Electoral Systems and the Formation of Democratic Party Systems:

Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru

by

Miguel Centellas

Department of Political Science

3303 Friedmann Hall
Western Michigan University
Kalamazoo, MI 49008

miguel.centellas@wmich.edu

This paper compares the evolution of party systems in Bolivia, Ecuador,

and Peru. Since democratization, these three party systems have taken
divergent turns. The relationship between electoral and party systems is
important and complex, especially in newly democratic systems. If
representative democracy requires political parties, then the ability of new
electoral systems to strengthen party systems is crucial for democratic
consolidation. This paper argues that political development in Bolivia,
Ecuador, and Peru since democratization can be explained by contrasting
their different electoral systems.
 Miguel CENTELLAS 2

Prepared for delivery at the 60th Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science
Association, Chicago, 25-27 April 2002.
 Miguel CENTELLAS 3

Electoral Systems and the Formation of Democratic Party Systems

1. Introduction
It is difficult to imagine modern representative democracy without political
parties and party systems. Political parties link elites to voters, organize and articulate
public political discourse, help make representative accountable, and help prepare
government teams. Party systems are the more than merely the sum of political parties in
a given country, they also include the way that political parties interact with each other
and with the larger political system.
Political party systems are not doing well in Latin America. Traditional parties are
losing ground across the region. Popular attitudes towards political parties (and
politicians) measured in surveys are very negative. In part, this is an international crisis of
political parties and politicians and the rise of populism (Manz and Zuazo 1998). The
crisis of political party systems in Peru and Venezuela, however, went beyond
widespread decline in trust of politicians and contributed to regimes that fit O’Donnell’s
(1994) definition of delegative democracy.
One set of explanations for differences among party systems is institutional. Since
Duverger (1954), we have been more aware about the relationship between electoral
systems and party systems. Electoral systems—the set of electoral laws—have important
consequences for the development of party systems. Electoral systems can punish larger
parties and help increase the number of parties. Conversely, electoral systems can
reinforce stable, moderated inter-party competition and help strengthen democracy.
This paper explores the relationship between electoral systems and party systems
in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru. In the last two decades, stable party system has only been
the norm in Bolivia. If electoral systems account for differences in political parties, we
may strengthen democracy by “constitutionally engineering” better electoral systems.
Since electoral systems essentially provide incentive structures for voter and (especially)
political elites, finding electoral systems that encourage moderated, democratic politics is
an essential task for all who seek to promote democratic consolidation.
 Miguel CENTELLAS 4

2. Theory
Most of the comparative democratization literature adopts Dahl’s (1971)
definition of democracy (or polyarchy) as a political system involving three dimensions:
competition, participation, and civil and political liberties. This definition of democracy
focuses primarily on the institutions of electoral democracy and is largely an extension of
Schumpeter’s description of democracy as “that institutional arrangement for arriving at
political decisions by means of competitive struggle for the people’s vote” (1943, 269).
Minimalist definitions of democracy are sometimes described as elitist or procedural
definitions because they focus on formal electoral democracy and on the role of political
elites. Nevertheless, such minimalist conceptions of democracy are practical for
comparative studies of democracy since “they deliberately focus on the smallest number
of attributes that are still seen as producing a viable standard for democracy” (Collier and
Levitsky 1997, 433).
Linz and Stepan (1996) consider democracy consolidated when it has become
“the only game in town.” Their commonly used definition focuses on five arenas: civil
society, political society, the rule of law, a usable state bureaucracy, and economic
society. For them, consolidation also requires certain behavioral attitudinal, and
constitutional conditions: behaviorally, no actors try to (violently) overthrow the
democratic regime; attitudinally, there is broad public support for democratic procedures
and institutions; constitutionally, all actors are subject to and accept the resolution of
conflicts using democratic institutions. Essentially, democracy is consolidated if it meets
the requirements for democracy as well as those necessary for its long-term
sustainability. At its core, democratic consolidation refers to expectations that democracy
will survive, that it is immune to reversal (Schedler 1998).
Recent scholars have also emphasized other elements essential to representative
democracy. These include civilian control over the military (Karl 1990), the rule of law
(O’Donnell 1996), and a vibrant civil society (Putnam 1993). The focus on these new
areas of study, however, primarily extends from procedural or minimalist definitions of
democracy. Though often seen as necessary conditions for democracy —and especially
for democratic consolidation— such things as the rule of law or a vibrant civil society are
essentially external to the democratic process itself. It is unclear whether the practice of
 Miguel CENTELLAS 5

democracy leads to the rule of law over time, or whether the rule of law is a necessary
precondition for democracy.
This paper focuses on the competitive dimension of democracy. Although
participation and civil and political liberties are important, inter-elite competition is at the
heart of representative democracy. Electoral systems and party systems play a key role in
democratic competition. Thus, this paper focuses on the relationship between electoral
systems and party systems in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru.

