Integrated information theory

Integrated information theory (IIT) attempts to explain what consciousness is

and why it might be associated with certain physical systems. Given any such
system, the theory predicts whether that system is conscious, to what degree it is
conscious, and what particular experience it is having (see Central identity).
According to IIT, a system's consciousness is determined by its causal properties
[1]
and is therefore an intrinsic, fundamental property of any physical system.

IIT was proposed by neuroscientist Giulio Tononi in 2004, and has been
continuously developed over the past decade. The latest version of the theory,
labeled IIT 3.0, was published in 2014.[2][3]

Phi, the symbol for integrated

Contents information.

Overview
Relationship to the "hard problem of consciousness"
Axioms: essential properties of experience
Postulates: properties required of the physical substrate
Mathematics: formalization of the postulates
Cause-effect space
Central identity
Extensions
Related experimental work
Reception
Support
Criticism
See also
References
External links
Related papers
Websites
Software
Books
News articles
Talks

Overview

Relationship to the "hard problem of consciousness"

David Chalmers has argued that any attempt to explain consciousness in purely physical terms (i.e. to start with the laws of physics as
they are currently formulated and derive the necessary and inevitable existence of consciousness) eventually runs into the so-called
"hard problem". Rather than try to start from physical principles and arrive at consciousness, IIT "starts with consciousness" (accepts
the existence of consciousness as certain) and reasons about the properties that a postulated physical substrate would have to have in
order to account for it. The ability to perform this jump from phenomenology to mechanism rests on IIT's assumption that if a
conscious experience can be fully accounted for by an underlying physical system, then the properties of the physical system must be
constrained by the properties of the experience.

Specifically, IIT moves from phenomenology to mechanism by attempting to identify the essential properties of conscious experience
(dubbed "axioms") and, from there, the essential properties of conscious physical systems (dubbed "postulates").

Axioms: essential properties of experience

The axioms are intended to capture the essential aspects of every conscious
experience. Every axiom should apply to every possible experience.

The wording of the axioms has changed slightly as the theory has developed, and the
most recent and complete statement of the axioms is as follows:

“ Intrinsic existence: Consciousness exists:

each experience is actual—indeed, that my
”
experience here and now exists (it is real) is
the only fact I can be sure of immediately
and absolutely. Moreover, my experience
exists from its own intrinsic perspective,
independent of external observers (it is
intrinsically real or actual).
Composition: Consciousness is structured:
each experience is composed of multiple Axioms and postulates of integrated
phenomenological distinctions, elementary information theory.
or higher-order. For example, within one
experience I may distinguish a book, a blue
color, a blue book, the left side, a blue book
on the left, and so on.
Information: Consciousness is specific:
each experience is the particular way it is—
being composed of a specific set of specific
phenomenal distinctions—thereby differing
from other possible experiences
(differentiation). For example, an experience
may include phenomenal distinctions
specifying a large number of spatial
locations, several positive concepts, such as
a bedroom (as opposed to no bedroom), a
bed (as opposed to no bed), a book (as
opposed to no book), a blue color (as
opposed to no blue), higher-order "bindings"
of first-order distinctions, such as a blue
book (as opposed to no blue book), as well
as many negative concepts, such as no bird
(as opposed to a bird), no bicycle (as
opposed to a bicycle), no bush (as opposed
to a bush), and so on. Similarly, an
experience of pure darkness and silence is
the particular way it is—it has the specific
quality it has (no bedroom, no bed, no book,
no blue, nor any other object, color, sound,
thought, and so on). And being that way, it
necessarily differs from a large number of
 alternative experiences I could have had but
I am not actually having.
Integration: Consciousness is unified: each
experience is irreducible to non-
interdependent, disjoint subsets of
phenomenal distinctions. Thus, I experience
a whole visual scene, not the left side of the
visual field independent of the right side
(and vice versa). For example, the
experience of seeing the word "BECAUSE"
written in the middle of a blank page is
irreducible to an experience of seeing "BE"
on the left plus an experience of seeing
"CAUSE" on the right. Similarly, seeing a
blue book is irreducible to seeing a book
without the color blue, plus the color blue
without the book.
Exclusion: Consciousness is definite, in
content and spatio-temporal grain: each
experience has the set of phenomenal
distinctions it has, neither less (a subset) nor
more (a superset), and it flows at the speed
it flows, neither faster nor slower. For
example, the experience I am having is of
seeing a body on a bed in a bedroom, a
bookcase with books, one of which is a blue
book, but I am not having an experience
with less content—say, one lacking the
phenomenal distinction blue/not blue, or
colored/not colored; or with more content—
say, one endowed with the additional
phenomenal distinction high/low blood
pressure. Moreover, my experience flows at
a particular speed—each experience
encompassing say a hundred milliseconds
or so—but I am not having an experience
that encompasses just a few milliseconds or
instead minutes or hours.
— Dr. Giulio Tononi, Scholarpedia[3]

