[G.R. No. 143276.
July 20, 2004] allegedly deprived of his right to cross-examine a material
LANDBANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
SPOUSES VICENTE BANAL and LEONIDAS ARENAS-
BANAL, respondents.
FACTS: Spouses Vicente and Leonidas Banal, respondents,
are the registered owners of agricultural land situated in San
Felipe, Basud, Camarines Norte. A portion of the land was
compulsorily acquired by the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657,[1] as amended,
otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
of 1988.
Respondents rejected the valuation of petitioner hence a
summary administrative proceeding was conducted before the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) to determine
the valuation of the land. Eventually, the PARAD rendered its
Decision affirming the Landbank’s valuation.
Dissatisfied with the Decision of the PARAD, respondents filed
with the RTC a petition for determination of just compensation.
In determining the valuation of the land, the trial court based the
same on the facts established in another case pending before it.
ISSUE: W/N the trial court erred in taking judicial notice of the
average production figures in another case pending before
it and applying the same to the present case without conducting
a hearing and without the knowledge or consent of the parties
HELD: Well-settled is the rule that courts are not authorized to
take judicial notice of the contents of the records of other cases
even when said cases have been tried or are pending in the
same court or before the same judge. They may only do so “in
the absence of objection” and “with the knowledge of the
opposing party,” which are not obtaining here.
Furthermore, as earlier stated, the Rules of Court shall apply to
all proceedings before the Special Agrarian Courts. In this
regard, Section 3, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence
is explicit on the necessity of a hearing before a court takes
judicial notice of a certain matter, thus:
“SEC. 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. – During the
trial, the court, on its own initiative, or on request of a party, may
announce its intention to take judicial notice of any
matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon.
“After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper
court, on its own initiative or on request of a party, may take
judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard
thereon if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the
case.” (emphasis added)
The RTC failed to observe the above provisions.
KULAIS
The trial courts erroneous taking of judicial notice of a witness
testimony in another case, also pending before it, does not affect
the conviction of the appellant, whose guilt is proven beyond
reasonable doubt by other clear, convincing and overwhelming
evidence, both testimonial and documentary.
FACTS: The respondents were charged with kidnapping
and kidnapping with ransom. Kulais argues that he was denied
due process when the trial court took judicial notice of the
testimony given in another case by one Lt. Melquiades
Feliciano, who was the team leader of the government troops
that captured him and his purported cohorts.[16] Because he was
witness in the person of Lieutenant Feliciano, he contends that
the latters testimony should not be used against him.[17]
True, as a general rule, courts should not take judicial
notice of the evidence presented in other proceedings, even if
these have been tried or are pending in the same court, or have
been heard and are actually pending before the same
judge.[18] This is especially true in criminal cases, where the
accused has the constitutional right to confront and cross-
examine the witnesses against him.
Having said that, we note, however, that even if the court a
quo did take judicial notice of the testimony of Lieutenant
Feliciano, it did not use such testimony in deciding the cases
against the appellant. Hence, Appellant Kulais was not denied
due process. His conviction was based mainly on the positive
identification made by some of the kidnap victims, namely,
Jessica Calunod, Armando Bacarro and Edilberto Perez. These
witnesses were subjected to meticulous cross-examinations
conducted by appellants counsel.At best, then, the trial courts
mention of Lieutenant Felicianos testimony is a decisional
surplusage which neither affected the outcome of the case nor
substantially prejudiced Appellant Kulais.
324 SCRA 414 – Conflict of Laws – Private International Law –
Proof of Foreign Law – Applicability of Foreign Laws
In 1978, Menandro Laureano was hired as a pilot by the
Singapore Airlines Limited (SAL). In 1982 however, SAL was hit
by recession and so it had to lay off some employees. Laureano
was one of them. Laureano asked for reconsideration but it was
not granted. Aggrieved, Laureano filed a labor case for illegal
dismissal against SAL. But in 1987, he withdrew the labor case
and instead filed a civil case for damages due to illegal
termination of contract against SAL. Laureano filed the case
here in the Philippines. SAL moved for the dismissal of the case
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The motion was denied. On
trial, SAL alleged that the termination of Laureano is valid
pursuant to Singaporean law.
The trial court ruled in favor of Laureano. SAL appealed the case
raising the issue of lack of jurisdiction, non applicability of
Philippine laws, and estoppel, among others. The Court of
Appeals reversed the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Singaporean Law is applicable to this
case.
