Paul Tillich’s Arguments for God’s Reality

Houston Craighead

The Thomist: A Speculative Quarterly Review, Volume 39, Number 2, April

1975, pp. 309-318 (Article)

Published by The Catholic University of America Press

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1353/tho.1975.0026

For additional information about this article

https://muse.jhu.edu/article/639780/summary

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PAUL TILLICH'S ARGUMENTS FOR GOD'S REALITY

I T IS INTERESTING to notice that, although he vehe-

mently denies that the question of God's existence is a
legitimate question, Paul Tillich does have arguments for
God's "reality." Tillich, of course, does not use the term
"reality" here, but there must be some term to denote God's
ontological status in Tillich's system. When Tillich speaks of
something that " exists," he means something which is finite,
is limited by the "categories of finitude" (time, space, sub-
stance, etc.) . God, Tillich says, is most assuredly not this.
God, he says, is being-itself.
The purpose of this article is to show that such a ploy does
not succeed for Tillich. Indeed, one can raise the question of
the reality of being-itself. In fact, Tillich himself raises this
question and gives at least two arguments to prove the reality
of his God. The notion of non-being plays a central role for
Tillich here. Hence, in this essay I shall explicate Tillich's no-
tion of non-being as an ontological power/ and examine his
arguments for God's reality. In so doing I hope to show two
things: (1) that Tillich does offer arguments for God's reality;
(~) that those arguments are not sound.

The notion of non-being, says Tillich, has a long history in

philosophy, beginning with Parrnenides and continuing to
Sartre and Heidegger." There have, however, been two basic
ways to try to avoid this notion.
1 Though Tillich mentions non-being in many places, the major sources for his

views on it are as follows: Systematic Theology, I (Chicago: University of Chicago

Press, 1951), pp. 186-189; The Courage to Be (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1952), pp. 32-63; Love, Power, and Justice (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1954), pp. 35-53.
2 Tillich, The Courage to Be, p. 33. Here Tillich lists the major philosophical

figures who have made use of the concept of non-being and states briefly the way
he thinks the notion functioned in their thought.

309
310 HOUSTON CRAIGHEAD

(1) Some philosophers, says Tillich, try to discard non-

being as an ontological notion by saying that negativity is only
a quality of negative judgments.8 Tillich's argument against
this view 4 is that negative judgments themselves presuppose
a being (man) who can transcend the present moment by ex-
pectations and then be disappointed when the events which
would fulfill those expectations do not occur. The judgment
made by that being, then, was mistaken. The important thing
to see, though, says Tillich, is that expectation itself would not
be possible unless being were structured in such a way as to
allow man to have expectations and fall into error. For this
to be possible, man himself " must be separated from his being
in a way which enables him to look at it as something strange
and questionable." 5 Further, this separation is itself possible
only because man participates in the ontological ground of
negativity, non-being. Thus, Tillich concludes, negative judg-
ments themselves presuppose non-being.
(~) The second way to attempt to avoid non-being is by
placing it in absolute contrast with being.6 If non-being is
in no way related to being then non-being is not. This was
Parmenides ' move. The answer to this, says Tillich, is to speak
of non-being as "dialectical," as related to being.7
Tillich distinguishes betwen two types of non-being by re-
ferring to the Greek distinction between meon and ouk on.8
M eon is dialectical non-being. In Platonism mean was " that
which does not yet have being but can become being if it is
united with essences or ideas." 9 It is the meontic "Matter"
from which the demiurgos formed the world in Plato's Timaeus.
Ouk on, on the other hand, is the " nothing which has no rela-
tion to being." 10
8 Tillich, Systematic Theolo,gy, I, p. 187. Cf. also Tillich, The Courage to Be,
p. ss.
• Ibid. Cf. also Tillich, The Courage to Be, p. 34.
• Ibid.
• Tillich, Systematic Theology, I, p. 254.
• Ibid., pp. 254-255.
• Ibid., p. 188.
• Ibid., p. 187
10 lllid.
 PAUL TILLICH'S ARGUMENTS FOR GOD's REALITY 311
It is never exactly clear just what Tillich means by " non-
being " when he uses it in his system. He definitely does want
to speak of it as having ontological status, thus rejecting ouk
on. However, he does not want it to be an independent reality
over against God, thus rejecting meon. He states that the
Christian doctrine of creatio ex nihilo is to be taken as creation
out of ouk on.11 What Tillich seems to do is to combine some
qualities of both concepts. He retains ouk on insofar as things
are said to be threatened with the total loss of their being.
But he retains meon in that his non-being is related to being.
In fact, it is said to be "within" being.
For Tillich, the notion of non-being is part of a discussion
of being, though such a discussion is of necessity symbolic.
Actually the notion of " power " is the closest Tillich comes
to saying anything literal about being-itself. Although it is
symbolic or metaphorical to speak of being-itself as the " power
of being " (the power by virtue of which things are rather than
are not), this symbol seems to be Tillich's favorite: "Being is
the power of being." 12
However, if being is spoken of as the power of being, some-
thing over which the power is proved is presupposed, says
Tillich.13 The problem is that everything participates in being
(and, thus, in the power of being) . So what is left to resist
it? " What can be that which tries to negate being but is ne-
gated by it?" 14 The answer is non-being. As I said, such talk
is symbolic. It touches, says Tillich, " the basic mystery of ex-
istence." Hence, any attempt to explain non-being will include
terms which " bear in themselves the scars of non-being." 15
That is, they will be paradoxical.
11Ibid.
12 Tillich, Love, Power, and Justice, p. 37. Cf. also Systematic Theology, I, p.

