Art 838

Roberts vs Leonidas
129 SCRA 33
FACTS:
Edward Grimm was an American residing in Manila until his death in 1977. He was survived by his 2nd
wife (Maxine), their two children (Pete and Linda), and by his two children from a 1st marriage (Juanita
and Ethel) which ended in divorce. Grimm executed two wills in San Francisco, CA in January 1959. One
will disposed of his Philippine estate described as conjugal property of himself and his 2nd wife. The
second will disposed of his estate outside the Philippines.
The two wills and a codicil were presented for probate in Utah by Maxine in March 1978. Maxine
admitted that she received notice of the intestate petition filed in Manila by Ethel in January 1978.
Subsequently, the Utah court admitted the two wills and a codicil for probate in April 1978, and was issued
upon consideration of the stipulation between the lawyers for Maxine and Ethel.
In April 1978, Maxine and Ethel, with knowledge of the intestate proceeding in Manila, entered
into an agreement in Utah regarding the estate. The agreement provided that Maxine, Pete and Ethel
would be designated as personal representatives (administrators) of Grimm’s Philippine estate and that
Maxine’s ½ conjugal share in the estate should be reserved for her which would not be less than $1.5
million plus the homes in Utah and Sta. Mesa.
Manila Intestate Proceedings: Maxine filed an opposition and motion to dismiss the intestate
proceeding in Manila on the ground of pendency of the Utah probate proceedings. However, pursuant
to the compromise agreement, Maxine withdrew the opposition and motion to dismiss. The court ignored
the will found in the record. The estate was partitioned.
In 1980, Maxine filed a petition praying for the probate of the two wills (which was already
probated in Utah), that the partition approved by the intestate court be set aside, and that Maxine be
named executrix, and Ethel be ordered to account for the properties received by them and return the
same to Maxine. Maxine alleged that they were defrauded due to the machinations of the Ethel, that the
compromise agreement was illegal and the intestate proceeding was void because Grimm died testate so
the partition was contrary to the decedent’s wills.
Ethel filed a motion to dismiss the petition which was denied by respondent Judge for lack of
merit
ISSUE:
WON respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion in denying Ethel’s motion to dismiss
HELD:
No. A testate proceeding is proper in this case because Grimm died with two wills and “no will
shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed.
The probate of the will is mandatory. It is anomalous that the estate of a person who died testate
should be settled through an intestate proceeding. Therefore, the intestate case should be consolidated
with the testate proceeding and the judge assigned to the testate proceeding should continue hearing the
two cases.
 Ethel may file within twenty days from notice of the finality of this judgment an opposition and
answer to the petition unless she considers her motion to dismiss and other pleadings sufficient for the
purpose. Juanita G. Morris, who appeared in the intestate case, should be served with copies of orders,
notices and other papers in the testate case.

