26)

G.R. No. L-56487 October 21, 1991

REYNALDA GATCHALIAN, petitioner,

vs.
ARSENIO DELIM and the HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

FACTS:

Reynalda Gatchalian boarded Thames" mini bus at Aringay, La Union bound for Bauang, of the same
province. The bus bumped a cement flower pot on the side of the road, went off the road, turned turtle
and fell into a ditch. Gatchalian got injured with physical injuries on the leg, arm and forehead

Mrs. Adela Delim visited the passenger and later paid for their hospitalization and medical expenses. She
also gave transportation expense of P12 in going home from the hospital and they were made to sign
a Joint Affidavit stating that they are no longer interested to file a complaint, criminal or civil against the
said driver and owner of the said Thames.

Gatchalian filed in the CFI an action extra contractu to recover compensatory and moral damages stating
that the mishap had left her with a conspicuous white scar measuring 1 by 1/2 inches on the forehead,
generating mental suffering and an inferiority complex on her part. As a result, she had to retire in
seclusion and stay away from her friends scar diminished her facial beauty and deprived her of
opportunities for employment Delim averred that it was a fortuitous event

CFI dismissed because of the Joint Affidavit

ISSUE:

W/N Gatchalian is entitled to damages

HELD:

YES.

A waiver, to be valid and effective, must in the first place be couched in clear and unequivocal terms
which leave no doubt as to the intention of a person to give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to
him.

While reading the same, she experienced dizziness but that, seeing the other passengers who had also
suffered injuries sign the document, she too signed without bothering to read the Joint Affidavit in its
entirety. Considering these circumstances there appears substantial doubt whether petitioner understood
fully the import of the Joint Affidavit

To uphold a supposed waiver of any right to claim damages by an injured passenger, under circumstances
like those exhibited in this case, would be to dilute and weaken the standard of extraordinary diligence
exacted by the law from common carriers and hence to render that standard unenforceable.
To exempt a common carrier from liability for death or physical injuries to passengers upon the ground of
force majeure, the carrier must clearly show not only that the efficient cause of the casualty was entirely
independent of the human will, but also that it was impossible to avoid.

The driver did not stop to check if anything had gone wrong with the bus after the snapping sound

A person is entitled to the physical integrity of his or her body; if that integrity is violated or diminished,
actual injury is suffered for which actual or compensatory damages are due and assessable. Petitioner
Gatchalian is entitled to be placed as nearly as possible in the condition that she was before the mishap. A
scar, especially one on the face of the woman, resulting from the infliction of injury upon her, is a
violation of bodily integrity, giving raise to a legitimate claim for restoration to her conditio ante. If the
scar is relatively small and does not grievously disfigure the victim, the cost of surgery may be expected
to be correspondingly modest.

27)

G.R. Nos. 103442-45 May 21, 1993

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, GAUDENCIO C. RAYO, ET AL., respondents.

Facts:

At the height of the typhoon “Kading”, a flash flood covered the towns near the Angat Dam, causing
deaths and destructions to residents and their properties. Respondents blamed the tragedy to the reckless
and imprudent opening of the 3 floodgates by petitioner, without prior warning to the residents within the
vicinity of the dam. Petitioners denied the allegations and contended that they have kept the water at a
safe level, that the opening of floodgates was done gradually, that it exercises diligence in the selection of
its employees, and that written warnings were sent to the residents. It further contended that there was no
direct causal relationship between the damage and the alleged negligence on their part, that the residents
assumed the risk by living near the dam, and that what happened was a fortuitous event and are of the
nature of damnum absque injuria.

Issues:

Whether the damage suffered by respondents is one of damnum absque injuria

Held:

We cannot give credence to petitioners' third assignment of error that the damage caused by the opening
of the dam was in the nature of damnum absque injuria, which presupposes that although there was
physical damage, there was no legal injury in view of the fortuitous events. There is no question that
petitioners have the right, duty and obligation to operate, maintain and preserve the facilities of Angat
Dam, but their negligence cannot be countenanced, however noble their intention may be. The end does
not justify the means, particularly because they could have done otherwise than simultaneously opening
the spillways to such extent. Needless to say, petitioners are not entitled to counterclaim.