Postulates: properties required of the physical substrate

The axioms describe regularities in conscious experience, and IIT seeks to explain these regularities. What could account for the fact
that every experience exists, is structured, is differentiated, is unified, and is definite? IIT argues that the existence of an underlying
causal system with these same properties offers the most parsimonious explanation. Thus a physical system, if conscious, is so by
virtue of its causal properties.

The properties required of a conscious physical substrate are called the "postulates," since the existence of the physical substrate is
itself only postulated (remember, IIT maintains that the only thing one can be sure of is the existence of one's own consciousness). In
what follows, a "physical system" is taken to be a set of elements, each with two or more internal states, inputs that influence that
state, and outputs that are influenced by that state (neurons or logic gates are the natural examples). Given this definition of "physical
system", the postulates are:

“ Intrinsic existence: To account for the intrinsic existence of experience, a ”

system constituted of elements in a state must exist intrinsically (be actual):
specifically, in order to exist, it must have cause-effect power, as there is no
point in assuming that something exists if nothing can make a difference to it, or
if it cannot make a difference to anything. Moreover, to exist from its own
intrinsic perspective, independent of external observers, a system of elements in
a state must have cause-effect power upon itself, independent of extrinsic
factors. Cause-effect power can be established by considering a cause-effect
space with an axis for every possible state of the system in the past (causes)
and future (effects). Within this space, it is enough to show that an "intervention"
that sets the system in some initial state (cause), keeping the state of the
elements outside the system fixed (background conditions), can lead with
probability different from chance to its present state; conversely, setting the
system to its present state leads with probability above chance to some other
state (effect).
Composition: The system must be structured: subsets of the elements
constituting the system, composed in various combinations, also have cause-
effect power within the system. Thus, if a system ABC is constituted of elements
A, B, and C, any subset of elements (its power set), including A, B, C, AB, AC,
BC, as well as the entire system, ABC, can compose a mechanism having
cause-effect power. Composition allows for elementary (first-order) elements to
form distinct higher-order mechanisms, and for multiple mechanisms to form a
structure.
Information: The system must specify a cause-effect structure that is the
particular way it is: a specific set of specific cause-effect repertoires—thereby
differing from other possible ones (differentiation). A cause-effect repertoire
characterizes in full the cause-effect power of a mechanism within a system by
making explicit all its cause-effect properties. It can be determined by perturbing
the system in all possible ways to assess how a mechanism in its present state
makes a difference to the probability of the past and future states of the system.
Together, the cause-effect repertoires specified by each composition of elements
within a system specify a cause-effect structure. ...
Integration: The cause-effect structure specified by the system must be unified:
it must be intrinsically irreducible to that specified by non-interdependent sub-
systems obtained by unidirectional partitions. Partitions are taken unidirectionally
to ensure that cause-effect power is intrinsically irreducible—from the system's
intrinsic perspective—which implies that every part of the system must be able
to both affect and be affected by the rest of the system. Intrinsic irreducibility can
be measured as integrated information ("big phi" or , a non-negative number),
which quantifies to what extent the cause-effect structure specified by a system's
elements changes if the system is partitioned (cut or reduced) along its minimum
partition (the one that makes the least difference). By contrast, if a partition of
the system makes no difference to its cause-effect structure, then the whole is
reducible to those parts. If a whole has no cause-effect power above and
beyond its parts, then there is no point in assuming that the whole exists in and
of itself: thus, having irreducible cause-effect power is a further prerequisite for
existence. This postulate also applies to individual mechanisms: a subset of
elements can contribute a specific aspect of experience only if their combined
cause-effect repertoire is irreducible by a minimum partition of the mechanism
("small phi" or ).
Exclusion: The cause-effect structure specified by the system must be definite:
it is specified over a single set of elements—neither less nor more—the one over
which it is maximally irreducible from its intrinsic perspective ( ), thus laying
maximal claim to intrinsic existence. ... With respect to causation, this has the
consequence that the "winning" cause-effect structure excludes alternative
cause-effect structures specified over overlapping elements, otherwise there
would be causal overdetermination. ... The exclusion postulate can be said to
enforce Occam's razor (entities should not be multiplied beyond necessity): it is
 more parsimonious to postulate the existence of a single cause-effect structure
over a system of elements—the one that is maximally irreducible from the
system's intrinsic perspective—than a multitude of overlapping cause-effect
structures whose existence would make no further difference. The exclusion
postulate also applies to individual mechanisms: a subset of elements in a state
specifies the cause-effect repertoire that is maximally irreducible (MICE) within
the system ( ), called a core concept, or concept for short. Again, it cannot
additionally specify a cause-effect repertoire overlapping over the same
elements, because otherwise the difference a mechanism makes would be
counted multiple times. ... Finally, the exclusion postulate also applies to spatio-
temporal grains, implying that a conceptual structure is specified over a definite
grain size in space (either quarks, atoms, neurons, neuronal groups, brain
areas, and so on) and time (either microseconds, milliseconds, seconds,
minutes, and so on), the one at which reaches a maximum. ... Once more, this
implies that a mechanism cannot specify a cause-effect repertoire at a particular
temporal grain, and additional effects at a finer or coarser grain, otherwise the
differences a mechanism makes would be counted multiple times.
— Dr. Giulio Tononi, Scholarpedia[3]

