barrio, being a
carpenter and farmer thereat.
(TSl pages 128-129, Hearing-
May 18, 1983)
He however, admitted in cross-
examination, that there were a lot
of arrests made by the authorities
in his barrio involving subversive
activities but they were released
and were not formally charged in
Court because they publicly took
their oath of allegiance with the
government. (TSN, pages 133-
134, in relation to page 136,
Hearing-May 18, 1983)
Finally, to support accused's
denial of the subject firearm, his
wife, Urbana Burgos, was
presented and who testified that
the subject firearm was left in
their house by Cesar Masamlok
and one Pedipol on May 10,
1982. It was night time, when the
two left the gun, alleging that it
was not in order, and that they
will leave it behind, temporarily
for them to claim it later. They
were the ones who buried it. She
said, her husband, the accused,
was not in their house at that time
and that she did not inform him
about said firearm neither did she
report the matter to the
authorities, for fear of the life of
her husband. (TSN, page 24,
November 22, 1983)
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 13
On cross-examination, she said,
even if Masamlok during the
recovery of the firearm, was
wearing a mask, she can still
Identify him. (TSN, page 6,
Hearing-November 22, 1983)
After the above-testimony,
accused through counsel formally
rested his case in support of
accused's through counsel
manifestation for the demurrer to
evidence of the prosecution, or in
the alternative for violation merely
of simple illegal possession of
firearm, 'under the Revised
Administrative Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 4,
reflected in the manifestation of
counsel for accused. (TSN,
pages 113-114, Hearing-May 18,
1983)
Accused-appellant Ruben Burgos now raises
the following assignments of error, to wit:
I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT (SIC) THE
ARREST OF ACCUSED-
APPELLANT WITHOUT VALID
WARRANT TO BE LAWFUL.
II THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
HOLDING THE SEARCH IN THE
HOUSE OF ACCUSED-
APPELLANT FOR FIREARM
WITHOUT VALID WARRANT TO
BE LAWFUL.
III THE TRIAL COURT ERRED
IN HOLDING ACCUSED-
APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT FOR
VIOLATION OF P.D. No. 9 IN
RELATION TO GENERAL
ORDERS NOS. 6 AND 7
Was the arrest of Ruben Burgos lawful? Were
the search of his house and the subsequent
confiscation of a firearm and documents

allegedly found therein conducted in a lawful
and valid manner? Does the evidence
sustaining the crime charged meet the test of
proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt?
The records of the case disclose that when the
police authorities went to the house of Ruben
Burgos for the purpose of arresting him upon
information given by Cesar Masamlok that the
accused allegedly recruited him to join the New
People's Army (NPA), they did not have any
warrant of arrest or search warrant with them
(TSN, p. 25, October 14, 1982; and TSN, p. 61,
November 15, 1982).
Article IV, Section 3 of the Constitution
provides:
The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and
for any purpose shall not be
violated, and no search warrant
or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to
be determined by the judge, or
such other responsible officer as
may be authorized by law, after
examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly
describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
The constitutional provision is a safeguard
against wanton and unreasonable invasion of
the privacy and liberty of a citizen as to his
person, papers and effects. This Court
explained in Villanueva vs. Querubin (48 SCRA
345) why this right is so important:
It is deference to one's
personality that lies at the core of
this right, but it could be also
looked upon as a recognition of a
constitutionally protected area,
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 14
primarily one's home, but not
necessarily thereto confined. (Cf.
Hoffa v. United States, 385 US
293 [19661) What is sought to be
guarded is a man's prerogative to
choose who is allowed entry to
his residence. In that haven of
refuge, his individuality can
assert itself not only in the choice
of who shall be welcome but
likewise in the kind of objects he
wants around him. There the
state, however powerful, does not
as such have access except
under the circumstances above
noted, for in the traditional
formulation, his house, however
humble, is his castle. Thus is
outlawed any unwarranted
intrusion by government, which is
called upon to refrain from any
invasion of his dwelling and to
respect the privacies of his life,
(Cf. Schmerber v. California, 384
US 757 [1966], Brennan, J. and
Boyd v. United States, 116 US
616, 630 [1886]). In the same
vein, Landynski in his
authoritative work (Search and
Seizure and the Supreme Court
[1966], could fitly characterize
this constitutional right as the
embodiment of a 'spiritual
concept: the belief that to value
the privacy of home and person
and to afford its constitutional
protection against the long reach
of government is no legs than to
value human dignity, and that his
privacy must not be disturbed
except in case of overriding
social need, and then only under
stringent procedural safeguards.'
(Ibid, p. 47).
The trial court justified the arrest of the
accused-appelant without any warrant as
falling under one of the instances when arrests
may be validly made without a warrant. Rule

113, Section 6 * of the Rules of Court, provides
the exceptions as follows:
a) When the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is about
to commit an offense in his presence;
b) When an offense has in fact been
committed, and he has reasonable ground to
believe that the person to be arrested has
committed it;
c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner
who has escaped from a penal establishment
or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending
or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another.
The Court stated that even if there was no
warrant for the arrest of Burgos, the fact that
"the authorities received an urgent report of
accused's involvement in subversive activities
from a reliable source (report of Cesar
Masamlok) the circumstances of his arrest,
even without judicial warrant, is lawfully within
the ambit of Section 6-A of Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court and applicable jurisprudence on
the matter."
If the arrest is valid, the consequent search
and seizure of the firearm and the alleged
subversive documents would become an
incident to a lawful arrest as provided by Rule
126, Section 12, which states:
A person charged with an offense
may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything which may
be used as proof of the
commission of the offense.
The conclusions reached by the trial court are
erroneous.
Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113, the officer
arresting a person who has just committed, is
committing, or is about to commit an offense
must have personal knowledge of that fact.
The offense must also be committed in his
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 15
presence or within his view. (Sayo v. Chief of
Police, 80 Phil. 859).
There is no such personal knowledge in this
case. Whatever knowledge was possessed by
the arresting officers, it came in its entirety
from the information furnished by Cesar
Masamlok. The location of the firearm was
given by the appellant's wife.
At the time of the appellant's arrest, he was not
in actual possession of any firearm or
subversive document. Neither was he
committing any act which could be described
as subversive. He was, in fact, plowing his field
at the time of the arrest.
The right of a person to be secure against any
unreasonable seizure of his body and any
deprivation of his liberty is a most basic and
fundamental one. The statute or rule which
allows exceptions to the requirement of
warrants of arrest is strictly construed. Any
exception must clearly fall within the situations
when securing a warrant would be absurd or is
manifestly unnecessary as provided by the
Rule. We cannot liberally construe the rule on
arrests without warrant or extend its application
beyond the cases specifically provided by law.
To do so would infringe upon personal liberty
and set back a basic right so often violated and
so deserving of full protection.
The Solicitor General is of the persuasion that
the arrest may still be considered lawful under
Section 6(b) using the test of reasonableness.
He submits that. the information given by
Cesar Masamlok was sufficient to induce a
reasonable ground that a crime has been
committed and that the accused is probably
guilty thereof.
In arrests without a warrant under Section 6(b),
however, it is not enough that there is
reasonable ground to believe that the person to
be arrested has committed a crime. A crime
must in fact or actually have been committed
first. That a crime has actually been committed
is an essential precondition. It is not enough to
suspect that a crime may have been

committed. The fact of the commission of the
offense must be undisputed. The test of
reasonable ground applies only to the identity
of the perpetrator.
In this case, the accused was arrested on the
sole basis of Masamlok's verbal report.
Masamlok led the authorities to suspect that
the accused had committed a crime. They
were still fishing for evidence of a crime not yet
ascertained. The subsequent recovery of the
subject firearm on the basis of information from
the lips of a frightened wife cannot make the
arrest lawful, If an arrest without warrant is
unlawful at the moment it is made, generally
nothing that happened or is discovered
afterwards can make it lawful. The fruit of a
poisoned tree is necessarily also tainted.
More important, we find no compelling reason
for the haste with which the arresting officers
sought to arrest the accused. We fail to see
why they failed to first go through the process
of obtaining a warrant of arrest, if indeed they
had reasonable ground to believe that the
accused had truly committed a crime. There is
no showing that there was a real apprehension
that the accused was on the verge of flight or
escape. Likewise, there is no showing that the
whereabouts of the accused were unknown,
The basis for the action taken by the arresting
officer was the verbal report made by
Masamlok who was not required to subscribe
his allegations under oath. There was no
compulsion for him to state truthfully his
charges under pain of criminal prosecution.
(TSN, p. 24, October 14, 1982). Consequently,
the need to go through the process of securing
a search warrant and a warrant of arrest
becomes even more clear. The arrest of the
accused while he was plowing his field is
illegal. The arrest being unlawful, the search
and seizure which transpired afterwards could
not likewise be deemed legal as being mere
incidents to a valid arrest.
Neither can it be presumed that there was a
waiver, or that consent was given by the
accused to be searched simply because he
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 16
failed to object. To constitute a waiver, it must
appear first that the right exists; secondly, that
the person involved had knowledge, actual or
constructive, of the existence of such a right;
and lastly, that said person had an actual
intention to relinquish the right (Pasion Vda. de
Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689). The fact that
the accused failed to object to the entry into his
house does not amount to a permission to
make a search therein (Magoncia v. Palacio,
80 Phil. 770). As pointed out by Justice Laurel
in the case of Pasion Vda. de Garcia V. Locsin
(supra)
xxx xxx xxx
. . . As the constitutional guaranty
is not dependent upon any
affirmative act of the citizen, the
courts do not place the citizen in
the position of either contesting
an officer's authority by force, or
waiving his constitutional rights;
but instead they hold that a
peaceful submission to a search
or seizure is not a consent or an
invitation thereto, but is merely a
demonstration of regard for the
supremacy of the law. (56 C.J.,
pp. 1180, 1181).
We apply the rule that: "courts indulge every
reasonable presumption against waiver of
fundamental constitutional rights and that we
do not presume acquiescence in the loss of
fundamental rights." (Johnson v. Zerbst 304
U.S. 458).
That the accused-appellant was not apprised
of any of his constitutional rights at the time of
his arrest is evident from the records:
A CALAMBA:
Q When you went
to the area to arrest
Ruben Burgos, you
were not armed
with an arrest
warrant?
 CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 17

A None Sir. dug the firearm

which was wrapped
Q Neither were you with a cellophane.
armed with a
search warrant? Q In your interview
of Burgos you did
A No Sir. not remind him of
his rights under the
Q As a matter of constitution
fact, Burgos was considering that he
not present in his was purposely
house when you under arrest?
went there?
A I did not.
A But he was
twenty meters away Q As a matter of
from his house. fact, he denied that
he has ever a gun?
Q Ruben Burgos
was then plowing A Yes Sir.
his field?
Q As a matter of
A Yes Sir. fact, the gun was
not in his
Q When you called possession?
for Ruben Burgos
you interviewed A It was buried
him? down in his horse.

A Yes Sir. Q As a matter of

fact, Burgos did not
Q And that you told point to where it
him that Masamlok was buried?
implicated him?
A Yes Sir.
A No Sir.
(TSN, pp. 25-26,
Q What did you tell Hearing-October
him? 14, 1982)

A That we received Considering that the questioned firearm and

information that you the alleged subversive documents were
have a firearm, you obtained in violation of the accused's
surrender that constitutional rights against unreasonable
firearm, first he searches and seizures, it follows that they are
denied but when inadmissible as evidence.
Sgt. Buncalan
interviewed his wife, There is another aspect of this case.
his wife told him
that it is buried, I

In proving ownership of the questioned firearm
and alleged subversive documents, the
prosecution presented the two arresting
officers who testified that the accused readily
admitted ownership of the gun after qqqs wife
pointed to the place where it was buried. The
officers stated that it was the accused himself
who voluntarily pointed to the place where the
alleged subversive documents were hidden.
Assuming this to be true, it should be recalled
that the accused was never informed of his
constitutional rights at the time of his arrest. So
that when the accused allegedly admitted
ownership of the gun and pointed to the
location of the subversive documents after
questioning, the admissions were obtained in
violation of the constitutional right against self-
incrimination under Sec. 20 of Art. IV of the Bill
of Rights winch provides:
No person shall be compelled to
be a witness against himself. Any
person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall
have the right to remain silent
and to counsel, and to be
informed of such right.. . .
The Constitution itself mandates that any
evidence obtained in violation of this right is
inadmissible in evidence. Consequently, the
testimonies of the arresting officers as to the
admissions made by the appellant cannot be
used against him.
The trial court validly rejected the extra-judicial
confession of the accused as inadmissible in
evidence. The court stated that the appellant's
having been exhaustively subjected to physical
terror, violence, and third degree measures
may not have been supported by reliable
evidence but the failure to present the
investigator who conducted the investigation
gives rise to the "provocative presumption" that
indeed torture and physical violence may have
been committed as stated.
The accused-appellant was not accorded his
constitutional right to be assisted by counsel
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 18
during the custodial interrogation. The lower
court correctly pointed out that the securing of
counsel, Atty. Anyog, to help the accused
when he subscribed under oath to his
statement at the Fiscal's Office was too late. It
could have no palliative effect. It cannot cure
the absence of counsel at the time of the
custodial investigation when the extrajudicial
statement was being taken.
With the extra-judicial confession, the firearm,
and the alleged subversive documents
inadmissible in evidence against the accused-
appellant, the only remaining proof to sustain
the charge of Illegal Possession of Firearm in
Furtherance of Subversion is the testimony of
Cesar Masamlok.
We find the testimony of Masamlok inadequate
to convict Burgos beyond reasonable doubt. It
is true that the trial court found Masamlok's
testimony credible and convincing. However,
we are not necessarily bound by the credibility
which the trial court attaches to a particular
witness. As stated in People vs.. Cabrera (100
SCRA 424):
xxx xxx xxx
. . .Time and again we have
stated that when it comes to
question of credibility the findings
of the trial court are entitled to
great respect upon appeal for the
obvious reason th+at it was able
to observe the demeanor,
actuations and deportment of the
witnesses during the trial. But we
have also said that this rule is not
absolute for otherwise there
would be no reversals of
convictions upon appeal. We
must reject the findings of the trial
court where the record discloses
circumstances of weight and
substance which were not
properly appreciated by the trial
court.

The situation under which Cesar Masamlok
testified is analogous to that found in People
vs. Capadocia (17 SCRA 98 1):
. . . The case against appellant is
built on Ternura's testimony, and
the issue hinges on how much
credence can be accorded to
him. The first consideration is that
said testimony stands
uncorroborated. Ternura was the
only witness who testified on the
mimeographing incident. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
. . .He was a confessed Huk
under detention at the time. He
knew his fate depended upon
how much he cooperated with the
authorities, who were then
engaged in a vigorous anti-
dissident campaign. As in the
case of Rodrigo de Jesus, whose
testimony We discounted for the
same reason, that of Ternura
cannot be considered as
proceeding from a totally
unbiased source. . . .
In the instant case, Masamlok's testimony was
totally uncorroborated. Considering that
Masamlok surrendered to the military certainly
his fate depended on how eagerly he
cooperated with the authorities. Otherwise, he
would also be charged with subversion. The
trade-off appears to be his membership in the
Civil Home Defense Force. (TSN, p. 83,
January 4, 1983). Masamlok may be
considered as an interested witness. It can not
be said that his testimony is free from the
opportunity and temptation to be exaggerated
and even fabricated for it was intended to
secure his freedom.
Despite the fact that there were other persons
present during the alleged NPA seminar of
April 19, 1982 i.e., Masamlok's father ,Matuguil
Masamlok, Isabel Ilan and Ayok Ides (TSN, p.
74, January 4, 1983) who could have
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 19
corroborated Cesar Masamlok's testimony that
the accused used the gun in furtherance of
subversive activities or actually engaged in
subversive acts, the prosecution never
presented any other witness.
This Court is, therefore, constrained to rule that
the evidence presented by the prosecution is
insufficient to prove the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt.
As held in the case of People vs. Baia (34
SCRA 347):
It is evident that once again,
reliance can be placed on People
v. Dramayo (42 SCRA 59), where
after stressing that accusation is
not, according to the fundamental
law, synonymous with guilt, it was
made clear: 'Only if the judge
below and the appellate tribunal
could arrive at a conclusion that
the crime had been committed
precisely by the person on trial
under such an exacting test
should the sentence be one of
conviction. It is thus required that
every circumstance favoring his
innocence be duly taken into
account. The proof against him
must survive the test of reason;
the strongest suspicion must not
be permitted to sway judgment.
The conscience must be satisfied
that on the defendant could be
laid the responsibility for the
offense charged; that not only did
he perpetrate the act but that it
amounted to a crime. What is
required then is moral certainty.'
(Ibid, 64. Cf. People v. Alvarez,
55 SCRA 81; People v. Joven, 64
SCRA 126; People vs. Ramirez,
69 SCRA 144; People vs. Godov
72 SCRA 69; People v. Lopez, 74
SCRA 205; People v. Poblador,
76 SCRA 634; People v.
Quiazon, 78 SCRA 513; People
v. Nazareno, 80 SCRA 484;
 CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 20

People vs. Gabilan 115 SCRA 1; Cost de oficio.

People v. Gabiana, 117 SCRA
260; and People vs. Ibanga 124 SO ORDERED.
SCRA 697).

We are aware of the serious problems faced by

the military in Davao del Sur where there
appears to be a well-organized plan to
overthrow the Government through armed
struggle and replace it with an alien system
based on a foreign ideology. The open
defiance against duly constituted authorities
has resulted in unfortunate levels of violence
and human suffering publicized all over the
country and abroad. Even as we reiterate the
need for all freedom loving citizens to assist
the military authorities in their legitimate efforts
to maintain peace and national security, we
must also remember the dictum in Morales vs.
Enrile (1 21 SCRA 538, 569) when this Court
stated:

While the government should

continue to repel the communists,
the subversives, the rebels, and
the lawless with an the means at
its command, it should always be
remembered that whatever action
is taken must always be within
the framework of our Constitution
and our laws.

Violations of human rights do not help in

overcoming a rebellion. A cavalier attitude
towards constitutional liberties and protections
will only fan the increase of subversive
activities instead of containing and suppressing
them.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction

rendered by the trial court is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The accused-appellant is hereby
ACQUITTED, on grounds of reasonable doubt,
of the crime with which he has been charged.
G.R. No. 81567 July 9, 1990
The subject firearm involved in this case
(homemade revolver, caliber .38, Smith and IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR
Wesson, with Serial No. 8.69221) and the HABEAS CORPUS OF ROBERTO UMIL,
alleged subversive documents are ordered ROLANDO DURAL and RENATO
disposed of in accordance with law. VILLANUEVA. MANOLITA O. UMIL, and

NICANOR P. DURAL, FELICITAS V.
SESE, petitioners,
vs.
FIDEL V. RAMOS, MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE
VILLA, BRIG. GEN. RAMON MONTANO,
BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER
AGUIRRE, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 84581-82 July 9, 1990
AMELIA ROQUE and WILFREDO
BUENAOBRA, petitioners,
vs.
GEN. RENATO DE VILLA and GEN. RAMON
MONTANO, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 84583-84 July 9, 1990
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR
HABEAS CORPUS OF ATTY. DOMINGO T.
ANONUEVO and RAMON CASIPLE.
DOMINGO T. ANONUEVO and RAMON
CASIPLE, petitioners,
vs.
HON. FIDEL V. RAMOS, GEN. RENATO S.
DE VILLA, COL. EVARISTO CARINO, LT.
COL. REX D. PIAD, T/SGT. CONRADO DE
TORRES, S/SGT. ARNOLD DURIAN, and
Commanding Officer, PC-INP Detention
Center, Camp Crame, Quezon
City, respondents.
G.R. No. 83162 July 9, 1990
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION
FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF VICKY A.
OCAYA AND DANNY RIVERA. VIRGILIO A.
OCAYA, petitioner,
vs.
BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, COL.
HERCULES CATALUNA, COL. NESTOR
MARIANO, respondents.
G.R. No. 85727 July 9, 1990
IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR
HABEAS CORPUS OF: DEOGRACIAS
ESPIRITU, petitioner,
vs.
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 21
BRIG. GEN. ALFREDO S. LIM, COL.
RICARDO REYES, respondents.
G.R. No. 86332 July 9, 1990
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR
HABEAS CORPUS OF NARCISO B.
NAZARENO. ALFREDO
NAZARENO, petitioner,
vs.
THE STATION COMMANDER OF THE
MUNTINGLUPA POLICE STATION,
Muntinglupa, Metro Manila, P/SGT.
JACINTO MEDINA, P/SGT. ELADIO TAGLE,
P/SGT. LEVI SOLEDAD, and P/SGT. MAURO
AROJADO, respondents.
Efren H. Mercado for petitioners in G.R. No.
81567.
Ricardo C. Valmonte for petitioners in G.R.
Nos. 84581-82.
Ramon S. Esguerra, Barbara Anne C. Migallos
and Agripino G. Morga for petitioners in G.R.
Nos. 84583-84.
Efren H. Mercado for petitioner in G.R. No.
83162.
Banzuela, Flores, Miralles, Raneses, Sy,
Taquio & Association for petitioner in G.R. No.
85727.
Josefina G. Campbell-Castillo for petitioners in
G.R. No. 86332.
The Solicitor General for the respondents.
PER CURIAM:
The are eight (8) petitioners for habeas
corpus filed before the Court, which have been
consolidated because of the similarity of issues
raised, praying for the issuance of the writ
of habeas corpus, ordering the respective
respondents to produce the bodies of the
persons named therein and to explain why they
should not be set at liberty without further
delay.