HELD: No. The specific Singaporean Law which holds valid the
dismissal of Laureano is not proved in court. As such, the trial
court cannot make a determination if the termination is indeed
valid under Singaporean Law. Philippine courts do not take
judicial notice of the laws of Singapore. SAL has the burden of
proof. SAL failed to prove such law hence Philippine law shall
apply. However, the case must be dismissed on the ground of
estoppel. Under our laws, all money claims arising from
employer-employee relationships must be filed within three
years from the time the cause of action accrued. Laureano’s
cause of action accrued in 1982 when he was terminated but he
only filed the money claim in 1987 or more than three years from
1982. Hence he is already barred by prescription.
MACQUILING VS. COMELEC
FACTS: Respondent was the Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norte. He was a former Filipino who reacquired Philippine
citizenship but continued to use his foreign passport.
Respondent contends that this Court failed to cite any law of the
United States "providing that a person who is divested of
American citizenship thru an Affidavit of Renunciation will re-
acquire such American citizenship by using a US Passport
issued prior to expatriation.
The Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws,1 which
must be presented as public documents 2 of a foreign country
and must be "evidenced by an official publication thereof." 3 Mere
reference to a foreign law in a pleading does not suffice for it to
be considered in deciding a case.
PEOPLE VS. BAHARAN
REPUBLIC VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
LIGTAS
FACTS: Ligtas was charged with the crime of theft. DARAB
rendered a decision finding him to be a tenant of the said land.
Generally, decisions in administrative cases are not binding on
criminal proceedings. This court has ruled in a number of cases
that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
It is indeed a fundamental principle of administrative law that
administrative cases are independent from criminal actions for
the same act or omission. Thus, an absolution from a criminal
charge is not a bar to an administrative prosecution, or vice
versa. One thing is administrative liability; quite another thing is
the criminal liability for the same act.
....
Thus, considering the difference in the quantum of evidence, as
well as the procedure followed and the sanctions imposed in
criminal and administrative proceedings, the findings and
conclusions in one should not necessarily be binding on the
other. Notably, the evidence presented in the administrative
case may not necessarily be the same evidence to be presented
in the criminal cases.82 (Emphasis supplied, citations
omitted)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
. People v. Mallilin
Title: JUNIE MALILLIN Y. LOPEZ, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Reference: G.R. No. 172953 / April 30, 2008
Topic: Rules of Admissibility – Object/Real Evidence – Chain of
Custody
Ponente: TINGA, J
Nature: Petition for Review under Rule 45, Junie Malillin y Lopez
(petitioner) assails the Decision of the CA denying his motion for
reconsideration. The challenged decision has affirmed the
Decision of the RTC which found petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of illegal possession of methamphetamine
hydrochloride (shabu), a prohibited drug.
Facts:
Police officers raided the residence of Junie Malillin y Lopez
(petitioner). The search allegedly yielded two (2) plastic sachets
of shabu and five (5) empty plastic sachets containing residual
morsels of the said substance. Petitioner was charged with
violation of Sec. 11, Art. II of RA No. 9165 (The Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002).
Petitioner entered a negative plea. At the ensuing trial, the
prosecution presented P/Insp Bolanos, Arroyo (forensic
chemist) and PO3 Esternon as witnesses.
The evidence for the defense focused on the irregularity of the
search and seizure conducted by the police operatives.
Petitioner testified that PO3 Esternon began the search of the
bedroom with Licup and petitioner himself inside. Petitioner was
then asked by a police officer to buy cigarettes at a nearby store.
Petitioner asserted that on his return from the errand, he was
summoned by Esternon to the bedroom and once inside, the
officer closed the door and asked him to lift the mattress on the
bed. And as he was doing as told, Esternon stopped him and
ordered him to lift the portion of the headboard. In that instant,
Esternon showed him "sachet of shabu" which according to him
came from a pillow on the bed. Petitioner's account in its entirety
was corroborated in its material respects by Norma (petitioner's
mother), barangay kagawad Licup and Sheila (petitioner’s wife)
in their testimonies. Norma and Sheila positively declared that
petitioner was not in the house for the entire duration of the
search because at one point he was sent by Esternon to the
store to buy cigarettes while Sheila was being searched by the
lady officer. Licup for his part testified on the circumstances
surrounding the discovery of the plastic sachets. He recounted
that after the five empty sachets were found, he went out of the
bedroom and into the living room and after about three minutes,
Esternon, who was left inside the bedroom, exclaimed that he
had just found two filled sachets.
