G.R. No.
157943 September 4, 2013 After Ligaray testified, the Prosecution formally offered the following: (a) BPI Check No. 0011003 in the amount of
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
vs.
GILBERT REYES WAGAS, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The Bill of Rights guarantees the right of an accused to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. In order
to overcome the presumption of innocence, the Prosecution is required to adduce against him nothing less than
proof beyond reasonable doubt. Such proof is not only in relation to the elements of the offense, but also in
relation to the identity of the offender. If the Prosecution fails to discharge its heavy burden, then it is not only the
right of the accused to be freed, it becomes the Court’s constitutional duty to acquit him.
The Case
Gilbert R. Wagas appeals his conviction for estafa under the decision rendered on July 11, 2002 by the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 58, in Cebu City (RTC), meting on him the indeterminate penalty of 12 years of prision mayor, as
minimum, to 30 years of reclusion perpetua, as maximum.
Antecedents
Wagas was charged with estafa under the information that reads:
That on or about the 30th day of April, 1997, and for sometime prior and subsequent thereto, in the City of Cebu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with deliberate intent, with
intent to gain and by means of false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud, to wit: knowing that he did not have sufficient funds deposited with the Bank of
Philippine Islands, and without informing Alberto Ligaray of that circumstance, with intent to defraud the latter,
did then and there issue Bank of the Philippine Islands Check No. 0011003, dated May 08, 1997 in the amount of
₱200,000.00, which check was issued in payment of an obligation, but which check when presented for
encashment with the bank, was dishonored for the reason "drawn against insufficient funds" and inspite of notice
and several demands made upon said accused to make good said check or replace the same with cash, he had
failed and refused and up to the present time still fails and refuses to do so, to the damage and prejudice of
Alberto Ligaray in the amount aforestated.
CONTRARY TO LAW.1
After Wagas entered a plea of not guilty,2 the pre-trial was held, during which the Defense admitted that the check
alleged in the information had been dishonored due to insufficient funds. 3 On its part, the Prosecution made no
admission.4
At the trial, the Prosecution presented complainant Alberto Ligaray as its lone witness. Ligaray testified that on
April 30, 1997, Wagas placed an order for 200 bags of rice over the telephone; that he and his wife would not
agree at first to the proposed payment of the order by postdated check, but because of Wagas’ assurance that he
would not disappoint them and that he had the means to pay them because he had a lending business and money
in the bank, they relented and accepted the order; that he released the goods to Wagas on April 30, 1997 and at
the same time received Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) Check No. 0011003 for ₱200,000.00 payable to cash
and postdated May 8, 1997; that he later deposited the check with Solid Bank, his depository bank, but the check
was dishonored due to insufficiency of funds;5 that he called Wagas about the matter, and the latter told him that
he would pay upon his return to Cebu; and that despite repeated demands, Wagas did not pay him.6
On cross-examination, Ligaray admitted that he did not personally meet Wagas because they transacted through
telephone only; that he released the 200 bags of rice directly to Robert Cañada, the brother-in-law of Wagas, who
signed the delivery receipt upon receiving the rice.7
₱200,000.00 payable to "cash;" (b) the return slip dated May 13, 1997 issued by Solid Bank; (c) Ligaray’s affidavit;
and (d) the delivery receipt signed by Cañada. After the RTC admitted the exhibits, the Prosecution then rested its
case.8
In his defense, Wagas himself testified. He admitted having issued BPI Check No. 0011003 to Cañada, his
brother-in-law, not to Ligaray. He denied having any telephone conversation or any dealings with Ligaray. He
explained that the check was intended as payment for a portion of Cañada’s property that he wanted to buy, but
when the sale did not push through, he did not anymore fund the check.9
On cross-examination, the Prosecution confronted Wagas with a letter dated July 3, 1997 apparently signed by him
and addressed to Ligaray’s counsel, wherein he admitted owing Ligaray ₱200,000.00 for goods received, to wit:
This is to acknowledge receipt of your letter dated June 23, 1997 which is self-explanatory. It is worthy also to
discuss with you the environmental facts of the case for your consideration, to wit:
It is true that I obtained goods from your client worth ₱200,000.00 and I promised to settle the same last May 10,
1997, but to no avail. On this point, let me inform you that I sold my real property to a buyer in Manila, and
promised to pay the consideration on the same date as I promised with your client. Unfortunately, said buyer
likewise failed to make good with such obligation. Hence, I failed to fulfill my promise resultant thereof. (sic)
Again, I made another promise to settle said obligation on or before June 15, 1997, but still to no avail attributable
to the same reason as aforementioned. (sic)
To arrest this problem, we decided to source some funds using the subject property as collateral. This other means
is resorted to for the purpose of settling the herein obligation. And as to its status, said funds will be rele[a]sed
within thirty (30) days from today.
In view of the foregoing, it is my sincere request and promise to settle said obligation on or
before August 15, 1997.
Lastly, I would like to manifest that it is not my intention to shy away from any financial
obligation.
Respectfully yours,
(SGD.)
GILBERT R. WAGAS10
Wagas admitted the letter, but insisted that it was Cañada who had transacted with Ligaray, and that he had
signed the letter only because his sister and her husband (Cañada) had begged him to assume the
responsibility.11 On redirect examination, Wagas declared that Cañada, a seafarer, was then out of the country;
that he signed the letter only to accommodate the pleas of his sister and Cañada, and to avoid jeopardizing
Cañada’s application for overseas employment.12 The Prosecution subsequently offered and the RTC admitted the
letter as rebuttal evidence.13
Decision of the RTC
As stated, the RTC convicted Wagas of estafa on July 11, 2002, viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as charged and
he is hereby sentenced as follows:
To suffer an indeterminate penalty of from twelve (12) years of pris[i]on mayor, as minimum, to thirty (30) years of
reclusion perpetua as maximum;
To indemnify the complainant, Albert[o] Ligaray in the sum of ₱200,000.00;
To pay said complainant the sum of ₱30,000.00 by way of attorney’s fees; and the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.14
The RTC held that the Prosecution had proved beyond reasonable doubt all the elements constituting the crime of
estafa, namely: (a) that Wagas issued the postdated check as payment for an obligation contracted at the time the
check was issued; (b) that he failed to deposit an amount sufficient to cover the check despite having been
informed that the check had been dishonored; and (c) that Ligaray released the goods upon receipt of the
postdated check and upon Wagas’ assurance that the check would be funded on its date.
Wagas filed a motion for new trial and/or reconsideration,15 arguing that the Prosecution did not establish that it
was he who had transacted with Ligaray and who had negotiated the check to the latter; that the records showed
that Ligaray did not meet him at any time; and that Ligaray’s testimony on their alleged telephone conversation
was not reliable because it was not shown that Ligaray had been familiar with his voice. Wagas also sought the
reopening of the case based on newly discovered evidence, specifically: (a) the testimony of Cañada who could not
testify during the trial because he was then out of the country, and (b) Ligaray’s testimony given against Wagas in
another criminal case for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.
On October 21, 2002, the RTC denied the motion for new trial and/or reconsideration, opining that the evidence
Wagas desired to present at a new trial did not qualify as newly discovered, and that there was no compelling
ground to reverse its decision.16
Wagas appealed directly to this Court by notice of appeal.17
Prior to the elevation of the records to the Court, Wagas filed a petition for admission to bail pending appeal. The
RTC granted the petition and fixed Wagas’ bond at ₱40,000.00.18 Wagas then posted bail for his provisional liberty
pending appeal.19
The resolution of this appeal was delayed by incidents bearing on the grant of Wagas’ application for bail. On
November 17, 2003, the Court required the RTC Judge to explain why Wagas was out on bail. 20 On January 15,
2004, the RTC Judge submitted to the Court a so-called manifestation and compliance which the Court referred to
the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for evaluation, report, and recommendation. 21 On July 5, 2005, the
Court, upon the OCA’s recommendation, directed the filing of an administrative complaint for simple ignorance of
the law against the RTC Judge.22 On September 12, 2006, the Court directed the OCA to comply with its July 5,
2005 directive, and to cause the filing of the administrative complaint against the RTC Judge. The Court also
directed Wagas to explain why his bail should not be cancelled for having been erroneously granted.23 Finally, in its
memorandum dated September 27, 2006, the OCA manifested to the Court that it had meanwhile filed the
administrative complaint against the RTC Judge.24
Issues
In this appeal, Wagas insists that he and Ligaray were neither friends nor personally known to one other; that it
was highly incredible that Ligaray, a businessman, would have entered into a transaction with him involving a huge
amount of money only over the telephone; that on the contrary, the evidence pointed to Cañada as the person
with whom Ligaray had transacted, considering that the delivery receipt, which had been signed by Cañada,
indicated that the goods had been "Ordered by ROBERT CAÑADA," that the goods had been received by Cañada in
good order and condition, and that there was no showing that Cañada had been acting on behalf of Wagas; that he
had issued the check to Cañada upon a different transaction; that Cañada had negotiated the check to Ligaray; and
that the element of deceit had not been established because it had not been proved with certainty that it was him
who had transacted with Ligaray over the telephone.
The circumstances beg the question: did the Prosecution establish beyond reasonable doubt the existence of all
the elements of the crime of estafa as charged, as well as the identity of the perpetrator of the crime?
Ruling
The appeal is meritorious.
Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides:
Article 315. Swindling (estafa). — Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned
hereinbelow shall be punished by:
xxxx
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud:
xxxx
(d) By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender had no funds in the
bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check. The failure of the
drawer of the check to deposit the amount necessary to cover his check within three (3) days from receipt of
notice from the bank and/or the payee or holder that said check has been dishonored for lack or insufficiency of
funds shall be prima facie evidence of deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act.
In order to constitute estafa under this statutory provision, the act of postdating or issuing a check in payment of
an obligation must be the efficient cause of the defraudation. This means that the offender must be able to obtain
money or property from the offended party by reason of the issuance of the check, whether dated or postdated. In
other words, the Prosecution must show that the person to whom the check was delivered would not have parted
with his money or property were it not for the issuance of the check by the offender.25
The essential elements of the crime charged are that: (a) a check is postdated or issued in payment of an obligation
contracted at the time the check is issued; (b) lack or insufficiency of funds to cover the check; and (c) damage to
the payee thereof.26 It is the criminal fraud or deceit in the issuance of a check that is punishable, not the
non-payment of a debt.27 Prima facie evidence of deceit exists by law upon proof that the drawer of the check
failed to deposit the amount necessary to cover his check within three days from receipt of the notice of dishonor.
