Go Goliath!

America, Light Footprints, and the Challenge of Asymmetric Warfare

Cole Pinheiro1

There are two ways to fight the U.S. military—asymmetrically and stupid. Future

enemies will not be passive; they will make every effort to avoid U.S. strengths, emulate

advanced U.S. capabilities, and disrupt U.S. advantages.

- LTG H.R. McMaster, “Continuity and Change” (2015)

In 2014, the United States spent over $610 billion on defense, more than the next seven

countries combined.2 This disparity in military spending creates vast inequalities in terms of

military power – a modern David and Goliath situation. As long as these inequalities exist, we

should expect less powerful actors to employ the “weapons of the weak”: terrorism and

insurgency.3 We should also expect strong states to protect themselves and counter actors that

attempt to challenge the status quo.

Over the past decade, the United States used population-centric counterinsurgency

strategies in Afghanistan and Iraq with limited success. Both campaigns sought to secure the

1
The views expressed in this article are personal and do not reflect the official policy or position of the United
States Military Academy, Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the United States government.
2
Peter G. Peterson Foundation, “The U.S. spends more on defense than the next seven countries combined”,
http://pgpf.org/Chart-Archive/0053_defense-comparison, April 13, 2015.
3
Martha Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” Comparative Politics, Vol. 13, No. 4. (Jul., 1981), 387.
 2

population and build local support for the new governments.4 These conflicts were tremendously

expensive in terms of blood and treasure, but neither produced a definitive victory for the United

States. Domestically the wars generated political, military, and public aversion to large-scale,

American-led counterinsurgency operations. Consequently, many continue to question the

efficacy of America’s counterinsurgency doctrine. After Iraq and Afghanistan, it is not clear

whether powerful states have learned how to overcome asymmetric threats to their power.

Many U.S. policymakers learned from Iraq and Afghanistan that it is best to avoid

counterinsurgency campaigns altogether. But policymakers are not always free to choose which

conflicts will arise. The era of transnational threats persists; religious extremism, organized

crime, ethnic and sectarian rivalry, poor governance, failing states, and other drivers of terrorism

and insurgency continue to grow.5 Asymmetric threats – actors that attempt to avoid a state’s

strength and attack where the state is weak in order to achieve a political aim – are likely to

remain a central concern for U.S. foreign policy. This paper intends to frame the central

questions facing policymakers as they grapple with these sorts of threats. Given current political

and fiscal realities, how should the United States structure their military force? Is it possible to

use counterinsurgency strategies to intervene successfully against contemporary threats like the

Islamic State (IS)? What other asymmetric threats loom on the horizon?

David Comes of Age: The Evolution of the Modern Asymmetric Threat

Asymmetric War refers to a conflict involving a sizeable power gap between two rivals.

This power disparity refers mainly to military capability, but can also include economic,

4
Joseph J. Collins, Understanding War in Afghanistan (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press,
2011), 54-55.
5
T.X. Hammes, “The Future of Counterinsurgency”, Foreign Policy Research Institute, Fall 2012,
http://www.fpri.org/articles/2012/11/future-counterinsurgency, 586-587.
 3

diplomatic, and political power. Asymmetric war encompasses multiple categories of sub-state

violence including: insurgency, terrorism, guerilla warfare, urban warfare, and proxy warfare.

MaoTse-tung was the most influential theorist and practitioner of this form of warfare. His

central premise - that a guerilla fighter relies on the support of the people - remains central to

understanding asymmetric war today.

Mao’s Contribution

Mao’s concept of revolutionary war combines traditional guerilla warfare with political

mass movements. Mao prescribes a peasant mobilization to defeat the ruling authority, reform

society, and alter economic conditions.6 In the protracted campaign he argues that popular will

and political factors are supreme.7 The insurgency must pursue political objectives that “coincide

with the aspirations of the people.”8 The people are “the fountainhead of guerilla warfare” - the

source of recruits, supplies, intelligence, shelter, and freedom of movement.9 Thus, the insurgent

must focus on controlling and organizing the population. Mao argues that guerillas cannot

survive without the population; “like a fish out of its native element, it cannot live.”10

Asymmetric war is as intensely psychological as it is political. According to Mao, “troops

should have a precise conception of the political goal of the struggle and political organization to

be used in attaining the goal.”11 Propaganda educates the masses, disciplines the troops, and

weakens the enemy.12 The key is to “link the political mobilization for the war with

developments in the war and with the life of the soldiers and the people, and make it a

6
Mao Tse-tung, On Guerilla Warfare, trans. Samuel B Griffith (New York: BN Publishing, 2007), 46.
7
A. Chaplin, Terror: The New Theater of War: Mao’s Legacy: Selected Cases of Terrorism in the 20 th and 21st
Centuries (New York: University Press of America, 2003), 7.
8
Tse-tung, On Guerilla Warfare, 43.
9
Tse-tung, On Guerilla Warfare, 73.
10
Tse-tung, On Guerilla Warfare, 93.
11
Tse-tung, On Guerilla Warfare, 88.
12
Tse-tung, On Guerilla Warfare, 93.
 4

continuous movement.”13 Propaganda and ideology achieve unity of effort, making every person

a resource to support the guerilla and oppose the enemy.

