Art 838

Roberts vs Leonidas
129 SCRA 33
FACTS:
Edward Grimm was an American residing in Manila until his death in 1977. He was survived by
his 2nd wife (Maxine), their two children (Pete and Linda), and by his two children from a 1st
marriage (Juanita and Ethel) which ended in divorce. Grimm executed two wills in San Francisco,
CA in January 1959. One will disposed of his Philippine estate described as conjugal property of
himself and his 2nd wife. The second will disposed of his estate outside the Philippines.
The two wills and a codicil were presented for probate in Utah by Maxine in March 1978.
Maxine admitted that she received notice of the intestate petition filed in Manila by Ethel in
January 1978. Subsequently, the Utah court admitted the two wills and a codicil for probate in
April 1978, and was issued upon consideration of the stipulation between the lawyers for Maxine
and Ethel.
In April 1978, Maxine and Ethel, with knowledge of the intestate proceeding in Manila,
entered into an agreement in Utah regarding the estate. The agreement provided that Maxine,
Pete and Ethel would be designated as personal representatives (administrators) of Grimm’s
Philippine estate and that Maxine’s ½ conjugal share in the estate should be reserved for her
which would not be less than $1.5 million plus the homes in Utah and Sta. Mesa.
Manila Intestate Proceedings: Maxine filed an opposition and motion to dismiss the
intestate proceeding in Manila on the ground of pendency of the Utah probate proceedings.
However, pursuant to the compromise agreement, Maxine withdrew the opposition and motion
to dismiss. The court ignored the will found in the record. The estate was partitioned.
In 1980, Maxine filed a petition praying for the probate of the two wills (which was already
probated in Utah), that the partition approved by the intestate court be set aside, and that
Maxine be named executrix, and Ethel be ordered to account for the properties received by them
and return the same to Maxine. Maxine alleged that they were defrauded due to the
machinations of the Ethel, that the compromise agreement was illegal and the intestate
proceeding was void because Grimm died testate so the partition was contrary to the decedent’s
wills.
Ethel filed a motion to dismiss the petition which was denied by respondent Judge for
lack of merit
ISSUE:
WON respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion in denying Ethel’s motion
to dismiss
HELD:
 No. A testate proceeding is proper in this case because Grimm died with two wills and
“no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed.
The probate of the will is mandatory. It is anomalous that the estate of a person who died
testate should be settled through an intestate proceeding. Therefore, the intestate case should
be consolidated with the testate proceeding and the judge assigned to the testate proceeding
should continue hearing the two cases.
Ethel may file within twenty days from notice of the finality of this judgment an opposition
and answer to the petition unless she considers her motion to dismiss and other pleadings sufficient
for the purpose. Juanita G. Morris, who appeared in the intestate case, should be served with copies
of orders, notices and other papers in the testate case.