In their respective Returns, the respondents
uniformly assert that the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus is not available to the
petitioners as they have been legally
arrested and are detained by virtue of valid
informations filed in court against them.
The petitioners counter that their detention is
unlawful as their arrests were made without
warrant and, that no preliminary
investigation was first conducted, so that the
informations filed against them are null and
void.
The Court has carefully reviewed the
contentions of the parties in their respective
pleadings, and it finds that the persons
detained have not been illegally arrested nor
arbitrarily deprived of their constitutional right
to liberty, and that the circumstances attending
these cases do not warrant their release
on habeas corpus.
The arrest of a person without a warrant of
arrest or previous complaint is recognized in
law. The occasions or instances when such an
arrest may be effected are clearly spelled out
in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, as
amended, which provides:
Sec. 5. Arrest without
warrant; when lawful. — A peace
officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a
person:
(a) When, in his presence, the
person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an
offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact
just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be
arrested is a prisoner who has
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 22
escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he
is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs
(a) and (b) hereof, the person
arrested without a warrant shall
be forthwith delivered to the
nearest police station or jail, and
he shall be proceeded against in
accordance with Rule 112,
Section 7.
An arrest without a warrant of arrest, under
Section 5 paragraphs (a) and (b) of Rule 113 of
the Rules of Court, as amended, is justified
when the person arrested is caught in flagranti
delicto, viz., in the act of committing an
offense; or when an offense has just been
committed and the person making the arrest
has personal knowledge of the facts indicating
that the person arrested has committed it. The
rationale behind lawful arrests, without warrant,
was stated by this Court in the case of People
vs. Kagui Malasugui 1 thus:
To hold that no criminal can, in
any case, be arrested and
searched for the evidence and
tokens of his crime without a
warrant, would be to leave
society, to a large extent, at the
mercy of the shrewdest, the most
expert, and the most depraved of
criminals, facilitating their escape
in many instances.
The record of the instant cases would show
that the persons in whose behalf these
petitions for habeas corpus have been filed,
had freshly committed or were actually
committing an offense, when apprehended, so
that their arrests without a warrant were clearly
justified, and that they are, further, detained by
virtue of valid informations filed against them in
court.

A brief narration of the facts and events
surrounding each of the eight (8) petitions is in
order.
I
In G.R. No. 81567 (Umil vs. Ramos), the
record shows that, on 1 February 1988, the
Regional Intelligence Operations Unit of the
Capital Command (RIOU-CAPCOM) received
confidential information about a member of the
NPA Sparrow Unit (liquidation squad) being
treated for a gunshot wound at the St. Agnes
Hospital in Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City.
Upon verification, it was found that the
wounded person, who was listed in the hospital
records as Ronnie Javelon, is actually Rolando
Dural, a member of the NPA liquidation squad,
responsible for the killing of two (2) CAPCOM
soldiers the day before, or on 31 January 1988,
in Macanining Street, Bagong Barrio, Caloocan
City. In view of this verification, Rolando Dural
was transferred to the Regional Medical
Services of the CAPCOM, for security reasons.
While confined thereat, or on 4 February 1988,
Rolando Dural was positively identified by
eyewitnesses as the gunman who went on top
of the hood of the CAPCOM mobile patrol car,
and fired at the two (2) CAPCOM soldiers
seated inside the car identified as T/Sgt. Carlos
Pabon and CIC Renato Manligot.
As a consequence of this positive identification,
Rolando Dural was referred to the Caloocan
City Fiscal who conducted an inquest and
thereafter filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Caloocan City an information charging Rolando
Dural alias Ronnie Javelon with the crime of
"Double Murder with Assault Upon Agents of
Persons in Authority." The case was docketed
therein as Criminal Case No. C-30112 and no
bail was recommended. On 15 February 1988,
the information was amended to include, as
defendant, Bernardo Itucal, Jr. who, at the filing
of the original information, was still unidentified.
Meanwhile, on 6 February 1988, a petition
for habeas corpus was filed with this Court on
behalf of Roberto Umil, Rolando Dural,
and Renato Villanueva. The Court issued the
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 23
writ of habeas corpus on 9 February 1988 and
the respondents filed a Return of the Writ on
12 February 1988. Thereafter, the parties were
heard on 15 February 1988.
On 26 February 1988, however, Roberto
Umil and Renato Villanueva posted bail before
the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City where
charges for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act
had been filed against them, and they were
accordingly released. The petition for habeas
corpus, insofar as Umil and Villanueva are
concerned, is now moot and academic and is
accordingly dismissed, since the writ of habeas
corpus does not lie in favor of an accused in a
criminal case who has been released on bail. 2
As to Rolando Dural, it clearly appears that he
was not arrested while in the act of shooting
the two (2) CAPCOM soldiers aforementioned.
Nor was he arrested just after the commission
of the said offense for his arrest came a day
after the said shooting incident. Seemingly, his
arrest without warrant is unjustified.
However, Rolando Dural was arrested for
being a member of the New Peoples Army
(NPA), an outlawed subversive organization.
Subversion being a continuing offense, the
arrest of Rolando Dural without warrant is
justified as it can be said that he was
committing an offense when arrested. The
crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or
proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or
offenses committed in furtherance thereof or in
connection therewith constitute direct assaults
against the State and are in the nature
of continuing crimes. As stated by the Court in
an earlier case:
From the facts as above-
narrated, the claim of the
petitioners that they were initially
arrested illegally is, therefore,
without basis in law and in fact.
The crimes of insurrection or
rebellion, subversion, conspiracy
or proposal to commit such
crimes, and other crimes and
offenses committed in the

furtherance, on the occasion
thereof, or incident thereto, or in
connection therewith under
Presidential Proclamation No.
2045, are all in the nature of
continuing offenses which set
them apart from the common
offenses, aside from their
essentially involving a massive
conspiracy of nationwide
magnitude. Clearly then, the
arrest of the herein detainees
was well within the bounds of the
law and existing jurisprudence in
our jurisdiction.
2. The arrest of persons involved
in the rebellion whether as its
fighting armed elements, or for
committing non-violent acts but in
furtherance of the rebellion, is
more an act of capturing them in
the course of an armed conflict,
to quell the rebellion, than for the
purpose of immediately
prosecuting them in court for a
statutory offense. The arrest,
therefore, need not follow the
usual procedure in the
prosecution of offenses which
requires the determination by a
judge of the existence of
probable cause before the
issuance of a judicial warrant of
arrest and the granting of bail if
the offense is bailable. Obviously,
the absence of a judicial warrant
is no legal impediment to
arresting or capturing persons
committing overt acts of violence
against government forces, or
any other milder acts but equally
in pursuance of the rebellious
movement. The arrest or capture
is thus impelled by the exigencies
of the situation that involves the
very survival of society and its
government and duly constituted
authorities. If killing and other
acts of violence against the
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 24
rebels find justification in the
exigencies of armed hostilities
which is of the essence of waging
a rebellion or insurrection, most
assuredly so in case of invasion,
merely seizing their persons and
detaining them while any of these
contingencies continues cannot
be less justified. . . . 3
The record, moreover, shows that the criminal
case filed against Rolando Dural and Bernardo
Itucal, Jr. for "Double Murder, etc." was tried in
the court below and at the conclusion thereof,
or on 17 August 1988, Rolando Dural and
Bernardo Itucal, Jr. were found guilty of the
charge and sentenced accordingly. Rolando
Dural is now serving the sentence imposed
upon him by the trial court. Thus, the writ
of habeas corpus is no longer available to him.
For, as held in the early case
4
of U.S. vs. Wilson:
In this case, whatever may be
said about the manner of his
arrest, the fact remains that the
defendant was actually in court in
the custody of the law on March
29, when a complaint sufficient in
form and substance was read to
him. To this he pleaded not guilty.
The trial followed, in which, and
in the judgment of guilty
pronounced by the court, we find
no error. Whether, if there were
irregularities in bringing him
personally before the court, he
could have been released on a
writ of habeas corpus or now has
a civil action for damages against
the person who arrested him we
need not inquire. It is enough to
say that such irregularities are
not sufficient to set aside a valid
judgment rendered upon a
sufficient complaint and after a
trial free from error.
II

In G.R. Nos. 84581-82 (Roque vs. De Villa),
the arrest of Amelia Roque and Wilfredo
Buenaobra, without warrant, is also justified.
When apprehended at the house of Renato
Constantino in Marikina Heights, Marikina,
Metro Manila, Wilfredo
Buenaobra admitted that he was an NPA
courier and he had with him letters to Renato
Constantino and other members of the rebel
group. Amelia Roque, upon the other hand,
was a member of the National United Front
Commission, in charge of finance,
and admitted ownership of subversive
documents found in the house of her sister in
Caloocan City. She was also in possession of
ammunition and a fragmentation grenade for
which she had no permit or authority to
possess.
The record of these two (2) cases shows that
on 27 June 1988, one Rogelio Ramos y
Ibanes, a member of the NPA, who had
surrendered to the military authorities, told
military agents about the operations of the
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and
the New Peoples Army (NPA) in Metro Manila.
He identified some of his former comrades as
"Ka Mong", a staff member of the
Communications and Transportation Bureau;
"Ka Nelia", a staff member in charge of finance;
"Ka Miller", an NPA courier from Sorsogon and
Lopez, Quezon; "Ka Ted", and "Ka Totoy". He
also pointed to a certain house occupied by
Renato Constantino located in the Villaluz
Compound, Molave St., Marikina Heights,
Marikina, Metro Manila, which is used as a
safehouse of the National United Front
Commission (NUFC) of the CPP-NPA.
In view of these revelations, the Constantino
house was placed under military surveillance
and on 12 August 1988, pursuant to a search
warrant issued by Judge Eutropio Migrino of
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, a search of
the house was conducted at about 5:00 o'clock
in the afternoon, by a combined team of the
Criminal Investigation Service, National Capital
District (CIS-NCD) and the Constabulary
Security Group (CSG). In the course of the
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 25
search, the following articles were found and
taken under proper receipt:
a) One (1) Colt M16A1 long rifle with defaced
serial number;
b) One (1) Cal. .380 ACT/9mm Model PPK/8
SN: 260577 & 2605778;
c) Two (2) fragmentation hand grenades;
d) Fifty-six (56) live ammunition for Cal. 5.56
mm;
e) Five (5) live ammunition for Cal. .380;
f) One (1) ICOM VHF FM Radio Transciever
SN: 14903
g) One (1) Regulated power supply 220V AC;
h) One (1) Antennae (adjustable);
i) One (1) Speaker with cord ALEXAR;
j) Voluminous Subversive documents.
When confronted, Renato Constatino could not
produce any permit or authority to possess the
firearms, ammunition, radio and other
communications equipment. Hence, he was
brought to the CIS Headquarters for
investigation. When questioned, he refused to
give a written statement, although
he admitted that he was a staff member of the
executive committee of the NUFC and a
ranking member of the International
Department of the Communist Party of the
Philippines (CPP).
At about 8:00 o'clock in the evening of the
same day (12 August 1988), Wilfredo
Buenaobra arrived at the house of Renato
Constantino in the Villaluz Compound. When
accosted, he readily admitted to the military
agents that he is a regular member of the
CPP/NPA and that he went to the place to
deliver letters to "Ka Mong", referring to Renato
Constatino, and other members of the rebel
group. On further questioning, he also admitted

that he is known as "Ka Miller" and that he was
from Barangay San Pedro, Lopez, Quezon.
Among the items taken from him were the
following:
(1) Handwritten letter addressed
to "Ka Bing & Co. from A & Co."
dated August 11, 1988;
(2) Handwritten letter addressed
to "ROD from VIC (Schell datre)"
dated August 11, 1988;
(3) Handwritten letter addressed
to "Suzie" from "Vic", dated
August 11, 1988.
Also found Buenaobra's possession was a
piece of paper containing a written but jumbled
telephone number of Florida M. Roque, sister
of Amelia Roque alias "Ka Nelia", at 69
Geronimo St., Caloocan City. Acting on the
lead provided as to the whereabouts of Amelia
Roque, the military agents went to the given
address the next day (13 August 1988). They
arrived at the place at about 11:00 o'clock in
the morning. After identifying themselves as
military agents and after seeking permission to
search the place, which was granted, the
military agents conducted a search in the
presence of the occupants of the house and
the barangay captain of the place, one Jesus
D. Olba.
The military agents found the place to be
another safehouse of the NUFC/CPP. They
found ledgers, journals, vouchers, bank deposit
books, folders, computer diskettes, and
subversive documents as well as live
ammunition for a .38 SPL Winchester, 11
rounds of live ammunition for a cal. .45, 19
rounds of live ammunition for an M16 Rifle, and
a fragmentation grenade. As a result, Amelia
Roque and the other occupants of the house
were brought to the PC-CIS Headquarters at
Camp Crame, Quezon City, for investigation.
Amelia Roque admitted to the investigators
that the voluminous documents belonged to
her and that the other occupants of the house
had no knowledge of them. As a result, the
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 26
said other occupants of the house were
released from custody.
On 15 August 1988, Amelia Roque was
brought to the Caloocan City Fiscal for inquest
after which an information charging her with
violation of PD 1866 was filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City. The
case is docketed therein as Criminal Case No.
C-1196. Another information for violation of the
Anti-Subversion Act was filed against Amelia
Roque before the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Caloocan City, which is docketed therein as
Criminal Case No. C-150458.
An information for violation of the Anti-
Subversion Act was filed against Wilfredo
Buenaobra before the Metropolitan Trial Court
of Marikina, Metro Manila. The case is
docketed therein as Criminal Case No. 23715.
Bail was set at P4,000.00.
On 24 August 1988, a petition for habeas
corpus was filed before this Court on behalf of
Amelia Roque and Wilfredo Buenaobra. At the
hearing of the case, however, Wilfredo
Buenaobra manifested his desire to stay in the
PC-INP Stockade at Camp Crame, Quezon
City. According, the petition for habeas
corpus filed on his behalf is now moot and
academic. Only the petition of Amelia Roque
remains for resolution.
The contention of respondents that petitioners
Roque and Buenaobra are officers and/or
members of the National United Front
Commission (NUFC) of the CPP was not
controverted or traversed by said petitioners.
The contention must be deemed admitted. 5 As
officers and/or members of the NUFC-CPP,
their arrest, without warrant, was justified for
the same reasons earlier stated vis-a-
vis Rolando Dural. The arrest without warrant
of Roque was additionally justified as she was,
at the time of apprehension, in possession of
ammunitions without license to possess them.
III

In G.R. Nos. 84583-84 (Anonuevo vs. Ramos),
the arrest of Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon
Casiple, without warrant, is also justified under
the rules. Both are admittedly members of the
standing committee of the NUFC and, when
apprehended in the house of Renato
Constatino, they had a bag containing
subversive materials, and both carried firearms
and ammunition for which they had no license
to possess or carry.
The record of these two (2) cases shows that
at about 7:30 o'clock in the evening of 13
August 1988, Domingo T. Anonuevo and
Ramon Casiple arrived at the house of Renato
Constatino at Marikina Heights, Marikina,
which was still under surveillance by military
agents. The military agents noticed bulging
objects on their waist lines. When frisked, the
agents found them to be loaded guns.
Anonuevo and Casiple were asked to show
their permit or license to possess or carry
firearms and ammunition, but they could not
produce any. Hence, they were brought to PC
Headquarters for investigation. Found in their
possession were the following articles:
a) Voluminous subversive
documents
b) One (1) Cal. 7.65 MOD 83 2C
Pistol SN: 001412 with one (1)
magazine for Cal. 7.65 containing
ten (10) live ammunition of same
caliber;
c) One (1) Cal. 7.65 Pietro
Barreta SN; A18868 last digit
tampered with one (1) magazine
containing five (5) live
ammunition of same caliber.
At the PC Stockade, Domingo Anonuevo was
identified as "Ka Ted", and Ramon Casiple as
"Ka Totoy" of the CPP, by their comrades who
had previously surrendered to the military.
On 15 August 1988, the record of the
investigation and other documentary evidence
were forwarded to the Provincial Fiscal at
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 27
Pasig, Metro Manila, who conducted an
inquest, after which Domingo Anonuevo and
Ramon Casiple were charged with violation of
Presidential Decree No. 1866 before the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila.
The cases are docketed therein as Criminal
Cases Nos. 74386 ad 74387, respectively. No
bail was recommended.
On 24 August 1988, a petition for habeas
corpus was filed with this Court on behalf of
Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple,
alleging that the said Anonuevo and Casiple
were unlawfully arrested without a warrant and
that the informations filed against them are null
and void for having been filed without prior
hearing and preliminary investigation. On 30
August 1988, the Court issued the writ
of habeas corpus, and after the respondents
had filed a Return of the Writ, the parties were
heard.
The petitioners' (Anonuevo and Casiple) claim
that they were unlawfully arrested because
there was no previous warrant of arrest, is
without merit The record shows that Domingo
Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple were carrying
unlicensed firearms and ammunition in their
person when they were apprehended.
There is also no merit in the contention that the
informations filed against them are null and
void for want of a preliminary investigation. The
filing of an information, without a preliminary
investigation having been first conducted, is
sanctioned by the Rules. Sec. 7, Rule 112 of
the Rules of Court, as amended, reads:
Sec. 7. When accused lawfully
arrested without a warrant. —
When a person is lawfully
arrested without a warrant for an
offense cognizable by the
Regional Trial Court the
complaint or information may be
filed by the offended party, peace
officer or fiscal without a
preliminary investigation having
been first conducted, on the basis
of the affidavit of the offended

party or arresting officer or
person.
However, before the filing of such
complaint or information, the
person arrested may ask for a
preliminary investigation by a
proper officer in accordance with
this Rule, but he must sign a
waiver of the provisions of Article
125 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, with the assistance
of a lawyer and in case of non-
availability of a lawyer, a
responsible person of his choice.
Notwithstanding such waiver, he
may apply for bail as provided in
the corresponding rule and the
investigation must be terminated
within fifteen (15) days from its
inception.
If the case has been filed in court
without a preliminary
investigation having been first
conducted, the accused may
within five (5) days from the time
he learns of the filing of the
information, ask for a preliminary
investigation with the same right
to adduced evidence in his favor
in the manner prescribed in this
Rule.
The petitioners Domingo Anonuevo and
Ramon Casiple, however, refused to sign a
waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended. In the
informations filed against them, the prosecutor
made identical certifications, as follows:
This is to certify that the accused
has been charged in accordance
with Sec. 7, Rule 112 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure,
that no preliminary investigation
was conducted because the
accused has not made and
signed a waiver of the provisions
of Art. 125 of the Revised Penal
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 28
Code, as amended; that based
on the evidence presented, there
is reasonable ground to believe
that the crime has been
committed, and that the accused
is probably guilty thereof.
Nor did petitioners ask for a preliminary
investigation after the informations had been
filed against them in court. Petitioners cannot
now claim that they have been deprived of their
constitutional right to due process.
IV
In G.R. No. 83162 (Ocaya vs. Aguirre), the
arrest without warrant, of Vicky Ocaya is
justified under the Rules, since she had with
her unlicensed ammunition when she was
arrested. The record of this case shows that on
12 May 1988, agents of the PC Intelligence
and Investigation of the Rizal PC-INP
Command, armed with a search warrant issued
by Judge Eutropio Migrino of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig, Metro Manila, conducted a
search of a house located at Block 19, Phase
II, Marikina Green Heights, Marikina, Metro
Manila, believed to be occupied by Benito
Tiamson, head of the CPP-NPA. In the course
of the search, Vicky Ocaya arrived in a car
driven by Danny Rivera. Subversive
documents and several rounds of ammunition
for a .45 cal. pistol were found in the car of
Vicky Ocaya. As a result, Vicky Ocaya and
Danny Rivera were brought to the PC
Headquarters for investigation. When Vicky
Ocaya could not produce any permit or
authorization to possess the ammunition, an
information charging her with violation of PD
1866 was filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig, Metro Manila. The case is docketed
therein as Criminal Case No. 73447. Danny
Rivera, on the other hand, was released from
custody.
On 17 May 1988, a petition for habeas
corpus was filed, with this Court on behalf of
Vicky Ocaya and Danny Rivera. It was alleged
therein that Vicky Ocaya was illegally arrested
 CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 29
and detained, and denied the right to a
preliminary investigation.
It would appear, however, that Vicky Ocaya
was arrested in flagranti delicto so that her
arrest without a warrant is justified. No
preliminary investigation was conducted
because she was arrested without a warrant
and she refused to waive the provisions of
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code,
pursuant to Sec. 7, Rule 112 of the Rule of
Court, as amended.
V result of an in-depth military
The petitioners Vicky Ocaya, Domingo
Anonuevo, Ramon Casiple, and Amelia Roque
claim that the firearms, ammunition and
subversive documents alleged to have been
found in their possession when they were
arrested, did not belong to them, but were
"planted" by the military agents to justify their
illegal arrest.
The petitioners, however, have not introduced
any evidence to support their aforesaid claim.
On the other hand, no evil motive or ill-will on
the part of the arresting officers that would
cause the said arresting officers in these cases
to accuse the petitioners falsely, has been
shown. Besides, the arresting officers in these
cases do not appear to be seekers of glory and
bounty hunters for, as counsel for the
petitioners Anonuevo and Casiple say, "there is
absolutely nothing in the evidence submitted
during the inquest that petitioners are on the
'AFP Order of Battle with a reward of
P150,000.00 each on their heads.'" 6 On the
other hand, as pointed out by the Solicitor
General, the arrest of the petitioners is not a
product of a witch hunt or a fishing expedition,
but the result of an in-depth surveillance of
NPA safehouses pointed to by no less than
former comrades of the petitioners in the rebel
movement.
The Solicitor General, in his Consolidated
Memorandum, aptly observes:
. . . . To reiterate, the focal point
in the case of petitioners Roque,
Buenaobra, Anonuevo and
Casiple, was the lawful search
and seizure conducted by the
military at the residence of
Renato Constantino at Villaluz
Compound, Molave St., Marikina
Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila.
The raid at Constantino's
residence, was not a witch
hunting or fishing expedition on
the part of the military. It was a
surveillance coupled with the
leads provided by former
members of the underground
subversive organizations. That
raid produced positive results. to
date, nobody has disputed the
fact that the residence of
Constantino when raided yielded
communication equipment,
firearms and ammunitions, as
well as subversive documents.
The military agents working on
the information provided by
Constantino that other members
of his group were coming to his
place, reasonably conducted a
"stake-out" operation whereby
some members of the raiding
team were left behind the place.
True enough, barely two hours
after the raid and Constantino's
arrest, petitioner Buenaobra
arrived at Constantino's
residence. He acted suspiciously
and when frisked and searched
by the military authorities, found
in his person were letters. They
are no ordinary letters, as even a
cursory reading would show. Not
only that, Buenaobra admitted
that he is a NPA courier and was
there to deliver the letters to
Constantino.

