JUNE 17,2017
Economic&PoliticalwEEKLY
EDITORIALS
= Unquiet Fields
= The Bane of Monetary Policy
= HalfLives
HT PAREKH FINANCE COLUMN
1 Is Banking Safer Today than before the Crisis?
LAW & SOCIETY
= Defecting from the Law
COMMENTARY
= Trump's Toxic Announcement
= What Do We Know about Remonetisation?
= Government Claims on Health
Divide and Educate
= ‘Strategic Partners’ in Defence Production
REVIEW ARTICLE
Askew—A Short Biography of Bangalore
= Reengineering India—Work, Capital, and
Class in an Offshore Economy
= Encoding Race, Encoding Class—Indian IT
Workers in Berlin
PERSPECTIVES
= Nursing Education in india
SPECIAL ARTICLES
= World Bank’s Poverty Enumeration
= Farmers and Climate Change
NOTES
= Elementary School Social Science
CURRENT STATISTICS
POSTSCRIPT
olLno26
80
wwnwepmin
Need for Alternative Calculations
The impact of slow remonetisation on the
unorganised sector of the economy employing 93%
of the workforce remains hidden behind a veil by the
GDP and monetary data. page 18
Incredible Claims
A civil society joint report on sexual and reproductive
health contradicts the government's claims to an
international human rights mechanism on its
achievements. page 21
Better Out than In
Until climate politics changes in the United States, it is
better out than in as far as the Paris Agreement on
climate change is concerned. page 14
Private Sector in Defence
There is no regulatory mechanism for the defence
production sector which is being opened up to
private and foreign suppliers even as the public sector is
being sidelined. page 29
Nursing Education in India
Regularisation and standardisation remain the greatest
challenge for Indian nursing despite it now being a
recognised profession. page 38OSBI
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Is Banking Safer Today than before the Crisis?
10 If we are to stick to conventional approaches to protecting stability, then
our best bet isto require banks to have substantially more capital than is
contemplated under Basel ui, —TT Ram Mohan
Defecting from the Law
12 Theimpunity with which legislators in Andhra Pradesh and Telangana have
ignored the anti-defection law points to certain weaknesses in the processes
and norms laid down in it. —Alok Prasanna Kumar
‘Trump's Toxic Announcement on Climate Change
14 President Donald Trump's announcement that the United States will ex
from the Paris Agreement reveals that the us cannot be regarded a reliable
partner for global climate cooperation. —Navros K Dubash
What Do We Know about Remonetisation?
18. Remonetisation has been far too slow, and its consequences on the informal
economy, though invisible to offical data, are a matter of serious economi
political and social concern. —Arun Kumar, Ankur Verma
Government Claims on Health Inconsistent with Reality
21 Civil society reports on sexual and reproductive health provide a contrast
‘o the claims and assurances made by the government on its public health
commitments and achievements. —Jashodhara Dasgupta, Subha Sri B,
Priya John, Sana Contractor, Renu Khanna & Sandhya YK
Divide and Educate
25 Social and human factors apart, the divisive trends in Indian education
threaten the prospects of adequate human resource development for India’s
economic growth, — Sukanta Chaudhuri
‘Strategic Partners’ in Defence Production
29 The blatant sidelining of public sector undertakings in defence procurement
and the promotion of select private sector companies are deepening the
country’s technological dependence in the design, development and
production of armaments. — Gautam Navlakha
Nursing Education in India
38. The history of nursing education in India, and the state, community and
market factors contributing to its recent growth are explored,
—Sreelekha Nair, $ Irudaya Rajan
World Bank's Poverty Enumeration
43. The World Bank's poverty enumeration exercise fails to satisfy the
requirements of transparency, denies researchers access to data, and hinders
replicability of the poverty numbers produced by the Bank.
—Amita Majumder, Ranjan Ray & Sattwik Santra
Farmers Need More Help to Adapt to Climate Change
53 Farmers re aware of long-term changes in the weather pattern and change
their practices to deal with socio-economic changes, but do not see these
changes as constituting “climate change.” — Amarnath Tripathi,
Ashok K Mishra
Negotiating the ‘Social’ in Elementary School Social Science
169 The rationale behind and lack of debate on the trifurcation of the social
science textbooks published by the National Council of Educational
Research and Training into history, geography, and social and politcal life is
questioned, —Karthik Venkatesh
Postscript
177, Suprabha Seshan's field notes from a botanical sanctuary; Usha
Subramanian talks politics and philosophy with a busker; and Last Lines by
Ponnappa.
Economic&PoliticalwEEKLY
"ler Fields
The Bane of Monetary Policy
ative, °
FROM 50 YEARS AGO.
Is Banking Safer Today than before the Crisis?
=P Ram Mohan. 10
Defecting from the Law
Alok Prasanna Kumar. 2
‘Trump's Toxic Announcement on Climate Change
—Navroe K Dubash 14
What Do We Know about Remonetisation?
Analysis of Available Data tll April 2017
—Arun Kumar, Ankur Verma: a8
International Rhetoric, Domestic Evidence:
Government Claims on Health Inconsistent
‘with Reality—Jashodhara Dasgupta,
‘Subla Sr B, Priya John, Sana Contractor,
Renu Khanna, Sandhya VK. a
Divide and Educate—Sukanta Chaudhuri... 25
“Strategic Partners’ in Defence Production:
Deepening Dependence
Gautam Naviak noes 29
REVIEW ARTICLE
‘Askew—A Short Biography of Bangalore;
Reengineering India —Work, Capital, and Class in
aan Offshore Economy; Encoding Race, Encoding
(Class—Indian IT Workers in Berlin: Bangalore and
Is IT Industry—A Changing Landscape of Work
and Le in Urban India—Michiel BaQ5.ecreroow31
‘Nursing Education in India: Changing Facets and
Emerging Trends
—Sreelekha Nair, §Irudaye Rajan... af
‘World Bank's Poverty Enumeration: A Critial
Examination ofthe Process, Methodology,
and Numbers—Amita Majumder, Ranjan Ray,
Satewik Santra “8
Farmers Need More Help to Adapt 10
Climate Change
Amarnath Tripathi, Ashok K MISHTA one 58
Negotiating the ‘Social’ in Elementary School
Social Science—Karthik Venkatesh, 169
CURRENT STATISTICS ssnsnnonnannee 8
Once, the Monsoon—Suprabha Seshan (177),
Nowhere Man—Usha Subramanian (179),
Last Lines (180)
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Poe by K Wika t Made Aa apd ntsc,
"Si Az india sate Gants Han a,
‘owe id uma and ped yh beha
‘np Kaa Mar, il, Ma ooo,
ator Pay ha Ti
a
Congress Must Come Back
whe answer to Zoya Hasan’s timely
‘question “Does the Congress Have a
Future?” (zew, 6 May 2017) isa thumping
“yes,” if only the party frees itself from
familial fetters and oleaginous oafs that
surround it. Hasan’s article deserves
wide reading because it throws light on
the current political scene in India.
‘The decline of the party is a certain
pointer to the decline of the family-based
feudalistic political clas that is becoming
somewhat anachronistic in a globalised
world, Indians are becoming more and
‘more disillusioned with politicians of all
ideological hues.
‘The real issue is how to understand
cour democratic exceptionalism and sus-
tain it in the midst of all-round intoler-
ance of every conceivable sort and forge
ahead on the path of progress. Demo-
cratic exceptionalism refers to a certain
pride in India being a democratic polity
surrounded by a host of theocratic and
non-democratic regimes. Athens, for
example, prided itself on its democratic
exceptionalism. Here then comes the
question of individual freedom as an
inalienable value that should be pre-
served at any cost rather than religious
freedom as conventionally understood
or secularism as a politically convenient
instrument, Otherwise our democratic
exceptionalism stands in danger of
extinction.
‘There isa growing tendency on the part
of intellectuals to debunk the Bharatiya
Janata Party's (Bue) recent victory as
symptomatic of “Hindu” nationalism, Such
peevish descriptions are pernicious to the
core. Have not non-Hindus as well as
Hindus who are far from hard-core Hindu
sympathisers voted for the BJP? Pray
‘what is Hindu, Muslim or Christian about
nationalism? Jinnah was as much a na-
tionalis as were Tilak, Gandhi or Nehru
Did not Jinnah defend Tilak in court
against charges of sedition? Nobody called
Jinnah a Muslim nationalist then or Nehru
a Hindu nationalist; why then call the
genuine sentiments of millions of Hindus,
“Hindu nationalism,” thereby attaching a
certain odium to this noble sentiment,
nationalism?
Hindu-bashing has become a symbol
of intellectual progressivism, in the pro-
cess, raking up avoidable acrimonies. Is
it not strange that Indian intellectuals
have no qualms in being called Marxists,
Leninists, Trotskyists or Maoists—all
—but being called a
or troglodyte?
Hasan’s call for rejuvenation of the
Congress makes eminent sense and is
timely. She has rightly pointed out that it
faces a structural dilemma on several
fronts. She might as well have added
another cause: the unbearable burden
of supine sychophants and lupine lam-
entations of the gerontocratic guard.
‘The Congress must rejuvenate and re-
emerge as a viable alternative if only to
act as a check on the authoritarian ten-
dencies of the ruling party at the centre
so as to ensure a vibrant and vigorous
democracy.
This has become a historical necessity
as the possibility of a third alternative in
the form of a ragtag of small parties is
likely to remain just that.
Hopes of the left parties as a strong
alternative have as good as vanished con-
sidering their pitiful struggle for surviv-
al. The sad decline of the leftists in India
‘who were on the forefront in champion-
ing progressive causes is due mainly to
the ideology’s iron-clad grip on their un-
derstanding of India’s complex political
problems, blind as they were to the ground
realities. There is a lesson in their dectine.
Foreign ideologies whatever their romantic
lure just cannot substitute homespun
‘ones. Marx, Mao, Lenin and Stalin, there-
fore have remained intellectual curiosi-
ties rather than idols to emulate, This is
because the leftists have rarely made any
efforts to understand ground realities in
India. The fact remains that the leftists
in general and particularly in India have
been a fairly honest and fiercely non-
corrupt lot. If only their ideological gulli-
bility were tempered by rationality and
they forged a strategy backed by a correct
understanding of political culture in the
country, India would not have to witness
the sad spectacle of the decline of left-
ism as a political fore.
‘The Indian state i certainly in “an inter-
nal siege.” A number of factors contribute
owe 17,2017 ou tH No 24 BNND Economic Pokal waexeyLETTERS
to this—growing violence, lawlessness,
political opportunism, vote bank poli-
tics, religious fundamentalism, rising
economic inequalities and economic
challenges such as inflation, unemploy-
‘ment and fiscal deficits, the rise of local
nationalism pose a big question mark
before national integrity. The challenge
is to forge a strategy that strikes a neat
balance between individual liberty and
the requirements of national security.
‘Therefore, the anomie that grips the
Indian state is very much endogenous.
Exogenous factors have only abetted it.
SRKasbekar
Gender Bias at Workplace
Tiare Pam sagatan aha
Dang, “Sexual Harassment at Work-
place: Experiences of Women Managers
and Organisations” (gew, 2 June 2017),
reflects the increasing rate of sexual
harassment of working women despite
the fact that they are well educated and
in a position to leave and opt for
alternate livelihood opportunities. The
writers’ argument holds water that
sexual harassment at the workplace re-
flects men’s aggression against women
‘who occupy positions traditionally in
men’s purview.
‘The policies and work culture of
economic organisations need to intro-
duce parity between men and women in
the workplace and management. Women
should be assured that their complaints
will not fall on deaf ears and they will
‘be provided speedy justice. Women most-
ly refrain from registering complaints
‘owing to the notion that far from justice
they might be handed out defamation
and neglect by the investigating officials.
‘Women are forced to keep quiet about
their sexual abuses until itis beyond tol:
erance. However, to neglect or bear
minor sexual abuses is routine owing to
the fears of social stigma and the pros
pect of job loss, especially ifthe perpe
trator is the boss. The social construe-
tion of gender invisibilises this structur-
al violence which prevails both in the
family and workplace, with women,
more often than not, consenting to this
male hegemonic culture.
‘There is a need to change the mind-
set along with the legal system. We
‘must shun gender-biased morality and
‘modernity.
Supriya Singh
University of Lucknow,
Academic Entrepreneur
whe 1970s produced a number of
social science institutions named
after doyens like V K RV Rao, K N Raj,
CT Kurian, and DT Lakdawala. India
was a pioneer in the craft of academic
institution-building, often from a limit-
ed resource base, and the country’s ex-
perience has immensely inspired scholars
in the rest of Asia, One among them was
M Alimullah Miyan.
A pioneer of the non-government uni-
versity in Bangladesh and founder vice
chancellor ofthe International University
of Business Agriculture and Technology
(eat), Miyan passed away on 10 May
2017. Abrilliant scholar of migration and
small business studies, his untimely
death is a great loss to the Institute of
Small Enterprises and Development
sep), Cochin, and, personally, to many
of his admirers.
‘My association and interaction with
Miyan dates back to 2005, when I was
based at the Development Research Ins-
titute, University of Tilburg, on a short
assignment. Since then, Miyan and the
university he nursed became intimate
partners of the ise. Serving as a mem-
ber ofits International Advisory Group,
he subsequently extended his services to
the institute, and to the cause of small
business and entrepreneurship in Asia,
Miyan was also a partner in the sep
Project on “Renewable Energy Entrepre-
in South Asia,” and played a
key role in organising two international
Besides the 1par, which he founded
in 1991, Miyan was the founder of the
South Asian Disaster Management Center
(sabato), which is involved in training,
research, and publication on disaster
preparedness and mitigation, He was in-
vited as an expert to the World Confer-
ence on Disaster Reduction (wenr) in
Kobe, Japan, in January 2005.
Miyan’s contribution to migration
studies stands out. Titled “Dynamics
and Diversity: Employment Relations in
the Asia-Pacific Region,” his contribution
has triggered widespread debates on the
subject, especially in Asian countries. He
has published extensively on family plan-
nning, human resources and business
‘management, industrial relations, mar-
keting, social development programmes,
disaster management, and energy policy.
In addition, he has undertaken research
and evaluation on public administra-
tion, management strategies for small
business and government, as well as
training needs of the health and family
planning sectors.
After completing his honours and
masters degree from Dhaka University,
he received an wa from Indiana Univer-
sity in the United States (us), and a doc-
torate from the Manchester Business
‘School in the United Kingdom,
Miyan was the chairman of the Regi
onal Centre of Expertise on Education
for Sustainable Development, Greater
Dhaka; founding executive board mem-
ber, Association of Management Deve-
lopment Institutions in South Asia
(ampisa); executive member, Inter-
national Society for Labour and Social
Security Law; member, International La-
bour and Employment Relations Ass0-
ciation, Geneva; member, Society for
International Development, Rome; and,
regional chair, International Association
of University Presidents, us.
conferences in Cochin and Colombo, PM Mathew
respectively. scocun
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2086 17,2017 VOLLI NO 24 HR Feonomic Polke weextyEconomic8PoliticalweekLy
SUNE 17, 2017
Unquiet Fields
Farmers in India are angry over betrayed poll promises of doubling farm incomes.
(sur) made extravagant promises of doubling farm incomes,
generating large-scale employment and bringing back black
money. The fate of poll promises is no secret in this country.
However, the difference with this govemment is that it also
promised a leader who actually delivers. Thus, the otherwise for-
giving and forgetting citizenry, pumped up on the projection of a
hyper-masculine, hyper-efficent leader, has assumed the burden
of reminding the leader of his self-proclaimed agenda. This ex-
plains the quandary in which the nsp finds itself as it confronts
the countrywide agrarian and livelihoods crises, even as its de-
monetisation histrionic appears to be unravelling atthe seams.
‘The ten-day historic strike by farmers in Maharashtra and
adjacent Madhya Pradesh (a4) caught the country in general and
the syp in particular by surprise. The hitherto unassertive, un-
organised mass of farmers across the rural expanse transformed
into a veritable political force overnight, The striking farmers have
reaffirmed the need to implement the structural reforms proposed
by the Swaminathan Commission, and to offset the immediate
setback of reduced prices for farm produce following demoneti-
sation and a bumper crop. The problem of a surplus crop in the
affected region has come after two years of intense drought. Thus,
this agitation has emerged from the relatively well-irrigated
and prosperous Pune and Nashik divisions of Maharashtra, and
Ujjain division of mr, and not the drought-prone and highly im-
poverished Marathwada and Vidarbha or Chambal and Bun-
delkhand respectively. Apart from the vagaries of nature, agri-
culture in India overall has been in deep crisis. Rising input
costs and falling output prices, dwindling government support
and increasing market instability, decreasing size of landhold-
ings and falling productivity, have led to reduced farm incomes,
making agriculture altogether unviable. Small and marginal
farmers, tillers, landless agricultural labour and those living on
the margins of the agrarian economy are the worst affected.
‘The nsp-led dispensation in both states has blundered in effec-
tively quelling or addressing the protests. They first suggested
that this was the handiwork of the opposition parties, giving the
latter undue credit. Then they went on to delegitimise the protes-
tors as not “genuine” farmers, which backfired instantaneously. In
Maharashtra, the government played divide and rule with members
ofthe core committee representing the farmers resulting in a new
I: the run-up to the 2014 elections, the Bharatiya Janata Party
‘and more exacting committee to replace them, with leaders from
the left taking charge. Finally, Chief Minister Devendra Fadnavis
buckled and relented to a €30,000 crore loan waiver for small and
‘marginal farmers, immediate disbursement of new loans for the
next cropping cycle, substantial increase inthe price of milk with
70% of the realised price assured to the farmer. He also promised to
lobby with the centre for fixing a minimum support price (Msp) at
the cost of production plus 50% profit. These promise, while highly
ambitious, are logistically challenging (in terms of identifying
genuinely needy farmers for loan waiver or calculating precise cost
of production), fiscally overwhelming and financially foreboding,
Notably, it is @ policy reversal back to government intervention in
agriculture, precisely the opposite of what the nse supports. In mr,
despite the death toll rising to seven, Chief Minister Shivraj
CChouhan is stil holding out with limited relief measures, including
‘waiver of loan interests and invitation to dialogue. Far from pla-
cating protestors, this move has actually empowered the opposition.