Mao’s protracted war strategy consists of three sequential phases: strategic defensive,

strategic stalemate, and strategic offensive.14 In the strategic defensive phase, insurgents build

clandestine infrastructure, separate the people from the government, gain sympathetic support,

and survive. This requires a vanguard, an elite group of leaders capable of building a political

and military organization.15 In the initial phase leaders enmesh the people’s grievances with

political ideology and the revolution’s objectives. In phase two, strategic stalemate, they isolate

the people from the government, establish administration, and conduct protracted warfare.

Guerillas avoid decisive battle and remain mobile to survive.16 Small unit tactics “deceive, tempt,

and confuse the enemy.”17 Guerillas attack the enemy’s vulnerabilities and spread fear through

sabotage. Units require secure bases for training and force generation. Finally, the insurgents

shift to a conventional offensive to defeat the military and usurp the regime.18

Mao’s greatest contribution was his emphasis on guerillas building political support

amongst the people to change the correlation of forces against a superior enemy.19 Mao exported

his doctrine and provided a successful template to aspiring revolutionaries. However, Mao never

intended his theory as a universal blueprint, and he emphasized the need for variation. He

understood that “strategic theory has meaning only in terms of the concrete political, social, and

13
Bruno Shaw, “Selections from Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung” in Revolutionary Guerilla Warfare: Theories,
Doctrines and Contexts, ed. Sam C. Sarkesian (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2010), 224.
14
Bard O’neill, Insurgency & Terrorism, 2d Edition (Washington DC: Potomac Books, INC, 2005), 50.
15
Tse-tung, On Guerilla Warfare, 44-45.
16
Tse-tung, On Guerilla Warfare, 57
17
Tse-tung, On Guerilla Warfare, 103.
18
O’neill, Insurgency & Terrorism, 50 -51.
19
T.X. Hammes, The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21 st Century (Saint Paul: Zenith Press, 2006), 52-53.
 5

international circumstances at the moment in which theory is being elucidated.”20 As a

practitioner, he believed ultimately in bridging the gap between theory and practice. 21

Insurgents of all flavors have studied the Maoist approach and innovated to form conflict-

specific strategies. General Vo Nguyen Giap, for instance, internationalized the Vietcong’s

guerilla war to destroy America’s national political will.22 The Shining Path in Peru and the

Union for the Total Independence of Angola preferred to weaken their rivals’ economies before

confronting their military forces.23 Che Guevara advocated a military-focused strategy in which

martial action, instead of political organization, would mobilize the masses against a despotic

regime.24 Carlos Marighella pioneered an urban guerilla strategy that combined protests, urban

combat, and terrorism to provoke government overreaction and galvanize support for

revolution.25 Today, al Qaeda and its associates follow a transnational military approach that

uses attacks against America and ‘apostate’ regimes to generate support.26 To gain popular

support, these insurgent leaders innovated and used a variety of techniques, including

charismatic attraction, esoteric and exoteric appeals, terrorism, provocation of government

repression, coercion, and demonstrations of potency.27

Mao’s Students

TX Hammes argues that contemporary insurgency, termed 4th Generation Warfare

(4GW), evolved from Mao’s strategy. 4GW uses superior political will to convince the enemy’s

20
John Shy and Thomas W. Collier, “Revolutionary War” in Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the
Nuclear Age, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton University Press: New Jersey, 1986), 844.
21
Shy and Collier, “Revolutionary War”, 838-839.
22
Hammes, The Sling and the Stone, 56.
23
O’neill, Insurgency & Terrorism, 54.
24
Ernesto Che Guevara, Guerilla Warfare. (1991), 1.
25
Carlos Marighella, Mini-manual of the Urban Guerilla. (June 1969), 1-40.
26
O’neill, Insurgency & Terrorism, 65-67.
27
O’neill, Insurgency & Terrorism, 98-109.
 6

decisionmakers that their goals are unachievable.28 It forgoes attempts to defeat the state’s

military forces and leverages new information technology and social networks to reach into the

enemy’s population and weaken his political position over time.29 Information dominance is

critical to winning these so-called “Long Wars” - conflicts that can potentially last decades.

