Stephen Gill argues that the contemporary global politics of development are

characterised by ‘new constitutionalism’ and ‘disciplinary neoliberalism’. Do you

agree or disagree with this statement, and why?

In 2002, Professor Stephen Gill of York University published an article discussing

the concept of ‘new constitutionalism’, which he described in part, as a
“redefinition of the political on a world scale” (Gill 2002: 47). This was one of
several articles related to ‘disciplinary neoliberalism’ and the emergence of what
he called the ‘market civilization’. These concepts refer to transformations in the
understanding of social purpose and ideologies based on market integration and
the neo-liberal oriented accumulation and consumption (Gill 1995: 401).

In the first section of this article, I will discuss the concepts of ‘new
constitutionalism’ and ‘disciplinary neoliberalism’, concluding that Gill’s
arguments are supported by strong evidence. In the second section, I will
evaluate to what extent the contemporary global politics of development can be
said to be ‘characterised’ by new constitutionalism and disciplinary neoliberalism
by discussing some of the implications of the neoliberal ‘redefinition of the
political’ as a philosophical and multilateral agenda and some of the ways in
which this agenda is unable to achieve complete hegemony.

New constitutionalism and disciplinary neoliberalism

Gill describes ‘new constitutionalism’ as the “political-juridical counterpart” to

‘disciplinary neoliberalism’. As such, the two concepts are very closely related.
Disciplinary neoliberalism has been defined as “a discourse of political economy
that promotes the power of capital through extension and deepening of market
values and disciplines in social life, under a regime of free enterprise” (Gill 2002:
47).
Without examining the conceptual complexities of how Gill arrives at his
understanding of discipline, we can concentrate on the way in which market
values are extended into social life in what he calls the “socialisation of capital”
(Gill 2002: 63). It essentially refers to the way that neo-liberal conceptions of
identity and relationship are based increasingly on the market and how these
conceptions are increasingly institutionalised. This trend is clearly visible in
several ways, including; the framing of ‘official’ development discourse, the use of
state or institutional power and the ‘common sense’ of market discipline.

Development discourse is replete with references to economic growth as the basis

of success (Higgot & Weber 2005: 437). Onis (2005: 265) identifies market

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liberalism as fundamental for the development model espoused by a neo-liberal
orthodoxy during the period of the Washington consensus. In a review of the
changing politics of the World Bank (WB) Cammack (2002) shows that the tenets
of neo-liberal economic theory have remained a consistent theme in policy. This
has continued regardless of the remodelling of the World Bank’s image from
banking into the business of ‘development’ (Cammack 2002; Higgot & Weber
2005). That neo-liberal capital accumulation forms part of the development
discourse and strategy of the World Bank suggests that neo-liberal thinking is a
strong part of the modern political landscape of institutional development.
Referring to a series of World Bank reports, Cammack says

“Its [WB] stated purpose, then, was to define for all economies
in the global capitalist system – not just those in transition – a
comprehensive set of institutions that would eradicate any
vestige of planning, and implement the logic of capitalist
exploitation, competition and accumulation throughout all
economic, social, political and cultural systems” (Cammack
2002:171)

This framing of development discourse in terms of capitalist accumulation is seen

just as clearly in the particulars of the ‘Millennium Challenge Account’ (MCA). This
fund was designed to give grants to so called ‘failed states’ that implemented
certain economic and governance policies. Soederberg (2004: 294) quotes
President George W Bush tying MCA support to the implementation of ‘economic
freedom’, a pseudonym for neo-liberal market policy.

Gill explains the emergence of market civilization when he says;

“…social institutions were redefined to create an emergent

market civilization – a monoculture of both social development
and the mind that is associated with a new political economy of
disciplinary neoliberalism… The structure of this emerging
civilizational form relies on the disciplinary power of market
forces… to shape social choice and social stratification” (Gill
2002: 50)

Even when the World Bank and similar institutions in Europe adopted the ‘human
face’ of a more socially responsible development, it really only disguised the
ultimate liberal goal of market rationality (Mitchell 2006: 404).

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The institutionalisation of market discipline involves the creation of laws,
regulations and forms of planning on a world scale (Gill 2002: 47). Concepts of
‘good governance’ are used to establish a basis of market liberalisation as the
ideal of government planning and regulation. An example is the changing policies
and programs put in place for the European Union’s integration of migrants and
second generation minorities. Mitchell (2004: 394) chronicles a move in the
policy of the education sector of the European Commission from a focus on
cultural diversity to a focus on lifelong learning. This change in focus prioritises
skills and mobility necessary for economic success. The aim is for the immigrant
to be able to drive their own individual learning to allow them to integrate
successfully, not into the social fabric of Europe, but into the European labour
market. Further, Ayers (2006) and Evans (2007) make good cases for both
democratic reforms and human rights codifications being platforms of support for
the advancement of market discipline. In both these cases, the authors present
the regulations and laws by which democracy and human rights are codified as
intentionally laying the foundation for the successful institution of market
liberalisation and notions of capital accumulation.

