Constitutional Law II S2- Warrantless Search

ESPANO V CA
Facts: Police officers, namely, Pat. Wilfredo Aquino, Simplicio Rivera, and Erlindo Lumboy of the
Western Police District (WPD), Narcotics Division went to Zamora and Pandacan Streets, Manila to
confirm reports of drug pushing in the area. They saw petitioner selling "something" to another person.
After the alleged buyer left, they approached petitioner, identified themselves as policemen, and frisked
him. The search yielded two plastic cellophane tea bags of marijuana. When asked if he had more
marijuana, he replied that there was more in his house. The policemen went to his residence where they
found ten more cellophane tea bags of marijuana. Petitioner was charged with possession of prohibited
drugs. The court found the accused him guilty of the crime of violation of Section 8, Article II, inrelation to
Section 2 (e-L) (I) of Republic Act No. 6425 as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 179.

Issue: Whether or not the pieces of evidence seized were admissible as evidence against the
accused?

Held: The marijuana seized from Espano when he was frisked is admissible as evidence even if the
search was done without a warrant. Rule 113 Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court provides that a peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. Petitioner's arrest
falls squarely under the aforecited rule. He was caught in flagranti as a result of a buy-bust operation
conducted by police officers on the basis of information received regarding the illegal trade of drugs within
the area of Zamora and Pandacan Streets, Manila. The police officer saw petitioner handing over
something to an alleged buyer. After the buyer left, they searched him and discovered two cellophanes of
marijuana. His arrest was, therefore, lawful and the two cellophane bags of marijuana seized were
admissible in evidence, being the fruits of the crime.

As for the marijuana found at petitioner's residence, however, the same are inadmissible in evidence. The
1987 Constitution guarantees freedom against unreasonable searches and seizures under Article III,
Section 2 which provides that the right of the people tobe secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.

An exception to the said rule is a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest for dangerous weapons
or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense. 11 It may extend beyond the
person of the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control. In this
case, the bags of marijuana seized at Espano's house after his arrest at Pandacan and Zamora Streets
do not fall under the said exceptions.

MATA V BAYONA
Facts: Soriano Mata was accused under Presidential Decree (PD) 810, as amended by PD 1306, the
information against him alleging that Soriano Mata offered, took and arranged bets on the Jai Alai game by
“selling illegal tickets known as ‘Masiao tickets’ without any authority from the Philippine Jai Alai &
Amusement Corporation or from the government authorities concerned.” Mata claimed that during the
hearing of the case, he discovered that nowhere from the records of the said case could be found the
search warrant and other pertinent papers connected to the issuance of the same, so that he had to inquire
from the City Fiscal its whereabouts, and to which inquiry Judge Josephine K. Bayona, presiding Judge of
the City Court of Ormoc replied, “it is with the court”. The Judge then handed the records to the Fiscal who
attached them to the records. This led Mata to file a motion to quash and annul the search warrant and for
the return of the articles seized, citing and invoking, among others, Section 4 of Rule 126 of the Revised
Rules of Court. The motion was denied by the Judge on 1 March 1979, stating that the court has made a
thorough investigation and examination under oath of Bernardo U. Goles and Reynaldo T. Mayote,
members of the Intelligence Section of 352nd PC Co./Police District II INP; that in fact the court made a
certification to that effect; and that the fact that documents relating to the search warrant were not attached
immediately to the record of the criminal case is of no moment, considering that the rule does not specify
when these documents are to be attached to the records. Mata’s motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid
order having been denied, he came to the Supreme Court, with the petition for certiorari, praying, among
others, that the Court declare the search warrant to be invalid for its alleged failure to comply with the
requisites of the Constitution and the Rules of Court, and that all the articles confiscated under such warrant
as inadmissible as evidence in the case, or in any proceedings on the matter.

Issue: WON the judge must before issuing the warrant personally examine on oath or affirmation
the complainant and any witnesses he may produce and take their depositions in writing, and attach
them to the record, in addition to any affidavits presented to him?