The Prosecution established that Ligaray had released the goods to Cañada because of the postdated check the
latter had given to him; and that the check was dishonored when presented for payment because of the
insufficiency of funds.
In every criminal prosecution, however, the identity of the offender, like the crime itself, must be established by
proof beyond reasonable doubt.28 In that regard, the Prosecution did not establish beyond reasonable doubt that
it was Wagas who had defrauded Ligaray by issuing the check.
Firstly, Ligaray expressly admitted that he did not personally meet the person with whom he was transacting over
the telephone, thus:
Q:
On April 30, 1997, do you remember having a transaction with the accused in this case?
A:
Yes, sir. He purchased two hundred bags of rice from me.
Q:
How did this purchase of rice transaction started? (sic)
A:
He talked with me over the phone and told me that he would like to purchase two hundred bags of rice and he will
just issue a check.29
Even after the dishonor of the check, Ligaray did not personally see and meet whoever he had dealt with and to
whom he had made the demand for payment, and that he had talked with him only over the telephone, to wit:
Q:
After the check was (sic) bounced, what did you do next?
A:
I made a demand on them.
Q:
How did you make a demand?
A:
I called him over the phone.
Q: during the trial as to how he had determined that his caller was Wagas. All that the Prosecution sought to elicit
Who is that "him" that you are referring to? from him was whether he had known and why he had known Wagas, and he answered as follows:
A: Q:
Do you know the accused in this case?
Gilbert Wagas.30 A:
Secondly, the check delivered to Ligaray was made payable to cash. Under the Negotiable Instruments Law, this Yes, sir.
type of check was payable to the bearer and could be negotiated by mere delivery without the need of an Q:
indorsement.31 This rendered it highly probable that Wagas had issued the check not to Ligaray, but to somebody If he is present inside the courtroom […]
else like Cañada, his brother-in-law, who then negotiated it to Ligaray.1âwphi1 Relevantly, Ligaray confirmed that A:
he did not himself see or meet Wagas at the time of the transaction and thereafter, and expressly stated that the No, sir. He is not around.
person who signed for and received the stocks of rice was Cañada. Q:
Why do you know him?
It bears stressing that the accused, to be guilty of estafa as charged, must have used the check in order to defraud A:
the complainant. What the law punishes is the fraud or deceit, not the mere issuance of the worthless check. I know him as a resident of Compostela because he is an ex-mayor of Compostela.36
Wagas could not be held guilty of estafa simply because he had issued the check used to defraud Ligaray. The During cross-examination, Ligaray was allowed another opportunity to show how he had determined that his caller
proof of guilt must still clearly show that it had been Wagas as the drawer who had defrauded Ligaray by means of was Wagas, but he still failed to provide a satisfactory showing, to wit:
the check. Q:
Mr. Witness, you mentioned that you and the accused entered into [a] transaction of rice selling, particularly with
Thirdly, Ligaray admitted that it was Cañada who received the rice from him and who delivered the check to him.
these 200 sacks of rice subject of this case, through telephone conversation?
Considering that the records are bereft of any showing that Cañada was then acting on behalf of Wagas, the RTC
A:
had no factual and legal bases to conclude and find that Cañada had been acting for Wagas. This lack of factual and
Yes, sir.
legal bases for the RTC to infer so obtained despite Wagas being Cañada’s brother-in-law.
Q:
Finally, Ligaray’s declaration that it was Wagas who had transacted with him over the telephone was not reliable But you cannot really ascertain that it was the accused whom you are talking with?
because he did not explain how he determined that the person with whom he had the telephone conversation was A:
really Wagas whom he had not yet met or known before then. We deem it essential for purposes of reliability and I know it was him because I know him.
trustworthiness that a telephone conversation like that one Ligaray supposedly had with the buyer of rice to be Q:
first authenticated before it could be received in evidence. Among others, the person with whom the witness Am I right to say [that] that was the first time that you had a transaction with the accused through telephone
conversed by telephone should be first satisfactorily identified by voice recognition or any other means.32 Without conversation, and as a consequence of that alleged conversation with the accused through telephone he issued a
the authentication, incriminating another person just by adverting to the telephone conversation with him would check in your favor?
be all too easy. In this respect, an identification based on familiarity with the voice of the caller, or because of A:
clearly recognizable peculiarities of the caller would have sufficed.33 The identity of the caller could also be No. Before that call I had a talk[ ] with the accused.
established by the caller’s self-identification, coupled with additional evidence, like the context and timing of the Q:
telephone call, the contents of the statement challenged, internal patterns, and other distinctive characteristics, But still through the telephone?
and disclosure of knowledge of facts known peculiarly to the caller.34 A:
Yes, sir.
Verily, it is only fair that the caller be reliably identified first before a telephone communication is accorded Q:
probative weight. The identity of the caller may be established by direct or circumstantial evidence. According to There was no instant (sic) that the accused went to see you personally regarding the 200 bags rice transaction?
one ruling of the Kansas Supreme Court: A:
Communications by telephone are admissible in evidence where they are relevant to the fact or facts in issue, and No. It was through telephone only.
admissibility is governed by the same rules of evidence concerning face-to-face conversations except the party Q:
against whom the conversations are sought to be used must ordinarily be identified. It is not necessary that the In fact[,] you did not cause the delivery of these 200 bags of rice through the accused himself?
witness be able, at the time of the conversation, to identify the person with whom the conversation was had, A:
provided subsequent identification is proved by direct or circumstantial evidence somewhere in the development Yes. It was through Robert.
of the case. The mere statement of his identity by the party calling is not in itself sufficient proof of such identity, Q:
in the absence of corroborating circumstances so as to render the conversation admissible. However, So, after that phone call[,] you deliver[ed] th[ose] 200 sacks of rice through somebody other than the accused?
circumstances preceding or following the conversation may serve to sufficiently identify the caller. The A:
completeness of the identification goes to the weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility, and the Yes, sir.37
responsibility lies in the first instance with the district court to determine within its sound discretion whether the Ligaray’s statement that he could tell that it was Wagas who had ordered the rice because he "know[s]" him was
threshold of admissibility has been met.35 (Bold emphasis supplied) still vague and unreliable for not assuring the certainty of the identification, and should not support a finding of
Yet, the Prosecution did not tender any plausible explanation or offer any proof to definitely establish that it had Ligaray’s familiarity with Wagas as the caller by his voice. It was evident from Ligaray’s answers that Wagas was not
been Wagas whom Ligaray had conversed with on the telephone. The Prosecution did not show through Ligaray even an acquaintance of Ligaray’s prior to the transaction. Thus, the RTC’s conclusion that Ligaray had transacted
with Wagas had no factual basis. Without that factual basis, the RTC was speculating on a matter as decisive as the
identification of the buyer to be Wagas.
The letter of Wagas did not competently establish that he was the person who had conversed with Ligaray by
telephone to place the order for the rice. The letter was admitted exclusively as the State’s rebuttal evidence to
controvert or impeach the denial of Wagas of entering into any transaction with Ligaray on the rice; hence, it could
be considered and appreciated only for that purpose. Under the law of evidence, the court shall consider evidence
solely for the purpose for which it is offered,38 not for any other purpose.39 Fairness to the adverse party demands
such exclusivity. Moreover, the high plausibility of the explanation of Wagas that he had signed the letter only
because his sister and her husband had pleaded with him to do so could not be taken for granted.
It is a fundamental rule in criminal procedure that the State carries the onus probandi in establishing the guilt of
the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, as a consequence of the tenet ei incumbit probation, qui dicit, non qui
negat, which means that he who asserts, not he who denies, must prove,40 and as a means of respecting the
presumption of innocence in favor of the man or woman on the dock for a crime. Accordingly, the State has the
burden of proof to show: (1) the correct identification of the author of a crime, and (2) the actuality of the
commission of the offense with the participation of the accused. All these facts must be proved by the State
beyond reasonable doubt on the strength of its evidence and without solace from the weakness of the defense.
That the defense the accused puts up may be weak is inconsequential if, in the first place, the State has failed to
discharge the onus of his identity and culpability. The presumption of innocence dictates that it is for the
Prosecution to demonstrate the guilt and not for the accused to establish innocence.41 Indeed, the accused, being
presumed innocent, carries no burden of proof on his or her shoulders. For this reason, the first duty of the
Prosecution is not to prove the crime but to prove the identity of the criminal. For even if the commission of the
crime can be established, without competent proof of the identity of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, there
can be no conviction.42
There is no question that an identification that does not preclude a reasonable possibility of mistake cannot be
accorded any evidentiary force.43 Thus, considering that the circumstances of the identification of Wagas as the
person who transacted on the rice did not preclude a reasonable possibility of mistake, the proof of guilt did not
measure up to the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt demanded in criminal cases. Perforce, the
accused’s constitutional right of presumption of innocence until the contrary is proved is not overcome, and he is
entitled to an acquittal,44 even though his innocence may be doubted.45
Nevertheless, an accused, though acquitted of estafa, may still be held civilly liable where the preponderance of
the established facts so warrants.46 Wagas as the admitted drawer of the check was legally liable to pay the
amount of it to Ligaray, a holder in due course.47 Consequently, we pronounce and hold him fully liable to pay the
amount of the dishonored check, plus legal interest of 6% per annum from the finality of this decision.
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision rendered on July 11, 2002 by the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 58, in Cebu City; and ACQUITS Gilbert R. Wagas of the crime of estafa on the ground of reasonable
doubt, but ORDERS him to pay Alberto Ligaray the amount of ₱200,000.00 as actual damages, plus interest of 6%
per annum from the finality of this decision.
No pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-49188 January 30, 1990
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JUDGE RICARDO D. GALANO, Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XIII,
JAIME K. DEL ROSARIO, Deputy Sheriff, Court of First Instance, Manila, and AMELIA TAN, respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
Behind the simple issue of validity of an alias writ of execution in this case is a more fundamental question. Should
the Court allow a too literal interpretation of the Rules with an open invitation to knavery to prevail over a more
discerning and just approach? Should we not apply the ancient rule of statutory construction that laws are to be
interpreted by the spirit which vivifies and not by the letter which killeth?
This is a petition to review on certiorari the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 07695 entitled
"Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Hon. Judge Ricardo D. Galano, et al.", dismissing the petition for certiorari against the
order of the Court of First Instance of Manila which issued an alias writ of execution against the petitioner.
