1.) ANCHETA VS.

ANCHETA over the person of the defendant/respondent or over

FACTS:
Petitioner and respondent were spouses,
wherein the latter intended to marry again filed a
petition w/ the RTC, for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage with the petitioner on the ground of
psychological incapacity.
Although the respondent knew that the
petitioner was already residing at the resort Munting
Paraiso in Bancal, Carmona, Cavite, he, nevertheless,
alleged in his petition that the petitioner was residing at
No. 72 CRM Avenue corner CRM Corazon, BF Homes,
Almanza, Las Piñas, Metro Manila, "where she may be
served with summons."
The clerk of court issued summons to the
petitioner at the address stated in the petition. The
sheriff served the summons and a copy of the petition
by substituted service on June 6, 1995 on the
petitioner’s son, Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III, at his
residence in Bancal, Carmona, Cavite.9
The petitioner failed to file an answer to the petition.
On June 22, 1995, the respondent filed an "Ex-Parte
Motion to Declare Defendant as in Default". During the
hearing on the said date, there was no appearance for
the petitioner. The trial court granted the motion and
declared the petitioner in default, and allowed the
respondent to adduce evidence ex-parte. Thereafter,
the trial court issued an Order granting the petition and
declaring the marriage of the parties void ab initio.
The petitioner filed a verified petition against the
respondent with the Court of Appeals under Rule 47 of
the Rules of Court, as amended, for the annulment of
the order of the RTC of Cavite in Special Proceedings ,
on her claim that the summons and the copy of the
complaint in Sp. Proc. No. NC-662 were not served on
her. Thus, according to the petitioner, the order of the
trial court in favor of the respondent was null and void
(1) for lack of jurisdiction over her person; and (2) due
to the extrinsic fraud perpetrated by the respondent
ISSUE: W/N the court acquired jurisdiction over the
person of the accused.
RULING: No
In a case where a petition for the annulment of
a judgment or final order of the RTC filed under Rule 47
of the Rules of Court is grounded on lack of jurisdiction
the nature or subject of the action, the petitioner need
not allege in the petition that the ordinary remedy of
new trial or reconsideration of the final order or
judgment or appeal there from are no longer available
through no fault of her own. This is so because a
judgment rendered or final order issued by the RTC
without jurisdiction is null and void and may be assailed
any time either collaterally or in a direct action or by
resisting such judgment or final order in any action or
proceeding whenever it is invoked,22 unless barred by
laches.
In this case, the original petition and the amended
petition in the Court of Appeals, in light of the material
averments therein, were based not only on extrinsic
fraud, but also on lack of jurisdiction of the trial court
over the person of the petitioner because of the failure
of the sheriff to serve on her the summons and a copy
of the complaint. She claimed that the summons and
complaint were served on her son, Venancio Mariano B.
Ancheta III, who, however, failed to give her the said
summons and complaint.
In Paramount Insurance Corporation v. Japzon,24 we
held that jurisdiction is acquired by a trial court over the
person of the defendant either by his voluntary
appearance in court and his submission to its authority
or by service of summons. The service of summons and
the complaint on the defendant is to inform him that a
case has been filed against him and, thus, enable him to
defend himself. He is, thus, put on guard as to the
demands of the plaintiff or the petitioner. Without such
service in the absence of a valid waiver renders the
judgment of the court null and void.25 Jurisdiction
cannot be acquired by the court on the person of the
defendant even if he knows of the case against him
unless he is validly served with summons.26
2.) BARCO VS. CA
FACTS:
 Private respondent Nadina Maravilla ("Nadina")
married Francisco Maravilla. Later on, the
spouses decided to live separately and they
obtained an ecclesiastical annulment of
marriage.
 Nadina gave birth to a daughter named June
Salvacio. June’s birth certificate listed Francisco
Maravilla as the father but despite of the
notation of her daughter’s birth certificate,
Nadina subsequently claimed that the real
 father of her child was Armando Gustilo, a
former Congressman with whom she
maintained a relationship. At the time of June’s
birth, Gustilo was married to Caraycong, who
would later perish in the naval accident of 1981.
