1. People of the Philippines vs. Domingo Panis 2.Lazo v. Salac, G.R. No.
152642, November 13, 2012
On January 9, 1981, four information were filed in the in the Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Zambales and Olongapo City alleging that herein private
respondent Serapio Abug, "without first securing a license from the Ministry
of Labor as a holder of authority to operate a fee-charging employment
agency, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally operate a
private fee charging employment agency by charging fees and expenses
(from) and promising employment in Saudi Arabia" to four separate
individuals. Abug filed a motion to quash contending that he cannot be
charged for illegal recruitment because according to him, Article 13(b) of the
Labor Code says there would be illegal recruitment only "whenever two or
more persons are in any manner promised or offered any employment for a
fee.”
Denied at first, the motion to quash was reconsidered and granted by the
Trial Court in its Orders dated June 24, 1981, and September 17, 1981. In the
instant case, the view of the private respondents is that to constitute
recruitment and placement, all the acts mentioned in this article should
involve dealings with two or more persons as an indispensable requirement.
On the other hand, the petitioner argues that the requirement of two or
more persons is imposed only where the recruitment and placement
consists of an offer or promise of employment to such persons and always in
consideration of a fee.
ISSUE: Whether or not Article 13(b) of the Labor Code provides for the
innocence or guilt of the private respondent of the crime of illegal
recruitment
COURT RULING: The Supreme Court reversed the CFI’s Orders and reinstated
all four information filed against private respondent.
The Article 13(b) of the Labor Code was merely intended to create a
presumption, and not to impose a condition on the basic rule nor to provide
an exception thereto.
Where a fee is collected in consideration of a promise or offer of
employment to two or more prospective workers, the individual or entity
dealing with them shall be deemed to be engaged in the act of recruitment
and placement. The words "shall be deemed" create the said presumption.
PETITIONER: Hon. Patricia A. Sto. Tomas, Rosalinda Baldoz and Lucita Lazo
RESPONDENT: Rey Salac, Willie D. Espiritu, Mario Montenegro, Dodgie
Belonio, Lolit Salinel and Buddy
DOCTRINE: Illegal recruitment" as defined in Section 6 is clear and
unambiguous and, contrary
to the RTC’s finding, actually makes a distinction between licensed and non-
licensed recruiters. By its terms, persons who engage in "canvassing,
enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers"
without the appropriate government license or authority are guilty of illegal
recruitment whether or not they commit the wrongful acts enumerated in
that section.
FACTS: Several cases were filed and consolidated questioning the
constitutionality of certain provisions of R.A 8042 otherwise known as the
Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino Act of 1995 which sets the Government’s
policies on overseas employment and establishes a higher standard of
protection and promotion of the welfare of migrant workers, their families, and
overseas Filipinos in distress. Republic Act 8042 was subsequently amended by
R.A. 9422, which expressly repealed Sections 29 and 30 of R.A. 8042 and
adopted the policy of close government regulation of the recruitment and
deployment of OFWs. On August 21, 1995 respondent Philippine Association of
Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI) filed a petition for declaratory relief and
prohibition with prayer for issuance of TRO and writ of preliminary injunction
before the RTC of Manila, seeking to annul, among others, Section 6 of R.A.
8042 defining Illegal Recruitment for being unconstitutional. It was contended
that it is vague as it fails to distinguish between licensed and non-licensed
recruiters and for that reason gives undue advantage to the non-licensed
recruiters in violation of the right to equal protection of those that operate with
government licenses or authorities.The RTC of Manila declared Section 6
unconstitutional.
Issue: Whether or not the illegal recruitment definition should be declared
unconstitutional?
Ruling: No. Illegal Recruitment as defined in Section 6 is clear and
unambiguous and, contrary to the RTC’s finding, actually makes a distinction
between licensed and non-licensed recruiters. By its terms, persons who engage
in "canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring
workers" without the appropriate government license or authority are guilty of
illegal recruitment whether or not they commit the wrongful acts enumerated
in that section. On the other hand, recruiters who engage in the canvassing,
enlisting, etc. of OFWs, although with the appropriate government license or
authority, are guilty of illegal recruitment only if they commit any of the
wrongful acts enumerated in Section 6.