28)

G.R. No. 92087 May 8, 1992

SOFIA FERNANDO, in her behalf and as the legal guardian of her minor children, namely:
ALBERTO & ROBERTO, all surnamed FERNANDO, ANITA GARCIA, NICOLAS LIAGOSO,
ROSALIA BERTULANO, in her behalf and as the legal guardian of her minor children, namely:
EDUARDO, ROLANDO, DANIEL, AND JOCELYN, all surnamed BERTULANO, PRIMITIVA
FAJARDO in her behalf and as legal guardian of her minor children, namely: GILBERT, GLEN,
JOCELYN AND JOSELITO, all surnamed FAJARDO, and EMETERIA LIAGOSO, in her behalf
and as guardian ad litem, of her minor grandchildren, namely: NOEL, WILLIAM, GENEVIEVE
and GERRY, all surnamed LIAGOSO, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND CITY OF DAVAO, respondents.

FACTS:

November 7, 1975: Bibiano Morta, market master of the Agdao Public Market filed a requisition request
with the Chief of Property of the City Treasurer's Office for the re-emptying of the septic tank in Agdao
wherein Bascon won.

November 22, 1975: bidder Bertulano with four other companions namely Joselito Garcia, William
Liagoso, Alberto Fernando and Jose Fajardo, Jr. were found dead inside the septic tank.

The bodies were removed by a fireman. The body of Joselito Garcia, was taken out by his uncle, Danilo
Garcia and taken to the Regional Hospital but he expired there.

The City Engineer's office investigated the case and learned they entered the septic tank without clearance
from it nor with the knowledge and consent of the market master. Since the septic tank was found to be
almost empty, they were presumed to be the ones who did the re-emptying.

Dr. Juan Abear of the City Health Office found them to have died from "asphyxia" - diminution of
oxygen supply in the body and intake of toxic gas.

ISSUE:

W/N Davao city is negligent and its negligence is the proximate cause therefore can be liable for damages

HELD:

Test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case: Did the defendant in doing the
alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have
used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.
Distinction must be made between the accident and the injury

Where he contributes to the principal occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he can not recover

Where, in conjunction with the occurrence, he contributes only to his own injury, he may recover the
amount that the defendant responsible for the event should pay for such injury, less a sum deemed a
suitable equivalent for his own imprudence

Toilets and septic tanks are not nuisances per se as defined in Article 694 of the New Civil Code which
would necessitate warning signs for the protection of the public

While the construction of these public facilities demands utmost compliance with safety and sanitary
requirements, the putting up of warning signs is not one of those requirements

Considering the nature of the task of emptying a septic tank especially one which has not been cleaned for
years, an ordinarily prudent person should undoubtedly be aware of the attendant risks. The victims are no
exception; more so with Mr. Bertulano, an old hand in this kind of service, who is presumed to know the
hazards of the job. His failure, therefore, and that of his men to take precautionary measures for their
safety was the proximate cause of the accident. Proximate and immediate cause of the death of the victims
was due to their own negligence. Consequently, the petitioners cannot demand damages from the public
respondent.

29)

G.R. No. 105410 July 25, 1994

PILIPINAS BANK, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND FLORENCIO REYES, respondents.

Facts:

Florencio Reyes issued postdated checks to Winner Industrial Corporation (20k~) and Vincent Tui (11k~)
as payments for the purchased shoe materials and rubber shoes. To cover the face value of the checks,
Reyes requested PCIB Money Shop’s manager to effect the withdrawal of 32k from his savings account
and have it deposited with his current account with Pilipinas Bank. Roberto Santos was requested to make
the deposit.

In depositing in the name of Reyes, Santos inquired from the teller Reyes’ current account number to
complete the deposit slip he was accomplishing. He was informed that it was “815” so that was the
number he placed on the slip. Noting that the account number coincided with the name “Florencio,” Efren
Alagasi [Pilipinas Bank Current Account Bookkeeper] thought it was for Florencio Amador, so he posted
the deposit in the account of Amador.

The check in favor of Winner was presented for payment. Since Reyes’ ledger indicated that his account
only had 4k~ balance, the check was dishonored. This check was redeposited 4 days later but it was
dishonored again. This also happened with the check issued in Tui’s favor. Tui returned the check to
Reyes and demanded a cash payment of its face value.