Later, Nadina and Gustilo were married in the
United States after two and a half years of
Nadina’s marriage to Francisco was alleged to
have been annulled in the Philippines.
 On 17 March 1983, Nadina filed in her own
name a Petition for Correction of Entries in the
Certificate of Birth of her daughter June with
the RTC. She prayed that the Local Civil
Registrar of Makati be directed to correct the
birth certificate of June that she will carry the
surname of her alleged real father Gustilo.
Notably, Francisco affixed his signature to the
Petition signifying his conformity thereto.
 On 20 March 1983. Gustilo filed a "Constancia,"
wherein he acknowledged June as his daughter
with Nadina, and that he was posing no
objection to Nadina’s petition.
 On 7 September 1983, Nadina filed an Amended
Petition,12 this time impleading Francisco and
Gustilo as respondents.
 The Office of the Sol. Gen. filed a Motion to
Dismiss the petition on the ground that the RTC
"had no jurisdiction over the subject matter”.
They cited various jurisprudence holding that
only innocuous or clerical errors may be
corrected under a Rule 108 petition for
correction of entries.
 Later on Motion to dismiss was denied by the
RTC and thereafter issued an order granting the
petition and ordering the requested corrections
to be effected.
 Gustilo died in 19 December 1986. Two estate
proceedings arose from his death.
 Jose Vicente Gustilo ("Jose Vicente"), allegedly a
biological child of Gustilo, he filed with the
Court of Appeals a Petition23 seeking the
annulment of the RTC Order of 7 January 1985
which had effected changes in the civil status of
June..
 After the Court of Appeals commenced hearings
on the petition, petitioner Milagros Barco
("Barco"), on 11 January 1994, filed in her
capacity as the natural guardian and/or
guardian ad litem of her daughter, Mary Joy
Ann Gustilo, a Motion for Intervention with a
Complaint-in-Intervention attached thereto.
Barco alleged that Mary Joy had a legal interest
in the annulment of the RTC Order as she was
likewise fathered by Gustilo.
 The appellate court held that neither Jose
Vicente nor Barco were able to establish the
existence of lack of jurisdiction and extrinsic
fraud, the two grounds that would justify the
annulment of a final judgment.32 It ruled that
while Jose Vicente and Barco had not been
made parties in the Petition for Correction, the
subsequent notice and publication of the Order
setting the case for hearing served as
constructive notice to all parties who might
have an interest to participate in the case. The
publication of the Order conferred upon the
RTC the jurisdiction to try and decide the case
 Before this Court, Barco assails that RTC Order
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUE: 1.) W/n the court acquires jurisdiction over the
parties due to the failure of impleading Barco as a
party to the petition for correction.
RULING: YES
Undoubtedly, Barco is among the parties referred to in
Section 3 of Rule 108. Her interest was affected by the
petition for correction, as any judicial determination
that June was the daughter of Armando would affect
her ward’s share in the estate of her father. It cannot be
established whether Nadina knew of Mary Joy’s
existence at the time she filed the petition for
correction. Indeed, doubt may always be cast as to
whether a petitioner under Rule 108 would know of all
the parties whose interests may be affected by the
granting of a petition. For example, a petitioner cannot
be presumed to be aware of all the legitimate or
illegitimate offsprings of his/her spouse or paramour.
The fact that Nadina amended her petition to implead
Francisco and Gustilo indicates earnest effort on her
part to comply with Section 3 as quoted above.
Yet, even though Barco was not impleaded in the
petition, the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out that
the defect was cured by compliance with Section 4, Rule
108, which requires notice by publication.
The purpose precisely of Section 4, Rule 108 is to bind
the whole world to the subsequent judgment on the
petition. The sweep of the decision would cover even
parties who should have been impleaded under Section
3, Rule 108, but were inadvertently left out.