The petition involving the alias writ of execution had its beginnings on November 8, 1967, when respondent
Amelia Tan, under the name and style of Able Printing Press commenced a complaint for damages before the
Court of First Instance of Manila. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 71307, entitled Amelia Tan, et al. v.
Philippine Airlines, Inc.
After trial, the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch 13, then presided over by the late Judge Jesus P. Morfe
rendered judgment on June 29, 1972, in favor of private respondent Amelia Tan and against petitioner Philippine
Airlines, Inc. (PAL) as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, ordering the defendant Philippine Air Lines:
1. On the first cause of action, to pay to the plaintiff the amount of P75,000.00 as actual damages, with legal
interest thereon from plaintiffs extra-judicial demand made by the letter of July 20, 1967;
2. On the third cause of action, to pay to the plaintiff the amount of P18,200.00, representing the unrealized profit
of 10% included in the contract price of P200,000.00 plus legal interest thereon from July 20,1967;
3. On the fourth cause of action, to pay to the plaintiff the amount of P20,000.00 as and for moral damages, with
legal interest thereon from July 20, 1 967;
4. On the sixth cause of action, to pay to the plaintiff the amount of P5,000.00 damages as and for attorney's fee.
Plaintiffs second and fifth causes of action, and defendant's counterclaim, are dismissed.
With costs against the defendant. (CA Rollo, p. 18)
On July 28, 1972, the petitioner filed its appeal with the Court of Appeals. The case was docketed as CA-G.R. No.
51079-R.
On February 3, 1977, the appellate court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, with the modification that PAL is condemned to pay plaintiff the sum of P25,000.00 as
damages and P5,000.00 as attorney's fee, judgment is affirmed, with costs. (CA Rollo, p. 29)
Notice of judgment was sent by the Court of Appeals to the trial court and on dates subsequent thereto, a motion
for reconsideration was filed by respondent Amelia Tan, duly opposed by petitioner PAL.
On May 23,1977, the Court of Appeals rendered its resolution denying the respondent's motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit.
No further appeal having been taken by the parties, the judgment became final and executory and on May 31,
1977, judgment was correspondingly entered in the case.
The case was remanded to the trial court for execution and on September 2,1977, respondent Amelia Tan filed a
motion praying for the issuance of a writ of execution of the judgment rendered by the Court of Appeals. On
October 11, 1977, the trial court, presided over by Judge Galano, issued its order of execution with the
corresponding writ in favor of the respondent. The writ was duly referred to Deputy Sheriff Emilio Z. Reyes of
Branch 13 of the Court of First Instance of Manila for enforcement.
Four months later, on February 11, 1978, respondent Amelia Tan moved for the issuance of an alias writ of
execution stating that the judgment rendered by the lower court, and affirmed with modification by the Court of
Appeals, remained unsatisfied.
On March 1, 1978, the petitioner filed an opposition to the motion for the issuance of an alias writ of execution
stating that it had already fully paid its obligation to plaintiff through the deputy sheriff of the respondent court,
Emilio Z. Reyes, as evidenced by cash vouchers properly signed and receipted by said Emilio Z. Reyes.
On March 3,1978, the Court of Appeals denied the issuance of the alias writ for being premature, ordering the
executing sheriff Emilio Z. Reyes to appear with his return and explain the reason for his failure to surrender the
amounts paid to him by petitioner PAL. However, the order could not be served upon Deputy Sheriff Reyes who
had absconded or disappeared.
On March 28, 1978, motion for the issuance of a partial alias writ of execution was filed by respondent Amelia Tan.
On April 19, 1978, respondent Amelia Tan filed a motion to withdraw "Motion for Partial Alias Writ of Execution"
with Substitute Motion for Alias Writ of Execution. On May 1, 1978, the respondent Judge issued an order which
reads:
As prayed for by counsel for the plaintiff, the Motion to Withdraw 'Motion for Partial Alias Writ of Execution with
Substitute Motion for Alias Writ of Execution is hereby granted, and the motion for partial alias writ of execution is
considered withdrawn.
Let an Alias Writ of Execution issue against the defendant for the fall satisfaction of the judgment rendered.
Deputy Sheriff Jaime K. del Rosario is hereby appointed Special Sheriff for the enforcement thereof. (CA Rollo, p.
34)
On May 18, 1978, the petitioner received a copy of the first alias writ of execution issued on the same day
directing Special Sheriff Jaime K. del Rosario to levy on execution in the sum of P25,000.00 with legal interest
thereon from July 20,1967 when respondent Amelia Tan made an extra-judicial demand through a letter. Levy was
also ordered for the further sum of P5,000.00 awarded as attorney's fees.
On May 23, 1978, the petitioner filed an urgent motion to quash the alias writ of execution stating that no return
of the writ had as yet been made by Deputy Sheriff Emilio Z. Reyes and that the judgment debt had already been
fully satisfied by the petitioner as evidenced by the cash vouchers signed and receipted by the server of the writ of
execution, Deputy Sheriff Emilio Z. Reyes.
On May 26,1978, the respondent Jaime K. del Rosario served a notice of garnishment on the depository bank of
petitioner, Far East Bank and Trust Company, Rosario Branch, Binondo, Manila, through its manager and garnished
the petitioner's deposit in the said bank in the total amount of P64,408.00 as of May 16, 1978. Hence, this petition
for certiorari filed by the Philippine Airlines, Inc., on the grounds that:
I
AN ALIAS WRIT OF EXECUTION CANNOT BE ISSUED WITHOUT PRIOR RETURN OF THE ORIGINAL WRIT BY THE
IMPLEMENTING OFFICER.
II
PAYMENT OF JUDGMENT TO THE IMPLEMENTING OFFICER AS DIRECTED IN THE WRIT OF EXECUTION
CONSTITUTES SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENT.
III
INTEREST IS NOT PAYABLE WHEN THE DECISION IS SILENT AS TO THE PAYMENT THEREOF.
IV
SECTION 5, RULE 39, PARTICULARLY REFERS TO LEVY OF PROPERTY OF JUDGMENT DEBTOR AND DISPOSAL OR
SALE THEREOF TO SATISFY JUDGMENT.
Can an alias writ of execution be issued without a prior return of the original writ by the implementing officer?
We rule in the affirmative and we quote the respondent court's decision with approval:
The issuance of the questioned alias writ of execution under the circumstances here obtaining is justified because
even with the absence of a Sheriffs return on the original writ, the unalterable fact remains that such a return is
incapable of being obtained (sic) because the officer who is to make the said return has absconded and cannot be
brought to the Court despite the earlier order of the court for him to appear for this purpose. (Order of Feb. 21,
1978, Annex C, Petition). Obviously, taking cognizance of this circumstance, the order of May 11, 1978 directing
the issuance of an alias writ was therefore issued. (Annex D. Petition). The need for such a return as a condition
precedent for the issuance of an alias writ was justifiably dispensed with by the court below and its action in this
regard meets with our concurrence. A contrary view will produce an abhorent situation whereby the mischief of an
erring officer of the court could be utilized to impede indefinitely the undisputed and awarded rights which a
prevailing party rightfully deserves to obtain and with dispatch. The final judgment in this case should not indeed
be permitted to become illusory or incapable of execution for an indefinite and over extended period, as had
already transpired. (Rollo, pp. 35-36)
Judicium non debet esse illusorium; suum effectum habere debet (A judgment ought not to be illusory it ought to
have its proper effect).
Indeed, technicality cannot be countenanced to defeat the execution of a judgment for execution is the fruit and
end of the suit and is very aptly called the life of the law (Ipekdjian Merchandising Co. v. Court of Tax Appeals, 8
SCRA 59 [1963]; Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Visayan Electric Co., 19 SCRA 697, 698 [1967]). A judgment
cannot be rendered nugatory by the unreasonable application of a strict rule of procedure. Vested rights were
never intended to rest on the requirement of a return, the office of which is merely to inform the court and the
parties, of any and all actions taken under the writ of execution. Where such information can be established in
some other manner, the absence of an executing officer's return will not preclude a judgment from being treated
as discharged or being executed through an alias writ of execution as the case may be. More so, as in the case at
bar. Where the return cannot be expected to be forthcoming, to require the same would be to compel the
enforcement of rights under a judgment to rest on an impossibility, thereby allowing the total avoidance of
judgment debts. So long as a judgment is not satisfied, a plaintiff is entitled to other writs of execution
(Government of the Philippines v. Echaus and Gonzales, 71 Phil. 318). It is a well known legal maxim that he who
cannot prosecute his judgment with effect, sues his case vainly.
More important in the determination of the propriety of the trial court's issuance of an alias writ of execution is
the issue of satisfaction of judgment.
Under the peculiar circumstances surrounding this case, did the payment made to the absconding sheriff by check
in his name operate to satisfy the judgment debt? The Court rules that the plaintiff who has won her case should
not be adjudged as having sued in vain. To decide otherwise would not only give her an empty but a pyrrhic
victory.
It should be emphasized that under the initial judgment, Amelia Tan was found to have been wronged by PAL.
She filed her complaint in 1967.
After ten (10) years of protracted litigation in the Court of First Instance and the Court of Appeals, Ms. Tan won her
case.
It is now 1990.
Almost twenty-two (22) years later, Ms. Tan has not seen a centavo of what the courts have solemnly declared as
rightfully hers. Through absolutely no fault of her own, Ms. Tan has been deprived of what, technically, she should
have been paid from the start, before 1967, without need of her going to court to enforce her rights. And all
because PAL did not issue the checks intended for her, in her name.
Under the peculiar circumstances of this case, the payment to the absconding sheriff by check in his name did not
operate as a satisfaction of the judgment debt.
In general, a payment, in order to be effective to discharge an obligation, must be made to the proper person.
Article 1240 of the Civil Code provides:
Payment shall be made to the person in whose favor the obligation has been constituted, or his successor in
interest, or any person authorized to receive it. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, payment must be made to the obligee himself or to an agent having authority, express or implied, to receive
the particular payment (Ulen v. Knecttle 50 Wyo 94, 58 [2d] 446, 111 ALR 65). Payment made to one having
apparent authority to receive the money will, as a rule, be treated as though actual authority had been given for its
receipt. Likewise, if payment is made to one who by law is authorized to act for the creditor, it will work a
discharge (Hendry v. Benlisa 37 Fla. 609, 20 SO 800,34 LRA 283). The receipt of money due on ajudgment by an
officer authorized by law to accept it will, therefore, satisfy the debt (See 40 Am Jm 729, 25; Hendry v. Benlisa
supra; Seattle v. Stirrat 55 Wash. 104 p. 834,24 LRA [NS] 1275).