2.1. Electoral Systems

Elections are an essential feature of modern representative democracy. In truth,
“the democratic process is indeed encapsulated in elections and electing” (Sartori 1987,
86). Of course, we must avoid the electoralist fallacy—while elections are a necessary
condition for democracy, they are not a sufficient condition. Nevertheless, free and fair
elections allow citizens to choose between competing political elites and different policy
options. Electoral systems make voting possible by stipulating, among other things, the
number and types of offices contested, how votes are cast, and the counting rules used to
determine winners and losers. Essentially, democracy becomes the only game in town
when all actors agree to use competitive elections as the mechanism to decide who wields
power in the polity.
The procedural model of democracy relies on elections to make popular self-
government possible in large political systems. While citizens of large, modern polities
are no longer able to directly decide political issues, they can freely select their own
representatives. Through competitive elections, citizens are able to influence public
policy, articulate their interests, and hold government officials accountable (Manin 1997).
Although democracies may also use referenda, ballot initiatives, or other electoral
mechanisms, this study focuses on national-level elections for the executive and
legislature.
The kind of electoral system reflects elementary foundations of the political
system. Different counting rules aim to build a different type of majority or popular
consensus. While single-member district systems are often meant to build elective
majorities, proportional representation (PR) systems are usually designed to increase
 Miguel CENTELLAS 6

minority representation. By dictating how votes are translated into seats, different
electoral systems affect citizen and elite behavior by providing different strategic choices.

This paper looks at three features of electoral systems: 1) the effective district
magnitude, 2) whether legislative and presidential elections are concurrent, and 3)
whether the president is elected by congressional majority formula. The effective district
magnitude (usually the average district magnitude) affects the proportionality of the
electoral system and, thus, the number of parties. Concurrent legislative elections more
closely link presidential and legislative elections, often providing executives with larger
legislative constituents and reducing the number of parties. Finally, congressional
election of the president has, in Bolivia, parliamentarized the political system by tightly
linking executive and legislative politics.

2.2. Party Systems

Because an institutionalized party system is indispensable for democracy,
significant attention should be given to the development of stable party systems in new
democracies (Lipset 2000). A party system is institutionalized if parties are more than
temporary or personal vehicles. Institutionalized parties are linked to, and legitimately
represent, important social groups and constituencies; they should coincide with the
significant social cleavages and retain relatively stable bases of electoral support. Party
systems also give voters intellectual shortcuts; voters should be able to identify basic
policy tendencies of political parties or, at the very least, who their core leaders are and
what they stand for. If parties are not institutionalized, if they are merely empty labels
used haphazardly during elections, then voters are essentially voting randomly and
without clearly articulated policy preferences.
Though electoral systems influence the party system’s character, political parties
and party systems also have independent social and historical roots. Lipset and Rokkan
(1967) argued that Western European party systems froze in the 1920s before the full
impact of electoral democracy. Because party systems in large part reflect and articulate a
society’s cleavages, the underlying social structure also influences the number and type
of political parties in the party system. These historical legacies were especially felt in
 Miguel CENTELLAS 7

new democracies. Political parties were common in Latin America, even in countries
with little or no history of democracy and democratic elections. The ability of these
parties to learn to play the electoral game proved crucial.
This paper looks at democratic party systems, party systems that are able to
support stable democracy. Though in theory all party system (even single-party systems)
can coexist with democratic politics, this paper emphasizes the special importance of
moderated multipartism. A party system that has a moderate number of parties (no more
than five effective parties) is expected to be more stable and capable of promoting
democratic politics than either a hegemonic or dominant party system (where one party
clearly dominates) or a fragmented party system (Sartori 1976).
Beyond the number of parties in the system, a “democratic” party system suggests
two other characteristics. In a democracy, political parties should be competitive, that is,
they should give voters real alternatives. A relative balance between the party (or parties)
in government and those in the opposition enables for checks on the abuse of power and
competitive, democratic politics. Secondly, political parties should represent core
constituencies (whether these follow ideological or other cleavages). The more parties
represent core sectors of the voting public, the more stable votes for parties and party
systems should be.