Subsequently, less than twenty
four hours after the arrest of
Constantino and Buenaobra,
petitioners Anonuevo and Casiple
arrived at Constantino's place.
Would it be unreasonable for the
military agents to believe that
petitioners Anonuevo and Casiple
are among those expected to visit
Constantino's residence
considering that Constatino's
information was true, in that
Buenaobra did come to that
place? Was it unreasonable
under the circumstances, on the
part of the military agents, not to
frisk and search anyone who
should visit the residence of
Constantino, such as petitioners
Anonuevo and Casiple? Must this
Honorable Court yield to
Anonuevo and Casiple's flimsy
and bare assertion that they went
to visit Constantino, who was to
leave for Saudi Arabia on the day
they were arrested thereat?
As to petitioner Roque, was it
unreasonable for the military
authorities to effect her arrest
without warrant considering that it
was Buenaobra who provided the
leads on her identity? It cannot
be denied that Buenaobra had
connection with Roque. Because
the former has the phone number
of the latter. Why the necessity of
jumbling Roque's telephone
number as written on a piece of
paper taken from Buenaobra's
possession? Petitioners Roque
and Buenaobra have not offered
any plausible reason so far.
In all the above incidents,
respondents maintain that they
acted reasonably, under the time,
place and circumstances of the
events in question, especially
considering that at the time of
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 30
petitioner's arrest, incriminatory
evidence, i.e, firearms,
ammunitions and/or subversive
documents were found in their
possession.
Petitioners, when arrested, were
neither taking their snacks nor
innocently visiting a camp, but
were arrested in such time, place
and circumstances, from which
one can reasonably conclude tat
they were up to a sinister plot,
involving utmost secrecy and
comprehensive conspiracy.
IV
In. G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu vs. Lim), the
release on habeas corpus of the petitioner
Deogracias Espiritu, who is detained by virtue
of an Information for Violation of Article 142 of
the Revised Penal Code (Inciting to Sedition)
filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, is
similarly not warranted.
The record of the case shows that the said
petitioner is the General Secretary of the
Pinagkaisahang Samahan ng Tsuper at
Operators Nationwide (PISTON), an
association of drivers and operators of public
service vehicles in the Philippines, organized
for their mutual aid and protection.
Petitioner claims that at about 5:00 o'clock in
the morning of 23 November 1988, while he
was sleeping in his home located at 363
Valencia St., Sta. Mesa, Manila, he was
awakened by his sister Maria Paz Lalic who
told him that a group of persons wanted to hire
his jeepney. When he went down to talk to
them, he was immediately put under arrest.
When he asked for the warrant of arrest, the
men, headed by Col. Ricardo Reyes, bodily
lifted him and placed him in their owner-type
jeepney. He demanded that his sister, Maria
Paz Lalic, be allowed to accompany him, but
the men did not accede to his request and
hurriedly sped away.

He was brought to Police Station No. 8 of the
Western Police District at Blumentritt, Manila
where he was interrogated and detained. Then,
at about 9:00 o'clock of the same morning, he
was brought before the respondent Lim and,
there and then, the said respondent ordered
his arrest and detention. He was thereafter
brought to the General Assignment Section,
Investigation Division of the Western Police
District under Police Capt. Cresenciano A.
Cabasal where he was detained, restrained
and deprived of his liberty. 7
The respondents claim however, that the
detention of the petitioner is justified in view of
the Information filed against him before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, docketed
therein as Criminal Case No. 88-683-85,
charging him with violation of Art. 142 of the
Revised Penal Code (Inciting to Sedition).
The respondents also claim that the petitioner
was lawfully arrested without a judicial warrant
of arrest since petitioner when arrested had in
fact just committed an offense in that in the
afternoon of 22 November 1988, during a
press conference at the National Press Club.
Deogracias Espiritu through tri-
media was heard urging all
drivers and operators to go on
nationwide strike on November
23, 1988, to force the
government to give into their
demands to lower the prices of
spare parts, commodities, water
and the immediate release from
detention of the president of the
PISTON (Pinag-isang Samahan
ng Tsuper Operators
Nationwide). Further, we heard
Deogracias Espiritu taking the
place of PISTON president
Medardo Roda and also
announced the formation of the
Alliance Drivers Association to go
on nationwide strike on
8
November 23, 1988.
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 31
Policemen waited for petitioner outside the
National Pres Club in order to investigate him,
but he gave the lawmen the slip. 9 He was next
seen at about 5:00 o'clock that afternoon at a
gathering of drivers and symphatizers at the
corner of Magsaysay Blvd. and Valencia
Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila where he was heard
to say:
Bukas tuloy ang welga natin,
sumagot na ang Cebu at Bicol na
kasali sila, at hindi tayo titigil
hanggang hindi binibigay ng
gobyerno ni Cory ang gusto
nating pagbaba ng halaga ng
spare parts, bilihin at and
pagpapalaya sa ating pinuno na
si Ka Roda hanggang sa
10
magkagulo na. (emphasis
supplied)
The police finally caught up with the petitioner
on 23 November 1988. He was invited for
questioning and brought to police headquarters
after which an Information for violation of Art.
142 of the Revised Penal Code was filed
against him before the Regional Trial Court of
Manila. 11
Since the arrest of the petitioner without a
warrant was in accordance with the provisions
of Rule 113, Sec. 5(b) of the Rules of Court
and that the petitioner is detained by virtue of a
valid information filed with the competent court,
he may not be released on habeas corpus. He
may, however be released upon posting bail as
recommended. However, we find the amount
of the recommended bail (P60,000.00)
excessive and we reduce it to P10,000.00 only.
VII
In G.R. No. 86332 (Nazareno vs. Station
Commander), we also find no merit in the
submission of Narciso Nazarenothat he was
illegally arrested and is unlawfully detained.
The record of this case shows that at about
8:30 o'clock in the morning of 14 December
1988, one Romulo Bunye II was killed by a
group of men near the corner of T. Molina and

Mendiola Streets in Alabang, Muntinglupa,
Metro Manila. One of the suspects in the killing
was Ramil Regal who was arrested by the
police on 28 December 1988. Upon
questioning, Regal pointed to Narciso
Nazareno as on of his companions in the killing
of the said Romulo Bunye II. In view thereof,
the police officers, without warrant, picked up
Narciso Nazareno and brought him to the
police headquarters for questioning. Obviously,
the evidence of petitioner's guilt is strong
because on 3 January 1989, an information
charging Narciso Nazareno, Ramil Regala, and
two (2) others, with the killing of Romulo Bunye
II was filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, Metro Manila. The case is docketed
therein as Criminal Case No. 731.
On 7 January 1989, Narciso Nazareno filed a
motion to post bail, but the motion was denied
by the trial court in an order dated 10 January
1989, even as the motion to post bail, earlier
filed by his co-accused, Manuel Laureaga, was
granted by the same trial court.
On 13 January 1989, a petition for habeas
corpus was filed with this Court on behalf of
Narciso Nazareno and on 13 January 1989,
the Court issued the writ of habeas corpus,
returnable to the Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna, Branch
24, ordering said court to hear the case on 30
January 1989 and thereafter resolve the
petition.
At the conclusion of the hearing, or on 1
February 1989, the Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna issued a
resolution denying the petition for habeas
corpus, it appearing that the said Narciso
Nazareno is in the custody of the respondents
by reason of an information filed against him
with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro
Manila which had taken cognizance of said
case and had, in fact, denied the motion for
bail filed by said Narciso Nazareno
(presumably because of the strength of the
evidence against him).
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 32
The findings of the Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna are
based upon the facts and the law.
Consequently, we will not disturb the same.
Evidently, the arrest of Nazareno was effected
by the police without warrant pursuant to Sec.
5(b), Rule 113, Rules of Court after he was
positively implicated by his co-accused Ramil
Regala in the killing of Romulo Bunye
II; and after investigation by the police
authorities. As held in People vs. Ancheta: 12
The obligation of an agent of
authority to make an arrest by
reason of a crime, does not
presuppose as a necessary
requisite for the fulfillment
thereof, the indubitable existence
of a crime. For the detention to
be perfectly legal, it is sufficient
that the agent or person in
authority making the arrest has
reasonably sufficient grounds to
believe the existence of an act
having the characteristics of a
crime and that the same grounds
exist to believe that the person
sought to be detained
participated therein.
VIII
It is to be noted that, in all the petitions here
considered, criminal charges have been filed in
the proper courts against the petitioners. The
rule is, that if a person alleged to be restrained
of his liberty is in the custody of an officer
under process issued by a court judge, and
that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue
the process or make the order, of if such
person is charged before any court, the writ
of habeas corpus will not be allowed. Section
4, Rule 102, Rules of Court, as amended is
quite explicit in providing that:
Sec. 4. When writ is allowed or
discharge authorized. — If it
appears that the person alleged
to be restrained of his liberty is in
the custody of an officer under

process issued by a court or
judge or by virtue of a judgment
or order of a court of record, and
that the court or judge had
jurisdiction to issue the process,
render the judgment, or make the
order, the writ shall not be
allowed; or if the jurisdiction
appears after the writ is allowed,
the person shall not be
discharged by reason of any
informality or defect in the
process, judgment, or order. Nor
shall anything in this rule be held
to authorize the discharge of a
person charged with a convicted
of an offense in the Philippines or
of a person suffering
imprisonment under lawful
judgment. (emphasis supplied)
At this point, we refer to petitioner's plea for the
Court of re-examine and, thereafter, abandon
its pronouncement in Ilagan vs. Enrile, 13 that a
writ of habeas corpus is no longer available
after an information is filed against the person
detained and a warrant of arrest or an order of
commitment, is issued by the court where said
information has been filed. 14 The petitioners
claim that the said ruling, which was handed
down during the past dictatorial regime to
enforce and strengthen said regime, has no
place under the present democratic
dispensation and collides with the basic,
fundamental, and constitutional rights of the
people. Petitioners point out that the said
doctrine makes possible the arrest and
detention of innocent persons despite lack of
evidence against them, and, most often, it is
only after a petition for habeas corpus is filed
before the court that the military authorities file
the criminal information in the courts of law to
be able to hide behind the protective mantle of
the said doctrine. This, petitioners assert,
stands as an obstacle to the freedom and
liberty of the people and permits lawless and
arbitrary State action.
We find, however, no compelling reason to
abandon the said doctrine. It is based upon
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 33
express provision of the Rules of Court and the
exigencies served by the law. The fears
expressed by the petitioners are not really
unremediable. As the Court sees it, re-
examination or reappraisal, with a view to its
abandonment, of the Ilagan case doctrine is
not the answer. The answer and the better
practice would be, not to limit the function of
the habeas corpus to a mere inquiry as to
whether or not the court which issued the
process, judgment or order of commitment or
before whom the detained person is charged,
had jurisdiction or not to issue the process,
judgment or order or to take cognizance of the
case, but rather, as the Court itself states
in Morales, Jr. vs. Enrile, 15 "in all
petitions for habeas corpus the court must
inquire into every phase and aspect of
petitioner's detention-from the moment
petition was taken into custody up to the
moment the court passes upon the merits of
the petition;" and "only after such a scrutiny
can the court satisfy itself that the due process
clause of our Constitution has in fact been
satisfied." This is exactly what the Court has
done in the petitions at bar. This is what should
henceforth be done in all future cases
of habeas corpus. In Short, all cases involving
deprivation of individual liberty should be
promptly brought to the courts for their
immediate scrutiny and disposition.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby
DISMISSED, except that in
G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu vs. Lim), the bail bond
for petitioner's provisional liberty is hereby
ordered reduced from P60,000.00 to
P10,000.00. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 154130 October 1, 2003

BENITO ASTORGA, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, seeking the reversal of a
Decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal
Case No. 24986, dated July 5, 2001,1 as well
as its Resolutions dated September 28, 2001
and July 10, 2002.
On October 28, 1998, the Office of the
Ombudsman filed the following Information
against Benito Astorga, Mayor of Daram,
Samar, as well as a number of his men for
Arbitrary Detention:
That on or about the 1st day of September,
1997, and for sometime subsequent thereto, at
the Municipality of Daram, Province of Samar,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a
public officer, being the Municipal Mayor of
Daram, Samar, in such capacity and
committing the offense in relation to office,
conniving, confederating and mutually helping
with unidentified persons, who are herein
referred to under fictitious names JOHN
DOES, who were armed with firearms of
different calibers, with deliberate intent, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously detain Elpidio Simon, Moises dela
Cruz, Wenifredo Maniscan, Renato Militante
and Crisanto Pelias, DENR Employees, at the
Municipality of Daram, by not allowing them to
leave the place, without any legal and valid
grounds thereby restraining and depriving them
of their personal liberty for nine (9) hours, but
without exceeding three (3) days.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
On September 1, 1997, Regional Special
Operations Group (RSOG) of the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) Office No. 8, Tacloban City sent a
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 34
team to the island of Daram, Western Samar to
conduct intelligence gathering and forest
protection operations in line with the
government’s campaign against illegal logging.
The team was composed of Forester II Moises
dela Cruz, Scaler Wenifredo Maniscan, Forest
Ranger Renato Militante, and Tree Marker
Crisanto Pelias, with Elpidio E. Simon, Chief of
the Forest Protection and Law Enforcement
Section, as team leader. The team was
escorted by SPO3 Andres B. Cinco, Jr. and
SPO1 Rufo Capoquian.3
The team stopped at Brgy. Bagacay, Daram,
Western Samar at 2:00 p.m., where they saw
two yacht-like boats being constructed. After
consulting with the local barangay officials, the
team learned that the boats belonged to a
certain Michael Figueroa. However, since
Figueroa was not around at the time, the team
left Brgy. Bagacay.4
En route to Brgy. Manungca, Sta. Rita, Samar,
the team spotted two more boats being
constructed in the vicinity of Brgy. Lucob-
Lucob, Daram, Samar, between 4:30-5:00
p.m., prompting them to stop and investigate.
Thus, Maniscan and Militante disembarked
from the DENR’s service pump boat and
proceeded to the site of the boat construction.
There, they met Mayor Astorga. After
conversing with the mayor, Militante returned
to their boat for the purpose of fetching Simon,
at the request of Mayor Astorga.5
When Simon, accompanied by dela Cruz,
SPO3 Cinco, and SPO1 Capoquian,
approached Mayor Astorga to try and explain
the purpose of their mission, Simon was
suddenly slapped hard twice on the shoulder
by Mayor Astorga, who exclaimed, "Puwede ko
kamo papaglanguyon pag-uli ha Tacloban.
Ano, di ka maaram nga natupa ako? Natupa
baya ako. Diri kamo makauli yana kay puwede
kame e charge ha misencounter." (I can make
you swim back to Tacloban. Don’t you know
that I can box? I can box. Don’t you know that I
can declare this a misencounter?)6 Mayor
Astorga then ordered someone to fetch
"reinforcements," and forty-five (45) minutes

later, or between 5:00-6:00 p.m., a banca
arrived bearing ten (10) men, some of them
dressed in fatigue uniforms. The men were
armed with M-16 and M14 rifles, and they
promptly surrounded the team, guns pointed at
the team members.7At this, Simon tried to
explain to Astorga the purpose of his team’s
mission.8 He then took out his handheld ICOM
radio, saying that he was going to contact his
people at the DENR in Catbalogan to inform
them of the team’s whereabouts. Suddenly,
Mayor Astorga forcibly grabbed Simon’s radio,
saying, "Maupay nga waray kamo radio bis diri
somabut an iyo opisina kon hain kamo, bis diri
kamo maka aro hin bulig." (It’s better if you
have no radio so that your office would not
know your whereabouts and so that you cannot
ask for help).9 Mayor Astorga again slapped
the right shoulder of Simon, adding, "Kong siga
kamo ha Leyte ayaw pagdad-a dinhi ha Samar
kay diri kamo puwede ha akon." (If you are
tough guys in Leyte, do not bring it to Samar
because I will not tolerate it here.)10Simon then
asked Mayor Astorga to allow the team to go
home, at which Mayor Astorga retorted that
they would not be allowed to go home and that
they would instead be brought to
11
Daram. Mayor Astorga then addressed the
team, saying, "Kon magdakop man la kamo,
unahon an mga dagko. Kon madakop niyo an
mga dagko, an kan Figueroa dida ha Bagacay
puwede ko liwat ipadakop an akon." (If you
really want to confiscate anything, you start
with the big-time. If you confiscate the boats of
Figueroa at Brgy. Bagacay, I will surrender
mine.)12 Simon then tried to reiterate his
request for permission to leave, which just
succeeded in irking Mayor Astorga, who angrily
said, "Diri kamo maka uli yana kay dad on ko
kamo ha Daram, para didto kita mag uro
istorya." (You cannot go home now because I
will bring you to Daram. We will have many
things to discuss there.)13
The team was brought to a house where they
were told that they would be served dinner.
The team had dinner with Mayor Astorga and
several others at a long table, and the meal
lasted between 7:00-8:00 p.m.14 After dinner,
Militante, Maniscan and SPO1 Capoquian
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 35
were allowed to go down from the house, but
not to leave the barangay.15On the other hand,
SPO3 Cinco and the rest just sat in the house
until 2:00 a.m. when the team was finally
allowed to leave.16 1awphi1.nét
Complainants filed a criminal complaint for
arbitrary detention against Mayor Astorga and
his men, which led to the filing of the above-
quoted Information.
Mayor Astorga was subsequently arraigned on
July 3, 2000, wherein he pleaded not guilty to
the offenses charged.17 At the trial, the
prosecution presented the testimonies of SPO1
Capoquian and SPO3 Cinco, as well as their
Joint Affidavit.18 However, the presentation of
Simon’s testimony was not completed, and
none of his fellow team members came
forward to testify. Instead, the members of the
team sent by the DENR RSOG executed a
Joint Affidavit of Desistance.19
On July 5, 2001, the Sandiganbayan
promulgated its Decision, disposing of the case
as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment
is hereby rendered finding accused BENITO
ASTORGA Y BOCATCAT guilty of Arbitrary
Detention, and in the absence of any mitigating
or aggravating circumstances, applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is hereby
sentenced to suffer imprisonment of four (4)
months of arresto mayor as minimum to one
(1) year and eight (8) months of prision
correctional as maximum.
SO ORDERED.20
The accused filed a Motion for Reconsideration
dated July 11, 200121 which was denied by the
Sandiganabayan in a Resolution dated
September 28, 2001.22 A Second Motion for
Reconsideration dated October 24, 200123 was
also filed, and this was similarly denied in a
Resolution dated July 10, 2002.24
Hence, the present petition, wherein the
petitioner assigns a sole error for review:

5.1. The trial court grievously erred in finding
the accused guilty of Arbitrary Detention as
defined and penalized under Article 124 of the
Revised Penal Code, based on mere
speculations, surmises and conjectures and,
worse, notwithstanding the Affidavit of
Desistance executed by the five (5)
complaining witnesses wherein the latter
categorically declared petitioner’s innocence of
the crime charged.25
Petitioner contends that the prosecution failed
to establish the required quantum of evidence
to prove the guilt of the accused,26 especially in
light of the fact that the private complainants
executed a Joint Affidavit of
27
Desistance. Petitioner asserts that nowhere in
the records of the case is there any competent
evidence that could sufficiently establish the
fact that restraint was employed upon the
persons of the team members.28 Furthermore,
he claims that the mere presence of armed
men at the scene does not qualify as
competent evidence to prove that fear was in
fact instilled in the minds of the team members,
to the extent that they would feel compelled to
stay in Brgy. Lucob-Lucob.29
Arbitrary Detention is committed by any public
officer or employee who, without legal grounds,
detains a person.30The elements of the crime
are:
1. That the offender is a public officer or
employee.
2. That he detains a person.
3. That the detention is without legal
grounds.31
That petitioner, at the time he committed the
acts assailed herein, was then Mayor of
Daram, Samar is not disputed. Hence, the first
element of Arbitrary Detention, that the
offender is a public officer or employee, is
undeniably present.
Also, the records are bereft of any allegation
on the part of petitioner that his acts were
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 36
spurred by some legal purpose. On the
contrary, he admitted that his acts were
motivated by his "instinct for self-preservation"
and the feeling that he was being "singled
out."32 The detention was thus without legal
grounds, thereby satisfying the third element
enumerated above.
What remains is the determination of whether
or not the team was actually detained.
In the case of People v. Acosta,33 which
involved the illegal detention of a child, we
found the accused-appellant therein guilty of
kidnapping despite the lack of evidence to
show that any physical restraint was employed
upon the victim. However, because the victim
was a boy of tender age and he was warned
not to leave until his godmother, the accused-
appellant, had returned, he was practically a
captive in the sense that he could not leave
because of his fear to violate such instruction.34
In the case of People v. Cortez,35 we held that,
in establishing the intent to deprive the victim
of his liberty, it is not necessary that the
offended party be kept within an enclosure to
restrict her freedom of locomotion. At the time
of her rescue, the offended party in said case
was found outside talking to the owner of the
house where she had been taken. She
explained that she did not attempt to leave the
premises for fear that the kidnappers would
make good their threats to kill her should she
do so. We ruled therein that her fear was not
baseless as the kidnappers knew where she
resided and they had earlier announced that
their intention in looking for her cousin was to
kill him on sight. Thus, we concluded that fear
has been known to render people immobile
and that appeals to the fears of an individual,
such as by threats to kill or similar threats, are
equivalent to the use of actual force or
violence.36
The prevailing jurisprudence on kidnapping
and illegal detention is that the curtailment of
the victim’s liberty need not involve any
physical restraint upon the victim’s person. If
the acts and actuations of the accused can

