THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 162267. July 4, 2008.]

PCI LEASING AND FINANCE, INC., petitioner, vs. UCPB

GENERAL INSURANCE CO., INC., respondent.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J : p

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, seeking a reversal of the Decision 1(1) of the Court of Appeals (CA)
dated December 12, 2003 affirming with modification the Decision of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City which ordered petitioner and Renato Gonzaga
(Gonzaga) to pay, jointly and severally, respondent the amount of P244,500.00 plus
interest; and the CA Resolution 2(2) dated February 18, 2004 denying petitioner's
Motion for Reconsideration. TSIDaH

The facts, as found by the CA, are undisputed:

On October 19, 1990 at about 10:30 p.m., a Mitsubishi Lancer car with
Plate Number PHD-206 owned by United Coconut Planters Bank was traversing
the Laurel Highway, Barangay Balintawak, Lipa City. The car was insured with
plaintiff-appellee [UCPB General Insurance Inc.], then driven by Flaviano Isaac
with Conrado Geronimo, the Asst. Manager of said bank, was hit and bumped
by an 18-wheeler Fuso Tanker Truck with Plate No. PJE-737 and Trailer Plate
No. NVM-133, owned by defendants-appellants PCI Leasing & Finance, Inc.
allegedly leased to and operated by defendant-appellant Superior Gas &
Equitable Co., Inc. (SUGECO) and driven by its employee, defendant appellant
Renato Gonzaga.

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 The impact caused heavy damage to the Mitsubishi Lancer car resulting
in an explosion of the rear part of the car. The driver and passenger suffered
physical injuries. However, the driver defendant-appellant Gonzaga continued
on its [sic] way to its [sic] destination and did not bother to bring his victims to
the hospital. CacEID

Plaintiff-appellee paid the assured UCPB the amount of P244,500.00

representing the insurance coverage of the damaged car.

As the 18-wheeler truck is registered under the name of PCI Leasing,

repeated demands were made by plaintiff-appellee for the payment of the
aforesaid amounts. However, no payment was made. Thus, plaintiff-appellee
filed the instant case on March 13, 1991. 3(3)

PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc., (petitioner) interposed the defense that it could
not be held liable for the collision, since the driver of the truck, Gonzaga, was not its
employee, but that of its co-defendant Superior Gas & Equitable Co., Inc. (SUGECO).
4(4) In fact, it was SUGECO, and not petitioner, that was the actual operator of the

truck, pursuant to a Contract of Lease signed by petitioner and SUGECO. 5(5)

Petitioner, however, admitted that it was the owner of the truck in question. 6(6)

After trial, the RTC rendered its Decision dated April 15, 1999, 7(7) the
dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in

favor of plaintiff UCPB General Insurance [respondent], ordering the defendants
PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc., [petitioner] and Renato Gonzaga, to pay jointly
and severally the former the following amounts: the principal amount of
P244,500.00 with 12% interest as of the filing of this complaint until the same is
paid; P50,000.00 as attorney's fees; and P20,000.00 as costs of suit. DHTECc

SO ORDERED. 8(8)

Aggrieved by the decision of the trial court, petitioner appealed to the CA.

In its Decision dated December 12, 2003, the CA affirmed the RTC's decision,
with certain modifications, as follows:

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision dated April 15, 1999 is hereby

AFFIRMED with modification that the award of attorney's fees is hereby
deleted and the rate of interest shall be six percent (6%) per annum computed
from the time of the filing of the complaint in the trial court until the finality of
the judgment. If the adjudged principal and the interest remain unpaid thereafter,
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 the interest rate shall be twelve percent (12%) per annum computed from the
time the judgment becomes final and executory until it is fully satisfied.

SO ORDERED. 9(9)

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which the CA denied in its

Resolution dated February 18, 2004.

Hence, herein Petition for Review.

The issues raised by petitioner are purely legal:

Whether petitioner, as registered owner of a motor vehicle that figured in

a quasi-delict may be held liable, jointly and severally, with the driver thereof,
for the damages caused to third parties. aSADIC

Whether petitioner, as a financing company, is absolved from liability by

the enactment of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8556, or the Financing Company Act
of 1998.