The theory is where payment is made to a person authorized and recognized by the creditor, the payment to such
a person so authorized is deemed payment to the creditor. Under ordinary circumstances, payment by the
judgment debtor in the case at bar, to the sheriff should be valid payment to extinguish the judgment debt.
There are circumstances in this case, however, which compel a different conclusion.
The payment made by the petitioner to the absconding sheriff was not in cash or legal tender but in checks. The
checks were not payable to Amelia Tan or Able Printing Press but to the absconding sheriff.
Did such payments extinguish the judgment debt?
Article 1249 of the Civil Code provides:
The payment of debts in money shall be made in the currency stipulated, and if it is not possible to deliver such
currency, then in the currency which is legal tender in the Philippines.
The delivery of promissory notes payable to order, or bills of exchange or other mercantile documents shall
produce the effect of payment only when they have been cashed, or when through the fault of the creditor they
have been impaired.
In the meantime, the action derived from the original obligation shall be held in abeyance.
In the absence of an agreement, either express or implied, payment means the discharge of a debt or obligation in
money (US v. Robertson, 5 Pet. [US] 641, 8 L. ed. 257) and unless the parties so agree, a debtor has no rights,
except at his own peril, to substitute something in lieu of cash as medium of payment of his debt (Anderson v. Gill,
79 Md.. 312, 29 A 527, 25 LRA 200,47 Am. St. Rep. 402). Consequently, unless authorized to do so by law or by
consent of the obligee a public officer has no authority to accept anything other than money in payment of an
obligation under a judgment being executed. Strictly speaking, the acceptance by the sheriff of the petitioner's
checks, in the case at bar, does not, per se, operate as a discharge of the judgment debt.
Since a negotiable instrument is only a substitute for money and not money, the delivery of such an instrument
does not, by itself, operate as payment (See. 189, Act 2031 on Negs. Insts.; Art. 1249, Civil Code; Bryan Landon Co.
v. American Bank, 7 Phil. 255; Tan Sunco v. Santos, 9 Phil. 44; 21 R.C.L. 60, 61). A check, whether a manager's check
or ordinary cheek, is not legal tender, and an offer of a check in payment of a debt is not a valid tender of payment
and may be refused receipt by the obligee or creditor. Mere delivery of checks does not discharge the obligation
under a judgment. The obligation is not extinguished and remains suspended until the payment by commercial
document is actually realized (Art. 1249, Civil Code, par. 3).
If bouncing checks had been issued in the name of Amelia Tan and not the Sheriff's, there would have been no
payment. After dishonor of the checks, Ms. Tan could have run after other properties of PAL. The theory is that she
has received no value for what had been awarded her. Because the checks were drawn in the name of Emilio Z.
Reyes, neither has she received anything. The same rule should apply.
It is argued that if PAL had paid in cash to Sheriff Reyes, there would have been payment in full legal
contemplation. The reasoning is logical but is it valid and proper? Logic has its limits in decision making. We should
not follow rulings to their logical extremes if in doing so we arrive at unjust or absurd results.
In the first place, PAL did not pay in cash. It paid in cheeks.
And second, payment in cash always carries with it certain cautions. Nobody hands over big amounts of cash in a
careless and inane manner. Mature thought is given to the possibility of the cash being lost, of the bearer being
waylaid or running off with what he is carrying for another. Payment in checks is precisely intended to avoid the
possibility of the money going to the wrong party. The situation is entirely different where a Sheriff seizes a car, a
tractor, or a piece of land. Logic often has to give way to experience and to reality. Having paid with checks, PAL
should have done so properly.
Payment in money or cash to the implementing officer may be deemed absolute payment of the judgment debt
but the Court has never, in the least bit, suggested that judgment debtors should settle their obligations by turning
over huge amounts of cash or legal tender to sheriffs and other executing officers. Payment in cash would result in
damage or interminable litigations each time a sheriff with huge amounts of cash in his hands decides to abscond.
As a protective measure, therefore, the courts encourage the practice of payments by cheek provided adequate
controls are instituted to prevent wrongful payment and illegal withdrawal or disbursement of funds. If particularly
big amounts are involved, escrow arrangements with a bank and carefully supervised by the court would be the
safer procedure. Actual transfer of funds takes place within the safety of bank premises. These practices are
perfectly legal. The object is always the safe and incorrupt execution of the judgment.
It is, indeed, out of the ordinary that checks intended for a particular payee are made out in the name of another.
Making the checks payable to the judgment creditor would have prevented the encashment or the taking of undue
advantage by the sheriff, or any person into whose hands the checks may have fallen, whether wrongfully or in
behalf of the creditor. The issuance of the checks in the name of the sheriff clearly made possible the
misappropriation of the funds that were withdrawn.
As explained and held by the respondent court:
... [K]nowing as it does that the intended payment was for the private party respondent Amelia Tan, the petitioner
corporation, utilizing the services of its personnel who are or should be knowledgeable about the accepted
procedures and resulting consequences of the checks drawn, nevertheless, in this instance, without prudence,
departed from what is generally observed and done, and placed as payee in the checks the name of the errant
Sheriff and not the name of the rightful payee. Petitioner thereby created a situation which permitted the said
Sheriff to personally encash said checks and misappropriate the proceeds thereof to his exclusive personal benefit.
For the prejudice that resulted, the petitioner himself must bear the fault. The judicial guideline which we take
note of states as follows:
As between two innocent persons, one of whom must suffer the consequence of a breach of trust, the one who
made it possible by his act of confidence must bear the loss. (Blondeau, et al. v. Nano, et al., L-41377, July 26, 1935,
61 Phil. 625)
Having failed to employ the proper safeguards to protect itself, the judgment debtor whose act made possible the
loss had but itself to blame.
The attention of this Court has been called to the bad practice of a number of executing officers, of requiring
checks in satisfaction of judgment debts to be made out in their own names. If a sheriff directs a judgment debtor
to issue the checks in the sheriff's name, claiming he must get his commission or fees, the debtor must report the
sheriff immediately to the court which ordered the execution or to the Supreme Court for appropriate disciplinary
action. Fees, commissions, and salaries are paid through regular channels. This improper procedure also allows
such officers, who have sixty (60) days within which to make a return, to treat the moneys as their personal finds
and to deposit the same in their private accounts to earn sixty (60) days interest, before said finds are turned over
to the court or judgment creditor (See Balgos v. Velasco, 108 SCRA 525 [1981]). Quite as easily, such officers could
put up the defense that said checks had been issued to them in their private or personal capacity. Without a
receipt evidencing payment of the judgment debt, the misappropriation of finds by such officers becomes clean
and complete. The practice is ingenious but evil as it unjustly enriches court personnel at the expense of litigants
and the proper administration of justice. The temptation could be far greater, as proved to be in this case of the
absconding sheriff. The correct and prudent thing for the petitioner was to have issued the checks in the intended
payee's name.
The pernicious effects of issuing checks in the name of a person other than the intended payee, without the
latter's agreement or consent, are as many as the ways that an artful mind could concoct to get around the
safeguards provided by the law on negotiable instruments. An angry litigant who loses a case, as a rule, would not
want the winning party to get what he won in the judgment. He would think of ways to delay the winning party's
getting what has been adjudged in his favor. We cannot condone that practice especially in cases where the courts
and their officers are involved.1âwphi1 We rule against the petitioner.
Anent the applicability of Section 15, Rule 39, as follows:
Section 15. Execution of money judgments. — The officer must enforce an execution of a money judgment by
levying on all the property, real and personal of every name and nature whatsoever, and which may be disposed of
for value, of the judgment debtor not exempt from execution, or on a sufficient amount of such property, if they
be sufficient, and selling the same, and paying to the judgment creditor, or his attorney, so much of the proceeds
as will satisfy the judgment. ...
the respondent court held:
We are obliged to rule that the judgment debt cannot be considered satisfied and therefore the orders of the
respondent judge granting the alias writ of execution may not be pronounced as a nullity.
xxx xxx xxx
It is clear and manifest that after levy or garnishment, for a judgment to be executed there is the requisite of
payment by the officer to the judgment creditor, or his attorney, so much of the proceeds as will satisfy the
judgment and none such payment had been concededly made yet by the absconding Sheriff to the private
respondent Amelia Tan. The ultimate and essential step to complete the execution of the judgment not having
been performed by the City Sheriff, the judgment debt legally and factually remains unsatisfied.
Strictly speaking execution cannot be equated with satisfaction of a judgment. Under unusual circumstances as
those obtaining in this petition, the distinction comes out clearly.
Execution is the process which carries into effect a decree or judgment (Painter v. Berglund, 31 Cal. App. 2d. 63, 87
P 2d 360, 363; Miller v. London, 294 Mass 300, 1 NE 2d 198, 200; Black's Law Dictionary), whereas the satisfaction
of a judgment is the payment of the amount of the writ, or a lawful tender thereof, or the conversion by sale of the
debtor's property into an amount equal to that due, and, it may be done otherwise than upon an execution
(Section 47, Rule 39). Levy and delivery by an execution officer are not prerequisites to the satisfaction of a
judgment when the same has already been realized in fact (Section 47, Rule 39). Execution is for the sheriff to
accomplish while satisfaction of the judgment is for the creditor to achieve. Section 15, Rule 39 merely provides
the sheriff with his duties as executing officer including delivery of the proceeds of his levy on the debtor's
property to satisfy the judgment debt. It is but to stress that the implementing officer's duty should not stop at his
receipt of payments but must continue until payment is delivered to the obligor or creditor.
Finally, we find no error in the respondent court's pronouncement on the inclusion of interests to be recovered
under the alias writ of execution. This logically follows from our ruling that PAL is liable for both the lost checks and
interest. The respondent court's decision in CA-G.R. No. 51079-R does not totally supersede the trial court's
judgment in Civil Case No. 71307. It merely modified the same as to the principal amount awarded as actual
damages.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The judgment of the respondent
Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED and the trial court's issuance of the alias writ of execution against the petitioner is
upheld without prejudice to any action it should take against the errant sheriff Emilio Z. Reyes. The Court
Administrator is ordered to follow up the actions taken against Emilio Z. Reyes.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 132362 June 28, 2001
PIO BARRETTO REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE PERFECTO A. S. LAGUIO, JR., RTC-Branch 18, Manila, and HONOR P.