Nepomuceno vs CA
139 SCRA 206
FACTS:
In the last will and testament of Martin Jugo, he named and appointed the petitioner Sofia
Nepomuceno as his sole and only executor of his estate. It is clearly stated in the Will that the
testator was legally married to a certain Rufina Gomez by whom he had two legitimate children,
Oscar and Carmelita, but since 1952, he had been estranged from his lawfully wedded wife and
had been living with petitioner as husband and wife. In fact, on December 5, 1952, the testator
Martin Jugo and the petitioner herein, Sofia J. Nepomuceno were married in Victoria, Tarlac
before the Justice of the Peace. The testator devised to his forced heirs, namely, his legal wife
Rufina Gomez and his children Oscar and Carmelita his entire estate and the free portion thereof
to herein petitioner.
The petitioner filed a petition for the probate of the Will, but the legal wife and children
filed an opposition. The lower court denied the probate of the will on the ground that the testator
admitted to cohabiting with Nepomuceno. The will’s admission to probate was deemed an idle
exercise since based on the face of the will, the invalidity of the intrinsic provisions is evident.
The appellate court, however, declared the will to be valid except that the devise in favor of the
petitioner is null and void. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but such was denied.
ISSUES:
1. WON the respondent court acted in excess of its jurisdiction when after declaring the last will
and testament of the testator validly drawn, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the
testamentary provision in favor of herein petitioner.
2. Is the disposition in favor of the petitioner valid?
HELD:
As to the first issue, the court acted within its jurisdiction. The general rule is that in
probate proceedings, the court’s area of inquiry is limited to an examination and resolution of
the extrinsic validity of the will. The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Given the
exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains
it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the Will.
The trial court acted correctly in passing upon the will’s intrinsic validity even before its
formal validity has been established. The probate of a will might become an idle ceremony if on
its face, it appears to be intrinsically void. Where practical considerations demand that the
intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the
issue.
On the second issue, as to validity of the disposition to the petitioner:
Article 739 of the Civil Code provides:
The following donations shall be void:
(1) Those made between persons who were guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the
donation;
(2) Those made between persons found guilty of the same criminal offense, in consideration
thereof;
(3) Those made to a public officer or his wife, descendants and ascendants, by reason of his office.
In the case referred to in No. 1, the action for declaration of nullity may be brought by the spouse
of the donor or donee; and the guilt of the donor and donee may be proved by preponderance
of evidence in the same action.
Article 1028 of the Civil Code provides:
The prohibitions mentioned in Article 739, concerning donations inter vivos shall apply to
testamentary provisions. The records of the case do not sustain a finding of innocence or good
faith on the part of Nepomuceno:
a. The last will and testament itself expressly admits it’s indubitably on its face the meretricious
relationship between the testator and petitioner, the devisee
b. Petitioner herself, initiated the presentation of evidence on her alleged ignorance of the true
civil status of the testator, which led private respondents to present contrary evidence. In short,
the parties themselves dueled on the intrinsic validity of the legacy given in the will to petitioner
by the testator at the start of the proceedings.
Whether or not petitioner knew that the testator, Jugo, the man she had lived with as a
husband, was already married was important. When the court ruled that Jugo and the petitioner
were guilty of adultery and concubinage, it was a finding that the petitioner was not the innocent
woman she pretended to be.
The prohibition in Art. 739 is against the making a donation between persons who are
living in adultery or concubinage. It is the donation which becomes void. The giver cannot given
even assuming that the recipient may receive. The very wordings of the Will invalidate the legacy
because the testator admitted he was disposing the properties to a person with whom he had
been living in concubinage.

Cañiza vs CA
268 SCRA 640
Facts:
Carmen Caniza (94), a spinster, a retired pharmacist, and former professor of the College
of Chemistry and Pharmacy of the University of the Philippines, was declared incompetent by
judgment of the QC RTC in a guardianship proceeding instituted by her niece, Amparo A.
Evangelista. She was so adjudged because of her advanced age and physical infirmities which
included cataracts in both eyes and senile dementia. Amparo A. Evangelista was appointed legal
guardian of her person and estate.
Cañiza was the owner of a house and lot. Her guardian Amparo commenced a suit to eject
the spouses Estrada from the said premises in the MTC of Quezon City. Complaint pertinently
alleged that plaintiff Cañiza was the absolute owner of the property in question, covered by TCT
No. 27147; that out of kindness, she had allowed the Estrada Spouses, their children,
grandchildren and sons-in-law to temporarily reside in her house, rent-free; that Cañiza already
had urgent need of the house on account of her advanced age and failing health, "so funds could
be raised to meet her expenses for support, maintenance and medical treatment;" that through
her guardian, Cañiza had asked the Estradas verbally and in writing to vacate the house but they
had refused to do so; and that "by the defendants' act of unlawfully depriving plaintiff of the
possession of the house in question, they ** (were) enriching themselves at the expense of the
incompetent, because, while they ** (were) saving money by not paying any rent for the house,
the incompetent ** (was) losing much money as her house could not be rented by others." Also
alleged was that the complaint was "filed within one (1) year from the date of first letter of
demand dated February 3, 1990."
In their Answer, the defendants declared that they had been living in Cañiza's house since
the 1960's; that in consideration of their faithful service they had been considered by Cañiza as
her own family, and the latter had in fact executed a holographic will by which she "bequeathed".
Judgement was rendered by the MetroTC in favor of Cañiza but it was reversed on appeal
by the Quezon City RTC. Cañiza sought to have the Court of Appeals reverse the decision but
failed in that attempt.
It ruled that (a) the proper remedy for Cañiza was indeed an accion publiciana in the RTC,
not an accion interdictal in the MetroTC, since the "defendants have not been in the subject
premises as mere tenants or occupants by tolerance, they have been there as a sort of adopted
family of Carmen Cañiza," as evidenced by what purports to be the holographic will of the
plaintiff; and (b) while "said will, unless and until it has passed probate by the proper court, could
not be the basis of defendants' claim to the property, ** it is indicative of intent and desire on
the part of Carmen Cañiza that defendants are to remain and are to continue in their occupancy
and possession, so much so that Cañiza's supervening incompetency cannot be said to have
vested in her guardian the right or authority to drive the defendants out. They conclude, on those
postulates, that it is beyond the power of Cañiza's legal guardian to oust them from the disputed
premises.
Carmen Cañiza died, and her heirs -- the aforementioned guardian, Amparo Evangelista,
and Ramon C. Nevado, her niece and nephew, respectively -- were by this Court's leave,
substituted for her.
Issue:

1. Whether or not Evangelista, as Cañiza's legal guardian had authority to bring said action; and

2. Whether or not Evangelista may continue to represent Cañiza after the latter's death.

Ruling:

On the first issue, the Estradas insist that the devise of the house to them by Cañiza clearly
denotes her intention that they remain in possession thereof, and legally incapacitated her
judicial guardian, Amparo Evangelista, from evicting them therefrom, since their ouster would be
inconsistent with the ward's will.

A will is essentially ambulatory; at any time prior to the testator's death, it may be
changed or revoked; and until admitted to probate, it has no effect whatever and no right can be
claimed thereunder, the law being quite explicit: "No will shall pass either real or personal
property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court" (ART. 838,id.).
An owner's intention to confer title in the future to persons possessing property by his
tolerance, is not inconsistent with the former's taking back possession in the meantime for any
reason deemed sufficient. And that in this case there was sufficient cause for the owner's
resumption of possession is apparent: she needed to generate income from the house on
account of the physical infirmities afflicting her, arising from her extreme age.
Amparo Evangelista was appointed by a competent court the general guardian of both
the person and the estate of her aunt, Carmen Cañiza. Her Letters of Guardianship clearly
installed her as the "guardian over the person and properties of the incompetent CARMEN
CANIZA with full authority to take possession of the property of said incompetent in any province
or provinces in which it may be situated and to perform all other acts necessary for the
management of her properties.".
By that appointment, it became Evangelista's duty to care for her aunt's person, to attend to
her physical and spiritual needs, to assure her well-being, with right to custody of her person in
preference to relatives and friends. It also became her right and duty to get possession of, and
exercise control over, Cañiza's property, both real and personal, it being recognized principle that
the ward has no right to possession or control of his property during her incompetency. That right
to manage the ward's estate carries with it the right to take possession thereof and recover it
from anyone who retains it, and bring and defend such actions as may be needful for this
purpose.
On the second issue, as already stated, Carmen Cañiza passed away during the pendency of
this appeal. The Estradas thereupon moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that Cañiza's death
automatically terminated the guardianship, Amaparo Evangelista lost all authority as her judicial
guardian, and ceased to have legal personality to represent her in the present appeal. The motion
is without merit.

While it is indeed well-established rule that the relationship of guardian and ward is
necessarily terminated by the death of either the guardian or the ward, the rule affords no
advantage to the Estradas. Amparo Evangelista, as niece of Carmen Cañiza, is one of the latter's
only two (2) surviving heirs, the other being Cañiza's nephew, Ramon C. Nevado. On their motion
and by Resolution of this Court, they were in fact substituted as parties in the appeal at bar in
place of the deceased.
"SEC. 18. Death of a party. — After a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished,
the court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and
be substituted for the deceased within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such time as may be
granted. If the legal representative fails to appear within said time, the court may order the
opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased within a
time to be specified by the court, and the representative shall immediately appear for and on
behalf of the interest of the deceased. The court charges involved in procuring such appointment,
if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs. The heirs of the deceased may be
allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or
administrator and the court may appoint guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.