‘The bottom line is that the ssp needs to pay attention to rural,
India and the agrarian economy, Primarily, traderfriendly and
urban-based party, the Bsr secured rural votes on the back of
intricate caste calculations and a promise to revamp the econo-
my in general and agriculture in particular. This promise has
come back to haunt it. The current agrarian crisis i the result of
accumulated policy distegard and incoherence vis-&-vis agricul-
ture across political parties and governments. While the BsP is
not, and cannot be held, exclusively responsible for this criss, it
has to bear the consequences of a desperate and desolate mass
demanding justice as never before. In the past, the asp had reso-
lutely opposed rural development schemes promoted by the
Congress party such as the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural
Employment Guarantee Act. On the other hand, its own policy
‘moves, including the proposed amendments to the Land Acqui
sition Act and demonetisation, betray ignorance and indiffer-
ence to the rural economy and its modes of functioning. This is
evident from the Reserve Bank of India's monetary policy review
statement on 7 June 2017 asserting the remarkable fallin prices
across agricultural commodities resulting in “fre (distress) sales”
‘on account of demonetisation. The cash crunch induced by de-
‘monetisation that persists to the day across villages, small towns
and bazaars, has triggered a deflation in the farm sector by rob-
bing produce markets of the all-important liquid capital. This is
7plainly visible as farmers in Haryana, Rajasthan, Gujarat,
‘Andhra Pradesh, Telangana and Karnataka ready to take up the
baton of protest, next.
A poignant detail missed by most is that the farmers’ strike in,
Maharashtra emanated from the same district where the Maratha
morchas began—Ahmednagar in Pune division, Both the public
The Bane of Monetary Policy
agitations, although different in demands and methods of pro-
test, have witnessed spontaneous mobilisation on.a scale, scope
and intensity that should be worrying to any government. In the
absence of a strong opposition, itis the intensifying wrath of
people that has proved to be the real check on this government
in securing accountability and the changes promised.
The rer’ stubborn stance on inflation has its roots in the government's own economic policies.
9f India’s (noi) refusal to reduce the rate of interest once
again at the second bimonthly monetary policy review on.
7 June 2017 that would have facilitated a reduction in bank lend-
ing rates and help boost growth, is rather perplexing. The chief
economic advisor ought to have realised that the Rat’ stubborn-
ness, a display of its independence, in pursuing a narrow, single-
minded policy perspective of inflation targeting, contrary to the
government's explicit wishes, is directly inspired by the govern-
rment’s own policy of stabilisation rooted in the theology advanced
by the International Monetary Fund (1ntr) and the World Bank. It
is a different matter that the Bt did not exhibit such independ-
ence when the government interfered with its autonomy during
demonetisation and in a few other administrative matters.
‘That apart, the central bank’s own image has been one of
overtly promoting the nar’s stabilisation programmes during
the past two decades or so. More specifically, a paper which is
the outcome ofa “technical collaboration” between the nat and,
the mtr, provides an outline of the analytical framework for
such an inflation targeting policy. It seeks to concretise what is
called flexible inflation targeting (rrr) recommended earlier by an,
expert committee headed by the current ret Governor, Urjit Patel
‘The committee had exhibited a single-minded devotion to con-
trolling inflation through a unique interest rate channel. It had
accordingly recommended a nominal inflation rate of 4% of
which operated around a + 2% band based on the consumer price
index (cn). This has been imposed statutorily by the govern-
‘menton the monetary system after it signed the Monetary Policy
Framework Agreement (MPRA) with the rat in February 2015.
‘The primary objective of monetary policy was thus ordained
as one of maintaining price stability. For this, nat has to establish an.
operating target and an operating procedure. With the amend-
‘ment ofthe ri Act, the central government, in consultation with
the Ret, notified the inflation target mentioned which is appli-
cable for the next five years until March 2021. If fails, the Ret
shall explain the failure and propose remedial measures, and
state the time required to bring inflation to the target level; as
though monetary policy alone was capable of inflation control.
Thus, there is this sword of Damocles hanging over the na’
head to ensure that the inflation targets met. Itisa different ques-
tion that this imposition is the result of the Rat’ own initiative,
based as itis ona blinkered view of the macroeconomy. The propa-
gation of rrrhas also been done witha selective and biased view of
other country experiences, some of which have no doubt been
T: government's public disapproval of the Reserve Bank
successful in moderating commodity inflation, but admittedly at
the cost of output, employment growth, and social welfare. The
propagation is further buttressed by the theoretical construct of
“rational expectations” (nz) which stands largely discredited in re
cent economic literature. As articles in this journal have brought
‘ut, the RE hypothesis fails to recognise the limits on individuals’
rationality imposed by cognitive liabilities
India adopted the rrr framework despite opposition to it from
even former nat governors. Those opposing it rightly contended
that focusing only on inflation while ignoring the wider develop-
‘mental issues is improper and supply-side influences, which are
beyond the control of monetary policy are more dominant in In-
dian inflation. The monetary transmission mechanism here faces
‘untold hurdles, including the complex nature of economic struc-
tures that prevent the spread of monetary signals.
Just to cite the importance of supplyside issues, studies show
that of the 117% inerease in the cpt during the decade between.
March 2007 and March 2017, 53% has been contributed by the
food index. In absolute terms, the food index has increased by
131%, while the non-food index has risen by 104% during the dec-
ade. Interestingly, even under the wholesale price index (wr),
the price index for food items has risen by 108% while prices of
all other nonfood items have risen by less than hal. No doubt,
food items in the commodities basket have considerably diver
fied with a shift in favour of millets as well as fruits and vegeta-
bles. Their prices do translate into higher prices in non-food
items and also into the general inflationary spiral. But that is at a
second stage when there can be varied forces operating in the eco-
nomic environment; it provides no justification for squeezing
the growth process by a restrictive ant-inflationary policy.
Reducing the inherently complex issues involved in monetary
policy strategy to a single, simplistic nominal anchor, which is what
has been done in the rr framework, appears textbookish and lacks
depth. Interestingly, studies done in the nat (Bulletin, March
2010) have shown how the multiple indicator approach was suc-
cessful on all fronts: in actual growth of gross domestic product,
{in inflation control, and in reducing volatility of the wer. The only
‘exception was the increased volatility in the cpr due to food pric-
es, thus underlying the importance of supply management.
Considering the complexity of India's economic structure,
and its multiple social, fiscal and monetary needs, the earlier
‘multiple indicators approach adopted by the net that was in-
formed by varied financial and real sector variables has a strong
case for deployment in monetary policy.Half Lives
Debilitating diabetes is spreading fast among the poor.
disease that mainly affected the rich has now afflicted
the poor in India. This is the disturbing finding of a maior
study conducted by the Indian Council of Medical Re
search (rexan). Until some years ago, Diabetes Mellitus was con-
sidered to be a lifestyle disease that mainly afflicted the socio-
economically better off sections of society. The “epidemic” sweep-
ing lange swathes of Asia was assumed to target consumers of
high-fat and sugary foods, the overweight and the sedentary
However, recent studies have found that the urban poor both in
the developed and the developing world are increasingly becom-
ing diabetic. Termed the diabetes capital of the world, India to is
going the same way. The largest national study conducted by the
tem and the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare has found
that in the urban areas of the more economically advanced states,
diabetes is higher among people from lower socio-economic status,
than those from the upper strata, However in all the states, in the
rural areas the disease was seen among those of a higher socio-
economic status. The findings imply that overall the disease is
spreading to sections that were hitherto considered unaffected or
less affected—poorer urban dwellers and better off rural dwellers.
Thisisa cause for not just concern but even alarm, Diabetes isa
“high maintenance” disease that leads to severe damage to the
heart, kidneys and eyes apart from risk of gangrene if misman-
aged. Given the state ofthe public health system inthe country, and
the fact that the poor have to pay for healthcare, the findings
must be treated as a distress signal on an urgent basis. According
to the rea study, while the overall prevalence of diabetes in all
1g states was 7.3%, it varied from 4.3% in Bihar to 10.0% in Punjab,
With a sample size of nearly 60,000, the study noted that since
70% of the population lives in rural areas, even a small increase
in percentage adds up to a large number of people who need sus-
tained medical attention but have access to poor health services.
In seven affluent states, including Chandigarh, Maharashtra and
‘Tamil Nadu, the prevalence was higher in those from the ower socio-
economic trata in urban areas. This finding could relate to greater
awareness about the disease in urban areas among the economically
‘etter off and their ability o spend more on managing the disease,
Nutritionists have pointed to the greater availability of “junk
food!” at affordable prices in cities as a possible cause ofa high-fat
EDITORIALS
diet among those of a lower socio-economic strata but there are
‘other factors that must be considered. For many poorer people in
cities, nutritionally well-balanced food may not be within their
‘means, Eating “junk food” is thus not a matter of choice or taste as
‘much asaffordabilty Similarly the study points to factorslike higher
income levels, ess physically demanding occupations and increased
availability of mechanised transport and household appliances
among urban dwellers to possibly explain the higher incidence of
the disease in urban areas. The pressure of commuting long dis-
tances to work and the need to use the public transport system is
also nota matter of choice in cities. These issues lead tothe build-up
of stress—another factor that is among the causes ofthe disease.
‘The onset of Type 2 diabetes among South Asians occurs at a
‘much younger age as compared to other populations, thus straining
the healthcare services. The study also points to another known,
fact: Asian Indians progress faster through the pre-diabetes stage
than those of other ethnic groups. Also, asin other countries where
diabetes is spreading rapidly in India too, recreational physical
activity is very low, more so, among women from all sections.
‘This study backs with data what has been surmised and found
inearlier but smaller studies. For instance, the National Programme
for Control and Prevention of Cancer, Diabetes, Cardiovascular
Disease and Strokes has been active since 2010. But the scan
findings cal for urgent short- and long-term interventions. The
government, non-governmental organisations (Nos), the medical
community and diabetics will have to join hands to ensure that
community involvement is encouraged. Starting with the avail-
ability of nutritious food and facilities for physical recreational
activities, a sustained campaign to spread awareness of the dis-
cease is needed. These in tur call for more long-term policy inter-
ventions that go beyond packaging and advertising of fas foo.
Infectious diseases remain the largest concern in developing
countries. However, non-communicable diseases like diabetes
(known appropriately as the silent killer) are spreading at a
frightening rate. Before the discovery of insulin in 1921, having
diabetes meant a sentence of death and after it, until some de-
cades ago, a 50% chance of survival. In the 2st century, if we
are not to sentence large sections ofthe population to a halflife,
‘we must act quickly and in concert.
FROM 50 YEARS AGO
oT TG
‘AND POLITICAL
All the Wrong P:
Hlibbertigibber
With the presence of
thieweeek somewhere
WEEKLY’
arallels
as many a5 six ministers
und Nexabbari (E&P W,
‘June 3) the place became not some obscure area
in easily forgetable North Bengal but—whar?
‘Some seein Naxalbari another Telengana the
‘more imaginative reporters tended to see in
Naxatbaria future Vietcong. Another Kakveip
seems more like i,t those who know the Ben-
galitemperament wth ts incoregibe volatility
Bue the other suggestions, domestic and exter
nal are worth discussing because they represent
the shadow that always falls between the idea
‘andthe realty in the Waste Land that is West
Bengal, The proximity of foreign borders—Nax-
abba is so many miles trom East Pakistan, so
‘many from Tibet and so many from Nepal (he
expert have the figures pat)—adds eredbility
{othe stories current inCalcuta and elsewhere;
Dut the facts are really much simpler. In North
Bengal there is a lot of uncultivated land:
‘Shareeroppers want some ot and vo preted in
the circumstances that isan international con
spracy involving several unfriendly neighbours
is to invite such a conspiracy. (Vide Nagaland,
Mizo Hills et, et
“The orldest thing is that, place names like
Naxalbai, Kharbari and Phansideon are begin:
ning to sound foreign. Will the ministerial cele
{gtion go into the interior or does it go only to
Siigue and take decisions onthe basis of reports
From the Commissioner of the Northern Range
and the Deputy Commissioner of Darjeeling? In
Spite of vaguely worded official contradictions,
there is litle doubt that local officals favour 8
hhand-over ofthe atea tothe atmy, The failure of,
the civil administration needs tobe looked into,Is Banking Safer Today than
before the Crisis?
the world economy has been in
I slow motion for most of the
period since the financial crisis of
2007. Interest rates fell steeply as central
banks attempted to use monetary policy
to get economies back on track. Falling
interest rates result in lower interest
margins for banks and a squeeze on
profits. Banks have ended up paying
hefty fines for assorted violations during
and after the financial crisis.
‘This combination of adverse factors
should have been bad news for banking
in the advanced economies. It has been
‘you look at valuations of banks. Major
banks in the United States (us) traded at
below their book value until about a
year or two ago. Leading banks in
Europe are stil trading below their book
values. However, there is little talk of an
imminent banking crisis. On the con-
trary, regulators exude confidence that
‘banks have become safer, thanks to
tighter regulation since the crisis. Is this
true? The Economist (2017) devotes a
special report to the subject and comes
up with a tentative “yes.” Many will be
sceptical about this conclusion.
Regulators have taken several meas
ues since the financial crisis of 2007
in order to ensure greater stability in
banking. Three of these are seen as
especially crucial. The Bank for Interna-
tional Settlements (61s) has stipulated
higher capital requirements. Regulators
in the us and Europe have sought to bol:
ster with “stress tests” that will check
that banks have adequate capital under
simulated conditions. In the us, regule-
tors have stipulated “living wills” that
will spell out how banks can meet their
liabilities in the event of failure without
requiring the injection of taxpayer money.
Inthe us and the United Kingdom (ux),
restrictions have been placed on the
scope of banks.
‘Many, especially in the banking com-
‘munity, believe that the combination of
higher capital and living wills suffices to
make a huge difference to stability in
banking. How true is this contention?
Let us examine each ofthe key measures
inturn,
Higher Capital Requirements
Following the crisis, the mis came up
with Basel 1 requirements for capital.
Of the basic requirement of 8% of capital
against riskweighted assets, the share
of tier 1 capital (which is equity plus
quasi-equity capital) has been increased
from 4% to 6%. In addition, Basel 1 pre-
scribes a capital conservation buffer of
up to2.5%, a countercyclical buffer of up
10 2.5% and a capital charge on systemi-
cally important banks of 2.5%. Adding
up the various charges, the largest banks
would require as much as 15.5% of capi-
tal, which is virtually double the require-
‘ment prior to the crisis
In addition, regulators in the us have
asked banks to hold debe that would
convert into equity in a crisis. Total loss
absorbing capacity (ri.ac) would include
equity and contingent convertibles that
convert into equity. Jamie Dimon, the
chief executive officer (ceo) of JPMorgan
Chase, America's biggest bank, seems to
think that regulators have erred on the
side of excess.
In a letter to shareholders in April
2017, Dimon contended that “banks have
too much capital” and that “essentially,
‘too big to fail’ has been solved—taxpay-
ers will not pay if a bank fails” (Dimon
2017). Dimon based his contention on
stress tests conducted by the us Federal
Reserve (or Fed) on the top 33 major
banks. The tests estimated losses at each
bank assuming it would be the worst
bank in a crisis. Even in this worst-case
scenario, losses added up to less than
10% of the banks’ combined capital.
Dimon wrote, “This definitively proves
that there is excess capital in the system.”
Neel Kashkari, President of the Fed-
ral Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, has
pointed out the fallacy in Dimon’s con-
tention (Kashkari 2017). Dimon bases his
argument on the total capital available
with banks, which is equity plus bonds.
This assumes that, in a crisis, after
equity holders have been wiped out by
losses at a bank, regulators will get
bondholders to bear losses.
But we know that this seldom hap-
pens. When bondholders at a bank are
forced to take losses, bondholders at other
banks take flight, at the very least, they
will not roll over the bonds on maturity.
‘The failure of any bank would thus result
in contagion. The only capital that mat-
ters when it comes to absorbing losses at
a bank, therefore, is equity capital.
Despite Basel 1m, there is not enough
equity capital in the system at the
‘moment. Under Basel m, the leverage
ratio (the ratio of equity to assets) is 3%.
For the top six banks in the us, the ratio
today is 6.69%. Kashkari thinks the lever-
age ratio for the biggest banks needs to
move up to around 15% (which would
mean a debt to equity ratio of about
5.52). For this to happen, the biggest
banks would need to have a capital
to riskweighted assets ratio of 23.5%
(Financial Times 2016).
In their well-known book, The Bank-
ers’ New Clothes: What’s Wrong with
Banking and What to Do About It (2013),
‘two academics, Anat Admati and Martin
Hellwig, take the case for higher capital
even further. The authors argue that the
leverage ratio may need to be as high as
25% for banks to be truly stable. This
means that the debt to equity ratio
would have to come down from 33:1
today to3:1. In terms of having adequate
capital at banks, we have a really long
way to go.
In the us, there is a proposal in
Congress to offer banks an alternative to
the complex regulations of Dodd-Frank
Act: a leverage ratio of 10:1. Then, banks
do not have to opt for Basel mt and other
norms. The Economist (2017) says thatHT PAREKH FINANCE COLUMN
small banks may opt for this alternative
‘but not the larger banks.
Living Wills
We have thus far lacked mechanisms for
orderly resolution of banks in a crisis.
‘That is why governments had to infuse
capital into banks in order to prevent
failure. Living wills are intended to
provide for orderly resolution, that is,
losses would be borne by equity and
bondholders (and, perhaps, by depositors
with deposits above the guaranteed
limit), The Dodd-Frank Act in the us has
provisions for living wills and it also
creates a new resolution authority called
the Orderly Liquidation Authority.
In 2014, 11 us banks submitted their
living wills to the Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation (roic). All were reje-
cted. In 2016, five out of eight living wills
were rejected by the Fed and the prc.
There are serious doubts as to whether
living wills will ever work in practice.
‘The living wills are based on est
mates of the value of assets and liabi
ties in normal times. In times of crises,
the valuations may well turn out to be
incorrect. Many of the large banks oper-
ate across several countries. Cross
border resolution of assets and liabilities
poses formidable challenges.
Moreover, living wills hinge on Tic,
which includes convertible debt. The
dea in having debt as a component of
‘TLacis that debr is cheaper than equity.