produce such fear in the mind of the victim
sufficient to paralyze the latter, to the extent
that the victim is compelled to limit his own
actions and movements in accordance with the
wishes of the accused, then the victim is, for all
intents and purposes, detained against his will.
In the case at bar, the restraint resulting from
fear is evident. Inspite of their pleas, the
witnesses and the complainants were not
allowed by petitioner to go home.37 This refusal
was quickly followed by the call for and arrival
of almost a dozen "reinforcements," all armed
with military-issue rifles, who proceeded to
encircle the team, weapons pointed at the
complainants and the witnesses.38 Given such
circumstances, we give credence to SPO1
Capoquian’s statement that it was not "safe" to
refuse Mayor Astorga’s orders.39 It was not just
the presence of the armed men, but also the
evident effect these gunmen had on the
actions of the team which proves that fear was
indeed instilled in the minds of the team
members, to the extent that they felt compelled
to stay in Brgy. Lucob-Lucob. The intent to
prevent the departure of the complainants and
witnesses against their will is thus clear.
Regarding the Joint Affidavit of Desistance
executed by the private complainants, suffice it
to say that the principles governing the use of
such instruments in the adjudication of other
crimes can be applied here. Thus, in People v.
Ballabare, it was held that an affidavit of
desistance is merely an additional ground to
buttress the defenses of the accused, not the
sole consideration that can result in acquittal.
There must be other circumstances which,
when coupled with the retraction or desistance,
create doubts as to the truth of the testimony
given by the witnesses at the trial and
accepted by the judge. Here, there are no such
circumstances.40 Indeed, the belated claims
made in the Joint Affidavit of Desistance, such
as the allegations that the incident was the
result of a misunderstanding and that the team
acceded to Mayor Astorga’s orders "out of
respect," are belied by petitioner’s own
admissions to the contrary.41 The Joint Affidavit
of Desistance of the private complainants is
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 37
evidently not a clear repudiation of the material
points alleged in the information and proven at
the trial, but a mere expression of the lack of
interest of private complainants to pursue the
case.1awphi1.nét This conclusion is supported
by one of its latter paragraphs, which reads:
11. That this affidavit was executed by us if
only to prove our sincerity and improving
DENR relations with the local Chiefs Executive
and other official of Daram, Islands so that
DENR programs and project can be effectively
implemented through the support of the local
officials for the betterment of the residence
living conditions who are facing difficulties and
are much dependent on government support.42
Petitioner also assails the weight given by the
trial court to the evidence, pointing out that the
Sandiganbayan’s reliance on the testimony of
SPO1 Capoquian is misplaced, for the reason
that SPO1 Capoquian is not one of the private
complainants in the case.43 He also makes
much of the fact that prosecution witness
SPO1 Capoquian was allegedly "not exactly
privy to, and knowledgeable of, what exactly
transpired between herein accused and the
DENR team leader Mr. Elpidio E. Simon, from
their alleged ‘confrontation,’ until they left
Barangay Lucob-Lucob in the early morning of
2 September 1997."44
It is a time-honored doctrine that the trial
court’s factual findings are conclusive and
binding upon appellate courts unless some
facts or circumstances of weight and
substance have been overlooked,
misapprehended or misinterpreted.45 Nothing in
the case at bar prompts us to deviate from this
doctrine. Indeed, the fact that SPO1
Capoquian is not one of the private
complainants is completely irrelevant. Neither
penal law nor the rules of evidence requires
damning testimony to be exclusively supplied
by the private complainants in cases of
Arbitrary Detention. Furthermore, Mayor
Astorga’s claim that SPO1 Capoquian was "not
exactly privy" to what transpired between
Simon and himself is belied by the evidence.
SPO1 Capoquian testified that he

accompanied Simon when the latter went to
talk to petitioner.46 He heard all of Mayor
Astorga’s threatening remarks.47 He was with
Simon when they were encircled by the men
dressed in fatigues and wielding M-16 and M-
14 rifles.48 In sum, SPO1 Capoquian witnessed
all the circumstances which led to the Arbitrary
Detention of the team at the hands of Mayor
Astorga.
Petitioner submits that it is unclear whether the
team was in fact prevented from leaving Brgy.
Lucob-Lucob or whether they had simply
decided to "while away the time" and take
advantage of the purported hospitality of the
accused.49 On the contrary, SPO3 Cinco
clearly and categorically denied that they were
simply "whiling away the time" between their
dinner with Mayor Astorga and their departure
early the following morning.50 SPO1 Capoquian
gave similar testimony, saying that they did not
use the time between their dinner with Mayor
Astorga and their departure early the following
morning to "enjoy the place" and that, given a
choice, they would have gone home.51
Petitioner argues that he was denied the "cold
neutrality of an impartial judge", because the
ponente of the assailed decision acted both as
magistrate and advocate when he propounded
"very extensive clarificatory questions" on the
witnesses. Surely, the Sandiganbayan, as a
trial court, is not an idle arbiter during a trial. It
can propound clarificatory questions to
witnesses in order to ferret out the truth. The
impartiality of the court cannot be assailed on
the ground that clarificatory questions were
asked during the trial.52
Thus, we affirm the judgment of the
Sandiganbayan finding petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Arbitrary Detention. Article
124 (1) of the Revised Penal Code provides
that, where the detention has not exceeded
three days, the penalty shall be arresto mayor
in its maximum period to prision correccional in
its minimum period, which has a range of four
(4) months and one (1) day to two (2) years
and four (4) months. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner is
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 38
entitled to a minimum term to be taken from the
penalty next lower in degree, or arresto mayor
in its minimum and medium periods, which has
a range of one (1) month and one (1) day to
four (4) months. Hence, the Sandiganbayan
was correct in imposing the indeterminate
penalty of four (4) months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to one (1) year and eight (8) months
of prision correccional, as maximum.
Before closing, it may not be amiss to quote
the words of Justice Perfecto in his concurring
opinion in Lino v. Fugoso, wherein he decried
the impunity enjoyed by public officials in
committing arbitrary or illegal detention, and
called for the intensification of efforts towards
bringing them to justice:
The provisions of law punishing arbitrary or
illegal detention committed by government
officers form part of our statute books even
before the advent of American sovereignty in
our country. Those provisions were already in
effect during the Spanish regime; they
remained in effect under American rule;
continued in effect under the Commonwealth.
Even under the Japanese regime they were
not repealed. The same provisions continue in
the statute books of the free and sovereign
Republic of the Philippines. This
notwithstanding, and the complaints often
heard of violations of said provisions, it is very
seldom that prosecutions under them have
been instituted due to the fact that the erring
individuals happened to belong to the same
government to which the prosecuting officers
belong. It is high time that every one must do
his duty, without fear or favor, and that
prosecuting officers should not answer with
cold shrugging of the shoulders the complaints
of the victims of arbitrary or illegal detention.
Only by an earnest enforcement of the
provisions of articles 124 and 125 of the
Revised Penal Code will it be possible to
reduce to its minimum such wanton trampling
of personal freedom as depicted in this case.
The responsible officials should be prosecuted,
without prejudice to the detainees’ right to the
indemnity to which they may be entitled for the
 CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 39

unjustified violation of their fundamental

rights.53

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the

petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 24986,
dated July 5, 2001 finding petitioner BENITO
ASTORGA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Arbitrary Detention and sentencing
him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four
(4) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to
one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision
correccional, as maximum, is AFFIRMED in
toto.

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

2. DELAY IN THE DELIVERY OF DETAINED
PERSONS TO THE PROPER JUDICIAL
AUTHORITIES
Art. 125. Delay in the delivery of detained
persons to the proper judicial authorities.
— The penalties provided in the next preceding
article shall be imposed upon the public officer
or employee who shall detain any person for
some legal ground and shall fail to deliver such
person to the proper judicial authorities within
the period of; twelve (12) hours, for crimes or
offenses punishable by light penalties, or their
equivalent; eighteen (18) hours, for crimes or
offenses punishable by correctional penalties,
or their equivalent and thirty-six (36) hours, for
crimes, or offenses punishable by afflictive or
capital penalties, or their equivalent.
In every case, the person detained shall be
informed of the cause of his detention and shall
be allowed upon his request, to communicate
and confer at any time with his attorney or
counsel. (As amended by E.O. Nos. 59 and
272, Nov. 7, 1986 and July 25, 1987,
respectively).
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 272 July 25, 1987
FURTHER AMENDING ARTICLE 125 OF
THE REVISED PENAL CODE, AS AMENDED
WHEREAS, in the interest of public safety and
order, it is imperative that a reasonable and
sufficient period be given within which to
conduct adequate and thorough investigation
of persons detained for some legal grounds.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, CORAZON C.
AQUINO, President of the Philippines, do
hereby order:
Sec. 1. Article one hundred twenty-five of Act
Numbered Three Thousand Eight Hundred
Fifteen (Act No. 3815) otherwise known as the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, is hereby
further amended to read as follows:
"Art. 125. Delay in the delivery of detained
persons to the proper judicial authorities. The
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 40
penalties provided in the next preceding article
shall be imposed upon the public officer or
employee who shall detain any person for
some legal ground and shall fail to deliver such
person to the proper judicial authorities within
the period of twelve (12) hours, for crimes or
offenses punishable by light penalties, or their
equivalent; eighteen (18) hours, for crimes or
offenses punishable by correctional penalties,
or their equivalent, and thirty-six (36) hours,
for crimes or offenses punishable by afflictive
or capital penalties, or their equivalent.
In every case, the person detained shall be
informed of the caused of his detention and
shall be allowed, upon his request, to
communicate and confer at any time with his
attorney or counsel."
Sec. 2. All laws, orders, issuances, rules and
regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with
this Executive Order are hereby repealed or
modified accordingly. lawphi1.net
Sec. 3. This Executive Order shall take effect
thirty (30) days following its publication in the
Official Gazette.
DONE in the City of Manila, this 25th day of
July, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred
and eighty-seven.
RULE 112, SEC 7 RULES OF COURT
Section 7. When accused lawfully arrested
without warrant. — When a person is lawfully
arrested without a warrant involving an offense
which requires a preliminary investigation, the
complaint or information may be filed by a
prosecutor without need of such investigation
provided an inquest has been conducted in
accordance with existing rules. In the absence
or unavailability of an inquest prosecutor, the
complaint may be filed by the offended party or
a peace office directly with the proper court on
the basis of the affidavit of the offended party
or arresting officer or person.

Republic Act No. 9372 March 6, 2007
AN ACT TO SECURE THE STATE AND
PROTECT OUR PEOPLE FROM
TERRORISM
SEC. 18. Period of Detention Without
Judicial Warrant of Arrest. - The provisions
of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code to the
contrary notwithstanding, any police or law
enforcement personnel, who, having been duly
authorized in writing by the Anti-Terrorism
Council has taken custody of a person charged
with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or
the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism
shall, without incurring any criminal liability for
delay in the delivery of detained persons to the
proper judicial authorities, deliver said charged
or suspected person to the proper judicial
authority within a period of three days counted
from the moment the said charged or
suspected person has been apprehended or
arrested, detained, and taken into custody by
the said police, or law enforcement personnel:
Provided, That the arrest of those suspected of
the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit
terrorism must result from the surveillance
under Section 7 and examination of bank
deposits under Section 27 of this Act.
The police or law enforcement personnel
concerned shall, before detaining the person
suspected of the crime of terrorism, present
him or her before any judge at the latter's
residence or office nearest the place where the
arrest took place at any time of the day or
night. It shall be the duty of the judge, among
other things, to ascertain the identity of the
police or law enforcement personnel and the
person or persons they have arrested and
presented before him or her, to inquire of them
the reasons why they have arrested the person
and determine by questioning and personal
observation whether or not the suspect has
been subjected to any physical, moral or
psychological torture by whom and why. The
judge shall then submit a written report of what
he/she had observed when the subject was
brought before him to the proper court that has
jurisdiction over the case of the person thus
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 41
arrested. The judge shall forthwith submit
his/her report within three calendar days from
the time the suspect was brought to his/her
residence or office.
Immediately after taking custody of a person
charged with or suspected of the crime of
terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism, the
police or law enforcement personnel shall
notify in writing the judge of the court nearest
the place of apprehension or arrest: Provided
,That where the arrest is made during
Saturdays, Sundays, holidays or after office
hours, the written notice shall be served at the
residence of the judge nearest the place where
the accused was arrested.
The penalty of ten (10) years and one day to
twelve (12) years of imprisonment shall be
imposed upon the police or law enforcement
personnel who fails to notify and judge as
Provided in the preceding paragraph.
SEC. 19. Period of Detention in the Event of
an Actual or Imminent Terrorist Attack. - In
the event of an actual or imminent terrorist
attack, suspects may not be detained for more
than three days without the written approval of
a municipal, city, provincial or regional official
of a Human Rights Commission or judge of the
municipal, regional trial court, the
Sandiganbayan or a justice of the Court of
Appeals nearest the place of the arrest. If the
arrest is made during Saturdays, Sundays,
holidays or after office hours, the arresting
police or law enforcement personnel shall bring
the person thus arrested to the residence of
any of the officials mentioned above that is
nearest the place where the accused was
arrested. The approval in writing of any of the
said officials shall be secured by the police or
law enforcement personnel concerned within
five days after the date of the detention of the
persons concerned: Provided, however, That
within three days after the detention the
suspects, whose connection with the terror
attack or threat is not established, shall be
released immediately.

G.R. No. L-2128 May 12, 1948
MELENCIO SAYO and JOAQUIN
MOSTERO, petitioners,
vs.
THE CHIEF OF POLICE and THE OFFICER
IN CHARGE OF MUNICIPAL JAIL, BOTH OF
CITY OF MANILA,respondents.
Enrique Q. Jabile for petitioners.
Acting City Fiscal A. P. Montesa, Assistant City
Fiscal Arsenio Nañawa and D. Guinto Lazaro
for respondents.
FERIA, J.:
Upon complaint of Bernardino Malinao,
charging the petitioners with having committed
the crime of robbery, Benjamin Dumlao, a
policeman of the City of Manila, arrested the
petitioners on April 2, 1948, and presented a
complaint against them with the fiscal's office
of Manila. Until April 7, 1948, when the petition
for habeas corpus filed with this Court was
heard, the petitioners were still detained or
under arrest, and the city fiscal had not yet
released or filed against them an information
with the proper courts justice.
This case has not been decided before this
time because there was not a sufficient number
of Justices to form a quorum in Manila, And it
had to be transferred to the Supreme Court
acting in division here in Baguio for deliberation
and decision. We have not until now an official
information as to the action taken by the office
of the city fiscal on the complaint filed by the
Dumlao against the petitioners. But whatever
night have been the action taken by said office,
if there was any, we have to decide this case in
order to lay down a ruling on the question
involved herein for the information and
guidance in the future of the officers
concerned.
The principal question to be determined in the
present case in order to decide whether or not
the petitioners are being illegally restrained of
their liberty, is the following: Is the city fiscal of
manila a judicial authority within the meaning of
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 42
the provisions of article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code?
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code provides
that "the penalties provided in the next
proceeding article shall be imposed upon the
public officer or employee who shall detain any
person for some legal ground and shall fail to
deliver such person to the proper judicial
authorities within the period of six hours."
Taking into consideration the history of the
provisions of the above quoted article, the
precept of our Constitution guaranteeing
individual liberty, and the provisions of Rules of
Court regarding arrest and habeas corpus, we
are of the opinion that the words "judicial
authority", as used in said article, mean the
courts of justices or judges of said courts
vested with judicial power to order the
temporary detention or confinement of a
person charged with having committed a public
offense, that is, "the Supreme Court and such
inferior courts as may be established by law".
(Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution.)
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code was
substantially taken from article 202 of the old
Penal Code formerly in force of these Islands,
which penalized a public officer other than a
judicial officer who, without warrant, "shall
arrest a person upon a charge of crime and
shall fail to deliver such person to the judicial
authority within twenty four hours after his
arrest." There was no doubt that a judicial
authority therein referred to was the judge of a
court of justice empowered by law, after a
proper investigation, to order the temporary
commitment or detention of the person
arrested; and not the city fiscals or any other
officers, who are not authorized by law to do
so. Because article 204, which complements
said section 202, of the same Code provided
that "the penalty of suspension in its minimum
and medium degrees shall be imposed upon
the following persons: 1. Any judicial officer
who, within the period prescribed by the
provisions of the law of criminal procedure in
force, shall fail to release any prisoner under
arrest or to commit such prisoner formally by

written order containing a statement of the
grounds upon which the same is based."
Although the above quoted provision of article
204 of the old Penal Code has not been
incorporated in the Revised Penal Code the
import of said words judicial authority or officer
can not be construed as having been modified
by the mere omission of said provision in the
Revised Penal Code.
Besides, section 1 (3), Article III, of our
Constitution provides that "the right of the
people to be secure in their persons...against
unreasonable seizure shall not be violated, and
no warrant [of arrest, detention or confinement]
shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge after the examination
under oath or affirmation of the complaint and
the witness he may produce." Under this
constitutional precept no person may be
deprived of his liberty, except by warrant of
arrest or commitment issued upon probable
cause by a judge after examination of the
complainant and his witness. And the judicial
authority to whom the person arrested by a
public officers must be surrendered can not be
any other but court or judge who alone is
authorized to issue a warrant of commitment or
provisional detention of the person arrested
pending the trial of the case against the latter.
Without such warrant of commitment, the
detention of the person arrested for than six
hours would be illegal and in violation of our
Constitution.
Our conclusion is confirmed by section 17,
Rule 109 of the Rules of court, which, referring
to the duty of an officer after arrest without
warrant, provides that "a person making arrest
for legal ground shall, without unnecessary
delay, and within the time prescribed in the
Revised Penal Code, take the person arrested
to the proper court or judge for such action for
they may deem proper to take;" and by section
11 of Rule 108, which reads that "after the
arrest by the defendant and his delivery to the
Court, he shall be informed of the complaint or
information filed against him. He shall also
informed of the substance of the testimony and
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 43
evidence presented against him, and, if he
desires to testify or to present witnesses or
evidence in his favor, he may be allowed to do
so. The testimony of the witnesses need not be
reduced to writing but that of the defendant
shall be taken in writing and subscribed by him.
And it is further corroborated by the provisions
of section 1 and 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of
Court. According to the provision of said
section, "a writ of habeas corpus shall extend
any person to all cases of illegal confinement
or detention by which any person is illegally
deprived of his liberty"; and "if it appears that
the person alleged to be restrained of his
liberty is in the custody of an officer under
process issued by a court or judge, or by virtue
of a judgement or order of a court of record,
and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to
issue the process, render judgment, or make
the order, the writ shall not be allowed. "Which
a contrario sensu means that, otherwise, the
writ shall be allowed and the person detained
shall be released.
The judicial authority mentioned in section 125
of the Revised Penal Code can not be
construed to include the fiscal of the City of
Manila or any other city, because they cannot
issue a warrant of arrest or of commitment or
temporary confinement of a person
surrendered to legalize the detention of a
person arrested without warrant. (Section 7,
Rule 108; Hashim vs. Boncan, 40 Off. Gaz.
13th Supp., p.13; Lino vs. Fugoso, L-1159,
promulgated on January 30, 1947, 43 Off.
Gaz., 1214). The investigation which the city of
fiscal of Manila makes is not the preliminary
investigation proper provided for in section 11,
Rule 108, above quoted, to which all person
charged with offenses cognizable by the Court
of First Instance in provinces are entitled, but it
is a mere investigation made by the city fiscal
for the purpose of filing the corresponding
information against the defendant with the
proper municipal court or Court of First
Instance of Manila if the result of the
investigation so warrants, in order to obtain or
secure from the court a warrant of arrest of the
defendant. It is provided by a law as a

substitute, in a certain sense, of the preliminary
investigation proper to avoid or prevent a hasty
or malicious prosecution, since defendant
charged with offenses triable by the courts in
the City of Manila are not entitled to a proper
preliminary investigation.
The only executive officers authorized by law
to make a proper preliminary investigation in
case of temporary absence of both the justice
of the peace and the auxiliary justice of the
peace from the municipality, town or place, are
the municipal mayors who are empowered in
such case to issue a warrant of arrest of the
caused. (Section 3, Rule 108, in connection
with section 6, Rule 108, and section 2 of Rule
109.) The preliminary investigation which a city
fiscal may conduct under section 2, Rule 108,
is the investigation referred to in the
proceeding paragraph.
Under the law, a complaint charging a person
with the commission of an offense cognizable
by the courts of Manila is not filed with
municipal court or the Court of First Instance of
Manila, because as above stated, the latter do
not make or conduct a preliminary investigation
proper. The complaint must be made or filed
with the city fiscal of Manila who, personally or
through one of his assistants, makes the
investigation, not for the purpose of ordering
the arrest of the accused, but of filing with the
proper court the necessary information against
the accused if the result of the investigation so
warrants, and obtaining from the court a
warrant of arrest or commitment of the
accused.
When a person is arrested without warrant in
cases permitted bylaw, the officer or person
making the arrest should, as abovestated,
without unnecessary delay take or surrender
the person arrested, within the period of time
prescribed in the Revised Penal Code, to the
court or judge having jurisdiction to try or make
a preliminary investigation of the offense
(section 17, Rule 109); and the court or judge
shall try and decide the case if the court has
original jurisdiction over the offense charged,
or make the preliminary investigation if it is a
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 44
justice of the peace court having no original
jurisdiction, and then transfer the case to the
proper Court of First Instance in accordance
with the provisions of section 13, Rule 108.
In the City of Manila, where complaints are not
filed directly with the municipal court or the
Court of First Instance, the officer or person
making the arrest without warrant shall
surrender or take the person arrested to the
city fiscal, and the latter shall make the
investigation above mentioned and file, if
proper, the corresponding information within
the time prescribed by section 125 of the
Revised Penal Code, so that the court may
issue a warrant of commitment for the
temporary detention of the accused. And the
city fiscal or his assistants shall make the
investigation forthwith, unless it is materially
impossible for them to do so, because the
testimony of the person or officer making the
arrest without warrant is in such cases ready
and available, and shall, immediately after the
investigation, either release the person
arrested or file the corresponding information.
If the city fiscal has any doubt as to the
probability of the defendant having committed
the offense charged, or is not ready to file the
information on the strength of the testimony or
evidence presented, he should release and not
detain the person arrested for a longer period
than that prescribed in the Penal Code, without
prejudice to making or continuing the
investigation and filing afterwards the proper
information against him with the court, in order
to obtain or secure a warrant of his arrest. Of
course, for the purpose of determining the
criminal liability of an officer detaining a person
for more than six hours prescribed by the
Revised Penal Code, the means of
communication as well as the hour of arrested
and other circumstances, such as the time of
surrender and the material possibility for the
fiscal to make the investigation and file in time
the necessary information, must be taken into
consideration.
To consider the city fiscal as the judicial
authority referred to in article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code, would be to authorize the
 CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 45

detention of a person arrested without warrant

for a period longer than that permitted by law
without any process issued by a court of
competent jurisdiction. The city fiscal, may not,
after due investigation, find sufficient ground
for filing an information or prosecuting the
person arrested and release him, after the
latter had been illegally detained for days or
weeks without any process issued by a court or
judge.

