Article 1174 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise
declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires the
assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those events which could not
be foreseen or which, though foreseen, were inevitable.

Reoublic vs Luzon Stevedoring

Fortuitous events by definition are extraordinary events not foreseeable or
avoidable. It is therefore, not enough that the event should not have been foreseen
or anticipated, as is commonly believed but it must be one impossible to foresee or
to avoid. The mere difficulty to foresee the happening is not impossibility to foresee
the same.

Metro Concast Steel Corp vs Allied Bank Corp

To constitute a fortuitous event, the following elements must concur:
(a) the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence or of the failure of the
debtor to comply with obligations must be independent of human will;
(b) it must be impossible to foresee the event that constitutes the caso fortuito or, if
it can be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid;
(c) the occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill
obligations in a normal manner; and,
(d) the obligor must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury
or loss.

Co vs Broadway Motors
The burden of proving that the loss was due to a fortuitous event rests on him who
invokes it.

Mindex Resources Development Corporation v. Morillo

And, in order for a fortuitous event to exempt one from liability, it is necessary that
one has committed no negligence or misconduct that may have occasioned the loss.

Nakpil & Sons vs CA

It has been held that an act of God cannot be invoked to protect a person who has
failed to take steps to forestall the possible adverse consequences of such a loss.
One's negligence may have concurred with an act of God in producing damage and
injury to another; nonetheless, showing that the immediate or proximate cause of
the damage or injury was a fortuitous event would not exempt one from liability.
When the effect is found to be partly the result of a person's participation —
whether by active intervention, neglect or failure to act — the whole occurrence is
humanized and removed from the rules applicable to acts of God.
The diligence with which the law requires the individual at all times to govern his
conduct varies with the nature of the situation in which he is placed and the
importance of the act which he is to perform. 34 Thus, the cases of Austria v. Court
of Appeals, 35 Hernandez v. Chairman, Commission on Audit 36 and Cruz v.
Gangan 37 cited by petitioners in their pleadings, where the victims of robbery
were exonerated from liability, find no application to the present case.
In Austria, Maria Abad received from Guillermo Austria a pendant with diamonds
to be sold on commission basis, but which Abad failed to subsequently return
because of a robbery committed upon her in 1961. The incident became the
subject of a criminal case filed against several persons. Austria filed an action
against Abad and her husband (Abads) for recovery of the pendant or its value, but
the Abads set up the defense that the robbery extinguished their obligation. The
RTC ruled in favor of Austria, as the Abads failed to prove robbery; or, if
committed, that Maria Abad was guilty of negligence. The CA, however, reversed
the RTC decision holding that the fact of robbery was duly established and
declared the Abads not responsible for the loss of the jewelry on account of a
fortuitous event. We held that for the Abads to be relieved from the civil liability
of returning the pendant under Art. 1174 of the Civil Code, it would only be
sufficient that the unforeseen event, the robbery, took place without any
concurrent fault on the debtor's part, and this can be done by preponderance of
evidence; that to be free from liability for reason of fortuitous event, the debtor
must, in addition to the casus itself, be free of any concurrent or contributory fault
or negligence. 38

We found in Austria that under the circumstances prevailing at the time the
Decision was promulgated in 1971, the City of Manila and its suburbs had a high
incidence of crimes against persons and property that rendered travel after
nightfall a matter to be sedulously avoided without suitable precaution and
protection; that the conduct of Maria Abad in returning alone to her house in the
evening carrying jewelry of considerable value would have been negligence per se
and would not exempt her from responsibility in the case of robbery. However we
did not hold Abad liable for negligence since, the robbery happened ten years
previously; i.e., 1961, when criminality had not reached the level of incidence
obtaining in 1971.
In contrast, the robbery in this case took place in 1987 when robbery was already
prevalent and petitioners in fact had already foreseen it as they wanted to deposit
the pawn with a nearby bank for safekeeping. Moreover, unlike in Austria, where
no negligence was committed, we found petitioners negligent in securing their
pawnshop as earlier discussed.
In Hernandez, Teodoro Hernandez was the OIC and special disbursing officer of
the Ternate Beach Project of the Philippine Tourism in Cavite. In the morning of
July 1, 1983, a Friday, he went to Manila to encash two checks covering the wages
of the employees and the operating expenses of the project. However for some
reason, the processing of the check was delayed and was completed at about 3
p.m. Nevertheless, he decided to encash the check because the project employees
would be waiting for their pay the following day; otherwise, the workers would
have to wait until July 5, the earliest time, when the main office would open. At
that time, he had two choices: (1) return to Ternate, Cavite that same afternoon
and arrive early evening; or (2) take the money with him to his house in Marilao,
Bulacan, spend the night there, and leave for Ternate the following day. He chose
the second option, thinking it was the safer one. Thus, a little past 3 p.m., he took a
passenger jeep bound for Bulacan. While the jeep was on Epifanio de los Santos
Avenue, the jeep was held up and the money kept by Hernandez was taken, and
the robbers jumped out of the jeep and ran. Hernandez chased the robbers and
caught up with one robber who was subsequently charged with robbery and
pleaded guilty. The other robber who held the stolen money escaped. The
Commission on Audit found Hernandez negligent because he had not brought the
cash proceeds of the checks to his office in Ternate, Cavite for safekeeping, which
is the normal procedure in the handling of funds. We held that Hernandez was not
negligent in deciding to encash the check and bringing it home to Marilao,
Bulacan instead of Ternate, Cavite due to the lateness of the hour for the following
reasons: (1) he was moved by unselfish motive for his co-employees to collect
their wages and salaries the following day, a Saturday, a non-working, because to
encash the check on July 5, the next working day after July 1, would have caused
discomfort to laborers who were dependent on their wages for sustenance; and (2)
that choosing Marilao as a safer destination, being nearer, and in view of the
comparative hazards in the trips to the two places, said decision seemed logical at
that time. We further held that the fact that two robbers attacked him in broad
daylight in the jeep while it was on a busy highway and in the presence of other
passengers could not be said to be a result of his imprudence and negligence. aSADIC

Unlike in Hernandez where the robbery happened in a public utility, the robbery in
this case took place in the pawnshop which is under the control of petitioners.
Petitioners had the means to screen the persons who were allowed entrance to the
premises and to protect itself from unlawful intrusion. Petitioners had failed to
exercise precautionary measures in ensuring that the robbers were prevented from
entering the pawnshop and for keeping the vault open for the day, which paved the
way for the robbers to easily cart away the pawned articles.
In Cruz, Dr. Filonila O. Cruz, Camanava District Director of Technological
Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA), boarded the Light Rail
Transit (LRT) from Sen. Puyat Avenue to Monumento when her handbag was
slashed and the contents were stolen by an unidentified person. Among those
stolen were her wallet and the government-issued cellular phone. She then
reported the incident to the police authorities; however, the thief was not located,
and the cellphone was not recovered. She also reported the loss to the Regional
Director of TESDA, and she requested that she be freed from accountability for
the cellphone. The Resident Auditor denied her request on the ground that she
lacked the diligence required in the custody of government property and was
ordered to pay the purchase value in the total amount of P4,238.00. The COA
found no sufficient justification to grant the request for relief from accountability.
We reversed the ruling and found that riding the LRT cannot per se be denounced
as a negligent act more so because Cruz's mode of transit was influenced by time
and money considerations; that she boarded the LRT to be able to arrive in
Caloocan in time for her 3 pm meeting; that any prudent and rational person under
similar circumstance can reasonably be expected to do the same; that possession of
a cellphone should not hinder one from boarding the LRT coach as Cruz did
considering that whether she rode a jeep or bus, the risk of theft would have also
been present; that because of her relatively low position and pay, she was not
expected to have her own vehicle or to ride a taxicab; she did not have a
government assigned vehicle; that placing the cellphone in a bag away from
covetous eyes and holding on to that bag as she did is ordinarily sufficient care of
a cellphone while traveling on board the LRT; that the records did not show any
specific act of negligence on her part and negligence can never be presumed.
Unlike in the Cruz case, the robbery in this case happened in petitioners' pawnshop
and they were negligent in not exercising the precautions justly demanded of a
pawnshop.
||| (Sicam v. Jorge, G.R. No. 159617, [August 8, 2007], 556 PHIL 278-301)