Although 4GW evolved from Maoist principles, it differs from Mao’s vision in some

crucial respects. David Kilcullen describes the

differences between modern insurgency and

Maoist revolutionary war.30 On the strategic

level, modern insurgency is transnational, and

technology provides some coordination

between various groups. The Internet provides

a virtual sanctuary that augments physical
bases and allows fighters to establish
connections, transfer knowledge, share
Figure 1: Insurgent is Iraq used advanced Improvised
Explosive Devices (IEDs), such as this Explosively Formed
Projectile (EFP), to destroy American armored vehicles.
Jihadi groups, such as al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), transferred
knowledge and tactics to their affiliates operating in
Afghanistan.

ideology, and train. Kilcullen argues that resistance insurgencies sparked by foreign invasion are

now more common than revolutionary insurgencies.31 Operationally, insurgents function “like a

self-synchronizing swarm of independent but cooperating cells” rather than well coordinated

mass organizations.32 Tactically, urban warfare and terrorism are more dominant than rural

28
Hammes, The Sling and the Stone, 2 & 5.
29
Hammes, The Sling and the Stone, 14.
30
David Kilcullen, “Counterinsurgency Redux” in Small Wars Journal,
http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/kilcullen1.pdf.
31
Kilcullen, “Counterinsurgency Redux”, 2-4.
32
Kilcullen, “Counterinsurgency Redux”, 6.
 7

campaigns.33 In the information age, leaders focus on perception management and media

exploitation.34

Even so, modern asymmetric warriors still require popular support to achieve a political

objective. Accordingly, violent groups continue to study and implement Maoist strategy. For

example, in 2002 Abu Ubayd al-Qurasi, an al Qaeda strategist, published a series of articles on

Maoist revolution and contemporary guerilla warfare. In “Revolutionary War” al-Qurashi

highlighted guerilla warfare tactics, the importance of a central political objective, and the need

to dedicate equal effort to political and military lines of operation.35 In “War of the Ether” he

argued that al Qaeda must use technology to internationalize the jihad in order to destroy U.S.

popular support.36 Indeed, Osama bin Laden’s strategy was an evolution of Maoist doctrine. Bin

Laden advocated a sequential guerilla campaign: 1) Provoke the United States into a protracted

war; 2) Mobilize the Muslim people and transform al Qaeda from an organization into a self-

perpetuating ideology and movement; 3) Exhaust the United States psychologically and

economically to force it to withdraw; 4) Overthrow Arab apostates regimes and destroy Israel; 5)

Resolve the heretical Shia situation.37 General David Petraeus sums up Mao’s pervasive

influence: “al Qaeda is trying to control populations, terrain and administer it… it has embraced

the Maoist concepts and used the very vocabulary. Again, these are peoples’ wars.”38

Al Qaeda’s leaders clearly understand the importance of leveraging the population. Dr.

Ayman al-Zawahiri, Deputy to Osama bin Laden and now the leader of al Qaeda, lamented in

Knights under the Prophet’s Banner that al Qaeda had failed to adequately mobilize Muslim

33
Kilcullen, “Counterinsurgency Redux”, 8.
34
Kilcullen, “Counterinsurgency Redux”, 8.
35
al-Qurashi, Abu Ubayd. “Revolutionary Warfare.”
36
al-Qurashi, Abu Ubayd. “The War of the Ether,” Al-Ansar, 20 November 2002.
37
Michael Scheuer, Osama Bin Laden(New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 112.
38
Octavian Manea, “Reflections on the ‘Counterinsurgency Decade’: Small Wars Journal Interview with General
David H. Petraeus” in Small Wars Journal, 1 September 2013, http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/reflections-on-
the-counterinsurgency-decade-small-wars-journal-interview-with-general-david, 8.
 8

support for guerilla war.39 Abu Musab Aal-Zarqawi, leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), lost

popular support by indiscriminately targeting Shia Muslims and coercing Sunni religious and

tribal leaders.40 Dr. Zawahiri cautioned Zarqawi against fomenting a sectarian civil war in Iraq

because it would endanger the insurgency.41 Documents captured in Abbottabad also revealed

bin Laden’s frustration with regional affiliates’ ineptness with the people. Bin Laden warned al

Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) against pressing for an Islamic state in Yemen before

establishing tribal support.42 Recently, the Islamic State has become the most advanced jihadist

group by co-opting disenfranchised Sunnis in Syria and Iraq, and by using brute force to

subjugate the people. This begs the question: Is it possible for insurgents to maintain popular

support through brute force, or is this a vulnerability that U.S. policymakers can exploit?

Go Goliath: American Counterinsurgency

American counterinsurgency doctrine follows Mao in focusing on the population. The

United States uses two approaches that seek to achieve popular support for the host nation

government.43 The direct, “large footprint” approach, as envisioned in Field Manual 3-24:

Counterinsurgency (2006), is expeditionary, large-scale, American-led operations. The United

States conducts combat operations while it develops the host nation’s institutions and security

forces. Subsequently, the United States transitions authority and responsibility to the host nation.

