Five (5) issues were discussed in this case, namely:

1. Whether the Petition filed before the SC, without resorting to the
filing of a motion for reconsideration, was the Ombudsman’s
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy;
2. Whether the Court of Appeals (“CA”) has subject matter
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petition;
3. Whether the CA has subject matter jurisdiction to issue a
Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”) and/or a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction (“WPI”) enjoining the implementation of
the preventive suspension issued by Ombudsman against Binay,
Jr.;
4. Whether the CA acted in grave abuse of its discretion in issuing
said TRO and WPI; and
5. Whether the CA’s directive for the Ombudsman to comment on
Binay, Jr.’s petition for contempt was improper or illegal.

In dispensing the First Issue, the SC ruled that the Ombudsman’s

petition falls under the exceptions that a prior motion for
reconsideration must be filed, citing the case of Republic v. Bayao,
G.R. No. 179492, 5 June 2013, which held as follows: (a) where the
order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no
jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari
proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower
court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the
lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the
resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice
the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject
matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under the
circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e)
where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme
urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an
order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial
court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court
are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceedings
were ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to
object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where
public interest is involved. (Emphasis supplied on the grounds
relied on by the SC in this case, in ruling that no motion for
reconsideration was needed.)
(Score: Ombudsman- 1; Binay, Jr. - 0.)
As to the Second Issue, the discussion revolved around Sec. 14 of
Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act
(RA 6770), more particularly its 2nd Paragraph states:
“Section 14. Restrictions. — No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court to delay
an investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman under this Act, unless there is a
prima facie evidence that the subject matter of the investigation is outside the jurisdiction
of the Office of the Ombudsman.
No court shall hear any appeal orapplication for remedy against the decision or findings
of the Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure question of law.”
Now the SC ruled that the 2nd Paragraph of Sec. 14, RA 6770, is
vague, unconstitutional and invalid. The SC relied on its ruling in
the landmark case of Fabian v. Desierto, 356 Phil. 787 (1998),
which, in turn, held that the 4th Paragraph of Sec. 27, RA 6770, is
void, as it had the effect of increasing theappellate jurisdiction of
the SC without its advice and concurrence, inviolation of Sec. 30,
Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution. This tells us that lawyers should
always be wary of reading RA 6770 since case law has affected itso
much – maybe it’s time to update it.
Interestingly, the SC mentioned the Senate deliberations cited by
the Ombudsman, in the crafting of RA 6770. It quoted the
exchanges between Senators Jovito Salonga, Edgardo Angara,
Teofisto Guingona, Jr., and Neptali Gonzales, which merely led
the SC to be suspicious on whether said Senators were talking
about Sec. 14, RA 6670, or some other provision. In other words,
while the throwback was appreciatedby the SC, the discussions
were not really useful in this case.
Regardless, the SC still ruled thatthe remedy of Binay, Jr. – the
filing of petition for certiorari pursuant to Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, to assail the Ombudsman’s preventive suspension order –
was valid, citing the cases of Office of the Ombudsman v. Capulong,
G.R.No. 201643, 12 March 2014, and Dagan v.Office of the
Ombudsman, G.R. No. 184083, 19 November 2013. It’s just sad that
the sorry end of Second Paragraph of Sec. 14, RA 6770 came as
collateral damage in this case. The SC justified its taking up this
issue on its own motion, or ex mero motu, which it canrightfully
do, since it is, after all, the SC.
(Score: Ombudsman- 1; Binay, Jr. - 1. Bonus point goes to Sec. 30, Art. VI of the 1987
Constitution)
The Third Issue is where it starts to become more
interesting.Here, the Ombudsman’s history was discussed, citing
heavily from the case of Gonzales III v. Office of the President, G.R.
No. 196231 and 19232, 28 January 2014 (hereinafter referred to as
“Gonzales”). You can imagine the Ombudsman smiling from ear
to ear while reading this portion, but this form of flattery should
lead one to be suspicious.
What can be picked up from the Gonzales case is that the Office of
the Ombudsman’s independence covers thefollowing: (1) it is the
creation of the Constitution; (2) it enjoys fiscalautonomy; and (3)
it is insulated from executive supervision and control. Onthis
basis, the SC held that the Ombudsman was meant to be protected
frompolitical harassment and pressure, to free it from the
“insidious tentacles of politics.” (Oh, what imagery does this give.)
Since the SC is apolitical, then Gonzales should not be interpreted
toshield the Ombudsman from the judicial review power of the
courts. After all, there is no politics in the judiciary, right?
After the Ombudsman, it is now the SC’s turn to give an
exhaustive recap of its own history. Starting from the definition of
Judicial Power, the SC went on the discuss its expanded scope
ofjudicial review enunciated in Oposa v. Factoran, G.R. No.
101083, 30 July 1993, then the evolution of itsrule-making
authority in Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, 361 Phil. 73 (1999).
The SC pointed out that Congress, in relation to RA 6770, has no
authority to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning
pleading, practice, and procedure, and rules allowing the issuance
of an injunction form part of the court’s inherent power, which
(now, citing foreign case law) enable the judiciary to accomplish
itsconstitutionally mandated functions.
The SC ruled that Congress’ passing of the First Paragraph of Sec.
14, RA 6770, which prohibits the issuance of an injunction, is an
encroachment of the SC’s rule-making authority. An injunction,
after all, is merely a provisional and auxiliary relief to preserve
rights in esse. However, the SC noted that it has not consented to
this as it has not issued rules of procedure through an
administrative circular. Thus, pending deliberation, the SC
declared the First Paragraph of Sec. 14, RA 6770, as ineffective,
“until it is adopted as part of the rules of procedure through an
administrative circular duly issued therefor.” Abangan ang
susunod na kabanata.
Sec. 14, RA 6770 is now beaten and badly bruised. To sum it up:
The Second Paragraph was declared unconstitutional, and the
First Paragraph was now deemed ineffective. As such,the CA was
held to have correctly issued the injunctive relief in enjoining
thepreventive suspension against Binay, Jr.
(Score: Ombudsman- 1; Binay, Jr. - 2.)
The Fourth Issue is where the condonation doctrine was taken up.
To go right at it, the SC abandoned the condonation doctrine, but
ruled that the CA did not act in excess of jurisdiction in issuing the
WPI, as it did so based on good case law, considering that the
abandonment is prospective in nature.
In abandoning the condonation doctrine, the SC emphasized that
this was a jurisprudential creation that originated in the 1959
Pascual case, which was decided under the 1935 Constitution. It is
notable that there was no legal precedent on the issue at that time,
and the SC resorted to American authorities. The SC stated what
appears the sole basis forthe condonation doctrine in Pascual, to
wit:
The weight of authorities x x x seems to incline toward the rule denying the right to
remove one from office because of misconduct during a prior term, to which we fully
subscribe.