Nepomuceno vs CA
139 SCRA 206
FACTS:
In the last will and testament of Martin Jugo, he named and appointed the petitioner Sofia
Nepomuceno as his sole and only executor of his estate. It is clearly stated in the Will that the testator
was legally married to a certain Rufina Gomez by whom he had two legitimate children, Oscar and
Carmelita, but since 1952, he had been estranged from his lawfully wedded wife and had been living with
petitioner as husband and wife. In fact, on December 5, 1952, the testator Martin Jugo and the petitioner
herein, Sofia J. Nepomuceno were married in Victoria, Tarlac before the Justice of the Peace. The testator
devised to his forced heirs, namely, his legal wife Rufina Gomez and his children Oscar and Carmelita his
entire estate and the free portion thereof to herein petitioner.
The petitioner filed a petition for the probate of the Will, but the legal wife and children filed an
opposition. The lower court denied the probate of the will on the ground that the testator admitted to
cohabiting with Nepomuceno. The will’s admission to probate was deemed an idle exercise since based
on the face of the will, the invalidity of the intrinsic provisions is evident. The appellate court, however,
declared the will to be valid except that the devise in favor of the petitioner is null and void. Petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration, but such was denied.
ISSUES:
1. WON the respondent court acted in excess of its jurisdiction when after declaring the last will and
testament of the testator validly drawn, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the testamentary
provision in favor of herein petitioner.
2. Is the disposition in favor of the petitioner valid?
HELD:
As to the first issue, the court acted within its jurisdiction. The general rule is that in probate
proceedings, the court’s area of inquiry is limited to an examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity
of the will. The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Given the exceptional circumstances, the
probate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions
of the Will.
The trial court acted correctly in passing upon the will’s intrinsic validity even before its formal
validity has been established. The probate of a will might become an idle ceremony if on its face, it
appears to be intrinsically void. Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the
will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue.
On the second issue, as to validity of the disposition to the petitioner:
Article 739 of the Civil Code provides:
The following donations shall be void:
(1) Those made between persons who were guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation;
(2) Those made between persons found guilty of the same criminal offense, in consideration thereof;
(3) Those made to a public officer or his wife, descendants and ascendants, by reason of his office.
In the case referred to in No. 1, the action for declaration of nullity may be brought by the spouse of the
donor or donee; and the guilt of the donor and donee may be proved by preponderance of evidence in
the same action.
Article 1028 of the Civil Code provides:
The prohibitions mentioned in Article 739, concerning donations inter vivos shall apply to testamentary
provisions. The records of the case do not sustain a finding of innocence or good faith on the part of
Nepomuceno:
a. The last will and testament itself expressly admits it’s indubitably on its face the meretricious
relationship between the testator and petitioner, the devisee
b. Petitioner herself, initiated the presentation of evidence on her alleged ignorance of the true civil status
of the testator, which led private respondents to present contrary evidence. In short, the parties
themselves dueled on the intrinsic validity of the legacy given in the will to petitioner by the testator at
the start of the proceedings.
Whether or not petitioner knew that the testator, Jugo, the man she had lived with as a husband,
was already married was important. When the court ruled that Jugo and the petitioner were guilty of
adultery and concubinage, it was a finding that the petitioner was not the innocent woman she pretended
to be.
The prohibition in Art. 739 is against the making a donation between persons who are living in
adultery or concubinage. It is the donation which becomes void. The giver cannot given even assuming
that the recipient may receive. The very wordings of the Will invalidate the legacy because the testator
admitted he was disposing the properties to a person with whom he had been living in concubinage.

Cañiza vs CA
268 SCRA 640
Facts:

Carmen Caniza (94), a spinster, a retired pharmacist, and former professor of the College of
Chemistry and Pharmacy of the University of the Philippines, was declared incompetent by judgment of
the QC RTC in a guardianship proceeding instituted by her niece, Amparo A. Evangelista. She was so
adjudged because of her advanced age and physical infirmities which included cataracts in both eyes and
senile dementia. Amparo A. Evangelista was appointed legal guardian of her person and estate.

Cañiza was the owner of a house and lot. Her guardian Amparo commenced a suit to eject the
spouses Estrada from the said premises in the MTC of Quezon City. Complaint pertinently alleged that
plaintiff Cañiza was the absolute owner of the property in question, covered by TCT No. 27147; that out
of kindness, she had allowed the Estrada Spouses, their children, grandchildren and sons-in-law to
temporarily reside in her house, rent-free; that Cañiza already had urgent need of the house on account
of her advanced age and failing health, "so funds could be raised to meet her expenses for support,
maintenance and medical treatment;" that through her guardian, Cañiza had asked the Estradas verbally
and in writing to vacate the house but they had refused to do so; and that "by the defendants' act of
unlawfully depriving plaintiff of the possession of the house in question, they ** (were) enriching
themselves at the expense of the incompetent, because, while they ** (were) saving money by not paying
any rent for the house, the incompetent ** (was) losing much money as her house could not be rented
by others." Also alleged was that the complaint was "filed within one (1) year from the date of first letter
of demand dated February 3, 1990."

In their Answer, the defendants declared that they had been living in Cañiza's house since the
1960's; that in consideration of their faithful service they had been considered by Cañiza as her own
family, and the latter had in fact executed a holographic will by which she "bequeathed".

Judgement was rendered by the MetroTC in favor of Cañiza but it was reversed on appeal by the
Quezon City RTC. Cañiza sought to have the Court of Appeals reverse the decision but failed in that
attempt.

It ruled that (a) the proper remedy for Cañiza was indeed an accion publiciana in the RTC, not
an accion interdictal in the MetroTC, since the "defendants have not been in the subject premises as mere
tenants or occupants by tolerance, they have been there as a sort of adopted family of Carmen Cañiza,"
as evidenced by what purports to be the holographic will of the plaintiff; and (b) while "said will, unless
and until it has passed probate by the proper court, could not be the basis of defendants' claim to the
property, ** it is indicative of intent and desire on the part of Carmen Cañiza that defendants are to remain
and are to continue in their occupancy and possession, so much so that Cañiza's supervening
incompetency cannot be said to have vested in her guardian the right or authority to drive the defendants
out. They conclude, on those postulates, that it is beyond the power of Cañiza's legal guardian to oust
them from the disputed premises.