189. There Tillich says: "The concept of being as being, of being-itself, points
to the power inherent in everything, the power of resisting non-being. Therefore,
instead of saying God is first of all being-itself, it is possible to say that he is
the power of being in everything. The infinite power of being."
18 Ibid.

"Ibid.
15 Ibid., p. 38.
 HOUSTON CRAIGHEAD

The reason non-being is able to resist being is that it is part

of being. "Being' embraces' itself and non-being." 16 As part
of being, non-being is eternally present and cannot be dispelled.
It is, in fact, a necessary part of being. Without it being would
be .static and dead. However, if non-being is within being, how
is it that it does not overcome being? Tillich's answer is that
being "logically precedes non-being." 17 If non-being did over-
come being then it would also overcome itself-it would have
nothing to negate and, thus, would not be.18 Thus, being and
non-being require one another and cannot be separated. God is
the power of being constantly overcoming non-being, which
is part of being!
Certainly one can describe being in terms of non-being; one can
justify such a description by pointing to the astonishing prerational
fact that there is something and not nothing. One could say that
"being is the negation of the primordial night of nothingness." But
in so doing one must realize that such an aboriginal nothing would
be neither nothing nor something, that it becomes nothing only
in ·contrast to something, in other words, that the ontological status
of non-being is dependent on being.19
Now such remarks make for very rough sledding indeed!
However, it would seem that Tillich is .saying something like
this: Non-being is not absolutely nothing at all. It is an
ontological power, the power of negating what-is and of driving
what-is on beyond itself or destroying it. As such, Tillich's
non-being is really not absolute nothingness; it is something.
It has ontological status and, as such, is included within being.
Were it not included within being it would not be at all. As
included within being, non-being•is manifest in all the things
that are, that have being. Hence, the tendency of things to
change and to die. Hence the anxiety of man, which we experi-
ence in terms of the categories of being and knowing. 20
16 Tillich, The Courage to Be., p. 34.
17 Tillich, Love, Porwer, and Ju,stice, p. 39.
18 Tillich, The Courage to Be., p. 40.
19 Ibid.

20 Tillich, Systematic Theology, I, pp. 191 ff.

 PAUL TILLICH'S ARGUMENTS FOR GOD'S REALITY 818
In other words, Tillich is basically an ontological realist. He
not only maintains the reality of essences as " powers of
being," 21 but, beyond them, the reality of an ontological ground
for the existence of beings and for the transitoriness and
passing-awayness of beings. Not only are there essences as
powers to make things what they are, there is also the Supreme
Power of Being-Itself to provide things (as well as essences)
their thatness. As such, this power includes within itself its
own negation and overcomes it continually, thus giving a
ground even to negation!
This is still not sufficiently clear. However, I think it can
best be made clear if we see it now in light of Tillich's own
arguments for God's reality. In his article "The Two Types
of Philosophy of Religion," 22 Tillich examines the ontological
and the cosmological approaches to God. Here he is not re-
ferring to these as arguments, but as approaches. The onto-
logical approach, he says, is Augustinian. It is the way of over-
coming estrangement. The cosmological approach is Thomist,
and is the way of meeting a stranger.
On the ontological approach, which Tillich accepts, man is
immediately aware of the unconditioned and its reality cannot
be inferred. 23 Tillich agrees with the Augustinian assertion that
in doubt and the quest for truth, verum ipsum is presupposed.
It is the norm of all approximations to truth. 24 Tillich also
agrees with a point he claims Kant makes in his moral argu-
ment for God-that good acts presuppose bonum ipsum. This
is the norm for all approximations to goodness. 25 Further, both
verum ipsum and bonum ipsum are manifestations o£ esse
ipsum, being-itself, " the ground and abyss of everything that
is." 26
21 Tillich, The Courage to Be, p. 179. See also a reply by Tillich in Philmophical

