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Carbon Trading 0109 2
Carbon Trading 0109 2
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Tax Issues Relating to Trading Cop
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In Carbon Emissions Rights Mat
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By Matthew P. Haskins .
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All
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Matthew P. Haskins is a director with the rese
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Washing-ton National Tax Services office of II
Pricewaterhouse-Coopers LLP and a member of
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the firm’s steering committee on climate change
and sustainability. Con
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As part of global efforts to reduce emissions of
greenhouse gasses, several governments either I. re
e
have already adopted or are considering adopting a n
system of tradable permits for carbon dioxide O h
emissions, and many observers anticipate ri o
Congress will give serious consideration to adopting gi u
a similar system in the United States. ‘‘Green n s
trading’’ in carbon dioxide emissions rights or other s e
environmental attributes poses significant technical o G
f a
tax issues both for U.S. taxpayers who participate in ‘ s
existing programs and for policymakers C R
contemplating the design of a U.S.-based trading a e
system. This report describes the devel-oping p d
spectrum of green tradables and outlines some of - u
the most significant tax issues that should be a ct
addressed both to facilitate existing trading systems n io
and to ensure that tax concerns do not impede the d n
environmental policy objectives of proposed trading - E
systems. T ff
r o
The author would like to thank Lauren Janosy of a rt
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP for her significant d s
con-tributions to this report and Chip Harter, Peter e’ .
Merrill, and Constance Skidmore, each of . .
Pricewaterhouse-Coopers LLP, for their support . .
and helpful comments. Any errors or omissions, . .
however, remain the sole responsibility of the . .
. .
author.
382 61. Carbon Trading Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . e
. 383
1. European Union Allowances
is
Exchanges . . . .. .. . . .
. . . . . . 383 su
es
2. Credits From Developing
Countries . . . . 384 pr
es
3. Verified Emissions
Reductions . . . . . . . . 384 en
te
4. Regional Greenhouse Gas
d
Initiative . . . . 384
by
38 VI.
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IV. The Emerging Spectrum of ‘Green 5 m
T ra d a b le s ’. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .. .. .VII.
at
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V. Secondary Markets for Carbon Credits . . . ch
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either have already adopted or are considering 2
adopting a system of tradable permits for carbon 00
dioxide emissions, frequently known as ‘‘cap-and- 9.
trade’’ or ‘‘carbon trading.’’ Because President-elect A
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Obama and most key members of the Democratic ig
Con-gressional leadership team now publicly support hts
cap-and-trade legislation, many observers anticipate re
Congress will give serious consideration to such se
legisla-tion in 2009. r
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While the science and environmental policy behind d
carbon trading have been hotly debated, few policymak- .T
ers have focused on the technical tax issues presented ax
by existing environmental trading systems or the need to A
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consider tax issues when designing carbon trading or al
y
other green trading systems for potential future imple- st
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mentation. The discussion below seeks to highlight a d
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number of tax issues that must be resolved to ensure e
that s
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As an alternative to cap-and-trade programs, many econo- g
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mists have recommended implementing a direct tax on carbon ti
emissions or fuels that contain carbon, arguing that a tax can n
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achieve comparable environmental outcomes while providing n
greater stability in the ‘‘carbon price’’ than a trading system y
p
does. Several European countries and two Canadian provinces u a
have implemented carbon taxes. See Carbon Tax Act of 2008, bl ic rt
y
Statutes of British Columbia, Chapter 40 (May 29, 2008); d c
Sidhartha Banerjee, ‘‘Quebec Starts Green Tax,’’ The Toronto o m o
n
Star (Oct. 2, 2007); EPA National Center for Environmental ai t
Econom-ics, ‘‘Economic Incentives for Pollution Control,’’ n e
o n
available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/ee/epa/eed.nsf/Webpages/ rt t.
hi
EconomicIncentivesPollutionControl.html (summarizing car-bon r
taxes imposed in Finland, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, d
p
Poland, and Sweden).