The trial court declared petitioner guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the offense charged. The trial court reasoned that the
fact that shabu was found in the house of petitioner was prima
facie evidence of petitioner's animus possidendi sufficient to
convict him of the charge inasmuch as things which a person
possesses or over which he exercises acts of ownership are
presumptively owned by him. It also noted petitioner's failure to
ascribe ill motives to the police officers to fabricate charges
against him.
Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal with the CA, calling the
attention of the court to certain irregularities in the manner by
which the search of his house was conducted. The OSG
advanced that on the contrary, the prosecution evidence
sufficed for petitioner's conviction and that the defense never
advanced any proof to show that the members of the raiding
team was improperly motivated to hurl false charges against him
and hence the presumption that they had regularly performed
their duties should prevail.
The CA affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
Issue: Whether petitioner's bare denial cannot defeat the
positive assertions of the prosecution and that the same does
not suffice to overcome the prima facie existence of animus
possidendi.
Held: Yes, petitioner may defeat the positive assertions through
proving the failure to follow the chain of custody rule.
 The dangerous drug itself constitutes the very corpus
delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence is vital to a
judgment of conviction.
o Essential therefore in these cases is that the
identity of the prohibited drug be established
beyond doubt.
o Be that as it may, the mere fact of unauthorized
possession will not suffice to create in a
reasonable mind the moral certainty required to
sustain a finding of guilt. More than just the fact of
possession, the fact that the substance illegally
possessed in the first place is the same substance
offered in court as exhibit must also be established
with the same unwavering exactitude as that
requisite to make a finding of guilt.
o The chain of custody requirement performs this
function in that it ensures that unnecessary doubts
concerning the identity of the evidence are
removed.
 As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of
custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be
preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the
matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be.
o It would include testimony about every link in the
chain, from the moment the item was picked up to
the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way
that every person who touched the exhibit would
describe how and from whom it was received,
where it was and what happened to it while in the
witness' possession, the condition in which it was
received and the condition in which it was
delivered to the next link in the chain.
o These witnesses would then describe the
precautions taken to ensure that there had been
no change in the condition of the item and no
opportunity for someone not in the chain to have
possession of the same.
 An unbroken chain of custody becomes indispensable and
essential when the item of real evidence is not distinctive
and is not readily identifiable, or when its condition at the
time of testing or trial is critical, or when a witness has failed
to observe its uniqueness.
o The same standard likewise obtains in case the
evidence is susceptible to alteration, tampering,
contamination and even substitution and
exchange. In other words, the exhibit's level of
susceptibility to fungibility, alteration or
tampering—without regard to whether the same is
advertent or otherwise not—dictates the level of
strictness in the application of the chain of custody
rule.
 A unique characteristic of narcotic substances is that they
are not readily identifiable as in fact they are subject to
scientific analysis to determine their composition and
nature.
o Hence, in authenticating the same, a standard
more stringent than that applied to cases involving
objects which are readily identifiable must be
applied, a more exacting standard that entails a
chain of custody of the item with sufficient
completeness if only to render it improbable that
the original item has either been exchanged with
another or been contaminated or tampered with.
 A mere fleeting glance at the records readily raises
significant doubts as to the identity of the sachets of shabu
allegedly seized from petitioner. Of the people who came
into direct contact with the seized objects, only Esternon
and Arroyo testified for the specific purpose of establishing
the identity of the evidence.
o SPO2 Gallinera, to whom Esternon supposedly
handed over the confiscated sachets for recording
and marking, as well as Garcia, the person to
whom Esternon directly handed over the seized
items for chemical analysis at the crime laboratory,
were not presented in court to establish the
circumstances under which they handled the
subject items.
o Any reasonable mind might then ask the question:
Are the sachets of shabu allegedly seized from
petitioner the very same objects laboratory tested
and offered in court as evidence?