Furious over the incident, Reyes proceeded to Pilipinas Bank and urged an immediate verification of his
account. It was then that the bank noticed the error. The 32k posted in Amador’s account was transferred
to Reyes’ account upon being cleared by the former that he did not effect a deposit of 32k. The bank then
honored the check.

Issue:

W/n proximate cause of injury was alagasi’s negligence in erroneously posting reyes’ cash deposit in the
name of another depositor having the same first name

Held:

Yes

For NCC 2179 to apply, it must be established that Reyes’ own negligence was the immediate and
proximate cause of his injury.

Proximate cause – any cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the result complained of and without which would not have occurred and
from which it ought to have been foreseen or reasonably anticipated by a person of ordinary case that the
injury complained of or some similar injury, would result therefrom as a natural and probable
consequence.

Alagasi failed to exercise degree of care required in the performance of his duties. He posted the cash
deposit in Amador’s account from the assumption that the name Florencio appearing on the ledger
without going through the full name, is the same Florencio stated in the deposit slip

He should have continuously gone beyond mere assumption and proceeded with clear certainty,
considering the amount involved and the repercussions it would create --> checks issued by Reyes were
dishonored because his ledger indicated an insufficient balance.

30)

FILOMENO URBANO, petitioner,

vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Facts:

On October 23, 1980, petitioner Filomeno Urbano was on his way to his ricefield. He found the place
where he stored palay flooded with water coming from the irrigation canal. Urbano went to the elevated
portion to see what happened, and there he saw Marcelino Javier and Emilio Efre cutting grass. Javier
admitted that he was the one who opened the canal. A quarrel ensued, and Urbano hit Javier on the right
palm with his bolo, and again on the leg with the back of the bolo. On October 27, 1980, Urbano and
Javier had an amicable settlement. Urbano paid P700 for the medical expenses of Javier. On November
14, 1980, Urbano was rushed to the hospital where he had lockjaw and convulsions. The doctor found the
condition to be caused by tetanus toxin which infected the healing wound in his palm. He died the
following day. Urbano was charged with homicide and was found guilty both by the trial court and on
appeal by the Court of Appeals. Urbano filed a motion for new trial based on the affidavit of the Barangay
Captain who stated that he saw the deceased catching fish in the shallow irrigation canals on November 5.
The motion was denied; hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether the wound inflicted by Urbano to Javier was the proximate cause of the latter’s death

Held:

If the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by tetanus germs at the time, it is
more medically probable that Javier should have been infected with only a mild cause of tetanus because
the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd dayafter the hacking incident or more than 14 days after
the infliction of the wound. Therefore, the onset time should have been more than six days. Javier,
however, died on the second day from theonset time. The more credible conclusion is that at the time
Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant, the severe form of tetanus that killed him was not yet
present. Consequently, Javier's wound could have been infected with tetanus after the hacking incident.
Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's death, his wound could have been infected by tetanus 2
or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died.

The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the wounds
inflicted upon him by the accused. And since we are dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the
accused caused the victim's death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. The medical
findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an
efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The
infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime.

There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its subsequent infection, for failure to
take necessary precautions, with tetanus may have been the proximate cause of Javier's death with which
the petitioner had nothing to do. "A prior and remote cause cannot be made the be of an action if such
remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury
was made possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct,
successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have happened
but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except because of the
independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or
defective condition sets into operation the instances which result in injury because of the prior defective
condition, such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause."
31)

FAR EASTERN SHIPPING COMPANY, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPELAS and PHILIPPINE
PORTS AUTHORITY, respondents.