But if investors believe that debt is likely
to be converted into equity with a high
probability, they are likely to price it
closer to equity, thereby defeating the
purpose of having a debtlike instru-
ment. The concept of living wills as a
means of making the banking system
safer fails to inspire confidence.
Restrictions on Scope
‘There is a view that banks came to grief
in the financial crisis because they were
using depositor money for high-risk
activities. In the us and the ux, regula:
tors have moved to restrict the scope of
banks’ activities. In the us, we have the
Volcker Rule in the Dodd-Frank Act.
Under the rule, banks are barred from
proprietary trading, hedge funds, and
private equity
commie & Pllc wrsxsy
‘The UK has opted to ring-fence retail
banking activities from investment ban-
king activities as recommended by the
‘Vickers Commission. There will be higher
capital requirements for the retail bank-
ing part and the regulatory safety net
will be available for the retail part alone.
Do restrictions on scope make bank-
ing safer? First, there are significant
challenges of implementation. In the us,
it has been especially difficult to define
“proprietary trading” under the Volcker
Rule and to distinguish it from hedging
cor market-making activities. In the UK,
ensuring that retail banking is properly
ring fenced poses its own challenges.
‘That apart, itis not clear that itis the
integration of investment banking with
retail banking that makes banking risk-
ier. In the last crisis, some investment
banks (for example, Bear Stearns and
Lehman Brothers) failed as did some
pure commercial banks (such as North-
em Rock and Washington Mutual). Some
banks that combined commercial and
investment banking (for example, Royal
Bank of Scotland) failed while others
(for example, JPMorgan Chase) weath-
ered the storm,
‘Moreover, separating investment ban-
king from commercial banking would
reverse a market-driven process stretch-
ing over a long period as banks found
that they were losing clients to the capi-
tal markets. The problem for universal
banks may not be scope of operations
per se. It may be that they have not, in
the past, set appropriate limits for
various activities or income streams i
accordance with prudent norms of risk
‘management. The answer, then, is not to
eliminate proprietary trading or hedge
fund activities but to place appropriate
limits on exposures to these activities.
If greater scope has resulted in banks
becoming bigger, then, perhaps, the pro-
blem is better addressed by addressing
the problem of size itself. As the argu-
‘ment goes, if a bank is too big to fail, it
should be too big to exist in the frst place.
Simon Johnson of the Sloan School of
‘Management, Massachusetts Institute of
‘Technology, has argued that banks’ size
should be limited to 2% of gross domes-
tic product. At least for now, the idea is
‘00 radical for regulators to stomach.
It does appear that banking stability is
still some distance away. If we are to
stick to conventional approaches. to
protecting stability, then our best bet is
to require banks to have substantially
‘more capital than is contemplated under
Basel mt. But this is an idea that has yet
to gain general acceptance.
‘A paper that came out last year
should jolt regulators out of their com-
placeney (Sarin and Summers 2016).
Using several measures of risk, the
paper finds that banks in the us and
elsewhere are not safe. If banks were
safer, bank equity should be less volatile
and there should be less market expec-
tation of future volatility of equity. It
turns out that this isnot the case. Meas-
ures of volatility are higher post-crisis
than before the crisis
‘The authors find that the franchise
value of most institutions, reflected in
the ratio of market value of equity to
assets, has declined significantly for
‘most major institutions after the crisis.
This naturally signals higher risk: there
is less equity available to bear losses on
assets. The authors say that their find-
ings “clearly call into question the view
‘of many officials and financial sector
leaders who believe that large banks
are far safer today than they were a
decade ago.” That is certainly some-
thing for regulators and policymakers to
chew over.
‘TT Ram Mohan ((o7@iima ac in) veaches at the
Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad,
Dimon, Jamie (2017): “Dear Fellow Shareholders
“4 April, beps//www. jpmorganchase.com/
‘Corpcateinvesorrlaons/decument/a2016,
‘eolettersreoers pl
-Beonomist (2017): A Decade After the Crisis, How
Tare the Work!® Banks Doing?” @-12' May,
http/tww:economistcom/newsspecial
report 21721505-though-ffects- financial
sit2007-08-are sll reverberating banks are,
Pinancial Times (2016): “Neo! Kashkari Pulls No
Punches in Plan to End "Too Big Too Fal." 18
November, htps//www.fecom/eontent/b4bo
an6a-adge-ne6-9¢b3-0b8207902122,
Kashkari, Neel (2017): Jamie Dimon's Shareholder
(Advocacy) Lette.” Mediumcom, 6 April,
hreps:/medium com/@neelkasnkar/jamie
«mons shareholder advocacy leterc24867-
pene
Sarin, Natasha and Lawrence H Summers (2016):
fave big Banks Gotten Safer" Brooking
Papers on Economic Activity, Fal ttps:/Wwwe
brookingsdu/peaatiles/have-big banks
gotten saferDefecting from the Law
ALOK PRASANNA KUMAR
‘The impunity with which
legislators in Andhra Pradesh and
‘Telangana have ignored the
anti-defection law points to certain
weaknesses in the processes and
norms laid down in it. What is
required to remedy this, however,
is not just a minor tweak, but a
complete overhaul of the way the
law works to adequately address
the problem of defections by
sitting legislators before it
overwhelms India’s democracy.
[would like to thank Hemant Desai and
‘Shraddha Upadhyay for their inputs.
‘Alok Prasanna Kumar (alok prasanna@
vidhilegelpolicy.in) isa visiting fellow atthe
Vidhi Centre for Legal Policy, New Delhi,
2
ince it was inserted into the Consti-
tution, the Tenth Schedule of the
Constitution of India (the “ant
defection law”) has been a subject of con-
siderable debate and controversy. It has
‘been partially struck down by the Supreme
Court in Kihoto Hollohan vZachilhu (1992).
Yet, the controversies and debates have
led it to be amended again through the
Constitution (Ninety-First Amendment)
‘Act, 2003. In its 32 years of existence,
political parties and legislators have come
th creative and ingenious ways of
the rigours ofthe law, an
taken much litigation, going all the way up
to the Supreme Court, not to mention the
‘ist amendment, to curb these attempts.
However, recent events in Telangana
and Andhra Pradesh show that the anti-
defection law faces a new, devast
threat, It comes from the simple refusal
of speakers to perform their constitu-
tional duties under the law by not taking
a decision as to the disqualification of a
member of legislative assembly (ta)
within reasonable time. This means that
aan mua, who has otherwise violated the
‘Tenth Schedule by “defecting” to another
political party, will not suffer the legal
consequence of disqualification for such
“defection,” but instead will continue to
enjoy her seat. This effectively renders
the anti-defection law irrelevant, with
terrible consequences for India's consti-
tutional democracy.
Until the Constitution (Fifty-Second
Amendment) Act, 1985 was passed, the
Constitution of India did not use the
phrase “politcal party” at all. Even though
the Indian Republic has been a multiparty
system, following the Westminster form
of parliamentary democracy, the Consti-
tution itself seems to be “blind” to the
existence and operation of political parties.
Itis nots if India did not have experience
with a limited form of multiparty demo-
cracy prior to the coming into force of
the Constitution; this was what the
Government of India Act, 1935 had ena-
bled. Yet, it was only with the coming
into force of the sand amendment to the
Constitution, which introduced the Tenth
Schedule to the Constitution, that the
words political party” were used for the
first time in the Constitution of India.
‘The ostensible reason for the intro-
duction of the ‘Tenth Schedule was to
curb the so-called “aaya-ram-gaya-ram’
practices of Indian legislators. The inspi-
ration for this moniker is said to be Gaya
Lal, a Haryana sia who changed par-
ties thrice in the space of one fortnight
in 1967 while retaining his seat as an
MLA. Defections thereafter reached such
epidemic proportions that the stability
of some state governments was always
in question, distracting from any sem-
blance of good governance.
‘The Tenth Schedule was offered as the
solution to this issue, But, almost as soon
as it was applied in various legislatures,
it was challenged in the Supreme Court as
being against the basic structure of the
Constitution. By a narrow majority of three
to two, a Constitution Bench held in the
Kihoto Hollohan case that the Tenth
Schedule was largely valid, but read down
paragraph 7 which tried to exclude judi-
cial review of the speaker's decision on
disqualification. The minority judgment
(authored by Justice JS Verma) held it to
be against democracy, a basic feature of
the Constitution, raising some valid con
cerns about the Tenth Schedule, notably
its reliance on the position of the speaker
to make an impartial adjudication when
the post clearly was a partisan one. Sub-
sequent years have proved the minority
judgment right as speakers have only
become more partisan
One initial loophole in the law, that of
defections being valid if a party “split,”
was closed by the gist Amendment Act.
Multiple committees over the years had
recommended that this loophole, which
allowed “bulk defections” while penalis-
ing individual defections, be closed.
Coupled with the constitutional limit
placed on the number of ministers in a
government, it was hoped that this
would prevent the kind of unprincipled
defections that the Tenth Schedule hadTAW& SOCIETY
tried and failed to stop.? This did not
necessarily work as intended.
Disregard for the Law
After the assembly elections in 2014, a
troubling situation has emerged in Andhra
Pradesh and Telangana in the context of.
the anti-defection law. As of date, 27 legis-
lators are alleged to have defected from
various parties to the ruling Telangana
Rashtra Samiti (res) since 2014. The
speaker, § Madhusudhana Chary, himself
a member of the TRS, has not taken any
decision on the disqualification petitions
filed against these atuas over these three
years. Likewise, in Andhra Pradesh, the
‘Telugu Desam Party (roP) in power has
been able to get 21 mttas from the Yuvajana
Shramika Rythu Congress Party (vsxce)
to defect to it, without suffering disquali-
fication (Somashekar 2017). Here t00,
Speaker Kodela Siva Prasada Rao, a
member of the Tbe, has taken no decision
(on the disqualification petitions.
‘The speakers’ inaction in both these
states is the latest manifestation of the
underlying problem highlighted by the
minority judgment in the Kihoto Hollo-
han case—the partisan role of the speaker.
In the past, speakers’ decisions have been
challenged before the Supreme Court and
high courts, and set aside on various
sgrounds® This new modus operandi to
defeat the anti-defection law seems to
avoid any possible judicial review.
Nonetheless, judicial review will not
be taken away entirely. The Telangana
impasse is under consideration in the
Supreme Court of India (S$ A Sampath
Kumar v Kale Yadaiah 2016) and the
‘Andhra Pradesh case is in the Hyderabad
High Court (Business Standard 2016). The
Supreme Court has referred the Telangana
case to a Constitution bench in an order
dated 8 November 2016 and one hopes
that the Court hears and decides the case
before the completion of the full term
of the legislative assembly. Before the
Supreme Court, the Telangana speaker
has raised the question as to whether a
court can at all issue a direction for
expeditious disposal of a disquelifica-
tion petition under the Tenth Schedule.
‘The key question before the Constitution
bench is whether a high court or the
Supreme Court can order the speaker to
commie & Pllc wrsxsy
take a decision on such disqualification
petitions.
‘The instances in Telangana and Andhra
Pradesh are not the first, and certainly
will not be the last attempts by political
parties or legislators to overcome the
‘Tenth Schedule. These have happened
exactly because of the reasons pointed
out by the minority judgment in the
Kihoto Hollohan case—an overbroad
law which requires a partisan speaker to
act ina non-partisan manner.
‘Though transplanted from foreign
shores, the Westminster form of parlia-
‘mentary democracy has taken root here
but developed some rather bizarre and
dangerous mutations, such as routine
defection. Further, with the increasing
likelihood of those with criminal charges
against them getting elected and the
decisive role of money power in an elec-
(Vaishnav 2017), this suggests a
democracy in poor health,
But, is the fix the right one? Does the
‘Tenth Schedule, in its present form, strike
the right balance between the freedoms
of the legislator and the need for respect-
ing democratic mandates and processes?
It is perhaps time to take heed of Justice
‘Verma's dissent in the Kihoto Hollohan
case and reconsider the anti-defection law.
Pethaps, one ofthe reasons wy there isso
litle debate in Parliament over important
legislation (Gandhi 2016) could be because
there is little or no incentive to do so
‘when the voting takes place along entirely
expected lines. It might make sense, there-
fore, to restrict the anti-defection law only
to votes on the budget and confidence/
no-confidence motions. It follows, there-
fore, that votes which do not follow the
party whip in such instances should be
automatically deemed invalid, and the
‘member disqualified by operation of law.
‘The disqualification should also be as a
‘matter of course and not involve any dis-
cretion or decision-making on the part of.
the speaker. While the Supreme Courthas
placed much faith in the neutrality and
sanetity of the office of the speaker, the
reality is that the office is anything but, a
fact recognised ironically by the Supreme
Court itself while holding that the deci-
sions of the speaker nonetheless will be
subject to judicial review, and invalidating
stich decisions in no fewer than 1 cases.
‘These changes are necessary since what
haas taken place in Telangana and Andhra
Pradesh is probably being watched with
interest by politcal parties around the
country. Given that most ideas concern-
ing governance in India, good or bad,
have travelled from the states to the cen-
tre, the day may not be far when the cen-
tral government is formed through an
illegitimate majority gained only by fla-
‘grant violation of the Tenth Schedule.
ores
1 TheSupreme Court alone ha delivered no fewer
than 26 judgments interpreting some aspect of
the Tench Schedule, the envlest being the Kioto
Hollohan case ad the latest in Nobort Rela &
Bamang! elie ¥. Deputy. Speaker, Arunachal
Pradesh Legislative Assobly 2016).
2 SeeStatement of Objects and Reasons” ro the
Constitution (Ninety-first Amendment Act,
2008 (http/ndiacode nie incotweb/amend?
amendou.pat.
3 See, for instance, Balehondra Jharkhol B.S
Yedyurappa Goi), where the Supreme Court
Sct aside te decision ofthe speaker ofthe Kar
hataka State Legislative Assembly disquality
ing members of egisative assemblies.
4 This suggestion was made ina private mem-
ber bill to this effec by then member of par
liament, Manish Tewari, bu the same lapse.
See Manish Tewari (201)
REFERENCES
Balchendra Jharkoll » BS Yeddyurappa (ou
SCC, SC, 7, p
Business Standard (2016): “Hycerabad High Court
Issues Notices 020 YSACP Members," 14 Novem
ber, viewed on 10 ne 207, htp//www bus
ness standard.con/aticle/ polities”
hyderabad high-coureissues-notces-10.20 9
ep members-n6m4o1222_ hm
‘Gandhi, Jatin (2016): “Patient Spending Less
"Time Debating Laws Than Ever. Hete’s Poo”
Hinduscan Times, 29 August, viewed on une
2oiy, htp//Anwwhindustantimescom/india
news/parliament-spendingiesstime-debat-
inglaws-than-ever/story-SoudFmmvUsDIWp-
MaBE7PUN hm
ihoto HollohanvZacilh (1992): SCC Supp, SC, 2,
Pst
aba Rebia & Bamang Felix v Deputy Speaker,
‘Arunachal Pradesh Legislative Asembly 2016)
SCC, SC, 8p
A Sampath Kumar v Kale Yadaih (2016): Speci
Leave Petcon (Civil), $C, 3367/2015, ode by
the Supreme Court dated 8 November 2016,
ewe on 10 June 2017, p:/supremecourt go"
ivjonew/courni/rop 201 40016/84771 pal
Somashekar, M (207): “Ruling Parties Use Defec
tions to Consolidate Position in AP, Telangana,”
Business Line, April viewed on 10 June 2017,
hutp//ww.thehindubusinessline.com/news/
national/rlng parties defections t-con
felidate-posionin-aptelangana/art
legenias.ece,
Tewari, Manish (2016); “Liberate the Lepisator”
“linda, 30 Api, viewed ono June 207, tp
\wwwthehindu.com/opinion/lead/lead-artice
by-congres-lader-manish-tewarton erat
‘the legislator /artiless37888.ece.
Vaishnav, Milan (2o17): When Crime Pays:
‘Money and Muscle iz Indien Politics, Delhi:
HarperCollins
3Trump’s Toxic Announcement
on Climate Change
President Donald Trump's
announcement that the United
States will exit from the Paris
Agreement betrays a fundamental
misunderstanding of the way the
agreement works. It also goes
against long-agreed climate
principles, and is blind to emergent
clean energy trends. In practical
terms, the us had activated a
rollback of mitigation policies and
contributions to climate finance
prior to this announcement. Until
there are changes in domestic us
climate politics—of which there
are positive signs—the us cannot
be regarded a reliable partner for
global climate cooperation,
Navrot K Dubash (ndubash@gmail.com) is
senior fellow atthe Centre for Policy Research,
New Delbi
4
ver since Donald Trump took office
E: President of the United States
(us) in January this year, environ-
‘mentalists the world over have been ask-
ing: will he or won't he withdraw the us
from the Paris Agreement on climate
change? Now we know. On 1 June, Trump
announced that “to fulfil my solemn
duty to protect America and its citizens,
the United States will withdraw from
the Paris climate accord...” (The White
House 20176). This article examines the
{implications of this statement for the fu-
ture of the Paris Agreement, the pros-
pects of meeting a global temperature
goal, the provision of climate finance, and
global climate politics.
However, to understand the implica-
tions of this action along these dimen-
sions, itis helpful to first delve into the
stated reasons for the us withdrawal,
and in Trumps own rather toxic words.
‘Trump said the Paris Agreement will
have the effect of “ost jobs, lower wag-
¢s, shuttered factories,” that it “punishes
the United States ... while imposing no
‘meaningful obligations of the world’s
leading polluters,” that it is “unfair, at
the very highest level, to the United
States,” and that it will lead to a “mas
redistribution of wealth to other
countries.” This reasoning, such as itis,
supports three disturbing interpretations,
all of which bode ill for the future of us
participation in global climate cooperation
First, it betrays, intentionally or not, a
fundamental misunderstanding of the
‘underlying mechanism ofthe Paris Agree-
‘ment Bodansky 2017; Rajamani 2017).