 The prosecution's evidence is incomplete to provide an
affirmative answer.
o Considering that it was Gallinera who recorded
and marked the seized items, his testimony in
court is crucial to affirm whether the exhibits were
the same items handed over to him by Esternon at
the place of seizure and acknowledge the initials
marked thereon as his own.
o The same is true of Garcia who could have, but
nevertheless failed, to testify on the circumstances
under which she received the items from Esternon,
what she did with them during the time they were
in her possession until before she delivered the
same to Arroyo for analysis.
 The prosecution was thus unsuccessful in discharging its
burden of establishing the identity of the seized items
because it failed to offer not only the testimony of Gallinera
and Garcia but also any sufficient explanation for such
failure.
o In effect, there is no reasonable guaranty as to the
integrity of the exhibits inasmuch as it failed to rule
out the possibility of substitution of the exhibits,
which cannot but inure to its own detriment.
 Also the records disclose a series of irregularities
committed by the police officers from the commencement
of the search of petitioner's house until the submission of
the seized items to the laboratory for analysis.
o The Court takes note of the unrebutted testimony
of petitioner, corroborated by that of his wife, that
prior to the discovery of the two filled sachets
petitioner was sent out of his house to buy
cigarettes at a nearby store.
o Equally telling is the testimony of Bolanos that he
posted some of the members of the raiding team
at the door of petitioner's house in order to forestall
the likelihood of petitioner fleeing the scene.
o By no stretch of logic can it be conclusively
explained why petitioner was sent out of his house
on an errand when in the first place the police
officers were in fact apprehensive that he would
flee to evade arrest.
o This fact assumes prime importance because the
two filled sachets were allegedly discovered by
Esternon immediately after petitioner returned to
his house from the errand, such that he was not
 able to witness the conduct of the search during
the brief but crucial interlude that he was away.
 It is also strange that, as claimed by Esternon, it was
petitioner himself who handed to him the items to be
searched including the pillow from which the two filled
sachets allegedly fell. Indeed, it is contrary to ordinary
human behavior that petitioner would hand over the said
pillow to Esternon knowing fully well that illegal drugs are
concealed therein.
 Moreover, Section 21 of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of R.A. No. 9165 clearly outlines the post-
seizure procedure in taking custody of seized drugs.
o It mandates that the officer acquiring initial custody
of drugs under a search warrant must conduct the
photographing and the physical inventory of the
item at the place where the warrant has been
served.
o Esternon deviated from this procedure. It was
elicited from him that at the close of the search of
petitioner's house, he brought the seized items
immediately to the police station for the alleged
purpose of making a "true inventory" thereof, but
there appears to be no reason why a true inventory
could not be made in petitioner's house when in
fact the apprehending team was able to record and
mark the seized items and there and then prepare
a seizure receipt therefor.
o Lest it be forgotten, the raiding team has had
enough opportunity to cause the issuance of the
warrant which means that it has had as much time
to prepare for its implementation.
o While the final proviso in Section 21 of the rules
would appear to excuse non-compliance
therewith, the same cannot benefit the prosecution
as it failed to offer any acceptable justification for
Esternon's course of action.
 Given the foregoing deviations of police officer Esternon
from the standard and normal procedure in the
implementation of the warrant and in taking post-seizure
custody of the evidence, the blind reliance by the trial court
and the Court of Appeals on the presumption of regularity
in the conduct of police duty is manifestly misplaced.
o The presumption of regularity is merely just that—
a mere presumption disputable by contrary proof
and which when challenged by the evidence
cannot be regarded as binding truth.
o Suffice it to say that this presumption cannot
preponderate over the presumption of innocence
that prevails if not overthrown by proof beyond
reasonable doubt.
o In the present case the lack of conclusive
identification of the illegal drugs allegedly seized
from petitioner, coupled with the irregularity in the
manner by which the same were placed under
police custody before offered in court, strongly
militates a finding of guilt.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated 27 January 2006 affirming with modification the judgment
of conviction of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon City,
Branch 52, and its Resolution dated 30 May 2006 denying
reconsideration thereof, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Petitioner Junie Malillin y Lopez isACQUITTED on reasonable
doubt and is accordingly ordered immediately released from
custody unless he is being lawfully held for another offense.
PEOPLE VS. PAGADUAN
Facts: Buy-bust operation was conducted by PO3 Almarez,
SPO1 Balido and Captain de Vera. Ruper Pagaduan was
arrested and plastic sachet of what appears to be shabu was
marked, request for laboratory examination was done the same
day. The plastic sachet was turned over to PNP Crime
Laboratory two days after. He was found guilty by the court and
the same was affirmed by CA
Pagaduan contents among others that the prosecution failed to
show an unbroken chain of custody in the handling of the seized
drug. He claims that there was no evidence to show when the
marking were done.