A peace officer has no power or authority to

arrest a person without a warrant upon
complaint of the offended party or any other
person, except in those cases expressly
authorized by law. What he or the complainant
may do in such case is to file a complaint with
the city fiscal of Manila, or directly with the
justice of the peace courts in municipalities and
other political subdivisions. If the City Fiscal
has no authority, and he has not, to order the
arrest even if he finds, after due investigation,
that there is a probability that a crime has been
committed and the accused is guilty thereof, a
fortiori a police officer has no authority to arrest
and detain a person charged with an offense
upon complaint of the offended party or other
persons even though, after investigation, he
becomes convinced that the accused is guilty
of the offense charged.

In view of all the foregoing, without making any

pronouncement as to the responsibility of the
officers who intervened in the detention of the
petitioners, for the policeman Dumlao may
have acted in good faith, in the absence of a
clear cut ruling on the matter in believing that
he had complied with the mandate of article
125 by delivering the petitioners within six
hours to the office of the city fiscal, and the
latter might have ignored the fact that the
petitioners were being actually detained when
the said policeman filed a complaint against
them with the city fiscal, we hold that the
petitioners are being illegally restrained of their
liberty, and their release is hereby ordered
unless they are now detained by virtue of a
process issued by a competent court of justice.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-26723 December 22, 1966
ARTHUR MEDINA Y YUMUL, petitioner,
vs.
MARCELO F. OROZCO, JR., Acting City
Warden of Caloocan City, respondent.
Federico Magdangal for petitioner.
Francisco A. Garcia for respondent.
SANCHEZ, J.:
On application for habeas corpus. The facts
are:
At about 12:00 p.m. on November 7, 1965,
petitioner Arthur Medina y Yumul was arrested
and thereafter incarcerated in the Caloocan
City jail, allegedly as one of those responsible
for the death of one Marcelo Sangalang y Diwa
which occurred on October 31, 1965 in said
city. At about 9:00 o'clock in the morning of the
same day, November 7, 1965, the case against
Medina and two others for Sangalang's murder
was referred to a fiscal, who forthwith
conducted a preliminary investigation in
petitioner's presence. At about 3:40 p.m. on
November 10, 1965, an information for murder
was filed against petitioner Arthur Medina y
Yumul, and Antonio Olivar y Flores and
Alexander Enriquez y Raginio in the Caloocan
branch of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
docketed as Criminal Case No. C-1197 of said
court. By court order, they were promptly
committed to jail. Arraigned, Medina and his
co-accused stood trial — which has not yet
terminated.
1. First to be considered is the charge of
arbitrary detention. Petitioner claims violation
of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. The
crime — for which petitioner is detained — is
murder, a capital offense. The arresting
officer's duty under the law1 was either to
deliver him to the proper judicial authorities
within 18 hours, or thereafter release him. The
fact however is that he was not released. From
the time of petitioner's arrest at 12:00 o'clock
p.m. on November 7 to 3:40 p.m. on November
10 when the information against him for murder
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 46
actually was in court, over 75 hours have
elapsed.
But, stock should be taken of the fact that
November 7 was a Sunday; November 8 was
declared an official holiday; and November 9
(election day) was also an official holiday. In
these three no-office days, it was not an easy
matter for a fiscal to look for his clerk and
stenographer, draft the information and search
for the Judge to have him act thereon, and get
the clerk of court to open the courthouse,
docket the case and have the order of
commitment prepared. And then, where to
locate and the certainty of locating those
officers and employees could very well
compound the fiscal's difficulties. These are
considerations sufficient enough to deter us
from declaring that Arthur Medina was
arbitrarily detained. For, he was brought to
court on the very first office day following
arrest.2
2. Nor could discharge from custody, by now,
be justified even on the assumption that
detention was originally arbitrary.
Petitioner at present is jailed because of the
court's order of commitment of November 10,
1965 upon a murder indictment. No bail was
provided for him, because he is charged with a
capital offense. Such detention remains
unaffected by the alleged previous arbitrary
detention. Because, detention under a valid
information is one thing, arbitrary detention
anterior thereto another. They are separate
concepts. Simply because at the inception
detention was wrong is no reason for letting
petitioner go scot-free after the serious charge
of murder has been clamped upon him and his
detention ordered by the court. The first is
illegal; but the second is not.3 Thus, the petition
for habeas corpus came too late.4
3. As unavailing is petitioner's claim that no
preliminary investigation was conducted by the
fiscal before the criminal charge against him
was registered in court. Other than that
averment in the petition herein, petitioner has
nothing whatsoever to show for it. Upon the
 CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 47

other hand, the assertion that such

investigation was made on the very day of
petitioner's arrest and in his presence, is
confirmed by the fact that on November 12,
1965 he moved the office of the city fiscal for
a reinvestigation of his case. And that
reinvestigation was held on December 1, 1965.
Thereafter, the case against him proceeded to
trial. Add to all of these the legal presumption
of regularity in the performance of official
duties,5 and the question of lack of preliminary
investigation is well nailed down.

4. Besides, the proper forum before which

absence of preliminary investigation should be
ventilated is the Court of First Instance, not this
Court. Reason is not wanting for this view.
Absence of preliminary investigation does not
go to the jurisdiction of the court but merely to
the regularity of the proceedings. It could even
be waived. Indeed, it is frequently
6
waived. These are matters to be inquired into
by the trial court, not an appellate court.

5. The cry of deprivation of a speedy trial

merits but scant consideration. The
arraignment of petitioner set for December 1,
1965 was postponed to December 20, 1965,
thence to February 28, 1966, to March 14,
1966, all on petition of counsel for the accused,
including petitioner. Then, on April 14, 1966,
petitioner's counsel moved to reset the date of
hearing on the merits. And again, the hearing
scheduled on July 26, 1966 was transferred to
September 6, 1966 on motion of defendant
Alexander Enriquez with the conformity of
petitioner's counsel. Finally, on motion of
petitioner's counsel, the hearing on September
6, 1966 was recalendared for December 6,
1966. In this factual environment, we do not
see denial to petitioner of the right to speedy
trial. Delay of his own making cannot be
oppressive to him.7

For the reasons given, the petition herein to set

petitioner Arthur Medina y Yumul at liberty is
hereby denied. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED

G.R. No. 134503 July 2, 1999
JASPER AGBAY, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN
FOR THE MILITARY, SPO4 NEMESIO
NATIVIDAD, JR. and SPO2 ELEAZAR M.
SOLOMON, respondent.
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
This petition for certiorari seeks to nullify the
Resolution of the Deputy Ombudsman for the
Military dated 19 January 19981 which
recommended the dismissal of the criminal
complaint filed by petitioner against herein
private respondents for violation of Article 125
of the Revised Penal Code for delay in the
delivery of detained persons, and the Order of
April 13, 19982 which denied his motion for
reconsideration.
The pertinent facts leading to the filing of the
petition at bar are as follows:
On September 7, 1997, petitioner, together
with a certain Sherwin Jugalbot, was arrested
and detained at the Liloan Police Station,
Metro Cebu for an alleged violation of R.A.
7610, the "Special Protection of Children
Against Child abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act."3 The following day, or on
September 8, 1997, a Complaint for violation of
R.A. 7610 was filed against petitioner and
Jugalbot before the 7th Municipal Circuit Trial
Court of Liloan, Metro Cebu by one Joan
Gicaraya for and in behalf of her daughter
Gayle4 . The complaint, insofar as pertinent,
reads as follows:
That on the 7th day of September
1997 at Sitio Bonbon, Brgy.
Catarman, Liloan, Metro Cebu,
Philippines and within the
Preliminary Jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, did then and
there, willfully, feloniously and
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 48
unlawfully, conspiring,
confederating, helping with one
another, while accused JASPER
AGBAY manipulating to finger the
vagina of GAYLE FATIMA
AMIGABLE GICAYARA, his
companion block the sight of the
Private Complainant, Mrs. JOAN
A. GICAYARA, while on board a
tricycle going their destinations.
Upon initial investigation of the
Bgy, Captain of Bgy. Catarman,
accused SHERWIN JUGALBOT
was released and accused
JASPER AGBAY is presently
detain Liloan Police Station Jail.
Medical Certificate issued from
Don Vicente Sotto Memorial
Medical Center, Cebu City is
hereto attached.
On September 10, 1997, counsel for petitioner
wrote the Chief of Police of Liloan demanding
the immediate release of petitioner considering
that the latter had "failed to deliver the detained
Jasper Agbay to the proper judicial authority
within thirty-six (36) hours from September 7,
1997."5 Private respondents did not act on this
letter and continued to detain petitioner.6
On September 12; 1997, the 7th Municipal
Circuit Trial Court of Liloan, Metro Cebu issued
an order, denominated as "Detention During
the Pendency of the Case", committing
petitioner to the jail warden of Cebu City.7 Five
(5) days later, or on September 17, 1997,
petitioner was ordered released by the said
court after he had posted bond.8
On September 26, 1997, petitioner filed a
complaint for delay in the delivery of detained
persons against herein private respondents
SPO4 Nemesio Natividad, Jr., SPO2 Eleazar
M. Salomon and other unidentified police
officers stationed at the Liloan Police
Substation, before the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for the Visayas.9
Regarding the complaint for violation of R.A.
7610, it is alleged by petitioner that on
 CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 49

November 10, 1997, the 7th MCTC of Liloan, CIRCULAR BEING

Metro Cebu issued a resolution containing the UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND
following dispositive portion: ILLEGAL, HENCE, NULL AND
VOID.
WHEREFORE, finding probable
cause for the crime in Violation of II.
Republic Act 7610, it is hereby
recommended that an THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT
INFORMATION be filed against GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
the two aforenamed accused. DISCRETION IN NOT HOLDING
THAT IT IS BEYOND ITS
Forward the record of this case to COMPENCE TO DETERMINE
the Provincial Fiscal's Office for WHETHER OR NOT THE
appropriate action.10 MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL
COURT OF LILOAN-
By virtue of Memorandum Circular No. 14, COMPOSTELA HAS IN FACT
Series of 1995, dated 10 October 1995 of the NO JURISDICTION TO TRY THE
Office of the Ombudsman,11 the case for delay CASE FILED AGAINST HEREIN
in delivery filed by petitioner against herein PETITIONER.
private respondents before the Deputy
Ombudsman for the Visayas was transferred to III.
the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military for its
proper disposition. Thus, it was this office THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT
which acted on the complaint, now GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
denominated as OMB-VIS-CRIM-97-0786, and DISCRETION IN NOT HOLDING
which issued the questioned Resolution dated THAT THE MCTC, WHILE
January 19, 1998 recommending its dismissal HAVING AUTHORITY TO
against herein private respondents. Petitioner CONDUCT A PRELIMINARY
moved for reconsideration of this Resolution INVESTIGATION, IS NOT THE
but this motion was denied in an Order dated "PROPER JUDICIAL
April 13, 1998. AUTHORITY " CONTEMPLATED
IN ARTICLE 125 OF THE
Hence, this petition for certiorari. REVISED PENAL CODE AND,
HENCE, THE FILING OF THE
The grounds relied upon in the present COMPLAINT BEFORE IT FOR
petition12 are as follows: THE PURPOSE OF
CONDUCTING A PRELIMINARY
I. INVESTIGATION DID NOT
INTERRUPT THE PERIOD
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT PRESCRIBED BY ART. 125.
GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN RELYING ON IV.
MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR NO.
14, SERIES OF 1995, DATED 10 THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT
OCTOBER 1995, OF THE GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN DISCRETION IN HOLIDING
IN HOLDING THAT IT HAS THAT THE ISSUE OF THE
COMPETENCE TO ACT ON VALIDITY OF THE ORDER OF
THE ABOVE-ENTITLED CASE DETENTION IS IRRELEVANT
BEFORE IT, THE SAID TO THE ISSUE OF CRIMINAL
 CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 50

LIABILITY OF PRIVATE for the Military has the authority to investigate

RESPONDENTS FOR DELAY IN civilian personnel of the government was
THE DELIVERY OF DETAINED resolved in the affirmative in the case of Acop
PERSONS. v. Office of the Ombudsman.16 In that case, the
petitioners, who were members of the
V. Philippine National Police questioned the
jurisdiction of the Deputy Ombudsman to
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT investigate the alleged shootout of certain
GRAVELY ABUSED ITS suspected members of the "Kuratong Baleleng"
DISCRETION IN HOLDING robbery gang; this Court held that:
THAT THE DUTY OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS TO FILE THE The deliberations on the Deputy
NECESSARY COMPLAINT IN for the military establishment do
COURT WAS FULFILLED not yield conclusive evidence that
WHEN THEY FILED A FORMAL such deputy is prohibited from
COMPLAINT ON 8 SEPTEMBER performing other functions or
1997 WITH THE 7TH MCTC OF duties affecting non-military
LILOAN-COMPOSTELA. personnel. On the contrary, a
review of the relevant
On the first issue, petitioner argues that due to Constitutional provisions reveal
the civilian character of the Philippine National otherwise.
Police, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman
for the Military, by virtue of the description of As previously established, the
the Office, has no competence or jurisdiction to Ombudsman "may exercise such
act on his complaint against private other powers or perform such
respondents who are members of the PNP. functions or duties" as Congress
Petitioner also questions the constitutionality of may prescribe through legisiation.
Memorandum Circular No. 14 insofar as it Therefore, nothing can prevent
purports to vest the Office of the Deputy Congress from giving the
Ombudsman for Military Affairs with jurisdiction Ombudsman supervision and
to investigate all cases against personnel of control over the Ombudsman's
the Philippine National Police.1âwphi1.nêt deputies, one being the deputy
for the military establishment. In
There is no dispute as to the civilian character this light, Section 11 of R.A. No.
of our police force. The 1987 Constitution, in 6770 provides:
Section 6, Article XVI, has mandated the
establishment of "one police force, which shall Sec. 11. Structural
be national in scope and civilian Organization. —
character (emphasis supplied)." Likewise, R.A. The authority and
697513 is categorical in describing the civilian responsibility for the
character of the police force.14The only exercise of the
question now is whether Memorandum Circular mandate of the
No. 14, in vesting the Office of the Deputy Office of the
Ombudsman for the Military with jurisdiction to Ombudsman and
investigate complaints against members of the for the discharge of
PNP, violates the latter's civilian character. its powers and
functions shall be
As opined by the Office of the Solicitor General vested in the
in its Comment dated 7 December 199815, the Ombudsman, who
issue as to whether the Deputy Ombudsman shall have
 CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 51

supervision and individual cases involving non-military

control of the said personnel referred by the Ombudsman to the
Office. Deputy for Military Affairs" and does not apply
when, as in this case, there is a wholesale or
While Section 31 thereof declares: indiscriminate referral of such cases to the
Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs in the
Sec. 31. form of an Office Memorandum Circular.
Designation of
Investigators and Petitioner's arguments do not convince as
Prosecutors. — The there is no basis for the distinction.
Ombudsman may
utilize the personnel There is no basis in the above-cited decision to
of his office and/or limit the referral of cases involving non-military
designate or personnel to the Deputy Ombudsman for
deputize any fiscal, Military Affairs to isolated or individual cases.
state prosecutor to The Office of the Ombudsman, in issuing
assist in the Memorandum Circular No. 15, is simply
investigation and exercising the power vested in the
prosecution of Ombudsman "to utilize the personnel of his
certain cases. office and/or designate or deputize any fiscal,
Those designated state prosecutor or the or lawyer in the
or deputized to government service to act as special
assist him herein investigator or prosecutor to assist in the
shall be under his investigation and prosecution of certain cases."
supervision and This Court, absent any grave abuse of
control. discretion, may not enterfere with the exercise
by the Ombudsman of his power of supervision
Accordingly, the Ombudsman and control over the said Office.
may refer cases involving non-
military personnel for Petitioner further argues that Memorandum
investigation by the Deputy for Circular No. 14 violates the clear intent and
Military Affairs. In these cases at policy of the Constitution and of R.A. 6975 to
bench, therefore, no irregularity maintain the civilian character of the police
attended the referral by the force and "would render nugatory and
Acting Ombudsman of the meaningless the distinction between cases
Kurutong Baleleng case to involving civilian and military personnel and the
respondent Casaclang who, in creation of separate divisions of the
turn, created a panel of Ombudsman."19
investigators.17
Said contentions are misplaced.
The cited case is determinative of the issue.
However, petitioner, in his Reply to Comment The Deputy Ombudsman for the Military,
dated February 1, 1999, argues that the ruling despite his designation as such, is by no
in the Acop case is not on all fours with the means a member of the military establishment.
case at bar18. Petitioner states that the doctrine The said Office was established "to extend the
laid down in the said case is simply that "the Office of the Ombudsman to the military
Ombudsman may refer cases involving non- establishment just as it champions the
military personnel for investigation by the common people against bureaucratic
Deputy for Military Affairs. This doctrine, indifference". The Office was intended to help
petitioner argues, "applies only to isolated or the "ordinary foot soldiers" to obtain redress for

their grievances against higher authorities and
the drafters of the Constitution were aware that
the creation of the Office, which is seemingly
independent of the President, to perform
functions which constitutionally should be
performed by the President, might be in
derogation of the powers of the President as
Commander-In-Chief of the Armed Forces20.
It must be borne in mind that the Office of the
Ombudsman was envisioned by the framers of
the 1987 Constitution as the "eyes and ears of
the people"21 and "a champion of the citizen.22"
Sec. 12, Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution
describes the Ombudsman and his deputies as
"protectors of the people." Thus, first and
foremost, the Ombudsman and his deputies,
including the Deputy Ombudsman for the
Military owe their allegiance to the people and
ordinary citizens, it is clearly not a part of the
military. We fail to see how the assumption of
jurisdiction by the said office over the
investigation of cases involving the PNP would
detract from or violate the civilian character of
the police force when precisely the Office of
the Ombudsman is a civilian office.
The other issues raised by petitioner concerns
the application of Art. 125 of the Revised Penal
Code which provides as follows:
Art. 125. Delay in the delivery of
detained persons to the proper
judicial authorities. — The
penalties provided in the next
preceding article shall be
imposed upon the public officer
or employee who shall detain any
person for some legal ground and
shall fail to deliver such person
for the proper judicial authorities
within the period of: twelve (12)
hours, for crimes or offenses
punishable by light penalties, or
their equivalent; eighteen (18)
hours, for crimes or offenses
punishable by correctional
penalties, or their equivalent; and
thirty-six hours (36) hours, for
crimes or offenses punishable by
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 52
afflictive or capital penalties, or
their equivalent.
In every case, the person
detained shall be informed of the
cause of his detention and shall
be allowed, upon his request, to
communicate and confer at any
time with his attorney or counsel.
In the case at bar, petitioner was arrested and
detained at the Liloan Police Station on 7
September 1997 for an alleged violation of
R.A. 7610, specifically section 5 (b) thereof 23.
This crime carries a penalty of reclusion
temporalin its medium period to reclusion
perpetua, an afflictive penalty. Under these
circumstances, a criminal complaint or
information should be filed with the proper
judicial authorities within thirty six (36) hours of
his arrest.
As borne by the records before us the mother
of private complainant, Joan Gicaraya, filed a
complaint on 8 September 1997 against
petitioner for violation of R.A. 7610 before the
7th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Liloan,
Metro Cebu.
Petitioner contends that the act of private
complainant in filing the complaint before the
MCTC was for purposes of preliminary
investigation as the MCTC has no jurisdiction
to try the offense. This act of private
complainant petitioner argues, was
unnecessary, a surplusage which did not
interrupt the period prescribed by Art.
12524 considering that under the Rules it is the
Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction to
try the case against him. As such, upon the
lapse of the thirty-six hours given to the
arresting officers to effect his delivery to the
proper Regional Trial Court, private
respondents were already guilty of violating
Art. 125. Thus, petitioner argues, when the
Judge-Designate of the 7th MCTC issued a
Commitment Order on September 12, 1997, he
was acting contrary to law since by then there
was no basis for the continued detention of
petitioner.25

In addressing the issue, the Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman for the Military in its 13
April 1998 Order, stated that the duty of filing
the corresponding complaint in court was
"fulfille by respondent when the formal
complaint was filed on September 8, 1997 with
the 7th MCTC of Liloan-Compostela, barely 20
hours after the arrest of herein complainant of
September 7, 1997."26 The Solicitor General,
for his part, argues that while a municipal court
judge may conduct preliminary investigations
as an exception to his normal judicial duties, he
still retains the authority to issue an order of
release or commitment. As such, upon the
filing of the complaint with the MCTC, there
was already compliance with the very purpose
and intent of Art. 12527.
The core issue is whether the filing of the
complaint with the Municipal Trial Court
constitutes to a "proper judicial authority" as
contemplated by Art. 125 of the Revised Penal
Code.
Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code is intended
to prevent any abuse resulting from confining a
person without informing him of his offense and
without permitting him to go on bail28. More
specifically, it punishes public officials or
employees who shall detain any person for
some legal ground and shall fail to deliver such
person to the proper judicial authorities within
the periods prescribed by law. The continued
detention of the accused becomes illegal upon
the expiration of the periods provided for by
Art. 125 without such detainee having been
delivered to the corresponding judicial
authorities29.
The words "judicial authority" as contemplated
by Art. 125 mean "the courts of justices or
judges of said courts vested with judicial power
to order the temporary detention or
confinement of a person charged with having
committed a public offense, that is, the
Supreme Court and other such inferior courts
as may be established by law.30"
Petitioner takes great pains in arguing that
when a municipal trial court judge, as in the
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 53
instant case, conducts a preliminary
investigation, he is not acting as a judge but as
a fiscal. In support, petitioner cites the cases
of Sangguniang Bayan ng Batac, Ilocos Norte
vs. Albano, 260 SCRA 561, and Castillo vs.
Villaluz, 171 SCRA 39, where it was held that
"when a preliminary investigation is conducted
by a judge, he performs a non-judicial function
as an exception to his usual duties." Thus,
petitioner opines, the ruling in Sayo v. Chief of
Police of Manila, 80 Phil. 862, that the city
fiscal is not the proper judicial authority
referred to in Art. 125 is applicable.
Petitioner's reliance on the cited cases is
misplaced. The cited cases of Sangguniang
Bayan and Castillo dealt with the issue of
whether or not the findings of the Municipal
Court Judge in a preliminary investigation are
subject to review by provincial and city fiscals.
There was no pronoucement in these cases as
to whether or not a municipal trial court, in the
exercise of its power to conduct preliminary
investigations, is a proper judicial authority as
contemplated by Art. 125.
Neither can petitioner rely on the doctrine
enunciated in Sayo vs. Chief of Police, supra,
since the facts of this case are different. In
Sayo, the complainant was filed with the city
fiscal of Manila who could not issue an order of
release or commitment while in the instant
case, the complaint was filed with a judge who
had the power to issue such an order.
Furthermore, in the Resolution denying the
Motion for Reconsideration of the Sayo case31,
this Court even made a pronouncement that
the delivery of a detained person "is a legal
one and consists in making a charge or filing a
complaint against the prisoner with the proper
justice of the peace or judge of Court of First
Instance in provinces, and in filing by the city
fiscal of an information with the corresponding
city courts after an investigation if the evidence
against said person warrants."
The power to order the release or confinement
of an accused is determinative of the issue. In
contrast with a city fiscal, it is undisputed that a
municipal court judge, even in the performance
 CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 54

of his function to conduct preliminary

investigations, retains the power to issue an
order of release or commitment32. Furthermore,
upon the filing of the complaint with the
Municipal Trial Court, the intent behind art. 125
is satisfied considering that by such act, the
detained person is informed of the crime
imputed against him and, upon his application
with the court, he may be released on bail33.
Petitioner himself acknowledged this power of
the MCTC to order his release when he applied
for and was granted his release upon posting
bail34. Thus, the very purpose underlying
Article 125 has been duly served with the filing
of the complaint with the MCTC. We agree with
the postion of the Ombudsman that such filing
of the complaint with the MCTC interrupted the
period prescribed in said Article.

