MORFE V MUTUC

FACTS: Section 7 of Republic Act No. 3019 (R.A. 3019), provides that “every public officer, ...after his assumption to
office and within the month of January of every other year thereafter, as well asupon the
termination of his position, shall prepare and file with the head of the office to which he belongs, a
true detailed and sworn statement of assets and liabilities, including a statement of theamounts
and sources of his income, the amounts of his perso nal and family expenses and
theamount of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year...”Jesus Morfe, disputing that such
requirement is violative of due process as an oppressiveexercise of police power and as an unlawful
invasion of the constitutional right to privacy, implicitin the ban against unreasonable search and seizure
construed together with the prohibition againstself-incrimination, filed a petition for declaratory relief before
the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Pangasinan. After the submission of pleadings and stipulation of facts,
the CFI found for Morfe,affirming that the requirement of periodical submission of such sworn
statement of assets andliabilities exceeds the permissible limit of the police power and is thus offensive to the due
processclause – hence, Section 7 of R.A. 3019 is unconstitutional.Aggrieved, Executive Secretary Amelito Mutuc
appealed the decision of the CFI before theSupreme Court.

Issue: Whether or not, the requirement of periodical submission of the sworn statement of
assetsand liabilities, pursuant to R.A. 3019, exceeds the permissible limit of the State’s police power andis thus
offensive to the due process clause?

Ruling: No. Nothing can be clearer than that R.A. 3019 was precisely aimed at curtailing
andminimizing the opportunities for official corruption and maintaining a standard of honesty in
the public service. It is intended to further promote morality in public administration. A public
officemust indeed be a public trust. Nobody can cavil at its objective; the goal to be pursued
commandsthe assent of all. The conditions then prevailing called for norms of such character. The
timesdemanded such a remedial device.In the absence of a factual foundation, the presumption of
a statute’s validity must prevailover mere pleadings and stipulation of facts (Ermita-
Malate Hotel, et. al. v. Mayor of Manila).While in the attainment of attainment of such public good, no
infringement of constitutional
rightsi s p e r m i s s i b l e , t h e r e m u s t b e a s h o w i n g , c l e a r , c a t e g o r i c a l , a n d u n d e n i a
b l e t h a t w h a t t h e Constitution condemns, the statute allows.While the soundness of the assertion that
a public office is a public trust and as such
nota m o u n t i n g t o p r o p e r t y i n i t s u s u a l s e n s e c a n n o t b e d e n i e d , t h e r e c a n b e
n o d i s p u t i n g t h e proposition that from the standpoint of the security of tenure
guaranteed by the Constitution themantle of protection afforded by due process could rightfully be invoked.

ONG V PEOPLE

Facts:
On September 10, 1998, the Senior Investigator III at the Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) Unit of theEconomic Intelligence
and Investigation Bureau (EIIB), received reliable information that counterfeit "Marlboro"cigarettes were being distributed and
sold by two (2) Chinese nationals, Johnny Sia and Jessie Concepcion, inthe areas of Tondo, Binondo, Sta. Cruz and Quiapo,
Manila. A mission team formed by EIIB conductedsurveillance operation to verify the report. EIIB agents did
a "test-buy" on the different sari-sari stores of Manilalocated in Quiapo, Tondo, Sta. Cruz and Blumentritt areas and
took samples of "Marlboro" cigarettes soldtherein.During the surveillance, the container van delivering the "Marlboro" packed in
black plastic bags wasseen parked at 1677 Bulacan corner Hizon Streets, Sta. Cruz, Manila.They learned that the place is
owned byMr. Jackson Ong. Initial examination made by Philip Morris, Inc. on those random sample purchases revealedthat
the cigarettes were indeed fake products unauthorized by the company. Senior Investigator filed anapplication for search
warrant before the RTC of Dasmariñas, Cavite, Branch 90. Said court issued a searchwarrant after finding probable cause to
believe that Mr. Jackson Ong has in his possession/control in thepremises located at 1675-1677 Bulacan St. cor. M. Hizon St.,
Sta. Cruz, Manila, the following properties:"Substantial number of fake locally made and imported fake cigarettes bearing the
Marlboro brand, togetherwith the corresponding labels, cartons, boxes and other packaging as well as receipts, invoices and
otherdocuments relative to the purchase, sale, and distribution of the aforesaid fake Marlboro cigarettes."On September 25,
1998, the EIIB team implemented the search warrant. They proceeded to thesubject premises but Jackson Ong, the alleged
owner was not there. It was the accused who entertained them.The team was able to search the premises and found
Marlboro cigarettes stocked in several boxes containingfifty (50) reams inside each box which were packed in black plastic
sacks like in "balikbayan boxes."Thereafter, "Inventory" and "Certification In the Conduct of Search" were duly accomplished
and signed by themembers of the EIIB and the other representatives present during the actual search whereby the
accusedsigned her name in the said documents as "Gemma Ong," as the Owner/Representative, while a certainemployee,
Girlie Cantillo, also signed as witness. The EIIB filed a case for Violation of Sections 155 and 168in relation to Section 170 of
Republic Act No. 8293 against Jackson Ong who is not an authorized distributor ofMarlboro products in the Philippines.The
prosecution presented Roger Sherman Slagle, the Director of Operations of Philip Morris Malaysia,
and Philip Morris Philippines, Inc.’s (PMPI) product/brand security expert, to testify that according to his
examination, the products they seized at the subject premises were counterfeit cigarettes, as well as thoseinvolved during the
search operation.The defense filed a Demurrer to Evidence but the RTC denied and thereafter, moved for areconsideration
but the same was denied. The accused denied that she is the Gemma Ong, accused in thiscase and never having engaged in
the manufacture and sale of any kind of cigarettes and claimed that shecould not even distinguish between a fake and a
genuine Marlboro cigarette. The defense claimed that therewas a mistaken identity of the accused.