MOSLARES, respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision dated 30 June 1997 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 33982, "Pio Barretto Realty Development Corporation v. Hon. Perfecto A. Laguio, et al.," which dismissed the
special civil action for certiorari filed by petitioner, as well as its Resolution dated 14 January 1998 denying
reconsideration.
On 2 October 1984 respondent Honor P. Moslares instituted an action for annulment of sale with damages before
the Regional Trial Court of Manila against the Testate Estate of Nicolai Drepin represented by its Judicial
Administrator Atty. Tomas Trinidad and petitioner Pio Barretto Realty Development Corporation. Moslares alleged
that the Deed of Sale over four (4) parcels of land of the Drepin Estate executed in favor of the Barretto Realty was
null and void on the ground that the same parcels of land had already been sold to him by the deceased Nicolai
Drepin. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 84-27008 and raffled to respondent Judge Perfecto A. S. Laguio, Jr.,
RTC-Br. 18, Manila.
On 2 May 1986 the parties, to settle the case, executed a Compromise Agreement pertinent portions of which are
quoted hereunder -
1. The Parties agree to sell the Estate, subject matter of the instant case, which is composed of the following real
estate properties, to wit:
a. Three (3) titled properties covered by TCT Nos. 50539, 50540 and 505411 of the Registry of Deeds for the
Province of Rizal, with a total area of 80 hectares, more or less, and
b. Untitled Property, subject matter of (a) Land Registration Case No. 1602 of the Regional Trial Court, Pasig, Metro
Manila, with an area of 81 hectares, more or less,
subject to the following situations and conditions, to wit:
a. If plaintiff Honor P. Moslares x x x buys the property, he is under obligation, as follows:
1. To reimburse and pay Defendant Pio Barretto Realty Development Corporation, represented by Anthony Que,
its capital investment of Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, and
2. To pay the Estate of Nicolai Drepin, represented by the Judicial Administrator, Atty. Tomas Trinidad, the sum of
One Million Three Hundred Fifty Thousand (P1,350,000.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency
b. If defendant Pio Barretto Realty Development Corporation, represented by Mr. Anthony Que x x x continue[s] to
buy the property, it shall pay for the interests of plaintiff Honor P. Moslares:
1. The sum of One Million (P1,000.000.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency to plaintiff Honor P. Moslares personally and
2. Pay to the Estate of Nicolai Drepin, through the Judicial Administrator, Atty. Tomas Trinidad, the balance of the
agreed purchase price subject to negotiation and verification of payments already made.
2. In the event that plaintiff Honor P. Moslares buys the Estate and pays in full the amount of Three Million
(P3,000,000.00) Philippine Currency to defendant Pio Barretto Realty Development Corporation, and the full sum
of One Million Three Hundred Fifty Thousand (P1,350,000.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, to the Estate of Nicolai
Drepin, through Atty. Tomas Trinidad, defendant Pio Barretto shall execute the corresponding Deed of Conveyance
in favor of plaintiff Honor P. Moslares and deliver to him all the titles and pertinent papers to the Estate.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto hereby sign this Compromise Agreement at Manila, Philippines, this 2nd
day of May 1986 xxxx xxxx xxxx
On 24 July 1986 the trial court rendered a decision approving the Compromise Agreement.2 However, subsequent
disagreements arose on the question of who bought the properties first.
It must be noted that the Compromise Agreement merely gave Moslares and Barretto Realty options to buy the
disputed lots thus implicitly recognizing that the one who paid first had priority in right. Moslares claimed that he
bought the lots first on 15 January 1990 by delivering to Atty. Tomas Trinidad two (2) PBCom checks, one (1) in
favor of Barretto Realty for P3 million, and the other, in favor of the Drepin Estate for P1.35 million.
But petitioner Barretto Realty denied receiving the check. Instead, it claimed that it bought the properties on 7
March 1990 by tendering a Traders Royal Bank Manager's Check for P1million to Moslares, and a Far East Bank and
Trust Company Cashier's Check for P1 million and a Traders Royal Bank Manager's Check for P350,000.00 to Atty.
Tomas Trinidad as Judicial Administrator of the Estate. However, Moslares and Atty. Trinidad refused to accept the
checks.
Consequently, Barretto Realty filed a motion before the trial court alleging that it complied with its monetary
obligations under the Compromise Agreement but that its offers of payment were refused, and prayed that a writ
of execution be issued to compel Moslares and Atty. Trinidad to comply with the Compromise Agreement and that
the latter be directed to turn over the owner's duplicate certificates of title over the lots.
On 10 May 19903 Judge Laguio, Jr. ordered that "a writ of execution be issued for the enforcement of the decision
of this Court for the parties to deposit with this Court, thru the City Treasurer's Office of Manila, their respective
monetary obligations under the compromise agreement that had been executed by them x x x x"
Reacting to the order, Atty. Trinidad for the Estate filed an urgent motion to hold the execution in abeyance on the
ground that there was another case involving the issue of ownership over subject lots pending before the Regional
Trial Court of Antipolo City. Moslares in turn filed a motion for reconsideration while Barretto Realty moved to
amend the order since the lower court did not exactly grant what it prayed for.
On 14 June 1990, ruling on the three (3) motions, Judge Laguio, Jr., issued his Order -
Considering Defendant Judicial Administrator's urgent motion to hold in abeyance x x x the plaintiff's motion for
reconsideration, and the Defendant Pio Barretto Realty Development, Inc.'s opposition to both motions x x x this
Court finds the two motions without merit and are accordingly, denied.
As regards Pio Barretto Realty Development, Inc.'s ex-parte motion to amend order x x x the same is hereby
granted and the deputy sheriff of this Court is allowed to deliver to the parties concerned thru their counsels the
bank certified checks mentioned in par. 2 of the motion (underscoring ours).4
On 20 June 1990 Deputy Sheriff Apolonio L. Golfo of the RTC-Br. 18, Manila, implemented the order by personally
delivering the checks issued by Barretto Realty in favor of Moslares and the Estate to Atty. Pedro S. Ravelo, counsel
for Moslares, and to Atty. Tomas Trinidad, respectively, as recorded in a Sheriff's Return dated 25 June 1990.5
However, on 17 September 1993, or more than three (3) years later, Moslares filed a Motion for Execution alleging
that he bought the lots subject of the Compromise Agreement on 15 January 1990 and that he paid the amounts
specified as payment therefor. He asked that Barretto Realty be directed to execute a deed of conveyance over
subject lots in his favor. In a Supplement to his motion Moslares contended that the previous tender of the checks
by Barretto Realty did not produce the effect of payment because checks, according to jurisprudence, were not
legal tender.
Respondent Judge granted Moslares' Motion for Execution. Consequently, on 8 November 1993 Barretto Realty
was ordered to execute a deed of conveyance over the subject lots in favor of Moslares.
Aggrieved, Barretto Realty moved for reconsideration alleging that respondent Judge could no longer grant
Moslares' motion since the prior sale of subject lots in its favor had already been recognized when the court sheriff
was directed to deliver, and did in fact deliver, the checks it issued in payment therefor to Moslares and Atty.
Trinidad.
On 7 December 1993 respondent Judge granted the motion of Barretto Realty for reconsideration and ruled -
Considering the motion for reconsideration and to quash writ of execution filed by defendant Pio Barretto Realty
Corporation, Inc., dated 16 November 1993, together with the plaintiff's comment and/or opposition thereto,
dated 18 November 1993, and the movant's reply to the opposition etc., dated 20 November 1993, this Court finds
the motion well taken. The record shows that on 10 May 1990, a writ of execution was issued by this Court for the
parties to deposit with the Court, thru the City Treasurer's Office of Manila, their respective monetary obligations
under the compromise agreement that they had executed, and that it was only defendant Pio Barretto Realty
Corporation Inc. that had complied therewith, per the return of this Court's deputy sheriff, Apolonio L. Golfo,
dated June 25, 1990. Such being the case, Defendant Pio Barretto Realty Corporation Inc., is the absolute owner
of the real properties in question and the issue on such ownership is now a closed matter.
WHEREFORE, Defendant Pio Barretto Realty Corporation Inc.'s motion for reconsideration etc., dated November
16, 1993, is hereby granted; this Court's order, dated November 8, 1993, is reconsidered and set aside, and the
writ of execution of the same date against Defendant Pio Barretto Realty Corporation Inc. is ordered quashed
(underscoring ours).6
Within a reglementary period Moslares moved to reconsider insisting that Barretto Realty's payment by check was
not valid because (a) the check was not delivered personally to him but to his counsel Atty. Pedro Ravelo, (b) the
check was not encashed hence did not produce the effect of payment; and, (c) the check was not legal tender per
judicial pronouncements. Barretto Realty opposed the motion, but to no avail. On 11 February 1994 respondent
Judge granted the motion for reconsideration and set aside his Order of 7 December 1993. Judge Laguio ruled that
Barretto Realty's payment through checks was not valid because "a check is not legal tender and it cannot produce
the effect of payment until it is encashed x x x x the check in question has neither been negotiated nor encashed
by the plaintiff."7 At the same time, however, Moslares' alleged payment of P3,000,000.00 on 15 January 1990
intended for Barretto Realty but delivered to Atty. Tomas Trinidad was likewise decreed as not valid because the
latter was not authorized to accept payment for Barretto Realty.
Invoking interest of justice and equity, respondent Judge resolved to: (a) set aside its ruling contained in its order
of 7 December 1993 that "(d)efendant Pio Barretto Realty Corporation, Inc., is the absolute owner of the property
in question and the issue on such ownership is now a closed matter;" (b) order the plaintiff (should he desire to
exercise his option to buy the real property in question) to pay defendant Pio Barretto Realty Corporation, Inc., the
sum of P3,000,000.00 within five (5) days from notice thereof by way of reimbursement of the latter's capital
investment; and, (c) order defendant Pio Barretto Realty Development Corporation, Inc., to pay the plaintiff (in the
event the latter should fail to exercise his said option and the former would want to buy the real property in
question) the sum of P1,000,000.00.
But Moslares failed to exercise his option and pay the amount within the five (5)-day period granted him. Instead,
he filed a Supplemental Motion to Pay praying that he be given additional seven (7) days within which to do so.
Barretto Realty opposed and invoked par. 3 of the Order of 11 February 1994 granting it the option to buy the lots
in the event that Moslares should fail to pay within the period given him. Barretto Realty prayed that the P1
million cashier's check still in Moslares' possession be considered as sufficient compliance with the pertinent
provision of the court's order. Later, Barretto Realty offered to exchange the check with cash. When Moslares did
not appear however at the designated time for payment on 10 March 1994 before the Branch Clerk of Court,
Barretto Realty filed a motion for consignation praying that it be allowed to deposit the P1,000,000.00 payment
with the cashier of the Office of the Clerk of Court.