Thus, Section 6 of R.A 8041 is constitutional.
3. Sunace International vs. NLRC G.R. No. 161757, January 25, 2006
There is an implied revocation of an agency relationship when after the
termination of the original employment contract, the foreign principal
directly negotiated with the employee and entered into a new and separate
employment contract. Respondent Divina Montehermozo is a domestic
helper deployed to Taiwan by Sunace International Management Services
(Sunace) under a 12-month contract. Such employment was made with the
assistance of Taiwanese broker Edmund Wang. After the expiration of the
contract, Montehermozo continued her employment with her Taiwanese
employer for another 2 years. When Montehermozo returned to the
Philippines, she filed a complaint against Sunace, Wang, and her Taiwanese
employer before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). She
alleges that she was underpaid and was jailed for three months in Taiwan.
She further alleges that the 2-year extension of her employment contract
was with the consent and knowledge of Sunace. Sunace, on the other hand,
denied all the allegations. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Montehermozo
and found Sunace liable thereof. The National Labor Relations Commission
and Court of Appeals affirmed the labor arbiter’s decision. Hence, the filing
of this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the 2-year extension of Montehermozo’s
employment was made with the knowledge and consent of Sunace
HELD: Contrary to the Court of Appeals finding, the alleged continuous
communication was with the Taiwanese broker Wang, not with the foreign
employer.
The finding of the Court of Appeals solely on the basis of the telefax
message written by Wang to Sunace, that Sunace continually communicated
with the foreign “principal” (sic) and therefore was aware of and had
consented to the execution of the extension of the contract is misplaced.
The message does not provide evidence that Sunace was privy to the new
contract executed after the expiration on February 1, 1998 of the original
contract. That Sunace and the Taiwanese broker communicated regarding
Montehermozo’s allegedly withheld savings does not necessarily mean that
Sunace ratified the extension of the contract.
As can be seen from that letter communication, it was just an information
given to Sunace that Montehermozo had taken already her savings from her
foreign employer and that no deduction was made on her salary. It contains
nothing about the extension or Sunace’s consent thereto.
Parenthetically, since the telefax message is dated February 21, 2000, it is
safe to assume that it was sent to enlighten Sunace who had been directed,
by Summons issued on February 15, 2000, to appear on February 28, 2000
for a mandatory conference following Montehermozo’s filing of the
complaint on February 14, 2000.
Respecting the decision of Court of Appeals following as agent of its foreign
principal, [Sunace] cannot profess ignorance of such an extension as
obviously, the act of its principal extending [Montehermozo’s] employment
contract necessarily bound it, it too is a misapplication, a misapplication of
the theory of imputed knowledge.
The theory of imputed knowledge ascribes the knowledge of the agent,
Sunace, to the principal, employer, not the other way around. The
knowledge of the principal-foreign employer cannot, therefore, be imputed
to its agent Sunace.
There being no substantial proof that Sunace knew of and consented to be
bound under the 2-year employment contract extension, it cannot be said
to be privy thereto. As such, it and its “owner” cannot be held solidarily
liable for any of Montehermozo’s claims arising from the 2-year
employment extension. As the New Civil Code provides, Contracts take
effect only between the parties, their assigns, and heirs, except in case
where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not
transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law.
Furthermore, as Sunace correctly points out, there was an implied
revocation of its agency relationship with its foreign principal when, after the
termination of the original employment contract, the foreign principal
directly negotiated with Montehermozo and entered into a new and
separate employment contract in Taiwan. Article 1924 of the New Civil Code
states that the agency is revoked if the principal directly manages the
business entrusted to the agent, dealing directly with third persons.