Finally, we note that it was the mother of

private complainant who filed the complaint
against petitioner with the 7th MCTC of Liloan,
Metro Cebu. If tere was any error in this
procedure, private respondents should not be
held liable. In the same manner, petitioner's
argument that the controversial orders issued
by the MCTC are contrary' to law does not give
rise to criminal liability on the part of the
respondents. Respondent police officers may
have rendered themselves open to sanctions if
they had released petitioners without the order
of the court, knowing fully well that a
complainant was a already filed with it.

WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of

discretion in the issuance of the assailed
January 19, 1998 Resolution and the April 13,
1998 Order of the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for the Military, the Court resolves
to DISMISS the petition. No pronouncement as
to costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. 153524-25 January 31, 2005
RODOLFO SORIA and EDIMAR
BISTA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ANIANO DESIERTO in his capacity as
Head of the Office of the Ombudsman,
HON. ORLANDO C. CASIMIRO in his
capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for
Military, P/INS. JEFFREY T. GOROSPE,
SPO2 ROLANDO G. REGACHO, SPO1
ALFREDO B. ALVIAR, JR., PO3 JAIME D.
LAZARO, PO2 FLORANTE B. CARDENAS,
PO1 JOSEPH A. BENAZA, SPO1 FRANKLIN
D. CABAYA and SPO4 PEDRO
PAREL, respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Yet again, we are tasked to substitute our
judgment for that of the Office of the
Ombudsman in its finding of lack of probable
cause made during preliminary investigation.
And, yet again, we reaffirm the time-honored
practice of non-interference in the conduct of
preliminary investigations by our prosecutory
bodies absent a showing of grave abuse of
discretion on their part.
Petitioners, thru a special civil action
for certiorari,1 contend precisely that the public
respondents herein – officers of the Office of
the Ombudsman – gravely abused their
discretion in dismissing the complaint for
violation of Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code (Delay in the delivery of detained
persons) against private respondents herein,
members of the Philippine National Police
stationed at the Municipality of Santa, Ilocos
Sur.
From the respective pleadings2 of the parties,
the following facts appear to be indubitable:
1. On or about 8:30 in the evening of
13 May 2001 (a Sunday and the day
before the 14 May 2001 Elections 3 ),
petitioners were arrested without a
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 55
warrant by respondents police officers
for alleged illegal possession of firearms
and ammunition;
2. Petitioner Soria was arrested for
alleged illegal possession of .38 cal.
revolver (a crime which carries with it
the penalty of prision correccional in its
maximum period) and for violation of
Article 261 par. (f) of the Omnibus
Election Code in relation to the
Commission on Election Resolution No.
3328 (which carries the penalty of
imprisonment of not less than one [1]
year but not more than six [6] years);
3. Petitioner Bista was arrested for
alleged illegal possession of sub-
machine pistol UZI, cal. 9mm and a .22
cal. revolver with ammunition;
4. Immediately after their arrest,
petitioners were detained at the Santa,
Ilocos Sur, Police Station. It was at the
Santa Police Station that petitioner Bista
was identified by one of the police
officers to have a standing warrant of
arrest for violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 6 issued by the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC) of Vigan, Ilocos Sur,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 12272;
5. The next day, at about 4:30 p.m. of
14 May 2001 (Monday and election
day), petitioners were brought to the
residence of Provincial Prosecutor
Jessica Viloria in San Juan, Ilocos Sur,
before whom a "Joint-Affidavit" against
them was subscribed and sworn to by
the arresting officers. From there, the
arresting officers brought the petitioners
to the Provincial Prosecutor’s Office in
Vigan, Ilocos Sur, and there at about
6:00 p.m. the "Joint-Affidavit" was filed
and docketed;
6. At about 6:30 in the evening of the
same day, 14 May 2001, petitioner
Soria was released upon the order of
Prosecutor Viloria to undergo the

requisite preliminary investigation, while
petitioner Bista was brought back and
continued to be detained at the Santa
Police Station. From the time of
petitioner Soria’s detention up to the
time of his release, twenty-two (22)
hours had already elapsed;
7. On 15 May 2001, at around 2:00 in
the afternoon, petitioner Bista was
brought before the MTC of Vigan, Ilocos
Sur, where the case for violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 6 was pending.
Petitioner Bista posted bail and an
Order of Temporary Release was issued
thereafter;
8. At this point in time, no order of
release was issued in connection with
petitioner Bista’s arrest for alleged illegal
possession of firearms. At 4:30 in the
afternoon of the same day (15 May
2001), an information for Illegal
Possession of Firearms and
Ammunition, docketed as Criminal Case
No. 4413-S, was filed against petitioner
Bista with the 4th Municipal Circuit Trial
Court of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur. At 5:00 in
the afternoon, informations for Illegal
Possession of Firearms and Ammunition
and violation of Article 261 par. (f) of the
Omnibus Election Code in relation to
COMELEC Resolution No. 3328,
docketed as Criminal Cases No. 2269-N
and No. 2268-N, respectively, were filed
in the Regional Trial Court at Narvacan,
Ilocos Sur;
9. On 08 June 2001, petitioner Bista
was released upon filing of bail bonds in
Criminal Cases No. 2268-N and No.
4413-S. He was detained for 26 days.
10. On 15 August 2001, petitioners filed
with the Office of the Ombudsman for
Military Affairs a complaint-affidavit for
violation of Art. 125 of the Revised
Penal Code against herein private
respondents.
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 56
11. After considering the parties’
respective submissions, the Office of the
Ombudsman rendered the first assailed
Joint Resolution dated 31 January 2002
dismissing the complaint for violation of
Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code for
lack of merit; and
12. On 04 March 2002, petitioners then
filed their motion for reconsideration
which was denied for lack of merit in the
second assailed Resolution dated 25
March 2002.
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code states:
Art. 125. Delay in the delivery of detained
persons to the proper judicial authorities. - The
penalties provided in the next preceding article
shall be imposed upon the public officer or
employee who shall detain any person for
some legal ground and shall fail to deliver such
person to the proper judicial authorities within
the period of: twelve (12) hours, for crimes or
offenses punishable by light penalties, or their
equivalent; eighteen (18) hours, for crimes or
offenses punishable by correctional penalties,
or their equivalent; and thirty-six (36) hours, for
crimes or offenses punishable by afflictive or
capital penalties, or their equivalent.
In every case, the person detained shall be
informed of the cause of his detention and shall
be allowed, upon his request, to communicate
and confer at any time with his attorney or
counsel.
It is not under dispute that the alleged crimes
for which petitioner Soria was arrested without
warrant are punishable by correctional
penalties or their equivalent, thus, criminal
complaints or information should be filed with
the proper judicial authorities within 18 hours of
his arrest. Neither is it in dispute that the
alleged crimes for which petitioner Bista was
arrested are punishable by afflictive or capital
penalties, or their equivalent, thus, he could
only be detained for 36 hours without criminal
complaints or information having been filed
with the proper judicial authorities.

The sole bone of contention revolves around
the proper application of the 12-18-36 periods.
With respect specifically to the detention of
petitioner Soria which lasted for 22 hours, it is
alleged that public respondents gravely erred
in construing Article 1254 as excluding
Sundays, holidays and election days in the
computation of the periods prescribed within
which public officers should deliver arrested
persons to the proper judicial authorities as the
law never makes such exception. Statutory
construction has it that if a statute is clear and
unequivocal, it must be given its literal meaning
and applied without any attempts at
interpretation.5 Public respondents, on the
other hand, relied on the cases of Medina v.
Orozco, Jr.,6 and Sayo v. Chief of Police of
Manila7 and on commentaries8 of jurists to
bolster their position that Sundays, holidays
and election days are excluded in the
computation of the periods provided in Article
125,9 hence, the arresting officers delivered
petitioners well within the allowable time.
In addition to the foregoing arguments and with
respect specifically to petitioner Bista,
petitioners maintain that the filing of the
information in court against petitioner Bista did
not justify his continuous detention. The
information was filed at 4:30 p.m. of 15 May
2001 but the orders for his release were issued
by the Regional Trial Court and Municipal Trial
Court of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur, only on 08 June
2001. They argued that based on law and
jurisprudence, if no charge is filed by the
prosecutor within the period fixed by law, the
arresting officer must release the detainee lest
he be charged with violation of Article
125.10 Public respondents countered that the
duty of the arresting officers ended upon the
filing of the informations with the proper judicial
authorities following the rulings in Agbay v.
Deputy Ombudsman for the
11 12
Military , and People v. Acosta.
From a study of the opposing views advanced
by the parties, it is evident that public
respondents did not abuse their discretion in
dismissing for lack of probable cause the
complaint against private respondents.
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 57
Grave abuse of discretion is such capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment on the part
of the public officer concerned which is
equivalent to an excess or lack of
jurisdiction.1awphi1.nét The abuse of
discretion must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a
virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by
law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
and despotic manner by reason of passion or
hostility.13
No grave abuse of discretion, as defined, can
be attributed to herein public respondents.
Their disposition of petitioners’ complaint for
violation of Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code cannot be said to have been conjured
out of thin air as it was properly backed up by
law and jurisprudence. Public respondents
ratiocinated thus:
As aptly pointed out by the respondents insofar
as the complaint of Rodolfo Soria is concerned,
based on applicable laws and jurisprudence,
an election day or a special holiday, should not
be included in the computation of the period
prescribed by law for the filing of
complaint/information in courts in cases of
warrantless arrests, it being a "no-office day."
(Medina vs. Orosco, 125 Phil. 313.) In the
instant case, while it appears that the
complaints against Soria for Illegal Possession
of Firearm and Violation of COMELEC
Resolution No. 3328 were filed with the
Regional Trial Court and Municipal Trial Court
of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur, only on May 15,
200[1] at 4:30 p.m., he had already been
released the day before or on May 14, 2001 at
about 6:30 p.m. by the respondents, as
directed by Prov. Prosecutor Jessica [Viloria].
Hence, there could be no arbitrary detention or
violation of Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code to speak of.14
Indeed, we did hold in Medina v. Orozco,
Jr.,15 that —
. . . The arresting officer’s duty under the law
was either to deliver him to the proper judicial

authorities within 18 hours, or thereafter
release him. The fact however is that he was
not released. From the time of petitioner’s
arrest at 12:00 o’clock p.m. on November 7 to
3:40 p.m. on November 10 when the
information against him for murder actually was
in court, over 75 hours have elapsed.
But, stock should be taken of the fact that
November 7 was a Sunday; November 8 was
declared an official holiday; and November 9
(election day) was also an official holiday. In
these three no-office days, it was not an easy
matter for a fiscal to look for his clerk and
stenographer, draft the information and search
for the Judge to have him act thereon, and get
the clerk of court to open the courthouse,
docket the case and have the order of
commitment prepared. And then, where to
locate and the uncertainty of locating those
officers and employees could very well
compound the fiscal’s difficulties. These are
considerations sufficient enough to deter us
from declaring that Arthur Medina was
arbitrarily detained. For, he was brought to
court on the very first office day following
arrest.
And, in Sayo v. Chief of Police of Manila16 --
. . . Of course, for the purpose of determining
the criminal liability of an officer detaining a
person for more than six hours prescribed by
the Revised Penal Code, the means of
communication as well as the hour of arrest
and other circumstances, such as the time of
surrender and the material possibility for the
fiscal to make the investigation and file in time
the necessary information, must be taken into
consideration.
As to the issue concerning the duty of the
arresting officer after the information has
already been filed in Court, public respondents
acted well within their discretion in ruling thus:
In the same vein, the complaint of Edimar Bista
against the respondents for Violation of Article
125, will not prosper because the running of
the thirty-six (36)-hour period prescribed by law
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 58
for the filing of the complaint against him from
the time of his arrest was tolled by one day
(election day). Moreover, he has a standing
warrant of arrest for Violation of B.P. Blg. 6 and
it was only on May 15, 2001, at about 2:00
p.m. that he was able to post bail and secure
an Order of Release. Obviously, however, he
could only be released if he has no other
pending criminal case requiring his continuous
detention.
The criminal Informations against Bista for
Violations of Article 125, RPC and COMELEC
Resolution No. 3328 were filed with the
Regional Trial Court and Municipal Trial Court
of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur, on May 15, 2001
(Annexes "G" and "I", Complaint-Affidavit of
Edimar Bista) but he was released from
detention only on June 8, 2001, on orders of
the RTC and MTC of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur
(Annexes "J" and "K", Complaint-Affidavit).
Was there a delay in the delivery of detained
person to the proper judicial authorities under
the circumstances? The answer is in the
negative. The complaints against him was (sic)
seasonably filed in the court of justice within
the thirty-six (36)-hour period prescribed by law
as discussed above. The duty of the detaining
officers is deemed complied with upon the filing
of the complaints. Further action, like issuance
of a Release Order, then rests upon the judicial
authority (People v. Acosta [CA] 54 O.G.
4739).17
The above disposition is in keeping with Agbay
v. Deputy Ombudsman for the
Military, wherein we ordained that –
18
. . . Furthermore, upon the filing of the
complaint with the Municipal Trial Court, the
intent behind Art. 125 is satisfied considering
that by such act, the detained person is
informed of the crime imputed against him and,
upon his application with the court, he may be
released on bail. Petitioner himself
acknowledged this power of the MCTC to order
his release when he applied for and was
granted his release upon posting bail. Thus,
the very purpose underlying Article 125 has
been duly served with the filing of the

complaint with the MCTC. We agree with the
position of the Ombudsman that such filing of
the complaint with the MCTC interrupted the
period prescribed in said Article.
All things considered, there being no grave
abuse of discretion, we have no choice but to
defer to the Office of the Ombudsman’s
determination that the facts on hand do not
make out a case for violation of Article 125 of
the Revised Penal Code.l^vvphi1.net
As we have underscored in numerous
decisions --
We have consistently refrained from interfering
with the investigatory and prosecutorial powers
of the Ombudsman absent any compelling
reason. This policy is based on constitutional,
statutory and practical considerations. We are
mindful that the Constitution and RA 6770
endowed the Office of the Ombudsman with a
wide latitude of investigatory and prosecutorial
powers, virtually free from legislative, executive
or judicial intervention, in order to insulate it
from outside pressure and improper influence.
Moreover, a preliminary investigation is in
effect a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits
of the case. Sufficient proof of the guilt of the
accused must be adduced so that when the
case is tried, the trial court may not be bound,
as a matter of law, to order an
acquittal. Hence, if the Ombudsman, using
professional judgment, finds the case
dismissible, the Court shall respect such
findings, unless clothed with grave abuse
of discretion. Otherwise, the functions of the
courts will be grievously hampered by
innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of
investigatory proceedings conducted by the
Office of the Ombudsman with regard to
complaints filed before it. In much the same
way, the courts will be swamped with cases if
they will have to review the exercise of
discretion on the part of fiscals or prosecuting
attorneys each time the latter decide to file an
information in court or dismiss a complaint by a
private complainant.19 (Emphasis supplied)
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 59
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
petition dated 27 May 2002 is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Joint
Resolution dated 31 January 2002 and the
Order dated 25 March 2002 of the Office of the
Ombudsman are hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Art. 126. Delaying release. — The penalties
provided for in Article 124 shall be imposed
upon any public officer or employee who
delays for the period of time specified therein
the performance of any judicial or executive
order for the release of a prisoner or detention
prisoner, or unduly delays the service of the
notice of such order to said prisoner or the
proceedings upon any petition for the liberation
of such person.
Art. 127. Expulsion. — The penalty of prision
correccional shall be imposed upon any public
officer or employee who, not being thereunto
authorized by law, shall expel any person from
the Philippine Islands or shall compel such
person to change his residence.
ART III, SEC 7 CONSTITUTION
SECTION 7. The right of the people to
information on matters of public concern shall
be recognized. Access to official records, and
to documents, and papers pertaining to official
acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for
policy development, shall be afforded the
citizen, subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law.
 CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 60

B. VIOLATION OF DOMICILE SECTION 3. (1) The privacy of communication

Art. 128. Violation of domicile. — The
penalty of prision correccional in its minimum
period shall be imposed upon any public officer
or employee who, not being authorized by
judicial order, shall enter any dwelling against
the will of the owner thereof, search papers or
other effects found therein without the previous
consent of such owner, or having
surreptitiously entered said dwelling, and being
required to leave the premises, shall refuse to
do so.
If the offense be committed in the night-time, or
if any papers or effects not constituting
evidence of a crime be not returned
immediately after the search made by the
offender, the penalty shall be prision
correccional in its medium and maximum
periods.
and correspondence shall be inviolable except
upon lawful order of the court, or when public
safety or order requires otherwise as
prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or
the preceding section shall be inadmissible for
any purpose in any proceeding.
RULES OF COURT RULE 126 SEC 8
Section 8. Search of house, room, or
premise to be made in presence of two
witnesses. — No search of a house, room, or
any other premise shall be made except in the
presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any
member of his family or in the absence of the
latter, two witnesses of sufficient age and
discretion residing in the same locality. (7a)

Art. 129. Search warrants maliciously

obtained and abuse in the service of those
legally obtained. — In addition to the liability
attaching to the offender for the commission of
any other offense, the penalty of arresto mayor
in its maximum period to prision correccional in
its minimum period and a fine not exceeding
P1,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any
public officer or employee who shall procure a
search warrant without just cause, or, having
legally procured the same, shall exceed his
authority or use unnecessary severity in
executing the same.

CONSTI ART III SECTION 2. The right of the

people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and
for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.

G.R. No. L-19550 June 19, 1967
HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P.
BROOKS, JOHN J. BROOKS and KARL
BECK, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO, in his capacity as
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE; JOSE LUKBAN,
in his capacity as Acting Director, National
Bureau of Investigation; SPECIAL
PROSECUTORS PEDRO D. CENZON,
EFREN I. PLANA and MANUEL VILLAREAL,
JR. and ASST. FISCAL MANASES G.
REYES; JUDGE AMADO ROAN, Municipal
Court of Manila; JUDGE ROMAN CANSINO,
Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE
HERMOGENES CALUAG, Court of First
Instance of Rizal-Quezon City Branch, and
JUDGE DAMIAN JIMENEZ, Municipal Court
of Quezon City, respondents.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno and
Meer, Meer and Meer and Juan T. David for
petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz,
Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de
Castro, Assistant Solicitor General Frine C.
Zaballero, Solicitor Camilo D. Quiason and
Solicitor C. Padua for respondents.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Upon application of the officers of the
government named on the margin1 —
hereinafter referred to as Respondents-
Prosecutors — several judges2 — hereinafter
referred to as Respondents-Judges — issued,
on different dates,3 a total of 42 search
warrants against petitioners herein4 and/or the
corporations of which they were
5 that, in due course, thereafter, decision be
officers, directed to the any peace officer, to
search the persons above-named and/or the
premises of their offices, warehouses and/or
residences, and to seize and take possession
of the following personal property to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records,
vouchers, correspondence, receipts,
ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit
journals, typewriters, and other
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 61
documents and/or papers showing all
business transactions including
disbursements receipts, balance sheets
and profit and loss statements and
Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).
as "the subject of the offense; stolen or
embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the
offense," or "used or intended to be used as
the means of committing the offense," which is
described in the applications adverted to above
as "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and
Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and
the Revised Penal Code."
Alleging that the aforementioned search
warrants are null and void, as contravening the
Constitution and the Rules of Court —
because, inter alia: (1) they do not describe
with particularity the documents, books and
things to be seized; (2) cash money, not
mentioned in the warrants, were actually
seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish
evidence against the aforementioned
petitioners in deportation cases filed against
them; (4) the searches and seizures were
made in an illegal manner; and (5) the
documents, papers and cash money seized
were not delivered to the courts that issued the
warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with
law — on March 20, 1962, said petitioners filed
with the Supreme Court this original action
for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and
injunction, and prayed that, pending final
disposition of the present case, a writ of
preliminary injunction be issued restraining
Respondents-Prosecutors, their agents and /or
representatives from using the effects seized
as aforementioned or any copies thereof, in the
deportation cases already adverted to, and
rendered quashing the contested search
warrants and declaring the same null and void,
and commanding the respondents, their agents
or representatives to return to petitioners
herein, in accordance with Section 3, Rule 67,
of the Rules of Court, the documents, papers,
things and cash moneys seized or confiscated
under the search warrants in question.