Held: YES. Under the Constitution “no search warrant shall issue but upon probable cause to be
determined by the Judge or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce”. More emphatic and
detailed is the implementing rule of the constitutional injunction, The Rules provide that the judge must
before issuing the warrant personally examine on oath or affirmation the complainant and any
witnesses he may produce and take their depositions in writing, and attach them to the record, in
addition to any affidavits presented to him. Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses
are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce and to attach them to the record. Such written deposition is necessary in order
that the Judge may be able to properly determine the existence or nonexistence of the probable cause, to
hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are false. We, therefore,
hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality by the failure of the Judge to conform with the essential
requisites of taking the depositions in writing and attaching them to the record, rendering the search warrant
invalid.

PEOPLE V DEL ROSARIO

Facts: Del Rosario was charged with illegal possession of firearms and ammutions and illegal sale of
regulated drugs

Upon application of SPO3 Raymundo Untiveros of PNP Cavite, before RTC judge Arturo de Guia
issued a search warrant authorizing the search and seizure of an: undetermined quantity of
methamphetamine hydrochloride commonly known as shabu and its paraphernalia” in the premises of
appellant’s house. However, the search warrant was not implemented immediately due to lack of police
personnel to form the raiding team.

In the course of the search they found a black canister containing shabu, an aluminum foil, a plastic
.22 caliber, three set of ammunitions and three wallets containing the marked money.

Issue: Whether or not there is a violation of the constitutional right against unreasonable search
and seizure

Held: The Supreme Court held that the accused cannot be convicted of the illegal possession of firearms
and ammunitions. The search warrant implemented by the raiding party authorized only the search and
seizure of the described quantity of shabu and paraphernalia.

A search warrant is not a sweeping authority empowering a raiding party to undertake a fishing
expedition to seize and confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles relating to a crime. The
constitution itself and the Rules of Court specifically mandate that the search warrant must particularly
describe the things to be seized. Thus, the search warrant was no authority for the police officers to seize
the firearms which was not mentioned, much less described with particularity, in the search warrant.

Neither may it maintain that the gun was seized in the course of an arrest, for as earlier observed,
accused arrest was far from regular and legal. Aid firearm, having been illegally seized, the same is not
admissible in evidence.

UMIL V RAMOS

Facts: On 1 February 1988, military agents were dispatched to the St. Agnes Hospital, Roosevelt
Avenue, Quezon City, to verify a confidential information which was received by their office, about a
"sparrow man" (NPA member) who had been admitted to the said hospital with a gunshot wound. That
the wounded man in the said hospital was among the five (5) male "sparrows" who murdered two (2)
Capcom mobile patrols the day before, or on 31 January 1988 at about 12:00 o'clock noon, before a road
hump along Macanining St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. The wounded man's name was listed by the
hospital management as "Ronnie Javellon," twenty-two (22) years old of Block 10, Lot 4, South City
Homes, Biñan, Laguna however it was disclosed later that the true name of the wounded man was
Rolando Dural. In view of this verification, Rolando Dural was transferred to the Regional Medical
Services of the CAPCOM, for security reasons. While confined thereat, he was positively identified by the
eyewitnesses as the one who murdered the 2 CAPCOM mobile patrols.

Issue: WON Rolando is lawfully arrested.

Held: Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the NPA, an outlawed subversive organization.
Subversion being a continuing offense, the arrest without warrant is justified as it can be said that he was
committing as offense when arrested. The crimes rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit
such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance therefore in connection therewith constitute
direct assaults against the state and are in the nature of continuing crimes.
 WEBB V DE LEON

Facts: June 1994, NBI filed with DOJ a letter-complaint charging petitioner Hubert Webb, and other
persons with the crime of rape with homicide. Forthwith, DOJ formed a panel of prosecutors headed
by assistant chief state prosecutor to conduct the PI of the charged with the rape and killing of the
Vizconde in their home in Paranaque.