4.Serrano v. Gallant, G.R. No. 167614, March 24, 2009
FACTS:
Petitioner was hired by Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow
Navigation Co., Ltd. (respondents) under a Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA)-approved Contract of Employment with the following
terms and conditions:
Duration of contract 12 months
Position Chief Officer
Basic monthly salary US$1,400.00
Hours of work 48.0 hours per week
Overtime US$700.00 per month
Vacation leave with pay 7.00 days per month
On March 19, 1998, the date of his departure, petitioner was constrained to
accept a downgraded employment contract for the position of Second Officer
with a monthly salary of US$1,000.00, upon the assurance and representation of
respondents that he would be made Chief Officer by the end of April 1998.
Respondents did not deliver on their promise to make petitioner Chief
Officer. Hence, petitioner refused to stay on as Second Officer and was
repatriated to the Philippines on May 26, 1998.
Petitioner’s employment contract was for a period of 12 months or from
March 19, 1998 up to March 19, 1999, but at the time of his repatriation on
May 26, 1998, he had served only two (2) months and seven (7) days of his
contract, leaving an unexpired portion of nine (9) months and twenty-three
(23) days.
Petitioner filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a Complaint against respondents
for constructive dismissal and for payment of his money claims in the total
amount of US$26,442.73.
The LA rendered a Decision dated July 15, 1999, declaring the dismissal of
petitioner illegal and awarding him monetary benefits, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring
that the dismissal of the complainant (petitioner) by the respondents in the
above-entitled case was illegal and the respondents are hereby ordered to
pay the complainant [petitioner], jointly and severally, in Philippine
Currency, based on the rate of exchange prevailing at the time of payment,
the amount of EIGHT THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED SEVENTY U.S. DOLLARS
(US $8,770.00), representing the complainant’s salary for three (3) months
of the unexpired portion of the aforesaid contract of employment.
The claims of the complainant for moral and exemplary damages are hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
In awarding petitioner a lump-sum salary of US$8,770.00, the LA based his
computation on the salary period of three months only — rather than the
entire unexpired portion of nine months and 23 days of petitioner’s
employment contract – applying the subject clause. However, the LA applied
the salary rate of US$2,590.00, consisting of petitioner’s “[b]asic salary,
US$1,400.00/month + US$700.00/month, fixed overtime pay, +
US$490.00/month, vacation leave pay = US$2,590.00/compensation per
month.”
Respondents appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
to question the finding of the LA that petitioner was illegally dismissed.
The NLRC modified the LA Decision and corrected the LA’s computation of
the lump-sum salary awarded to petitioner by reducing the applicable salary
rate from US$2,590.00 to US$1,400.00 because R.A. No. 8042 “does not
provide for the award of overtime pay, which should be proven to have been
actually performed, and for vacation leave pay.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, but this time he
questioned the constitutionality of the subject clause. The NLRC denied the
motion.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA, reiterating the
constitutional challenge against the subject clause. After initially dismissing
the petition on a technicality, the CA eventually gave due course to it, as
directed by this Court in its Resolution which granted the petition for
certiorari,filed by petitioner.
The CA affirmed the NLRC ruling on the reduction of the applicable salary
rate; however, the CA skirted the constitutional issue raised by petitioner.
His Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by the CA, petitioner
brings his cause to this Court on the following grounds:
The Court of Appeals and the labor tribunals have decided the case in a way
not in accord with applicable decision of the Supreme Court involving similar
issue of granting unto the migrant worker back wages equal to the unexpired
portion of his contract of employment instead of limiting it to three (3)
months.
Even without considering the constitutional limitations [of] Sec. 10 of Republic
Act No. 8042, the Court of Appeals gravely erred in law in excluding from
petitioner’s award the overtime pay and vacation pay provided in his contract
since under the contract they form part of his salary.
The Court now takes up the full merit of the petition mindful of the extreme
importance of the constitutional question raised therein.