Mathematics: formalization of the postulates

For a complete and thorough account of the mathematical formalization of IIT, see reference.[2] What follows is intended as a brief
summary, adapted from,[4] of the most important quantities involved. Pseudocode for the algorithms used to calculate these quantities
can be found at reference.[5]

A system refers to a set of elements, each with two or more internal states, inputs that influence that state, and outputs that are
influenced by that state. A mechanism refers to a subset of system elements. The mechanism-level quantities below are used to
assess the integration of any given mechanism, and the system-level quantities are used to assess the integration of sets of
mechanisms ("sets of sets").

In order to apply the IIT formalism to a system, its full transition probability matrix (TPM) must be known. The TPM specifies the
probability with which any state of a system transitions to any other system state. Each of the following quantities is calculated in a
bottom-up manner from the system's TPM.
 Mechanism-level quantities
A cause-effect repertoire is a set of two probability
distributions, describing how the mechanism in its current state constrains the past and future states of the
sets of system elements and , respectively.
Note that may be different from , since the elements that a mechanism affects may be different from the
elements that affect it.

A partition is a grouping of system elements, where the connections between the parts
and are injected with independent noise. For a simple binary element which outputs to a
simple binary element , injecting the connection with independent noise means that the input value which
receives, or , is entirely independent of the actual state of , thus rendering causally ineffective.
denotes a pair of partitions, one of which is considered when looking at a mechanism's causes, and the other of
which is considered when looking at its effects.

The earth mover's distance is used to measure distances between probability distributions and .
The EMD depends on the user's choice of ground distance between points in the metric space over which the
probability distributions are measured, which in IIT is the system's state space. When computing the EMD with a
system of simple binary elements, the ground distance between system states is chosen to be their Hamming
distance.
Integrated information measures the irreducibility of a cause-effect repertoire with respect to partition ,
obtained by combining the irreducibility of its constituent cause and ef
fect repertoires with respect to the same
partitioning.
The irreducibility of the cause repertoire with respect to is given by
, and similarly for the effect
repertoire.

Combined, and yield the irreducibility of the as a whole:

.

The minimum-information partitionof a mechanism and its purview is given by

. The minimum-information partition is the partitioning that least
affects a cause-effect repertoire. For this reason, it is sometimes called theminimum-difference partition.
Note that the minimum-information "partition", despite its name, is really a pair of partitions. We call these partitions
and .