Carmen Cañiza died, and her heirs -- the aforementioned guardian, Amparo Evangelista, and
Ramon C. Nevado, her niece and nephew, respectively -- were by this Court's leave, substituted for her.

Issue:

1. Whether or not Evangelista, as Cañiza's legal guardian had authority to bring said action; and

2. Whether or not Evangelista may continue to represent Cañiza after the latter's death.

Ruling:

On the first issue, the Estradas insist that the devise of the house to them by Cañiza clearly denotes
her intention that they remain in possession thereof, and legally incapacitated her judicial guardian,
Amparo Evangelista, from evicting them therefrom, since their ouster would be inconsistent with the
ward's will.

A will is essentially ambulatory; at any time prior to the testator's death, it may be changed or
revoked; and until admitted to probate, it has no effect whatever and no right can be claimed thereunder,
the law being quite explicit: "No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and
allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court" (ART. 838,id.).

An owner's intention to confer title in the future to persons possessing property by his tolerance,
is not inconsistent with the former's taking back possession in the meantime for any reason deemed
sufficient. And that in this case there was sufficient cause for the owner's resumption of possession is
apparent: she needed to generate income from the house on account of the physical infirmities afflicting
her, arising from her extreme age.

Amparo Evangelista was appointed by a competent court the general guardian of both the person
and the estate of her aunt, Carmen Cañiza. Her Letters of Guardianship clearly installed her as the
"guardian over the person and properties of the incompetent CARMEN CANIZA with full authority to take
possession of the property of said incompetent in any province or provinces in which it may be situated
and to perform all other acts necessary for the management of her properties.".

By that appointment, it became Evangelista's duty to care for her aunt's person, to attend to her
physical and spiritual needs, to assure her well-being, with right to custody of her person in preference to
relatives and friends. It also became her right and duty to get possession of, and exercise control over,
Cañiza's property, both real and personal, it being recognized principle that the ward has no right to
possession or control of his property during her incompetency. That right to manage the ward's estate
carries with it the right to take possession thereof and recover it from anyone who retains it, and bring
and defend such actions as may be needful for this purpose.

On the second issue, as already stated, Carmen Cañiza passed away during the pendency of this
appeal. The Estradas thereupon moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that Cañiza's death automatically
terminated the guardianship, Amaparo Evangelista lost all authority as her judicial guardian, and ceased
to have legal personality to represent her in the present appeal. The motion is without merit.

While it is indeed well-established rule that the relationship of guardian and ward is necessarily
terminated by the death of either the guardian or the ward, the rule affords no advantage to the Estradas.
Amparo Evangelista, as niece of Carmen Cañiza, is one of the latter's only two (2) surviving heirs, the other
being Cañiza's nephew, Ramon C. Nevado. On their motion and by Resolution of this Court, they were in
fact substituted as parties in the appeal at bar in place of the deceased.

"SEC. 18. Death of a party. — After a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court
shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and be substituted for
the deceased within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such time as may be granted. If the legal
representative fails to appear within said time, the court may order the opposing party to procure the
appointment of a legal representative of the deceased within a time to be specified by the court, and the
representative shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the interest of the deceased. The court
charges involved in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as
costs. The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the
appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint guardian ad litem for the minor
heirs.

Sanchez vs CA
 279 SCRA 647

Facts:

Lilia Sanchez, constructed a house on a lot owned by her parents-in-law. The lot was registered
under TCT No. 263624 with the following co-owners: Eliseo Sanchez, Marilyn Sanchez, Lilian Sanchez,
Nenita Sanchez, Susana Sanchez and Felipe Sanchez. Thereafter, the lot was registered under TCT No.
289216 in the name of Virginia Teria by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale supposed to have been executed
by all six (6) co-owners in her favor. Lilia Sanchez claimed that she did not affix her signature on the
document and subsequently refused to vacate the lot, thus prompting Virginia Teria to file an action for
recovery of possession of the aforesaid lot with the MeTC. MeTC decided in favor of Teria. RTC decision
affirmed the RTC. CA dismissed the case and held the proceedings closed and terminated.