Anent the first issue, the CA found petitioner liable for the damage caused by
the collision since under the Public Service Act, if the property covered by a franchise
is transferred or leased to another without obtaining the requisite approval, the transfer
is not binding on the Public Service Commission and, in contemplation of law, the
grantee continues to be responsible under the franchise in relation to the operation of
the vehicle, such as damage or injury to third parties due to collisions. 10(10)

Petitioner claims that the CA's reliance on the Public Service Act is misplaced,
since the said law applies only to cases involving common carriers, or those which
have franchises to operate as public utilities. In contrast, the case before this Court
involves a private commercial vehicle for business use, which is not offered for
service to the general public. 11(11)

Petitioner's contention has partial merit, as indeed, the vehicles involved in the
case at bar are not common carriers, which makes the Public Service Act inapplicable.
cSEAHa

However, the registered owner of the vehicle driven by a negligent driver may
still be held liable under applicable jurisprudence involving laws on compulsory
motor vehicle registration and the liabilities of employers for quasi-delicts under the
Civil Code.

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 The principle of holding the registered owner of a vehicle liable for
quasi-delicts resulting from its use is well-established in jurisprudence. Erezo v. Jepte,
12(12) with Justice Labrador as ponente, wisely explained the reason behind this
principle, thus:

Registration is required not to make said registration the operative act by

which ownership in vehicles is transferred, as in land registration cases, because
the administrative proceeding of registration does not bear any essential relation
to the contract of sale between the parties (Chinchilla vs. Rafael and Verdaguer,
39 Phil. 888), but to permit the use and operation of the vehicle upon any public
highway (section 5 [a], Act No. 3992, as amended). The main aim of motor
vehicle registration is to identify the owner so that if any accident happens, or
that any damage or injury is caused by the vehicle on the public highways,
responsibility therefor can be fixed on a definite individual, the registered
owner. Instances are numerous where vehicles running on public highways
caused accidents or injuries to pedestrians or other vehicles without positive
identification of the owner or drivers, or with very scant means of identification.
It is to forestall these circumstances, so inconvenient or prejudicial to the public,
that the motor vehicle registration is primarily ordained, in the interest of the
determination of persons responsible for damages or injuries caused on public
highways. STCDaI

"'One of the principal purposes of motor vehicles legislation is

identification of the vehicle and of the operator, in case of accident; and
another is that the knowledge that means of detection are always
available may act as a deterrent from lax observance of the law and of
the rules of conservative and safe operation. Whatever purpose there
may be in these statutes, it is subordinate at the last to the primary
purpose of rendering it certain that the violator of the law or of the rules
of safety shall not escape because of lack of means to discover him'. The
purpose of the statute is thwarted, and the displayed number becomes a
'snare and delusion', if courts would entertain such defenses as that put
forward by appellee in this case. No responsible person or corporation
could be held liable for the most outrageous acts of negligence, if they
should be allowed to place a 'middleman' between them and the public,
and escape liability by the manner in which they recompense their
servants". (King vs. Brenham Automobile Co., 145 S.W. 278, 279).

With the above policy in mind, the question that defendant-appellant

poses is: should not the registered owner be allowed at the trial to prove who the
actual and real owner is, and in accordance with such proof escape or evade
responsibility and lay the same on the person actually owning the vehicle? We
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 hold with the trial court that the law does not allow him to do so; the law, with
its aim and policy in mind, does not relieve him directly of the responsibility
that the law fixes and places upon him as an incident or consequence of
registration. Were a registered owner allowed to evade responsibility by proving
who the supposed transferee or owner is, it would be easy for him, by collusion
with others or otherwise, to escape said responsibility and transfer the same to
an indefinite person, or to one who possesses no property with which to respond
financially for the damage or injury done. A victim of recklessness on the public
highways is usually without means to discover or identify the person actually
causing the injury or damage. He has no means other than by a recourse to the
registration in the Motor Vehicles Office to determine who is the owner. The
protection that the law aims to extend to him would become illusory were the
registered owner given the opportunity to escape liability by disproving his
ownership. If the policy of the law is to be enforced and carried out, the
registered owner should not be allowed to prove the contrary to the prejudice of
the person injured, that is, to prove that a third person or another has become the
owner, so that he may thereby be relieved of the responsibility to the injured
person. SICDAa

The above policy and application of the law may appear quite harsh and
would seem to conflict with truth and justice. We do not think it is so. A
registered owner who has already sold or transferred a vehicle has the recourse
to a third-party complaint, in the same action brought against him to recover for
the damage or injury done, against the vendee or transferee of the vehicle. The
inconvenience of the suit is no justification for relieving him of liability; said
inconvenience is the price he pays for failure to comply with the registration that
the law demands and requires.