As can be read above, it is clear that no real justification was given

for the condonation doctrine, except that “it seems to incline”
towards American authorities. On this regard, the SC made its
own investigation, and found that there was really no established
weight ofauthorities in the United States (“US”). In fact, 17 States
in the US have already abandoned the condonation doctrine, as
pointed out by the Ombudsman. The SC went on to adopt the
findings of the Ombudsman in US jurisprudence, with the caveat
that said cases are merely “guides of interpretation.”
Perhaps the greatest victory in this case for the Ombudsman is
that it was able to convince the SC not to adhere to stare decisis,
thereby enriching Philippine jurisprudence on this matter. This is
important, as its effects are far-reaching, since we now have
additional basis to petition the abandonment of old ineffective
case laws. For this moment of glory, allow us to quote directly
from the case, viz:
Therefore, the ultimate analysis is on whether or not the condonation doctrine, as
espoused in Pascual,and carried over in numerous cases after, can be held up against
prevailing legal norms. Note that the doctrine of stare decisis does not preclude this Court
from revisiting existing doctrine. As adjudged in the case of Belgica, the stare decisis rule
should not operate when there are powerful countervailing considerations against its
application. In other words, stare decisis becomes an intractable rule only when
circumstances exist to preclude reversal of standing precedent. As the Ombudsman
correctly points out, jurisprudence, after all, is not a rigid, atemporal abstraction; it is an
organic creature that develops and devolves along with the society within which it
thrives. In the words of a recent US Supreme Court Decision, ‘[w]hat we can decide, we
can undecide.'
In this case, the Court agrees with the Ombudsman that since the time Pascual was
decided, the legal landscape has radically shifted. Again, Pascual was a 1959 case
decided under the 1935 Constitution, which dated provisions do not reflect the experience
of the Filipino People under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Therefore, the plain
difference in setting, including, of course, the sheer impact of the condonation doctrine
on public accountability, calls for Pascual’s judicious re-examination.”
The SC then proceeded to dissect Pascual, and went on to
enumerate the notable cases that applied Pascual, which included
cases issued under the 1987 Constitution. Pascual was tested
under existing laws, to see if there exists legislation to support
Pascual, e.g. 1987 Constitution, Revised Administrative Code,
Code of Conductand Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees, Local Government Code of 1991, and Revised Rules
on Administrative Cases in Civil Service. The SC ruled:
"Reading the 1987 Constitution together with the above-cite legal provisions now leads
this Court to the conclusion that the doctrine of condonation is actually bereft of legal
bases.
To begin with, the concept of public office is a public trust and the corollary requirement
of accountability to the people at all times, as mandated under the 1987 Constitution, is
plainly inconsistent with the idea that an elective local official’s administrative liability
for a misconduct committed during a prior term can be wiped off by the fact that he was
elected to a second term of office, or even another elective post. Election is not a mode of
condoning an administrative offense,and there is simply no constitutional or statutory
basis in our jurisdiction tosupport the notion that an official elected for a different term is
fully absolved of any administrative liability arising from an offense done during a prior
term. In this jurisdiction, liability arising from administrative offenses may be condoned
by the President in light of Section 19, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which was
interpreted in Llamas v. Orbos to apply to administrative offenses: xxx …"

The SC made it clear that Pascual has no statutory basis at all. By

abandoning the condonation doctrine, the SC would remove this
defense oft-times used by elected officials, of which the SC was
aware of, as it made mention of the databrought forward by the
Ombudsman, to wit:
“To provide a sample size, the Ombudsman has informed the Court that ‘for the period of
July 2013 to December 2014 alone, 85 cases from the Luzon Office and 24 cases from
the Central Office were dismissed on the ground on condonation. Thus, in just one and a
half years, over a hundred cases of alleged misconduct – involving infractions such as
dishonesty, oppression, gross neglect of duty and grave misconduct – were placed beyond
the reach of the Ombudsman’s investigatory and prosecutorial powers.’ Evidently, this
fortifies the finding that the case is capable of repetition and must therefore, not evade
review.”

(Score: Ombudsman– 2; Binay, Jr. - 2. Bonus point goes to the research team of the
Ombudsman, who painstakingly went through American jurisprudence to support their
position.)
The Fifth and Final Issue on whether the order to comment
directed to the Ombudsman was illegal, was refused to be resolved
on the ground there are no contempt proceedings yet. It is the
claim of the Ombudsman that since she was an impeachable
officer, she could be subjected to contempt. However, no due
course has been given to the contempt action, thus, the
Ombudsman’s claim was premature.
(Score: Ombudsman – 2; Binay,Jr. -2. No points in this round.)