Issue:

Whether or not the CA erred when it deemed the special proceedings closed and terminated?

Held:

No. Under Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, an order for the distribution of the estate may be
made when the “debts, funeral charges, and expenses of administration, the allowance to the widow, and
inheritance tax, if any,” had been paid. This order for the distribution of the estate’s residue must contain
the names and shares of the persons entitled thereto. A perusal of the whole record, particularly the trial
court’s conclusion, reveals that all the foregoing requirements already concurred in this case. The
payment of the indebtedness of the estates have already been paid. Thus, the court has essentially
finished said proceedings which should be closed and terminated.

Art. 839

Coso vs Deza

42 Phil 585

FACTS:

The testator, a married man, became acquainted with Rosario Lopez and had illicit relations with her
for many years. They begot an illegitimate son. The testator’s will gives the tercio de libre disposicion to the
illegitimate son and also provides for the payment of nineteen hundred Spanish duros to Rosario Lopez by
way of reimbursement for expenses incurred by her in talking care of the testator when he is alleged to
have suffered from severe illness. The will was set aside on the ground of undue influence alleged to have
been exerted over the mind of the testator by Rosario Lopez. There is no doubt that Rosario exercised
some influence over the testator.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the influence exercised was of such a character to vitiate the will.
RULING:

Mere general or reasonable influence over a testator is not sufficient to invalidate a will; to have that
effect, the influence must be undue. The rule as to what constitutes undue influence has been variously
stated, but the substance of the different statements is that, to be sufficient to avoid a will, the influence
exerted must be of a kind that so overpowers and subjugates the mind of the testator as to destroy his free
agency and make him express the will of another rather than his own.

Such influence must be actually exerted on the mind of the testator in regard to the execution of the
will in question, either at the time of the execution of the will, or so near thereto as to be still operative, with
the object of procuring a will in favor of particular parties, and it must result in the making of testamentary
dispositions which the testator would not otherwise have made.

And while the same amount of influence may become undue when exercise by one occupying an
improper and adulterous relation to testator, the mere fact that some influence is exercised by a person
sustaining that relation does not invalidate a will, unless it is further shown that the influence destroys the
testator’s free agency.

The burden is upon the parties challenging the will to show that undue influence existed at the time of
its execution. While it is shown that the testator entertained strong affections for Rosario Lopez, it does not
appear that her influence so overpowered and subjugated his mind as to destroy his free agency and make
him express the will of another rather than his own. Mere affection, even if illegitimate, is not undue influence
and does not invalidate a will.

Influence gained by kindness and affection will not be regarded as undue, if no imposition or fraud be
practiced, even though it induces the testator to make an unequal and unjust disposition of his property in
favor of those who have contributed to his comfort and ministered to his wants, if such disposition is
voluntarily made.

Pascual vs Dela Cruz

28 SCRA 421

FACTS:
On 2 January 1960, Catalina de la Cruz, single and without any surviving descendant or
ascendant, died at the age of 89 in her residence at San Roque, Navotas, Rizal. On 14 January 1960,
a petition for the probate of her alleged will was filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal by Andres
Pascual, who was named in the said will as executor and sole heir of the decedent.
Pedro de la Cruz and 26 other nephews and nieces of the late Catalina de la Cruz contested the validity
of the will on the grounds that the formalities required by law were not complied with; that the testatrix was
mentally incapable of disposing of her properties by will at the time of its execution; that the will was procured
by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the petitioner; and that the signature of the
testatrix was obtained through fraud.