In synthesis, we hold that the registered owner, the defendant-appellant

herein, is primarily responsible for the damage caused to the vehicle of the
plaintiff-appellee, but he (defendant-appellant) has a right to be indemnified by
the real or actual owner of the amount that he may be required to pay as damage
for the injury caused to the plaintiff-appellant. 13(13)

The case is still good law and has been consistently cited in subsequent cases.
14(14) Thus, there is no good reason to depart from its tenets. ACTESI

For damage or injuries arising out of negligence in the operation of a motor

vehicle, the registered owner may be held civilly liable with the negligent driver either
1) subsidiarily, if the aggrieved party seeks relief based on a delict or crime under
Articles 100 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code; or 2) solidarily, if the complainant
seeks relief based on a quasi-delict under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code. It
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 is the option of the plaintiff whether to waive completely the filing of the civil action,
or institute it with the criminal action, or file it separately or independently of a
criminal action; 15(15) his only limitation is that he cannot recover damages twice for
the same act or omission of the defendant. 16(16)

In case a separate civil action is filed, the long-standing principle is that the
registered owner of a motor vehicle is primarily and directly responsible for the
consequences of its operation, including the negligence of the driver, with respect to
the public and all third persons. 17(17) In contemplation of law, the registered owner of
a motor vehicle is the employer of its driver, with the actual operator and employer,
such as a lessee, being considered as merely the owner's agent. 18(18) This being the
case, even if a sale has been executed before a tortious incident, the sale, if
unregistered, has no effect as to the right of the public and third persons to recover
from the registered owner. 19(19) The public has the right to conclusively presume that
the registered owner is the real owner, and may sue accordingly. 20(20)

In the case now before the Court, there is not even a sale of the vehicle
involved, but a mere lease, which remained unregistered up to the time of the
occurrence of the quasi-delict that gave rise to the case. Since a lease, unlike a sale,
does not even involve a transfer of title or ownership, but the mere use or enjoyment
of property, there is more reason, therefore, in this instance to uphold the policy
behind the law, which is to protect the unwitting public and provide it with a definite
person to make accountable for losses or injuries suffered in vehicular accidents. 21(21)
This is and has always been the rationale behind compulsory motor vehicle
registration under the Land Transportation and Traffic Code and similar laws, which,
as early as Erezo, has been guiding the courts in their disposition of cases involving
motor vehicular incidents. It is also important to emphasize that such principles apply
to all vehicles in general, not just those offered for public service or utility. 22(22)

The Court recognizes that the business of financing companies has a legitimate
and commendable purpose. 23(23) In earlier cases, it considered a financial lease or
financing lease a legal contract, 24(24) though subject to the restrictions of the so-called
Recto Law or Articles 1484 and 1485 of the Civil Code. 25(25) In previous cases, the
Court adopted the statutory definition of a financial lease or financing lease, as: SCHIac

[A] mode of extending credit through a non-cancelable lease contract

under which the lessor purchases or acquires, at the instance of the lessee,
machinery, equipment, motor vehicles, appliances, business and office
machines, and other movable or immovable property in consideration of the
periodic payment by the lessee of a fixed amount of money sufficient to
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 amortize at least seventy (70%) of the purchase price or acquisition cost,
including any incidental expenses and a margin of profit over an obligatory
period of not less than two (2) years during which the lessee has the right to hold
and use the leased property, . . . but with no obligation or option on his part to
purchase the leased property from the owner-lessor at the end of the lease
contract. 26(26)

Petitioner presented a lengthy discussion of the purported trend in other

jurisdictions, which apparently tends to favor absolving financing companies from
liability for the consequences of quasi-delictual acts or omissions involving
financially leased property. 27(27) The petition adds that these developments have been
legislated in our jurisdiction in Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8556, 28(28) which provides:

Section 12. Liability of lessors. — Financing companies shall not be

liable for loss, damage or injury caused by a motor vehicle, aircraft, vessel,
equipment, machinery or other property leased to a third person or entity except
when the motor vehicle, aircraft, vessel, equipment or other property is operated
by the financing company, its employees or agents at the time of the loss,
damage or injury. IHCDAS

Petitioner's argument that the enactment of R.A. No. 8556, especially its
addition of the new Sec. 12 to the old law, is deemed to have absolved petitioner from
liability, fails to convince the Court.