Respondent Judge however failed to act on the motion as he went on vacation leave. For reasons which do not
clearly appear in the record, Judge Rosalio G. dela Rosa, Executive Judge of the RTC, Manila, acted on the motion
and granted the prayer of Barretto Realty.8 Upon the return of respondent Judge Laguio from his vacation,
petitioner Barretto Realty immediately filed a motion for his inhibition on the ground that he had already lost the
cold neutrality of an impartial judge as evident from his "seesaw" orders in the case. On 28 March 1994
respondent Judge denied the motion for his inhibition. Moslares for his part moved for reconsideration of
Executive Judge dela Rosa's Order of 10 March 1994.
On 15 April 1994, in a Consolidated Order, respondent Judge Laguio set aside the questioned order of Executive
Judge dela Rosa on the ground that the motion for consignation should have been referred to the pairing judge of
Branch 18, Judge Zenaida Daguna of Branch 19. Respondent Judge further ruled that the questioned order was
premature since there were pending motions, namely, Moslares' Supplemental Motion to Pay dated 1 March 1994,
and Motion to Deposit dated 9 March 1994 which were both filed earlier than Barretto Realty's Motion for
Consignation which however remained unresolved.
Respondent Judge Laguio found Moslares' motions meritorious and granted them. Moslares was thus given a
non-extendible grace period of three (3) days within which to pay the P3,000,000.00 to Barretto Realty. Moslares
then deposited the amount with the Branch Clerk of Court of Br. 18 within two (2) days from receipt of the order
of respondent Judge, and on 25 April 1994 filed a motion for the Clerk of Court to be authorized to execute the
necessary deed of conveyance in his favor.
On 2 May 1994 Barretto Realty filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a temporary
restraining order and/or preliminary injunction with the Court of Appeals assailing the Orders of respondent Judge
dated 28 March 1994 and 15 April 1994 on the ground that they were issued with grave abuse of discretion.
Meanwhile, on 12 October 1994 or during the pendency of the petition, respondent Judge granted Moslares'
motion and authorized the Clerk of Court to execute the deed of conveyance in his favor. The implementation of
the order however was enjoined by the Court of Appeals on 9 December 1994 when it issued a writ of preliminary
injunction barring the issuance of the writ until further orders from the court.
In its Petition and Memorandum petitioner specifically alleged that respondent Judge's Orders of 8 November
1993,9 11 February 1994,10 15 April 1994,11 and 12 October 199412were all issued with grave abuse of discretion as
the trial court had no more jurisdiction to issue such orders since the Compromise Agreement of 2 May 1986
which was the basis of the decision of 24 July 1986 had already been executed and implemented in its favor way
back on 20 June 1990.
Petitioner likewise contended that the Order of 28 March 199413denying petitioner's motion for inhibition was
void because it did not state the legal basis thereof; that respondent Judge displayed obvious bias and prejudice
when he issued "seesaw" orders in the case; and, that the bias in favor of Moslares was apparent when
respondent Judge granted the former another three (3)-day period within which to pay the P3 million
notwithstanding the fact that Moslares failed to comply with the original five (5)-day period given him. With
respect to Executive Judge dela Rosa's Order of 10 March 1994, petitioner contended that there was no rule of
procedure prohibiting the Executive Judge from acting on an urgent motion even if the pairing judge of the judge
to whom the case was raffled was present.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. It ruled that the denial by respondent Judge of the motion for his
inhibition was not tainted with grave abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari. Aside from the fact that judges
are given a wide latitude of discretion in determining whether to voluntarily recuse themselves from a case, which
is not lightly interfered with, the appellate court however observed that the orders and resolutions issued by
respondent Judge in the five (5) years he had been presiding over Civil Case No. 84-27008 indicated that they were
not uniformly issued in favor of one or the other party. As petitioner itself aptly described, respondent Judge's
actuations in the case "seesawed" between the parties.
On the matter of the validity of Judge dela Rosa's Order of 10 March 1994 granting petitioner's motion for
consignation, the Court of Appeals ruled that the order was precipitate and unauthorized not only because the
motion did not comply with the requisites for litigated motions but also because Judge dela Rosa had no judicial
authority to act on the case. His duties as Executive Judge were purely administrative and did not include acting on
a case assigned to another judge.
With respect to the two (2) writs of execution, one dated 10 May 1990 in favor of petitioner, and the other dated
11 February 1994 in favor of respondent, the Court of Appeals ruled -
Lastly, anent the existence of two writs of execution, first one for petitioner and the second for Moslares which the
former has repeatedly cited as capricious and whimsical exercise of judicial discretion by respondent Judge, the
records reveal that on 10 May 1990 a writ of execution was issued in favor of the petitioner upon its motion. For
reasons of its own, petitioner did not pursue its effective and fruitful implementation in accordance with the
decision based on a compromise agreement, spelling out the respective monetary obligations of petitioner and
Moslares. Hence, after the lapse of at least one year, Moslares filed a motion for execution of the same decision x
x x x [I]t cannot be said that respondent Judge issued two conflicting orders sans any legal basis. What really
happened was that the matter of the first order granting execution in favor of petitioner was repeatedly put at
issue until the order of the court dated 11 February 1994 x x x x Observedly, the said order was never elevated by
petitioner to the appellate courts. Instead, he agreed with it by filing a "Manifestation and Motion" on 01 March
1994 praying that the P1 Million Cashier's Check still in the possession of Moslares be considered compliance with
paragraph 3 of that order x x x x
On 14 January 1998 petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied; hence, this petition.
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred (a) in concluding that petitioner did not pursue the effective
and fruitful implementation of the writ of execution dated 10 May 1990 in its favor, (b) in not setting aside Judge
Laguio's Orders dated 11 February 1994, 15 April 1994 and 12 October 1994 as patent nullities, and, (c) in
disregarding jurisprudence declaring that cashier's or manager's checks are deemed cash or as good as the money
they represent.
We grant the petition. Final and executory decisions, more so with those already executed, may no longer be
amended except only to correct errors which are clerical in nature. They become the law of the case and are
immutable and unalterable regardless of any claim of error or incorrectness.14 Amendments or alterations which
substantially affect such judgments as well as the entire proceedings held for that purpose are null and void for
lack of jurisdiction.15 The reason lies in the fact that public policy dictates that litigations must be terminated at
some definite time and that the prevailing party should not be denied the fruits of his victory by some subterfuge
devised by the losing party.16
It is not disputed, and in fact borne by the records, that petitioner bought the disputed lots of the Drepin Estate
subject matter of the Compromise Agreement ahead of Moslares and that the checks issued in payment thereof
were even personally delivered by the Deputy Sheriff of the RTC-Br. 18, Manila, upon Order of respondent Judge
dated 14 June 1990 after tender was refused by Moslares and the Drepin Estate. Respondent Moslares never
raised the invalidity of the payment through checks either through a motion for reconsideration or a timely appeal.
Hence, with the complete execution and satisfaction of the Decision dated 24 July 1986 which approved
the Compromise Agreement, Civil Case No. 84-27008 became closed and terminated leaving nothing else to be
done by the trial court with respect thereto.17 As petitioner correctly contended, the Court of Appeals erred when
it concluded that petitioner did not pursue the fruitful and effective implementation of the writ of execution in its
favor. As already stated petitioner paid for the lots through the court-sanctioned procedure outlined above. There
was no more need for the Drepin Estate, owner of the lots, to execute a deed of conveyance in petitioner's favor
because it had already done so on 10 October 1980. In fact the disputed lots were already registered in petitioner's
name under TCT Nos. 50539, 50540 and 50541 as a consequence thereof. That was also why in the penultimate
paragraph of the Compromise Agreement it was provided that in the event respondent Moslares bought the lots
ahead of petitioner Barretto Realty the latter, not the Drepin Estate, was to execute the corresponding deed of
conveyance and deliver all the titles and pertinent papers to respondent Moslares. There was therefore nothing
more to be done by way of fruitful and effective implementation.
Clearly then respondent Judge Laguio no longer had any jurisdiction whatsoever to act on, much less grant, the
motion for execution and supplement thereto filed by Moslares on 17 September 1993 or more than three (3)
years later, claiming that he had already bought the lots. The fact that the check paid to him by Barretto Realty was
never encashed should not be invoked against the latter. As already stated, Moslares never questioned the tender
done three (3) years earlier. Besides, while delivery of a check produces the effect of payment only when it is
encashed, the rule is otherwise if the debtor was prejudiced by the creditor's unreasonable delay in presentment.
Acceptance of a check implies an undertaking of due diligence in presenting it for payment. If no such presentment
was made, the drawer cannot be held liable irrespective of loss or injury sustained by the payee. Payment will be
deemed effected and the obligation for which the check was given as conditional payment will be discharged.18
Considering the foregoing, respondent Judge Laguio's Order dated 8 November 1993 which granted private
respondent's motion for execution thus nullifying the 1990 sale in favor of petitioner after he had in effect
approved such sale in his Order of 14 June 1990 and after such order had already become final and executory,
amounted to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority, a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction, for which reason, all further orders stemming therefrom are also null and void and without effect.19
The principle of laches does not attach when the judgment is null and void for want of jurisdiction.20 The fact that
petitioner invoked par. 3 of the Order of 11 February 1994 praying that its P1,000,000.00 check still in Moslares'
possession be considered sufficient payment of the disputed lots, could not be cited against it. For one thing,
petitioner from the very start had always consistently questioned and assailed the jurisdiction of the trial court to
entertain respondent's motion for execution filed three (3) years after the case had in fact been executed.
Secondly, estoppel being an equitable doctrine cannot be invoked to perpetuate an injustice.21
WHEREFORE, the questioned Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 30 June 1997 and 14 January
1998, respectively, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order of respondent Judge Perfecto A. S. Laguio Jr. dated 11
February 1994 in Civil Case No. 84-27008, setting aside his earlier ruling of 7 December 1993 which had declared
petitioner Pio Barretto Realty Development Corporation as the absolute owner of the real properties in question,
and all subsequent proceedings culminating in the Order of 12 October 1994 authorizing the Clerk of Court,
RTC-Manila, to execute a deed of conveyance over subject properties in favor of respondent Honor P. Moslares,
are declared NULL and VOID for want of jurisdiction.