ISSUES:
Whether Section 10 (par 5) of RA 8042 is unconstitutional
Proper computation of the Lump-sum salary to be awarded to petitioner by
reason of his illegal dismissal
Whether the overtime and leave pay should form part of the salary basis in
the computation of his monetary award
The unanimous finding of the LA, NLRC and CA that the dismissal of
petitioner was illegal is not disputed. Likewise not disputed is the salary
differential of US$45.00 awarded to petitioner in all three fora.
Applying the subject clause, the NLRC and the CA computed the lump-sum
salary of petitioner at the monthly rate of US$1,400.00 covering the period
of three months out of the unexpired portion of nine months and 23 days of
his employment contract or a total of US$4,200.00.
Impugning the constitutionality of the subject clause, petitioner contends
that, in addition to the US$4,200.00 awarded by the NLRC and the CA, he is
entitled to US$21,182.23 more or a total of US$25,382.23, equivalent to his
salaries for the entire nine months and 23 days left of his employment
contract, computed at the monthly rate of US$2,590.00.31
Arguments of the Petitioner
For Antonio Serrano (petitioner), a Filipino seafarer, the last clause in the 5th
paragraph of Section 10, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042, violates the OFWs’
constitutional
them of equal rights in that
protection andit impairs the terms
denies them of their contract, deprives
due process.
The Arguments of Respondents
Respondents contend that the constitutional issue should not be
entertained, for this was belatedly interposed by petitioner in his appeal
before the CA, and not at the earliest opportunity, which was when he filed
an appeal before the NLRC.40
The Arguments of the Solicitor General
The Solicitor General (OSG)41 points out that as R.A. No. 8042 took effect on
July 15, 1995, its provisions could not have impaired petitioner’s 1998
employment contract. Rather, R.A. No. 8042 having preceded petitioner’s
contract, the provisions thereof are deemed part of the minimum terms of
petitioner’s employment, especially on the matter of money claims, as this
was not stipulated upon by the parties.
The Court’s Ruling:
First Issue
Does the subject clause violate Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, and
Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII on Labor as protected sector?
The answer is in the affirmative.
Section 1, Article III of the Constitution guarantees:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the law.
Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII accord all members of the
labor sector, without distinction as to place of deployment, full protection of
their rights and welfare.
To Filipino workers, the rights guaranteed under the foregoing constitutional
provisions translate to economic security and parity: all monetary benefits
should be equally enjoyed by workers of similar category, while all monetary
obligations should be borne by them in equal degree; none should be
denied the protection of the laws which is enjoyed by, or spared the burden
imposed on, others in like circumstances.
Imbued with the same sense of “obligation to afford protection to labor,” the
Court in the present case also employs the standard of strict judicial scrutiny,
for it perceives in the subject clause a suspect classification prejudicial to
OFWs.
Upon cursory reading, the subject clause appears facially neutral, for it
applies to all OFWs. However, a closer examination reveals that the subject
clause has a discriminatory intent against, and an invidious impact on OFWs
The subject clause does not state or imply any definitive governmental
purpose; and it is for that precise reason that the clause violates not just
petitioner’s right to equal protection, but also her right to substantive due
process under Section 1, Article III of the Constitution.
Second Issue
It is plain that prior to R.A. No. 8042, all OFWs, regardless of contract
periods or the unexpired portions thereof, were treated alike in terms of the
computation of their monetary benefits in case of illegal dismissal. Their
claims were subjected to a uniform rule of computation: their basic salaries
multiplied by the entire unexpired portion of their employment contracts.
The enactment of the subject clause in R.A. No. 8042 introduced a
differentiated rule of computation of the money claims of illegally dismissed
OFWs based on their employment periods, in the process singling out one
category whose contracts have an unexpired portion of one year or more
and subjecting them to the peculiar disadvantage of having their monetary
awards limited to their salaries for 3 months or for the unexpired portion
thereof, whichever is less, but all the while sparing the other category from
such prejudice, simply because the latter’s unexpired contracts fall short of
one year.