Issue: WON the integrity of the evidence was preserved
Decision: SC acquitted Pagaduan. The prosecution failed to
show that the illegal drug presented in the court is the same
illegal drug actually recovered from the Pagaduan. Strict
compliance with the prescribed procedure is required because
of the illegal drug’s unique characteristic rendering it indistinct,
not readily identifiable, and easily open to tampering alteration
or substitution either by accident or otherwise.
CITIBANK VS. TEODORO
Facts: Efren Teodoro is a Citibank Card credit card holder. Bt
1995 his outstanding obligation ballooned to 191,693.25
inclusive of interest and service charges. During the trial,
Citibank presented several sales invoices or charge slips, which
added up to only P24,388.36. Although mere photocopies of the
originals, the invoices were marked in evidence as Exhibits F to
F-4. Because all these copies appeared to bear the signatures
of respondent, the trial court deemed them sufficient proof of his
purchases with the use of the credit card. MTC decided in favour
of Citibank. Teodoro appealed to RTC and affirmed MTC
decision. CA reversed.
Issue: WON CA erred in holding that petitioner failed to prove
the due execution and the cause of the unavailability and non-
production of the charge slips marked in evidence as Exhibits F
to F-4
Decision: SC affirmed CA decision.
The original copies of the sales invoices are the best evidence
to prove the alleged obligation. Photocopies thereof are mere
secondary evidence.
Before a party is allowed to adduce secondary evidence to prove
the contents of the original sales invoices, the offeror must prove
the following: (1) the existence or due execution of the original;
(2) the loss and destruction of the original or the reason for its
nonproduction in court; and (3) on the part of the offeror, the
absence of bad faith to which the unavailability of the original
can be attributed. The correct order of proof is as
follows: existence, execution, loss, and contents.
The loss of the originals and reasonable diligence in the search
for them were conditions that were not met, because the sales
invoices might have been found by Equitable. Hernandez,
testifying that he had requested the originals from Equitable,
failed to show that he had subsequently followed up the request.
When more than one original copy exists, it must appear
that all of them have been lost, destroyed, or cannot be
produced in court before secondary evidence can be given of
any one. A photocopy may not be used without accounting for
the other originals.
Triplicates were produced, although the cardholder signed the
sales invoice only once. During the trial, Hernandez explained
that an original copy had gone to respondent, another to the
merchant, and still another to petitioner.
Each of these three copies is regarded as an original in
accordance with Section 4 (b) of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioner failed to show that all three original copies were
unavailable, and that due diligence had been exercised in the
search for them.
FACTS:
Respondents Power Master, Inc. and Tri-C General Services
employed and assigned the petitioners as janitors and leadsmen
in various Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company
(PLDT) offices in Metro Manila area. Subsequently, the
petitioners filed a complaint for money claims against Power
Master, Inc., Tri-C General Services and their officers, the
spouses Homer and Carina Alumisin collectively, the
respondents. The petitioners alleged in their complaint that they
were not paid minimum wages, overtime, holiday, premium,
service incentive leave, and thirteenth month pays. They further
averred that the respondents made them sign blank payroll
sheets. On June 11, 2001, the petitioners amended their
complaint and included illegal dismissal as their cause of action.
They claimed that the respondents relieved them from service in
retaliation for the filing of their original complaint.
Notably, the respondents did not participate in the proceedings
before the Labor Arbiter except on April 19, 2001 and May 21,
2001 when Mr. Romulo Pacia, Jr. appeared on the respondent's
behalf. The respondents counsel also appeared in a preliminary
mandatory conference on July 5, 2001. However, the
respondents neither filed any position paper nor proffered pieces
of evidence in their defense despite their knowledge of the
pendency of the case.
In a decision dated March 15, 2002, the Labor Arbiter partially
ruled in favor of the petitioners. The LA awarded the petitioners
salary differential, service incentive leave, and thirteenth month
pays. In awarding these claims, the LA stated that the burden of
proving the payment of these money claims rests with the
employer. The LA also awarded attorneys fees in favor of the
petitioners, pursuant to Article 111 of the Labor Code.