Campaigns in Vietnam (post 1965), Iraq (2003), and Afghanistan (post 2008), followed this

model. Conversely, the indirect, “small footprint” approach combines Security Force Assistance

39
Peter L. Bergen, The Osama bin Laden I Know (New York: Free Press, 2006), 389.
40
“The Combating Terrorism Center, Letters from Abbottabad: Bin Laden Sidelined?”, CTC: West Point, 2012,
http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/letters-from-abbottabad-bin-ladin-sidelined, 1-2.
41
Ayman al-Zawahiri, “Letter from al-Zawahiri to al-Zarqawi, 9 July 2005”,
http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2005/10/letter_in_english.pdf.
42
Osama bin Laden, “Osama bin Laden letter to Shaykh Mahmud (Attiyah), May-June 2010”, CTC: West Point,
2011, http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/letter-from-ubl-to-atiyatullah-al-libi-4-english-translation-2.
43
Collins, Understanding War in Afghanistan, 54-55.
 9

(SFA) and Foreign Internal Defense (FID) to “develop the capacity and capability of foreign

security forces and their supporting institutions.”44 Small contingents provide the host nation

with funding, weapons, training, and advice, but the host nation’s security forces perform combat

operations. At the core of this second approach is the concept that “only local governments can

establish legitimacy.”45 These two approaches, direct and indirect, can be seen as components of

a larger strategy; in fact, each conflict requires its own approach, and some conflicts require

policymakers to combine elements of each.46

The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have discredited the direct approach in the eyes of

many U.S. policymakers. Has the indirect or small-footprint approach been similarly discredited?

Historical examples suggest, as one source puts it, “that comparatively small levels of American

security forces can succeed in defeating overseas insurgencies.”47 A partial list of successful

American advisory missions would include: Greece vs. Greek People’s Liberation Army (ELAS)

(1945-55); Philippines vs. Hukbalahap Insurgency (1946-1954); Thailand vs. Thai Communist

Party (1950-1970s); El Salvador vs. Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) (1981-

1991); Columbia vs. Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) (1964-Present);

Philippines vs. Moro Insurgencies (MNLF, MILF).48 Admittedly, the record is not perfect.

American support was ineffective against Mao’s Communist movement in China and against the

Viet Cong in Vietnam prior to 1965. Yet, the indirect approach appears to have a better success

rate than the direct approach. The United States defeated the Filipino Insurrectos (1899-1902)

using brutal techniques that are unsuitable in the modern information age. American intervention

44
Joint Publication 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense, 12 July 2010.
45
T.X. Hammes, “The Future of Counterinsurgency”, 581.
46
T.X. Hammes, “The Future of Counterinsurgency”, 566.
47
Stephen L. Melton, “Aligning FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency with Reality: The U.S. in the Lead COIN Approach
Usually Fails Where Security Force Assistance Could Succeed”, Small Wars Journal, 9 April 2013,
http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/aligning-fm-3-24-counterinsurgency-with-reality, 1.
48
T.X. Hammes, “The Future of Counterinsurgency”, 570-581.
 10

in South Vietnam (1965-1975) was a failure. American efforts in Iraq did not produce

sustainable security, and it is gripped by violence today. The verdict for Afghanistan is still out.

Maintaining low troop levels in an advisory role appears to provide U.S. policymakers

with many benefits. American forces avoid direct combat and focus on building capabilities in

the host nation’s institutions and security forces. The host nation’s military and police do the

majority of the fighting.49 Studies suggest that the American public is casualty-averse, especially

when they detect incompetence, see little military progress, and believe that vital national

interests are not at stake.50 U.S. public support eroded as casualties mounted in Vietnam, Iraq,

and Afghanistan. Small footprint approaches rely primarily on Special Operations Forces and

intelligence agencies, and they do not require a large Department of Defense (DOD)

commitment. Small contingents prevent “impatient Americans from hastily attempting to do the

job themselves.”51 This reinforces host nation

self-reliance and limits free riding.52 The

military also avoids having to restructure the

force for counterinsurgency and can prepare

conventional formations for other

contingencies. Consequently, “a small, indirect

commitment may provide the United States
useful leverage against a Pentagon that does
Figure 2: The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan forced the
Pentagon to task Soldiers with missions that did not align
with their specialties. Above, M1A2 Armored crewman
prepare explosives to clear a minefield during a dismounted
patrol in the Arghandab River Valley, Kandahar, Afghanistan.