Prior to R.A. No. 8042, a uniform system of computation of the monetary
awards of illegally dismissed OFWs was in place. This uniform system was
applicable even to local workers with fixed-term employment.
The subject clause does not state or imply any definitive governmental
purpose; and it is for that precise reason that the clause violates not just
petitioner’s right to equal protection, but also her right to substantive due
process under Section 1, Article III of the Constitution.
The subject clause being unconstitutional, petitioner is entitled to his
salaries for the entire unexpired period of nine months and 23 days of his
employment contract, pursuant to law and jurisprudence prior to the
enactment of R.A. No. 8042.
Third Issue
Petitioner contends that his overtime and leave pay should form part of the
salary basis in the computation of his monetary award, because these are
fixed benefits that have been stipulated into his contract.
Petitioner is mistaken.
The word salaries in Section 10(5) does not include overtime and leave pay.
For seafarers like petitioner, DOLE Department Order No. 33, series 1996,
provides a Standard Employment Contract of Seafarers, in which salary is
understood as the basic wage, exclusive of overtime, leave pay and other
bonuses; whereas overtime pay is compensation for all work “performed” in
excess of the regular eight hours, and holiday pay is compensation for any
work “performed” on designated rest days and holidays.
In the same vein, the claim for the day’s leave pay for the unexpired portion
of the contract is unwarranted since the same is given during the actual
service of the seamen.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Petition. The subject clause “or for three
months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less” in the 5th
paragraph of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is DECLARED
UNCONSTITUTIONAL; and the December 8, 2004 Decision and April 1, 2005
Resolution of the Court of Appeals are MODIFIED to the effect that petitioner is
AWARDED his salaries for the entire unexpired portion of his employment
contract consisting of nine months and 23 days computed at the rate of
US$1,400.00 per month.
5. Yap v. Thenamaris, G.R. No. 179532, May 30, 2011
FACTS: Claudio S. Yap was employed as electrician of the vessel, M/T SEASCOUT
by Intermare Maritime Agencies, Inc. in behalf of its principal, Vulture Shipping
Limited. The contract of employment entered into by Yap and Capt. Francisco B.
Adviento, the General Manager of Intermare, was for a duration of 12 months.
On 23 August 2001, Yap boarded M/T SEASCOUT and commenced his job as
electrician. However, on or about 8 November 2001, the vessel was sold. The
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) was informed about
the sale on 6 December 2001 in a letter signed by Capt. Adviento. Yap, along
with the other crewmembers, was informed by the Master of their vessel that
the same was sold and will be scrapped.
Yap received his seniority bonus, vacation bonus, extra bonus along with the
scrapping bonus. However, with respect to the payment of his wage, he
refused to accept the payment of one-month basic wage. He insisted that he
was entitled to the payment of the unexpired portion of his contract since
he was illegally dismissed from employment. He alleged that he opted for
immediate transfer but none was made. He then filed a complaint for Illegal
Dismissal with Damages and Attorney’s Fees before the Labor Arbiter.
The LA rendered a decision in favor of petitioner, finding the latter to have
been constructively and illegally dismissed by respondents. The NLRC
affirmed the decision but held that instead of an award of salaries
corresponding to nine months, petitioner was only entitled to salaries for
three months as provided under Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042. Petitioner
however questions the award of wages and assails Sec. 10 of R.A. 8042 as
unconstitutional.
ISSUE: Is the 5th par. Sec 10 of R.A. 8042 violative of substantive due process?
RULING:
Yes. The Court declared in Serrano vs. Gallant Maritime that the clause “or
for three months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less”
provided in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 is
unconstitutional for being violative of the rights of Overseas Filipino Workers
(OFWs) to equal protection of the laws. In an exhaustive discussion of the
intricacies and ramifications of the said clause, this Court, in Serrano,
pertinently held
The Court concludes that the subject clause contains a suspect classification
in that, in the computation of the monetary benefits of fixed-term
employees who are illegally discharged, it imposes a 3-month cap on the
claim of OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year or more in their
contracts, but none on the claims of other OFWs or local workers with fixed-
term employment. The subject clause singles out one classification of OFWs
and burdens it with a peculiar disadvantage.