There is at least one choice of elements over which a mechanism's cause-ef

fect repertoire is maximally irreducible (in
other words, over which its is highest). We call this choice of elements , and say that this
choice specifies a maximally irreducible cause-effect repertoire .
Formally, and
.

The concept is the maximally irreducible cause-effect

repertoire of mechanism in its current state over , and describes the causal role of within the system.
Informally, is the concept's purview, and specifies what the concept "is about".
The intrinsic cause-effect power of is the concept's strength, and is given by:
 System-level quantities

A cause-effect structure is the set of concepts specified by all mechanisms with within the
system in its current state . If a system turns out to be conscious, its cause-ef
fect structure is often referred to as
a conceptual structure.
A unidirectional partition is a grouping of system elements where the connections from the set of
elements to are injected with independent noise.

The extended earth mover's distance is used to measure the minimal cost of transforming cause-
effect structure into structure . Informally, one can say that–whereas the EMD transports the probability of a
system state over the distance between two system states–the XEMD transports the strength of a concept over the
distance between two concepts.
In the XEMD, the "earth" to be transported is intrinsic cause-effect power ( ), and the ground distance between
concepts and with cause repertoires and and effect repertoires and is given by
.

Integrated (conceptual) information measures the irreducibility of a

cause-effect structure with respect to a unidirectional partition. captures how much the cause-effect repertoires of
the system's mechanisms are altered and how much intrinsic cause ef fect power ( ) is lost due to partition .

The minimum-information partitionof a set of elements in a state is given by

. The minimum-information partition is the unidirectional partition that least
affects a cause-effect structure .

The intrinsic cause-effect powerof a set of elements in a state is given by , such that
for any other with , . According to IIT, a system's is the degree to which it can
be said to exist.

A complex is a set of elements with , and thus specifies a maximally irreducible cause-
effect structure, also called a conceptual structure. According to IIT, complexes are conscious entities.

Cause-effect space
For a system of simple binary elements, cause-effect space is formed by axes, one for each possible past and future state
of the system. Any cause-effect repertoire , which specifies the probability of each possible past and future state of the system, can
be easily plotted as a point in this high-dimensional space: The position of this point along each axis is given by the probability of
that state as specified by . If a point is also taken to have a scalar magnitude (which can be informally thought of as the point's
"size", for example), then it can easily represent a concept: The concept's cause-effect repertoire specifies the location of the point in
cause-effect space, and the concept's value specifies that point's magnitude.

In this way, a conceptual structure can be plotted as a constellation of points in cause-effect space. Each point is called a star, and
each star's magnitude ( ) is its size.

Central identity
IIT addresses the mind-body problem by proposing an identity between phenomenological properties of experience and causal
properties of physical systems:The conceptual structure specified by a complex of elements in a state is identical to its experience.

Specifically, the form of the conceptual structure in cause-effect space completely specifies the quality of the experience, while the
irreducibility of the conceptual structure specifies the level to which it exists (i.e., the complex's level of consciousness). The
maximally irreducible cause-effect repertoire of each concept within a conceptual structure specifies what the concept contributes to
the quality of the experience, while its irreducibility specifies how much the concept is present in the experience.

According to IIT, an experience is thus an intrinsic property of a complex of mechanisms in a state.

Extensions
The calculation of even a modestly-sized system's is often computationally intractable, so efforts have been made to develop
heuristic or proxy measures of integrated information. For example, Masafumi Oizumi has developed , a practical approximation
for integrated information that solves the theoretical shortcomings of previously proposed proxy measures,[6] such as the one
proposed by Adam Barrett.[7]

A significant computational challenge in calculating integrated information is finding the Minimum Information Partitionof a neural
system, which requires iterating through all possible network partitions. To solve this problem, Daniel Toker has suggested using the
[8]
most modular decomposition of a network as an extremely quick proxy for the Minimum Information Partition.

Related experimental work

While the algorithm[5] for assessing a system's and conceptual structure is relatively straightforward, its high time complexity
makes it computationally intractable for many systems of interest. Heuristics and approximations can sometimes be used to provide
ballpark estimates of a complex system's integrated information, but precise calculations are often impossible. These computational
challenges, combined with the already difficult task of reliably and accurately assessing consciousness under experimental
conditions, make testing many of the theory's predictions dif
ficult.