49
Walter C. Ladwig III, “Supporting Allies in Counterinsurgency”, Small Wars & Insurgencies, Vol. 19, No.1,
March 2008 (62-88), 80.
50
Louis Klarevas, “The ‘Essential Domino’ of Military Operations: American Public Opinion and the Use of
Force,” International Studies Perspectives, Vol.3, No. 2 (November 2002), 417-437.
51
Hammes, “The Future of Counterinsurgency”, 571.
52
Walter C. Ladwig III, “Supporting Allies in Counterinsurgency”, 80.
 11

not favor a counterinsurgency campaign.”53 Small footprint strategies do require the military to

maintain a FID capability, update doctrine, and train specialized units.54

Small footprint counterinsurgency is more likely to survive multiple political

administrations because it is less costly. U.S. advisory missions in the Philippines, Colombia,

and Africa, for instance, managed to “stay small enough so that no one in the U.S. is

interested.”55 This produces consistency in American foreign policy and provides “the long term

support the host nation needs to make the difficult political, social, and economic changes

necessary to neutralize the drivers of an insurgency.”56 Advisors also stay long enough to

develop local expertise and fight the long war. Unlike large footprint counterinsurgency

operations, advisory missions do not exhaust the military or the economy. Properly executed,

they may prove more sustainable than the alternative.

For the host nation, small footprint missions can also prove attractive, so long as U.S.

forces protect the host nation’s sovereignty and legitimacy.57 American-led operations always

risk undermining “the legitimacy of the government we are attempting to support.” 58 This risk is

usually more pronounced in large rather than small-scale interventions. A large military presence

distorts the political and economic reality and damages the state’s ability to govern.59 It is

extremely difficult for host nations to succeed without legitimacy, and they cannot achieve

legitimacy if they are occupied by a foreign power.60 Large-scale interventions can also generate

53
Hammes, “The Future of Counterinsurgency”, 582.
54
Hammes, “The Future of Counterinsurgency”, 586.
55
Octavian Manea, “The Fallacies of Big Expeditionary Counterinsurgency: Interview with T.X. Hammes”, Small
Wars Journal, September 6, 2013, http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-fallacies-of-big-expeditionary-
counterinsurgency-interview-with-tx-hammes.
56
Octavian Manea, “The Fallacies of Big Expeditionary Counterinsurgency: Interview with T.X. Hammes.”
57
Max G. Manwaring, “Uncomfortable Wars: Toward a New Paradigm of Low-Intensity Conflict”, Low-Intensity
Conflict: Old Threats in a New World, Edwin G. Corr and Stephen Sloan, eds. (Oxford: Westview Press, 1992), 12.
58
Melton, “Aligning FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency with Reality”, 4.
59
Hammes, “The Future of Counterinsurgency”, 571.
60
Melton, “Aligning FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency with Reality”, 6.
 12

“accidental guerillas,” i.e., cause otherwise peaceful people to join the fight.61 Modern

insurgencies forgo attempts to defeat the state’s military forces and use information technology

to weaken the state’s political will.62 The war of ideas and the insurgents’ narrative are

paramount. Military occupation can validate the enemy’s narrative, paint the United States as

“Crusaders,” “Occupiers,” or “Imperialists,” and reduce the host nation to a “puppet regime.”

Critics argue that the United States created proxy

governments in South Vietnam, Iraq, and

Afghanistan, then used military power to defend

them from their own countrymen who opposed

them.63 The mere perception that this is so, whether

or not it is true, can prove important in asymmetric

war. Messaging shapes both domestic and

international support. Figure 3: An IED detonates in Southern Baghdad as an

American armored column moves to establish security at
a voting center for Iraq’s first “legitimate,” “free,” and
“fair” parliamentary elections in December 2005.

Small footprint counterinsurgency has important limitations. It is a “multinational and

interagency effort, requiring integration and synchronization of all instruments of national

power.”64 The United States assists the political, economic, legislative, judicial, military, police,

and intelligence functions of the government.65 Therefore, advisory missions require a standing

government with some political capacity, administrative structure, and the ability to coordinate

61
David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One. Oxford University
Press, 2009, 34-38.
62
Hammes, The Sling and the Stone, 14.
63
Melton, “Aligning FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency with Reality”, 5.
64
Joint Publication 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense, 12 July 2010.
65
Hammes, “The Future of Counterinsurgency”, 584
 13

actions.66 A light footprint approach is a poor sequel to regime change. A small contingent of

advisors is also inadequate for a failed state. The light footprint in Afghanistan (2002-2004), for

example, was insufficient because of the lack of established state institutions and security

forces.67 However, as of this writing, the Afghan government may be strong enough to allow

Washington to follow a light footprint approach. Advisory missions also require some level of

political stability in the host country to facilitate the lengthy counterinsurgency process. The

regime must have some right to govern even if its institutions require substantial reform.68 An

insurgency indicates that some state institutions are performing poorly. Success usually “requires

reform in both political and security arenas” to address societal grievances.69 Advisors must

ensure that the host nation’s plan is sound and leverage America’s support to encourage

change.70 Reformers within the host nation often require an external impetus to change policies

or restructure the government. The country’s leaders may be driven by parochial interests and

want to maintain the status quo inside their country.71 Advocating reforms may “threaten to alter

fundamentally the positions and prerogatives of those in power.”72 Despotic rulers, corrupt elites,

and unruly security forces can hinder success, and it is often difficult for advisors to achieve

change. Last, America’s reputation depends upon the host nation’s just conduct during the war.