Sanchez vs CA
279 SCRA 647
Facts:
Lilia Sanchez, constructed a house on a lot owned by her parents-in-law. The lot was
registered under TCT No. 263624 with the following co-owners: Eliseo Sanchez, Marilyn Sanchez,
Lilian Sanchez, Nenita Sanchez, Susana Sanchez and Felipe Sanchez. Thereafter, the lot was
registered under TCT No. 289216 in the name of Virginia Teria by virtue of a Deed of Absolute
Sale supposed to have been executed by all six (6) co-owners in her favor. Lilia Sanchez claimed
that she did not affix her signature on the document and subsequently refused to vacate the lot,
thus prompting Virginia Teria to file an action for recovery of possession of the aforesaid lot with
the MeTC. MeTC decided in favor of Teria. RTC decision affirmed the RTC. CA dismissed the case
and held the proceedings closed and terminated.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred when it deemed the special proceedings closed and
terminated?
Held:
No. Under Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, an order for the distribution of the estate
may be made when the “debts, funeral charges, and expenses of administration, the allowance
to the widow, and inheritance tax, if any,” had been paid. This order for the distribution of the
estate’s residue must contain the names and shares of the persons entitled thereto. A perusal of
the whole record, particularly the trial court’s conclusion, reveals that all the foregoing
requirements already concurred in this case. The payment of the indebtedness of the estates
have already been paid. Thus, the court has essentially finished said proceedings which should
be closed and terminated.

Art 839
Coso vs Deza
42 Phil 585
FACTS:

The testator, a married man, became acquainted with Rosario Lopez and had illicit relations
with her for many years. They begot an illegitimate son. The testator’s will gives the tercio de
libre disposicion to the illegitimate son and also provides for the payment of nineteen hundred
Spanish duros to Rosario Lopez by way of reimbursement for expenses incurred by her in talking
care of the testator when he is alleged to have suffered from severe illness. The will was set aside
on the ground of undue influence alleged to have been exerted over the mind of the testator by
Rosario Lopez. There is no doubt that Rosario exercised some influence over the testator.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the influence exercised was of such a character to vitiate the will.

RULING:
 Mere general or reasonable influence over a testator is not sufficient to invalidate a will; to
have that effect, the influence must be undue. The rule as to what constitutes undue influence
has been variously stated, but the substance of the different statements is that, to be sufficient
to avoid a will, the influence exerted must be of a kind that so overpowers and subjugates the
mind of the testator as to destroy his free agency and make him express the will of another rather
than his own.

Such influence must be actually exerted on the mind of the testator in regard to the execution
of the will in question, either at the time of the execution of the will, or so near thereto as to be
still operative, with the object of procuring a will in favor of particular parties, and it must result
in the making of testamentary dispositions which the testator would not otherwise have made.

And while the same amount of influence may become undue when exercise by one occupying
an improper and adulterous relation to testator, the mere fact that some influence is exercised
by a person sustaining that relation does not invalidate a will, unless it is further shown that the
influence destroys the testator’s free agency.

The burden is upon the parties challenging the will to show that undue influence existed at
the time of its execution. While it is shown that the testator entertained strong affections for
Rosario Lopez, it does not appear that her influence so overpowered and subjugated his mind as
to destroy his free agency and make him express the will of another rather than his own. Mere
affection, even if illegitimate, is not undue influence and does not invalidate a will.

Influence gained by kindness and affection will not be regarded as undue, if no imposition or
fraud be practiced, even though it induces the testator to make an unequal and unjust
disposition of his property in favor of those who have contributed to his comfort and ministered
to his wants, if such disposition is voluntarily made.