Interrogations, eds., Sidney and Beatrice Rome (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and
Winston, 1964), p. 45.
22 Tillich, The Theology of Culture (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959),

pp. 10-29. Cf. also Systematic Theology, I, pp. 204 ff.

28 Ibid., p. 28.

2 • Ibid., pp. 12-18.

25 Tillich, Systematic Theology, I, p. 207.

26 Ibid.
314 HOUSTON CRAIGHEAD

If, as Tillich says, " V eritas is God," 27-or presupposes

God-then God must be real. This is so, Tillich claims, because
truth can be denied only in the name of truth; if there is no
truth, then it is true that there is no truth, but that is itself a
truth. Hence, it is impossible to deny truth-hence it is impos-
sible to deny God. 28
Putting this another way, Tillich says that thought presup-
poses a unity of subject and object, else thought would have no
content. This fundamental unity or ground of all thought,
Tillich says, is God. In God, being and knowing are identical.
Such a God " is a necessary thought because it is the ground
of all thought." 29
In short, Tillich maintains that man has a fundamental
awareness of the Unconditioned, God, which involves his whole
being. All of man's thought and activity presupposes this fun-
damental element. " Man is immediately aware of something
unconditional which is the prius of the separation and interrac-
tion of subject and object, theoretically as well as practical-
ly." 30
Tillich attempts to explicate what he means here by " aware-
ness." He says it is the "most neutral term," it avoids the
connotations of "intuition," "experience," and "knowledge." 81
It is not "intuition" because intuition (in the Kantian
sense) has the character of a Ge8talt. But the Unconditioned
appears as" an element, a power, as demand." 32 It is not" ex-
perience" because that connotes" the observed presence of one
reality to another reality.'' 33 The Unconditioned is not an ob-
ject of observation. It is not " knowledge " because in knowl-
edge the separation of subject and object is presupposed, and
a theoretical act is implied. This is "just the opposite of aware-
27 Tillich, The Theology of Culture, p. 12.
28 Ibid., p. 13.
29 Ibid., p. 15.

ao Ibid., p. 22.
81 Ibid., p. 23.

82 Ibid.
83 Ibid.
 PAUL TILLICH'S ARGUMENTS FOR GOD's REALITY 31.1)
ness of the Unconditioned." 34 This awareness is immediate, not
inferred. " It is present whenever conscious atention is focused
on it, in terms of an unconditional certainty." 35
This power of being is the prius of everything that has being. It
precedes all special contents logically and ontologically. It pre-
cedes every separation and makes every interaction possible, be-
cause it is the point of identity without which neither separation
nor interaction can be thought. This refers basically to the separa-
tion and interaction of subject and object, in knowing as well as
in acting. The prius of subject and object cannot become an object
to which man as a subject is theoretically and practically related.
God is no object for us as subjects. He is always that which pre-
cedes this division. 36
In other words, Tillich seems to be saying that, if God is
conceived as being-itself, rather than as a being, then the sub-
jective reality of God entails his objective reality-objective
as ontological ground as opposed to objective as a being or sub-
jective only (i.e., being real only in thought) . If thought and
truth both presuppose this foundamental ground then, as
Tillich says, " God is the presupposition of the question of
God." 37 Hence, since the question of God is clearly real, 38
God too is real.
Tillich's second argument for God's reality as being-itself is
actually more implicit than explicit. Nevertheless, it is working
as a kind of " hidden assurance " behind all of Tillich' s claims
that God does not exist but is the ground of being. The" argu-
ment" appears in Tillich's discussion of the question "Why
is there something rather than nothing?" 39
This question, says Tillich, is " meaningless," because no mat-
ter what answer is given to it, the same question can be asked