Verily, a petition for correction is an action in rem, an
action against a thing and not against a person.46 The
decision on the petition binds not only the parties
thereto47 but the whole world.48 An in rem proceeding is
validated essentially through publication.49 Publication
is notice to the whole world that the proceeding has for
its object to bar indefinitely all who might be minded to
make an objection of any sort against the right sought
to be established. It is the publication of such notice
that brings in the whole world as a party in the case and
vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it.
ISSUE: 2.) W/n the court acquires jurisdiction over the
nature of the action or the subject matter.
RULING:
Section 2, Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
explicitly provides only two grounds for annulment of
judgment, namely: extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction.
Assuming arguendo that Nadina’s petition for
correction had prescribed and/or that the action
seeking the change of name can only be filed by the
party whose name is sought to be changed, this does
not alter the reality that under the law the Makati RTC
had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petition
for correction. The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980,
the applicable law at the time, clearly conferred on the
Makati RTC exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil
actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable
of pecuniary estimation.62 In complementation of grant
of jurisdiction, Section 1 of Rule 108 provides that the
verified petition to the cancellation or correction of any
entry relating thereto should be filed with the Court of
First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of the province
where the corresponding civil registry is located.
Barco in this case posed defenses of prescription and
lack of capacity to bring action to the extent that a
finding that any of these grounds exist will be sufficient
to cause the dismissal of the action. Yet, the existence
of these grounds does not oust the court from its power
to decide the case. Jurisdiction cannot be acquired
through, waived, enlarged or diminished by any act or
omission of the parties. Contrariwise, lack of capacity to
sue and prescriptions as grounds for dismissal of an
action may generally be rendered unavailing, if not
raised within the proper period.6
It thus follows that assuming that the petition for
correction had prescribed, or that Nadina lacked the
capacity to file the action which led to the change of her
daughter’s name, the fact that the RTC granted the
Order despite the existence of these two grounds only
characterizes the decision as erroneous.
The RTC’s possible misappreciation of evidence ( RTC
erred in directing that the name of Nadina’s daughter
be changed from "June Salvacion Maravilla" to "June
Salvacion Gustilo." Following the trial court’s
determination that Gustilo was the father of June, but
prescinding from the conclusive presumption of
legitimacy for the nonce assuming it could be done, the
child would obviously be illegitimate. ) is again at most,
an error in the exercise of jurisdiction, which is different
from lack of jurisdiction. These purported errors do not
extend to the competence of the RTC to decide the
matter and as such does not constitute a valid ground
to annul the final order.
3.) RTC RAPID CITY VS. VILLA
FACTS:
Sometime in 2004, Rapid City Realty and Development
Corporation (petitioner) filed a complaint for
declaration of nullity of subdivision plans . . . mandamus
and damages against several defendants including
Spouses Orlando and Lourdes Villa (respondents).
After one failed attempt at personal service of
summons, court process server resorted to substituted
service by serving summons upon respondents’
househelp who did not acknowledge receipt thereof
and refused to divulge their names.
Despite substituted service, respondents failed to file
their Answer, prompting petitioner to file a "Motion to
Declare Defendants[-herein respondents] in Default"
which the trial court granted by Order of May 3, 2005.
More than eight months thereafter respondents filed a
Motion to Lift Order of Default,3 claiming that on
January 27, 2006 they "officially received all pertinent
papers such as Complaint and Annexes. And they
denied the existence of two women helpers who
allegedly refused to sign and acknowledge receipt of
the summons. In any event, they contended that
assuming that the allegation were true, the helpers had
no authority to receive the documents.4
By Order the trial court set aside the Order of Default
and gave herein respondents five days to file their
Answer. Respondents just the same did not file an
Answer, drawing petitioner to again file a Motion to
declare them in default, which the trial court again
granted..