These developments, indeed, point to a seeming emancipation of financing

companies from the obligation to compensate claimants for losses suffered from the
operation of vehicles covered by their lease. Such, however, are not applicable to
petitioner and do not exonerate it from liability in the present case.

The new law, R.A. No. 8556, notwithstanding developments in foreign

jurisdictions, do not supersede or repeal the law on compulsory motor vehicle
registration. No part of the law expressly repeals Section 5 (a) and (e) of R.A. No.
4136, as amended, otherwise known as the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, to
wit:

Sec. 5. Compulsory registration of motor vehicles. — (a) All

motor vehicles and trailer of any type used or operated on or upon any highway
of the Philippines must be registered with the Bureau of Land Transportation
(now the Land Transportation Office, per Executive Order No. 125, January 30,
1987, and Executive Order No. 125-A, April 13, 1987) for the current year in
accordance with the provisions of this Act. ECDAcS

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 xxx xxx xxx

(e) Encumbrances of motor vehicles. — Mortgages, attachments, and

other encumbrances of motor vehicles, in order to be valid against third
parties must be recorded in the Bureau (now the Land Transportation Office).
Voluntary transactions or voluntary encumbrances shall likewise be properly
recorded on the face of all outstanding copies of the certificates of registration
of the vehicle concerned.

Cancellation or foreclosure of such mortgages, attachments, and other

encumbrances shall likewise be recorded, and in the absence of such
cancellation, no certificate of registration shall be issued without the
corresponding notation of mortgage, attachment and/or other encumbrances.

xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied)

Neither is there an implied repeal of R.A. No. 4136. As a rule, repeal by implication is
frowned upon, unless there is clear showing that the later statute is so irreconcilably
inconsistent and repugnant to the existing law that they cannot be reconciled and made
to stand together. 29(29) There is nothing in R.A. No. 4136 that is inconsistent and
incapable of reconciliation. EIAScH

Thus, the rule remains the same: a sale, lease, or financial lease, for that matter,
that is not registered with the Land Transportation Office, still does not bind third
persons who are aggrieved in tortious incidents, for the latter need only to rely on the
public registration of a motor vehicle as conclusive evidence of ownership. 30(30) A
lease such as the one involved in the instant case is an encumbrance in contemplation
of law, which needs to be registered in order for it to bind third parties. 31(31) Under
this policy, the evil sought to be avoided is the exacerbation of the suffering of victims
of tragic vehicular accidents in not being able to identify a guilty party. A contrary
ruling will not serve the ends of justice. The failure to register a lease, sale, transfer or
encumbrance, should not benefit the parties responsible, to the prejudice of innocent
victims.

The non-registration of the lease contract between petitioner and its lessee
precludes the former from enjoying the benefits under Section 12 of R.A. No. 8556.

This ruling may appear too severe and unpalatable to leasing and financing
companies, but the Court believes that petitioner and other companies so situated are
not entirely left without recourse. They may resort to third-party complaints against
their lessees or whoever are the actual operators of their vehicles. In the case at bar,
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 there is, in fact, a provision in the lease contract between petitioner and SUGECO to
the effect that the latter shall indemnify and hold the former free and harmless from
any "liabilities, damages, suits, claims or judgments" arising from the latter's use of
the motor vehicle. 32(32) Whether petitioner would act against SUGECO based on
this provision is its own option. EIcSDC

The burden of registration of the lease contract is minuscule compared to the

chaos that may result if registered owners or operators of vehicles are freed from such
responsibility. Petitioner pays the price for its failure to obey the law on compulsory
registration of motor vehicles for registration is a pre-requisite for any person to even
enjoy the privilege of putting a vehicle on public roads.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated December 12,

2003 and Resolution dated February 18, 2004 of the Court of Appeals are
AFFIRMED. cADEHI

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Ynares-Santiago, Chico-Nazario, Nachura and Reyes, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1. Penned by Associate Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria with the concurrence of Associate
Justices Mercedes Gozo-Dadole and Rosmari D. Carandang, rollo, pp. 41-47. HCITAS

