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    Aap Penis Pony Cone 1997 by te Amen Pron Ano ne RAS When Exemplification Fails: Hypocrisy and the Motive for Self-Integrity Jeff Stone Princeton University Joel Coo, Prinson Unersty Andrew W. Wies University of California, Santa Cruz Elliot Aronson University of California, Santa Cruz ‘Two experiments investigated how the dissonance that follows a hypocritical behavior is reduced when 2 ateratives ae avaiable: a direct strategy (changing behavior to make it less hypocritical) or an indirect strategy (the affirmation ofan unrelated postive aspect ofthe self) In Experiment 1, after dissonance was aroused by hypocrisy, significantly more participant chose to reduce dissonance irectly, despite the clear avaiable of seieaffcmaton srategy. In Experiment 2. prticipans gain chose direct resolution of their hypocritical discrepancy, even whea the opportunity to affirm the self held more imporance for ter global self-worth The dicuston focuses on the mechanisms ‘that influence how people selet among readily avaiable strategies for disonance reduction, How do people choose to reduce the discomfort that arises from a discrepancy between behavior and important attinudes or self-beliefs? In this article we investigate the reduction of psychological discomfort from the dissonance theory tradition (Festinger, 1957; see E. Aronson, 1992; Cooper & Fazio, 1984; ‘Steele, 1988). Dissonance theorists maintain that discrepancies between behavior and belief arouse dissonance (Le., psychologi- cal discomfort), which in turn motivates activities designed to reduce the arousal. Dissonance reduction occurs through a vari= ‘ety of strategies that, for our purposes, can be classified into ‘one of two general categories. First, psychological discomfort can be reduced through a di- ‘rect strtegy—one that involves altering elements of the dis- ‘tepant cognitions. For example, people can change te discrep- ant attitude or self-belief (J. Aronson, Blanton, & Cooper, 1995), make compensation for the unwanted behavior (e.g, Sherman & Gorkin, 1980), reduce the importance of either discrepant cognition (ie, tivializtion, see Simon, Green- berg, & Brehm, 1995), or distor perceptions of the circum- stances that led to the discrepancy (i, claim unforeseeability of or low volition for the behavior; See Cooper & Fazio, 1984). Jeff Stone and Joel Cooper Department of Pychology, Princeton University; Andrew W. Wiegand and Eliot Aronson, Department of Prychology, Univesity of Califia, Santa Cruz. ‘This research was partially supported by a grant from the University ‘of California Universitywide AIDS Research Program and by « National ‘Science Foundation predoctora fellowship award to Andrew W. Wie ‘and, who conducted Experiment for partial stfaction of the Master of Science degree awarded by the University of Califomia, Santa Cruz. ‘We wish wo express our sincere appreciation to Mike Nune and Nathan Effron for acting asthe experimenters in Study 1 and to Stephen Weight for his belp in collecting the self-concept measure athe Univesity of California, Santa Cruz. We also extend our tanks to Hart Blanton, Beth ‘Bennet, Adam Galinsky, Claude Stele, Eddie Harmon-Jones, an Petr GGollwitzer for tei comments onthe research presented in is article. Correspondence concerning this article shoud be addressed to Jeff ‘Stone, Department of Psychology, Princeton Univesity, Princeton, New Terey 08544, Ey Direct strategies for dissonance reduction can be distinguished from a second general class of strategies we call indirect, which involve activities that reduce dissonance without altering cle- meats ofthe discrepancy. These include misatwibutng the ds- comfort to something other than the discrepancy (Zanna & Coo- pet 1974) or reflecting on other valued aspects of the seif (Steele & Lui, 1983; Teser & Cornel, 1991). The fact that direc and indirect strategies have been shown to be effective for dissonance eduction suggests that people have wemendous flexibility when it comes to Selecting strategy for dissonance reduction. (Ordo they? The mere fact that a tna of strategies will reduce dissonance may not indicate that any one strategy for ‘eduction is jos as good as another Indeed, there is evidence indicating that when several options ae available, people show preferences for using some stategies over others (eg, Gow ‘Marchand, Got, & Ire, 1974; Olson & Zanna, 1979; Scheie & ‘Carve, 1980). Festinger (1957) noted that selection of a mode of dissonance reduction may depend on a numberof factors, such asthe importance ofthe cognitions underlying the dscrep- ancy or the circumstances that led othe discrepant act It seems likely that even wien multiple ateraves for dissonance reduc- tion are available, factors related to the discrepancy and its antecedent conditions might conan the choice people make for how to rede their prychologcal dscomfor. ‘The research inthis article focuses on how people reduce the Aisonance that follows a specific type of discrepancy —an act. of hypocrisy (E. Aronson, Fried, & Stone, 1991; Dickerson, Thibodeas, Aronson, & Miller 1992; Stone, Aronson, Crain, Winslow, & Fried, 1994). Our goal was to investigate bow ‘mh flexibility a person who commits a hypocritical act has for redacing dissonance when multiple strategies are available. Clues o understanding dissonance reduction in this case may lie in the amtecedeats that lead to a hypocritical discrepancy. Hypocrisy and the Failed Exemplifer ‘A bout with hypocrisy begins when, perhaps through an act ‘of moral sef-presentation, (ie., exemplification; see Gilbert & WA OME oad ot TS TY gh ETS ek es HYPOCRISY