So, respondents filed an Omnibus Motion for
reconsideration of the second order declaring them in
default and to vacate proceedings, this time claiming
that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over their
persons due to invalid service of summons.
The trial court denied respondents’ Omnibus Motion by
Order and proceeded to receive ex-parte evidence for
petitioner.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration having been
denied by the appellate court by Resolution of August
12, 2008, it comes to the Court via petition for review
on certiorari, arguing in the main that respondents, in
filing the first Motion to Lift the Order of Default,
voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of
the court.
ISSUE: W/n the court acquires jurisdiction over the
persons of the defendants [respondents].
RULING: YES
The petition is impressed with merit.
It is settled that if there is no valid service of summons,
the court can still acquire jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant by virtue of the latter’s voluntary
appearance. Thus Section 20 of Rule 14 of the Rules of
Court provides:
Sec. 20. Voluntary appearance. – The defendant’s
voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent
to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to
dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction
over the person shall not be deemed a voluntary
appearance.
And Philippine Commercial International Bank v.
Spouses Wilson Dy Hong Pi and Lolita Dy, et al.
enlightens:
Preliminarily, jurisdiction over the defendant in a civil
case is acquired either by the coercive power of legal
processes exerted over his person, or his voluntary
appearance in court. As a general proposition, one who
seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted
to the jurisdiction of the court. It is by reason of this
rule that we have had occasion to declare that the filing
of motions to admit answer, for additional time to file
answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and
to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration,
is considered voluntary submission to the court’s
jurisdiction. This, however, is tempered by the concept
of conditional appearance, such that a party who makes
a special appearance to challenge, among others, the
court’s jurisdiction over his person cannot be
considered to have submitted to its authority.
Prescinding from the foregoing, it is thus clear that:
(1) Special appearance operates as an exception
to the general rule on voluntary appearance;
(2) Accordingly, objections to the jurisdiction of
the court over the person of the defendant
must be explicitly made, i.e., set forth in an
unequivocal manner; and
(3) Failure to do so constitutes voluntary
submission to the jurisdiction of the court,
especially in instances where a pleading or
motion seeking affirmative relief is filed and
submitted to the court for resolution.
Respondents did not, in said motion, allege that their
filing thereof was a special appearance for the purpose
only to question the jurisdiction over their persons.
Clearly, they had acquiesced to the jurisdiction of the
court.
4.) TACAY VS. RTC TAGUM
FACTS:
These were 2 separate cases originally filed by
Godofredo Pineda at the RTC of Tagum for recovery of
possession (acciones publiciana) against 3 defendants,
namely: Antonia Noel, Ponciano Panes, and Maximo
Tacay.
Pineda was the owner of 790 sqm land evidenced by
TCT No. T-46560. The previous owner of such land has
allowed the 3 defendants to use or occupy the same by
mere tolerance. Pineda, having himself the need to use
the property, has demanded the defendants to vacate
the property and pay reasonable rentals therefore, but
such were refused.

The complaint was challenged in the Motions to Dismiss
filed by each defendant alleging that it did not specify
the amounts of actual, nominal, and exemplary
damages, nor the assessed value of the property, that
being bars the determination of the RTC’s jurisdiction in
deciding the case.
The Motions to Dismiss were denied but the claims for
damages in the complaint were expunged for failure to
specify the amounts. Thus, the defendants filed a Joint
Petition for certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, and
temporary restraining order against the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the amount of damages claimed and
the assessed value of the property are relevant in the
determination of the court’s jurisdiction in a case for
recovery of possession of property?
RULING:
Determinative of the court’s jurisdiction in a recovery of
possession of property is the nature of the action (one
of accion publiciana) and not the value of the property,
it may be commenced and prosecuted without an
accompanying claim for actual, nominal or exemplary
damages and such action would fall within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the RTC. The court acquired
jurisdiction upon the filing of the complaint and
payment of the prescribed docket fees.