2. Id. at 49.
3. Rollo, p. 42.
4. Id. at 72.
5. Id. at 72-73.
6. Id. at 72.
7. Id. at 52-56.
8. Id. at 56.
9. Id. at 47.
10. Id. at 44-45.
11. Id. at 21-22.
12. 102 Phil. 103 (1957).
13. Id. at 108-110.
14. Equitable Leasing Corp. v. Suyom, 437 Phil. 244, 256 (2002); Aguilar v. Commercial
Savings Bank, 412 Phil. 834, 841 (2001); Spouses Hernandez v. Spouses Dolor, 479
Phil. 593, 603 (2004).
15. RULES OF COURT, Rule 111, Sec. 1, par. (a), sub-par. 1.
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 16. CIVIL CODE, Art. 2177.
17. Equitable Leasing Corp. v. Suyom, supra note 14, at 255; First Malayan Leasing and
Finance Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 91378, June 9, 1992, 209 SCRA 660,
663.
18. Equitable Leasing Corp. v. Suyom, supra 14, at 255, citing First Malayan Leasing
and Finance Corp. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 17; MYC-Agro-Industrial Corp. v.
Camerino, 217 Phil. 11, 17 (1984); and Vargas v. Langcay, 116 Phil. 478, 481-482
(1962). aTcESI

The only known exception to the rule is that enunciated in FGU Insurance Corp. v.
Court of Appeals, 351 Phil. 219, 225 (1998), where it was held that a rent-a-car
company is not liable for the damages caused by the negligence of its lessee, who
drove the subject vehicle. Here, it was established that between a rent-a-car company
and a client who drove a leased vehicle, there was a clear absence of vinculum juris as
employer and employee.
19. Equitable Leasing Corp. v. Suyom, supra; note 14, at 255; First Malayan Leasing
and Finance Corp. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 17, at 664.
20. First Malayan Leasing and Finance Corp. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 17, at 664.
21. Erezo v. Jepte, supra note 12, at 108.
22. Erezo v. Jepte, supra note 12, at 107; Equitable Leasing Corp. v. Suyom, supra note
14, at 256; BA Finance Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 98275, November 13,
1992, 215 SCRA 715, 720.
23. PCI Leasing and Finance Inc. v. Giraffe-X Creative Imaging Inc., G.R. No. 142618,
July 12, 2007, 527 SCRA 405, 420-421.
24. Cebu Contractors Consortium Co. v. Court of Appeals, 454 Phil. 650, 656 (2003).
25. Elisco Tools Manufacturing Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 367 Phil. 242, 255 (1999);
PCI Leasing and Finance Inc. v. Giraffe-X Creative Imaging Inc., supra note 23, at
424-426. TAIEcS

26. Republic Act No. 5980 (1969), as amended by Republic Act No. 8556 (1998), Sec. 3
(d), quoted in Cebu Contractors Consortium Co. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 24,
at 657; PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. v. Giraffe-X Creative Imaging Inc., supra note
23, at 416.
27. Rollo, pp. 29-30.
28. Amending R.A. No. 5980, or the old Financing Company Act.
29. Agujetas v. Court of Appeals, 329 Phil. 721, 745 (1996).
30. First Malayan Leasing and Finance Corp. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 17, at 664.
31. Roxas v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 92245, June 26, 1991, 198 SCRA 541, 546; also
Black's Law Dictionary (abridged 5th edition) defines an encumbrance as "any right
to, or interest in, land which may subsist in another to diminution of its value, but
consistent with the passing of the fee. A claim, lien, charge, or liability attached to
and binding real property; e.g. a mortgage; judgment lien; mechanic's lien; lease;
security interest; easement of right of way; accrued and unpaid taxes". (Emphasis
supplied).
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 32. Exhibit "1-A", records, p. 359. DcCEHI

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 Endnotes

1 (Popup - Popup)
1. Penned by Associate Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria with the concurrence of Associate
Justices Mercedes Gozo-Dadole and Rosmari D. Carandang, rollo, pp. 41-47.

2 (Popup - Popup)
2. Id. at 49.

3 (Popup - Popup)
3. Rollo, p. 42.

4 (Popup - Popup)
4. Id. at 72.

5 (Popup - Popup)
5. Id. at 72-73.

6 (Popup - Popup)
6. Id. at 72.

7 (Popup - Popup)
7. Id. at 52-56.

