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FROM SIR DAVID OMAND
Security & Intelligence Co-ordinator
Permanent Secretaty, Cabinet Office
DATE 21 July 2003
TEL,
E-MAIL

NOTE FOR THE RECORD

MEETINGS IN THE PRIME MI NISTER'S STUDY, 7 AND 8 JULY 2003

7 July

1 . I was pulled out of a CMPS lecture at 09 .15 on Monday morning, 7

July, with a request to go straight to No . 10 I joined a discussion
m progress m the PM's study, with the PM, Foreign Secretary,
David Manning, Jonathan Powell, Nigel Sheinwald, Sally Morgan
John Scarlett and Kevin Tebbit arrived a little late . Alastair
Campbell was also present for part of the meeting.

2 The main subject was discussion of the FAC Report about to issue .
There were various advance copies in the room . Lines to take were
being prepared . It was noted that the FAC had split largely on
party political lines, as the Appendices to the Report showed .

3. There was also a review of the weekend decision not to inform the
FAC before the publication of their Report that Dr Kelly had come
forward to say that he had met Mr Gflligan . Kevin Tebbit ran over
the ground he had covered fn his two letters (of Friday 4 and
Saturday 5 July) . There was some questioning from the PM about
what we knew about Dr Kelly, and whether we could find out more
about his views . Kevin Tebbit agreed to report back . Kevin Tebbit
warned that Dr Kelly was an expert on Iraqi WMD and if he was
summoned to give evidence some of it might be uncomfortable on
specifics such as the likelihood of there being weapons systems
being ready for use within 45 minutes . But he believed from what
he had said to Richard Hatfield that Dr Kelly had no doubts that
there were Iraqi WMD programmes being concealed from the
inspectors . Kevin Tebbit also expressed the view that we would
have to face up to the fact that Dr Kelly's name was likely to
become public at some point soon, given the number of people he
would have talked to . MOD were preparing contingency
statements just in case .

4 There was complete agreement that the inconsistencies in Dr

Kelly's story needed to be subject to more forensic examination,

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and that MOD ought to be considering re-interviewing him . Kevin

Tebbit said that MOD were considering calling him back from a
conference he was at in order to talk t0 him again. He reiterated
that Dr Kelly had come forward of his own volition, and that as far
as MOD was concerned there was no question of any offence
having been committed under the Official Secrets Act. Dr Kelly's
continued co-operation was therefore essential . The Prime Minister
made it clear that MOD should continue to handle the case
properly, and should follow whatever internal procedures were
normal in such cases.

8 JuOY

5 . John Scarlett and I were in a videoconference END

ipikp when we were asked to - see the
PM . I reported orally on further information received from the
MOD to the effect that the re-interview had confirmed the earlier
story as reported by Kevin Tebbit in his letter on Saturday. It
looked as if the main explanation for the Gilligan story of a single
source was Dr Kelly, but that Mr Gilligan may well have heavily
embellished the conversation, or be drawing on other uncited
sources, for the controversial parts of his story.

6 . There was discussion (which I may have initiated) of the difficulty

that Government witnesses before the ISC would be in if, as was
very likely, they were asked whether we had a clue as to the
identity of the Gilligan source . I said I would have to reply that we
did have someone who had come forward - we could not attempt to
cover up this important fact. And I was uneasy that we could be
accused of a cover up if we did not tell the FAC, subject to
whatever came out of a re-interview . I suggested that we should
write to the Chairman of the ISC to tell them that an MOD official
had come forward, and thus enable them to interview the
individual if they thought fit. We could provide the actual name in
confidence . The ISC took evidence in private, so confidentiality
could be maintained . If we wrote to the FAC (which the FAC might
feel was appropriate given that they had just completed a report on
the subject) then this could be read as an invitation by them to
summon Dr Kelly. We all agreed that the ISC was the proper
forum for investigation of this lead, and not the FAC . But the
Prime Minister made clear that if, as he suspected, the FAC
insisted on calling Dr Kelly to give evidence then we could not in
conscience order him not to appear given the relevance of the
information he had given us to the FAC's own inquiry. It was
accepted at the meeting that copying any ISC letter to the FAC
would be tantamount to a public statement, and therefore we
should make public in a straightforward way the letter to the ISC .
I agreed to write the letter given my position as Security and
Intelligence Co-ordinator . MOD would draft with the Cabinet
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Office . I would make the ISC aware of the actual name of Dr Kelly
separately and in confidence .

7. There was also discussion, briefly, of whether the BBC should be

informed in advance that a public announcement of an MOD
official coming forward was about to be made . We felt there should
be, as a courtesy . There was reference to an idea (possibly from
MOD) that Mr Hoon should write to either the DG or the Chairman
of Governors of the BBC, and after some discussion it was felt that
the Chairman was the appropriate person given the Governors'
meeting later that evening. It was felt that it would be fair to Dr
Kelly to give the BBC the chance to clear his name but it was
unreasonable to press the BBC to go fuqther and reveal the name
of their source if it was not Dr Kelly. We were clear that they would
not do that. 6 °

8 . Immediately after the meeting at about midday I went to see the

Clerk to the ISC, and explain that I was minded to write to the
Chairman in those terms . The Clerk expressed some concern,
saying that the ISC would not want to be put in a position publicly
of having to see an individual ; they would make their own mind up
on the progress of their inquiry. He was sure that Ann Taylor
would not want to break the Committee rule that they were not
giving a public commentary on the progress of their inquiry, and a
publication of a letter from me to her might be seen as just that . I
then had to leave immediately for Heathrow airport for an official
visit to Ottawa. I was informed by telephone that Ann Taylor had
confirmed she definitely did not want to receive any letter that was
going to be made public. There was confirmation that she however
would be prepared to see a reference to the ISC possibly
interviewing the individual, if that came at the end of a press
statement from Government .

DAVID OMAND

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