Where the action is purely for the recovery of money or
damages, the docket fees are assessed on the basis of
the aggregate amount claimed, exclusive only of
interests and costs. In this case, the complaint or similar
pleading should, according to Circular No. 7 of this
Court, "specify the amount of damages being prayed for
not only in the body of the pleading but also in the
prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the
assessment of the filing fees in any case."
Two situations may arise. One is where the complaint or
similar pleading sets out a claim purely for money or
damages and there is no precise statement of the
amounts being claimed. In this event the rule is that the
pleading will "not be accepted nor admitted, or shall
otherwise be expunged from the record." In other
words, the complaint or pleading may be dismissed, or
the claims as to which the amounts are unspecified may
be expunged, although as aforestated the Court may,
on motion, permit amendment of the complaint and
payment of the fees provided the claim has not in the
meantime become time-barred. The other is where the
pleading does specify the amount of every claim, but
the fees paid are insufficient; and here again, the rule
now is that the court may allow a reasonable time for
the payment of the prescribed fees, or the balance
thereof, and upon such payment, the defect is cured
and the court may properly take cognizance of the
action, unless in the meantime prescription has set in
and consequently barred the right of action.
Where the action involves real property and a related
claim for damages as well, the legal fees shall be
assessed on the basis of both (a) the value of the
property and (b) the total amount of related damages
sought. The Court acquires jurisdiction over the action if
the filing of the initiatory pleading is accompanied by
the payment of the requisite fees, or, if the fees are not
paid at the time of the filing of the pleading, as of the
time of full payment of the fees within such reasonable
time as the court may grant, unless, of course,
prescription has set in the meantime. But where-as in
the case at bar-the fees prescribed for an action
involving real property have been paid, but the amounts
of certain of the related damages (actual, moral and
nominal) being demanded are unspecified, the action
may not be dismissed. The Court undeniably has
jurisdiction over the action involving the real property,
acquiring it upon the filing of the complaint or similar
pleading and payment of the prescribed fee. And it is
not divested of that authority by the circumstance that
it may not have acquired jurisdiction over the
accompanying claims for damages because of lack of
specification thereof. What should be done is simply to
expunge those claims for damages as to which no
amounts are stated, which is what the respondent
Courts did, or allow, on motion, a reasonable time for
the amendment of the complaints so as to allege the
precise amount of each item of damages and accept
payment of the requisite fees therefore within the
relevant prescriptive period.
5.) RSBRDC VS. FORMARAN
Note: This case is consistent w/ the principle laid down
in Sun Insurance - liberal
FACTS: Petitioner filed before the RTC a Complaint
against respondents Tan, Obiedo, and Atty. Reyes, for
declaration of nullity of deeds of sales and damages.
Upon filing its Complaint with the RTC on 16
March 2006, petitioner paid the sum of P13,644.25 for
docket and other legal fees, as assessed by the Office of
the Clerk of Court. The Clerk of Court initially
considered Civil Case as an action incapable of
pecuniary estimation and computed the docket and
other legal fees due thereon according to Section
7(b)(1), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court.
Then, Respondent Tan, thus, sought not just the
dismissal of the Complaint of petitioner, but also the
grant of his counterclaim.
Thereafter, respondent Tan filed before the RTC
an Omnibus Motion in which he contended that Civil
Case No. 2006-0030 involved real properties, the docket
fees for which should be computed in accordance with
Section 7(a), not Section 7(b)(1), of Rule 141 of the
Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC
which took effect on 16 August 2004. Since petitioner
did not pay the appropriate docket fees for Civil Case
No. 2006-0030, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over
the said case. Hence, respondent Tan asked the RTC to
issue an order requiring petitioner to pay the correct
and accurate docket fees pursuant to Section 7(a), Rule
141 of the Rules of Court, as amended.
As required by the RTC, the parties submitted
their Position Papers on the matter. On 24 March 2006,
the RTC issued an Order17 granting respondent Tan’s
Omnibus Motion. In holding that both petitioner and
respondent Tan must pay docket fees in accordance
with Section 7(a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as
amended.