Consequently, petitioner Pio Barretto Realty Development Corporation is declared the absolute owner of the
disputed properties subject matter of the Compromise Agreement dated 2 May 1986 as fully implemented by the
Deputy Sheriff, RTC-Br. 18, Manila, pursuant to the final and executory Order dated 14 June 1990 of its Presiding
Judge Perfecto A. S. Laguio, Jr.
SO ORDERED.1âwphi1.nêt
G.R. No. 158802 November 17, 2004
IN RE: THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FOR REYNALDO DE VILLA (detained at the New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa
City)
JUNE DE VILLA, petitioner-relator,
vs.
THE DIRECTOR, NEW BILIBID PRISONS, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus under Rule 102 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner
Reynaldo de Villa, joined by his son, petitioner-relator June de Villa, seeks a two-fold relief: First, that respondent
Director of Prisons justify the basis for the imprisonment of petitioner Reynaldo de Villa; and second, that
petitioner be granted a new trial.1 These reliefs are sought on the basis of purportedly exculpatory evidence,
gathered after performing deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing on samples allegedly collected from the petitioner
and a child born to the victim of the rape.
By final judgment dated February 1, 2001, in People of the Philippines v. Reynaldo de Villa,2 we found petitioner
guilty of the rape of Aileen Mendoza, his niece by affinity; sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusión
perpetua; and ordered him to pay the offended party civil indemnity, moral damages, costs of the suit, and
support for Leahlyn Corales Mendoza, the putative child born of the rape. Petitioner is currently serving his
sentence at the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City.
As summarized in our Decision dated February 1, 2001, Aileen Mendoza charged petitioner Reynaldo de Villa with
rape in an information dated January 9, 1995, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City. When arraigned on
January 26, 1995, petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty."3
During the trial, the prosecution established that sometime in the third week of April 1994, at about 10:00 in the
morning, Aileen Mendoza woke up in her family's rented room in Sagad, Pasig, Metro Manila, to find petitioner on
top of her. Aileen was then aged 12 years and ten months. She was unable to shout for help because petitioner
covered her mouth with a pillow and threatened to kill her. Aileen could not do anything but cry. Petitioner
succeeded in inserting his penis inside her vagina. After making thrusting motions with his body, petitioner
ejaculated. This encounter allegedly resulted in Aileen's pregnancy, which was noticed by her mother, Leonila
Mendoza, sometime in November 1994. When confronted by her mother, Aileen revealed that petitioner raped
her. Aileen's parents then brought her to the Pasig Police Station, where they lodged a criminal complaint against
petitioner.4
Dr. Rosaline Cosidon, who examined Aileen, confirmed that she was eight months pregnant and found in her
hymen healed lacerations at the 5:00 and 8:00 positions. On December 19, 1994, Aileen gave birth to a baby girl
whom she named Leahlyn Mendoza.5
In his defense, petitioner alleged that, at the time of the alleged rape, he was already 67 years old. Old age and
sickness had rendered him incapable of having an erection. He further averred that Aileen's family had been
holding a grudge against him, which accounted for the criminal charges. Finally, he interposed the defense of alibi,
claiming that at the time of the incident, he was in his hometown of San Luis, Batangas.6
The trial court found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified rape, and sentenced him
to death, to indemnify the victim in the amount of P50,000.00, to pay the costs of the suit and to support the child,
Leahlyn Mendoza.7
On automatic review,8 we found that the date of birth of Aileen's child was medically consistent with the time of
the rape. Since it was never alleged that Aileen gave birth to a full-term nine-month old baby, we gave credence to
the prosecution's contention that she prematurely gave birth to an eight-month old baby by normal delivery.9
Thus, we affirmed petitioner's conviction for rape, in a Decision the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of rape, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusión
perpetua and ordered to pay the offended party P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; P50,000.00 as moral damages;
costs of the suit and to provide support for the child Leahlyn Corales Mendoza.
SO ORDERED.10
Three years after the promulgation of our Decision, we are once more faced with the question of Reynaldo de
Villa's guilt or innocence.
Petitioner-relator in this case, June de Villa, is the son of Reynaldo. He alleges that during the trial of the case, he
was unaware that there was a scientific test that could determine once and for all if Reynaldo was the father of the
victim's child, Leahlyn. Petitioner-relator was only informed during the pendency of the automatic review of
petitioner's case that DNA testing could resolve the issue of paternity.11 This information was apparently furnished
by the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG) Anti-Death Penalty Task Force, which took over as counsel for
petitioner.
Thus, petitioner's brief in People v. de Villa sought the conduct of a blood type test and DNA test in order to
determine the paternity of the child allegedly conceived as a result of the rape.12 This relief was implicitly denied in
our Decision of February 21, 2001.
On March 16, 2001, Reynaldo de Villa filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the Decision, wherein he once
more prayed that DNA tests be conducted.13 The Motion was denied with finality in a Resolution dated November
20, 2001.14 Hence, the Decision became final and executory on January 16, 2002.15
Petitioner-relator was undaunted by these challenges. Having been informed that DNA tests required a sample
that could be extracted from saliva, petitioner-relator asked Billy Joe de Villa, a grandson of Reynaldo de Villa and a
classmate of Leahlyn Mendoza, to ask Leahlyn to spit into a new, sterile cup.16 Leahlyn readily agreed and did so.
Billy Joe took the sample home and gave it to the petitioner-relator, who immediately labeled the cup as
"Container A."
Petitioner-relator then gathered samples from four grandchildren of Reynaldo de Villa. These samples were placed
in separate containers with distinguishing labels and temporarily stored in a refrigerator prior to transport to the
DNA Analysis Laboratory at the National Science Research Institute (NSRI).17 During transport, the containers
containing the saliva samples were kept on ice.
Petitioner-relator requested the NSRI to conduct DNA testing on the sample given by Leahlyn Mendoza, those
given by the grandchildren of Reynaldo de Villa, and that given by Reynaldo de Villa himself. The identities of the
donors of the samples, save for the sample given by Reynaldo de Villa, were not made known to the DNA Analysis
Laboratory.18
After testing, the DNA Laboratory rendered a preliminary report on March 21, 2003, which showed that Reynaldo
de Villa could not have sired any of the children whose samples were tested, due to the absence of a match
between the pertinent genetic markers in petitioner's sample and those of any of the other samples, including
Leahlyn's.19
Hence, in the instant petition for habeas corpus, petitioner argues as follows:
DNA ANALYSIS ON PATERNITY SHOWS CONCLUSIVELY THAT PETITIONER DE VILLA IS NOT THE FATHER OF LEAHLYN
MENDOZA; HIS CONVICTION FOR RAPE, BASED ON THE FACT THAT LEAHLYN WAS SIRED AS A RESULT OF THE
ALLEGED RAPE, CANNOT STAND AND MUST BE SET ASIDE.20
xxx xxx xxx
A NEW TRIAL TO CONSIDER NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE IS PROPER AND MAY BE ORDERED BY THIS COURT IN
VIEW OF THE RESULTS OF THE DNA TESTS CONDUCTED.21
Considering that the issues are inter-twined, they shall be discussed together.
In brief, petitioner relies upon the DNA evidence gathered subsequent to the trial in order to re-litigate the factual
issue of the paternity of the child Leahlyn Mendoza. Petitioner alleges that this issue is crucial, considering that his
conviction in 2001 was based on the factual finding that he sired the said child. Since this paternity is now
conclusively disproved, he argues that the 2001 conviction must be overturned.
In essence, petitioner invokes the remedy of the writ of habeas corpus to collaterally attack the 2001 Decision. The
ancillary remedy of a motion for new trial is resorted to solely to allow the presentation of what is alleged to be
newly-discovered evidence. This Court is thus tasked to determine, first, the propriety of the issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus to release an individual already convicted and serving sentence by virtue of a final and executory
judgment; and second, the propriety of granting a new trial under the same factual scenario.
The extraordinary writ of habeas corpus has long been a haven of relief for those seeking liberty from any
unwarranted denial of freedom of movement. Very broadly, the writ applies "to all cases of illegal confinement or
detention by which a person has been deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person has
been withheld from the person entitled thereto".22 Issuance of the writ necessitates that a person be illegally
deprived of his liberty. In the celebrated case of Villavicencio v. Lukban,23 we stated that "[a]ny restraint which will
preclude freedom of action is sufficient."24
The most basic criterion for the issuance of the writ, therefore, is that the individual seeking such relief be illegally
deprived of his freedom of movement or placed under some form of illegal restraint. If an individual's liberty is
restrained via some legal process, the writ of habeas corpus is unavailing. Concomitant to this principle, the writ of
habeas corpus cannot be used to directly assail a judgment rendered by a competent court or tribunal which,
having duly acquired jurisdiction, was not deprived or ousted of this jurisdiction through some anomaly in the
conduct of the proceedings.
Thus, notwithstanding its historic function as the great writ of liberty, the writ of habeas corpus has very limited
availability as a post-conviction remedy. In the recent case of Feria v. Court of Appeals,25 we ruled that review of a
judgment of conviction is allowed in a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus only in very specific
instances, such as when, as a consequence of a judicial proceeding, (a) there has been a deprivation of a
constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person; (b) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence;
or (c) an excessive penalty has been imposed, as such sentence is void as to such excess.26
In this instance, petitioner invokes the writ of habeas corpus to assail a final judgment of conviction, without,
however, providing a legal ground on which to anchor his petition. In fine, petitioner alleges neither the
deprivation of a constitutional right, the absence of jurisdiction of the court imposing the sentence, or that an
excessive penalty has been imposed upon him.
In fine, petitioner invokes the remedy of habeas corpus in order to seek the review of findings of fact long passed
upon with finality. This relief is far outside the scope of habeas corpus proceedings. In the early case of Abriol v.
Homeres,27 for example, this Court stated the general rule that the writ of habeas corpus is not a writ of error, and
should not be thus used. The writ of habeas corpus, whereas permitting a collateral challenge of the jurisdiction of
the court or tribunal issuing the process or judgment by which an individual is deprived of his liberty, cannot be
distorted by extending the inquiry to mere errors of trial courts acting squarely within their jurisdiction. 28 The
reason for this is explained very simply in the case of Velasco v. Court of Appeals:29 a habeas corpus petition
reaches the body, but not the record of the case. 30 A record must be allowed to remain extant, and cannot be
revised, modified, altered or amended by the simple expedient of resort to habeas corpus proceedings.