AND SELF-INTEGRITY 35 Jones, 1986; Jones & Pitman, 1982), a person avocates pub- lely te importance of conducting a specie rosocal behavior, soch as practicing safer texto prevent AIDS, conserving water during a drought, or rcycting to preserve natural resources. By itself, a proaminadnal and prosocal advocacy should not arouse rich dissonance —not mich, tat is, assuming the speaker fl- lows systematically his or her own good advice. But few people ae truly “perfect” in this regard, and thre i always the posi- bility that sometime in the past an exemplifier’s own behavior has fallen short of the sandarde advocated to others. If the speaker is made aware of instances when be of she did not Uphold the advocated sandards, the discrepancy between the ‘dvocated beliefs and behavior should arouse dissonance. The would-be exemplifer would then be mtivated 10 rece the psychological discomfort incurred by the hypocritical discrepancy. "The discrepancy produced by hypocrisy, however, may be relatively dificult to resolve. For example, it seems unlikely thatthe speaker would become less favorable toward a course ‘of action that is both personally and socially acceptable. Not ‘only would this require that one alter important atimdes and beliefs, but also the advocacy may enhance one’s commitment ‘nd make the beliefs more resistant to change (Brehm && Coben, 1962). Instead, to diminish the discrepancy, the advocate could bring his or her own behavior back into line with the promoted beliefs. Practicing what was preached would reduce dissonance ‘without changing the perception of what constitutes appropriate and reasonable behavior Diet reduction ofthe discrepancy also satisfies the need for consistency between behavior and important self-beliefs (€-£ E. Aronson, 1992; Thibodeau & Aronsca, 1992). That is, a Inypocritical discrepancy between past behavior and advocated beliefs could threaten the speaker's sense of self as a principled individsal, one who strives to be honest and sincere about im- ‘portant issues (e.g, Fred & Aronson, 1995; Stone t a, 1994). ‘Once the self-threat is perceived, the discrepancy may focus a ‘person on taking action capable of maintaining the threatened self-beliefs. Bringing future behavior into line with the advo: cated standards isthe most direct and effective way for a person 1 restore the self-views of honesty and sincerity, following haypocriy! ‘Previous researc supports the prediced effin bt hypocr on bebavioe For example, E- Aronson of al (19917 and Stove: al (1994) indcod 1 feel bout thee. tse of condoms Th resus showed that participant in condition repated greater in- tent to improve thei in ta fore (E. Aronson et a, 1991) and were spore likly to purchase condoms compared 1 conditions (Stone et al, 1994). Similarly, ‘help a recycling organization but also found that a misatribution. ‘cue significantly reduced the effect of hypocrisy on behavior. ‘The effect of misattribution suggests that hypocrisy induces a form of dissonance arousal (e.g, Zanna & Cooper, 1974) that {in tur motivates people to adopt behavior consistent with the ‘content of their advocacy. In sum, an act of hypocrisy appears to motivate behavior change as the route to dissonance reduction. Altering behavior directly resolves the discrepancy by bringing one cognitive ele~ ‘meat (i.e. behavior) into line with the other (i.., belief). Tbe adjustment of behavior following hypocrisy suggests that, under some conditions, people may choose to reduce psychological discomfort through direct confrontation with the source oftheir negative arousal. Direct Versus Indirect Routes to Dissonance Reduction It is clear from other research, however, that an effective strategy for dissonance reduction can have absolutely nothing to do with the discrepancy that caused the discomfort in the first place. For example, after committing a discrepant act, person can reduce dissonance by consuming alcohol (c.g. Steele, Southwick, & Critchlow, 1981), engaging in distracting activites (Zanna & Aziza, 1976), misatributing the aversive ‘arousal to various external sources (e.g., a soundproof booth; see Faaio, Zanna, & Cooper, 1977), or simply expressing posi- tive affect (e.g., Cooper, Fazio, & Rhodewalt, 1978). Another effective strategy isto consider one’s standing on positive self ‘anribates that are unrelated to the discrepancy. For example, research on self-affirmation theory (e.g. Steele, 1988) shows that making positive aspects of the sef accessible following a discrepant act attenuates the use of direct routes to dissonance reduction (Le, attitode change, Stele & Lui, 1983). The thrust ‘of these findings implies that under some conditions, dissonance ‘can be reduced indirectly, that is, without changing elements of the discrepancy itself. "The use of indirect strategies for reducing dissonance —those that reduce dissonance but eave the discrepancy intact—raises ‘mn important issue about the relationship between dissonance srousal and reduction. Specifically it suggests that even when 1 discrepancy involves highly important cognitive elements, such as firmly held antinades, seif-beliefs, or behavioral san- dards; a person may not necessarily be motivated 10 reduce tsonance through a strategy that will directly resolve the dis- ‘repascy, Instead, dissonance reduction may be governed pri- marily by the availability of alternatives and the ease with which ‘sx alteruative will reduce peychological discomfort. (Abelson, 1959; Steele, 1988). Consistent with this reasoning are stdies demonstrating that When the order of direct and indirect reduc- ‘on routes is alienated, participants tend to use the fist