In a letter dated 19 April 2006, the RTC Clerk of
Court computed, upon the request of counsel for the
petitioner, the petitioner must still pay the amount of
P720,392.60 as docket fees.
Petitioner did not concede so it was elevated to
CA, however, CA affirmed RTC’s order.
ISSUE: W/n the court is correct in ordering appropriate
docket fees be based on Sec. 7(a), Rule 141 which
involves a real action rather than Sec. 7(b)(1) an action
incapable of pecuniary estimation.
RULING: YES
Well-settled is the rule "[t]he court acquires jurisdiction
over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed
docket fee." Hence, the payment of docket fees is not
only mandatory, but also jurisdictional.
The docket fees under Section 7(a), Rule 141, in cases
involving real property depend on the fair market value
of the same: the higher the value of the real property,
the higher the docket fees due. In contrast, Section
7(b)(1), Rule 141 imposes a fixed or flat rate of docket
fees on actions incapable of pecuniary estimation.
In the Petition at bar, the RTC found, and the Court of
Appeals affirmed, that petitioner did not pay the correct
amount of docket fees for Civil Case No. 2006-0030.
According to both the trial and appellate courts,
petitioner should pay docket fees in accordance with
Section 7(a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as
amended. Consistent with the liberal tenor of Sun
Insurance, the RTC, instead of dismissing outright
petitioner’s Complaint in Civil Case No. 2006-0030,
granted petitioner time to pay the additional docket
fees. Despite the seeming munificence of the RTC,
petitioner refused to pay the additional docket fees
assessed against it, believing that it had already paid the
correct amount before, pursuant to Section 7(b)(1),
Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended.
The docket fees under Section 7(a), Rule 141, in cases
involving real property depend on the fair market value
of the same: the higher the value of the real property,
the higher the docket fees due. In contrast, Section
7(b)(1), Rule 141 imposes a fixed or flat rate of docket
fees on actions incapable of pecuniary estimation.
As this Court has previously discussed herein, the
nature of Civil Case No. 2006-0030 instituted by
petitioner before the RTC is closer to that of Serrano,
rather than of Spouses De Leon, hence, calling for the
application of the ruling of the Court in the former,
rather than in the latter.
It is also important to note that, with the amendments
introduced by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC, which became
effective on 16 August 2004, the paragraph in Section 7,
Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, pertaining specifically to
the basis for computation of docket fees for real actions
was deleted. Instead, Section 7(1) of Rule 141, as
amended, provides that "in cases involving real
property, the FAIR MARKET value of the REAL property
in litigation STATED IN THE CURRENT TAX DECLARATION
OR CURRENT ZONAL VALUATION OF THE BUREAU OF
INTERNAL REVENUE, WHICH IS HIGHER, OR IF THERE IS
NONE, THE STATED VALUE OF THE PROPERTY IN
LITIGATION x x x" shall be the basis for the computation
of the docket fees. Would such an amendment have an
impact on Gochan, Siapno, and Serrano? The Court
rules in the negative.
A real action indisputably involves real property. The
docket fees for a real action would still be determined
in accordance with the value of the real property
involved therein; the only difference is in what
constitutes the acceptable value. In computing the
docket fees for cases involving real properties, the
courts, instead of relying on the assessed or estimated
value, would now be using the fair market value of the
real properties (as stated in the Tax Declaration or the
Zonal Valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue,
whichever is higher) or, in the absence thereof, the
stated value of the same.
In sum, the Court finds that the true nature of the
action instituted by petitioner against respondents is
the recovery of title to and possession of real property.
It is a real action necessarily involving real property, the
docket fees for which must be computed in accordance
with Section 7(1), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as
amended.