Market discipline is presented as a sort of fait accompli or even ‘common sense’

in modern western society. One writer says, “…global action is guided by the
norms defined by ‘market discipline’. These norms have achieved widespread
acceptance as ‘common sense’ within the populations of advanced economies”
(Evans 2007: 118). This acceptance comes partly from the illusion of economic
liberalism as ‘ahistorical’, that is, without any traceable development or
alternative. Higgot and Weber support the point, saying “This strategy can
appear unproblematic from the mainstream perspective because of the ahistorical
nature of the theoretical framework of the trade-development debate anyway”
(Higgot & Weber 2005: 436). Concealing the history and development of
economic liberalism as the dominant perspective creates a sort of stasis in the
framework of understanding development discourse. Cammack traces the
changing fortunes of market liberalisation and neo-liberal development discourse
and establishes the specific struggle by particular economists and academics to
restore the “hegemony of economic liberalism” (Cammack 2002: 163). This
indicates that there are alternatives to economic liberalism and possibilities for
differing political discourse. The ideological basis of market civilisation and the
historical struggles for the discourse of development will be discussed further in
the second section of the article.

This acceptance also comes partly from economics being presented as separate
from politics. Markets are viewed as being somehow independent and neutral

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entities ruled from the grave by Adam Smith’s invisible hand, maintaining a sort
of natural equilibrium that transcend the question of politics. As neutral bodies
maintaining independence from political concerns, they conceal their political
biases and connections. Barry Gills laments the true study of political economy
when he says “What we cannot have (again!) is economics without politics and
politics without economics” (Gills 2001: 236). But it is precisely this separation of
economics from politics in institutional form that Gill describes as ‘new
constitutionalism’.

Gill introduces his article with an abstract that states, “New constitutionalism’
limits democratic control over central elements of economic policy and regulation
by locking in future governments to liberal frameworks of accumulation premised
on freedom of enterprise” (Gill 2002: 47). He further elucidates by explaining
that the separation of economics and politics and the institution of neoliberal
political and legal reforms are designed to commit governments to a future of
neoliberal market economy and limit the political means to change that
commitment (Gill 2002: 47). Simply put, a framework is created which
establishes what sort of political action is possible. Referring to the World Trade
Organisation (WTO), Weber says “The WTO as a multilaterally constituted agency
of global governance with constitutional features limits in politically important
ways the range of environmental policy options from the local to the international
level” (Weber 2001: 93). Organisations such as the WTO are constituted
multilaterally to make decisions which rely on compliance by member states.
These decisions are effectively removed from the arena of representative decision
making because they occur at a level when citizenship provides no opportunity for
representation. More specifically, the WTO provides a conceptual framework for
national decision making (Lang in Higgot & Weber 2005: 443). Similarly, this
constriction of decision making to neo-liberal economic strategy, which Friedman
(1999: 86) ironically refers to as the ‘golden straightjacket’ is seen in situations
that arise from free trade agreements (FTA). The Peru-US FTA contains provision
for a fund manager, Citibank, to sue the nation of Peru at the United Nations or
World Bank tribunal for loss of income, should Peru choose to reverse a
privatisation deal made for managing superannuation. Considering the size of the
claim, Peru would have great difficulty choosing to reinstate government
sponsored superannuation, even if it was in the best interest of the welfare of the
Peruvians (Public Citizen 2007: 3).

Gill suggests that new constitutionalism also consists of those efforts to “contain
challenges to the disciplinary neoliberalism project through co-optation,
domestication, neutralization and depoliticization of opposition.” (Gill 2002: 48)

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He uses an example of the ‘third way’ agenda to show that traditional political
parties based on alternatives to neo-liberalism have been co-opted to support
neo-liberal policy. (Gill 2002: 50) A review of Thomas and Weber’s (1999) article
on the political ramifications of environmental organisations being involved in the
establishment of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) suggests
that organisations with agendas alternative to neoliberal policy are in danger of
being co-opted or subverted into supporting the discourse of neo-liberal market
economy.

Ideology and Agenda

“The new constitutionalism can be defined as the political

project of attempting to make transnational liberalism, and if
possible liberal democratic capitalism, the sole model for future
development. It is therefore intimately related to the rise of
market civilization” (Gill 1995: 412)

New constitutionalism and disciplinary neoliberalism are really ways of analysing

a calculated agenda to establish political hegemony. This agenda is regarded as
being the project of western agencies, international organisation and of neo-
colonial elites (Ayers 2006: 321) and of big corporate capital and dominant social
forces (Gill 2002: 48). This becomes relevant in that establishing a motive and
reasoning for a neo-liberal agenda helps in understanding to what degree motive
driven concepts such as disciplinary neo-liberalism and new constitutionalism can
be said to be ‘characteristic’ of contemporary development politics.