8 (Popup - Popup)
8. Id. at 56.

9 (Popup - Popup)

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 9. Id. at 47.

10 (Popup - Popup)
10. Id. at 44-45.

11 (Popup - Popup)
11. Id. at 21-22.

12 (Popup - Popup)
12. 102 Phil. 103 (1957).

13 (Popup - Popup)
13. Id. at 108-110.

14 (Popup - Popup)
14. Equitable Leasing Corp. v. Suyom, 437 Phil. 244, 256 (2002); Aguilar v. Commercial
Savings Bank, 412 Phil. 834, 841 (2001); Spouses Hernandez v. Spouses Dolor, 479
Phil. 593, 603 (2004).

15 (Popup - Popup)
15. RULES OF COURT, Rule 111, Sec. 1, par. (a), sub-par. 1.

16 (Popup - Popup)
16. CIVIL CODE, Art. 2177.

17 (Popup - Popup)
17. Equitable Leasing Corp. v. Suyom, supra note 14, at 255; First Malayan Leasing and
Finance Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 91378, June 9, 1992, 209 SCRA 660,
663.
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 18 (Popup - Popup)
18. Equitable Leasing Corp. v. Suyom, supra 14, at 255, citing First Malayan Leasing and
Finance Corp. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 17; MYC-Agro-Industrial Corp. v.
Camerino, 217 Phil. 11, 17 (1984); and Vargas v. Langcay, 116 Phil. 478, 481-482
(1962).
The only known exception to the rule is that enunciated in FGU Insurance Corp. v.
Court of Appeals, 351 Phil. 219, 225 (1998), where it was held that a rent-a-car
company is not liable for the damages caused by the negligence of its lessee, who
drove the subject vehicle. Here, it was established that between a rent-a-car company
and a client who drove a leased vehicle, there was a clear absence of vinculum juris as
employer and employee.

19 (Popup - Popup)
19. Equitable Leasing Corp. v. Suyom, supra; note 14, at 255; First Malayan Leasing and
Finance Corp. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 17, at 664.

20 (Popup - Popup)
20. First Malayan Leasing and Finance Corp. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 17, at 664.

21 (Popup - Popup)
21. Erezo v. Jepte, supra note 12, at 108.

22 (Popup - Popup)
22. Erezo v. Jepte, supra note 12, at 107; Equitable Leasing Corp. v. Suyom, supra note
14, at 256; BA Finance Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 98275, November 13,
1992, 215 SCRA 715, 720.

23 (Popup - Popup)
23. PCI Leasing and Finance Inc. v. Giraffe-X Creative Imaging Inc., G.R. No. 142618,
July 12, 2007, 527 SCRA 405, 420-421.

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 24 (Popup - Popup)
24. Cebu Contractors Consortium Co. v. Court of Appeals, 454 Phil. 650, 656 (2003).

25 (Popup - Popup)
25. Elisco Tools Manufacturing Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 367 Phil. 242, 255 (1999);
PCI Leasing and Finance Inc. v. Giraffe-X Creative Imaging Inc., supra note 23, at
424-426.

26 (Popup - Popup)
26. Republic Act No. 5980 (1969), as amended by Republic Act No. 8556 (1998), Sec. 3
(d), quoted in Cebu Contractors Consortium Co. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 24,
at 657; PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. v. Giraffe-X Creative Imaging Inc., supra note
23, at 416.

27 (Popup - Popup)
27. Rollo, pp. 29-30.

28 (Popup - Popup)
28. Amending R.A. No. 5980, or the old Financing Company Act.

29 (Popup - Popup)
29. Agujetas v. Court of Appeals, 329 Phil. 721, 745 (1996).

30 (Popup - Popup)
30. First Malayan Leasing and Finance Corp. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 17, at 664.

31 (Popup - Popup)
31. Roxas v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 92245, June 26, 1991, 198 SCRA 541, 546; also
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 Black's Law Dictionary (abridged 5th edition) defines an encumbrance as "any right
to, or interest in, land which may subsist in another to diminution of its value, but
consistent with the passing of the fee. A claim, lien, charge, or liability attached to
and binding real property; e.g. a mortgage; judgment lien; mechanic's lien; lease;
security interest; easement of right of way; accrued and unpaid taxes". (Emphasis
supplied).

32 (Popup - Popup)
32. Exhibit "1-A", records, p. 359.

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