During the PI, NBI presented: (1) sworn statement of their principal witness Alfaro who allegedly
saw the commission of the crime. (2) sworn statements of two former housemaids of the Webb (3)
sworn statement of Cristobal who allegedly that he was a passenger of United Airlines bound for
New York and expressed doubt on whether Webb was his co-passenger in the trip (4) sworn
statement of Birrer, former live-in partner of Biong, who narrated the manner of how Biong
investigated and tried to cover up the crime (5) sworn statements of two Vizconde maids, security
guard and engineer. (6) Autopsy reports of the victims showing the number of stab wounds and
genital examination of the victims.

Before submitting his counter-affidavit, Webb filed with DOJ panel a motion for production and
examination of evidence and documents for the NBI to produce some documents like (1)
certification of US FBI on the admission to and stay of Hubert Webb in the US from MArch 9, 1991
to October 22, 1992 (2) Laboratory report of the medico legal officer (3) sworn statement of Biong
(4) photographs of the fingerprints lifted from the Vizconde residence taken during investigation (5)
investigation of NBI

The motion was granted by DOJ and the NBI submitted the photocopies of the requested
documents. Then Webb filed a civil case in RTC of Makati for the purpose of obtaining the original
of said sworn statement and has succeeded to obtain the original copy. This was submitted to the
DOJ together with his other evidence. But Webb failed to obtain the document from US FBI.

During PI, Webb denied the crime as he went to the US and was not in the Philippines when the
crime happened. This alibi was supported by the other persons accused and the documentary
evidence of Webb's purchase of bicycle in the US, the driver's license State of California issued for
him and the letter of the legal attache of the US embassy confirming his arrival at San Francisco,
California on March 9, 1991.

The other respondents submitted their sworn statement as well.

On August 1995, DOJ Panel issued a resolution finding probable cause to hold the respondents
for trial and recommending that an information for rape with homicide be filed against petitioners
and their co-respondents, which was complied on the same date with the RTC of Paranaque. The
case was raffled to branch 258 with Judge Escano, however it was Judge de Leon, pairing judge
of Judge Escano who issued the warrant of arrest against the accused. BUt later, Judge Ecano
voluntarily inhibited himself from the case to avoid any suspicion considering that he was with NBI
before his appointment to the bench. The case was re-raffled again to branch 274 with Judge
Tolentino who issued new warrants of arrest against the accused, then Webb with other accused
voluntarily surrendered to the police.

In their petitions, the petitioners contend: (1) Judge de Leon and Tolentino gravely abused their
discretion when they failed to conduct PI before issuing warrants of arrest (2) DOJ panel gravely
abused its discretion in holding that there is probable cause to charge them with the crime of rape
and homicide (3) DOJ denied them their constitutional right to due process during the PI (40) DOJ
panel unlawfully intruded into judicial prerogative when it failed to charge Jessica Alfaro in the
information as an accused.

Issue: WON respondent Judges de Leon and Tolentino gravely abused their discretion when
they failed to conduct a preliminary examination before issuing warrants of arrest against
them.
Held: Yes, In arrest cases there must be probable cause that a crime has been committed and that the
person to be arrested committed it, which of course can exist without any showing that evidence of the
crime will be found at premises under that person's control. With respect to warrants of arrest, section 6 of
Rule 112 simply provides that "upon filing of an information, the Regional Trial Court may issue a warrant
for the arrest of the accused. That before issuing warrants of arrest, judges merely determine personally
the probability, not the certainty of guilt of an accused. In doing so, judges do not conduct a de novo
hearing to determine the existence of probable cause. They just personally review the initial determination
of the prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if it is supported by substantial evidence.
 PEOPLE V SUCRO

Facts: Pat. Roy fulgencio, a member of the INP Kalibo, Aklan was instructed by P/Lt Vicente Seraspi Jr.,
Station commander, to monitor the activities of appellant. Fulgencio positioned himself to a house, adjacent
of which i a chapel. Fulgencio saw appellant enter the chapel taking something which turn out later to be
marijuana from a compartment of a cart found inside the chapel and return to the street where he handed
the same to a buyer.