‘The agreement is structured around bot-
tom-up voluntary pledges; each country
puts on the table what it deems fit in
terms of mitigation action and also finan-
cial support. The only mandatory elements
of the Paris Agreement are procedural
cones, such as reporting progress and
regularly updating pledges. Given this
cemtrely Voluntary structure, representing
the us as a victim fundamentally misin-
terprets the agreement
Second, Trump's language seeks to
appropriate the notion of fairness in cli-
‘mate politics in a manner that belies a
long history of negotiation. Historically,
equity and fairness have been determined
by which countries have responsibility for
causing the problem—in terms of contri-
bution to emissions over time—and which
countries are best placed to solve it, in
terms of their capacity to address the
problem. While the negotiations have long
been plagued by contradictory interpreta-
tions of these principles, Trump dismiss-
es the very basis for discussions of fair-
ness. Instead he seeks to replace it with
the idea that all countries bear equiva-
lent obligations, irrespective of responsi-
bility and capacity. This interpretation
rejects, even as a principle, any differen-
tial treatment for poor countries or coun-
tries that have not contributed much to
the build-up of greenhouse gases.
Third, by emphasising the potential
‘economic downsides of climate action—
jobs, shuttered factories—the Trump state-
‘ment seeks to deny the feasibility of alow
carbon transition at a reasonable and
shrinking cost. Trump's assertions are
based on an industry-funded report (vena
2017) that has been heavily criticised by
environmental groups (Steinberger and
Levin 2017; wrt 2017). Among the criti-
cisms are that the speech cherry-picks
only the highest cost case among several
presented in the underlying report, and
is based on an assumed low level of in-
novation in renewable energy. This as-
sertion cuts at a critical understanding
that underpinned the political agree-
‘ment at Paris: that a low carbon energy
transition is feasible at a reasonable and
falling economic cost. Undercutting this
‘message feeds the political reluctance to
address climate change in the us.
The flexible architecture of Paris, the
agreement on the underlying conception
of fairness, and the promise of a declin-
ing cost energy transition were central
to agreement in Paris. Conversely, the
vs denial of all three concepts can have‘COMMENTARY
a deeply corrosive effect on the agree-
ment. To what extent are these ideas
likely to be propagated and affect mate-
rial outcomes?
Future of the Paris Agreement
‘The obvious concern following the us
announcement of intent to exit is that it
will trigger a domino effect, and lead
other countries to follow suit. Afterall, if
the country most responsible for the
build-up of greenhouse gases over time
refuses to act, why should other, smaller,
poorer, and lower emitting countries
continue to cooperate?
Whether or not this is a real risk
depends greatly on the reaction of other
countries, particularly other powers. If
the us is isolated, and the reputational
costs to an exit are high, other defections
are less likely. The immediate reactions
by other countries are heartening. The
European Union (ev) and China reaf-
firmed their commitment to implement
ing the Paris Agreement and to hosting
a joint ministerial gathering to take this
forward (European Commission 2017).
French President Emmanuel Macron
gave a stirring speech calling on the
‘world to “make our planet great again,”
and Prime Minister Narendra Modi has
stressed India’s commitment to the Paris
Agreement in bilateral meetings with
Chancellor Angela Merkel and President
Macron. India’s Minister for External
Affairs Sushma Swaraj has explicitly
confirmed that India would meet its obi
gations in the Paris Agreement irrespec-
tive of any us actions (Hindu 2017), These
statements suggest that there may be no
takers for Trump's offer to “re-negoti-
ate” an agreement arrived at after years
of gruelling negotiations. And they but-
tress the agreement, signalling to others
that exiting it may not be politically
without costs.
Interestingly, the us statement of intent
to exit may not be the worst outcome.
Another option Trump was reportedly
considering, to stay in the agreement
but to reduce the us mitigation pledge
(or “nationally determined contribu-
tion"), may, paradoxically, have been
worse. Doing so would have violated
the Paris Agreement’s principle of “pro-
sression,” by which each new pledge has
to be more ambitious than past one
Yet, some us environmental groups,
an effort to keep the us in at any cost,
have argued that the Paris Agreement
allowed for such a step, legally even if
not ethically (c2es 2017), a view that
has correctly been challenged forcefully
(Rajamani 2017a). Had Trump taken this,
route, and the effort to legitimise a low-
cr pledge succeeded, it would have sent
the signal that any country could, at any
time, lower its pledge if it became in-
convenient, This would have entirely
undermined a central principle of the
Paris Agreement—no back-sliding—
and rendered ineffective the ability of
the agreement to nudge countries onto
a virtuous cycle. The formal exit, with
its higher political costs, is less likely
to lead to a domino effect than the alter-
native of staying in and watering down
its pledge
‘An important detail, and one that
complicates interpretation of the ‘Trump
statement on the agreement, is that a
party can only withdraw from the Paris
Agreement three years after it enters
into force, and withdrawal takes a
further year. Hence, despite Trump's
statement that the us will cease to hon-
ur its obligations immediately, the us
cannot legally withdraw for four years,
around the time of the next us election,
in November 2019.
This has implications for the ongoing
negotiations to elaborate the agreement's
‘mechanisms. Ifthe us is committed to a
withdrawal, it will play a limited rote in
these negotiations,
weaken the development of important
Paris Agreement mechanisms on trans-
parency and review. However, there is
also risk that the us’ stated withdrawal
could complicate negotiations, by leaving
negotiators guessing at what may be
required to induce a future us adminis-
tration to rejoin the agreement.
In sum, the short-term risk to the
stability of the agreement appears man-
ageable, particularly if other powers join
forces to buttress it. And there does not
seem to be much danger of a renegotia-
tion process. Whether the us will rejoin
the agreement at a future date, and
‘under what terms, isa complex question
and is dependent on potential shifts in
us politics around climate change in
the coming years.
Global Temperature Target
fone were to consider actual greenhouse
{gas reductions, the prospect of diminis-
hed action by the us is alarming, The us
accounts for the largest share of cumula-
tive emissions since 1850, about 27%,
and emits about 13% of annual global
emissions currently, second only to China
(wrt 2014). To have any chance of limit-
ing the increase in global average tem-
perature to well below 2°c, as the Paris
Agreement states, large emitters such as
the us have to limit their emissions.
However, even before he made the
announcement, Trump had signed an
executive order on Energy rolling back a
series of Obama-era measures designed
to limit us emissions (The White House
2017). This order, among other things,
sets in place processes to slow down or
it the Clean Power Plan aimed at re-
ducing emissions from the electricity
sector, lifts restrictions on using federal
and for coal mining, and revisits an im-
portant regulatory measure aimed at set-
ting an implicit price on carbon for the
purpose of regulatory decisions, The
playing field, in short, is being systemati
cally tilted towards greenhouse gas-emit-
ting fossil fuels.
‘The achievement of its pledge—of a
26%-28% reduction in its emissions
by 2025, from a 2005 baseline—was by
no means clear even with Obama-era
policies, but the Trump order further
reduces the likelihood of the us meet-
ing this pledge. For example, one study
suggests the effects of these changes
are that the us will decrease its emis-
sions by a much lower 15%-18% by 2025
(Larsen et al 2017). us environmental
groups argue that the Trump policies
‘may have less effect than expected, both
because some of these, such as the Clean
Power Plan, are complex to undo, and
because market forces are working
towards clean energy independent of
regulatory measures. While the final
outcome is certainly hard to predict,
there is little doubt that Trump's energy
order undoes efforts to achieve the us
pledge and makes the 2° limit harder to
achieve. For climate-vulnerable countries
15‘COMMENTARY.
such as India, this represents a clear
abdication of responsibility.
‘The emergent countertrend to this
bad news message is that the baldness of
the Trump statement appears to have
had a galvanising effect on other actors
in American society. For example, a net-
‘work of us cities, states, corporations
and universities are preparing a plan to
redouble mitigation efforts in order to
achieve the original us pledge in Paris
(Tabuchi and Fountain 2017). Opinion
polls suggest that there is a wide pool of
popular support into which such initi
tives could tap: a majority of voters in
every state were in favour ofthe us stay-
ing in the Paris Agreement (Marion et al
2o17), and 42% think the pullout will
hurt the us economy, while 32% think it
will help (Langer 2017). These numbers
suggest that an intense battle of opinion-
shaping and mobilisation around climate
outcomes is under way in the us. While
the outcome cannot be prejudged, there
is at least a possibility that some of the
slowdown in mitigation may, over time,
be reversed both by market forces and
collective action by pro-climate action
coalitions in the us.
Implications for Climate Finance
‘Trump took central aim at financing for
climate change action as a key reason
‘why the Paris Agreement is unfairto the
us. The proposed Trump budget for 2018,
already discontinues funding for the
Green Climate Fund and other interna:
tional climate support programmes, as
well as the Advanced Research Projects
‘Agency-Energy, the programme charged
‘with taking further clean energy research
and development (Office of Management
and Budget 2017: 19). In his announce-
ment, he criticised the Green Climate
Fund, ascribed a massive redistribution
of wealth due to the Paris Agreement,
and singled out India as a country that
stood to gain “billions and billions” of
dollars. To understand these comments
and the ways in which they are mislead:
ing, it is necessary to briefly take a detour
into the evolution of discussions around
climate finance.
Climate finance has long had a bit of.
an “Alice in Wonderland” quality, in that
countries have argued vociferously over
16
the underlying principle of climate fina-
nce, even as remarkably little money has
flowed into or shaped actual climate ac-
tions. The Paris Agreement enshrines a
‘compromise view on finance:
Support shall be provided to developing
‘country Parties. recognising that enhanced
support for developing country Parties will
allow for higher ambition in their actions.
(onrece 2015: Article 4, Paragraph s)
‘This formulation recognises the principle
that developing countries need financing,
while also allowing for the fact that
developing countries will take some
actions with their own domestic finane-
ing. No amounts were agreed upon, al-
though in early negotiations developed
countries had offered a goal of providing
S100 billion a year from 2020 onward
(onc 2016). In the short term, devel-
‘oped countries have pledged just over
Sto billion.
‘The us has, in actual fact, only con-
tributed $1 billion so far, intended to
support both mitigation and adaptation
for all countries, against a pledge of $3
billion, As Trump now limits further
payment, as he has announced, the us
‘would be the second-lowest contributor
in per capita terms among developed
countries, at $3 per capita (the highest,
in comparison, is Sweden's at $59 per
capita). Were the us to contribute is full
$3 billion, it would still rank 11th in per
capita terms, at about $9 per capita
ravins 2017). It is difficult to under-
stand how these numbers indicate un-
fairness to the us.
More salient, however, the Trumpstate-
‘ment fails to appreciate the extent to
which climate finance discussions are
shaped by jostling over principle as
‘much as by reality. For example, India
has made considerable strides in imple.
‘menting its pledge to enhance non fossil
fuel electricity capacity entirely with
domestic resources, even though India’s
Paris pledge does include an estimate of
mitigation needs of $834 billion for “sue-
cessful implementation” and adaptation
needs of $206 billion. Arguably, India can
and should do a better job being more
precise and specific about the method
through which these numbers were ar-
rived at. But, in the curious, unreal world
of climate finance, these numbers are at
least as much about reinforcing the prin-
ciple of who is responsible, even while
action on both climate mitigation and
adaptation proceeds with domestic funds.
The lack of finance is unlikely to
induce the larger emerging economies,
such as China, India, South Africa and
Brazil, to slow down the realisation of
their mitigation pledges. However, the
shortfall in funds will have negative
implications, particularly on adaptation
programmes in poor and vulnerable
nations. Neither any arguments about
fairness, based on relative contributions,
nor arguments about other countries
pulling their weight, provide even the
smallest justification for the us pulling
back on its agreed, and so far very limit-
ed, contribution to climate finance.
Global Climate Polities
What, collectively, does allthis imply for
global climate polities and outcomes? To
begin with, the deleterious effects of
‘Trump's policies on us emissions and on
finance were apparent even before the
announcement on the Paris Agreement
(Kemp 2017). The rollback of Obama-era
emission reduction policies and the
withdrawal of funding for international
climate programmes will undoubtedly
have directly negative consequences.
‘They will slow the pace of global emission
reductions and, unless compensated by
other countries, reduce the quantum of
funds available for developing countries.
The announcement to exit the Paris
Agreement does not modify these ef-
fects, for better or worse.
However, its real potential effects are
political and operate at three levels.
First, based on inital reactions, the Trump
announcement is unlikely to lead to a
deleterious domino effect of other coun-
tries exiting from the Paris Agreement.
The statements from other powerful
countries and regions, such as the eu,
China, and India, are reassuring in this
regard. There sno indication whatsoever
that countries are considering reopening
negotiation. Confronted with the Paris
Agreement potentially under threat, the
early indications seem to be that other
countries are willing to set aside their
residual concerns about the agreement
and coalesce around keeping Paris intact.‘As has been mentioned, the alternative—
of the us staying in the Paris Agreement
but lowering its pledge—may have had a
more destructive effect.
‘Second, mobilisation by states and cit-
ies, and by civil society and business
signal a strong latent constituency for
climate action in the us, which has also
been energised by the Trump announce-
ment. In addition to taking action to
compensate for federal inaction, these
actors could provoke a deeper and more
robust debate on climate change in
American politics. The result is not a
foregone conclusion; Trump was clearly
playing to a social base that continues to
harbour deeply negative views about
Paris. But if a decisive majority is to
>be forged in favour of climate action, a
catalyst such as the Trump announce-
ment may well have been needed.
Climate change is now likely to be firmly
on the radar for the next presidential
elections; continuing with low-level po-
litical skirmishes may not have resulted
in this opening.
‘Third, the tone and tenor of the Trump
remarks, and their narrative break with
key concepts—agreement on the archi-
tecture of climate cooperation, key prin-
ciples, and direction of travel towards
cleaner energy—signal the futility of
any further accommodation of the vs.
‘The climate announcement is of a piece
with a much-discussed recent article by
the us National Security Adviser and
Chief Economic Adviser that proclaims:
«the word is nota global community” but
fan arena where nations, non-governmental
factors and businesses engage and compete
foradvantage. (MeMaster and Cohn 2017)
‘The long and contentious history of
climate negotiations indeed suggests the
‘world is not a perfect global community.
But italso suggests that a purely transac-
tional, competitive view, one that belies
important shared principles and that re~
fuses to honour hard-won past agree-
‘ments, is not a basis for engagement ona
complex subject such as climate change.
An article in Nature Climate Change,
anticipating this decision, argued that
from a global perspective, the us
“Better Out Than In” (Kemp 2017).Given
that weak mitigation actions and lower
finance would have happened anyway,
given the hopeful upsurge in mobilisa-
tion globally and in the us, and, above
all, given the toxic language that denies
room for dialogue and new understand-
ings, until climate polities changes for
the better in the us, better out than in is
an apt conclusion,
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sources Defense Cound, hetps:/wwvennde
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tes cost ignores-benefts excludes the most vulnerable
women by disqualifying anyone with
‘more than two children. This effectively
debars the poorest and those from mar-
ginalised groups including Dalits and
tribals (Lingam and Yelamanchili 2010),
Sterilisations and
Unsafe Abortions
India had committed to ensuring that all
‘women would have access to sexual and
reproductive health services including
safe abortion services (vex 2: Recom-
‘mendation 138.153). India's UPR 3 report,‘COMMENTARY
however, does not specifically report on
the progress towards this recommenda
tion. Unsafe abortions are believed to
contribute to 9-13% of maternal mortali-
ties (Srivastava et al 2013). In spite of the
Medical Termination of Pregnancy (18)
‘Act of 1971, the Indian Penal Code still
considers abortion tobe a criminal offence.
More than 80% of women in the country
still do not know that abortion is legal and
available (Banerjee and Anderson 2012).
Several medical students are either una-
ware about the MTP Act or have anti
abortion views (Palo et al 2015; Sjostrom
etal 2014).
Misinterpretation and overzealous im-
plementation of the Preconception Pre-
natal Diagnostic Techniques Act (eceNDT),
1994 has resulted in further restriction of.
access to safe abortion services. The con-
tinued use of problematic terms such as
“female foeticide” in government litera
ture and reports adds further to the ant
abortion rhetoric (Got 2017: para 1).
Ensuring access to gender-sensitive,
comprehensive contraceptive services was
one of the key recommendations of ur 2
(Recommendation 138.153). However, the
Got does not specifically report on this.
On paper, the Got promises women an
informed choice in the matter of repro-
duction, but plans and budgets actually
promote female sterilisation as the pre-
dominant method (prt et al 2014: 26).
Expected Levels of Achievement (6a)
are set, which translate on the ground
as targets imposed upon health manag
ers and providers for female sterilisa-
tion, as against the purported target
free approach.
Female sterilisation is performed under
extremely hazardous conditions leading
to deaths, complications and illnesses as
well a failure and unwanted pregnancy.
When seen together with the govern-
rment's target of covering 48 million cou-
ples with family planning by 2020, a
promise made to Family Planning 2020
(P2020), the reduction in public health
expenditure raises serious concerns
about maintaining standards of qu:
of sexual and reproductive health ser-
vices. In November 2014, following a
“mass sterilisation camp” performed
under shockingly negligent conditions, 13
young women in Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh
commie & Pllc wrsxsy
lost their ives (5a, SAMA and NAME
2014) Protests by activists and legal inter-
ventions have led the Supreme Court to
direct the government to stop camp-based
sterilisations altogether (Devika Biswas
Union of india and Ors). However, coer-
cive measures such as the two-child norm
(by which those with more than two chil-
dren are excluded from contesting elec-
tions, applying for jobs and accessing
welfare benefits) continue to be invoked
as in the case of Assamis draft Population
Policy (Government of Assam 2017)?
In order to address adolescent health,
the government cites that the Rashtriya
Kishor Swasthya Karyakram (Rxsx)*has
been initiated in 2014. However, three
years after the scheme was launched,
Adolescent Friendly Clinics, which were
to be operationalised at prics, crics and
district hospitals, are not in place (AKAs
2017) and the programme has not been
implemented in many states. The Rajiv
Gandhi Scheme for Empowerment of
Adolescent Girls-Sabla was launched in
2010 in 205 pilot districts, as an effort to
empower adolescent girls. Despite posi-
tive evaluations (Asct 2013), Sabla has
not been upscaled across the country, as
indicated by decreasing budgets of the
Ministry of Women and Child Develop-
‘ment in 2015-16. Several states have not
introduced comprehensive sexuality edu-
cation for adolescents and a parliamen-
tary committee has ruled against it i
ing moral and cultural reasons (Rajya
‘Sabha Committee on Petitions 2009).