FACTS:
M/V PAVLODAR, owned and operated by the Far Eastern Shipping Company (FESC), arrived at the
Port of Manila and was assigned Berth 4 of the Manila International Port, as its berthing space. Gavino,
who was assigned by the Appellant Manila Pilots' Association to conduct the docking maneuvers for the
safe berthing, boarded the vessel at the quarantine anchorage and stationed himself in the bridge, with the
master of the vessel, Victor Kavankov, beside him. After a briefing of Gavino by Kavankov of the
particulars of the vessel and its cargo, the vessel lifted anchor from the quarantine anchorage and
proceeded to the Manila International Port. The sea was calm and the wind was ideal for docking
maneuvers. When the vessel reached the landmark, one-half mile from the pier, Gavino ordered the
engine stopped. When the vessel was already about 2,000 feet from the pier, Gavino ordered the anchor
dropped. Kavankov relayed the orders to the crew of the vessel on the bow. The left anchors, with two (2)
shackles, were dropped. However, the anchor did not take hold as expected. The speed of the vessel did
not slacken. A commotion ensued between the crew members. After Gavino noticed that the anchor did
not take hold, he ordered the engines half-astern. Abellana, who was then on the pier apron, noticed that
the vessel was approaching the pier fast. Kavankov likewise noticed that the anchor did not take hold.
Gavino thereafter gave the "full-astern" code. Before the right anchor and additional shackles could be
dropped, the bow of the vessel rammed into the apron of the pier causing considerable damage to the pier
as well as the vessel.

ISSUES:
(1) Is the pilot of a commercial vessel, under compulsory pilotage, solely liable for the damage caused by
the vessel to the pier, at the port of destination, for his negligence?;
(2) Would the owner of the vessel be liable likewise if the damage is caused by the concurrent negligence
of the master of the vessel and the pilot under a compulsory pilotage?

HELD:
(1) Generally speaking, the pilot supersedes the master for the time being in the command and navigation
of the ship, and his orders must be obeyed in all matters connected with her navigation. He becomes the
master pro hac vice and should give all directions as to speed, course, stopping and reversing anchoring,
towing and the like. And when a licensed pilot is employed in a place where pilotage is compulsory, it is
his duty to insist on having effective control of the vessel, or to decline to act as pilot. Under certain
systems of foreign law, the pilot does not take entire charge of the vessel, but is deemed merely the
adviser of the master, who retains command and control of the navigation even in localities where
pilotage is compulsory. It is quite common for states and localities to provide for compulsory pilotage,
and safety laws have been enacted requiring vessels approaching their ports, with certain exceptions, to
take on board pilots duly licensed under local law. The purpose of these laws is to create a body of
seamen thoroughly acquainted with the harbor, to pilot vessels seeking to enter or depart, and thus protect
life and property from the dangers of navigation. Upon assuming such office as compulsory pilot, Capt.
Gavino is held to the universally accepted high standards of care and diligence required of a pilot,
whereby he assumes to have skill and knowledge in respect to navigation in the particular waters over
which his license extends superior to and more to be trusted than that of the master. He is not held to the
highest possible degree of skill and care, but must have and exercise the ordinary skill and care demanded
by the circumstances, and usually shown by an expert in his profession. Under extraordinary
circumstances, a pilot must exercise extraordinary care. In this case, Capt. Gavino failed to measure up to
such strict standard of care and diligence required of pilots in the performance of their duties. As pilot, he
should have made sure that his directions were promptly and strictly followed.

(2) The negligence on the part of Capt. Gavino is evident; but Capt. Kabancov is no less responsible for
the allision. The master is still in command of the vessel notwithstanding the presence of a pilot. A
perusal of Capt. Kabankov's testimony makes it apparent that he was remiss in the discharge of his duties
as master of the ship, leaving the entire docking procedure up to the pilot, instead of maintaining watchful
vigilance over this risky maneuver. The owners of a vessel are not personally liable for the negligent acts
of a compulsory pilot, but by admiralty law, the fault or negligence of a compulsory pilot is imputable to
the vessel and it may be held liable therefore in rem. Where, however, by the provisions of the statute the
pilot is compulsory only in the sense that his fee must be paid, and is not in compulsory charge of the
vessel, there is no exemption from liability. Even though the pilot is compulsory, if his negligence was
not the sole cause of the injury, but the negligence of the master or crew contributed thereto, the owners
are liable. But the liability of the ship in rem does not release the pilot from the consequences of his own
negligence. The master is not entirely absolved of responsibility with respect to navigation when a
compulsory pilot is in charge. Except insofar as their liability is limited or exempted by statute, the vessel
or her owners are liable for all damages caused by the negligence or other wrongs of the owners or those
in charge of the vessel. As a general rule, the owners or those in possession and control of a vessel and the
vessel are liable for all natural and proximate damages caused to persons or property by reason of her
negligent management or navigation.