However, the LA denied the petitioners claims for backwages,
overtime, holiday, and premium pays. The LA observed that the
petitioners failed to show that they rendered overtime work and
worked on holidays and rest days without compensation. The LA
further concluded that the petitioners cannot be declared to have
been dismissed from employment because they did not show
any notice of termination of employment. They were also not
barred from entering the respondents premises.
Both parties appealed the LAs ruling with the National Labor
Relations Commission. The petitioners disputed the LAs denial
of their claim for back wages, overtime, holiday and premium
pays. Meanwhile, the respondents questioned the LAs ruling on
the ground that the LA did not acquire jurisdiction over their
persons because they were not personally served with
summons and other processes. They also claimed that they paid
the petitioners minimum wages, service incentive leave and
thirteenth month pays. As proofs, they attached photocopied
and computerized copies of payroll sheets to their memorandum
on appeal. They further maintained that the petitioners were
validly dismissed. They argued that the petitioners repeated
defiance to their transfer to different workplaces and their
violations of the company rules and regulations constituted
serious misconduct and willful disobedience.
On January 3, 2003, the respondents filed an unverified
supplemental appeal. They attached photocopied and
computerized copies of list of employees with automated teller
machine (ATM) cards to the supplemental appeal. This list also
showed the amounts allegedly deposited in the employees ATM
cards. They also attached documentary evidence showing that
the petitioners were dismissed for cause and had been accorded
due process.
On January 22, 2003, the petitioners filed an Urgent
Manifestation and Motion where they asked for the deletion of
the supplemental appeal from the records because it allegedly
suffered from infirmities. First, the supplemental appeal was not
verified. Second, it was belatedly filed six months from the filing
of the respondents notice of appeal with memorandum on
appeal. The petitioners pointed out that they only agreed to the
respondents filing of a responsive pleading until December 18,
2002. Third the attached documentary evidence on the
supplemental appeal bore the petitioners forged signatures.
Subsequently,thepetitioners filed an Urgent Manifestation with
Reiterating Motion to Strike-Off the Record Supplemental
Appeal/Reply, Quitclaims and Spurious Documents Attached to
Respondents Appeal dated August 7, 2003. The petitioners
argued in this last motion that the payrolls should not be given
probative value because they were the respondents
fabrications. They reiterated that the genuine payrolls bore their
signatures, unlike the respondents photocopies of the payrolls.
They also maintained that their signatures in the respondents
documents (which showed their receipt of thirteenth month pay)
had been forged.
In a resolution dated November 27, 2003, the NLRC partially
ruled in favor of the respondents. The NLRC affirmed the LAs
awards of holiday pay and attorneys fees. It also maintained that
the LA acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the respondents
through their voluntary appearance.
However, it allowed the respondents to submit pieces of
evidence for the first time on appeal on the ground that they had
been deprived of due process. It found that the respondents did
not actually receive the LAs processes. It also admitted the
respondents unverified supplemental appeal on the ground that
technicalities may be disregarded to serve the greater interest
of substantial due process. Furthermore, the Rules of Court do
not require the verification of a supplemental pleading.
The NLRC also vacated the LAs awards of salary differential,
thirteenth month and service incentive leave pays. In so ruling,
it gave weight to the pieces of evidence attached to the
memorandum on appeal and the supplemental appeal. It
maintained that the absence of the petitioners signatures in the
payrolls was not an indispensable factor for their authenticity. It
pointed out that the payment of money claims was further
evidenced by the list of employees with ATM cards. It also found
that the petitioners signatures were not forged. It took judicial
notice that many people use at least two or more different
signatures.
The NLRC further ruled that the petitioners were lawfully
dismissed on grounds of serious misconduct and willful
disobedience. It found that the petitioners failed to comply with
various memoranda directing them to transfer to other
workplaces and to attend training seminars for the intended
reorganization and reshuffling.
The NLRC denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration in a
resolution dated April 28, 2006. Aggrieved, the petitioners filed
a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before
the CA.
The CA affirmed the NLRCs ruling. The CA held that the
petitioners were afforded substantive and procedural due
process. Accordingly, the petitioners deliberately did not explain
their side. Instead, they continuously resisted their transfer to
other PLDT offices and violated company rules and regulations.
It also upheld the NLRCs findings on the petitioners monetary
claims.