American prestige is often tied to our partner’s performance and adherence to

humanitarian norms. The American advisory mission to El Salvador illustrates the advisor’s

moral dilemma. Washington threatened to withdraw assistance to compel the Salvadorian

66
Ladwig III, “Supporting Allies in Counterinsurgency”, 81.
67
Collins, Understanding War in Afghanistan, 76.
68
Daniel Byman, “Going to War with the Allies You Have: Allies, Counterinsurgency, and the War on Terrorism”,
Strategic Studies Institute, November 2005, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub630.pdf, 4.
69
Hammes, “The Future of Counterinsurgency”, 582.
70
Ladwig III, “Supporting Allies in Counterinsurgency”, 78.
71
Byman, “Going to War with the Allies You Have”, 26.
72
Benjamin C. Schwartz, “American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and El Salvador: The Frustrations of Reform and
the Illusions of Nation Building”, National Defense Research Institute, (Santa Monica: RAND, 1991), Viii.
 14

government to stop war crimes. Vice President George Bush (December 1983) and Vice

President Dan Quayle (November 1989) engaged El Salvador leaders to establish ethical

guidelines for American support. After the Salvadorian military executed six Jesuit Priests in

1989, Congress halved American financial assistance.73 Salvadorian political leaders feared

losing American support and suppressed the military vigilantes and death squads. This vital

reform reduced grievances and support for the insurgency. Currently, the United States supports

multiple governments in their fight against Salafist insurgents. It is difficult to force these

countries to reform because they know that America has a national interest in their struggle.74

Accordingly, the “US may be tarred with the brush of a brutal ally, even if it is urging that ally to

reform.”75 This begs the question: Should U.S. policymakers recognize that democratization and

protection of human rights are not always feasible, or is it preferable to accept strategic risks

compel our partners to pursue reform?

The small footprint approach cannot guarantee that our partners will be victorious. U.S.

policymakers must therefore consider the danger of mission creep - the gradual expansion of

mission requirements. Military Assistance Advisory Group –Vietnam (MAAG-V) was incapable

of building sufficient political, economic, and security momentum to prevent the collapse of

South Vietnam. Consequently, the United States intervened without a rigorous policy

reassessment and committed its first maneuver battalions on March 8, 1965 at Danang.76 The

military became mired in a costly protracted war and was not able to defeat the Viet Cong. As

domestic support plummeted and the anti-war movement grew, the United States withdrew

forces and cut support for South Vietnam. Without external support, the Army of the Republic of

73
Schwartz, “American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and El Salvador”, 23-24.
74
Byman, “Going to War with the Allies You Have”, 28.
75
Byman, “Going to War with the Allies You Have”, 28.
76
John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam,
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 153.
 15

Vietnam (ARVN) could not repel the North Vietnamese offensive in 1975. Would a sustained

small footprint approach have produced a different outcome? Advocates suggest that the ultimate

advantage of the small footprint approach is that we are not locked in a protracted conflict and

can easily walk away. Critics argue that Vietnam shows how footprints have a tendency to

increase in size. If policymakers engage in small-footprint approaches, they must be prepared for

the possibility of failure and to answer a hard question: Is the government under attack worthy of

the American commitment required to save it?77

More Tough Questions for the Big Guy

This is not the only hard question facing U.S. policymakers. General Petraeus, an

advocate for small footprint strategies, warns that when the indirect approach is not enough,

“some cold hard calculations and assessments of interests must be made.”78 Is there truly an

existential threat present? What U.S. national interests are at stake? What might be the

unintended consequences of our action or inaction? Which states or non-state actors will exploit

the situation if we do not intervene? What are we willing to sacrifice, and what are we willing to

do to achieve our ends?

The United States continues to grapple with how to best counter the Islamic State (IS) in

Iraq and Syria. President Obama initially adopted a light footprint approach that combines SFA,

FID, and coalition airstrikes. However, IS remains resilient and continues to control a large

territory. Opponents of the current policy question whether host nation forces can defeat IS

without U.S. conventional forces on the ground. Pundits also argue that our reluctance to

intervene has made the United States appear weak and allowed Iran to become a regional

77
Melton, “Aligning FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency with Reality.”
78
Manea, “Reflections on the ‘Counterinsurgency Decade’: Small Wars Journal Interview with General David H.
Petraeus.”
 16

hegemon. Will the current light footprint approach continue after the 2016 presidential election?