Pascual vs Dela Cruz

28 SCRA 421
FACTS:
On 2 January 1960, Catalina de la Cruz, single and without any surviving descendant or
ascendant, died at the age of 89 in her residence at San Roque, Navotas, Rizal. On 14 January 1960,
a petition for the probate of her alleged will was filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal by Andres
Pascual, who was named in the said will as executor and sole heir of the decedent.
Pedro de la Cruz and 26 other nephews and nieces of the late Catalina de la Cruz contested the
validity of the will on the grounds that the formalities required by law were not complied with; that
the testatrix was mentally incapable of disposing of her properties by will at the time of its execution;
that the will was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the
petitioner; and that the signature of the testatrix was obtained through fraud.
ISSUE:
WON under the circumstances, undue and improper pressure and influence as well as
fraud are grounds to disallow a will.
HELD:
No. Petitioner, Andres Pascual, although not related by blood to the deceased Catalina de
la Cruz, was definitely not a stranger to the latter for she considered him as her own son. As a
matter of fact it was not only Catalina de la Cruz who loved and cared for Andres Pascual but also
her sisters held him with affection so much so that Catalina's sister, Florentina Cruz, made him also
her sole heir to her property in her will without any objection from Catalina and Valentina Cruz.
The basic principles of undue pressure and influence as laid down by the jurisprudence on
this Court: that to be sufficient to avoid a will, the influence exerted must be of a kind that so
overpowers and subjugates the mind of the testator as to destroy his free agency and make him
express the will of another rather than his own (Coso v Fernandez Deza, 42 Phil 596); Icasiano v
Icasiano, L-18979, 30 June 1964.
The circumstances marshaled by the contestants certainly fail to establish actual undue
influence and improper pressure exercised on the testatrix by the proponent. Their main reliance is
on the assertion of the latter, in the course of his testimony, that the deceased "did not like to sign
anything unless I knew it," which does not amount to proof that she would sign anything that
proponent desired. On the contrary, the evidence of contestants-appellants, that proponent
purchased a building in Manila for the testatrix, placed the title in his name, but caused the name
"Catalina de la Cruz" to be painted therein in bold letters to mislead the deceased, even if true,
demonstrates that proponent's influence was not such as to overpower and destroy the free will of
the testatrix. Because if the mind of the latter were really subjugated by him to the extent pictured
by the contestants, then proponent had no need to recourse to the deception averred.
Nor is the fact that it was proponent, and not the testatrix who asked Dr. Sanchez to be one
of the instrumental witnesses evidence of such undue influence, for the reason that the rheumatism
of the testatrix made it difficult for her to look for all the witnesses. That she did not resort to relative
or friend is, likewise, explainable: it would have meant the disclosure of the terms of her will to those
interested in her succession but who were not favored by her, thereby exposing her to unpleasant
importunity and recrimination that an aged person would naturally seek to avoid. The natural desire
to keep the making of a will secret can, likewise, account for the failure to probate the testament
during her lifetime.
Pedro de la Cruz and 26 other nephews and nieces of the late catalina de la cruzfell short
of establishing actual exercise of improper pressure or influence. Considering that the testatrix
considered proponent as her own son, to the extent that she expressed no objection to his being
made sole heir of her sister, Florentina Cruz, in derogation of her own rights, we find nothing
abnormal in her instituting proponent also as her own beneficiary.
The probate of the will was allowed.

Art 842
De Aparicio vs Paraguya
150 SCRA 279
Facts:
Trinidad Montilde had a love affair with a priest, Rev. Fr. Felipe Lumain and in the process
she conceived. When she was almost 4 months pregnant and in order to conceal her disgrace
from the public, she decided to marry Anastacio Mamburao. Fr. Lumain solemnized the marriage
on March 4, 1942 but Trinidad and Anastacio never lived together as man and wife. On
September 12, 1924, Trinidad gave birth to Consolacion. As shown by her birth certificate, her
registered parents are Trinidad and Anastacio. On October 31, 1936, Fr. Lumain died but he left
a last will and testament wherein he acknowledged Consolacion as his daughter and instituted
her as the sole and universal heir of all his property rights and interests. Soon after reaching the
age of majority, Consolacion filed an action for the recovery of certain parcels of land, which she
claims to have inherited from Fr. Lumain.
Issue:
Whether or no Consolacion should be considered as Fr. Lumain’s illegitimate child
Ruling:
The Court ruled that it was unnecessary to determine the filiation of Consolacion.
Hipolito contended that the declarations against the legitimacy of Consolacion cannot
prevail over the presumption of legitimacy under the provisions of Article 109 of the Spanish Civil
Code, now Article 256 of the Civil Code. However, since Fr. Lumain not only acknowledged
Consolacion as his natural daughter but also designated her as his only heir, the Court found it
unnecessary to determine the filiation of Consolacion.
Since Fr. Lumain died without any intestate heirs, Consolacion is therefore his lawful heir
as duly instituted in his will. One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose by will of all his estate
or any part of it in favor of any person having capacity to succeed.