ISSUE:
 WON under the circumstances, undue and improper pressure and influence as well as
fraud are grounds to disallow a will.
HELD:
No. Petitioner, Andres Pascual, although not related by blood to the deceased Catalina de
la Cruz, was definitely not a stranger to the latter for she considered him as her own son. As a
matter of fact it was not only Catalina de la Cruz who loved and cared for Andres Pascual but also
her sisters held him with affection so much so that Catalina's sister, Florentina Cruz, made him also
her sole heir to her property in her will without any objection from Catalina and Valentina Cruz.
The basic principles of undue pressure and influence as laid down by the jurisprudence on
this Court: that to be sufficient to avoid a will, the influence exerted must be of a kind that so
overpowers and subjugates the mind of the testator as to destroy his free agency and make him
express the will of another rather than his own (Coso v Fernandez Deza, 42 Phil 596); Icasiano v
Icasiano, L-18979, 30 June 1964.
The circumstances marshaled by the contestants certainly fail to establish actual undue
influence and improper pressure exercised on the testatrix by the proponent. Their main reliance is
on the assertion of the latter, in the course of his testimony, that the deceased "did not like to sign
anything unless I knew it," which does not amount to proof that she would sign anything that
proponent desired. On the contrary, the evidence of contestants-appellants, that proponent
purchased a building in Manila for the testatrix, placed the title in his name, but caused the name
"Catalina de la Cruz" to be painted therein in bold letters to mislead the deceased, even if true,
demonstrates that proponent's influence was not such as to overpower and destroy the free will of
the testatrix. Because if the mind of the latter were really subjugated by him to the extent pictured
by the contestants, then proponent had no need to recourse to the deception averred.
Nor is the fact that it was proponent, and not the testatrix who asked Dr. Sanchez to be one
of the instrumental witnesses evidence of such undue influence, for the reason that the rheumatism
of the testatrix made it difficult for her to look for all the witnesses. That she did not resort to relative
or friend is, likewise, explainable: it would have meant the disclosure of the terms of her will to those
interested in her succession but who were not favored by her, thereby exposing her to unpleasant
importunity and recrimination that an aged person would naturally seek to avoid. The natural desire
to keep the making of a will secret can, likewise, account for the failure to probate the testament
during her lifetime.
Pedro de la Cruz and 26 other nephews and nieces of the late catalina de la cruzfell short
of establishing actual exercise of improper pressure or influence. Considering that the testatrix
considered proponent as her own son, to the extent that she expressed no objection to his being
made sole heir of her sister, Florentina Cruz, in derogation of her own rights, we find nothing
abnormal in her instituting proponent also as her own beneficiary.
The probate of the will was allowed.
 De Aparicio vs Paraguya
150 SCRA 279

Art. 850
Austria vs Reyes
31 SCRA 754
FACTS:

Basilia Austria filed with the CFI of Rizal a petition for probate ante mortem of her last will
and testament which was opposed by Ruben Austria and others who are nephews and nieces of
Basilia. However, such opposition was dismissed and the probate was allowed after due hearing.
The bulk of the estate was destined under the will to pass on the Perfecto Cruz and others whom
had been assumed and declared by Basilia as her own legally adopted children. Subsequently,
upon Basilia’s death, Perfecto was appointed executor in accordance with the provisions of the
former’s will. Ruben and the other petitioners filed in the same proceedings a petition in
intervention for partition alleging in substance that they are the nearest kin and that the five
private respondents (Perfecto et al.) had not in fact been adopted by the testator in accordance
with law, hence they should be rendered mere strangers and without any right to succeed as
heirs. The court then allowed the said intervention by petitioners which the court delimited to
the properties of the deceased which were not disposed of in the will and disregarded the matter
of the genuineness of adoption. Upon denial of two motions for reconsiderations, the petitioners
filed before the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari praying for the annulment of the lower
court’s orders restricting their intervention.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the institution of heirs would retain efficacy in the event there exists proof
that the adoption of the same heirs by the decedent is false.

RULING:

Article 850 provides, “The statement of a false cause for the institution of an heir shall be
considered as not written, unless it appears from the will of the testator would not have made
such institution if he had known the falsity of such cause.”

Before the institution of heirs may be annulled under Art. 850, the following requisites must
concur:

1. The cause for the institution heirs must be stated in the will;
2. The cause must be shown to be false; and
 3. It must appear from the face of the will that the testator would not have made such
institution if he had known the falsity of the cause.

The article quoted above is a positive injunction to ignore whatever false cause the
testator may have written in his will for the institution of heirs. Such institution may be annulled
only when one is satisfied, after an examination of the will, that the testator clearly would not
have made the institution of he had known the cause for it to be false. The words used in her will
to describe the class of heirs instituted and the abstract object of the inheritance offer no
absolute indication that the decedent would have willed her estate other than the way she did if
she had known that she was not bound by law to make allowance for legitimes. Her disposition
of the free portion of her estate which largely favored Cruz, et al. shows a perceptible inclination
on her part to give to the respondents more than what she thought the law enjoined her to give
to them. Testacy is favored and doubts are resolved on its side, especially where the will evinces
an intention on the part of the testator to dispose of practically his whole estate. Moreover, so
compelling is the principle that intestacy should be avoided and the wishes of the testator
allowed to prevail, that we could even vary the language of the will for the purpose of giving it
effect.