32)

ESTANISLAWA CANLAS, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
CHAN LIN PO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.

Facts:

June 11 1951: Juanito Chan, son of Chan Lin Po and Remedios Diala, drove and operated a motor vehicle
(a truck) along Rizal Ave Ext, Manila in a reckless and imprudent manner thereby causing to hit Nicolas
Paras, 65 yo, and ran over his head, crushing it, resulting to his instantaneous death; facs revealed that the
truck was registered in the name of Lim Koo.
At the initial stage of the criminal trial, Petitioner, Estanislawa Canlas (widow of Nicolas, representing
also 5 minor children), made a reservation to file a separate civil action.

Trial Court rendered Juanito is guilty, serve sentence of 1yr-8mos, plus 5K indeminity.

In the civil action, same facts were alleged. Defendants disclaimed liability by establishing that Juanito is
married and is no longer a minor living in the company of his parents, and that he is also not an employee
of Lim Koo. Thus, Neither Juanito’s parents can be made liable under vicarious liability (2180 of the
NCC) nor the owner of vehicle be the subsidiary liable under 103 of the RPC.

Civil action was dismissed, since petitioner already tried to execute the indemnity adjudged in the
criminal action and Juanito already served subsidiary imprisonment by virtue of his inability to pay
indemnity. Petitioner insists on the liability of parents and truck owner. MR denied, hence this petition.

Issue:

W/N Respondents can be made liable over the civil liability of Juanito?

Held:

NO.

Art. 2180 par 5 of the NCC (primary liab-vicarious liability) only applies if the offender is a MINOR
LIVING in the COMPANY of his PARENTS. In this case, Juanito was already married and lives
independently from his parents

Art 103 of the RPC (subsidiary liability) only attaches if EER between the owner and offender is
established and that the act happened while he was discharging his duties (as employee). In this case, no
evidence was presented to establish such relationship.

The civil complaint was confused with the nature of liability to charge (103 or 2180). Court however
clarified that the lower court erred when they adjudged that the civil action is barred by res judicata. The
civil action from criminal action and independent civil action are of different nature and purpose. The 2
cases affect different parties. In the independent civil action, subsidiary and vicarious liability were being
established. Nevertheless, since 2180 of

NCC and 103 of RPC was inapplicable, the action was still dismissed.

33)

CRESENCIO LIBI * and AMELIA YAP LIBI, Petitioners, v. HON. INTERMEDIATE

APPELLATE COURT, FELIPE GOTIONG and SHIRLEY GOTIONG, Respondents.

FACTS:
Wendell Libi (Wendell) , son of petitioners, and Julie Ann Gotiong (Julie Ann), the daughter of private
respondent spouses, were sweethearts until Julie broke up with Wendell upon finding out of his sadistic
and irresponsible character.

Wendell tried hard to reconcile with Julie Ann but when the latter refused, Wendell started making
threats. On that fateful day of January 14, 1978, Julie Ann and Wendell died from a single gunshot wound
each coming from the same Smith and Wesson revolver licensed in the name of petitioner Cresencio Libi
(Cresencio).

There being no eyewitnesses to the crime, petitioners and private respondents herein advanced conflicting
versions of the case. Private respondents claimed that with the use of the same gun, Wendell took his own
life after killing Julie Ann. On the other hand, the petitioners argued that an unknown third party, whom
Wendell may have displeased by reason of his work as a narcotic informant, must have caused the death
of Wendell and Julie Ann.

As a result of the death of Julie Ann, private respondents filed an action to recover damages arising from
the vicarious liability of the parents of Wendell (petitioners herein) under Article 2180 of the New Civil
Code. After trial, the case was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. Likewise, the counterclaim filed
by the petitioners was dismissed for lack of merit.

On appeal lodged by private respondents, the respondent court set aside the dismissal of the case and held
petitioners liable under Art. 2180 of the NCC. Hence this case. Herein petitioners seek for the reversal of
judgment of requiring them to pay P30,000.00 for moral damages, P10,000.00 for exemplary damages,
P20,000.00 as attorney's fees and costs.