route available regardless ofits relevance to the dissonant act (€.. J. Aronson ef al, 1995; Gotz-Marchand ef al, 1974; Simon et ‘a, 1995; Steele & Lui, 1983). Thus, when a discrepancy in- ‘volves important attinudes or self-betiefs, the motivation 10 re- doce dissonance may not focas people on reducing the discrep- ancy Instead, it may focus them on reducing negative affect by * We wish wm noe thatthe avesve-consquences revision (Cooper Fazio, 1984) makes a similar prodicion. Specifically if past bebavior ‘sumptions about the source for the dissonance arousal that follows posing ge 7 56 STONE, WIEGAND, COOPER, AND ARONSON any means possible (e.g., Elliot & Devine, 1994; Tessex, Mar- tin, & Comell, 1996). Hypocrisy and the Preference for the Direct Route 10 Self-Inegrity We propose that an act of hypocrisy motivates a desire to deal directly with the discrepancy through behavior change. That is, once aware of the discrepancy between the advocacy and past behavior, a person would rather adopt the behavior ‘advocated to others than simply reduce the discomfort through indirect means. This suggests that, if provided a choice between 4 reduction route that would re-establish self integrity direcly and one that would reduce dissonance indirectly through a dis- ‘eaction or self-ffirmation, a perton who has acted bypocrti- cally would choose the most direct route to sel-ntegrty. ‘The primary purpose of the current research wat 10 invesi- sate preferences for reducing dissonance following hypocrisy ‘when direct and indirect strategies were available. A clear dem- constration of preferences among dissonance reduction routes require that participants simultaneously be provided with malti- ple alternatives (see J. Aronson et al., 1995; Gotz-Marchand et a, 1974). In this ease, participants who were made to fel Inypociical about safe-sex practices were provided with two ‘options: one behavior that would uphold directly their beliefs bout practicing safer sx (ie, purchasing condoms, se Stone tal, 1994) and one behavior that would reduce dissonance {nicely by bolstering unrelated cognitions about the self (12. donating time or money to disadvantaged people, see Steele & Lui, 1981). For some participant, only the indirect option was presented: for oters, both options were made available atthe same time. ‘We predicted that if an indirect route to reduction were the only option available for dissonance reduction, participants who felthypocritical would us that rout to reduce their discomfort. As suggested by Fried and Aronson’s (1995) study, the disso- ‘ance that follows an act of hypocrisy can be reduced by an indirect strategy when soch a swategy is presented fist. If, how- ‘vez bypocrsy motivates a person 10 confront the discrepancy head-on, then when a direct route to reduction also is made available, we expected participants to choose the bebavioal alternative that dealt specifically with the source of their hypoc- tisy. Despite the opporunity to affirm an unrelated postive aspect of the self, participants made to feel hypocritical should ‘opt to reduce the discrepancy directly through adopting the very behavior they promoted to others. Role of Advocacy in Bolstering Responses to Dissonance It is well documented that disconfirmation of important be- liefs causes dissonance and motivates a person to take action capable of restoring those beliefs. One of the fist demonstra- tions of dissonance reduction through behavioral bolstering was reported by Festinger, Riecken, and Schacter (1986) in their classic observation of a group who announced publicly thatthe ‘world would end on December 21, 1954. When it became clear that the prophecy had failed, instead of changing their beliefs about the prophecy, group members bolstered their doomsday beliefs by proselytizing to new members. Similarly, a laboratory investigation by Sherman and Gorkin (1980) showed that when participants with strong feminist beliefs displayed anti-feminist ‘behavior during a sextole stereotyping task, they subsequently took actions on a separate task indicative of song pro-feminist beliefs (see also Batson, 1975; Dutton & Lake, 1973). In a study by Kantola, Syme, and Campbell (1984) that closely resembles hypocrisy research, a utlty company notified com- ‘munity members with strong beliefs in energy conservation that they were wasting electricity. The results showed that residents ‘with strong pro-conservation attitudes significantly reduced their consumption of elecicity over a 2-week follow-up period tis important o note that in many ofthese early sues on ‘behavioral bolstering participants did not advocate their bles before receiving information thet disconfrmed them. This im- plies that an advocacy of one's beliefs may not be necestary for the use of behavioral bolstering as a mode to dissonance reduction, Although in the early work only direct outs to disso- nance reduction were measured (i.e, behavior change), this research suggests that disconfrmation by itself may be sufficient to arouse dissonance and motivate the use of behavioral bolster. ing for dissonance reduction. ‘By itself, learning that one's own bebavior has disconfimed {important beliefs could pose a significant threat othe self Sherman & Gorkin, 1980), If these beliefs are held in private, however, would disconfirmation by itself cause a specific need to re-establish the validity of those beliefs? It seems that if beliefs ar held in private, there may be otber ways to reduce dissonance. For example, person could make sight adjut- ‘ments in the beliefs to accommodate the disconfirming evi

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