Despite these challenges, researchers have attempted to use measures of information integration and differentiation to assess levels of
consciousness in a variety of subjects.[9][10] For instance, a recent study using a less computationally-intensive proxy for was
able to reliably discriminate between varying levels of consciousness in wakeful, sleeping (dreaming vs. non-dreaming),
[11]
anesthetized, and comatose (vegetative vs. minimally-conscious vs. locked-in) individuals.

IIT also makes several predictions which fit well with existing experimental evidence, and can be used to explain some
counterintuitive findings in consciousness research.[12] For example, IIT can be used to explain why some brain regions, such as the
cerebellum do not appear to contribute to consciousness, despite their size and/or functional importance.

Reception
Integrated Information Theory has received both broad criticism and support.

Support
Neuroscientist Christof Koch, who has helped to develop the theory, has called IIT "the only really promising fundamental theory of
consciousness".[13] Technologist Virgil Griffith says "IIT is currently the leading theory of consciousness."
[14]

Criticism
Challenges to IIT:

ficient.[15]
IIT proposes conditions which are necessary for consciousness, but are not entirely suf
[16]
IIT claims that all of its axioms are self-evident.
Since IIT is not a functionalist theory of consciousness, criticisms of non-functionalism have been levied against
it.[16]
[15][16]
The limits of IIT's definition of consciousness have led to criticism.

See also
Causality Phenomenology (philosophy)
Consciousness Phenomenology (psychology)
Hard problem of consciousness Philosophy of mind
Mind–body problem Qualia
Neural correlates of consciousness Sentience
References
1. Tononi, Giulio; Boly, Melanie; Massimini, Marcello; Koch, Christof."Integrated information theory: from
consciousness to its physical substrate"(http://www.nature.com/doifinder/10.1038/nrn.2016.44). Nature Reviews
Neuroscience. 17 (7): 450–461. doi:10.1038/nrn.2016.44 (https://doi.org/10.1038%2Fnrn.2016.44). PMID 27225071
(https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/27225071).
2. Oizumi, Masafumi; Albantakis, Larissa; T
ononi, Giulio (2014-05-08). "From the Phenomenology to the Mechanisms
of Consciousness: Integrated Information Theory 3.0"(https://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003588)
. PLoS
Comput Biol. 10 (5): e1003588. doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003588(https://doi.org/10.1371%2Fjournal.pcbi.1003588)
.
PMC 4014402 (https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4014402) . PMID 24811198 (https://www.ncbi.nlm.ni
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3. "Integrated information theory - Scholarpedia"(http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Integrated_information_theory).
www.scholarpedia.org. Retrieved 2015-11-23.
4. Albantakis, Larissa; Tononi, Giulio (2015-07-31). "The Intrinsic Cause-Effect Power of Discrete Dynamical Systems
—From Elementary Cellular Automata to Adapting Animats"(http://www.mdpi.com/1099-4300/17/8/5472). Entropy.
17 (8): 5472–5502. doi:10.3390/e17085472 (https://doi.org/10.3390%2Fe17085472).
5. "CSC-UW/iit-pseudocode"(https://github.com/CSC-UW/iit-pseudocode). GitHub. Retrieved 2016-01-29.
6. Oizumi, Masafumi; Amari, Shun-ichi; Yanagawa, Toru; Fujii, Naotaka; Tsuchiya, Naotsugu (2015-05-17). "Measuring
integrated information from the decoding perspective".PLOS Computational Biology. 12 (1): e1004654.
arXiv:1505.04368 (https://arxiv.org/abs/1505.04368) . doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1004654(https://doi.org/10.1371%2
Fjournal.pcbi.1004654).
7. Barrett, A.B.; Seth, A.K. (2011). "Practical measures of integrated information for time-series data".
PLoS Comput.
Biol. 7 (1): e1001052. doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1001052(https://doi.org/10.1371%2Fjournal.pcbi.1001052) .
8. Toker, Daniel; Sommer, Friedrich (2016-05-03). "Moving Past the Minimum Information Partition: How to Quickly and
Accurately Calculate Integrated Information".arXiv:1605.01096 (https://arxiv.org/abs/1605.01096) .
9. Massimini, M.; Ferrarelli, F.; Murphy, Mj; Huber, R.; Riedner, Ba; Casarotto, S.; Tononi, G. (2010-09-01)."Cortical
reactivity and effective connectivity during REM sleep in humans" (https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC29
30263). Cognitive Neuroscience. 1 (3): 176–183. doi:10.1080/17588921003731578(https://doi.org/10.1080%2F175
88921003731578). ISSN 1758-8936 (https://www.worldcat.org/issn/1758-8936). PMC 2930263 (https://www.ncbi.nl
m.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2930263) . PMID 20823938 (https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/20823938).
10. Ferrarelli, Fabio; Massimini, Marcello; Sarasso, Simone; Casali, Adenauer; Riedner , Brady A.; Angelini, Giuditta;
Tononi, Giulio; Pearce, Robert A. (2010-02-09). "Breakdown in cortical effective connectivity during midazolam-
induced loss of consciousness"(https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2823915). Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America . 107 (6): 2681–2686. doi:10.1073/pnas.0913008107
(https://doi.org/10.1073%2Fpnas.0913008107) . ISSN 1091-6490 (https://www.worldcat.org/issn/1091-6490).
PMC 2823915 (https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2823915) . PMID 20133802 (https://www.ncbi.nlm.ni
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11. Casali, Adenauer G.; Gosseries, Olivia; Rosanova, Mario; Boly, Mélanie; Sarasso, Simone; Casali, Karina R.;
Casarotto, Silvia; Bruno, Marie-Aurélie; Laureys, Steven; Massimini, Marcello (2013-08-14)."A Theoretically Based
Index of Consciousness Independent of Sensory Processing and Behavior" (http://stm.sciencemag.org/content/5/19
8/198ra105). Science Translational Medicine. 5 (198): 198ra105–198ra105.doi:10.1126/scitranslmed.3006294(http
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PMID 23946194 (https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/23946194).
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edictions_and_explanations). www.scholarpedia.org. Retrieved 2016-01-28.
13. Zimmer, Carl (2010-09-20). "Sizing Up Consciousness by Its Bits"(https://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/21/science/21c
onsciousness.html). The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331 (https://www.worldcat.org/issn/0362-4331). Retrieved
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14. "How valid is Giulio Tononi's mathematical formula for consciousness?"(https://www.quora.com/How-valid-is-Giulio-T
ononis-mathematical-formula-for-consciousness/answer/V irgil-Griffith-1).
15. "Shtetl-Optimized » Blog Archive » Why I Am Not An Integrated Information Theorist (or
, The Unconscious
Expander)" (http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=1799). www.ScottAaronson.com. Retrieved 23 November 2015.
16. Cerullo, Michael A.; Kording, Konrad P. (17 September 2015). "The Problem with Phi: A Critique of Integrated
Information Theory". PLOS Computational Biology. 11 (9): e1004286. doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1004286(https://doi.o
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External links