Conclusions
AAs detailed above, the Got has reported
to the un Human Rights Council that it
has made progress in several of the com-
‘mitments it made at upr 2, when it had
voluntarily accepted suggestions from a
peer group. The civil society joint report
(on sexual and reproductive health pro-
vides a contrast to these claims of the
government with information that is at
‘gross variance to the official report. This
discordance questions the credibility of
the claims and assurances of the govern-
‘ment's report to an international human
rights mechanism on its commitments and
achievements, and brings us to question
the government's accountability to these
international human rights processes. It is
necessary for the people of this country
and their elected representatives to be
aware about the suggestions received dur-
ing the wer 3 and play the role of informed
interlocutors. Although these international
processes play a facilitatory role in main-
taining peer pressure on member states,
the Indian government’ primary account-
ability remains to its citizens,
Despite the progressive objectives in
the nup 2017 to achieve universal health
coverage and reinforce trust in public
health systems, the policy fails to recog-
nise health as a human right, inereases
private sector involvement, and further
delays substantive increases in public
health expenditure. Given this worrying
lack of commitment to guarantee the right
to health, the Got must be reminded of
its constitutional obligations to protect
and fulfil the human rights ofits people,
including their right to health, especially
those most marginalised. The upr 3 in-
ternational review process, reinforced
with domestic involvements, can provide
it with some impetus in this direction,
ores
1 The underfunding ofthe National Heal Mision
(NHMD should be read inthe light ofthe draft
National Health Policy's comment that “The
budget received (or the NHRM) and the expend:
iture as only abou 40% of what wasenvis-
cd for 4 ull revitalization in the NRHM,
rmework.”
2 AS recommended by the 14th Finance Commis
Sion, there has been an increase inthe share of
Stats inthe divstle pool of central taxes rom
28h to42% every yearsine 2015-16. Arthe same
time there have een reductions inthe centre's
Financial assistance to states for thei plan
spending. Thus, the 10% points increas in the
fates’ share in cenerl taxes has come at the
ost ofthe reductions in centre's support for 8
numberof schemes inthe social seco. Also, as
Fecommendedby the subgroup of chief ministers
fn restructuring cenrally-sponsored schemes
(CSS) constituted bythe NIT Aayog, NHM now
has a changed centre state funding pattern in
the aio of o:40 from the erstwhile 7:25. This
changed funding pater has transferred larger
Fesponstlities of financing some of thers
octal sector schemeslike NHM tothe states.
3 Abeavily diluted Clinical Establishments (Regis
tration and Regulation) Act, 2010, designed 19
ies, was passed by
However, even its limited provi
sons have nat been notified in most states
4 §88k launched in 2011 provide ee as cash
less services to pregnant women, including
normal deliveries and caesarean operations
sd eare forthe sick newborn (up to 30 days
er bgt), in government health inscutions
in both rural and urban areas, aimed at mit
gating the burden of eu of pocket expenses,
5 IGMSY was sarted more than five years ago as
“pilot” across go-odd dstrits of the sates
Aid union teerores. Til date, cremains as 8
pilin these fe districts.
23‘COMMENTARY.
{5 P2020 6.2 global health ntatve whieh aims
{oexpand aeeess to family planning informa.
tion, services and supplies an additional 120
nillon women and girls in 69 of the word's
Poorest centres by 2020 For more information
see wwe familyplanningao2o ory
7 The recently dafted State Population Policy by
the stat of Assam (which has bees put ou bythe
{government for comments) stipulates that those
‘oh more than two elldren willbe ineligible
{for government employment and taking part in
‘panchayat and munidpal bod elections.
‘8 RXSK includes the imparting of health educa
tion through community-based interventions,
land the Scheme for Promotion of Menstrial
Hygiene among adolesent gist rural areas.
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Expansion of Banking Statistics Module
(State-wise Data)
‘The Economicand Political Weekly Research Foundation (EPWRF) has added state-wise
data fo the existing Banking Statistics module of its online India Time Series (ITS)
Stateswise and regionswise (orth, north-east, ast, central, west an south ime series
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tnd minber of bank ofces and employees.
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such as agriculture, industry, transport operators, profesional serves, personal loans
oasing, vehicle, education, et), rade and finance. These state-wise data are also
presented by bank group and by population group (rural, sem-urban, urban and
metropolitan,
“The data series ae available from December 1972: halfyealy basis till June 1989 and
inmal basis thereafer. These data have been sourced from the Reserve Bank of Indias
publication, Basi Stanstical Retuns of Scheduled Commercial Banks in Indi
Including the Banking Statistics module, the EPWRF ITS has 16 modules covering a
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2086 17,2017 VOL LM NO 24, BIN Economic Poca wesxtyDivide and Educate
SUKANTA CHAUDHURI
Indian education is becoming
increasingly divisive. Cuts in
public funding for primary
education and child welfare are
laying the basis for new inequities
in higher education. The funding
of public universities is grossly
unequal; the expansion of private
universities is causing further
imbalance. The class profile of the
academic community is being
redrawn. Social and human
factors apart, these trends
threaten the prospects of adequate
human resource development for
India’s economic growth.
Sukanta Chaudhuri (sukantac@gmail.cm) is
professor emeritus, Jadavpur Univers
is is an article on India’s higher
[ education policy. But for a proper
perspective, I must startby looking
at primary education. Let me begin with
an anecdote.
Thad taken a taxi to my place of work,
Jadavpur University. The cab driver had
never been inside the campus, never
conceived of such a large space devoted
to education. He said he would like his
young son to study there so that he
‘might learn to repair mobile phones. I
suggested that their local Industrial
‘Training Institute might suffice for that;
if he could fund his son through uni-
versity, the young man might work for a
telecom firm, or set up a business
himself. 1 left this dutiful father, with
some schooling and experience of city
life, more confused than encouraged by
the prospect.
1 was reminded of this encounter by a
‘newspaper report that the National Coun-
cil of Educational Research and Training
(wceRt) would conduct a nationwide
survey to assess whether vocational trai-
‘ning can be introduced in upper primary
schools (Statesman 2016). One would
have to be exceptionally naive to imag-
ine that children of the privileged class-
es would number among the “beneficiar-
ies” ofsuch a provision. The demographic
profile of high-school vocational stu
dents speaks for itself. We cannot fore-
tell the findings ofthe NceRr survey; but
to conduct such a survey at all is to ac-
cept the fallacy of confusing aptitude
with social and familial conditioning,
particularly in terms of class, caste, gen-
der and economic status. The fallacy is
being garbed as painstaking scientific
‘method: even “regions and climates”
will be taken into account. In other
words, children from Delhi and Bastar,
or Gujarat and Arunachal, will be pro-
filed in radically different terms. Their
plans and ambitions, or even their par-
ents, might be grossly unreal. My taxi
driver would have said he wanted his
son to repair mobile phones.
Weehave heard nothing about the project
since; but if only at a symbolic level, it
offers a telling clue to the union govern-
‘ment’s education policy. India has finally
achieved near-universal enrolment in pri-
‘mary education with a balanced gender
ratio (unesco 2015: 21) But even in 2014-15,
the drop-out rate was 4.3%, rising to over
10% in five north-eastern states (India
Today 2016).? Surveys consistently report
alarming under-performance in children’s
attainments. Child labour, in “family enter-
prises” fancifully definable, was legalised
in 2016. This was the situation after seven
years of the Right to Education (nts) Act,
passed 62 years after independence.
Underfunding of primary education
and child development is virtually being
implemented as a policy. Allocation for
the Integrated Child Development Ser-
vices (tes) or anganwadi scheme fell by
6.5% in 2015-16 and a further 6.6% in
2016-17. From this low base, ithas risen by
15% in 2017-18 to its highest ever amount,
but only marginally higher than in 2014-15
even before adjusting for inflation. The
Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (ssa) budget fell
by 9.5% in 2015-16, rose 2.2% from this
base in 2016-17 and a further 4.4% in
2017-18, but is still nearly 12% below the
2013-14 level, again before adjusting for
inflation. It also marks the lowest point
(4206) in the steadily dectining allocation-
to-outlay ratio for ssa (cBGA 2017: 22).
The 2015-16 budget for the Mid Day Meal
Scheme (ntbms) was 16.4% below 2014-
1s, with fewer children benefiting; the
number of beneficiaries had dropped
still more sharply the previous year (ere
2016). The allocation rose 5% in 2016-17
and another 3.1% in 2017-18; but again,
this is nearly 18% less than in 2013-14
before adjusting for inflation. (All figures
in this paragraph are based on Centre for
Budget and Governance Accountability
(cca) (2017: 45) unless otherwise noted)
‘The centre has also reduced its share
in the ssA from 65% to 60% (etn 2015),
and in the Moms from 75% to 60% (1B
2016). These cuts (added to those in other
sectors) are hardly compensated by the
additional 10% of central tax revenue
that the states now receive. A symbolic
factoid says ital: the United Progressive
Alliance government withdrew the Lec
subsidy for moms, and ts successor has not
25‘COMMENTARY.
restored it (Singh 2012). Of the education
cesses levied on all taxes, €13,298 crore
for basic education and no less than
264,288 crore for secondary and tertiary
education lay unspent on 31 March 2015,
(Hindu 2015). Since then, these cesses
have been merged in an enhanced ser-
vvice tax whose proceeds need not be
spent on education. That reduces ac
countablity but does not solve the chal-
Jenge of human resource development.
Neither Need Nor Merit
‘The centre has now found a way to reduce
the cess mountain, Itwill setup 20 “world-
class” universities, 1 state-run and 10 pri-
vate, and feed the former 2500 crore each
over the next five years—that i, a total of
%5,000 crore (uGc 2016b: 7). Place this
against the %4,692 crore allocated to the
University Grants Commission (vec)
2017-18 (cnGA 2017: 23) for the entire
public university system, including full
running costs for 46 central universities
and virtually all development grants for
360 state universities In 2015-16, roughly
56% of the ucc Plan grants and 88% of.
non-Plan grants went to central univer-
sities; state universities received 19% and
4.3% respectively. The figures for 2014-15
were still more skewed: 70% and 89% to
central universities and 15% and 3.6% to
state universities of Plan and non-Plan
grants respectively. For colleges, over 85%
of Plan grants in 2015-16 (83% in 2014~
415) went to state institutions, but virtu
ally 100% of non-Plan grants to central
ones in both years (uae 2015: 235, 240,
244-45; UGC 20162: 69, 73, 76-77).
‘States might be expected to meet the
non-Plan expenses of their own establish
‘ments, though they cannot possibly match
the mounting salary levels of central
universities, For development funds, all
universities in India can reasonably
expect major support from the usc. As
the figures Ihave quoted earlier show, this,
is just not happening. The Rashtriya
Uchchatar Shiksha Abhiyan (usa) provi
des additional funds to state universities,
but in a 65:35 ratio (90: 10 for ill states
and Jammu and Kashmir: Rusa (2013: 87).
‘Another body under formation, the High-
er Education Financing Agency, will atu-
ally lend money at interest. Itis assumed
that only institutions like the Indian
26
Institutes of Technology (irs) and Indi-
an Institutes of Management (ims) will
constitutes its clients
‘The “world-class” bonanza for 20 insti-
‘utions—of which some private ones may
not existas yet—seems part of an unspo-
ken agenda to dismantle the current high-
er education system as a whole. Social
justice aside, in terms of sheer educa-
tional strategy, this subversive policy
will leave the nation’s human resource
pool permanently depleted. The outcome
isalmost arithmetically predictable.
‘We need not waste breath on the crass-
ness of a scheme to conjure up “world-
class” universities by government fiat. If
throwing money at new or reinvented
campuses could ensure “international”
quality, King Saud University in Riyadh
‘would be the world’s leading institution
India itself hosts two formally interna-
al universities whose budgets are dra-
‘matically above Indian norms, taxpayer-
funded through the Ministry of External
Affairs (sta) rather than the Ministry of
Human Resource Development (14#RD).
In 2017-18, the meA allocated £260 crote
to South Asian University (up from 79
crore revised to 2184 crore in 2016-17: OB
2017: 99), with 522 students in 2015¢ and
56 faculty members. India is committed to
‘$300 million (approximately £1,930 crore
at current rates) to meet its entire capital
costs, not to mention a 100 acre plot in
South Delhi (sau 2015: 6). Nalanda Uni-
versity was allocated €200 crore by the
atza in both 2016-17 and 2017-18 (revised
down to 2100 crore in 2016-17: O81 2017:
199). The MEA is committed to%1,750 crore
towards its capital expenditure (MEA 2016:
14), besides contributions from other
nations. The scale of Nalanda's targeted
expenditure might be gauged from the
fact that the university budgeted for €367
crore in 2014-15 (Nalanda 2013: 48). That
‘was over two-thirds the 2014-15 budget
estimate of %510 crore of Jawaharlal
Nehru University (INU 2014), a central
university with some 8,000 students and
nearly 600 faculty in place against some
1so students and 25 faculty at Nalanda
today (15 students in 2014) gnu has
headed the National institutional Ranking
Framework (wire) list among “universi-
ties” so named® since the winr’s incep-
tion. The state-government-run Jadavpur
University (10,000 + students, some 600
faculty in place), which has topped all
Indian universities (6o named) in the
‘Times Higher Education (rie) table two
years running, had budget actuals of 226
Crore in 2015-16 (Jadavpur 2016: ).”
Clearly, the quantum of funds is not
determined even remotely by either need
(or merit: the mismatch is almost grote-
sque. I have already noted the gross dis-
parity in levels of ucc support to the
central and the state universities. The
vuac’s actual expenditure declined from
a high of &4,967 crore in 2013-14 (4HiRD
2016: 128) 024,186 crore in 2015-16. Ithas
thereafter climbed to a budget estimate
of %4,692 crore in 2017-18 (caGa 2017:
23), but the actual expenditure remains
to be seen, And most unsettling of all,
disbursement of sanctioned funds can
be indefinitely delayed as never before.
Needless to say, all this does not affect
the mea-funded Nalanda and South
Asian Universities.
‘There is also glaring variance berween
the assessments of various agencies:
international rankings like THE or Quac-
uarelli Symonds (93), orthe mminp'sown
separate assessments through NIRF and
the National Assessment and Accredita-
tion Council (WAAC). Not all universities
participate in all the ranking exercises;
the lists do not cover the same range of
institutions or apply the same criteria
The bizarre result is that there is not a
single name common to all four ofthe 9s,
THE, NAAC and NiRE choices of India's top
10 universities (op six for Qs).
Itis uncertain whether the authorities
will identify the 20 institutions marked
for “world-class” status on the basis of
the grossly incomplete 2016 wire, as first
announced, or the fuller (though not
comprehensive) list of 2017, or any other
ranking. Nor is it clear how this proposal
will mesh with the earlier plan (still
featured on the mp website) for world-
class “innovation universities.” Maybe it
does not matter, for no institutions have
been identified nor any funds disbursed
Public and Private, Rich and Poor
No less bizarre is the specification of 10
private to 10 public universities for “world-
class” status. As of now, there would not
be 10 or even five private universitiesamong India’s top 20, judged by any
criteria. The “world-class” private insti-
tutions can even be greenfield, qualifying
solely by the quantum of funds invested
(or perhaps merely pledged). The “world-
class” tag would be gifted on the strength
of future claims, not past performance.
In exchange, these universities would be
free from all external regulation, academic
or financial; have no set criteria for ap-
pointments; and effectively charge what
fees they liked, provided no meritorious
student was turned away.
‘That last stipulation is almost impos-
sible to enforce. It might create the situa-
tion threatening the rts, that steeply en-
hhanced fees might actually lower revenues
(Economic Times 2016). But the real prob-
Jem lies elsewhere. Given the downscaling
of schooling for the poor, as I described
at the outset, very few indigent students
could qualify for entry in the first place.
There is a seamless and mischievous
consistency between the unfolding poli-
cies for primary and tertiary education.
Itcannot be denied—in fact, it should
be strongly asserted—that an effective
university system fosters an elitism of
merit. But for merit to prevail, two other
factors ate imperative. The first is an
equitable system of schooling irrespective
of gender, economic or social status. The
other is a pyramidal structure of tertiary
education—the top rung of institutions
supported by many more of only slightly
less merit, and so down, tier by tier.
There can be peaks of excellence rising
from the foothills, but not looming islands
in a sea of underperformance. Our
favoured policy seeks to invert this
structure by lavishing funds, freedom
and attention on a handful of institu-
tions to the detriment of the rest. Social
Justice apart, such a scenario is pedagog-
ically untenable. It can only undermine
the educational edifice as a whole.
‘Two matters call for special thought.
One is the feasible extent of private-sec
tor tertiary education, Twenty years ago,
there were virtually no private univers:
ties in India, except hole-in-the-corner
outfits in a few “rogue” states. Today, two-
thirds of students at tertiary level study
at private universities (in the full sense,
excluding private colleges affliated to
public universities). Though the demand
for private education seems inexhaustible,
sooner or later there will bea shortage of
students both able and willing to pay: the
‘market may end up outpricing itself. In
the deplorable absence of educational
philanthropy in India, Funding constraints
prevent private campuses from develop-
ing into truly fullfledged universities
with a wide range of faculties, above all in
the basic sciences (as opposed to lucra-
tive branches of technology). Even pro:
hibitive fees cannot suffice to fund the
infrastructure, Hence, the few private
universities run on relatively enligh-
tened lines offer a curious mix of tech-
nology and the humanities (in one case
the latter alone), with a yawning gap in
the intervening space of basic science
and other fundamental studies.
‘The other disquieting prospect is that
the coming dispensation virtually debars
our poorer youths from a higher educa-
tion worth the name. They will continue
by default to populate state-run univer-
sities, whose funding has sunk to unvia-
ble levels. These universities are also
plagued by a host of home-grown prob-
Jems. Almost
governments have played a discreditable
role in corrupting the universities in their
care, turning them into local satrapies.
Even if the centre were to offer lavish
funds, many state governments might
decline them for fear of losing political
control over the campuses. If a handful
of state universities still figure among
the nation’s best—seven of TH#’s best 10
and four of gs’ best six, hough curiously
only three of wine's best 10—itis through
a heroic effort by the faculty, sometimes
virtually fighting their political overlords.