Clearly, mere errors of fact or law, which did not have the effect of depriving the trial court of its jurisdiction over
the case and the person of the defendant, are not correctible in a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas
corpus; if at all, these errors must be corrected on certiorari or on appeal, in the form and manner prescribed by
law.31 In the past, this Court has disallowed the review of a court's appreciation of the evidence in a petition for
the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, as this is not the function of said writ.32 A survey of our decisions in habeas
corpus cases demonstrates that, in general, the writ of habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ which furnishes an
extraordinary remedy; it may thus be invoked only under extraordinary circumstances.33 We have been categorical
in our pronouncements that the writ of habeas corpus is not to be used as a substitute for another, more proper
remedy. Resort to the writ of habeas corpus is available only in the limited instances when a judgment is rendered
by a court or tribunal devoid of jurisdiction. If, for instance, it can be demonstrated that there was a deprivation of
a constitutional right, the writ can be granted even after an individual has been meted a sentence by final
judgment.
Thus, in the case of Chavez v. Court of Appeals,34 the writ of habeas corpus was held to be available where an
accused was deprived of the constitutional right against self-incrimination. A defect so pronounced as the denial of
an accused's constitutional rights results in the absence or loss of jurisdiction, and therefore invalidates the trial
and the consequent conviction of the accused. That void judgment of conviction may be challenged by collateral
attack, which precisely is the function of habeas corpus.35 Later, in Gumabon v. Director of the Bureau of Prisons,36
this Court ruled that, once a deprivation of a constitutional right is shown to exist, the court that rendered the
judgment is deemed ousted of jurisdiction and habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy to assail the legality of the
detention.37 Although in Feria v. Court of Appeals38 this Court was inclined to allow the presentation of new
evidence in a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, this was an exceptional situation. In that case,
we laid down the general rule, which states that the burden of proving illegal restraint by the respondent rests on
the petitioner who attacks such restraint. Where the return is not subject to exception, that is, where it sets forth a
process which, on its face, shows good ground for the detention of the prisoner, it is incumbent on petitioner to
allege and prove new matter that tends to invalidate the apparent effect of such process.39
In the recent case of Calvan v. Court of Appeals,40 we summarized the scope of review allowable in a petition for
the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus. We ruled that the writ of habeas corpus, although not designed to
interrupt the orderly administration of justice, can be invoked by the attendance of a special circumstance that
requires immediate action. In such situations, the inquiry on a writ of habeas corpus would be addressed, not to
errors committed by a court within its jurisdiction, but to the question of whether the proceeding or judgment
under which a person has been restrained is a complete nullity. The probe may thus proceed to check on the
power and authority, itself an equivalent test of jurisdiction, of the court or the judge to render the order that so
serves as the basis of imprisonment or detention.41 It is the nullity of an assailed judgment of conviction which
makes it susceptible to collateral attack through the filing of a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas
corpus.
Upon a perusal of the records not merely of this case but of People v. de Villa, we find that the remedy of the writ
of habeas corpus is unavailing.
First, the denial of a constitutional right has not been alleged by petitioner. As such, this Court is hard-pressed to
find legal basis on which to anchor the grant of a writ of habeas corpus. Much as this Court sympathizes with
petitioner's plea, a careful scrutiny of the records does not reveal any constitutional right of which the petitioner
was unduly deprived.
We are aware that other jurisdictions have seen fit to grant the writ of habeas corpus in order to test claims that a
defendant was denied effective aid of counsel.42 In this instance, we note that the record is replete with errors
committed by counsel, and it can be alleged that the petitioner was, at trial, denied the effective aid of counsel.
The United States Supreme Court requires a defendant alleging incompetent counsel to show that the attorney's
performance was deficient under a reasonable standard, and additionally to show that the outcome of the trial
would have been different with competent counsel.43 The purpose of the right to effective assistance of counsel is
to ensure that the defendant receives a fair trial.44
The U.S. Supreme Court asserts that in judging any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, one must examine
whether counsel's conduct undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process to such an extent that
the trial did not produce a fair and just result.45 The proper measure of attorney performance is "reasonable"
under the prevailing professional norms, and the defendant must show that the representation received fell below
the objective standard of reasonableness.46 For the petition to succeed, the strong presumption that the counsel's
conduct falls within the wide range or reasonable professional assistance must be overcome.47
In the case at bar, it appears that in the middle of the appeal, the petitioner's counsel of record, a certain Atty.
Alfonso G. Salvador, suddenly and inexplicably withdrew his appearance as counsel, giving the sole explanation
that he was "leaving for the United States for an indefinite period of time by virtue of a petition filed in his
favor."48In the face of this abandonment, petitioner made an impassioned plea that his lawyer be prevented from
this withdrawal in a handwritten "Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and Opposition of Counsel's Withdrawal of
Appearance with Leave of Court" received by this Court on September 14, 1999. 49 Petitioner alleged that his
counsel's withdrawal is an "untimely and heartbreaking event", considering that he had placed "all [his] trust and
confidence on [his counsel's] unquestionable integrity and dignity."50
While we are sympathetic to petitioner's plight, we do not, however, find that there was such negligence
committed by his earlier counsel so as to amount to a denial of a constitutional right. There is likewise no showing
that the proceedings were tainted with any other jurisdictional defect.
In fine, we find that petitioner invokes the remedy of the petition for a writ of habeas corpus to seek a
re-examination of the records of People v. de Villa, without asserting any legal grounds therefor. For all intents and
purposes, petitioner seeks a reevaluation of the evidentiary basis for his conviction. We are being asked to
reexamine the weight and sufficiency of the evidence in this case, not on its own, but in light of the new DNA
evidence that the petitioner seeks to present to this Court. This relief is outside the scope of a habeas corpus
petition. The petition for habeas corpus must, therefore, fail.
Coupled with the prayer for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, petitioner seeks a new trial to re-litigate the
issue of the paternity of the child Leahlyn Mendoza.
It must be stressed that the issue of Leahlyn Mendoza's paternity is not central to the issue of petitioner's guilt or
innocence. The rape of the victim Aileen Mendoza is an entirely different question, separate and distinct from the
question of the father of her child. Recently, in the case of People v. Alberio, 51 we ruled that the fact or not of the
victim's pregnancy and resultant childbirth are irrelevant in determining whether or not she was raped. Pregnancy
is not an essential element of the crime of rape. Whether the child which the victim bore was fathered by the
purported rapist, or by some unknown individual, is of no moment in determining an individual's guilt.
In the instant case, however, we note that the grant of child support to Leahlyn Mendoza indicates that our
Decision was based, at least in small measure, on the victim's claim that the petitioner fathered her child. This
claim was given credence by the trial court, and, as a finding of fact, was affirmed by this Court on automatic
review.
The fact of the child's paternity is now in issue, centrally relevant to the civil award of child support. It is only
tangentially related to the issue of petitioner's guilt. However, if it can be conclusively determined that the
petitioner did not sire Leahlyn Mendoza, this may cast the shadow of reasonable doubt, and allow the acquittal of
the petitioner on this basis.
Be that as it may, it appears that the petitioner once more relies upon erroneous legal grounds in resorting to the
remedy of a motion for new trial. A motion for new trial, under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, is
available only for a limited period of time, and for very limited grounds. Under Section 1, Rule 121, of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, a motion for new trial may be filed at any time before a judgment of conviction
becomes final, that is, within fifteen (15) days from its promulgation or notice. Upon finality of the judgment,
therefore, a motion for new trial is no longer an available remedy. Section 2 of Rule 121 enumerates the grounds
for a new trial:
SEC. 2. Grounds for a new trial.—The court shall grant a new trial on any of the following grounds:
(a) That errors of law or irregularities prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused have been committed
during the trial;
(b) That new and material evidence has been discovered which the accused could not with reasonable diligence
have discovered and produced at the trial and which if introduced and admitted would probably change the
judgment.
In the case at bar, petitioner anchors his plea on the basis of purportedly "newly-discovered evidence", i.e., the
DNA test subsequently conducted, allegedly excluding petitioner from the child purportedly fathered as a result of
the rape.
The decision sought to be reviewed in this petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus has long attained
finality, and entry of judgment was made as far back as January 16, 2002. Moreover, upon an examination of the
evidence presented by the petitioner, we do not find that the DNA evidence falls within the statutory or
jurisprudential definition of "newly- discovered evidence".
A motion for new trial based on newly-discovered evidence may be granted only if the following requisites are met:
(a) that the evidence was discovered after trial; (b) that said evidence could not have been discovered and
produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) that it is material, not merely cumulative,
corroborative or impeaching; and (d) that the evidence is of such weight that that, if admitted, it would probably
change the judgment.52 It is essential that the offering party exercised reasonable diligence in seeking to locate the
evidence before or during trial but nonetheless failed to secure it.53
In this instance, although the DNA evidence was undoubtedly discovered after the trial, we nonetheless find that it
does not meet the criteria for "newly-discovered evidence" that would merit a new trial. Such evidence disproving
paternity could have been discovered and produced at trial with the exercise of reasonable diligence.
Petitioner-relator's claim that he was "unaware" of the existence of DNA testing until the trial was concluded
carries no weight with this Court. Lack of knowledge of the existence of DNA testing speaks of negligence, either
on the part of petitioner, or on the part of petitioner's counsel. In either instance, however, this negligence is
binding upon petitioner. It is a settled rule that a party cannot blame his counsel for negligence when he himself
was guilty of neglect.54 A client is bound by the acts of his counsel, including the latter's mistakes and negligence. 55
It is likewise settled that relief will not be granted to a party who seeks to be relieved from the effects of the
judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own negligence, or to a mistaken mode of
procedure.56
Even with all of the compelling and persuasive scientific evidence presented by petitioner and his counsel, we are
not convinced that Reynaldo de Villa is entitled to outright acquittal. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor
General, even if it is conclusively proven that Reynaldo de Villa is not the father of Leahlyn Mendoza, his conviction
could, in theory, still stand, with Aileen Mendoza's testimony and positive identification as its bases. 57The Solicitor
General reiterates, and correctly so, that the pregnancy of the victim has never been an element of the crime of
rape.58 Therefore, the DNA evidence has failed to conclusively prove to this Court that Reynaldo de Villa should be
discharged. Although petitioner claims that conviction was based solely on a finding of paternity of the child
Leahlyn, this is not the case. Our conviction was based on the clear and convincing testimonial evidence of the
victim, which, given credence by the trial court, was affirmed on appeal.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition for habeas corpus and new trial is DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.