ISSUE:

Are petitioners liable for vicarious liability under Art 2180 of the NCC?

HELD:

The Libi spouses are and should be held primarily liable for the civil liability arising from criminal
offenses committed by their minor son under their legal authority or control, and who lives in their
company.

Petitioners Libi failed to prove that they had exercised due diligence of a good father of a family over
their son Wendell as shown by the fact that it was only when Wendell died that petitioners came to know
that their son Wendell was a Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit (CANU) agent and that the gun of
petitioner Cresencio Bili was missing from their safety deposit box. Petitioners are indeed liable under
Art. 2180 of the NCC because it is still the duty of the parents to know the activity of their children and,
in this case, had the petitioners been diligent in supervising the activities of Wendell and in keeping said
gun from his reach, the death of Julie and Wendell could have been prevented.

Petitioners are indeed liable under Art. 2180 of the NCC because it is still the duty of the parents to know
the activity of their children and, in this case, had the petitioners been diligent in supervising the activities
of Wendell and in keeping said gun from his reach, the death of Julie and Wendell could have been
prevented. The liability of the parents for damages caused by their children imposed under Article 2180
of the New Civil Code covers obligation arising from both quasi delict and criminal offenses.

34)

G.R. No. L-14342 May 30, 1960

CIRIACO L. MERCADO, petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, MANUEL QUISUMBING, JR., ET AL., respondents.

FACTS:

Augusto Mercado and Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. are both pupils of the Lourdes Catholic School, Kanlaon,
Quezon City. A ‘pitogo’ (an empty nutshell used by children as a piggy bank) belonged to Augusto
Mercado but he lent it to Benedicto Lim and in turn Benedicto lent it to Renato Legaspi. Renato was not
aware that the ‘pitogo’ belonged to Augusto. Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. thought it was Benedicto’s, so
when Augusto attempted to get the ‘pitogo’ from Renato, Manuel, Jr. told him not to do so because
Renato was better at putting the chain into the holes of the ‘pitogo’. Augusto resented his remark and
pushed Manuel, Jr., which started the fight. After successive blows to Manuel, Jr., Augusto cut him on the
right cheek with a piece of razor.

Manuel, Jr. and his father filed a complaint against Ciriaco Mercado, Augusto’s father.

ISSUE:

W/N the teacher or head of the school should be held responsible instead of the father since the incident
occurred in the school during recess time, through no fault of the father.

HELD:

NO. CHILDREN WERE NOT IN THEIR CUSTODY.

Petitioner rests his claim on the last paragraph of Art. 2180 of the Civil Code: “Lastly, teachers or heads
of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or
apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.”

That clause contemplates a situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher, such that the
control, direction and influence on the pupil supersede those of the parents.

In these circumstances the control or influence over the conduct and actions of the pupil would pass from
the father and mother to the teacher; and so would the responsibility for the torts of the pupil.

Such a situation does not appear in the case at bar; the pupils appear to go to school during school hours
and go back to their homes with their parents after school is over.
35)

ST. FRANCIS HIGH SCHOOL, as represented by SPS. FERNANDO NANTES AND ROSARIO
LACANDULA, BENJAMIN ILUMIN, TIRSO DE CHAVEZ, LUISITO VINAS, CONNIE
ARQUIO AND PATRIA CADIZ, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ELEVENTH DIVISION and DR. ROMULO
CASTILLO and LILIA CADIZ, respondents.

FACTS:

Ferdinand Castillo, a 13-year-old freshman student of Section 1-C at the St. Francis High School (SFHS)
wanted to join a school picnic at Talaan Beach, Sariaya, Quezon. However, his parents, Dr. Romulo
Castillo and Lilia Castillo, because of short notice, did not allow him.

He was only allowed to bring food (adobo) to the teachers for the picnic. However, the teachers
persuaded him to go with them to the beach.

During the picnic, a teacher was apparently drowning. Some students, including Ferdinand, came to her
rescue, but in the process, it was Ferdinand himself who drowned. He was brought to Mt. Cannel General
Hospital but was pronounced dead on arrival.

Ferdinand’s parents filed a case for damages against SFHS and the teachers.