Fulgencio radioed Seraspi and reported the activity, Seraspi instructed Fulgencio to continue
monitoring.

At about 6:30 PM Fulgencio again called up Sraspi to report the third buyer later identified as Ronnie
Macabante, was transacting with appellant.

At that point, the team seraspi proceeded to the area and fulgencio told seraspi to intercept
Macabante and Appellant. Team Seraspi caught up with macabante at a crossing. Upon seeing the police
Macabante throw something at the ground which turned to a tea bag of marijuana. Macabante admitted
that he brought the same from appellant. The police team was able to overtake and arrest appellant.

Issue: Whether or not the arrest without warrant of the accused is lawful and whether or not the
evidence resulting from arrest is admissible.

Held: Yes, The Supreme Court held that under Section 5 Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure for the instance that arrest without warrant is considered lawful. – A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has just been
committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances
that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who
has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another. In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall
be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with
section 7 of Rule 112.

An offense is committed in the presence or within the view of an officer when the officer sees the
offense, although at the distance, or hears the disturbance created thereby and proceed at once at the
scene – the act of surveillance

Second requirement: the act of macabante, throwing of the marijuana and the admission, constitute
that he just committed an illegal act which the police officer had personal knowledge, being members of the
team which monitors Sucro’s nefarious activity

People vs bati – police officers have personal knowledge of the actual commission of the crime
when it had earlier conducted surveillance activities.

Evidence - admissible because the arrest is valid

 PEOPLE V RODRIGUEZA

Facts: CIC Taduran et al was in their headquarters at the office of the Narcotics Regional Unit at Camp
Bagong Ibalon, Legaspi City when a confidential informer arrived and told them that there was an ongoing
illegal traffic of prohibited drugs. They form a team to conduct a buy bust operation. The money with ultra
violet powder was given to Tadura who acted as the poseur buyer. He was told to look for a certain Don,
The alleged seller of prohibited drug. Tudara went to Tagas alone, and while along the road he met Samuel
Segovia. He asked Segovia where he could find Don and where he could buy marijuana. Segovia left for a
while when he return he was accompanied by Don.

Don gave Tudaran “a certain object wrapped in a plastic which was later identified as marijuana and
received payment thereof. Thereafter Taduran return to the headquarter and made a report.

In the evening they arrested appellant however they ae not armed with warrant of arrest.

Then they conducted a raid in the house of Jovencio Rodriqueza, father of appellant. During the
raid they were able to confiscate dried marijuana leaves and a plastic syringe. The search however was
not authorized by any search warrant.

Issue: WON the arrest is valid

Held: A search warrant to be valid, must generally be authorized by search warrant duly issued by proper
government authority. The court has allowed government authorities to conduct searches and seizure even
without search warrant. Thus, when the search is incidental to a lawful arrest, when it is made on vessels,
aircraft for violation of custom laws, when it made to automobile for the purpose of preventing violation of
smuggling or immigration laws, when it involves prohibited article in plain view or in case of inspection of
building and other premises for the enforcement of fire, sanitary and building regulation.

In the case at bar the raid conducted was not authorized by search warrant and it does not appear
that the situation falls any of the aforementioned cases.