In their answer, respondents-prosecutors
alleged, 6 (1) that the contested search
warrants are valid and have been issued in
accordance with law; (2) that the defects of
said warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners'
consent; and (3) that, in any event, the effects
seized are admissible in evidence against
herein petitioners, regardless of the alleged
illegality of the aforementioned searches and
seizures.
On March 22, 1962, this Court issued the writ
of preliminary injunction prayed for in the
petition. However, by resolution dated June 29,
1962, the writ was partially lifted or dissolved,
insofar as the papers, documents and things
seized from the offices of the corporations
above mentioned are concerned; but, the
injunction was maintained as regards the
papers, documents and things found and
seized in the residences of petitioners herein. 7
Thus, the documents, papers, and things
seized under the alleged authority of the
warrants in question may be split into two (2)
major groups, namely: (a) those found and
seized in the offices of the aforementioned
corporations, and (b) those found and seized in
the residences of petitioners herein.
As regards the first group, we hold that
petitioners herein have no cause of action to
assail the legality of the contested warrants
and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof,
for the simple reason that said corporations
have their respective personalities, separate
and distinct from the personality of herein
petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares
of stock or of the interest of each of them in
said corporations, and whatever the offices
they hold therein may be.8 Indeed, it is well
settled that the legality of a seizure can be
contested only by the party whose rights have
been impaired thereby,9 and that the objection
to an unlawful search and seizure is purely
personal and cannot be availed of by third
parties. 10 Consequently, petitioners herein
may not validly object to the use in evidence
against them of the documents, papers and
things seized from the offices and premises of
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 62
the corporations adverted to above, since the
right to object to the admission of said papers
in evidence belongs exclusively to the
corporations, to whom the seized effects
belong, and may not be invoked by the
corporate officers in proceedings against them
in their individual capacity. 11 Indeed, it has
been held:
. . . that the Government's action in
gaining possession of papers belonging
to the corporation did not relate to nor
did it affect the personal defendants. If
these papers were unlawfully seized
and thereby the constitutional rights of
or any one were invaded, they were the
rights of the corporation and not the
rights of the other defendants. Next, it is
clear that a question of the lawfulness of
a seizure can be raised only by
one whose rights have been invaded.
Certainly, such a seizure, if unlawful,
could not affect the constitutional rights
of defendants whose property had not
been seized or the privacy of whose
homes had not been disturbed; nor
could they claim for themselves the
benefits of the Fourth Amendment,
when its violation, if any, was with
reference to the rights
of another. Remus vs. United
States (C.C.A.)291 F. 501, 511. It
follows, therefore, that the question of
the admissibility of the evidence based
on an alleged unlawful search and
seizure does not extend to the personal
defendants but
embraces only the corporation whose
property was taken. . . . (A
Guckenheimer & Bros. Co. vs. United
States, [1925] 3 F. 2d. 786, 789,
Emphasis supplied.)
With respect to the documents, papers and
things seized in the residences of petitioners
herein, the aforementioned resolution of June
29, 1962, lifted the writ of preliminary injunction
previously issued by this Court, 12 thereby, in
effect, restraining herein Respondents-

Prosecutors from using them in evidence
against petitioners herein.
In connection with said documents, papers and
things, two (2) important questions need be
settled, namely: (1) whether the search
warrants in question, and the searches and
seizures made under the authority thereof, are
valid or not, and (2) if the answer to the
preceding question is in the negative, whether
said documents, papers and things may be
used in evidence against petitioners
herein.1äwphï1.ñët
Petitioners maintain that the aforementioned
search warrants are in the nature of general
warrants and that accordingly, the seizures
effected upon the authority there of are null
and void. In this connection, the
Constitution 13provides:
The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures shall not be violated, and
no warrants shall issue but upon
probable cause, to be determined by the
judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.
Two points must be stressed in connection with
this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to
be determined by the judge in the manner set
forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant
shall particularly describe the things to be
seized.
None of these requirements has been
complied with in the contested warrants.
Indeed, the same were issued upon
applications stating that the natural and
juridical person therein named had committed
a "violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and
Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and
Revised Penal Code." In other words,
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 63
no specific offense had been alleged in said
applications. The averments thereof with
respect to the offense committed
were abstract. As a consequence, it
was impossible for the judges who issued the
warrants to have found the existence of
probable cause, for the same presupposes the
introduction of competent proof that the party
against whom it is sought has
performed particular acts, or
committed specific omissions, violating a given
provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of
fact, the applications involved in this case do
not allege any specific acts performed by
herein petitioners. It would be the legal heresy,
of the highest order, to convict anybody of a
"violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and
Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and
Revised Penal Code," — as alleged in the
aforementioned applications — without
reference to any determinate provision of said
laws or
To uphold the validity of the warrants in
question would be to wipe out completely one
of the most fundamental rights guaranteed in
our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity
of the domicile and the privacy of
communication and correspondence at the
mercy of the whims caprice or passion of
peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought
to be remedied by the constitutional provision
above quoted — to outlaw the so-called
general warrants. It is not difficult to imagine
what would happen, in times of keen political
strife, when the party in power feels that the
minority is likely to wrest it, even though by
legal means.
Such is the seriousness of the irregularities
committed in connection with the disputed
search warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to
amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former
Rules of Court 14 by providing in its
counterpart, under the Revised Rules of
Court 15 that "a search warrant shall not issue
but upon probable cause in connection with
one specific offense." Not satisfied with this
qualification, the Court added thereto a

paragraph, directing that "no search warrant
shall issue for more than one specific offense."
The grave violation of the Constitution made in
the application for the contested search
warrants was compounded by the description
therein made of the effects to be searched for
and seized, to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records,
vouchers, journals, correspondence,
receipts, ledgers, portfolios, credit
journals, typewriters, and other
documents and/or papers showing all
business transactions including
disbursement receipts, balance sheets
and related profit and loss statements.
Thus, the warrants authorized the search for
and seizure of records pertaining to all
business transactions of petitioners herein,
regardless of whether the transactions
were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned
the seizure of all records of the petitioners and
the aforementioned corporations, whatever
their nature, thus openly contravening the
explicit command of our Bill of Rights — that
the things to be seized
be particularly described — as well as tending
to defeat its major objective: the elimination
of general warrants.
Relying upon Moncado vs. People's Court (80
Phil. 1), Respondents-Prosecutors maintain
that, even if the searches and seizures under
consideration were unconstitutional, the
documents, papers and things thus seized are
admissible in evidence against petitioners
herein. Upon mature deliberation, however, we
are unanimously of the opinion that the position
taken in the Moncado case must be
abandoned. Said position was in line with the
American common law rule, that the criminal
should not be allowed to go free merely
"because the constable has
16
blundered," upon the theory that the
constitutional prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures is protected by means
other than the exclusion of evidence unlawfully
obtained, 17 such as the common-law action for
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 64
damages against the searching officer, against
the party who procured the issuance of the
search warrant and against those assisting in
the execution of an illegal search, their criminal
punishment, resistance, without liability to an
unlawful seizure, and such other legal
remedies as may be provided by other laws.
However, most common law jurisdictions have
already given up this approach and eventually
adopted the exclusionary rule, realizing that
this is the only practical means of enforcing the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable
searches and seizures. In the language of
Judge Learned Hand:
As we understand it, the reason for the
exclusion of evidence competent as
such, which has been unlawfully
acquired, is that exclusion is the only
practical way of enforcing the
constitutional privilege. In earlier times
the action of trespass against the
offending official may have been
protection enough; but that is true no
longer. Only in case the prosecution
which itself controls the seizing officials,
knows that it cannot profit by their wrong
will that wrong be repressed.18
In fact, over thirty (30) years before, the
Federal Supreme Court had already declared:
If letters and private documents can
thus be seized and held and used in
evidence against a citizen accused of an
offense, the protection of the 4th
Amendment, declaring his rights to be
secure against such searches and
seizures, is of no value, and, so far as
those thus placed are concerned, might
as well be stricken from the
Constitution. The efforts of the courts
and their officials to bring the guilty to
punishment, praiseworthy as they are,
are not to be aided by the sacrifice of
those great principles established by
years of endeavor and suffering which
have resulted in their embodiment in the
fundamental law of the land.19

This view was, not only reiterated, but, also,
broadened in subsequent decisions on the
same Federal Court. 20After reviewing previous
decisions thereon, said Court held, in Mapp vs.
Ohio (supra.):
. . . Today we once again examine the
Wolf's constitutional documentation of
the right of privacy free from
unreasonable state intrusion, and after
its dozen years on our books, are led by
it to close the only courtroom door
remaining open to evidence secured by
official lawlessness in flagrant abuse of
that basic right, reserved to all persons
as a specific guarantee against that very
same unlawful conduct. We hold that all
evidence obtained by searches and
seizures in violation of the Constitution
is, by that same authority, inadmissible
in a State.
Since the Fourth Amendment's right of
privacy has been declared enforceable
against the States through the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is
enforceable against them by the same
sanction of exclusion as it used against
the Federal Government. Were it
otherwise, then just as without the
Weeks rule the assurance against
unreasonable federal searches and
seizures would be "a form of words,"
valueless and underserving of mention
in a perpetual charter of inestimable
human liberties, so too, without that rule
the freedom from state invasions of
privacy would be so ephemeral and so
neatly severed from its conceptual
nexus with the freedom from all brutish
means of coercing evidence as not to
permit this Court's high regard as a
freedom "implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty." At the time that the
Court held in Wolf that the amendment
was applicable to the States through the
Due Process Clause, the cases of this
Court as we have seen, had steadfastly
held that as to federal officers the Fourth
Amendment included the exclusion of
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 65
the evidence seized in violation of its
provisions. Even Wolf "stoutly adhered"
to that proposition. The right to when
conceded operatively enforceable
against the States, was not susceptible
of destruction by avulsion of the
sanction upon which its protection and
enjoyment had always been deemed
dependent under the Boyd, Weeks and
Silverthorne Cases. Therefore, in
extending the substantive protections of
due process to all constitutionally
unreasonable searches — state or
federal — it was logically and
constitutionally necessarily that the
exclusion doctrine — an essential part
of the right to privacy — be also insisted
upon as an essential ingredient of the
right newly recognized by the Wolf
Case. In short, the admission of the new
constitutional Right by Wolf could not
tolerate denial of its most important
constitutional privilege, namely, the
exclusion of the evidence which an
accused had been forced to give by
reason of the unlawful seizure. To hold
otherwise is to grant the right but in
reality to withhold its privilege and
enjoyment. Only last year the Court
itself recognized that the purpose of the
exclusionary rule to "is to deter — to
compel respect for the constitutional
guaranty in the only effectively available
way — by removing the incentive to
disregard it" . . . .
The ignoble shortcut to conviction left
open to the State tends to destroy the
entire system of constitutional restraints
on which the liberties of the people rest.
Having once recognized that the right to
privacy embodied in the Fourth
Amendment is enforceable against the
States, and that the right to be secure
against rude invasions of privacy by
state officers is, therefore constitutional
in origin, we can no longer permit that
right to remain an empty promise.
Because it is enforceable in the same
manner and to like effect as other basic

rights secured by its Due Process
Clause, we can no longer permit it to be
revocable at the whim of any police
officer who, in the name of law
enforcement itself, chooses to suspend
its enjoyment. Our decision, founded on
reason and truth, gives to the individual
no more than that which the Constitution
guarantees him to the police officer no
less than that to which honest law
enforcement is entitled, and, to the
courts, that judicial integrity so
necessary in the true administration of
justice. (emphasis ours.)
Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary,
not only to the letter, but also, to the spirit of
the constitutional injunction against
unreasonable searches and seizures. To be
sure, if the applicant for a search warrant has
competent evidence to establish probable
cause of the commission of a given crime by
the party against whom the warrant is
intended, then there is no reason why the
applicant should not comply with the
requirements of the fundamental law. Upon the
other hand, if he has no such competent
evidence, then it is not possible for the Judge
to find that there is probable cause, and,
hence, no justification for the issuance of the
warrant. The only possible explanation (not
justification) for its issuance is the necessity
of fishing evidence of the commission of a
crime. But, then, this fishing expedition is
indicative of the absence of evidence to
establish a probable cause.
Moreover, the theory that the criminal
prosecution of those who secure an illegal
search warrant and/or make unreasonable
searches or seizures would suffice to protect
the constitutional guarantee under
consideration, overlooks the fact that violations
thereof are, in general, committed By agents of
the party in power, for, certainly, those
belonging to the minority could not possibly
abuse a power they do not have. Regardless of
the handicap under which the minority usually
— but, understandably — finds itself in
prosecuting agents of the majority, one must
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 66
not lose sight of the fact that the psychological
and moral effect of the possibility 21 of securing
their conviction, is watered down by the
pardoning power of the party for whose benefit
the illegality had been committed.
In their Motion for Reconsideration and
Amendment of the Resolution of this Court
dated June 29, 1962, petitioners allege that
Rooms Nos. 81 and 91 of Carmen Apartments,
House No. 2008, Dewey Boulevard, House No.
1436, Colorado Street, and Room No. 304 of
the Army-Navy Club, should be included
among the premises considered in said
Resolution as residences of herein petitioners,
Harry S. Stonehill, Robert P. Brook, John J.
Brooks and Karl Beck, respectively, and that,
furthermore, the records, papers and other
effects seized in the offices of the corporations
above referred to include personal belongings
of said petitioners and other effects under their
exclusive possession and control, for the
exclusion of which they have a standing under
the latest rulings of the federal courts of federal
courts of the United States. 22
We note, however, that petitioners' theory,
regarding their alleged possession of and
control over the aforementioned records,
papers and effects, and the alleged "personal"
nature thereof, has Been Advanced, not in their
petition or amended petition herein, but in the
Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of
the Resolution of June 29, 1962. In other
words, said theory would appear to be
readjustment of that followed in said petitions,
to suit the approach intimated in the Resolution
sought to be reconsidered and amended.
Then, too, some of the affidavits or copies of
alleged affidavits attached to said motion for
reconsideration, or submitted in support
thereof, contain either inconsistent allegations,
or allegations inconsistent with the theory now
advanced by petitioners herein.
Upon the other hand, we are not satisfied that
the allegations of said petitions said motion for
reconsideration, and the contents of the
aforementioned affidavits and other papers
submitted in support of said motion, have
 CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 67

sufficiently established the facts or conditions

contemplated in the cases relied upon by the
petitioners; to warrant application of the views
therein expressed, should we agree thereto. At
any rate, we do not deem it necessary to
express our opinion thereon, it being best to
leave the matter open for determination in
appropriate cases in the future.

We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in

the Moncado case must be, as it is hereby,
abandoned; that the warrants for the search of
three (3) residences of herein petitioners, as
specified in the Resolution of June 29, 1962,
are null and void; that the searches and
seizures therein made are illegal; that the writ
of preliminary injunction heretofore issued, in
connection with the documents, papers and
other effects thus seized in said residences of
herein petitioners is hereby made permanent;
that the writs prayed for are granted, insofar as
the documents, papers and other effects so
seized in the aforementioned residences are
concerned; that the aforementioned motion for
Reconsideration and Amendment should be,
as it is hereby, denied; and that the petition
herein is dismissed and the writs prayed for
denied, as regards the documents, papers and
other effects seized in the twenty-nine (29)
places, offices and other premises enumerated
in the same Resolution, without special
pronouncement as to costs.

It is so ordered.

G.R. No. L-64261 December 26, 1984
JOSE BURGOS, SR., JOSE BURGOS, JR.,
BAYANI SORIANO and J. BURGOS MEDIA
SERVICES, INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF
THE PHILIPPINES, THE CHIEF, PHILIPPINE
CONSTABULARY, THE CHIEF LEGAL
OFFICER, PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY
COMMAND, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE
GENERAL, ET AL., respondents.
Lorenzo M. Tañada, Wigberto E. Tañada,
Martiniano Vivo, Augusto Sanchez, Joker P.
Arroyo, Jejomar Binay and Rene Saguisag for
petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
ESCOLIN, J.:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari prohibition
and mandamus with preliminary mandatory
and prohibitory injunction is the validity of two
[2] search warrants issued on December 7,
1982 by respondent Judge Ernani Cruz-Pano,
Executive Judge of the then Court of First
Instance of Rizal [Quezon City], under which
the premises known as No. 19, Road 3, Project
6, Quezon City, and 784 Units C & D, RMS
Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City,
business addresses of the "Metropolitan Mail"
and "We Forum" newspapers, respectively,
were searched, and office and printing
machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor
vehicles and other articles used in the printing,
publication and distribution of the said
newspapers, as well as numerous papers,
documents, books and other written literature
alleged to be in the possession and control of
petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of
the "We Forum" newspaper, were seized.
Petitioners further pray that a writ of
preliminary mandatory and prohibitory
injunction be issued for the return of the seized
articles, and that respondents, "particularly the
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 68
Chief Legal Officer, Presidential Security
Command, the Judge Advocate General, AFP,
the City Fiscal of Quezon City, their
representatives, assistants, subalterns,
subordinates, substitute or successors" be
enjoined from using the articles thus seized as
evidence against petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr.
and the other accused in Criminal Case No. Q-
022782 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, entitled People v. Jose Burgos, Jr. et al. 1
In our Resolution dated June 21, 1983,
respondents were required to answer the
petition. The plea for preliminary mandatory
and prohibitory injunction was set for hearing
on June 28, 1983, later reset to July 7, 1983,
on motion of the Solicitor General in behalf of
respondents.
At the hearing on July 7, 1983, the Solicitor
General, while opposing petitioners' prayer for
a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction,
manifested that respondents "will not use the
aforementioned articles as evidence in the
aforementioned case until final resolution of the
legality of the seizure of the aforementioned
articles. ..." 2 With this manifestation, the prayer
for preliminary prohibitory injunction was
rendered moot and academic.
Respondents would have this Court dismiss
the petition on the ground that petitioners had
come to this Court without having previously
sought the quashal of the search warrants
before respondent judge. Indeed, petitioners,
before impugning the validity of the warrants
before this Court, should have filed a motion to
quash said warrants in the court that issued
them. 3 But this procedural flaw
notwithstanding, we take cognizance of this
petition in view of the seriousness and urgency
of the constitutional issues raised not to
mention the public interest generated by the
search of the "We Forum" offices, which was
televised in Channel 7 and widely publicized in
all metropolitan dailies. The existence of this
special circumstance justifies this Court to
exercise its inherent power to suspend its
rules. In the words of the revered Mr. Justice
Abad Santos in the case of C. Vda. de

Ordoveza v. Raymundo, 4 "it is always in the
power of the court [Supreme Court] to suspend
its rules or to except a particular case from its
operation, whenever the purposes of justice
require it...".
Respondents likewise urge dismissal of the
petition on ground of laches. Considerable
stress is laid on the fact that while said search
warrants were issued on December 7, 1982,
the instant petition impugning the same was
filed only on June 16, 1983 or after the lapse of
a period of more than six [6] months.
Laches is failure or negligence for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time
to do that which, by exercising due diligence,
could or should have been done earlier. It is
negligence or omission to assert a right within
a reasonable time, warranting a presumption
that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it. 5
Petitioners, in their Consolidated Reply,
explained the reason for the delay in the filing
of the petition thus:
Respondents should not find
fault, as they now do [p. 1,
Answer, p. 3, Manifestation] with
the fact that the Petition was filed
on June 16, 1983, more than half
a year after the petitioners'
premises had been raided.
The climate of the times has
given petitioners no other choice.
If they had waited this long to
bring their case to court, it was
because they tried at first to
exhaust other remedies. The
events of the past eleven fill
years had taught them that
everything in this country, from
release of public funds to release
of detained persons from
custody, has become a matter of
executive benevolence or
largesse
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 69
Hence, as soon as they could,
petitioners, upon suggestion of
persons close to the President,
like Fiscal Flaminiano, sent a
letter to President Marcos,
through counsel Antonio Coronet
asking the return at least of the
printing equipment and vehicles.
And after such a letter had been
sent, through Col. Balbino V.
Diego, Chief Intelligence and
Legal Officer of the Presidential
Security Command, they were
further encouraged to hope that
the latter would yield the desired
results.
After waiting in vain for five [5]
months, petitioners finally
decided to come to Court. [pp.
123-124, Rollo]
Although the reason given by petitioners may
not be flattering to our judicial system, We find
no ground to punish or chastise them for an
error in judgment. On the contrary, the
extrajudicial efforts exerted by petitioners quite
evidently negate the presumption that they had
abandoned their right to the possession of the
seized property, thereby refuting the charge of
laches against them.
Respondents also submit the theory that since
petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. had used and
marked as evidence some of the seized
documents in Criminal Case No. Q- 022872,
he is now estopped from challenging the
validity of the search warrants. We do not
follow the logic of respondents. These
documents lawfully belong to petitioner Jose
Burgos, Jr. and he can do whatever he pleases
with them, within legal bounds. The fact that he
has used them as evidence does not and
cannot in any way affect the validity or
invalidity of the search warrants assailed in this
petition.
Several and diverse reasons have been
advanced by petitioners to nullify the search
warrants in question.