Issues: Whether or not Gemma’s guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt in light of her alleged mistaken identity.

Ruling: Positive identification of a culprit is of great weight in determining whether an accused is guilty ornot. Gemma, in
claiming the defense of mistaken identity, is in reality denying her involvement in the crime. SChas held that the defense of
denial is insipid and weak as it is easy to fabricate and difficult to prove; thus, itcannot take precedence over the positive
testimony of the offended party. The defense of denial is unavailingwhen placed astride the undisputed fact that there was
positive identification of the accused.
Gemma’s defense consists of her claim of mistaken identity, her denial of her involvement in the crime,and her accusation
against the prosecution witnesses of allegedly giving false testimonies and committingperjury are all weak, unproven, and
unfounded claims, and will not stand against the strong evidence againsther. Gemma is guilty of violating Section 155 in
relation to Section 170 of Republic Act No. 8293.WHEREFORE, SC DENIES the Petition. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.28308 is AFFIRMED.

MEJORADA V SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS:Application and Computation of Penalties: Service of Sentence (Specific Rules)FACTS:Arturo Mejorada

was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 3(E) of RA. 3019, aka Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. Mejorada was a right-away agent whose duty was to process the claims for compensation of
damageso f p r o p e r t y o w n e r s a f f e c t e d b y h i g h w a y c o n s t r u c t i o n
a n d i m p r o v e m e n t s . H e required the claimants to sign blank copies of Sworn Statements and Agreementsto
Demolish, where it appeared that the properties of the claimants have highervalues than the actual value being
claimed by them. However, the claimants didnot bother reading through the paper because they very
much interested in thecompensation of damages. After processing the claims, instead of giving to
theclaimants the proper amount, Mejorada gave one of them Php 5,000 and the rest,Php 1,000 each, saying
that there are many who would share in said amoun ts. The claimants weren’t able to complain because
they were afraid of the accusedand his armed companion. The Sandiganbayan sentenced Mejorada 56 years and8
y e a r s o f i m p r i s o n m e n t w h i c h i s e q u i v a l e n t t o t h e e i g h t ( 8 ) p e n a l t i e s f o r t h e eight (8)
informations filed against him.Contention of the State: Section 3 of RA 3019 states that Mejorada
should bepunished with “imprisonment for not less than 1 year nor more than 10 years” asstated in Sec 9 of the
same Act. In this case, there are 8 charges against him andeach charge should be served with the penalty prescribed
by the law.Contention of the Accused: Mejorada states that the penalty imposed upon him iscontrary to the three-fold
rule and states that the duration should not exceed 40years. This is in accordance to Article 70 of the

ISSUE: W ON the penalty imposed upon him violates the three -fold rule underArticle 70 of the

RULING: The Court favors the State. Article 70 of the RPC does not state anything about the
“imposition of penalty”. It only explains the “service” of sentence, “duration”of penalty and penalty “to be inflicted”. It
should be interpreted that the
accusedc a n n o t b e m a d e t o s e r v e m o r e t h a n t h r e e t i m e s t h e m o s t s e v e r e o f t h e
s e penalties the maximum of which is forty (40) years. As stated in a previous case,“The courts can still impose as
many penalties as there are separate and distinctoffenses committed, since for every individual crime committed, a
correspondingp e n a l t y i s p r e s c r i b e d b y l a w . ” W i t h t h e s e r e a s o n s , M e j o r a d a c a n n o t c o r r e c t
l y contend that his penalty is excessive. There are eight charges against him andeach has an
equivalent penalty as prescribed by RA 3019, thus, Sandiganbayan has imposed the correct penalty.