Buy bust – must be in flagrante delicto = requires that the suspected dealer must be caught red
handed in the act of selling marijuana or any prohibited drugs.
 GO V COURT OF APPEALS

Facts: Petitioner, while traveling in the wrong direction on a one-way street, almost had a collision with
another vehicle. Petitioner thereafter got out of his car, shot the driver of the other vehicle, and drove off.
An eyewitness of the incident was able to take down petitioner’s plate number and reported the same to
the police, who subsequently ordered a manhunt for petitioner. 6 days after the shooting, petitioner
presented himself in the police station, accompanied by 2 lawyers, the police detained him. Subsequently
a criminal charge was brought against him. Petitioner posted bail, the prosecutor filed the case to the lower
court, setting and commencing trial without preliminary investigation. Prosecutor reasons that the petitioner
has waived his right to preliminary investigation as bail has been posted and that such situation, that
petitioner has been arrested without a warrant lawfully, falls under Section 5, Rule 113 and Section 7, Rule
112 of The 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides for the rules and procedure pertaining to
situations of lawful warrantless arrests. Petitioner in his petition for certiorari assails such procedure and
actions undertaken and files for a preliminary investigation.

Issue: Whether or Not warrantless arrest of petitioner was lawful.

Held: Petitioner and prosecutor err in relying on Umil v. Ramos, wherein the Court upheld the warrantless
arrest as valid effected 1 to 14 days from actual commission of the offenses, which however constituted
“continuing crimes,” i.e. subversion, membership in an outlawed organization, etc. There was no lawful
warrantless arrest under Section 5, Rule 113. This is because the arresting officers were not actually there
during the incident, thus they had no personal knowledge and their information regarding petitioner were
derived from other sources. Further, Section 7, Rule 112, does not apply.

Petitioner was not arrested at all, as when he walked in the police station, he neither expressed surrender
nor any statement that he was or was not guilty of any crime. When a complaint was filed to the prosecutor,
preliminary investigation should have been scheduled to determine probable cause. Prosecutor made a
substantive error, petitioner is entitled to preliminary investigation, necessarily in a criminal charge, where
the same is required appear thereat. Petition granted, prosecutor is ordered to conduct preliminary
investigation, trial for the criminal case is suspended pending result from preliminary investigation, petitioner
is ordered released upon posting a bail bond.
 POSADAS VS COURT OF APPEALS

Facts: Pat. Ursicio Ungad and Pat. Umbra Umpar were conducting surveillance along Magallanes Street
Davao City. While they were within the preemies they spotted petitioner carrying a buri bag and they
noticed him to be acting suspiciously. They approached petitioner and identified themselves as members
of the INP. Petitioner attempted to flee but his attempt to get away was thwarted by the two. They
checked the bag and found one caliber and two ammunitions.

Issue: Whether or not the arrest is a valid warrantless arrest

Held: Yes, Section 12 Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on criminal Procedure is not applicable because at the
time the police officers identified themselves and apprehended petitioner as he attempted to flee, they did
not know that he had committed or actually committing the offense of illegal possession of firearms and
ammunitions. They just suspected that he is hiding something.

The probable cause is that when the petitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to flee with the
buri bag there was a probable cause that he was concealing something illegal in the bag and it was the
right and duty of the police officers to inspect the same

It is too much indeed to require the police officers to search the bag in the possession of the
petitioner only after they shall have obtained a search warrant for the purpose. Such exercise may prove
to be useless, futile and mush too late.
 PEOPLE VS MENGOTE

Facts: August 8, 1987: Western Police District received a telephone call from an informer that there were
3 suspicious-looking persons at the corner of Juan Luna and North Bay Boulevard, Tondo Manila and
because of it, a surveillance team of plainclothesmen were then dispatched to the place. Patrolmen saw 2
men “looking from side to side”, one of whom was holding his abdomen. The patrolmen approached these
persons and identified themselves as policemen where the 2 “suspicious-looking men” allegedly tried to
run away but were unable to escape because other lawmen surrounded them.

The suspects were then searched and one of them who turned out to be Mengote y Tejas was found
with .38 caliber Smith and Wesson revolver with 6 live bullets in the chamber. His companion, identified as
Morellos had a fan knife secreted in his front right pants pocket. The weapons were then taken and Mengote
and Morellos were turned over police headquarters for investigation.