Related papers
Integrated information theory: from consciousness to its physical substrate
Integrated information theory (Scholarpedia)
From the Phenomenology to the Mechanisms of Consciousness: Integrated Information Theory 3.0
Integrated Information Theory: An Updated Account (2012) (First presentation of IIT 3.0)
Integrated Information Theory: A Provisional Manifesto (2008) (IIT 2.0)
An Information Integration Theory of Consciousness (2004) (IIT 1.0)

Websites
IntegratedInformationTheory.org: resource for learning about IIT; features a graphical user interface toPyPhi.
"Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness" . Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Software
PyPhi: an open-source Python library for calculating integrated information and related quantities.

Graphical user interface

Documentation

Books
Phi: A Voyage from the Brain to the Soul

News articles
Nautilus (2017): Is Matter Conscious?
Aeon (2016): Consciousness creep
MIT Technology Review (2014):What It Will Take for Computers to Be Conscious
Wired (2013): A Neuroscientist's Radical Theory of How Networks Become Conscious
The New Yorker (2013): How Much Consciousness Does an iPhone Have?
New York Times (2010): Sizing Up Consciousness by Its Bits
Scientific American (2009):A "Complex" Theory of Consciousness
IEEE Spectrum (2008):A Bit of Theory: Consciousness as Integrated Information Theory

Talks
David Chalmers (2014):How do you explain consciousness?
Christof Koch (2014): The Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness

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