1. Petitioners fault respondent judge for his
alleged failure to conduct an examination
under oath or affirmation of the applicant and
his witnesses, as mandated by the above-
quoted constitutional provision as wen as Sec.
4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court .6 This
objection, however, may properly be
considered moot and academic, as petitioners
themselves conceded during the hearing on
August 9, 1983, that an examination had
indeed been conducted by respondent judge of
Col. Abadilla and his witnesses.
2. Search Warrants No. 20-82[a] and No. 20-
82[b] were used to search two distinct places:
No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City and
784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon
Avenue, Quezon City, respectively. Objection
is interposed to the execution of Search
Warrant No. 20-82[b] at the latter address on
the ground that the two search warrants
pinpointed only one place where petitioner
Jose Burgos, Jr. was allegedly keeping and
concealing the articles listed therein, i.e., No.
19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City. This
assertion is based on that portion of Search
Warrant No. 20- 82[b] which states:
Which have been used, and are
being used as instruments and
means of committing the crime of
subversion penalized under P.D.
885 as amended and he is
keeping and concealing the same
at 19 Road 3, Project 6, Quezon
City.
The defect pointed out is obviously a
typographical error. Precisely, two search
warrants were applied for and issued because
the purpose and intent were to search two
distinct premises. It would be quite absurd and
illogical for respondent judge to have issued
two warrants intended for one and the same
place. Besides, the addresses of the places
sought to be searched were specifically set
forth in the application, and since it was Col.
Abadilla himself who headed the team which
executed the search warrants, the ambiguity
that might have arisen by reason of the
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 70
typographical error is more apparent than real.
The fact is that the place for which Search
Warrant No. 20- 82[b] was applied for was 728
Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue,
Quezon City, which address appeared in the
opening paragraph of the said
warrant. 7 Obviously this is the same place that
respondent judge had in mind when he issued
Warrant No. 20-82 [b].
In the determination of whether a search
warrant describes the premises to be searched
with sufficient particularity, it has been held
"that the executing officer's prior knowledge as
to the place intended in the warrant is relevant.
This would seem to be especially true where
the executing officer is the affiant on whose
affidavit the warrant had issued, and when he
knows that the judge who issued the warrant
intended the building described in the affidavit,
And it has also been said that the executing
officer may look to the affidavit in the official
court file to resolve an ambiguity in the warrant
as to the place to be searched." 8
3. Another ground relied upon to annul the
search warrants is the fact that although the
warrants were directed against Jose Burgos,
Jr. alone, articles b belonging to his co-
petitioners Jose Burgos, Sr., Bayani Soriano
and the J. Burgos Media Services, Inc. were
seized.
Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court,
enumerates the personal properties that may
be seized under a search warrant, to wit:
Sec. 2. Personal Property to be
seized. — A search warrant may
be issued for the search and
seizure of the following personal
property:
[a] Property subject
of the offense;
[b] Property stolen
or embezzled and
other proceeds or

fruits of the offense;
and
[c] Property used or
intended to be used
as the means of
committing an
offense.
The above rule does not require that the
property to be seized should be owned by the
person against whom the search warrant is
directed. It may or may not be owned by him.
In fact, under subsection [b] of the above-
quoted Section 2, one of the properties that
may be seized is stolen property. Necessarily,
stolen property must be owned by one other
than the person in whose possession it may be
at the time of the search and seizure.
Ownership, therefore, is of no consequence,
and it is sufficient that the person against
whom the warrant is directed has control or
possession of the property sought to be seized,
as petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was alleged to
have in relation to the articles and property
seized under the warrants.
4. Neither is there merit in petitioners' assertion
that real properties were seized under the
disputed warrants. Under Article 415[5] of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, "machinery,
receptables, instruments or implements
intended by the owner of the tenement for an
industry or works which may be carried on in a
building or on a piece of land and which tend
directly to meet the needs of the said industry
or works" are considered immovable property.
In Davao Sawmill Co. v. Castillo9 where this
legal provision was invoked, this Court ruled
that machinery which is movable by nature
becomes immobilized when placed by the
owner of the tenement, property or plant, but
not so when placed by a tenant, usufructuary,
or any other person having only a temporary
right, unless such person acted as the agent of
the owner.
In the case at bar, petitioners do not claim to
be the owners of the land and/or building on
which the machineries were placed. This being
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 71
the case, the machineries in question, while in
fact bolted to the ground remain movable
property susceptible to seizure under a search
warrant.
5. The questioned search warrants were
issued by respondent judge upon application of
Col. Rolando N. Abadilla Intelligence Officer of
the P.C. Metrocom.10 The application was
accompanied by the Joint Affidavit of Alejandro
M. Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango, 11 members
of the Metrocom Intelligence and Security
Group under Col. Abadilla which conducted a
surveillance of the premises prior to the filing of
the application for the search warrants on
December 7, 1982.
It is contended by petitioners, however, that the
abovementioned documents could not have
provided sufficient basis for the finding of a
probable cause upon which a warrant may
validly issue in accordance with Section 3,
Article IV of the 1973 Constitution which
provides:
SEC. 3. ... and no search warrant
or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to
be determined by the judge, or
such other responsible officer as
may be authorized by law, after
examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly
describing the place to be
searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
We find petitioners' thesis impressed with
merit. Probable cause for a search is defined
as such facts and circumstances which would
lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed
and that the objects sought in connection with
the offense are in the place sought to be
searched. And when the search warrant
applied for is directed against a newspaper
publisher or editor in connection with the
publication of subversive materials, as in the

case at bar, the application and/or its
supporting affidavits must contain
specification, stating with particularity the
alleged subversive material he has published
or is intending to publish. Mere generalization
will not suffice. Thus, the broad statement in
Col. Abadilla's application that petitioner "is in
possession or has in his control printing
equipment and other paraphernalia, news
publications and other documents which were
used and are all continuously being used as a
means of committing the offense of subversion
punishable under Presidential Decree 885, as
amended ..." 12 is a mere conclusion of law
and does not satisfy the requirements of
probable cause. Bereft of such particulars as
would justify a finding of the existence of
probable cause, said allegation cannot serve
as basis for the issuance of a search warrant
and it was a grave error for respondent judge
to have done so.
Equally insufficient as basis for the
determination of probable cause is the
statement contained in the joint affidavit of
Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango,
"that the evidence gathered and collated by our
unit clearly shows that the premises above-
mentioned and the articles and things above-
described were used and are continuously
being used for subversive activities in
conspiracy with, and to promote the objective
of, illegal organizations such as the Light-a-Fire
Movement, Movement for Free Philippines,
and April 6 Movement." 13
In mandating that "no warrant shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined
by the judge, ... after examination under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce; 14 the Constitution
requires no less than personal knowledge by
the complainant or his witnesses of the facts
upon which the issuance of a search warrant
may be justified. In Alvarez v. Court of First
Instance, 15 this Court ruled that "the oath
required must refer to the truth of the facts
within the personal knowledge of the petitioner
or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof
is to convince the committing magistrate, not
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 72
the individual making the affidavit and seeking
a the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of
probable cause." As couched, the quoted
averment in said joint affidavit filed before
respondent judge hardly meets the test of
sufficiency established by this Court in Alvarez
case.
Another factor which makes the search
warrants under consideration constitutionally
objectionable is that they are in the nature of
general warrants. The search warrants
describe the articles sought to be seized in this
wise:
1] All printing equipment,
paraphernalia, paper, ink, photo
(equipment, typewriters, cabinets,
tables, communications/recording
equipment, tape recorders,
dictaphone and the like used
and/or connected in the printing
of the "WE FORUM" newspaper
and any and all documents
communication, letters and
facsimile of prints related to the
"WE FORUM" newspaper.
2] Subversive documents,
pamphlets, leaflets, books, and
other publication to promote the
objectives and piurposes of the
subversive organization known
as Movement for Free
Philippines, Light-a-Fire
Movement and April 6 Movement;
and,
3] Motor vehicles used in the
distribution/circulation of the "WE
FORUM" and other subversive
materials and propaganda, more
particularly,
1] Toyota-Corolla,
colored yellow with
Plate No. NKA 892;

2] DATSUN pick-up
colored white with
Plate No. NKV 969
3] A delivery truck
with Plate No. NBS
524;
4] TOYOTA-
TAMARAW, colored
white with Plate No.
PBP 665; and,
5] TOYOTA Hi-Lux,
pick-up truck with
Plate No. NGV 427
with marking
"Bagong Silang."
In Stanford v. State of Texas 16 the search
warrant which authorized the search for
"books, records, pamphlets, cards, receipts,
lists, memoranda, pictures, recordings and
other written instruments concerning the
Communist Party in Texas," was declared void
by the U.S. Supreme Court for being too
general. In like manner, directions to "seize any
evidence in connectionwith the violation of
SDC 13-3703 or otherwise" have been held too
general, and that portion of a search warrant
which authorized the seizure of any
"paraphernalia which could be used to violate
Sec. 54-197 of the Connecticut General
Statutes [the statute dealing with the crime of
conspiracy]" was held to be a general warrant,
and therefore invalid. 17 The description of the
articles sought to be seized under the search
warrants in question cannot be characterized
differently.
In the Stanford case, the U.S. Supreme Courts
calls to mind a notable chapter in English
history: the era of disaccord between the Tudor
Government and the English Press, when
"Officers of the Crown were given roving
commissions to search where they pleased in
order to suppress and destroy the literature of
dissent both Catholic and Puritan Reference
herein to such historical episode would not be
relevant for it is not the policy of our
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 73
government to suppress any newspaper or
publication that speaks with "the voice of non-
conformity" but poses no clear and imminent
danger to state security.
As heretofore stated, the premises searched
were the business and printing offices of the
"Metropolitan Mail" and the "We Forum
newspapers. As a consequence of the search
and seizure, these premises were padlocked
and sealed, with the further result that the
printing and publication of said newspapers
were discontinued.
Such closure is in the nature of previous
restraint or censorship abhorrent to the
freedom of the press guaranteed under the
fundamental law, 18 and constitutes a virtual
denial of petitioners' freedom to express
themselves in print. This state of being is
patently anathematic to a democratic
framework where a free, alert and even militant
press is essential for the political enlightenment
and growth of the citizenry.
Respondents would justify the continued
sealing of the printing machines on the ground
that they have been sequestered under
Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 885, as
amended, which authorizes "the sequestration
of the property of any person, natural or
artificial, engaged in subversive activities
against the government and its duly constituted
authorities ... in accordance with implementing
rules and regulations as may be issued by the
Secretary of National Defense." It is doubtful
however, if sequestration could validly be
effected in view of the absence of any
implementing rules and regulations
promulgated by the Minister of National
Defense.
Besides, in the December 10, 1982 issue of
the Daily Express, it was reported that no less
than President Marcos himself denied the
request of the military authorities to sequester
the property seized from petitioners on
December 7, 1982. Thus:

The President denied a request
flied by government prosecutors
for sequestration of the WE
FORUM newspaper and its
printing presses, according to
Information Minister Gregorio S.
Cendana.
On the basis of court orders,
government agents went to the
We Forum offices in Quezon City
and took a detailed inventory of
the equipment and all materials in
the premises.
Cendaña said that because of the
denial the newspaper and its
equipment remain at the disposal
of the owners, subject to the
discretion of the court. 19
That the property seized on December 7, 1982
had not been sequestered is further confirmed
by the reply of then Foreign Minister Carlos P.
Romulo to the letter dated February 10, 1983
of U.S. Congressman Tony P. Hall addressed
to President Marcos, expressing alarm over the
"WE FORUM " case. 20 In this reply dated
February 11, 1983, Minister Romulo stated:
2. Contrary to reports, President
Marcos turned down the
recommendation of our
authorities to close the paper's
printing facilities and confiscate
the equipment and materials it
uses. 21
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, Search
Warrants Nos. 20-82[a] and 20-82[b] issued by
respondent judge on December 7, 1982 are
hereby declared null and void and are
accordingly set aside. The prayer for a writ of
mandatory injunction for the return of the
seized articles is hereby granted and all
articles seized thereunder are hereby ordered
released to petitioners. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 74
Art. 131. Prohibition, interruption and
dissolution of peaceful meetings. — The
penalty of prision correccional in its minimum
period shall be imposed upon any public officer
or employee who, without legal ground, shall
prohibit or interrupt the holding of a peaceful
meeting, or shall dissolve the same.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon a
public officer or employee who shall hinder any
person from joining any lawful association or
from attending any of its meetings.chanrobles
virtual law library
The same penalty shall be imposed upon any
public officer or employee who shall prohibit or
hinder any person from addressing, either
alone or together with others, any petition to
the authorities for the correction of abuses or
redress of grievances.chanrobles virtu
CONSTI ART IIII SECTION 4. No law shall be
passed abridging the freedom of speech, of
expression, or of the press, or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances.
SECTION 5. No law shall be made respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof. The free exercise and
enjoyment of religious profession and worship,
without discrimination or preference, shall
forever be allowed. No religious test shall be
required for the exercise of civil or political
rights.
SECTION 6. The liberty of abode and of
changing the same within the limits prescribed
by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful
order of the court. Neither shall the right to
travel be impaired except in the interest of
national security, public safety, or public health,
as may be provided by law.
SECTION 7. The right of the people to
information on matters of public concern shall
be recognized. Access to official records, and
to documents, and papers pertaining to official
acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for

policy development, shall be afforded the
citizen, subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law.
SECTION 8. The right of the people, including
those employed in the public and private
sectors, to form unions, associations, or
societies for purposes not contrary to law shall
not be abridged.
CRIMES AGAINST RELIGIOUS WORSHIP
Art. 132. Interruption of religious worship.
— The penalty of prision correccional in its
minimum period shall be imposed upon any
public officer or employee who shall prevent or
disturb the ceremonies or manifestations of
any religion.
If the crime shall have been committed with
violence or threats, the penalty shall be prision
correccional in its medium and maximum
periods.
CONSTI ART III SECTION 5. No law shall be
made respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The
free exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession and worship, without discrimination
or preference, shall forever be allowed. No
religious test shall be required for the exercise
of civil or political rights.
OFFENDING THE RELIGIOUS FEELINGS
Art. 133. Offending the religious feelings. —
The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum
period to prision correccional in its minimum
period shall be imposed upon anyone who, in a
place devoted to religious worship or during the
celebration of any religious ceremony shall
perform acts notoriously offensive to the
feelings of the faithful.
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 75
PEOPLE VS. MANDORIAO, JR.
C.A., 51 O.G. 4619
FACTS: The Iglesiani Cristo held a religious
rally at a public place in Baguio. About 200
people attended the meeting, about 50 of
whom were members of the Iglesiani Cristo but
the rest were outsiders and curious listeners.
While Salvio, a minister of Iglesiani Cristo, was
expounding on his topic to the effect that Christ
is not God, but only man, the crowd became
unruly. Some people urged Mandoriao to go up
the stage and have a debate with Salvio.
Mandoriao however, was not able to speak
before the microphone because the wire
connecting it was abruptly disconnected.
ISSUE: Whether or not the meeting was a
religious ceremony.
HELD: The meeting here was not a religious
ceremony. A religious meeting is an
“assemblage of people meeting for the purpose
of performing acts of adoration to the Supreme
Being, or to perform religious services in
recognition of God as an object of worship…”
The meeting here was not limited to the
members of the Iglesiani Cristo. The supposed
prayers and singing of hymns were merely
incidental because the principal object of the
rally was to persuade new converts to their
religion. Assuming that the rally was a religious
ceremony, the appellant cannot be said to
have performed acts or uttered words offensive
to the feelings of the faithful. The act
complained of must be directed against a
dogma or ritual, or upon an object of
veneration. There was no object of veneration
at the meeting.
Reyes Book II, page 80:
When the application of the Iglesiani Cristo
was to hold the meeting at a public place and
the permit expressly stated that the purpose
was to hold a religious rally, what was held on

that occasion was not a religious ceremony,
even if a minister was then preaching (“that
Jesus Christ was not God but only a man”).
The rally was attended by persons who are not
members of the sect.
Reyes Book II, page 81:
Remarks that those who believed that Christ is
God are anti-Christ, that all the members of the
Roman Catholic Church are marked by the
demon, and that the Pope is the Commander
of Satan are notoriously offensive to the
feelings of the faithful.
G.R. No. L-46000 May 25, 1939
THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
JOSE M. BAES, appellant.
Crispin Oben for appellant.
Guillermo B. Guevarra for defendants-
appellees.
No appearance for plaintiff-appellee.
CONCEPCION, J.:
This appeal was given due course by the Court
of First Instance of Laguna by virtue of a writ
of mandamus issued by this court in G.R. No.
45780. The facts are the following: In the
justice of the peace court of the municipality of
Lumban, Province of Laguna, a complaint was
filed of the following tenor:
The undersigned Parish Priest of the
Roman Catholic Church in the parish
and municipality of Lumban, Province of
Laguna, upon being duly sworn,
charges Enrique Villaroca, Alejandro
Lacbay and Bernardo del Rosario with
an offense against religion committed as
follows:
That on April 14, 1937, at about 9
o'clock a.m., in this municipality of
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 76
Lumban, Province of Laguna,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this court, the aforesaid accused, while
holding the funeral of one who in life
was called Antonio Macabigtas, in
accordance with the rites of religious
sect known as the "Church of Christ",
willfully, unlawfully, and criminally
caused the funeral to pass, as it in fact
passed, through the chruchyard fronting
the Roman Catholic Church, which
churchyard belongs to the said Church,
which churchyard belongs to the said
Church and is devoted to the religious
worship thereof, against the opposition
of the undersigned complainant who,
through force and threats of physical
violence by the accused, was compelled
to allow the funeral to pass through the
said churchyard. An act committed in
grave profanation of the place, in open
disregard of the religious feelings of the
Catholics of this municipality, and in
violation of article 133 of the Revised
Penal Code.
(Sgd.) JOSE M.A. BAES
Parish Priest
Complainant
(Here follow the affidavit and the list of
witnesses.)
The accused pleaded not guilty and waived the
preliminary investigation. Before the case was
remanded to the Court of First Instance of
Laguna, the complainant filed a sworn
statement regarding other points so that the
provincial fiscal may have full knowledge of the
facts and of the witnesses who could testify
thereon. Upon the remand of the case to the
court, the fiscal, instead of filing the
corresponding information, put in the following
motion for dismissal:
The complainant is the parish priest of
the Roman Catholic Church of Lumban,
Laguna. The said priest charges the
accused with having caused, through
force, intimidation and threats, the

funeral of one belonging to the Church
of Christ to pass through the churchyard
of the Church. Apparently, the offense
consists in that the corpse was that of
one who belonged to the Church of
Christ.
The undersigned is of the opinion that
the fact act imputed to the accused does
not constitute the offense complained of
considering the spirit of article 133 of the
Revised Penal Code. At most they might
be chargeable with having threatened
the parish priest, or with having passed
through a private property without the
consent of the owner. Justice Albert,
commenting on the article, has this to
say: "An act is said to be notoriously
offensive to the religious feelings of the
faithful when a person ridicules or
makes light of anything constituting a
religious dogma; works or scoffs at
anything devoted to religious
ceremonies; plays with or damages or
destroys any object of veneration by the
faithful." The mere act of causing the
passage through the churchyard
belonging to the Church, of the funeral
of one who in life belonged to the
Church of Christ, neither offends nor
ridicules the religious feelings of those
who belong to the Roman Catholic
Church.
Sustaining the foregoing motion, the court by
an order of August 31, 1937, dismissed the
case, reserving, however, to the fiscal the right
to file another information for the crime found
to have been committed by the accused.
From this order, the plaintiff appealed, which
appeal was denied but thereafter given due
course by the court by virtue of an order of this
court.
The appealed order is based upon the motion
to dismiss filed by the fiscal. This officer
questions the sufficiency of the facts alleged in
the complaint, but omits an essential part
thereof, to wit, that the churchyard belongs to
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 77
the church, and is devoted to the religious
services of said church, and it is through this
churchyard that the accused, over the
objection of the parish priest and through force
and intimidation, caused to pass the funeral of
one under the rites of the religious sect known
as the Church of Christ. Had the fiscal not
omitted this essential part, he would not have
come to the conclusion that the acts
complained of do not constitute the crime
defined and penalized by article 133 of the
Revised Penal Code.
Moreover, the fiscal, in his aforesaid motion,
denies that the unlawful act committed by the
accused had offended the religious feelings of
the Catholics of the municipality in which the
act complained of took place. We believe that
such ground of the motion is indefensible. As
the fiscal was discussing the sufficiency of the
facts alleged in the complaint, he cannot deny
any of them, but must admit them, although
hypothetically, as they are alleged. The motion
raises a question of law, not one of fact. In the
second place, whether or of the act complained
of is offensive to the religious feelings of the
Catholics, is a question of fact which must be
judged only according to the feelings of the
Catholics and not those of other faithful ones,
for it is possible that certain acts may offend
the feelings of those who profess a certain
religion, while not otherwise offensive to the
feelings of those professing another faith. We,
therefore, take the view that the facts alleged in
the complaint constitute the offense defined
and penalized in article 133 of the Revised
Penal Code, and should the fiscal file an
information alleging the said facts and a trial be
thereafter held at which the said facts should
be conclusively established, the court may find
the accused guilty of the offense complained
of, or that of coercion, or that of trespass under
article 281 of the Revised Penal Code, as may
be proper, pursuant to section 29 of General
Orders, No. 58.
The appealed order is reversed and the fiscal
is ordered to comply with his duty under the
law, without pronouncement as to the costs.

People of the Philippines vs. Epifanio
Nanoy, alias Nanie (02-24-1972)
GR No. 10365-CR
Ponente: Santiago B. Buslon, J.
Action: APPEAL from a judgment of the MTC
of Jetafe, Bohol
SHORT STORY: Nanoy, who was allegedly
drunk, entered into the chapel of the
congregation of the Assembly of God while it
was having its afternoon services and
attempted to grab the song leader. As a result,
everyone ran out of the church and the
religious services were discontinued. He was
charged with the crime of offending religious
feelings. After appeal, the court held that he
was only guilty of unjust vexation
FACTS:
 While the congregation of the Assembly
of God was having its afternoon
services in its chapel, accused
EpifanioNanoy, who was drunk, entered
with uplifted hands, approached
LevitaLapura, the song leader, and
attempted to grab her.
 LevitaLepura ran away from Nanoy.
Romeo Zafra, also a member of said
congregation, held the accused and led
him outside the church.
 The other members of the sect also ran
out of the church and the religious
services were discontinued.
 Accused was charged with the crime of
offending religious feelings penalized
under Art. 133 of the RPC. The
complaint alleged that he had the
intention of stopping the said rite in an
unholy manner.
 Trial court found Nanoy guilty of
disturbance or interruption of a religious
ceremony, penalized under A153 of the
RPC and sentenced him to 10 months
and 21 days of imprisonment, plus a fine
CRIM LAW 2I JANUARY 27, 2018 IACJUCO 78
of Php50 with subsidiary imprisonment
in the case of insolvency.
 Accused appealed, arguing that the
offense, if any is unjust vexation.
ISSUE/S
1. WON the TC erred in convicting Nanoy
of disturbance or interruption of a
religious ceremony.
 WON the offense was unjust
vexation.
RULES
 Art. 133. Offending the religious
feelings. The penalty of arresto mayor
in its maximum period to
prisioncorreccional in its minimum
period shall be imposed upon anyone
who, in a place devoted to religious
worship or during the celebration of any
religious ceremony, shall perform acts
notoriously offensive to the feelings of
the faithful.
 There must be deliberate intent to hurt
the feelings of the faithful.
ANALYSIS
1. YES. The appellant did NOT perform
acts notoriously offensive to the feelings
of the faithful. Neither did he cause such
a serious disturbance as to interrupt or
disturb the services of the said
congregation. That he had no intention
of interrupting the services was
shown by the fact that appellant allowed
himself to be led outside the church by
ZomeoZafra.
CONCLUSION/HELD/DISPOSITIVE:
Decision MODIFIED. Accused-appellant guilty
of only unjust vexation and sentenced to pay
a fine of Php100 with subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency.