Drew Pollhammer

The Origin of Thought:

On the Role of Stoic Freedom in Hegel’s Phenomenology
“Come, let us recapitulate the points that we’ve agreed.
The person who isn’t subject to hindrances is free, he who
has everything at hand as he wants it; but one who is
subject to hindrance, or constraint, or obstruction or can be
thrown into any difficulty against his will, is a slave”
–Epictetus1

G.W.F. Hegel’s dedicated discussion of Stoicism in the Phenomenology of Spirit2

occupies all of four sections of his famous work (from §198 to §201). The short shrift that Hegel

gives to his treatment of this shape of self-consciousness is rather difficult to come to grips with

when one considers the fact that Hegel grants Stoicism the role of introducing thought [Denken]

(as opposed to desire [begierde], representation [Vorstellung], understanding [Verstehen] or any

other sub-conceptual3 kind of dealing with objects) to the unfolding of Spirit’s logically, ever-

dialectically-advancing trajectory. Hegel’s evidently rapid dismissal of Stoicism as a form of

self-consciousness that refuses to engage with the dirty work of concrete negation4 is

                                                                                                               
1
Discourses, Fragments, Handbook, p. 231.
2
Henceforth PhS, followed by section numbers.
3
By ‘sub-conceptual’ here I simply mean any form of self-consciousness’s—whether in the form
of the master’s or the slave’s self-consciousness (or any pre-Stoic self-consciousness’s)—dealing
with objects prior to the inception of conceptual thinking, which is to say any form of self-
consciousness’s dealing with objects which is not an actively self-conscious awareness of those
objects as objects of conceptual thought.      
4
For reasons of space, in the present paper I will refrain from offering an account of the
important reasons why Hegel deems Stoicism’s thinking to be overly abstract, and therefore
lacking the conceptual determinateness requisite for actual thinking and engagement with the
world of concrete things. Suffice it to say here that Hegel thinks Stoicism is abstract and
   2  

symptomatic of his overarching aversion toward what he would deem ‘one-sidedly’ abstract

forms of consciousness5 or self-consciousness (self-conscious thought in this case).

Nevertheless, it is apparent in Hegel’s discussion of the role of Stoicism as the progenitor

of self-consciousness’s thinking capacities that this shape of self-consciousness plays an

important and pivotal role in the advancement of self-consciousness toward higher shapes.

Indeed, it is the case that the form of self-consciousness known as Stoicism inaugurates the

active awareness on the part of self-consciousness of purely conceptual thinking, which will

eventually allow for the subsequent dialectical transitions into Skepticism, and the ‘Unhappy

Consciousness’ before leading into Reason and culminating in the Absolute. Without Stoicism’s

introduction of thought into self-consciousness these latter shapes of self-consciousness simply

could not “appear on the scene” as Hegel says (199).

In the present essay I wish to show why it is that the shapes of self-consciousness prior to

Stoic self-consciousness, i.e., master and slave self-consciousness, transform into Stoic self-

consciousness, as well as show how Stoic self-consciousness establishes thinking as a new form

of self-consciousness over and above master and slave forms of self-consciousness. The primary

emphasis here will be on the nature of the transition from the ‘master/slave dialectic’ to Stoic

self-consciousness.6 I will also (if only in a tangential manner) show why it is the case that Stoic

thinking concerns a specific kind of freedom as opposed to the ‘independence’ sought after by

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
therefore “tedious” (PhS 200) because Stoic thinking lacks the concreteness requisite for actual
determination. For a concise account of Hegel’s critique of Stoicism as overly abstract, I refer the
reader to Robert Brandom’s excellent (currently unpublished) book The Spirit of Trust (see
chapter on ‘Freedom of Self-Consciousness’). The text is available online here:
http://www.pitt.edu/~brandom/spirit_of_trust_2014.html [last accessed Oct. 26, 2015].
5
See, for example, Hegel’s treatment of the Understanding (PhS §132- §165).
6
Terry Pinkard rightly acknowledges the “puzzling” nature of this transition in his landmark
study, Hegel’s Phenomenology: The Sociality of Reason, p. 64. I will allude to what I find to be
the most puzzling aspect of this transition in my concluding remarks, where I wish to point out
that Hegel’s account of the logical necessity of this transition seems difficult to discern.
   3  

the shapes of self-consciousness which precede it. I will first describe the nature of the transition

from the ‘master/slave dialectic’ into Stoic self-consciousness. This will occupy the majority of

the present paper. I will then offer some remarks on the nature of thinking and freedom for Stoic

self-consciousness. Lastly, I will give an account of why I think there are some important things

left unsaid in Hegel’s account of the transition from master and slave self-consciousness’s into

Stoic self-consciousness: if we want a genetic account of the logical necessity of the transition

from master and slave self-consciousness’s into Stoic self-consciousness, it is difficult to discern

whether or not Hegel himself provides this account.

To begin, it will be helpful to recall the scene that emerges after the dizzying efforts of

self-consciousness to establish its independence in the ‘master/slave dialectic’ (particularly from

§191-§196). By the end of the ‘master/slave dialectic’ it is apparent that neither the master nor

the slave has achieved the true independence that self-consciousness initially set out to find in its

seeking out a kind of recognition in an other which would allow it to rise above its merely

desiderative dependence on things. Certainly both master and slave each discover a kind of

independence, but for each the independence that it finds is not the full-fledged independence

that self-consciousness had initially sought before undertaking the ‘struggle to the death’ and

then the process of the ‘master/slave dialectic’ itself. Each self-consciousness achieves a sense of

independence which is at the same time a sense of dependence.

The master is independent in the sense that he does not need to work but rather

determines the actions of the ‘other’ (slave) who must do the work for him7. Moreover, this

‘other’ recognizes the master as independent, and that certainly counts for something for the

                                                                                                               
7
For the sake of consistency between my own words and those of the scholars cited in this paper
I have opted to use non-gender-neutral language. While acknowledging that this is an unfortunate
fact I must also acknowledge the fact that it will (hopefully) result in greater readability.
   4  

master. Nevertheless, the master is dependent in the sense that he is not in actuality “certain of

being-for-self as the truth of himself” (192). He depends on the slave, which is to say the ‘truth of

an other’, for his very status as seemingly independent; such an independence is thus not really

much of an independence after all. Now, with regard to the slave, it is obvious that he is

dependent in the sense that he owes his life and livelihood to the master; and yet, it turns out that

the slave is in a sense independent as well inasmuch as his creative work allows him to see

himself in the things he works on.8 His experiences have a greater determinative depth than the

master’s inasmuch as the slave’s concrete creations allow him to see himself in the object he

creates and to come back to himself all the richer in his increasing abilities and self-

determinations. This murky picture of two self-consciousness’s, both of which are in a sense

dependent and in a sense independent, is where we arrive at the end of the ‘master/slave

dialectic’.

In the section following the close of the ‘master/slave dialectic’, entitled “Freedom of

Self-Consciousnes”, Hegel announces that ‘we’ (the readers) are now “in the presence of self-

consciousness in a new shape” —a shape Hegel will eventually deem “Stoicism” (197-198).

However, it is not so explicitly apparent in Hegel’s prose why precisely this shift to a new shape

of self-consciousness called Stoicism occurs. It will therefore be helpful here to offer an analysis

                                                                                                               
8
Precisely how this process works involves much more philosophical depth than I am able to
explicate here. However, below I will expand a bit upon this aspect of the slave’s independence
by way of practical work with reference to Stoicism inasmuch as this aspect of the slave’s self-
consciousness is integral to the transition into the logically succeeding form of Stoic self-
consciousness. Suffice it to say here that the slave’s work involves concrete determination and
self-determination in a way that gives it a much richer depth of experience and sense of self than
the master, who idly stagnates in his ‘abstract’ identity. The issues here are complex
epistemological ones. For more on these issues I refer the reader to: Russon, Reading Hegel’s
Phenomenology, pp. 97-112; Chiereghin “Freedom and Thought: Stoicism, Skepticism, and
Unhappy Consciousness” (esp. pp. 56-59 and note 3, p. 70); and Brandom, The Spirit of Trust,
(see his chapter on ‘Freedom and Self-Consciousness’).
   5  

of Hegel’s complex prose in this section of the Phenomenology in order explicate the reasons for

this transition to the new shape of self-consciousness that is Stoicism.

Hegel begins “Freedom as Self-Consciousness” with a recapitulation of the implicit

failure of the master’s attempted quest for complete independence. He writes of the master’s self-

consciousness thus: “For the independent self-consciousness it is only the pure abstraction of the

‘I’ that is its essential nature” (197). The master is merely an “abstract ‘I’” inasmuch as his

“essential nature” lacks the kind of concrete determinateness that is implicit in the slave’s

essential nature, given the fact that the slave experiences himself in a concrete manner to the

extent that he sees himself shaped by the objects that he works on in the world (albeit objects

which are intended for consumption by the master).

Here it is important to recall that for Hegel self-consciousness (beyond mere abstractness)

requires the concrete work of identity going out into the world of otherness and then “return[ing]

from otherness” (168). If the master is a mere “abstract ‘I’” it is precisely because he does not do

the dirty work of toiling with concrete experience which the slave in fact does. And it is for this

reason of toiling with objectivity that the slave comes to have a higher sort of self-consciousness

than the master, one which is determinatively richer than mere abstractness. For, in contrast to

the master, “the consciousness that is forced back into itself becomes, in its formative activity, its

own object in the form of the thing fashioned” (197). Here, an example will help clarify how the

slave might see himself in the ‘form of the thing fashioned’.

The slave creates the plough, a thing ‘out there’ in the world, and he comes to see his

very self in the plough. The very concept ‘plough’ and thus by extension the thing ‘out there’ is,

to use an analogy that might be helpful here, his ‘thought-offspring’. In a way similar to the way

that parents see themselves in their children (for example, in the habits, traits, and qualities they
   6  

have wittingly and unwittingly imparted upon their children), the fabricator of practical objects

(e.g. the plough) recognizes himself in the object created; for he knows the design plan of the

thing, how to execute it, how to shape the materials, and what the thing’s intended purpose is.

He, like the parent, is responsible for having put that knowledge into the thing. The point here is

that he has to create this knowledge; nature does not provide it ready-made. Thus, the slave’s

being “forced back into itself” denotes the process by which the slave recognizes that he is as

much in the plough as the plough is in him. The slave ‘went out’ into the plough, for the first

time saw himself in a ‘thing’ (the plough) and was therefore “forced back” into himself in the

thing seen (or rather, conceptualized/thought).

It is clear then that the “being forced back into itself” of what Hegel is here calling

“subservient consciousness” (197) again recalls the fundamentally important process of self-

consciousness determining things (and itself) by “return[ing] from otherness” (167). Thus it

becomes evident why the master’s seeming independence achieved over the slave is in fact a

much less rich sense of independence than that of the slave. It is clear for the readers of the

Phenomenology that the master has a weak sense of independence relative to the slave’s stronger

sense of independence (even if this fact is not apparent to the slave). This is the case inasmuch as

the master’s weak independence: (1) requires the slave’s recognition for its being independent

and therefore in actually remains dependent upon the slave (as discussed above on p. 4); and (2)

the master’s independence is achieved at the cost of establishing the master’s identity as a merely

“abstract ‘I’” (a point which is more important for the present concerns).9

The most important thing for Hegel at this stage of the Phenomenology is the fact that

with the slave, for the first time self-consciousness has managed to merge the in-itself (objects,

                                                                                                               
9
It is for these two reasons above all that Hegel declares the slave’s self-consciousness to be the
more “truly independent consciousness” (193).
   7  

the objective) with the for-itself (in this case the slave’s own self-consciousness).10 However, it is

immediately important to point out the fact that for the slave these “two moments” —the merging

of the in-itself and the for-itself—“fall apart” (198). The slave is unable to truly hold these two

moments together in the way that Hegel will eventually show Stoicism to succeed at doing. Slave

self-consciousness, Hegel writes, “becomes in its formative activity the form of the thing it has

fashioned”, before noting that, “for the subservient consciousness as such, these two moments—

itself as an independent object [the in-itself], and this object as a mode of consciousness [the for-

itself], and hence its own essential nature—fall apart” (197).

The reason that, for the slave, these two moments ‘fall apart’ concerns the fact that,

despite the slave’s seeing himself in the objects that he forms (thereby implicitly establishing the

identity of the in-itself and the for-itself) he still sees in the object its primary intended purpose,

which it is to say its consumption by the master (or its conducing to the production of such

consumables). The slave still sees more of the master in the object than himself; there is not

complete merging of the in-itself and the for-itself here because even though the slave sees the

form of himself embodied in the thing worked on, the thing really is for the master. Peter

Kalkavage’s remarks are helpful on this point. He writes that the “slave does not put these two

moments together” because the slave “sees the master rather than himself as the essential or

independent self. The slave does not see that qua conscious worker, he rather than the master is

the substance of things—the being that gives form, lastingness and value to them” (Kalkavage

127-128). Even though, for the slave, these two moments ‘fall apart’, Hegel declares that ‘we’

phenomenologists nevertheless see implicit in the slave’s bringing together of in-itself and for-

itself a “new shape of consciousness” (197), quite simply that shape of consciousness which is

                                                                                                               
10
This is not to say that there will not eventually be higher forms of the merging of the in-itself
with the for-itself; this is merely the first form of such merging.    
   8  

able to make identical the in-itself (object) and for-itself (thinking self-consciousness). This new

shape is Stoicism.

Hegel declares that this new shape of consciousness is Stoicism because Hegel see in the

historical model11 of Stoic thinking the kind of self-consciousness implicit in the slave’s blending

of the in-itself of the object with the for-itself of its self-consciousness, now made explicit to self-

consciousness. Stoic self-consciousness knows what it is doing when it brings together the in-

itself and the for-itself, and it cognizes only itself when it does so. The Stoic says to himself: “I

am free because I am not in an other but remain solely and simply in communion with myself”

(197). The Stoic, in pure thinking, is the unity of the in-itself and the for-itself as solely thought

because the Stoic does not let the realm of existent things perturb his purely abstract

concepts/thoughts. With the Stoic we are in the realm of pure theory.12

For Hegel, the identity of the in-itself and the for-itself denotes the distinctive character of

conceptual thinking in contrast to representative schematizing which latter always has the

character of taking something other than consciousness—something external to it—as its

                                                                                                               
11
Here it is important to note the fact that Hegel is not saying that this new shape of
consciousness is something that simply historically emerges in ancient Greek or Roman Stoicism
and is then left behind as history continues onward. As Franco Chiereghin writes: “The
Phenomenology is not a work of philosophical historiography, but the philosophies which
appeared historically are used as examples of figures of consciousness which may appear in
different epochs” (Chiereghin 59).
12
Interestingly, such ‘pure theory’ was generated out of the purely practical workings of the
slave in his merging of in-itself and for-itself. Indeed an interesting approach to understanding the
shifts from slave self-consciousness into the various forms of self-consciousness in “Freedom as
Self-Consciousness” would be to trace the way theoretical forms of self-consciousness emerge
out of practical forms of self-consciousness and vice versa. We could demonstrate this
progression thus: slave (practical) à Stoic (theoretical) à Skeptic (practical) à unhappy
consciousness as “pure heart” (theoretical) à unhappy  consciousness as work, desire and
enjoyment (practical) à unhappy consciousness as Priest-mediator (theoretical).
   9  

object.13 On this point, Hegel writes: “What is represented … has as such the form of being

something other than consciousness” (197, Pinkard Trans.)14 In purely conceptual thinking the

object and the (conceptual) thought of the object are identical; and it such purely conceptual

thinking that the Stoics inaugurated and forwarded as the primary goal of life. Only in completely

abstracting from the externalities of existing things could thought achieve the sense of freedom

that would allow it to remain utterly indifferent to otherness as such. In thinking as pure thinking

the Stoic thinks only of concepts; concrete existence is, for Stoicism a painful nuisance.

Such purely conceptual thinking concerns nothing external to it, for it cannot be bothered

with external existence, and thus with representation, desire, understanding and other such modes

of dealing with objects. With regard to thinking as the form of self-consciousness that makes

itself identical to its object (in the concept), Hegel writes: “to think does not mean to be an

abstract ‘I’ [in contrast to the master in the master/slave dialectic] but an ‘I’ which has at the

same time the significance of intrinsic being, of having itself for object, or of relating itself to

objective being in such a way that its significance is the being-for-self of the consciousness for

which it is [an object]” (198). The important point to take away here is that Stoic thought has

only ‘itself for object’. This denotes the specific nature of Stoic freedom: in thinking purely about

the conceptual realm the Stoic is free from any disturbances in the realm of the “bustle of

existence”, or “natural existence” (199/200).

Why Hegel sees in Stoicism most particularly this new shape of consciousness concerns

the fact that the ancient Stoics were interested in pure thought in such a way that the existence of

                                                                                                               
13
For a clear a concise overview of the distinction between purely conceptual thinking and
representation see Franco Chiereghin’s “Freedom and Thought: Stoicism, Skepticism, and
Unhappy Consciousness”, p.58. Chiereghin notes: “a concept is pure thought, not mixed with
representations or sensory images” (58).
14
Here I have opted for Pinkard’s rendering of Vorstellung as ‘representation’ as is the now
common translation of this technical term. Miller translates Vorstellung as “picture-thoughts”.    
   10  

natural things, things external to purely conceptual thought, were said to have virtually no

significance whatsoever for the thinker. The specifically pure freedom of Stoic thinking concerns

the fact that such thinking can rest content with solely itself and its thoughts and therefore not be

perturbed in any way by external things, as Hegel makes clear: “The freedom of [Stoic] self-

consciousness is indifferent15 to natural existence and has therefore equally let this go free …

Freedom in thought has only pure thought as its truth, a truth lacking the fullness of life” (200).

Interestingly, Hegel has shifted the focus from self-consciousness’s seeking independence

in the ‘master/slave dialectic’ to the distinctively Stoic preoccupation with freedom.

Independence, it seems, was the aim of a self-consciousness still mired in the realm of desire for

recognition, whilst Stoic freedom has no need whatsoever for either desire or the recognition of

others. Here it is important to note that in Hegel’s discussion of Stoic freedom he is, of course,

emphasizing the great significance of negative freedom for the Stoics of imperial Rome.16 This is

to say that the Roman Stoics sought freedom from the constraints of an often brutal and

impersonal empire, and they found this freedom in the escape to pure thought. This is clear in

Hegel’s account of Stoic freedom:

Stoicism is the freedom which always comes directly out of bondage and returns into the
pure universality of thought. As a universal form of World-Spirit, Stoicism could only
appear on the scene in a time of bondage, but also a time of universal culture which had
raised itself to the level of thought (199).

                                                                                                               
15
Hegel’s use of the term ‘indifferent’ here is not fortuitous. He is referring to two Stoic (and
Skeptic) technical terms which are variously translated into English as ‘indifferent’. These Greek
terms are ataraxia and apatheia. For a discussion of the significance of these technical terms in
Hegel’s discussion of Stoicism and Skepticism see: Solomon (460); Kalkavage (129); Kain (57);
and Pinkard (66). Pinkard’s translation of the Phenomenology translates ‘indifferent’ as
‘ataraxie’ at §205 in the discussion of Skepticism.
16
For a discussion of the role of negative freedom in Stoic thought, as well as Hegel’s remarks
thereon, see Robert Solomon’s In the Spirit of Hegel, p. 460.
   11  

The point here seems to be that, in a way, “all are slaves in Rome”, as Philip Kain puts it (Kain

57). Every Roman individual was a slave to the brutality of the impersonal Empire.17 This point

becomes clearer in Hegel’s overt allusion to Epictetus (a Roman slave) and Marcus Aurelius (a

Roman emperor, or ‘master’) both of whom equally sought refuge from the drudgery of Roman

life in pure thought. Thus Hegel writes:

Whether on the throne or in chains, in the utter dependence of its individual existence, its
aim is to be free, and to maintain that lifeless indifference which steadfastly withdraws
from the bustle of existence … into the simple essentiality of thought (199).

Importantly, this passage shows that at the level of “individual existence” masters and

slaves are still entirely mired in the process of desiring recognition and desiring objects; at this

logical level of self-consciousness masters and slaves alike are still in “utter dependence” on one

another and on objects. Thus it is only in abstraction from this realm of ‘bustling existence’ that

the Stoic is free and therefore it seems apparent that the Stoic is simultaneously18 a desiring and a

thinking self-consciousness (so long as the Stoic is, like either Marcus Aurelius or Epictetus both

a master or slave and a self-consciousness which thinks of pure concepts.19 Nevertheless, Hegel’s

remarks on the fact that Stoicism shows up ‘on the scene’ during a time of ‘universal bondage’

are designed, I contend, to illustrate the fact that Stoicism really does seem to be the logically
                                                                                                               
17
For a brief discussion of some of the social and political aspects of individual alienation in the
Roman empire I refer the reader to Kain’s development of these points in citation given: Hegel
and the Other, p. 59.
18
The question of simultaneously concurrent shapes of conscious in Hegel’s Phenomenology
(shapes which are all-too-often considered as strictly logically successive) is an issue which I
believe requires much more attention in the future of scholarly literature on this work.
19
Hegel will discuss this simultaneity with reference to the Skeptic (the shape of self-
consciousness which follows from Stoicism) in terms of the “empirical”, “contingent”, and “non-
identity” on the one side of self-consciousness, and the “universal” and “self-identical” (or
transcendental) on the other side (PhS 205). This division between the identical and the non-
identical will take on profound significance for the section of the Phenomenology devoted to the
“Unhappy Consciousness”, where it is discussed in terms of the “unchangeable” (208).
   12  

necessary consequent to the logically antecedent20 impasses of the master’s and the slave’s

respective aims for a satisfactory independence.