6.) GODINEZ VS. CA
FACTS:
Delfina Village Subdivision Homeowners
Association (DVSHA), respondent, filed with the
Regional Trial Court Tagum, an amended complaint for
injunction and damages against spouses Godinez and
their son Edwin, petitioners. The complaint alleges that
petitioners were operating a mineral processing plant in
the annex of their residential house located within
Delfina Village.
Petitioners filed their answer raising the
following affirmative defenses: a) the complaint states
no cause of action; b) respondent DVSHA has no
capacity to sue; c) it is not a real party in interest; d) the
complaint fails to implead the real parties in interest;
and e) respondent failed to refer the case for
conciliation to the barangay before filing its complaint.
Thereafter, the trial court issued an Order
directing respondent to amend its complaint and attach
thereto proofs showing that it is a juridical person with
capacity to sue and that it is the real party in interest.
Then, respondent submitted its amended
complaint impleading, as additional plaintiffs, its
officers and members, and attaching thereto its
Certificate of Registration with the Home Insurance and
Guaranty Corporation, as well as its Articles of
Incorporation and By-Laws.
The Court of Appeals held that the trial court did
not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in directing respondent to
amend its complaint. In sum, its intention was to ensure
respondent’s compliance with the procedural rules.
ISSUE: W/n the court CA erred in sustaining the trial
court’s April 3, 2001 Order directing respondent to
amend its complaint.
RULING: NO
In resolving this issue, we are guided by two principles.
First, there is nothing sacred about processes or
pleadings and their forms or contents, their sole
purpose being to facilitate the application of justice to
the rival claims of contending parties. Hence, pleadings
as well as procedural rules should be construed
liberally. Second, the judicial attitude has always been
favorable and liberal in allowing amendments to a
pleading in order to avoid multiplicity of suits and so
that the real controversies between the parties are
presented, their rights determined, and the case
decided on the merits without unnecessary delay.
Here, we find no reason to deviate from the foregoing
dicta. It is on record that in its first amended complaint,
respondent DVSHA alleged that it is a registered
association. However, it failed to attach to its complaint
the supporting certificate of registration, as well as its
articles of incorporation and by-laws. In their answer,
petitioners promptly assailed respondent’s lack of
personality to sue. The trial court, desiring to determine
if indeed respondent has the capacity to sue, directed
respondent to amend its complaint anew by attaching
thereto the necessary documents.
7.) BIACO VS. PCRB
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
8.) LAPANDAY VS. ESPITA
FACTS:
ISSUE:
RULING:
 9.) OPOSA VS. FACTORAN

FACTS: The petitioners, all minors, sought the help of 10.) NOCUM VS. TAN
the Supreme Court to order the respondent, then
Secretary of DENR, to cancel all existing Timber License
Agreement (TLA) in the country and to cease and desist FACTS:
from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or
ISSUE:
approving new TLAs. They alleged that the massive
commercial logging in the country is causing vast abuses RULING:
on rainforest.

They furthered the rights of their generation and the 11.) MARIANO VS. JUDGE NACIONAL
rights of the generations yet unborn to a balanced and
healthful ecology.
FACTS:

ISSUE:
ISSUE: W/n the case constituted as a class suit.
RULING:
RULING: YES

Petitioners instituted Civil Case No. 90-777 as a

class suit. The original defendant and the present
respondents did not take issue with this matter.
Nevertheless, We hereby rule that the said civil case is
indeed a class suit. The subject matter of the complaint
is of common and general interest not just to several,
but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since
the parties are so numerous, it, becomes impracticable,
if not totally impossible, to bring all of them before the
court. We likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are
numerous and representative enough to ensure the full
protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all the
requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under Section
12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present
both in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the
latter being but an incident to the former.

This case, however, has a special and novel element.

Petitioners minors assert that they represent their
generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find
no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for
others of their generation and for the succeeding
generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in
behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based
on the concept of intergenerational responsibility
insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology
is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded,
considers on the concept of intergenerational
responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as
hereinafter expounded, considers