August 11, 1987: Mengote y Tejas was then filed before RTC for a violation of PD 1866 “Illegal Possession of
Firearms”. Aside from the policemen, the prosecution also presented Rigoberto Danganan who identified the
.38 caliber Smith and Wesson revolver as among the articles stolen from him during a robbery in his house in
Malabon. Danganan pointed at Mengote y Tejas as one of the robbers.

The defense side however, Mengote, made no effort to prove that he owned the firearm or that he was
licensed to possess it and claimed instead that the weapon had been "planted" on him at the time of his arrest

RTC: Mengote was convicted for violation of PD 1866 and sentenced to reclusion perpetua.

As appeal however by Mengote, it is submitted in the Appellant's Brief that:

-the revolver should not have been admitted in evidence because of its illegal seizure, no warrant therefor
having been previously obtained.

-Neither could it have been seized as an incident of a lawful arrest because the arrest of Mengote was itself
unlawful, having been also effected without a warrant.

-also contends that the testimony regarding the alleged robbery in Danganan's house was irrelevant and should
also have been disregarded by the trial court.

Issue: (1) Whether the warrantless search and seizure was illegal? (2) Whether the warrantless arrest
was illegal?

Held: Yes, the warrantless search and arrest was illegal.

There is no question that evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search or seizure is inadmissible in any
proceeding for any purpose. In fact, illegal search or seizure is an absolute prohibition of Article 3(2) of the
Constitution. The Solicitor General, however, while conceding the rule, maintains that it is not applicable in
the case at bar. His reason is that the arrest and search of Mengote and the seizure of the revolver from
him were lawful under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or private person may without a
warrant, arrest a person: Cdpr

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment
or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending,
or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

SC: Does not agree with the Solicitor General.

Par.c of Section 5 is obviously inapplicable as Mengote was not an escapee from a penal institution when
he was arrested. We therefore confine ourselves to determine lawfulness of his arrest under either Par. (a)
or Par. (b) of this section.

Paragraphs a and b however, have not been established in the case.

At the time of the arrest in question, Mengote y Tejas was merely "looking from side to side" and "holding
his abdomen," according to the arresting officers themselves. There was apparently no offense that had
just been committed or was being actually committed or at least being attempted by Mengote in their
presence.

As to the argument actual existence of an offense was not necessary as long as Mengote's acts "created
a reasonable suspicion on the part of the arresting officers and induced in them the belief that an offense
had been committed and that the accused-appellant had committed it."

SC: “looking from side to side” and “holding his abdomen” and in a place not exactly forsaken
certainly do not constitute sinister acts.

It would have been different if Mengote had been apprehended at an ungodly hour and in a place where
he had no reason to be, like a darkened alley at 3 o'clock in the morning. But he was arrested at 11:30 in
the morning and in a crowded street shortly after alighting from a passenger jeep with his companion. He
was not skulking in the shadows but walking in the clear light of day. There was nothing clandestine about
his being on that street at that busy hour in the blaze of the noonday sun.

People v. Malmstedt (Court sustained the warrantless arrest of the accused because there was a bulge in
his waist that excited the suspicion of the arresting officer and, upon inspection, turned out to be a pouch
containing hashish) and People v. Claudio (accused boarded a bus and placed the buri bag she was
carrying behind the seat of the arresting officer while she herself sat in the seat before him. His suspicion
aroused, he surreptitiously examined the bag, which he found to contain marijuana. He then and there
made the warrantless arrest and seizure that we subsequently upheld on the ground that probable cause
had been sufficiently established) do not apply to this case. These cases do not apply for there was
nothing to support the arresting officers' suspicion other than Mengote's darting eyes and his hand
on his abdomen. By no stretch of imagination could it have been inferred from these acts that an
offense has been committed, was actually being committed or was at least being attempted in their
presence.