381
COMMENTARY / SPECIAL REPORT multilateral agreement to impose binding obligations on certain
ratifying countries to limit (and, in most instances, actually reduce) (
tax issues do not impede or distort the environmental policies their GhG emissions. The Kyoto Protocol covers emissions of six C
GhGs — CO2, methane, nitrous oxide, hyrdofluoro-carbons,
underlying either existing or proposed cap-and-trade systems.2
perfluorocarbons, and sulfur hexafluoride — and establishes )
I. Origins of ‘Cap-and-Trade’ reduction commitments for each.
Carbon credits are only one portion of an emerging spectrum The Kyoto Protocol distinguishes between ‘‘Annex I’’ parties T
of ‘‘green tradables,’’ and, indeed, they are not even the first (typically, developed nations) and other parties (typically,
such instrument. By putting a market price on pollutiondeveloping nations). Under the Kyoto Proto-col, Annex I a
emissions or other environmental harm, ‘‘green trading’’signatories have agreed to binding reduction targets for GhGs
schemes aim to force market participants to factor into privatethat generally are intended to reduce emissions so that by 2012 x
decision-making costs that previ-ously were passed off to their annual emissions are no more than 95 percent of those
society as economic externali-ties. emissions in 1990. In contrast, other parties do not face binding A
Under the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1991, the GhG reduction targets but may be incentivized to participate in
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) developed a program ofthe UN’s ‘‘Clean Development Mechanism’’ (as described in n
tradable permits for sulfur dioxide (SOx) and nitrogen oxide more detail below).
al
(NOx) intended to control acid rain pol-lution. Effective in 1995, The Kyoto Protocol effectively fixes the amounts of GhGs to
the Acid Rain Program created a number of air basins in whichbe emitted by each Annex I party between 2008 and 2012. y
overall emissions of SOx and NOx were subject to a regulatory Although the Kyoto Protocol covers six GhGs, measurement
cap. The EPA issues allowances to utilities within each air basinand trading is based on metric tons of CO 2-equivalent st
to emit a certain number of tons of SOx or NOx. Those emissions. The Kyoto Protocol contem-plates that these national
allowances may be traded, with the intention of minimizing theallocations of ‘‘assigned allow-ance units’’ will be suballocated s
private sector cost of achieving emissions reduction targets. by each ratifying Annex I country to private businesses
Example: Utility A and Utility B both operate in the Losoperating within its borders in certain economic sectors, 2
Angeles air basin. Utility A can reduce its SOx emissions at a including agricul-ture, utilities, manufacturing, energy, and
cost of $80 per ton. Utility B also can reduce its SOx emissions, transportation. A private business that has been allocated or 0
but at a cost of $120 per ton. Under traditional ‘‘command and otherwise obtained emissions units (for example, through
control’’ regulation, if Utility A and Utility B each were required to trading) must surrender units to the relevant national 0
reduce emissions by a ton, the aggregate cost of compliancegovernment agency for cancellation in amounts equal to its
would be $200. Under the Acid Rain trading program, it isemissions. A private emitter’s failure to meet required emissions 9
possible for Utility A to reduce its emissions by two tons and selllevels is expected to result in a fine for the amount of pollution
its excess allowance to Utility B. In this case, the aggregate cost emitted in excess of the emissions credits the party surrenders. .
of compliance would be reduced by 20 percent to $160. Additional units can be created through three mecha-nisms.
The cap-and-trade mechanism in the Acid Rain Pro-gram isRemoval units are created by actions of Annex I governments, A
widely regarded as successful in reducing the costs of pollutionsuch as reforestation projects, and cannot be traded in private
control. In fact, the Government Ac-countability Office hasmarkets. Emission reduction units (ERUs) are created through llr
estimated that cost of pollution control under the Acid Rain‘‘Joint Implementation’’ (JI) projects that either reduce or absorb
Program was cut in half by using a trading mechanism rather GhG emissions in Annex I countries. Certified emission ig
than command and control regulation.3 reduction units
h
e
2
For an overview of those issues from an academic commen-tator, see r
Jonathan R. Nash, ‘‘Taxes and the Success of Non-Tax Market-Bassed
Environmental Regulatory Regimes,’’ University of Chicago John M. Olin
Law & Economics Working Paper No. 412 (2d Series) (July 2008). v
3
See, e.g., General Accounting Office, ‘‘Overview and Issues on
e
Emissions Allowance Trading Programs,’’ GAO/T-RCED-97-183 (July 1997).
This agency has been renamed the Government Accountability Office.
d
.
system.4 The UNFCCC was the first international treaty to focus
on the harmful environmental effects of GhGs, including carbon T
dioxide (CO2). Binding limits on GhG emissions were adopted in
the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC. As of October 16, 2008, 182 a
countries have ratified or otherwise adopted the Kyoto Protocol.
Of the initial signatories, only the United States and Kazakhstan x
have not yet ratified the protocol.5
The Kyoto Protocol entered into force on February 16, 2005, and A
its first binding commitment period for GhG reductions started on
January 1, 2008, and ends on December 31, 2012. It is the first n
al n
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6 e
Kyoto Protocol, Article 6(1).