Or will the U.S. footprint continue to expand until mission creep draws us into another large

footprint campaign?

The United States will undoubtedly work to maintain its technological advantage and

military might. This inequality in military power will continue to drive asymmetric threats and

create dilemmas for the United States. Asymmetric threats are multiplying, and simultaneously

rival states are modernizing. If we invest heavily in sub-state conflicts, near-peer competitors

such as China or Russia may be able to close the conventional power gap with the United States.

Budgets are tight, resources are scarce, and time is limited. Davids are rising and arming

themselves with stones. What should Goliath do in response?

 17

Recommended Readings

Austin Long, Stephanie Pezard, Bryce Loidolt, Todd C. Helmus, Locals Rule: Historical

Lessons for Creating Local Defense Forces for Afghanistan and Beyond, Santa Monica: RAND,

2012, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2012/RAND_MG1232.pdf.

David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, Westport CT: Praeger, PSI

Classics of the Counterinsurgency Era, 2006.

Mao Tse-Tung, On Guerrilla Warfare, 2d edition, edited and trans. Samuel B. Griffith II, ed.

Univ. of Illinois Press, 2000.

Max Boot, “The Evolution of Irregular War,” Foreign Affairs, January 5, 2013,

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2013-02-05/evolution-irregular-war.

Steve Metz, “The Internet, New Media, and the Evolution of Insurgency, Parameters, Autumn

2012, at http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Articles/2012autumn/Metz.pdf.

Stephen L. Melton, “Aligning FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency with Reality: The U.S. in the Lead

COIN Approach Usually Fails Where Security Force Assistance Could Succeed”, Small Wars

Journal, 9 April 2013, http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/aligning-fm-3-24-counterinsurgency-

with-reality.
 18

Additional Readings

Angel Rabasa, et al., Money in the Bank: Lessons Learned from Past Counterinsurgency (COIN)

Operations RAND OP-185, 2007; www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP185.html.

Ariel Merari, “Terrorism as a Strategy of Insurgency,” Terrorism and Political Violence 5, No. 4

(Winter 1993).

Artemy Kalinovsky, “The Blind Leading the Blind: Soviet Nation-Building and

Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan,” Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Cold

War International History Project Working Paper No. 60.

http://www.academia.edu/219985/The_Blind_Leading_the_Blind_Soviet_Nation-

Building_and_Counterinsurgency_in_Afghanistan.

Bard E. O'Neill, Insurgency and Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse; 2nd Ed.,

Potomac Books; 2nd edition (September 2005).

Ben Connable, Embracing the Fog of War, 2012, Santa Monica, RAND,

http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2012/RAND_MG1086.pdf.

Ben Connable and Martin C. Libicki (RAND) How Insurgencies End,

http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG965.pdf.
 19

British Ministry of Defence, Operation Banner: An Analysis of Operations in Northern Ireland,”

2006.

http://www.vilaweb.cat/media/attach/vwedts/docs/op_banner_analysis_released.pdf.

Bruce Hoffman , Inside Terrorism, Columbia University Press; 2nd edition (May 12, 2006).

Central Intelligence Agency, The Vietnamese Communist Will to Persist (Declassified Study),

August 1966, http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/virtualarchive/items.php?item=04114192001.

Central Intelligence Agency, US Government Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency – 2012,

https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=713599.

Christopher Paul, et. al. (RAND), Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Sources of Success in

Counterinsurgency, 2010,

http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG964.pdf.

Colin Gray, “How War Has Changed Since the End of the Cold War,” Parameters, Spring 2005,

at http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/Parameters/Articles/05spring/gray.pdf.

Constantin Melnik (RAND), Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria, 1964,

www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/documents/2006/D10671-1.pdf.
 20

Dale Andrade and James H. Willbanks, “CORDS/Phoenix: Counterinsurgent Lessons from

Vietnam for the Future,” Military Review, March-April 2006,

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/milreview/andrade.pdf.

Dale Andrade, “Westmoreland War Right: Learning the Wrong Lessons from the Vietnam War”,

Small Wars and Insurgencies, 19, No. 2 (Spring 2008), pp. 145-181.

Daniel Byman, “Going to War with the Allies You Have: Allies, Counterinsurgency, and the

War on Terrorism,” US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute Monograph, November

2005, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub630.pdf.

Daniel Byman, Understanding Proto-Insurgencies, RAND Monograph, 2007,

http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2007/RAND_OP178.pdf.

David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One, New

York: Oxford University Press, 2009.

David Johnson, Hard Fighting, Santa Monica: RAND,

http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1085.html .

David Sterman, “Supporting Rebels: Three Conditions for Success,” Small Wars Journal, 28

February 2013, http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/supporting-rebels-three-conditions-for-

success.
 21

Ernesto Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare: Che Guevara. University of Nebraska Press, December

1998.