Power and the Perpetuation
of Inequality
In effect, the centre and the states are
either competing or conspiring to curb
campus freedom and academic confi-
dence. In the past three years, they have
engaged as never before to crush not
only dissent but the unregulated pursuit
of knowledge. There can be nothing more
perverse than to imagine that “world-
class" institutions, or even “centres of
excellence,” can be created by thought
control on set lines; yet more and more,
‘our rulers seem intent on confining
higher education to the rote learning of,
advanced employment skills. This—
apart from the obvious financial benefits
is a major reason for the advocacy of
private universities. The latter's clientele,
keen to extract full career advantage from
the hefty sums they invest, is unlikely to
disrupt the establishment. (This is also
true of high-profile, increasingly costly
public-sector professional institutions ike
the 1s and mts) Hence any sign of free
thought, let alone dissent, ina private insti
tution causes special alarm in the ruling
establishment, as witnessed last year in
India’s only private university devoted
solely to the liberal arts. Meanwhile, the
aggressive student outfits of all major
parties play havoc in the public campuses
‘on their respective turfs. Their aggression
should not be construed as an excess of
youthful freedom: the apparent license
is the instrument of a deadening control
over the academic community, stifling
all freedom, let alone dissent.
This is the very reverse of a viable
ambience for higher learning. The institu-
tions (chiefly in the West) held up as
‘models have many insidious restrictions
in place, most often through class and
‘economic preconditions; but they project
the image, and in good measure the
reality, of an arena for free thought and
debate. It is folly to think that research
initiative and original thought in any
sphere of knowledge, even the supposedly
value-neutral realm of science and techno-
logy, can flourish if its exponents are
barred from exercising their minds freely
inall other directions, Our higher educa-
tion system has long been geared to
employment skills masquerading as sci-
entific education. We need not contest this
purpose by touting a lofty ideal of pure
knowledge. Let us, by all means, view the
pursuit of knowledge as an economic end.
Our current policies will not achieve that
end. Rather, such intellectual subservience
will perpetuate our economic and political
subservience within the global order.
Despite innumerable faults, indepen-
dent India's public universities held the
potential fora genuine knowledge delivery
system that could and did engage with
the West on an honourable footing and
might, in time, have matched it in
stature. That prospect has faded with
27‘COMMENTARY.
the West on an honourable footing and
might, in time, have matched it in
stature, That prospect has faded with
the incursion of three factors: destruc-
tive politicisation (as opposed to a re-
sponsible political culture); misapplica-
tion of the principles of free economy;
and the insistence of the Indian middle
class on reducing education to an em-
ployment machine for their young, In
the process, the academic profession has
allowed itself to be part compromised,
part demoralised and disempowered.
More and more, India's higher educa-
tion system is cosying up to the people
already lodged in its bosom, with no call to
Jook further. Incursions from outside the
circle are seen as a burden and, worse, a
threat. Hence the energetic moves, out-
lined at my start, to frustrate whatever
reformative potential might remain in the
state school system. Till now, the public
universities had provided some corrective
to the inequities faced by the nation’s
‘youth earlier at school or later in the job
market, Current policy would divest the
universities ofthat function, We are mov-
ing towards a system whereby the most
ambitious and privileged students—if
they do not head abroad straight after
school—will attend expensive private insti-
tutions where they might possibly obtain a
rich and liberating education, but probably
no more than efficient professional train-
ing and added social cachet. Something
of these benefits will accrue to other such
students, plus the luckiest and most am-
bitious of the underprivileged, ina sprin-
bling of central universities. The general
rum of students will proceed from a restric-
tive and impoverished school environment
to equally impoverished state-govern-
ment-run universities to nurse their falt-
ering ambitions—or their growing anger,
to the nation’s detriment and their own.
‘The irony is that this should happen in
the name of human resource creation for
economic growth. The unacknowledged
assumption is that we can afford to under-
train and underemploy the greater part of
our population. For all our talk of demo-
graphic dividend, we have attention only
for our Canada-or Australia sized affluent
and articulate population, Such an outlook
might suit a vendor of consumer durables,
‘but hardly the makers of a national
28
education policy. It begs two questions.
One is that our best human resources re-
side exclusively within that Canada or
‘Australia rather than the whole of Indi
a demented fantasy of dass-based genetics
to which, one suspects, many subscribe
‘though few confess. The other is that even
the privileged classes can best prosper,
6 prosper at all, by shouldering the bur-
den of an immense band of their coun-
‘trymen whom they have prevented from
improving their own lot or the nation’s.
Iemay be wrong to accuse our planners
of alack of vision. From the primary to the
tertiary, each new step is synchronised to
a single purpose. Sadly, that purpose seems
directed to deprive and exclude rather
than to develop and integrate, As nation,
‘we have decided to short-change ourselves
drastically with respect to human re-
sources. We may rue tif, to say nothing of
other losses, we stint on this score and yer,
or therefore, end up with empty coffers.
ores
1 Asn 5 June soi, there was nothing on che
Subject traceable in the NCERT webs or that
ofits subdir, the Prat Sundar Sharma
entra Insti of Vocational Eaton, The
programmes fearon theaters ste relted
{othe yearsons16
2 The rpor ces a pariamentary reply bythe
then HRD Minster
3 Figures from the UGC website, accessed on 5
shine201.
4 Theunsersy has agoal of 000 students and
790 teachers (SAU 207, but reached oly the
Bove enrolment in 2s, the atest year for
hich figures are acs SAU 2015.1)
Ofcourse, Nalanda univers under cons
"ction, sd the proposed budget was doubt
‘hel for this pure is etal expedite or
Scn-rowas unde a crore Nalanda 20144)
presumably forthe sane renton ain he pres
fs eae (Nalanda 213 48), delay in aearding
Contract fr capa wore.
6 ‘val rnking beste ranks cid are among
“erste” ap raed, acu Is and re
‘cuca Heth Indio neo Sec
7 One shoud ad that Nalanda charges 24,000
Setuton fra tw year curse, and a mina
OF 70,00 per antum for board and lodging
South Asan University charges students
SAARC ont $3,000 (3000) fra 0:
Year coure ncading hosel eso SAARC
aden pay over 10 tmes this amount JNU
hages an erage of€.200 fora two-year pose
pate couse, Icing host ret Sadar
Evers charges oo per anim foram ats
pongraddte couse sing to &,800 for eng
ering, and under G00 over to years
hotel ent In other Words, the istttons re
ceiving hugely more publi funds pe student
Se ako charging gly moe fees fom them,
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Economie Times (2016): “HRD Ministry Notes the
Diffcultes, Tuition Fee Hike May Be Review
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yan: National Higher Education Mision,” Min
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gouinsites/upload.fles/mhrd/fles/upload_
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(All website URLs areas acessible ons June 2037)
2086 17,2017 VOL LM NO 24, BIN Economic Poca wesxty‘Strategic Partners’ in
Defence Production
Deepening Dependence
‘The blatant sidelining of
technologically-competent public
sector undertakings in defence
procurement and the promotion
of select private sector companies
as junior partners of foreign
original equipment manufacturers
are deepening the country’s
technological dependence in the
design, development and
production of armaments.
Gautam Naviakha (gnavlakha@grmail.com) is
a member ofthe Peoples Union for Democratic
3s, Delhi
fier a delay of 14 months, the
Act Committee on Security
cleared the “broad contours” of
the government's policy approach on
strategie partners for collaboration bet
ween Indian and foreign companies for
joint miliary production. Like its prede-
cessor, the Congress-led government
which granted “Raksha Udyog Ratna”
status to 12 private sector companies for
preferential treatment in military pro-
curement, the Bharatiya Janata Party
(@48)Led government 100 was to provide
a list of “Strategic Private Partners” (35)
‘two years back. When the Defence Pro-
urement Policy (bP) was announced
in Goa on 28 March 2016, it was without
Chapter 7 which was to deal with “Strate-
gie Partners." This was because of differ.
ences over the criteria fr selecting private
corporate business houses, The pattern
of piecemeal announcements continues
under the Narendra Modé-led government
and so does the recourse to partial steps
For instance, the mos critical part, namely,
the regulatory regime for strategic part-
ners and joint ventures remains conspic:
ously absent. Also missing was the pen-
alty provision in the event of delay or
default for such joint ventures.
Four segments have been identified for
strategic partners—submarines, fighter
jets, helicopters, and armoured vehicles
and tanks. Defence Publie Sector Under-
takings (oPsus) are barred from bidding
for fighter jets and helicopters. Moreover,
it remains to be seen if they will be
selected for bidding for submarines and
armoured vehicles and tanks, given the
ideological bias against the public sec-
tor, From a shortlist of sx strategie part-
ners applying for each segment, one stra-
tegic partner will be selected for each seg-
‘ment and two or more Original Equip-
‘ment Manufacturers (oem) identified for
each segment. Companies must have a
turnover of at least ®4,000 crore over the
last three fiscal years, capital assets of at
least %2,000 crore, demonstrable manu-
facturing and technical expertise, and the
infrastructure and ability to absorb tech-
nology from the foreign partner. Foreign
‘oem will be selected on the basis of the
“range, depth and scope” ofthe technology
they are willing to transfer. Indian indus-
try partners will “tie-up” with oxats to
“seek technology transfer and mamufac-
turing know how to set up domestic infra-
structure and supply chains."® Of course,
there are companies such as Bharat Forge,
Larsen & Toubto, Tata Power, Mahindra
and afew others who have been suppliers
to the military and have acquired a degree
offin-house expertise. But compared to the
‘oem behemoths, they remain marginal
players, and are less qualified than nPsus
in every respect where in-house exper-
tise in military production is concerned,
Besides, treating the private companies
with experience on par with the new en-
trants entails other risks. How does the
‘government ensure that the private com-
panies, lured into defence production be-
cause of easy land acquisition, cheap loans,
and assured goverment orders, are not
vulnerable to accepting terms set by the
‘oems which reduce them to the role of a
‘mere “assembly house of a foreign os"?
Although the Defence Minister-head-
ed Defence Acquisition Council said that
wilful defaults, debt restructuring and
non-performing assets (was) will be
taken into account while selecting the
strategic partner, there are also misgiv-
{ngs on this count. For instance, two of the
shortlisted corporate houses, Anil Dhirub-
hai Ambani Group and Gautam Adani
Group companies reportedly owe 1.25
lakh crore and 96,031 crore respectively
to public and private sector banks which
are reeling under nas.‘ So why were they
shortlisted in the first place? Surely, their
selection sends a message that poor finan-
cial management is not considered seri-
(ous enough to disqualify a company from
the critical military sector, Indeed, the fact
that Reliance Defence is a beneficiary of
the £29,000 crore Rafale offset clause
and has signed a deal for repair and akera-
tions with the United States (us) Seventh
Fleet in February 2017—the same fleet
which tried to threaten India during 1971
29‘COMMENTARY.
‘war—as part of the Indo-Us Logistic Ex-
change Memorandum of Agreementsigned
in August 2016 by the Modi government
corroborates this. The Government of
India favouring lucrative collaborations
of a financially vulnerable Indian entity
with a French oem and with a us naval
fleet raises strategic concerns about the
soundness of its defence policy.
Sidelining Defence PSUs
‘The Ministry of Defence has been plagued
by pressures for diminution of the role of
the pesus in defence production for the
military. Instead of prioritising the public
sector and letting private corporations
play secondary role, the 2005 report of
the Vijay Kelkar committee placed the
public and the private sectors at par for
augmenting indigenous military produc-
tion. This has now been taken one step
further by privileging the private sector
and ensuring a secondary role for the
public sector. In June 2015, under pres-
sure from foreign oeMs and the Indian
private corporate sector demanding a
“evel playing field,” the preference given
to pesus for military tenders was re-
moved. Further, ppsus were barred from
participating in two segments listed for
seps, namely, fighter jets and helicopters.
‘And now, the main demand of ows for
firm orders has been accepted after the
new Union Minister for Defence Arun
Jaitley assumed office. He explained:
“You don't set up a manufacturing facility
if you are not sure of an order; that is the
rationale behind the model.” His prede-
cessor, Manohar Partikar was reticent on
this issue and had drawn attention to a
special feature of India’s military sector
‘when he said that itis only the pesus who
can afford to maintain idle infrastructure
and “sustain such capacities.” The impli-
cation is that there may be periods when
there are no orders or the size of the
orders is reduced. Besides, to place or
not place an order is the prerogative of
the Ministry of Defence. In the military
sector, our need for military equipment
is dictated by our strategic requirement
based on assessment of threat, which is
subject to change and can
‘Apart from restricting the public sector
to just two out of the four segments opened
up for strategic partners, the ordinance
30
factories have been asked to exit from the
production of 87 items, including 39
‘weapon-related items. Further, they have
been asked to list facilities which will
become “idle” as well as possible “alter-
native” uses for their manufacturing ca
pacities, as also, “re-deployment” of the
“affected manpower.” Besides, the Prime
Minister’ Office has asked for details of the
land held by the 41 ordinance factories.>
Is this a precursor to divesting them of
the land they possess as they exit arma-
‘ments manufacturing?
So it appears that five pesus, 50 labo-
ratories of the Defence Research and
Development Organisation, 41 ordinance
factories, and four shipyards will play
second fiddle to Indian private and foreign
‘equipment providers under the new per.
In the process, the country's dependence
(on foreign ms and foreign powers such
as the us and its allies will deepen. The
Joint Doctrine ofthe three services already
speaks of the “country’s national interests”
as if tis includes foreign “strategic part-
ners” in its definition.* For a company to
be considered Indian, just 50% of its equity
capital must be owned by Indian citizens,
With such definitional difution, what is at
stake isthe very control of India’s military
sector. Tallow the Indian state's sovereign
function of defence to come under the sway
of foreign powers and oeMs, to expand the
definition of what constitutes an Indian
‘company to include those controlled by
foreign entities, and to encourage native
capitalists to serve as junior partners of
foreign oeMs are all inimical to our coun-
try’s interests,
‘What raises further alarm isthe absence
of a mechanism for regulating the coun-
tty defence production sector which is
being opened up to private and foreign
suppliers. The latter will acquire a stake
in the country’s military sector, all paid
for by the public exchequer. Will the
Comptroller and Auditor General (AG) of
India exercise jurisdiction over the stra-
tegic partners and the joint ventures? Will
they be subject to parliamentary scruti-
ny? In short, how does the government
ensure probity, transparency and ac-
countability in the military sector? Or will
the government yet again give in to the
demand of private and foreign compa-
nies to leave them largely unregulated?
Conceding to the demands of private
and foreign companies seems to be see-
ond nature to the Modi-led government.
In the Rafale deal, the government, its
tall claims notwithstanding, settled fora
“comfort letter” instead of a guarantee
from the French government. Thus, in the
event of a dispute, like in any commercial
deal, the Indian government has to first
try toresolve the matter with the French
‘oem, Dassault? Thus, if there is no regu-
latory mechanism or it does not include
mandatory auditing by cac as well as
Parliamentary scrutiny, then it only
‘means that the new ppP policy disregards
key issues relating to liability, probity,
transparency and accountability.
The larger point is that the current
policy regime, instead of lessening de-
pendence on foreign suppliers and en-
hhancing Indias strategic manoeuvrability,
creates a new form of dependency. Threat
scenarios will remain hyped up to justify
large orders and the public exchequer will
feed the voracious appetite ofthe military
behemoths that establish their afiliates
in India. The private corporate sector
will be able to influence policy and the
choice of defence requirements. The fall-
‘out, amongst other things, would be the
undermining of selfretiance. All this will
fuel rigidity, rather than provide flexibil-
ity, inthe conduct ofthe country’s foreign-
cum-security policy. Sadly, political par-
ties shy away from critical scrutiny of the
military sector and do not offer an alter-
native approach. The corporate media
remains dogmatic in support of privati-
sation and globalisation of the military
sector, and the public remains oblivious to
‘anew form of colonialism in the making
Nores
1-Ajai Shull “Make in india: Wil the Strategic
Partners Spur’ Defence Manufacturing?”
Busines Standard, May 20
2 Rajat Pandit, "Defence Ministry Finaises Big
Preducte
Private len Ar sn Times of nd,
21 May 2007
3 Sameas Note
4 Neera} Thakur, “Shock and Ave: The Top 10
Indebted ‘Companies in India,” Catdhnews,
14 February 2097
5 Ghetan Kumar, “Def Ministry Cracks Whip on
Ordinance Factories” Sunday Times of India,
28 May 2017
6 Ali Ahmed, ‘A Digjointed Doctrine Reviewing the
Military’ Joint Doctrine Economic & Poca!
Weekly, Val 2, No, 27 May 2017
7 Gautam Navlakha, “A Hard Look at National
Secunty” Economic & Pitcel Weekly, Vl st,
No9, 16 July 2016
Vou NO 24 BHM. Economic Pica wsestyBangalore and Its IT Industry
A Changing Landscape of Work and Life in Urban India
persistent myth has it hat when
Atren Sued Dae
in 1537, he had four towers built
to mark the outermost boundaries of the
sera hal eonulond tai cee
Would never grow beyond these limits. The
views from atop these towers, however,
show that present-day Bangalore's outer
limits have long since disappeared into the
horizon. In fact, the towers can now be
considered part of the city's urban centre.