•• Ibid.
•• Ibid.
•• Ibid., p. 25.
•• Ibid., p. 13.
38 See Systematic Theology, I, pp. 204 fl'. Tillich's main point here is that though

none of the traditional arguments are valid in the sense of proving God's existence
they do show that the question of God is inevitable.
•• Tillich, Systematic Theology, I, pp. 163-164.
316 HOUSTON CRAIGHEAD

again. Hence, one is caught in an infinite regress. 40 The ques-

tion does serve the function though, of expressing the " meta-
physical shock " which one has when he realizes that there is
something but no good reason why there should be-that there
could just as well have been nothing, and that this possibility
or " power " of nothingness is present in all existing being.
Tillich says, "If one asks why there is not nothing, one at-
tributes being even to nothing." 41 In other words, thought can
imagine the negation of everything that is, but one must realize
that, even if there were not anything, then there would be
nothing. This, however, is contradictory, for nothing cannot
" be." If nothing cannot be then some fundamental ground or
power must necessarily exist or, better, be real. Hence, being-
itself as ultimate ground of everything is necessarily real!
These two arguments are obviously inter-related and, I think
obviously spurious. To take the second one first, I should think
Tillich would see that if everything ceased to exist that would
not mean that, suddenly, nothing, as a kind of ontological
"thing," had "come into being." The term "non-being" is
merely a linguistic sign which stands for the fact that it is
possible for things to cease to be. We need not say that, if all
things ceased to be, then there would " be " nothing, and so,
nothing would have ontological status, and, so, would not
really be nothing but something-thus requiring being-itself
as even more fundamental. On the contrary, if all things ceased
to be then there would be a return to what Tillich calls the
"primordial night of nothingness." 42 Further, as Tillich says,
such a nothing would not " be " anything at all. It would not
" be " something and it would not " be " nothing, if such lan-
guage entails that an ontological power (being-itself) would
have to be presuposed even for there to "be" nothing. Such
a state would be gained simply by the absence of all that is.
And, if one replies that then the absence of all things would

•• Ibid., p. 163. Cf. also Philosophical Interrogations, p. 408 .

•, Ibid.
'"Tillich, The Courage to Be, p. 40.
 PAUL TILLICH'S ARGUMENTS FOR GOD's REALITY 817
have "being," and, thus, presuppose being-itself, I can only
say that he is bewitched by language. To say that there are
no unicorns does not entail that the non-being of unicorns has
some kind of ontological status. It just means that unicorns
as objective realities are not available to any experience what-
ever.
It is easy to see now, in light of this argument, why Tillich
wishes to make a case for non-being as dialectical, " within"
being. He wishes to do away with non-being as pure nothing-
ness because that kind of non-being does not require being-it-
self to give it "being."
The reply to Tillich's first argument is two-fold: (1) even
if there is some ontological ground which provides the unity
of subject and object, which is the prius of all thought and
being, this prius is not clearly God. 43 It may well be that any
legitimate concept of God would have to say that he is the
ground of thought and being. But that does not mean that such
a ground is God.
(2) One can easily say that truth is only a quality of the
propositions which correctly describe the world. Clearly Tillich
does not want to say God is a quality of propositions. In light
of his previous remarks concerning negativity as a property of
judgments, it is reasonable to think that Tillich would reply
to this criticism by saying that in order for propositions ever
to correctly describe the world there must first be a " ground "
for this correctness, just as there must be a "ground " for
negativity. But, as was pointed out in connection with nega-
tivity, there is no need for such a "ground." One can simply
deny Tillich's ontological realism. He nowhere argues for it
but only asumes it. One certainly cannot establish anything
about God (or anything else, for that matter) by simply as-
suming a particular brand of metaphysics which leads inevit-
ably to what one desires. Hence, Tillich's arguments fail.
To sum up then: Paul Tillich offers at least two arguments

•• John Smith, Reason and God (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), p.
169.
318 HOUSTON CRAIGHEAD

to prove the reality of his God. One argument claims that if

anything at all exists, then there must be an ontological ground
by virtue of which whatever exists does so. This is being-itself,
the power of being. The second argument claims that even if
nothing at all exists there would still have to be being-itself to
give the "nothing" its being. I have tried to counter these
arguments by showing that, in the first case, Tillich is simply
appealing to an ontological realism which he only assumes,
and, in the second case, that Tillich is either bewitched by
language or (more likely) has developed a special notion of
"non-being" which presupposes being-itself.

HousToN CRAIGHEAD
Winthrop College
Rock Hill, South Carolina