The CA declared that the teachers failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family to guard
against the foreseen harm. Also, SFHS and principal Benjamin Illumin was declared jointly and solidarily
liable with the teachers for the death of Ferdinand, under Art 2180.

ISSUE:

WON the school SFHS, principal and teachers were liable for the death of Ferdinand?

HELD:

NO. Petitioners were able to prove that they had exercised the required diligence.

It is the rule in Art 2180 that the negligence of the employees in causing the injury or damage gives rise to
a presumption of negligence on the part of SFHS and its principal; and while this presumption is not
conclusive, it may be overthrown only by clear and convincing proof that the owner and/or manager
(SFHS and principal) exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and/or
supervision of the employee or employees causing the injury or damage (in this case, the defendants-
teachers).

“The obligation imposed by Art 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also
for those of persons for whom one is responsible.”

“Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting
within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or
industry.”
SC found that CA committed an error in applying Art 2180 of the Civil Code in rendering SFHS liable for
the death of respondent's son.

SC found that the teachers are neither guilty of their own negligence nor guilty of the negligence of those
under them. Consequently they cannot be held liable for damages of any kind.

At the outset, it should be noted that respondent spouses, parents of the victim Ferdinand, allowed their
son to join the excursion. The fact that he gave money to his son to buy food for the picnic even without
knowing where it will be held, is a sign of consent for his son to join the same.

In the case at bar, the teachers were not in the actual performance of their assigned tasks. The incident
happened outside the school premises, not on a school day and most importantly while the teachers and
students were holding a purely private affair, a picnic. This picnic had no permit from the school head or
its principal, because this picnic is not a school-sanctioned activity or an extra-curricular activity. Mere
knowledge by the principal of the planning of the picnic by the students and teachers does not in any way
show acquiescence or consent to the holding of the same.

It was shown that Connie Arquio, the class adviser of I-C, did her best and exercised diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent any untoward incident or damages to all the students who joined the picnic.

a. Connie invited co-petitioners Tirso de Chavez (who conducted first aid on Ferdinand) and Luisito
Vinas who are both P.E. instructors and scout masters who have knowledge in First Aid
application and swimming.
b. Even respondents' witness, Segundo Vinas, testified that the teachers brought life savers in case
of emergency.
c. The records also show that both petitioners Chavez and Vinas did all what is humanly possible to
save the child.

Moreover, as already pointed out hereinabove, the teachers are not guilty of any fault or negligence,
hence, no moral damages can be assessed against them.

36)

ERNESTO MARTIN, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, respondents.

Facts:

Ernesto Martin was the owner of a private car bearing license plate No. NPA-930. At around 2 o’clock in
the morning of May 11, 1982, while being driven by Nestor Martin, it crashed into a Meralco electric post
on Valley Golf Road, in Antipolo, Rizal. The car was wrecked and the pole severely damaged. Meralco
subsequently demanded reparation from Ernesto Martin, but the demand was rejected. It thereupon sued
him for damages in the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, alleging that he was liable to it as the employer of
Nestor Martin. The petitioner’s main defense was that Nestor Martin was not his employee. Meralco did
not present any evidence to prove that Nestor Martin was
the employee of Ernesto Martin and Ernesto Martin did not rebut such allegation.

Issues:

Who bears the burden of proving employer-employee relationship between the owner of the car and the
driver at the time of the accident?

Whether or not engaged in any business or industry, the employer under Article 2180 is liable for torts

Held:

HE WHO ALLEGES MUST PROVE HIS ALLEGATION! MERALCO had the burden of proof, or the
duty to present evidence on the fact in issue necessary to establish his claim as required by Rule 131, Sec
1 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Whether or not engaged in any business or industry, the employer under Article 2180 is liable for torts
provided the following are shown: (1) employment relationship and (2) employee was acting within the
scope of his assigned task when the tort complained of was committed.

No evidence whatsoever was adduced by MERALCO to show the employment relationship. Trial court
merely presumed its existence. It even shifted the burden to Ernesto by saying that “he did not present any
proof to substantiate his allegation.”

Although the law recognizes presumption juris (law) or presumption hominis (fact), both are not
applicable in the case at bar. There is no law directing the deduction made by the courts below from the
particular facts presented to them by the parties. Neither is there a sufficient base from the facts proved, or
not denied for the inference that the petitioner is the employer of Nestor.