7
The full text of the Marrakesh Accords may be found on the UNFCCC’s
Web site available at http://unfccc.int/cop7/ documents/accords_draft.pdf. d
8
See http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/emission/
emission_plans.htm. .
COMMENTARY / SPECIAL REPORT
T
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The International Emissions Trading Association is a non-profit
organization composed of 175 member companies that seeks to establish v
an international framework for trading in GhG emissions reductions. See
http://www.ieta.org/ieta/ www/pages/index.php?IdSitePage=1152. e
11
The Gold Standard Foundation is an outgrowth of efforts by the WWF
(formerly known as the World Wildlife Federation) to facilitate voluntary GhG d
emissions reductions. See http:// www.cdmgoldstandard.org/index.php.
.
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B. Treatment as an Intangible x
On June 20, 2008, the IRS released its first private letter ruling
A
on carbon trading issues. In LTR 200825009,43 the IRS considered
a situation in which a taxpayer’s EU affiliate was granted allowances n
under the EU-ETS and sold off its surplus allowances. The IRS
ruled that the taxpayer need not treat the income from those sales al
as current subpart F inclusions on the grounds that the allowances
y a
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D. Treatment as an Expense T
In some cases, it may be appropriate to analogize the costs of 47For example, in LTR 200813009 (Mar. 28, 2008), Doc 2008-6844,
acquiring carbon credits (particularly VERs) to other section 1622008 TNT 62-35, the IRS ruled that when a resort hotel’s intangibles such as a
expenses. For example, in Rev. Rul. 2000-4,46 the IRS addressedits trade names, brand names, and goodwill were ‘‘inextricably linked’’ with
the tax treatment of costs incurred by companies to obtain, the real estate so that those intangibles could be treated as ‘‘real estate x
maintain, and renew certification under ISO 9000, a series ofassets’’ and the license fees from those intangibles would qualify as ‘‘rents
international standards for quality management systems. While ISOfrom real property’’ for purposes of section 856(c). However, no similar A
guidance has been issued regarding carbon credits.
9000 certification is often a contractual requirement for doing
business with many organizations, it is never-theless voluntary (that n
is, not required by any govern-mental authority). The IRS concluded
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that the costs related to ISO 9000 certification, except to the extent
they create an asset with a useful life substantially beyond the y
current tax year (for example, a quality manual), can be deducted in (
the year incurred, reasoning that ‘‘the ben-efits derived from ISO st
9000 certification are akin to the current benefits derived from C
advertising, training, and similar expenditures incurred in . . . s
improving the over-all quality or attractiveness of the taxpayer’s )
business operations.’’ Similar arguments can be made regarding the d
purchase of VERs. Depending on the nature of the underlying VER T
project or issuer, it also may be possible to analogize the purchase o
a
of a VER to a charitable contribution that is deductible under section
170. e
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E. Treatment for Special Entities s
The current-law treatment of carbon credits in the hands of A
certain special entities under the code also is unclear. For example, n
n
if an environmentally oriented tax-exempt organization undertakes a
project within its exempt purpose that also generates carbon credits, o
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it is unclear whether the sale of those credits may give rise to
tc
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46
2000-1 C.B. 331, Doc 2000-1084, 2000 TNT 5-3. i
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2
unrelated business taxable income. Similarly, although the IRS
has shown some flexibility in defining the term ‘‘real property’’ for c
0
real estate investment trust testing purposes, it is unclear
whether carbon credits qualify as ‘‘real property’’ for purposes of o
0
applying the 75 percent asset test applicable to REITs under
p
section 856(c)(3).47 9
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VIII. Conclusion .
Even in the absence of U.S. federal climate change ri
A
legislation, many U.S.-based companies and investors have
crossed the green frontier into trading in both compliance- g
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oriented and voluntary carbon markets. These activities raise a
host of federal income tax issues that are difficult for clients and h
ig
their advisers to resolve at strong levels of comfort under
existing authorities. While the issuance of PLR 200825009 ti
h
represents a useful start by the IRS in coming to grips with
carbon trading, more guidance will be required to facilitate both n
ts
U.S.-based carbon trading and the participation of U.S.-based
firms in existing cap-and-trade systems. a
r
Looking ahead, because President-elect Obama and many n
leaders in Congress have publicly supported cap-and-trade e
legislation, many observers anticipate Con-gress will give y
serious consideration to such legislation soon. A review of s
p
bl
ic
ai
rt
hi
rt
o
e
n
n
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t.