To be sure, the primary reason which Hegel offers for why Stoicism, and thus thinking,

‘appears on the scene’ is quite simply that a new kind of self-consciousness emerged when the

slave implicity merged the in-itself with the for-itself and some self-consciousness took up this

novelty and made it explicit to itself. And this ‘some self-consciousness’ just so happens to be

Stoic self-consciousness. Us readers can clearly enough see that what is implicit in the slave’s

merging of in-itself and for-itself has the structure of conceptual thought. But Hegel is much less

clear on why this new conceptually thinking self-consciousness rendered what was implicit in

slave consciousness explicit to itself. (And, of course, Hegel might here be less interested here in

this question of ‘why?’ than with simply showing that if ‘we’ readers of the Phenomenology can

accept that, even if the slave could not make his novelty explicit to himself, ‘we’ can make it

explicit to ourselves and move onward with the book, than this logical progression makes enough

sense to allow us the comfort of seeing how this progression might be possible). However, such a

possible progression offers us nothing in the way of reasons for a logical necessity for such a

progression. And thus here I simply wish to point out that when Hegel claims that conceptual

thinking could “only” appear “on the scene in a time of bondage” —a claim he makes with

specific reference to Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius21—he is making a veiled claim about self-

                                                                                                               
20
Here I would again wish to point out that even if Stoic self-consciousness is the logically
necessary resulting shape of consciousness following the logically prior self-consciousness’s of
the master and the slave in the ‘master/slave dialectic’, this does not in any way mean that the
master/slave consciousness’s are necessarily (1) historically antecedent to Stoic self-
consciousness, and (2) temporally distinct, or successive, in individual Stoic self-consciousness’s
at the level of ‘individual existence’. This latter point would require greater elaboration than the
space I have here, and to my knowledge has not received an in-depth scholarly treatment.
21
That is to say, two individuals, one master and one slave, each of whom seeking to extricate
themselves entirely from both mere independence over the other (self-consciousness) and
   13  

consciousness transitioning from master and slave self-consciousness to Stoic self-consciousness

because both the master and slave self-consciosnesses came to realize that the independence they

each had was an insufficient false independence. Each was therefore compelled toward the

freedom of conceptual thought, thereby doing the hard work of making explicit to themselves the

novelty of the slaves implicit merging of in-itself with for-itself, because each felt that something

had to be better than false independence, and freedom of thought was that something.22

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
desiderative relating to objects. Here it is helpful to recall the Stoic’s credo: ““I am free because I
am not in an other but remain solely and simply in communion with myself” (197). Only the
pure identity of the in-itself and the for-itself in conceptual thought unperturbed by concrete
existence allows for such communion. It is this communion that the Stoic lives in.  
22
To further substantiate this claim I would need to do more work; specifically, I would need to
consult all of Hegel’s texts and lectures on the history of philosophy with respect to Stoicism to
see whether he makes any claims therein about the transition from slave self-consciousness to
Stoic self-consciousness. I simply offer the claim here concerning why self-consciousness prior
to Stoic self-consciousness might logically advance into logically subsequent forms as a possible
way of reading the necessity of the transition from the ‘master/slave dialectic’ to Stoicism. It
seems to me that if we (the readers) want a truly genetic account of the logical necessity—and
maybe we don’t—of this transition, then this work has, to my knowledge, yet to be done.
   14  

Works Cited:

Brandom, Robert. The Spirit of Trust. (Unpublished). Available here:

http://www.pitt.edu/~brandom/spirit_of_trust_2014.html [last accessed: Oct. 26, 2015].
Chiereghin, Franco. “Freedom and Thought: Stoicism, Skepticism, and Unhappy
Consciousness”. In The Blackwell Guide to Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. Ed Ken
R.Westphal. West Sussex: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2009.
Epictetus. Discourses, Fragments, Handbook. Trans. Robin Hard. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2014.
Kain, Philip. Hegel and the Other. Albany: SUNY Press, 2005.
Kalkavage, Peter. The Logic of Desire: An Introduction to Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit.
Philadelphia: Paul Dry Books, 2007.
Hegel, G. W. F. Phenomenology of Spirit. Trans. A. V. Miller. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1977.
Hegel, G. W. F. Phenomenology of Spirit. Trans. Terry Pinkard. (Unpublished). Available here:
http://terrypinkard.weebly.com/phenomenology-of-spirit-page.html [last accessed: Oct.
22, 2015].
Pinkard, Terry. Hegel’s Phenomenology: The Sociality of Reason. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1994.
Russon, John. Reading Hegel’s Phenomenology. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004.
Solomon, Robert. In the Spirit of Hegel. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983.