Moreover, this Court held therein that the subject clause does not state or
imply any definitive governmental purpose; hence, the same violates not
just therein petitioner’s right to equal protection, but also his right to
substantive due process under Section 1, Article III of the Constitution.
6. Meralco vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 78763, July 12, 1989
FACTS
Private resondent, Apolinario Signo was dismissed from work by Meralco when
it was found out that he breached the trust of thpe company by making it
appear that the residence of one applicant for an electric service is within
the serviceable area of MEralco. The applicant’s residence was installed with
electrical services thru Signo’s maneuver, however, due to the fault of the
Power sales division, the applicant-consumer was not billed for a year.
ISSUE
Whether or not, the dismissal of Signo was a proper penalty for his acts.
RULING
The Court affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter in finding that Dismissal
was a drastic measure considering the length of service of to the Company
by Signo, which is 20 years, and the 2 awards he received for honesty from
the employer. He was ordered reinstated, thought without backwages for he
is not at all faultless.
Further, it was held that in carrying out and interpreting the Labor Code's
provisions and its implementing regulations, the workingman's welfare
should be the primordial and paramount consideration. This kind of
interpretation gives meaning and substance to the liberal and
compassionate spirit of the law as provided for in Article 4 of the New Labor
Code which states that "all doubts in the implementation and interpretation
of the provisions of the Labor Code including its implementing rules and
regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor"
7. Juco vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 98107, Aug. 18,
1997
Facts: Benjamin C. Juco was hired as a project engineer of National Housing
Corporation (NHC) from November 16, 1970 to May 14, 1975. On May 14, 1975,
he was separated from the service for having been implicated in a crime of theft
and/or malversation of public funds. On March 25, 1977, Juco filed a complaint
for illegal dismissal against the NHC with the Department of Labor. On
September 17, 1977, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision dismissing the
complaint on the ground that the NLRC had no jurisdiction over the case. Juco
then elevated the case to the NLRC which rendered a decision on December
28, 1982, reversing the decision of the Labor Arbiter. NHC then appealed the
NLRC decision before the Supreme Court and on January 17, 1985 which
petition the Court granted thereby setting aside the NLRC decision and
reinstating the labor arbiter’s decision of dismissing the case.
On January 6, 1989, Juco filed with the Civil Service Commission a
complaint for illegal dismissal, with preliminary mandatory injunction. On
February 6, 1989, NHC moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the
ground that the Civil Service Commission has no jurisdiction over the case.
CSC granted the motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
On April 28, 1989, Juco filed with NLRC a complaint for illegal
dismissal with preliminary mandatory injunction against NHC. NLRC find
NHC guilty of illegal dismissal. On June 1, 1990, NHC filed its appeal before
the NLRC and on March 14, 1991, the NLRC promulgated a decision which
reversed the decision of Labor Arbiter Manuel R. Caday on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction.
Issue: Whether or not the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in
holding that petitioner is not governed by the Labor Code
Held: Yes. Under the laws then in force, employees of government-owned
and/or controlled corporations were governed by the Civil Service Law and not
by the Labor Code. Although in National Housing Corporation v. Juco, it was held
that employees of government-owned and/or controlled corporations, whether
created by special law or formed as subsidiaries under the general Corporation
Law, are governed by the Civil Service Law and not by the Labor Code, this ruling
has been supplanted by the 1987 Constitution which states that the civil service
embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the
Government, including government owned or controlled corporations with 8. Republic vs. CA, G.R. No. 87676, December 20,
original charter. In National Service Corporation (NASECO) v. National Labor
1989 G.R. No. 87676 December 20, 1989
Relations Commission, it was held that the NLRC has jurisdiction over the
employees of NASECO on the ground that it is the 1987 Constitution that National Parks Development Committee (NPDC) was originally created in
governs because it is the Constitution in place at the time of the decision. It was 1963 under Executive Order No. 30, as the Executive Committee for the
further held that the new phrase "with original charter" means that development of Quezon Memorial, Luneta and other national parks. The
government-owned and controlled corporations refer to corporations Committee was registered with the SEC as a non-stock and non-profit
corporation.