Art 850
Austria vs Reyes
31 SCRA 754
FACTS:
 Basilia Austria filed with the CFI of Rizal a petition for probate ante mortem of her last will
and testament which was opposed by Ruben Austria and others who are nephews and nieces of
Basilia. However, such opposition was dismissed and the probate was allowed after due hearing.
The bulk of the estate was destined under the will to pass on the Perfecto Cruz and others whom
had been assumed and declared by Basilia as her own legally adopted children. Subsequently,
upon Basilia’s death, Perfecto was appointed executor in accordance with the provisions of the
former’s will. Ruben and the other petitioners filed in the same proceedings a petition in
intervention for partition alleging in substance that they are the nearest kin and that the five
private respondents (Perfecto et al.) had not in fact been adopted by the testator in accordance
with law, hence they should be rendered mere strangers and without any right to succeed as
heirs. The court then allowed the said intervention by petitioners which the court delimited to
the properties of the deceased which were not disposed of in the will and disregarded the matter
of the genuineness of adoption. Upon denial of two motions for reconsiderations, the petitioners
filed before the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari praying for the annulment of the lower
court’s orders restricting their intervention.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the institution of heirs would retain efficacy in the event there exists proof
that the adoption of the same heirs by the decedent is false.

RULING:

Article 850 provides:

The statement of a false cause for the institution of an heir shall be

considered as not written, unless it appears from the will of the
testator would not have made such institution if he had known the
falsity of such cause.

Before the institution of heirs may be annulled under Art. 850, the following requisites must
concur:

1. The cause for the institution heirs must be stated in the will;
2. The cause must be shown to be false; and
3. It must appear from the face of the will that the testator would not have made such
institution if he had known the falsity of the cause.

The article quoted above is a positive injunction to ignore whatever false cause the
testator may have written in his will for the institution of heirs. Such institution may be annulled
only when one is satisfied, after an examination of the will, that the testator clearly would not
have made the institution of he had known the cause for it to be false. The words used in her will
to describe the class of heirs instituted and the abstract object of the inheritance offer no
absolute indication that the decedent would have willed her estate other than the way she did if
she had known that she was not bound by law to make allowance for legitimes. Her disposition
of the free portion of her estate which largely favored Cruz, et al. shows a perceptible inclination
on her part to give to the respondents more than what she thought the law enjoined her to give
to them. Testacy is favored and doubts are resolved on its side, especially where the will evinces
an intention on the part of the testator to dispose of practically his whole estate. Moreover, so
compelling is the principle that intestacy should be avoided and the wishes of the testator
allowed to prevail, that we could even vary the language of the will for the purpose of giving it
effect.

Art 854
Reyes vs Barreto-Datu
19 SCRA 85
FACTS:
Bibiano Barretto was married to Maria Gerardo. During their lifetime they acquired a vast estate,
consisting of real properties in Manila, Pampanga, and Bulacan.
When Bibiano Barretto died on February 18, 1936, in the City of Manila, he left his share
of these properties in a will to SaludBarretto (Salud), mother of plaintiff's wards, and Lucia
Milagros Barretto (Milagros) and a small portion as legacies to his two sisters Rosa Barretto and
FelisaBarretto and his nephew and nieces. The usufruct of the fishpond situated in barrio San
Roque, Hagonoy, Bulacan, above-mentioned, however, was reserved for his widow, Maria
Gerard. In the meantime, Maria Gerardo was appointed administratrix. By virtue thereof, she
prepared a project of partition, which was signed by her in her own behalf and as guardian of the
minor Milagros Barretto. Said project of partition was approved by the Court of First Instance of
Manila. The distribution of the estate and the delivery of the shares of the heirs followed. As a
consequence, Salud Barretto took immediate possession of her share and secured the
cancellation of the original certificates of title and the issuance of new titles in her own name.
Maria Gerardo died and upon her death, it was discovered that she executed two will. In
the first will, she instituted Salud and Milagros as her heirs. In the second will, she revoked the
same and left all her properties in favour of Milagros alone. The later will was allowed and the
first rejected. In rejecting the first will presented by Tirso Reyes, husband of the deceasedSalud,
as guardian of the children, it was determined by the lower court that Salud was not a child of
Maria Gerardo and her husband, Bibiano. This ruling was appealed to the Supreme Court, which
affirmed the same. Having thus lost this fight for a share in the estate of Maria Gerardo as a
legitimate heir of Maria Gerardo, plaintiff now falls back upon the remnant of the estate of the
deceased BibianoBarretto, which was given in usufruct to his widow Maria Gerardo (fishpond
property). Hence, this action for the recovery of one-half portion, thereof.
Milagros then moved to declare the project of partition submitted in the proceedings for
the settlement of the estate of Bibiano to be null and void ab initio because the Distributee,
SaludBarretto, was not a daughter of the Sps. The nullity of the project was based on Art. 1081
of the Civil Code of 1889 which provided that :
“A partition in which a person was believed to be an heir, without being so, has been been
included, shall be null and void.”
The Court ordered the plaintiff to return the properties received under the project
of partition.
ISSUE:
WON the partition from which Salud acquired the fishpond is void ab initio and that Salud
did not acquire title thereto