Disheartened by the rundown state of
some of the tower ely che one
located in Kempegowda Nagar in south
Bangalore, a facelift was announced for all
four recently, at a total cost of 3 crore.*
‘While the city has never been particu-
larly heavy on historical sites that predate
the arrival of the British, this latest effort to
protect and upkeep what remains of
Bangalore's heritage needs to be at least
party area in ta ater
of urban change. It could be argued that
nowhere else in India has urban change
open neemres |
“disheartening” as it has been in Banga-
ire The ao deapeg te che
the rr industry has had on the city. Over
time, India’s rr industry and Bangalore
have not just developed a symbiotic rela-
ccna be oy ne cen a
vaie. palaarymhdertacier
Bangalore is often referred to as the
Silicon Valley ofthe East, though of late, it
is more likely to be called Silicon Plateau —
spereclonse the placate chy
sits on, roughly thousand metres above
sea level. Due to this geographic advan-
caps Daal, ee te fa ah
often thought of as the Air-Conditioned
City, decidedly cooler than other cities and
towns located on the much hotter plains
of Karnataka. The salubrious climate was
‘one of the factors that influenced the
prt besa ia be
galore in the early 19th century, and it
certainly also played a part in the city’s
EATS
[Askew—A Short Biography of Bangalore >)
1S George New Dei Alegh Book Company 2018
ardbeck
Reengineering India—Work, Capital, and lass
nan Offshore Economyby Cl Upadya New
Dah etd Unters Pres 2016, pp +384 8995
Indian tT
Workersin Berlin Saves Aut: Durhamand
london Duke Unies Pres, 216 px 268, rie not
mentioned papeba0)
emergence as a Pensioners’ Paradise in the
post-independence period. Throughout,
Bangalore was thought of as Garden City,
characterised by spacious tree-lined ave-
rues flanked by British-style bungalows.
‘The British influence, the (later) presence
of the Indian Army, as well as the reloca-
tion of strategic industries tothe city post-
independence, all contributed to Banga-
lore's emergence as India’s Pub City and
also as its most “middle class” of cities.
For a city with such a variety of identi-
ties, few studies actually engaged with
the various dimensions and characteris-
tics ofthe city until the new millennium,
Bangalore was known, admired, enjoyed,
but was rarely the object of research,
unlike (admittedly considerably larger)
cities such as Kolkata, Mumbai, or New
Delhi. This has started to change more
recently, and the arrival of the rr industry
has been key to this development.
This review essay explores Bangalore's
relationship with its rr industry through
three recent publications and, by doing so,
it seeks to understand not only how the
‘wo relate to each other, but also the vari-
‘ous kinds of questions that have emerged
over time. In particular, it seeks to under-
stand how the idea of an old Bangalore (as
encapsulated by its various names in the
past) and the arrival ofa new Bangalote—
‘hich seems somewhat coterminous with
the notion of a “new” India in general—
relate to each other; it also seeks to trace
the trajectories and narratives of urban
change that can be distilled from the city.
This essay argues that it is important to
not limit ourselves to studies that directly
speak of Bangalore andor its rr industry,
but toemploy a transnational lens that also
includes perspectives on the tives and
lifestyles of Indian rr professionals across
borders. The three primary books that
will be examined here are TJ $ George's
Askew: A Short Biography of Bangalore,
Carol Upadhya's. Reengineering India
Work, Capital and Class in an Offshore
Economy, and Sareeta Amrute’s Encoding
Race, Encoding Class: Indian rr Workers
in Berlin, Published in 2016, these books
explore different aspects of Bangalore and/
or its rr industry. While veteran journal
TJS George's account of Bangalore is
styled as a highly personal “biography”
of the city that only touches on the rr
industry peripherally, Carol Upadhya's
meticulously researched Reengineering
India is primarily interested in the func-
tioning of the rr industry, albeit set in
Bangalore, Finally, Sareeta Amrute’s
Encoding Race, Encoding Class extends the
discussion on India’s rr industry across
borders and focuses on the lives and life-
styles of Indian rr professionals in Berlin
with a particular focus on race and class.
‘While in Encoding Race, Encoding Class
Bangalore is presented as a place where
‘professionals come from or may one day
return to, Amrute's study complements a
growing body of work that investigates
the dialectical and dichotomous relation-
ship between the city and its rr industry.
Here, itis important that we do not reduce
India’s 1 industry to its presence or
“headquarters” in Bangalore (the industry
has a presence in most large Indian cities
as well as in some smaller ones) nor limit
our understanding of Bangalore to studies
that focus on how the city has (physically)
changed in the last two decades. In that
sense, Reengineering India is a typical
3REVIEW ARTICLE.
example of a study that is remarkably
revealing of the city’s (changed) mental
make-up without explicitly drawing on a
Bangalorean perspective. Upadhya’s des-
criptions of changing urban middle-class
lifestyles, the attendant consumerism, and
the mushrooming of luxury shopping
malls, secluded residential enclaves, and
slass-fronted office towers, are as much
physical as they are mental: they describe
and point to new ways of living, working,
and thinking. The notion of a city having
run askew, to borrow from TJS George's
formulation, is deeply present in such
analyses, not just of the city itself with
its clogged arteries, endless infrastruc-
tural projects, and worsening environ-
‘mental conditions, but also with respect to
working lives, management techniques,
and lifestyles in general. As such, the
three books discussed here need to be
subsumed within a larger and rapidly
growing body of studies that touch upon
this one way or the other.
‘Tocomplement the subsequent analysis,
| will draw upon a numberof other (recent
and not so recent) publicati
city with the specific aim of
earlier-mentioned titles within a grow-
ing body of work on Bangalore as well as
its 1 industry. One such work that I
‘would like to highlight here is a recently
Published graphic novel, simply titled
Bangalore (Syenagiri, 2017). The cover of
this title is adorned with what can only
be interpreted as.a blue-skinned goddess
emerging from the ruins in the back-
ground that look vaguely Hoysala in
style—a city bathed in a golden hue, a
fiercely futuristic take on what Bangalore
‘may be many years from now. This graphic
novel is particularly relevant to the dis-
cussion at hand not just for the way it
envisions a future Bangalore, but also for
its “courage” to imagine one altogether.
Although it brings together the memo
ries and myths of an old Bangalore with
reflections on a yet undetermined future,
in its narration of murder mysteries,
spooky recollections, and even zombies,
the rr industry is intriguingly absent. It
is as if the authors have sought to dis-
tance their work from the ever present
rrindustry, perhaps building on the idea
that as it once arrived, it might also
depart in some distant future.
32
Although this essay does not speculate
on this in detail, it needs tobe noted that
‘many publications on Bangalore and its
ambivalent relationship with the rr indus-
‘ay are characterised by a certain lament-
ing of the demise of an “old” Bangalore
and the arrival of a “new” and far less
appealing one, As we will see in the
analysis below, perspectives on the Indian
rr industry are not very different: for all
its ostentatious “newness,” considerably
higher salaries, and concomitant middle-
class lifestyle, the new ways of worki
(and thinking) do come at a cost. Whi
both the city and the industry have long
since passed a point of no-return, the
‘works discussed in this essay raise impor-
tant questions about new ways of working
and living, middle-class dreams and aspi-
rations, as well as urban change in
India—all ropies that will remain high on
the research agenda in the years to come.
ACity Askew
‘TJ S George notes in his intriguing “short
biography” of Bangalore, Askew, that “the
changes that overtook Bangalore from
the 1990s onwards were deeper, faster
and more far-reaching than earlier
changes” (p 17). The author points to
two areas in the city—Whitefield and
Sarjapur—to illustrate how the city has
changed. Once too far off to even be con-
sidered the suburbs of Bangalore, now
they have firmly merged with the city's
urban landscape and are well-known
areas of urban expansion. Whitefield,
which started off as a Eurasian enclave,
hhas since become “a monster” (p 18),
partly due to the establishment of Inter-
national Tech Park India Ltd (pt), “a
ten-building behemoth that included
sports arenas and a hotel, all of interna-
tional standard,” while Electronic City's
hailing distance from Sarjapur meant
that the “real estate mafia arrived in a
frenzied rush” (p 20). In broad brush-
strokes, T J S George paints Bangalore's
history of the last century, noting that
while the rr industry is often credited
with ushering in the more “futuristic”
dimensions of the city, it was in fact Tipu
Sultan himself who introduced technology
as such to the region. He says, “as early
as the 1870s his engineers had invented
rocketry, terrorizing the British” (p 22).
‘The author goes on to note that the Brit-
ish too played an important role in this
regard-—he remarks that by making Ban-
galore the headquarters of the Madras
Sappers, they enabled the subsequent
development of the Bangalore Torpedo
here; and he also points to Diwan
Seshadri lyer’s project of harnessing water-
falls in 1904, because of which “Banga-
lore became the first Indian city to have
streets lighted by electricity” (p 22).
Most of Karnataka, up until independ
ence, fell under the independent princely
state of Mysore. It was Mokshagundam
Visvesvaraya (1860-1962), whose motto
was “industrialise or perish,” who per-
mitted a technocratic bureaucracy the
freedom to implement modern, industrial
planning models in order to establish
some of India's earliest electrification and
communication infrastructures (Schenk
2001: 42)3 This paved the way for other
initiatives. During the 1940s and 1950s,
‘massive investments were made in pub-
lic sector enterprises around the city.
Jawaharlal Nehru himself described
Bangalore as the “city of the future’;
while in the early 1940s, industrialisation
had focused mostly on textile manufac-
turing (Madon 1997: 233), after inde-
pendence, the establishment of a number
of large-scale modern public sector under-
takings—such as Hindustan Aeronaut-
ies, Hindustan Machine Tools, Indian
Telephone Industries, Bharat Electronics,
and Bharat Heavy Electricity —ushered in
‘anew industrial phase for the city. These
institutions sped up the establishment of.
‘a number of universities, institutions, and
colleges providing engineering and sci-
entific training (Madon 1997: 233). Indus-
trialisation also had an effect on popula-
tion growth in the city. In 1951, the
organised sector employed 46,000 peo-
ple. In 1971, this number had risen to
1,06,000. During this period, the popu-
lation of Bangalore almost doubled
(Schenk 2001: 42).
TJS George's Askew does not discuss
these changes in detail, but it does con-
neet these earlier developments to the
arrival of well-known Indian rr flagship
such as Infosys and Wipro,
as well as Texas Instruments, the first
American (rr-oriented) multinational that
established itself in the city in the 1980s.‘REVIEW ARTICLE
About the 17 industry, he notes that it
“transformed Bangalore in ways that
earlier bouts of industrialization and immi-
gration had not.” The old Bangalore was
characterised as being “agreeable,” while
this was now replaced by one “where no
cone had time for his neighbours.” About
the newcomers who had flocked to the
city, he writes: “Ifthe pre-rr immigrants
made an effort to merge into Bangalore,
the new combatants were too disparate to
try." He concludes here: “Cosy Town tumed
international melting pot, Bangalore's face
tumed ugly.” He goes on to wonder: "Why
did modernity and enterprise make Ban-
galore unbearable” (p 24). T J $ George
then goes on to sketch some recentdevel-
opments such as Kannada language and
Kannadiga identty/representation issues
and the animosity, racism, and violence
directed towards Africans and North East
Indians, At the end of his first chapter,
‘TJS George ominously notes that the rr
boom and related forces have altered
Bangalore from within,
as though unseen hands had reconstituted its
DNA... Itused tobe acy at peace with ese
Ie [is] ow a bundle of eontradietions,a bat
tleground of competing constituencies, where
going forward resemble(s] going backward.
‘And thus, the city has gone askew:
“Knocked off balance by the weight ofits
own growth...” (p 32).
‘The Arrival of the IT Industry
In Reengineering India, Carol Upadhya
starts her introduction by stating that
“visitors to Bangalore are usually struck by
the numerous signs indicating the city's
reinvention as India’s ‘Silicon Plateau”
(p 0), Newly-built apartment buildings,
luxurious shopping malls, gated commu
nities, and never-ending infrastructural
projects all, one way or the other, seem
to cater to the needs of young urban
professionals. Here, Upadliya notes the
“glaring contrast between these sharp-
edged, modernist, steel-and-glass struc
tures and manicured lawns” and the urban
environment in which these buildings and
middle-class spaces of living, leisure, and
consumption have mushroomed. The old
and new are interwoven here ina narrative
of transformation that a growing number
of studies on Bangalore seek to sketch,
mention, and/or explain. Upadhya’s point
commie & Pllc wrsxsy
of departure, however, is not the physical
transformation ofthe city, but what can
be observed going on inside, behind the
slass fronted offices of large rr companies.
As she observes:
Shutting out the noise, pollution, and erowe
ced streets ofthe city ouside, this is a world
‘ofexpansive airconditioned and obsesively
clean workplaces where neatly dressed, po
lite, and apparently enthusiast young men
and women tol before computer screens in
theie symmetrical ebicles—an atmosphere
‘ofhushed voices punctuated only by the tap
ping of numerous Keyboards. (p 2)
Itis thus rr professionals and the global
‘workspaces where they spend the bulk of
their time that Upadhya seeks to investi-
gate. In general, the book explores “aspects
of India’s development after liberalization”
through the lens of the rr industry and
the experiences of those working in it
(P 3). Upadhya is quick to point out that
she does not consider the rr industry an
“enclave economy” that is only tenu-
ously connected to what may be consid-
ered the real India; instead, she believes
that it comprises a social field that is
“both embedded in older formations of
capital and class as well as central to the
fashioning of a‘new’ India” (p 3). One of.
her central arguments here is that
the forms and modalities of capital, labour,
production, sociality, and subjectivity that
have been forged in rr workspaces are not
simply by-products of globalization, but
have deeply shaped by the social and histori-
cal conditions oftheir making. (p 3)
She therefore also considers the rr indus-
try as site where “novel forms of work
and working subjects, dispositions and
social identities, and new aspirations and
social imaginaries are being created, citcu-
lated, and naturalized” (p 3). The idea of
“new workplace” is central to this (p16).
This new workplace contrasts an older
(Indian) workplace in that it is open,
flexible, and flat in term of its organisa
tional/bureaucratic design. This comes
with the rhetoric of “new ways” of work-
ing, which draw upon “new age” man:
agement ideas originating from Silicon
Valley-based (“new economy”) companies,
and which have trickled down to Indian
TT companies such as Infosys, Wipro,
and Tata Consultancy Services (rcs).
Yet, as Upadhya also argues, these new
‘management practices do not simply
result in a new type of worker-subject;
such practices are also influenced by the
way rr professionals “engage with, con-
test, and sometimes appropriate the
‘modes of power and subjectification that
they encounter at work” (p 19).
Upadhya argues that the rr industry
and its employees cannot be separated
from the larger context of an emerging
‘middle class (p 21. In particular, software
engineering, as a profession, has gradu-
ally emerged as one of the most aspira-
tional occupations for India's middle-class
youth. Yet, as Upadhya also notes, actu-
ally securing a position in one of the
‘country's better-known rr companies can
be quite challenging (p 79). Although rr
companies have developed a “symbiotic
relationship with engineering colleges”
(p 85), there is no denying the fierce
competition for jobs. rr professionals, thus,
often emphasise that they work in “actual”
IT companies (as software engineers,
programmers, testers, or otherwise), in
contrast to call centre or business pro-
cess outsourcing (#P0) workers, who are
often characterised as having failed to
have made it into the software industry
(p 297). The insecurity associated with
job positions is not just visible in how rr
workers contrast their own position with
those considered “lower” on the ladder,
but also in how work is organised and
structured within the industry itself
‘An understanding of the function of
the “bench” or what it means to “be
benched” is particularly important here.
While it refers to employees who are not
committed to a project at the moment
and are thus not billable (p 137), in more
general terms, it metaphorically captures
something about rr work itself: the long
hhouts in office, the 24-hour economy that
connects Indian rr companies to various
project sites in Europe and in the us, and
the significant amount of time spent wait-
ing and doing nothing (while on “stand
by"). Because of the standardisation of
workand the constant availability of fresh
staduates, a certain disposability of labour
has also emerged; this all too easily trans-
lates into trepidation with regard to
future employment, Here, itis helpful to
also sketch the “temporal” context within
which Upadhya’s and others’ (early) work
‘on Bangalore and the Indian rr industry
33including that of Amrute, discussed later)
needs to be situated.
Post Millennium (Bug)
Reengineering India builds upon research
material that was gathered during an
18-month period between 2004 and 2006
and which was preceded by a preparation
stage that was clearly influenced by the
developments that followed the turn of the
millennium. Riding high on global fears
of an impending apocalypse due to the
now largely forgotten y2x phenomenon
or millennium bug, Indian rr companies
were instrumental in offering rrrelated
services to those at risk around the world.
‘To meet this sudden surge in demand,
Indian rr companies fiercely recruited soft
ware engineers from across the country
to work at their campuses in Bangalore,
Hyderabad, Pune, and elsewhere. Once
the new millennium passed, the v2x prob-
Jem quickly dropped off companies’ radars
and a rapid decline in business set in
Consequently, a significant number of
software engineers were either “benched”
of laid off. While a new wave of optimism
had hung in the air in 2003, it quickly
facled in the following years as lay-offs and
the closing down of various rr companies
created a climate of insecurity, which was
further exacerbated by the kinds of con-
tracts employees were on. As Upadhya
also notes, such developments need to be
understood within the context of flexibi-
lisation of labour in general (pp 97-100).
Inthe cane ofthe indian) redndastry; his
not only affected the way projects were
organised and structured—thus leading to
higher competition—but also led to the
“breeding” ofa particular kind of rr worker
who is only a part ofa production process.
Thisfactory ine approachtorrled Upadhya
to regularly employ the term “rr factory.”
The detailed case studies and inter
views that Reengineering India presents
provide a glaring contrast to how the rr
industry would have liked to present
itself at the time. Inthe local media, India's
rr industry sought to present itself as
innovative, dynamic, cutting-edge, and in
a sense, the opposite of “ordinary” Indian
businesses. I distinctly recall an Outlook
cover fom 29 January 2003 which fea-
tured the in-house band of flagship 1
company, Infosys. In the accompanying
article, “A Debugged Operating System,”
‘we see Infosys’ czo, Narayana Murthy, on
a ladder climbing onto the roof, as if to
symbolically suggest that even the com-
pany’s most important executive is not
afraid to get his hands dirty. Perhaps influ-
‘enced by companies based in Silicon Valley,
a keenness to exhibit a particular kind of
social consciousness is also seen. Bob
Hoekstra, the cro of software operations
at Philips in Bangalore, once showed me
a flyer that spelled out the Philips Inno-
vation Campus (etc) way. The flyers—
which could be found across the cam-
pus—included statements such as “we
respect every person” and that at Pic
“everyone is given equal opportunity,
irrespective of race, religion, geography,
sex, ethnic background, ec.” Bob Hoekstra
himself had recently published a small
volume of reflections on the city titled
‘An Exemplary Family in Bangalore and
Other Short Stories and Pen Sketches
(2002). Also, Sudha Murthy,‘ wife of the
earlier mentioned Narayana Murthy and
chairperson of the Infosys Foundation,
had then recently published her first
collection of impressions titled Wise and
Otherwise: A Salute o Life (2002)
Such publications seem to embody a
general desire to communicate a sense of
The Problem of Caste
bah tC
Ppxi 42s 5395
150N 978-81-250-55013
2018
Edited by
Saris DesHPANDE
Caste is one of the oldest concerns ofthe sacal sciences in India that continues toe relevant even today
The general perception about caste i that it was an outdated concept unt it was revived by colonial polices and
promoted by vested interests and electoral pols after independence This hegemonic perception changed irevoably
inthe 1990safterthe controversial reservationsfor the Other Backward Classes recommended by the Mandal Commission,
revealing it tobe a bei of only a privileged upper caste minority fr the vast majority of Indans caste continued
to be a crucial determinant of life opportunites.