chartered by special law as distinguished from corporations organized under
the Corporation Code. Thus, NASECO which had been organized under the
However, in 1987, due to failure to comply with SEC requirements (i.e. to
general incorporation statute and a subsidiary of the National Investment submit General Information Sheet and Financial Statements from 1981 to
Development Corporation, which in turn was a subsidiary of the Philippine 1987; to register its Corporate Books; and to operate for a continuous
National Bank, is excluded from the purview of the Civil Service Commission. period for at least 5 years since 1967) NPDC was attached to the Ministry of
The above doctrine applies in this case. In the case at bench, the National Tourism. Pursuant thereto, Civil Service Commission notified NPDC that all
Housing Corporation is a government owned corporation organized in 1959 appointments and other personnel actions shall be submitted to the former.
in accordance with Executive Order No. 399, otherwise known as the
Uniform Charter of Government Corporation, dated January 1, 1959. Its The Rizal Park Supervisory Employees Association was organized, and it
shares of stock are and have been one hundred percent (100%) owned by affiliated with the Trade Union of the Philippines and Allied Service (TUPAS,
the Government from its incorporation under Act 1459, the former for brevity) under Certificate No. 1206. However, NPDC entered into a
corporation law. The government entities that own its shares of stock are the separate CBA with NPDCEA (TUPAS Local Chapter No. 967), and NPDCSA
Government Service Insurance System, the Social Security System, the (TUPAS Chapter No. 1206) for a period of two (2) years. Pursuant thereto,
Development Bank of the Philippines, the National Investment and these unions staged a strike alleging unfair labor practices by NPDC.
Development Corporation and the People's Homesite and Housing
Contention of the NPDC: The strike is illegal on ground that the strikers,
Corporation. Considering the fact that the NHA had been incorporated under being government employees, the strikers have no right to strike, although
Act 1459, the former corporation law, it is but correct to say that it is a they may form a union.
Ruling
to wit: of the
(1)of Trial
there Court
exists and CA: Complaint
ancomplained
employer-employee is dismissed5,for
relationship lack ofinjurisdiction,
between
government-owned or controlled corporation whose employees are subject the
of DOLE. On appeal,acts
Art. strikers;
265 (2)
the the
Labor Code.
CA Hence,
affirmed of
thethe falls
case under
decision par
properly
of the falls
trial Art.
under
court. the NPDC
217, and
relation to
jurisdiction
to the provisions of the Labor Code. This observation is reiterated in the
recent case of Trade Union of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS) v. ISSUE
National Housing
Whether the petitioner, National Parks Development Committee (NPDC), is a
Corporation, where the SC held that the NHA is now within the jurisdiction government agency, or a private corporation, for on this issue depends the
of the Department of Labor and Employment, it being a government-owned right of its employees to strike.
and/or controlled corporation without an original charter. Furthermore, the
Court previously ruled that the workers or employees of the NHC (now NHA)
HELD
undoubtedly have the right to form unions or employee's organization and
that there is no impediment to the holding of a certification election among The NPDC is an agency of the government, not a government-owned or
them as they are covered by the Labor Code. controlled corporation.

Since NPDC is a government agency, its employees are covered by civil
service rules and regulations (Sec. 2, Article IX, 1987 Constitution). Its
employees are civil service employees (Sec. 14, Executive Order No. 180).