HELD:
NO. SaludBarretto admittedly had been instituted as an heir in the late Bibiano Barretto's
last will and testament together with defendant Milagros; hence, the partition had between
them could not be one such had with a party who was believed to be an heir without really being
one, and was not null and void under said article. The legal precept (Article 1081) does not speak
of children, or descendants, but of heirs (without distinction between forced, voluntary or
intestate ones), and the fact that Salud happened not to be a daughter of the testator does not
preclude her being one of the heirs expressly named in his testament; for Bibiano Barretto was
at liberty to assign the free portion of his estate to whomsoever he chose. While the share (½)
assigned to Salud impinged on the legitime of Milagros, Salud did not for that reason cease to be
a testamentary heir of Bibiano Barretto.
Where the testator allotted in his will to his legitimate daughter a share less than her
legitime, such circumstance would not invalidate the institution of a stranger as an heir, since
there was no preterition or total omission of the forced heir.
Where a partition was made between two persons instituted as heirs in the will, and one
of them was found out later not to be the testator’s daughter, while the other was really his
daughter, it cannot be said that the partition was a void compromise on the civil status of the
person who was not the testator’s daughter. At the time of the partition, the civil status of that
person was not being questioned. There can be no compromise on a matter that was not an
issue. While the law outlaws a compromise over civil status, it does not forbid a settlement by
the parties regarding the share that should correspond to the claimant to the hereditary estate.
A project of partition is merely a proposal for the distribution of the hereditary estate,
which the court may accept or reject. It is the court alone that makes the distribution of the
estate and determines the persons entitled thereto. It is the final judicial decree of distribution
that vests title in the distributees. If the decree was erroneous, it should have been corrected by
an opportune appeal; but once it had become final, its binding effect is like that of any other
judgment in rem, unless properly set aside for lack of jurisdiction or fraud. Where the court has
validly issued a decree of distribution and the same has become final, the validity or invalidity of
the project of partition becomes irrelevant.
A distribution in the decedent’s will, made according to his will should be respected. The
fact that one of the distributees was a minor (Milagros) at the time the court issued the decree
of distribution does not imply that the court had no jurisdiction to enter the decree of
distribution. The proceeding for the settlement of a decedent’s estate is a proceeding in rem. It
is binding on the distributee who was represented by her mother as guardian.
Where in a partition between two instituted heirs, one of them did not know that she was
not really the child of the testator, it cannot be said that she defrauded the other heir who was
the testator’s daughter. At any rate, relief on the ground of fraud must be obtained within 4
years from its discovery. When Milagros was 16 years old in 1939, when the fraud was allegedly
perpetrated and she became of age in 1944, and became award of the fraud in 1946, her action
in 1956 to set aside the partition was clearly barred.

Aznar vs Duncan
17 SCRA 590
Facts:
Edward Christensen’s (citizen of the State of California) will was executed in Manila where
it provides that Helen Christensen Garcia receive a payment of P3,600 and proposed that the
residue of the estate be transferred to his daughter Maria Lucy Christensen. Helen Christensen
Garcia opposed the project of partition of Edward’s estate claiming that she was deprived of her
legitime as acknowledged natural child under the Philippine law.
Issue:
Whether or not the California law or the Philippine law should apply in the case at bar.
Held:
Philippine law should be applied. The State of California prescribes two sets of laws for its
citizens residing therein and a conflict of law rules for its citizens domiciled in other jurisdictions.
Art. 946 of the California Civil Code states that “If there is no law to the contrary in the place
where personal property is situated, it is deemed to follow the person of its owner and is
governed by the law of his domicile.” Edward, a citizen of the State of California, is considered to
have his domicile in the Philippines. The court of domicile cannot and should not refer the case
back to the California, as such action would leave the issue incapable of determination, because
the case would then be tossed back and forth between the states(doctrine of renvoi). The validity
of the provisions of Edward’s will depriving his acknowledged natural child of latter’s legacy,
should be governed by the Philippine law.
 The decision appealed from is reversed and the case returned to the lower court with
instruction that the partition be made as the Philippine law on succession provides