TRIESTE SR V SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:Trieste was the mayor of Numancia, Aklan. In 1980, during his term, the Municipality of Numancia purchased
construction materials from Trigen Agro-Industrial Development Corporation. Trieste was allegedly the president of
said corporation. Trieste was then sued for allegedly violating the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act particularly for
willfully and unlawfully having financial or pecuniary interest in a business, contract or transaction in connection with
which said accused intervened or took part in his official capacity and in which he is prohibited by law from having
any interest.
Trieste, in defense, said that he already divested his interest from the corporation when he took his office as mayor;
that he sold his shares to his sister; he presented evidence to that effect. The Solicitor General doubted said sale
because it was not registered in the Securities and Exchange Commission. Further, the advertisement of Trigen in
the local rotary club shows that Trieste is the president of the corporation.
In time, the old Sol-Gen was replaced by a new one. The new Sol-Gen gave credit to the arguments presented by
Trieste as it recommended the dismissal of the case on the ground that Trieste did divest his interest from the
corporation by virtue of his selling his shares to his sister; that said sale cannot be doubted simply because it was not
reported to the SEC; that sales of stocks are not required to be reported in the SEC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the recommendation of the Solicitor General is correct.
HELD: Yes. The Solicitor General is well within his rights to make such recommendation. A public prosecutor should
not hesitate to recommend to the court the accused’s acquittal if the evidence in his possession shows that the
accused is innocent. If on appeal by the accused from a conviction by the trial court he finds no legal basis to sustain
the conviction, he should not also hesitate to recommend that the accused be acquitted.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V

INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

FACTS: Republic of the Philippines, through the Bureau of Internal Revenue, commenced an action in the Court of First
Instance (now Regional Trial Court), to collect from the spouses Antonio Pastor and Clara Reyes-Pastor deficiency income
taxes for the years 1955 to 1959 with surcharge and monthly interest, and costs. The Pastors filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint, but the motion was denied. They filed an answer admitting there was an assessment against them for income
tax deficiency but denying liability therefor. They contended that they had availed of the tax amnesty under P.D.’s Nos. 23,
213 and 370 and had paid the corresponding amnesty taxes amounting of their reported untaxed income under P.D. 23,
and a final payment on October 26, 1973 under P.D. 370 evidenced by the Government’s Official Receipt. The trial court
held that the respondents had settled their income tax deficiency for the years 1955 to 1959, not under P.D. 23 or P.D.
370, but under P.D. 213.

The Government appealed to the Intermediate Appellant Court, alleging that the private respondents were not qualified
to avail of the tax amnesty under P.D. 213 for the benefits of that decree are available only to persons who had no pending
assessment for unpaid taxes, as provided in Revenue Regulations Nos. 8-72 and 7-73. Since the Pastors did in fact have a
pending assessment against them, they were precluded from availing of the amnesty granted in P.D.’s Nos. 23 and 213.
The Government further argued that “tax exemptions should be interpreted strictissimi juris against the taxpayer. The
Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) rendered a decision dismissing the Government’s appeal and
holding that the payment of deficiency income taxes by the Pastors under PD. No. 213, and the acceptance thereof by the
Government, operated to divest the latter of its right to further recover deficiency income taxes from the private
respondents pursuant to the existing deficiency tax assessment against them.

ISSUE: Whether or not the tax amnesty payments made by the private respondents bar an action for recovery of deficient
income taxes under P.D.’s Nos. 23, 213 and 370.
HELD: YES. Petition for review is denied.

RATIO: [T]he Government is estopped from collecting the difference between the deficiency tax assessment and the
amount already paid by them as amnesty tax. The finding of the appellate court that the deficiency income taxes were
paid by the Pastors, and accepted by the Government, under P.D. 213, granting amnesty to persons who are required by
law to file income tax returns but who failed to do so, is entitled to the highest respect and may not be disturbed except
under exceptional circumstances

The rule is that in case of doubt, tax statutes are to be construed strictly against the Government and liberally in favor of
the taxpayer strictisimi juris for taxes, being burdens, are not to be presumed beyond what the applicable statute (in this
case P.D. 213) expressly and clearly declares.