3. Case Selection
The three Central Andean republics were early third wave democratizers.
Nevertheless, their political trajectories have been dramatically different. While Bolivia’s
democracy has been stable and uninterrupted for two decades, democracy has not been
stable in Ecuador or Peru. Peru’s experiment with democracy ended abruptly in 1992
after President Alberto Fujimori’s military-backed autogolpe (self-coup) disbanded the
legislature, purged the judiciary, and suspended the constitution. Ecuadorian democracy
has also had a troubled road. Since 1979, the forced removal of two presidents from
office, the brief kidnapping of another by the military, and several military interventions
in politics have kept the future of Ecuador’s democracy uncertain.
Comparing such different outcomes along the dependent variable (party system
stability) is possible because the three cases are substantially similar. The United Nations
 Miguel CENTELLAS 8

Development Program classifies all three Central Andean republics as developing

countries. They rank the lowest in South America (along with Paraguay) along
socioeconomic indicators such as annual per capita GDP, the human development index,
life expectancy, and adult literacy rates. Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru also share a similar
sociopolitical Andean cultures. All three have a majority indigenous population that has
been historically excluded from national cultural, political, and economic life. All three
also share similar obstacles to democracy: no previous history of democracy and a history
of authoritarian rule.
Several scholars argue that the democratic shortcomings in Ecuador and Peru are
related to the developments of their party systems. Like Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru had a
history of organized political parties with long historical trajectories. By the end of the
1990s, however, only in Bolivia did traditional parties retain any stable level of popular
support. Traditional parties in Ecuador and Peru, meanwhile, have been marginalized
even as the national party system have become more fragmented and personalized. In
contrast, Bolivia’s party system appears to have stabilized around a moderate number of
political parties.
The limited literature on Bolivia’s democratization highlights a new Bolivian
exceptionalism. In a cross-national study of Latin American democracies, Jones (1995)
finds a significant relationship between the dummy variable for Bolivia and presidential
legislative majorities (which, Jones argues, support stable presidential democracy).
Conaghan and Malloy (1994) point out that of the three Central Andean countries, only
Bolivia successfully implemented neoliberal economic reforms (in the 1980s). They
suggest that the success or failure of neoliberal reforms helps explain the different
political trajectories of Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru. It is possible, however, that the
success or failure of economic reforms —which require political decisions— may just as
easily be a consequence of institutional design.

3.1. Bolivia
Bolivia experienced a difficult and prolonged democratic transition. By 1982, the
military had exhausted its willingness and ability to repress demands for democracy and
allowed Hernán Siles Zuazo, plurality winner of the 1979 and 1980 elections, to assume
 Miguel CENTELLAS 9

the presidency at the head of his Democratic Popular Union (UDP) coalition. In the midst
of a growing economic crisis, Siles Zuazo stepped down one year ahead of schedule in
favor of new elections in 1985.
The 1985 election marked a collapse of Bolivia’s leftist parties, with most votes
split between the center-right Democratic National Action (ADN) of former dictator
Hugo Bánzer and the centrist National Revolutionary Movement (MNR) headed by
Victor Paz Estenssoro, though neither candidate won a majority. Under Bolivia’s
electoral system, presidential candidates must win by a majority. If not candidate wins a
majority, the legislature meets in a joint session to elect the president from among the
front-runners. The MNR was able to gather a congressional majority for its candidate.
Two months later, however, Paz Estenssoro entered a political alliance with Bánzer,
securing himself a legislative supermajority.
The pattern of congressional election of the president and inter-party political
pacts has continued. Since 1985, no president has been elected directly; parliament has
elected the president in each election, making the building of a majority governing
coalitions unavoidable. These coalitions have held together surprisingly well, making
Bolivian governments since 1985 true coalition governments.
A stable pattern of bi-polar alliances has developed since 1989. In 1989, Bánzer
ordered his ADN to support the third-place Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR)
candidate, Jaime Paz Zamorra. The unexpected move came after MNR decided to
campaign for the presidency even though Paz Estenssoro had agreed to support Bánzer’s
candidacy. Since 1989, ADN and MIR have supported each other nationally against the
MNR in a bi-polar competitive system. Other political parties have tended to play
kingmaker roles, though some parties have consistently sided with one or another of the
major parties.
In a region not know for democratic stability, Bolivia’s democratic stability is
remarkable. Elections have gone unhindered for two decades; a democratically elected
civilian government was able to substantive economic reforms; presidents have relied on
legislative coalitions. The normalization of politics around consensual practices and
moderated elite bargaining point to the possibility that Bolivian democracy was
consolidated by the late 1980s (Mayorga 1992).
 Miguel CENTELLAS 10