The case of Amor v. Soberano was missaplied because the vehicle involved in that case was a 6x6 truck,
which reasonably raised the factual presumption that it was engaged in business and that its driver was
employed by the owner of the vehicle.

37)

G.R. No. 116617. November 16, 1998

METRO MANILA TRANSIT CORPORATION (MMTC), PEDRO A. MUSA, CONRADO

TOLENTINO, FELICIANA CELEBRADO and THE GOVERNMENTSERVICE
INSURANCE SYSTEM, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, SPS. RODOLFO V. ROSALES
and LILY ROSALES, respondents.
Facts:
MMTC is the operator of a fleet of passenger buses within the Metro Manila area and Musa was its driver
. The spouses Rosales were parents of Liza Rosalie, a third-year high school student at the University of
the Philippines Integrated School.

At around a quarter past one in the afternoon of August 9, 1986, MMTC Bus No. 27, which was driven
by Musa, hit Liza Rosalie who was then crossing Katipunan Avenue in Quezon City. An eye witness said
the girl was already near the center of the street when the bus, then bound for the south, hit her. She fell to
the ground upon impact, rolled between the two front wheels of the bus, and was run over by the left rear
tires thereof. Her body was dragged several meters away from the point of impact. Liza Rosalie was
taken to the Philippine Heart Center, but efforts to revive her proved futile.

Pedro Musa was found guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. However, for the civil
liability, Souses Rosales filed an independent civil action for damages against MMTC, Musa, MMTC
Acting General Manager Conrado Tolentino, and the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS).
They subsequently amended their complaint to include Feliciana Celebrado, a dispatcher of the MMTC,
as a defendant therein.

To free themselves from liability, petitioners attempted to prove that it exercise diligentissimi patris
familias in the selcetion and supervision of employees through oral evidence.

Issue:
Whether or not MMTC is solidarily liable with Musa.

Held:
Yes!
Petitioner’s attempt to prove its diligentissimi patris familias in the selection and supervision of
employees through oral evidence must fail as it was unable to buttress the same with any other evidence,
object or documentary, which might obviate the apparent biased nature of the testimony.

Although, MMTC submitted brochures and programs of seminars for prospective employees on vehicle
maintenance, traffic regulations, and driving skills and claimed that applicants are given tests to determine
driving skills, concentration, reflexes, and vision, there is no record that Musa attended such training
programs and passed the said examinations before he was employed. No proof was presented that Musa
did not have any record of traffic violations. Nor were records of daily inspections, allegedly conducted
by supervisors, ever presented.

The failure of the defendant company to produce in court any record or other documentary proof tending
to establish that it had exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of its drivers and buses, notwithstanding the calls therefor by both the trial court and the
opposing counsel, argues strongly against its pretensions.

As already stated, MMTC is primarily liable for damages for the negligence of its employee in view of
Art. 2180. Pursuant to Art. 2181, it can recover from its employee what it may pay. This does not make
the employee’s liability subsidiary. It only means that if the judgment for damages is satisfied by the
common carrier, the latter has a right to recover what it has paid from its employee who committed the
fault or negligence which gave rise to the action based on quasi-delict. Hence, the spouses Rosales have
the option of enforcing the judgment against either MMTC or Musa.

Rationale for Imposing Vicarious liability

What has emerged as the modern justification for vicarious liability is a rule of policy, a deliberate
allocation of a risk. The losses caused by the torts of employees, which as a practical matter are sure to
occur in the conduct of the employer’s enterprise, are placed upon that enterprise itself, as a required cost
of doing business. They are placed upon the employer because, having engaged in an enterprise, which
will on the basis of all past experience involve harm to others through the tort of employees, and sought
to profit by it, it is just that he, rather than the innocent injured plaintiff, should bear them; and because he
is better able to absorb them, and to distribute them, through prices, rates or liability insurance, to the
public, and so to shift them to society, to the community at large. Added to this is the makeweight
argument that an employer who is held strictly liable is under the greatest incentive to be careful in the
selection, instruction and supervision of his servants, and to take every precaution to see that the
enterprise is conducted safely.