Instead, the case before us is similar to People v. Aminnudin where the Court held that the warrantless
arrest of the accused was unconstitutional. This was effected while he was coming down a vessel, to all
appearances no less innocent than the other disembarking passengers. He had not committed nor was he
actually committing or attempting to commit an offense in the presence of the arresting officers. He was not
even acting suspiciously. In short, there was no probable cause that, as the prosecution incorrectly
suggested, dispensed with the constitutional requirement of a warrant.

SC: Moreover, Paragraph b is all the more not applicable for its requirements have not been satisfied. The
prosecution has not shown that at the time of Mengote's arrest an offense had in fact just been committed
and that the arresting officers had personal knowledge of facts indicating that Mengote had committed it.
All they had was hearsay information from the telephone caller, and about a crime that had yet to be
committed.

As for the illegal possession or the firearm found on Mengote's person, the policemen discovered this only
after he had been searched and the investigation conducted later revealed that he was not its owners nor
was he licensed to possess it. Before these events, the peace officers had no knowledge even of Mengote'
identity, let alone the fact (or suspicion) that he was unlawfully carrying a firearm or that he was involved in
the robbery of Danganan's house. (In short there was no investigation done, policemen had no personal
knowledge about Mengote)

It would be a sad day, indeed, if any person could be summarily arrested and searched just because he is
holding his abdomen, even if it be possibly because of a stomachache, or if a peace officer could clamp
handcuffs on any person with a shifty look on suspicion that he may have committed a criminal act or is
actually committing or attempting it. Without the evidence of the firearm taken from him at the time of his
illegal arrest, the prosecution has lost its most important exhibit and must therefore fail. The testimonial
evidence against Mengote (which is based on the said firearm) is not sufficient to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime imputed to him.

There is no need therefore to discuss the other issue in depth as the ruling is sufficient enough to
sustain Mengote's exoneration.

FINAL DISPOSITIVE PORTION: Decision is reversed and set aside. Mengote is acquitted.
 PEOPLE VS AMMINUDIN

Facts: Idel Aminnudin, accused-appellant was arrested on June 25, 1984, shortly after disembarking from
the M/V Wilcon 9 at about 8:30 in the evening, in Iloilo City. The PC officers who were in fact waiting for
him because of a tip from one their informers simply accosted him, inspected his bag and finding what
looked liked marijuana leaves took him to their headquarters for investigation. The two bundles of suspect
articles were confiscated from him and later taken to the NBI laboratory for examination. It was found to
contain three kilos of what were later analyzed as marijuana leaves by an NBI forensic examiner. An
information for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against him. Later, the information was
amended to include Farida Ali y Hassen, who had also been arrested with him that same evening and
likewise investigated. Both were arraigned and pleaded not guilty. Subsequently, the fiscal filed a motion
to dismiss the charge against Ali on the basis of a sworn statement of the arresting officers absolving her
after a 'thorough investigation." The motion was granted, and trial proceeded only against the accused-
appellant, who was eventually convicted . In his defense, Aminnudin disclaimed the marijuana, averring
that all he had in his bag was his clothing consisting of a jacket, two shirts and two pairs of pants. He alleged
that he was arbitrarily arrested and immediately handcuffed. His bag was confiscated without a search
warrant. At the PC headquarters, he was manhandled to force him to admit he was carrying the marijuana,
the investigator hitting him with a piece of wood in the chest and arms even as he parried the blows while
he was still handcuffed. He insisted he did not even know what marijuana looked like and that his business
was selling watches and sometimes cigarettes. However the RTC rejected his allegations. Saying that he
only has two watches during that time and that he did not sufficiently proved the injuries allegedly sustained

Issue: Whether or not search of defendant’s bag is legal.

Held: No, the search was illegal. Defendant was not caught in flagrante delicto, which could allow
warrantless arrest or search. At the moment of his arrest, he was not committing a crime. Nor was he about
to do so or had just done so. To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently
disembarking from the vessel. The said marijuana therefore could not be appreciated as evidence against
the defendant, and furthermore he is acquitted of the crime as charged.