The CA denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration in a
resolution dated August 28, 2009, prompting the petitioners to
file the present petition. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred when it did not find
that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in giving due
course to the respondents appeal?
2. Whether or not the respondents were estopped from
submitting pieces of evidence for the first time on appeal?
3. Whether or not the petitioners were illegally dismissed and
are thus entitled to backwages?
4. Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to salary
differential, overtime, holiday, premium, service incentive leave,
and thirteenth month pays?
5. Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to attorneys fees?
HELD: Court of Appeals decision is reversed.
REMEDIAL LAW: prospective application of bonding
company authority
Paragraph 2, Article 223 of the Labor Code provides that in case
of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the
employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or
surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly
accredited by the Commission in the amount equivalent to the
monetary award in the judgment appealed from.
Contrary to the respondents claim, the issue of the appeal bonds
validity may be raised for the first time on appeal since its proper
filing is a jurisdictional requirement. The requirement that the
appeal bond should be issued by an accredited bonding
company is mandatory and jurisdictional. The rationale of
requiring an appeal bond is to discourage the employers from
using an appeal to delay or evade the employees' just and lawful
claims. It is intended to assure the workers that they will receive
the money judgment in their favor upon the dismissal of the
employers appeal.
In the present case, the respondents filed a surety bond issued
by Security Pacific Assurance Corporation(Security Pacific) on
June 28, 2002. At that time, Security Pacific was still an
accredited bonding company. However, the NLRC revoked its
accreditation on February 16, 2003. Nonetheless, this
subsequent revocation should not prejudice the respondents
who relied on its then subsisting accreditation in good faith. In
Del Rosario v. Philippine Journalists, Inc., we ruled that a
bonding companys revocation of authority is prospective in
application.
However, the respondents should post a new bond issued by an
accredited bonding company in compliance with paragraph 4,
Section 6, Rule 6 of the NLRC Rules of Procedure. This
provision states that a cash or surety bond shall be valid and
effective from the date of deposit or posting, until the case is
finally decided, resolved or terminated or the award satisfied.
REMEDIAL LAW: verification
The CA also correctly ruled that the NLRC properly gave due
course to the respondents supplemental appeal. Neither the
laws nor the rules require the verification of the supplemental
appeal. Furthermore, verification is a formal, not a jurisdictional,
requirement. It is mainly intended for the assurance that the
matters alleged in the pleading are true and correct and not of
mere speculation. Also, a supplemental appeal is merely an
addendum to the verified memorandum on appeal that was
earlier filed in the present case; hence, the requirement for
verification has substantially been complied with.
The respondents also timely filed their supplemental appeal on
January 3, 2003. The records of the case show that the
petitioners themselves agreed that the pleading shall be filed
until December 18, 2002. The NLRC further extended the filing
of the supplemental pleading until January 3, 2003 upon the
respondents motion for extension.
DIMAGUILA VS. MONTEIRO
THERESITA, JUAN, ASUNCION, PATROCINIA, RICARDO,
and GLORIA, all surnamed DIMAGUILA vs. JOSE and SONIA
A. MONTEIRO G.R. No. 201011 January 27, 2014 Facts: On
July 5, 1993, respondent spouses, Jose and Sonia Monteiro,
along with Jose, Gerasmo, Elisa and Clarita Nobleza filed a
complaint for Partition and Damages before the RTC against the
Dimaguilas, together with the Borlazas, alleging that the parties
were co-owners and prayed for the partition of a residential
house and lot in Laguna covered by Tax Declaration No. 1453.