‘This volume collects significant writings spanning seven decades three generations and several disciplines and discusses
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‘elationsip between caste and asthe interplay between cate and politics old and new challenges in law and poy,
emergent research areas and post-Mandal innovation in caste studies.
‘Authors: Satish Deshpande + rawati Karve * M N Srinivas» Dipankar Gupta + André Béteile + Rajni Kothari + Kumkum Roy + Sukhadeo Thorat
+ Katherine $ Newman + Marc Galantr + Sundar Sarukkai » Gopal Guru * L Sheth + Anand Chakravarti + Carol Upadhya + Ashwini Deshpande
‘ Meena Gopal + Baldev Raj Nayar « Gail Omvedt + Mohan Ram «| P Desal «K Balagopal » Sudha Pai » Anand Teltumbde + Surinder S Jodhka
+ Ghanshyam Shah + Suse Tharu* M Madhava Prasad « Rekha Pappu +k Satyanarayana + Padmanabh Samarendra « Mary E John + Uma Chakravart
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Orient Blackswan Pvt Ltd
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SET
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Pore secu)
Pe er eT)
34 owe 17,2017 VoL tH No 24 BND Economic Pokal waexty‘REVIEW ARTICLE
social responsibility. Industry leaders have
made a determined effort to disassociate
themselves from ostentatious wealth and
living, employees were explicitly recruited
on a “merit” only basis, and rr companies
sponsored initiatives that aimed to
improve the environment or give under-
privileged Indians opportunities to better
themselves. While cynics would be quick
to point out that the rr industry itself was
connected to various social and environ:
mental issues across the city, itis impor-
tant to understand that the way the rr
industry presented itself signifies a shift
in ideas from a perceived “old” India toa
“new” one. By 2003, the rr industry had
already become symbolic of—and was
gradually becoming synonymous with—
this shift, which not only built upon the
idea of economic growth, but also grad-
ually came to equate it with various
notions of social change.
Reengineering India is particularly
insightful because of the critical analysis
itpresents on the way work is done within
an ostensibly new Indian industry such as
rm. The gap between those with client-
facing positions and those who are part
of the production process illustrates that
for many the work is mundane, repetitive,
and far removed from the innovative
and adventurous image the industry has
cultivated for itself. Client-facing 1
‘workers, on the one hand, are usually
those who can socialise informally with
people from diverse cultural backgrounds,
and thus are thought to be capable of
communicating with clients about work
(p91); on the other hand, the latter group
may never have this opportunity and/or
develop such skills. The emphasis on soft
skills (p 93)—a predominant feature of
the industry—is a testimony of this.
‘While the work itself is so much like a
factory line that it is rather interchange-
able in terms of who is put to the task, it
is the more elusive nature of soft skills
that determines mobility opportunities.
Upadhya is also particularly critical of
the notion of rr professional” or the often
used “knowledge worker.” According to
her, it“suggests that all rr employees are
engaged in highly challenging and creative
work" (p 121), which she decidedly disa-
grees with. The work done within rr com.
Panis is often intensely “process-driven”
and is guarded by a range of surveillance
and measurement mechanisms that col-
lect data on every aspect of the workflow
and output (p 126). Ironically, Upadhya
observes, even as rr companies promote
the idea of soft capitalism (something
which, resonates with theirimage of social
responsibility), in her words, “organiza-
tions use direct, panoptical, and exacting
‘methods to extract the maximum value
from software labour.” This contrasts the
social atmosphere within rr workspaces,
which, according to Upadhya, “is marked
by informality and camaraderie...” (p 190).
Yet, even ifthe individualised work cul-
ture and the ideal of employee auton-
omy does allow room for negotiation,
“the combination of intense surveillance
and monitoring systems with subjective
‘management techniques creates a highly
effective system of organization control”
(P 190). Itis therefore no surprise that rr
professionals themselves are quite scep:
tical and cynical about notions of employee
empowerment.
A Transnational Perspective
With regard to the way work gets done
within the industry, Carol Upadhya'sstudy
resonates with the more transnational
perspective Sareeta Amrute employs in
Encoding Race, Encoding Class. In fact,
they even employ overlapping research
periods; Amrute conducted 18 months
of research between 2002 and 2004 in
Berlin, with a three-month follow-up in
2006. The principal aim of Amrute’s
study is to examine how
knowledge workrealigns and reimagines race
and class and bow these i turn give rise to
alternatives within the neoliberal eoloniza
tion of life by work. (92)
Like the Bangalore-based rr profession-
als of Upadhya’s study, the Indian pro-
sgrammers whom Amrute encountered in
Berlin were “working through and rein-
venting ways of inhabiting a changed
landscape of work and value ...” While
for rr professionals in Bangalore, their
context comprises similarly highly edu-
cated, often middle to upper-middle-
class and upper caste Indians, in Berlin,
European and American co-workers add
a layer of complexity (p 4).
In a bid to distance herself from earlier
studies (mainly with a call centre/sro
focus) that centre on questions of adapta-
tion/assimilation through mimicry, Amrute
is particularly interested in understand-
ing “how racialization as [she] use(s] it
does not imply an ultimate truth about
race” (p 4). Amrute is
interested in how the race of the Indian rr
workers is used to generalize about emerg
ing economies by providing a frame through
hich to speculate on the kinds of rit that
make good cognitive worker and t further
imagine what populations might possess
such traits. (P15)
What stands out in her well-crafted
and thoroughly researched ethnography
is how various notions of Indianness
(inverlinked with the idea of “Indian” rr
professionals or “techies") permeate the
transnational/Germany workplace and
how itis interpreted, negotiated, and occa-
sionally also appropriated. Drawing on a
vast array of representations of Indian 1
professionals in German media and else-
where, Amrute's analysis also provides
insight on a changing world. Underneath
the (occasionally shockingly racist)
imagery lurks a palpable shift in global
power relations which produces a confus-
ing array of interpretations. The rr profes-
sionals n Amrute’s study are clearly caught
in a divide where they have to navigatea
confusing landscape characterised. by
‘opportunities on the one hand and all sorts
of constraints on the other. While the pre-
cariousness of their temporary employ-
‘ment visas only makes the situation worse,
their effect is somewhat tangential; what
is more striking here is the functioning
and structure of the industry. Software
programmers often note the limited
(creative) freedom they are given in their
work and that though they create code,
they never own their creations nor does
it bear their names; and uhimately, they
function as machines within a factory.
‘Talking about code, Amrute found
that rr workers echo Marx's thoughts on
‘machines:
as atechnology that ought to free them to pur
sue their many-sdedness but has instead been
hamessed to a business strategy that sees
them mosty as expendable, cheap labor (p21)
Within the transnational context of knowl
edge economies, race takes on a particu-
larly illuminating capacity here: “as both
a regimentation of labor divisions and
worker management and an affirmation
35REVIEW ARTICLE.
of liberal selfhood and a fecund source of
communicative value” (p 83). As “Indian”
knowledge workers, their work is inter-
preted “through repeated moments of
noticing and remarking on their foreign-
ness ..” (P 84). While this clearly associ-
ates them with particular aspects of
knowledge work, it also separates them,
as Amrute argues, as having a specific
role to play in this.
From the perspective of “Bangalore,” the
1 professionals in Encoding Race, Encod-
ing Class have been given the opportunity
to further develop their soft skills through
exposure to transnational work environ-
‘ment. While this implies upward mobility,
it is interesting to note that Amrute’s
informant would occasionally espouse “a
Political philosophy of fee code” to explain
‘why rr professionals should be allowed to
move freely across borders (p 87). While
code is boundary-free and can cross bor-
ders, they themselves are not, and yet
ought to be. Here Amrute explains:
‘many Indian coders Ispent time with implictly
and explicitly make the argument that they to,
like the code, should be able o go anywhere
and use their skillsto solve problems. (097)
‘They draw parallels between them-
selves—highly skilled migrants—and the
problem-solving capabilites of code: they
see themselves as
boundless potential that i restricted by arbi
trary laws and people (such as visa-dispens
ing bureaucrats and business oriented pro
{eet managers) who lack the expertise appre-
‘iat the importance of echnical work (p 99)
‘And here, race (or nationality) isa limit-
ing/constraining factor: “third-worldist
suppositions” continue to render Indian
software programmers desirable only as
temporary workers (p 99).
Close readings of Reengineering India
and Encoding Race, Encoding Class show
the similarities in attitudes towards rr
work and the management techniques and
processes used to organise, streamline, and
monitor workflows in these companies.
Inboth studies, race and class are recurrent
topics of discussion. Race plays a partic.
larly predominant role in the more trans-
national dimensions of rr work, while class
permeates a more general understand:
ing of the hierarchical position of rr work
within the mental makeup of middle.
class India. Upadhya notes that within
36
Bangalore's middle class, “conversations
about children's employment are a means
of negotiating and asserting relative social
status” (p 287). Although most rr profes-
sionals hail from middle- and upper-mid-
dle-class families, it is not uncommon for
“freshers” in the industry to draw a salary
that is higher than what their parents
ever received. Yet, as transnational subjects
‘working across borders, they are no longer
“upwardly mobile professionals” as they
were considered at home, but are often
labelled ‘cheap Indians’ who are out steal
‘Wester jos, or as technocoolies' who have
base programming skills but lack the social
‘and cultural eapital required for manager
‘or more creative roles. (P 308)
Indian companies play a role in fash-
{oning or internalising such identities as
well. Upadhya notes how rr companies
‘make a concerted effort to fashion socially
acceptable subjects who can. fun
Within transnational work environments,
developing in them the habitus and
practices of the global corporate work-
place and, pethaps most significantly,
“instructing them to manage or suppress
‘Indian’ characteristics and habits that
are deemed inappropriate for this space”
(P 258). Amrute’s study is particularly
insightful about how a cross-border work
environment or global corporate work-
place is experienced—in this regard, she
analyses the jokes software programmers
share among each other (pp 182-83);
Upadhya’s material from her fieldwork in
Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands
also enriches her study in this regard.
‘Indian’ IT and Bangalore
Around the time Carol Upadhya and
Sareeta Amrute embarked on their
research (circa 2003), there were rela-
tively few studies available on the city
compared to the other large metropolitan
centres of India. Gangaram’s bookshop, at
the time sill located on me Road, carried
‘two volumes on its shelves. Maya Jayapal’s
Bangalore: The Story of a City (1997)
offered a very general but insightful
account of the city, while Peter Colaco's
Bangalore: A Century of Tales from City &
Cantonment (2003), which had just been
published then, offered a much more
personal take on the city, not unlike TJS
George's Askew more than adecade later.
Such early writings on Bangalore reveal
something that reverberates with con-
temporary scholarship on the city and its rr
industry. There isa sense of a Bangalore
ofthe past, an old Bangalore so to speak,
and an impending new reality that is a
significant departure from this. As Jayapal
noted in her pemultimate chapter in 1997,
“Bangalore is the fastest growing metrop-
ols inthe country today” (p 263). The city
had already been named the “Silicon
Valley of India,” and in the year the book
‘was published (1997), the phrase acquired
‘momentum in the international press asi
‘was frequently cited in lengthy overview
articles on India's 50 years of Independ-
ence. It is worth noting here that Jayapal
raised the alarm about the city’s soaring
population and its already overstrained
infrastructure 20 years ago, and it has only
become even more fragile now. Colaco
echoes these sentiments and writes that
“the old bungalows are coming down, giv-
ing way to high rise fortresses, with black
‘mirror fronts, to house the thousands of rr
lonesand the amenitiesthey need” (p293).
Smriti Srinivas’ Landscapes of Urban
Memory (2001) was the first academic
study to bring together perspectives on
old and new Bangalore. Yet, this juxta-
position was less about the demise of a
previous, more charming version of the
city and the emergence of a less appealing
(one, and more about the contrast between
local (Karnatic) Bangalore and its global
avatar. Centring on various aspects and
rituals of goddess worship, the book
investigates, as the subtitle explains, The
Sacred and the Civic in India’s High-Tech
City. However, the book only touches upon
the latter. Perhaps like the more recently
published graphic novel discussed in the
introduction of this essay, this implies
that though there is no denying the pres-
ence of the rr industry in Bangalore,
there are vast sections ofthe city’s popu-
ation whose lives are only peripherally
impacted by the presence of the industry.
Bangalore as an Object of Study
‘Compared to the earlier lack of studies on
the city and/or its rr industry, publications
‘on these topics have effloresced recently.
Janaki Nair’ Bangalore’ Twentieth Century:
The Promise of a Metropolis (200) is an
important study on the various factors‘REVIEW ARTICLE
that have shaped the city’s urban planning
and aesthetics. It therefore also provides
sights into why Bangalore became the
feal destination for the rr industry. The
history of India's rr industry has been
extensively covered in Dinesh C Sharma's
highly readable The Long Revolution
(2009), which, as the subtitle states,
tracks The Birth and Growth of India’s rr
Industry. Sareeta Amrute also discusses
these developments in Encoding Race,
Encoding Class (pp 118-36) and both show
that a Bangalorean perspective is not
enough to properly appreciate these var-
ious interrelated developments.
More recently, various edited volumes
such as Beantown Boomtown (2007) by
Jayanth Kodkani and R Edwin Sudhir,
‘Multiple City (2008), by Aditi De, and
Bengoluru, Bangalore, Bengaluru, by
Narendar Pani, Sindhu Radhakrishna, and
or G Bhat (2010) have examined the
city in detail, While the first two brin
together writings on the city by “original
or “okter” inhabitants, collating memories
of the past as well as reflections on the
city’s current and potential future state,
the latter zooms in on various instances in
Bangalore's past, drawing a bridge to
‘where itcurrently sand heading onwards.
‘A common thread runs through these
‘works: the notion of change and the depar-
‘ure from old toa less pleasant, les certain
new. Ye, a certain celebration of the resil-
fence of the city, and perhaps also a pride
in its recognisability as a brand within
the global landscape, can be observed as
well. Harini Nagendra’s (2016) striking
volume, Nature in the City, on nature
and conservation in Bangalore, deserves
‘a mention here as well, especially for how
she strives to connect the past, present,
and future through the city’s greenery,
Which is now so much under threa
In parallel, studies on the city’s rr
industry have mushroomed in recent
years. Eshwar Sundaresan’s Bangalored
(2006) provides a perspective on the
influx of thousands of foreigners employed
by the rr industry. Xiang Biao'sinfluen-
tial study, Global “Body Shopping” (2007),
was the first to tackle the complexities and
precariousness of labour arrangements
and relations in the industry, He was also
probably the first to map the lives and
lifestyles of Indian rr professionals in
commie & Pllc wrsxsy
‘other countries, in this case, in Australia,
Similarly, the more recent Appropriately
India (20n) by Smitha Radhakrishnan
focuses on rr professionals abroad (in
Silicon Valley as well as in South Africa)
while also including perspectives from
‘Mumbai and Bangalore. Itis not hard to
see how Sareeta Amrute’s study functions
as the next chapter in this exploration.
‘The Now Long History of IT in India
Carol Upadhya’s Reengineering india and
Sareeta Amute’s Encoding Race, Encoding
Class not only add to a growing body of
workon India's industry and its relation-
ship with Bangalore, but they also provide
important perspectives on its impact on
‘urban lives and lifestyles. T J S George's
‘Askew acts asa bridge to this body of work.
that clearly draws inspiration from and
builds upon the notion of change. This
change is best visualised as an (elusive)
linearity from old to new, and which com-
prises changes in quality of life, working
lives, and related (urban, environmental,
social, cultural) conditions. Upadhya's and
Amaute's studies show the complexities
cof working in the rr industry and call into
question some of the appeal and glamour
it may have for middle-class Indians. On
the one hand, while Reengineering India
focuses on what 1 work really entails,
Encoding Race, Encoding Class explores
questions of race in the rr industry and
reflects on the imagined position of
Indian rr within a global playfield
While Bangalore does not play an
explicit role in Amrute's analysis, her work
contributes towards situating Bangalore
within a broader global (ocio-economic)
context, Although both studies build upon
‘material that is at least a decade old,
studies that draw on more recent material
donot necessarily seem to suggest that the
uation has changed a great deal. There
are, however, whispers of the industry
“maturing’—while some believe that this
‘means that Indias rr industry is losing its
competitive edge, others suggest the
industry is moving away from low-cost
production oriented work and is becoming
‘more cutting-edge. Such rumours were
abundant even in 2003, which perhaps
shows that the industry cannot and does
not stand still. While the management
processes and surveillance techniques that
Upadhya describes have become more
fine-tuned, one wonders what the expe-
rience of race and racism among Indian
1 professionals abroad would be now,
considering India's significant economic
‘growth and emergence as a geopolitical
power. With India’s rr industry now
roughly 20 years old, itis time to investi-
gate where earlier the cohorts of rr pro-
fessionals are, Here, itis important to let
0 of the implicit novelty of India's 1
industry and accept that rr now has a
long history in Bangalore as well as the
rest ofIndia,
ihe TJ'S Georg, 1 refer using the name
galore in Englslanguage publications.
ie | acknowledge that Bengalara i the cys
official name, Bangalore has always been the
English version of this, Just as international
publications do not speak of Den Haag but The
Hogue and of Vienna instead of Wien, Twill
refer wo Bengaluru as Bangalore here
2 BRRohih, "tp Crore Facelift for Kempegowda
“Towers Soon,” Times of Indi, 8 February 2017,
htep/timesofindia indiatimes com/city/ben-
galoru/rs-3