Frank Hoffman, Conflict in the 21st Century: Rise of Hybrid Wars, Dec 2007, Potomac Institute

http://www.potomacinstitute.org/images/stories/publications/potomac_hybridwar_0108.pdf.

George Packer. “The Lesson of Tal Afar.” The New Yorker, 10 April 2006, pp. 48-65.

http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2006/04/10/060410fa_fact2?currentPage=all.

Gordon McCormick, et al., “Things fall apart: the endgame dynamics of internal wars,” Third

World Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 2 (March 2007).

Gilles Martin, “War in Algeria: The French Experience,” Military Review, July-August 2005, pp.

51-57.

James Clancy and Chuck Crossett, “Measuring Effectiveness in Irregular Warfare,” Parameters,

(Summer 2007), www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/parameters/Articles/07summer/clancy.pdf [12].

James Wirtz, “Intelligence to Please? The Order of Battle Controversy during the Vietnam War,”

Political Science Quarterly, 106, No. 2 (Summer 1991), pp. 239-263.

Jeffery Record, “External Assistance: Enabler of Insurgent Success,” Parameters, Autumn 2006,
 22

www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/parameters/Articles/06autumn/record.pdf.

Joseph J. Collins, “Counterinsurgency and Common Sense,” Armed Forces Journal,

January/February 2013, at http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2013/01/12842318.

John Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and

Vietnam. Univ. of Chicago Press: Sept. 2005.

Karl Hack, “The Malayan Emergency as Counter-insurgency Paradigm,” Journal of Strategic

Studies, 32(3) (2009), http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.1080/01402390902928180.

Keliv I. Sepp, “Best Practices in Counterinsurgency,” Military Review, May-June 2005,

http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/milreview/sepp.pdf.

Lawrence M. Greenberg (US Army Center of Military History), The Hukbalahap Insurrection: A

Case Study of a Successful Anti-Insurgency Operation in the Philippines, 1946-1955, 1987.

http://www.history.army.mil/books/coldwar/huk/huk-fm.htm.

Lewis Sorely, “The Vietnam War We Ignore,” New York Times, 18 October 2009.

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/18/opinion/18sorley.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
 23

Lou DiMarco “Losing the moral compass: torture and guerre revolutionnaire in the Algerian

War”. Parameters, 36(2) 2006,

http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/Articles/06summer/dimarco.pdf.

Max Boot, Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power, New York:

Basic Books, 2002.

Octavian Manea, “Reflections on the ‘Counterinsurgency Decade’: Small Wars Journal

Interview with General David H. Petraeus” in Small Wars Journal, 1 September 2013,

http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/reflections-on-the-counterinsurgency-decade-small-wars-

journal-interview-with-general-david.

Republican Army Green Book, Volumes 1 and 2.

http://tensmiths.files.wordpress.com/2012/08/15914572-ira-green-book-volumes-1-and-2.pdf.

Robert Komer, Bureaucracy Does Its Thing: Institutional Constraints on U.S.(RAND),

http://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/R967/.

Robert Komer, The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect: Organization of a Successful

Counterinsurgency Effort, 1972, http://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/R957/.

Rod Thornton. “Getting it wrong: the crucial mistakes made in the early stages of
 24

the British Army's Deployment to Northern Ireland (August 1969 to March 1972)”. Journal of

Strategic Studies, 30, No 1 (2007).

Stathis N. Kalyvas, “The Ontology of ‘Political Violence’: Action and Identity in Civil Wars,”

Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 1, No. 3 (2003), pp. 475-494.

Stephen Young, "How North Vietnam Won the War," Wall Street Journal, Thursday, August 3,

1995.

Thomas H. Hendrickson, What Really Happened in Northern Ireland: Revision and Revelation,

Joint Special Operations University Report, October 2008.

https://jsou.socom.mil/JSOU%20Publications/JSOU08-5henriksenNorthernIreland_final.pdf.

Thomas Marks, “Counterinsurgency and Operational Art,” Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol.

13, No. 3.

Thomas Rid, “The Nineteenth Century Origins of Counterinsurgency Doctrine,” Journal of

Strategic Studies 33, No. 5, www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/01402390.2010.498259.

T.X. Hammes, “The Future of Counterinsurgency”, Foreign Policy Research Institute, Fall 2012,

http://www.fpri.org/articles/2012/11/future-counterinsurgency.
 25

T.X. Hammes, The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century Saint Paul: Zenith Press,

2006.

US Army, Lessons from the War in Afghanistan, U.S. Army, May 1989 (Army

Department Declassification Release),

http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB57/us11.pdf.

William A. Knowlton, Jr. The Surge: General Petraeus and the Turnaround in Iraq, Industrial

College of the Armed Forces Case Study, 2010, www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/icaf-case-

study/icaf_casestudy-1.pdf.