There are a number of perspectives from which to approach the neoliberal

agenda. Firstly, we can consider it from the point of view of an ideological and
philosophical necessity. This is a question based on the premise of what it
means to be civilised. Is civilisation to be based on the concept of the market as
an expression of personal freedoms to trade and own property? Higgot and
Weber answer the question, “the answer to the question of ‘who we are’ is homo
economicus, with its instrumental justification of ‘market-society’” (Higgot &
Weber 2005: 437). This concept is based on the belief that all people are
economically rational (Ayers 2006: 332) and if ‘free’, will always choose to ‘better’
themselves. These concepts conceal power relations and cultural norms which
serve to constrain action. Part of the claim of the ‘rational mind’ is the
assumption that this claim of the free ‘liberal self’ is a universal characteristic.
(Ayers 2006: 332) These assumptions require a self justification of market

5
civilisation that naturally resolves into the belief that what is good for us, is good
for everyone (Soederberg 2004: 289).

Secondly, we can view the neo-liberal agenda as an integral part of a multilateral

project on behalf of the United States of America and other western capitalist
nations who have adopted similar projects. Gill suggests this when he says

“In other words, the US government is using access to its vast

market as a lever of power, linked to a reshaping of the
international business climate, by subjecting other nations to
the disciplines of the new constitutionalism, whilst largely
refusing to submit to them itself, partly for strategic reasons”
(Gill 2002: 415).

It is possible to view this spread of market civilisation as part of a multilateral

project to maintain US global supremacy. President Bush’s driving of the MCA
was a challenge to the institutions of world governance, such as the World Trade
Organisation and World Bank to adopt more stringent means of fitting ‘failed
states’ into Friedman’s ‘golden straightjacket’ (Soederberg 2004: 292).

Finally, we can view it as a process initiated on behalf of big business. Gill says
“Disciplinary neo-liberalism is commensurate with interests of big corporate
capital and dominant social forces” (Gill 2002: 48). This would suggest that
market liberalisation is really about supporting the agenda of a class of financial
elite. Market civilisation would simply be a means by which ever expanding
markets could be opened and the social experiences of people increasingly
packaged as a commodity.

But while the neo-liberal agenda enjoys a position of supremacy it is unable to

completely achieve hegemony. There are various forces which threaten neo-
liberal development. Gill (2002: 47) speaks of a ‘clash of globalizations’ which he
puts down to intensified inequalities, social dislocations and human insecurities.
This refers to the obvious disconnect between an agenda of development which
claims to be the solution to poverty but is resulting in an increasing gap between
rich and poor. It is the same disconnect which sees fragmenting society and an
increase in global inequality. (Gill 2002: 399; Onis 2005: 267)

New constitutionalism and disciplinary neoliberalism also suffer from internal

inconsistencies. Foremost among these is a discourse that calls for a minimalist
state (Onis 2005: 263) and the recession of state power increasingly requiring

6
institutional and state power to maintain. The concept of new constitutionalism
itself bears witness to this contradiction. Further, the fundamental contradiction
of continual economic growth in the face of limited resources suggests that neo-
liberal market civilisation is facing a sustainability crisis (Gill 2002: 419).

Finally, there is an increasing disquiet and dissatisfaction that is beginning to

manifest itself in alternative movements such as the World Social Forum (WSF).
Movements such as the WSF open up spaces for alternative discourse and a place
to ask the questions of neoliberal economics and institutions that cannot be asked
in conventional politics. Conway says “it provides a space for actors who may
construct democratic projects in different contexts”. (Conway 2004: 624) This
space is just one way in which segments of global populations can begin to
experiment with ideas outside the accepted neo-liberal constraints.

In this essay, I have reflected on the concepts of disciplinary neoliberalism and its
counterpart, new constitutionalism. Discussing related concepts and looking at
some of the support given by Gill and other writers, I would argue that disciplinary
neoliberalism and new constitutionalism are indeed characteristic of the
contemporary global politics of development. This essay briefly considered a
few of the examples that can be marshalled to support this case. It is important,
however, to consider the motivations behind these concepts. Certainly this can
help shed light on how viable support for alternatives might be. It is clear that
there are a number of ways in which neoliberal market economy is contested, not
only from without, but from internal structural weaknesses. These may provide
avenues for opening up opportunities for discourse. It may be that the case I
have given for contesting market civilisation is positive, so it is good to keep in
mind Stephen Gill’s closing words in his article ‘Constitutiionalizing Inequality and
the Clash of Globalizations’.

However, it would be unwise to underestimate the scope and

depth of the problem for the forces challenging the G7 nexus
and disciplinary neoliberalism: a wide series of ‘productive
constraints’ have been institutionalized.” (Gill 2002: 65)

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