While NPDC employees are allowed under the 1987 Constitution to organize
and join unions of their choice, there is as yet no law permitting them to
strike. In case of a labor dispute between the employees and the
government, Section 15 of Executive Order No. 180 dated June 1, 1987
provides that the Public Sector Labor- Management Council, not the
Department of Labor and Employment, shall hear the dispute. Clearly, the
Court of Appeals and the lower court erred in holding that the labor dispute
between the NPDC and the members of the NPDSA is cognizable by the
Department of Labor and Employment.
9. CORAZON JAMER petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION
This complaint arose from the dismissal of the complainants Corazon
Jamer and Cristina Amortizido both were cashier of Isetann. They were both
dismissed on the alleged ground of dishonesty for incurring a shortage
ofP15,353.78.
Complainants were asked to explain and they submitted their
respective written explanations for the shortage.
Respondents placed both complainants under preventive
suspension for the alleged shortages. Thereafter, respondents conducted an
administrative investigation. Finding the explanation of the complainants to
be unsatisfactory, respondent dismissed the complainants from the service.
Aggrieved, complainant instituted this present action .
The Labor Arbiter directed the respondents to reinstate
complainants to service with full backwages and without loss of seniority
rights.
Isetann and John Go appealed the aforesaid decision to the NLRC. The NLRC
found that the complainants were validy dismissed for lack of confidence.
Issue: Whether NLRC is correct?
Held: Yes. The failure of petitioners to report to management the
aforementioned irregularities constitute fraud or willful breach of the trust
reposed in them by their employer or duly authorized representative one of
the just causes in terminating employment as provided for by paragraph (c),
Article 282 of the Labor Code, as amended.
WHEREFORE,the assailed decision of the National Labor Relations
Commission in is hereby AFFIRMED.
10. SSS Employee Asso. v CA 175 SCRA 686 (July 28, 1989)
Facts: The petitioners went on strike after the SSS failed to act upon the
union’s demands concerning the implementation of their CBA. SSS filed
before the court action for damages with prayer for writ of preliminary
injunction against petitioners for staging an illegal strike. The court issued a
temporary restraining order pending the resolution of the application for
preliminary injunction while petitioners filed a motion to dismiss alleging the
court’s lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Petitioners contend that
the court made reversible error in taking cognizance on the subject matter
since the jurisdiction lies on the DOLE or the National Labor Relations
Commission as the case involves a labor dispute. The SSS contends on one
hand that the petitioners are covered by the Civil Service laws, rules and
regulation thus have no right to strike. They are not covered by the NLRC or
DOLE therefore the court may enjoin the petitioners from striking.
Issue: Whether or not SSS employers have the right to strike
Whether or not the CA erred in taking jurisdiction over the subject
matter.
Held: The Constitutional provisions enshrined on Human Rights and Social
Justice provides guarantee among workers with the right to organize and
conduct peaceful concerted activities such as strikes. On one hand, Section
14 of E.O No. 180 provides that “the Civil Service law and rules governing
concerted activities and strikes in the government service shall be observed,
subject to any legislation that may be enacted by Congress” referring to
Memorandum Circular No. 6, s. 1987 of the Civil Service Commission which
states that “prior to the enactment by Congress of applicable laws
concerning strike by government employees enjoins under pain of
administrative sanctions, all government officers and employees from
staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms of
mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public
service.” Therefore in the absence of any legislation allowing govt.
employees to strike they are prohibited from doing so.

In Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 the employees in the civil service are denominated
as “government employees” and that the SSS is one such government-
controlled corporation with an original charter, having been created under
R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil service and are covered by
the Civil Service Commission’s memorandum prohibiting strikes.

Neither the DOLE nor the NLRC has jurisdiction over the subject matter but
instead it is the Public Sector Labor-Management Council which is not
granted by law authority to issue writ of injunction in labor disputes within
its jurisdiction thus the resort of SSS before the general court for the
issuance of a writ of injunction to enjoin the strike is appropriate.