The Monteiros anchored their claim on a Deed of Sale executed
in their favor by the heirs of Pedro Dimaguila. The Dimaguilas
argued that there was no co-ownership at all since the property
had long been partitioned to Perfecto and Vitaliano Dimaguila,
with Perfecto becoming owner of the southern half and Vitaliano
owning the northern half. The defendants claim that they are
Vitaliano’s heirs and further averred that the Monteiro’s claim to
the property is null for they were not heirs of either Perfecto or
Vitaliano. Petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA
assailing the RTC’s orders which denied several of their motions
and the proceedings were suspended while such petition was
pending. The CA upheld the RTC’s orders and, upon resumption
of the proceedings, the spouses Monteiro filed their Motion for
Leave to Amend and/or Admit Amended Complaint which was
granted by the RTC. The Monteiros admitted in the amended
complaint the defendant’s allegation of a partition and aver that
a third of Perfecto’s share was sold to them through Bilihan ; and
that, upon their attempt to take possession of that portion, they
found that the Dimaguilas were occupying it. The Dimaguilas, in
their answer to the amended complaint now contravened their
original answer that the subject property was actually divided
into northern and southern halves, replacing it with a division into
two and share and share alike. This resulted to an admission of
a co-ownership, contrary to their original position. According to
the Dimaguilas, the Bilihan€ • also violated Article 1485 of the the Rules of Court similarly provides that entries in official
Civil Code for not specifying the metes and bounds of the records are an exception to the rule. The rule provides that
property sold and that, even if it was specified, the sale was still entries in official records made in the performance of the duty of
void since a co-owner can only sell his undivided share in the a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the
property. The RTC ruled in favor of Spouses Monteiro after performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie
perusing evidence aliunde of a cadastral map of Liliw, Laguna evidence of the facts therein stated. The necessity of this rule
and a corresponding list of claimant as to show that the property consists in the inconvenience and difficulty of requiring the
had indeed been partitioned into southern and northern portions. official’s attendance as a witness to testify to the innumerable
The RTC concluded that the Dimaguilas were stopped from transactions in the course of his duty. The document’s
denying this partition and the Bilihan document was regular and trustworthiness consists in the presumption of regularity of the
authentic absent any evidence to the contrary. The Dimaguilas performance of official duty. Cadastral maps are the output of
appealed their case to the CA which affirmed the trial court’s cadastral surveys. The DENR is the department tasked to
decision. A motion for reconsideration was subsequently filed by execute, supervise and manage the conduct of cadastral
the petitioners but it was denied, hence, this appeal under Rule surveys. It is, therefore, clear that the cadastral map and the
45. Issues: 1) Whether there was a partition of the subject corresponding list of claimants qualify as entries in official
property; and 2) Whether the 1/3 portion of the southern half of records as they were prepared by the DENR, as mandated by
the subject property was sold to the respondent spouses. law. As such, they are exceptions to the hearsay rule and are
Ruling: The petition is DENIED. Both aforementioned issues are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
answered in the affirmative. The Supreme Court points out that
to determine whether there was a partition and a sale of the 1/3
portion of the property requires an evaluation of the evidence.
This entails a question of fact which is beyond the ambit of Rule
45 upon which this petition is based. On this ground alone, the
petition could be denied. However, the Supreme Court delved
into the concepts of evidence to put the case to rest.
Preponderance of evidence; definition Spouses Monteiro, as
plaintiffs in the original case, had the burden of proof to establish
their case by a preponderance of evidence, which is the weight,
credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side,
synonymous with the term greater weight of the evidence.
Preponderance of evidence is evidence, which is more
convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is
offered in opposition thereto. Admissions; contradiction Section
4 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides that an admission
made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same
case does not require proof, and may be contradicted only by
showing that it was made through palpable mistake. The
petitioners argue that such admission was the palpable mistake
of their former counsel in his rush to file the answer, a copy of
which was not provided to them. This contention is
unacceptable. It is a purely self-serving claim unsupported by
any iota of evidence. Bare allegations, unsubstantiated by
evidence, are not equivalent to proof. Admissions; rendered
conclusive through estoppels Article 1431 of the Civil Code
provides that through estoppel, an admission is rendered
conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or
disproved as against the person relying thereon. The
respondent spouses had clearly relied on the petitioners
admission and so amended their original complaint for partition
to one for recovery of possession of a portion of the subject
property. Thus, the petitioners are now estopped from denying
or attempting to prove that there was no partition of the property.
Considering that an admission does not require proof, the
admission of the petitioners would actually be sufficient to prove
the partition even without the documents presented by the
respondent spouses. If anything, the additional evidence they
presented only served to corroborate the petitioners admission.
Best Evidence Rule Section 3(d) of Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court provides that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of
a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the
original document itself, except when the original is a public
record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public
office. Section 7 of the same Rule provides that when the original
of a document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded
in a public office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy
issued by the public officer in custody thereof. Section 24 of Rule
132 provides that the record of public documents may be
evidenced by a copy attested by the officer having the legal
custody or the record. Hearsay Rule Section 44 of Rule 130 of