One explanation for Bolivia’s democratic stability is its system of

“parliamentarized presidentialism” (Mayorga 1992; 1997). The system is characterized
by: 1) fused–ballot PR electoral system; 2) congressional election of the executive; and 3)
informal coalition rules that provide presidents with legislative majorities. The electoral
system is the key to parliamentarized presidentialism. The fused ballot is, essentially, a
parliamentary ballot; it closely binds presidents to the legislature and eliminates the
problem of dual legitimacy plaguing many presidential systems (Linz 1994). The 1994
constitutional reforms did not essentially modify Bolivia’s political system.1

3.2. Ecuador
Despite a relatively smooth transition to democracy, Ecuador’s democratic
experience has been troubled. Since 1979, nine civilian governments have struggled to
govern in the midst of nagging economic problems and a highly fragmented political
system. The last two elected presidents have been forced out of office. Abdalá Bucaram
was removed by congress for “mental incapacity” in 1997 after accusations of massive
corruption. Jamil Muhuad was overthrown in a military-backed popular uprising January
2000 and replaced by his vice president, Gustavo Naboa.
The military’s important role was clearly seen in the recent coup. Ecuador’s
military negotiated its withdrawal from power, winning several important concessions.
The military prevented Assad Bucaram, the popular Concentration of Popular Forces
(CFP) leader, from campaigning for the presidency in 1979. Nevertheless, Assad
Bucaram maintained tight control over his party and antagonized the presidency of his
nephew-in-law, Jaime Roldós. Since 1979, Ecuador’s military has intervened in politics
as the poder moderador. Resentment over policies pursued by president León Febres
Cordero led to a rebellion in Quito’s air base in March 1986 and the president’s brief
kidnapping by paratroopers January 1987. After Abdalá Bucaram was removed from
office, the military resolved a succession struggle by supporting the succession of Fabián

1
Under the reforms, parliament is now limited to selecting from among the top two (rather than
three) presidential candidates. This reform may have actually helped streamline the process. The
introduction of a multi-member proportional (MMP) electoral system also did not significantly change
Bolivia’s political system. Although MMP allows for direct election of half of the lower house in single-
member districts, the system is still essentially a PR system since the other half of the seats are
apportioned in compensatory fashion.
 Miguel CENTELLAS 11

Alarcón, head of the legislature, over vice president Rosalia Arteaga.

An important element in Ecuador’s political system is the highly fragmented and
uninstituionalized party system. Ecuador’s political parties are primarily personalist
vehicles; political alliances are dominated more by personal and familial ties, rather than
ideological or programmatic considerations. The two most important parties in 1979, the
populist CFP and the Marxist Democratic Left (ID), have steadily declined in support,
with CFP splitting into different personalist factions. Clashes between the executive and
legislature are pronounced, even when presidents have a majority coalition. Executives
also tended to lose legislative support after midterm elections and due to frequent cambio
de camisetas as legislators often switched party loyalties back and forth while in office.

3.3. Peru
Peru’s democratic transition was also relatively smooth. The military held
elections in 1978 for a constituent assembly, which drafted a new constitution approved
in 1979. After the installation of democracy in 1980, the military returned to its barracks.
Peru’s two major parties, the center-right Popular Action (AP) and popular-center
American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA), had long historical traditions. The
inability of Peru’s first two presidents to deal with the growing economic crisis, as well
as two guerrilla insurgencies, weakened the two major parties. By 1990 Peru’s party
system had collapsed, reverting to personalist politics, and allowing the election of
Alberto Fujimori, a political unknown.
The 1990 election marked a dramatic decline in electoral support for both AP and
APRA. It also marked a return of Peru’s traditional right with the candidacy of author
Mario Vargas Llosa, another independent outsider. Fuijimori won the second-round
election to become Peru’s third democratically elected president. Elected without a
congressional majority, Fujimori was antagonized by a legislature still dominated by AP
and APRA.
Fujimori’s April 1992 coup ended Peruvian democracy. At best, the Fujimori-
period Peru fit O’Donnell’s (1994) description of a delegative democracy. Though
international pressure led to elections later that year of a constituent assembly, Fujimori’s
supporters dominated the assembly. It drafted a new constitution that altered Peru’s
 Miguel CENTELLAS 12

political landscape, significantly enhancing executive powers. The 1995 and 2000
elections maintained a democratic façade, though they were marked by large numbers of
blank and null votes and accusations of fraud. The sudden collapse of Fujimori’s regime
in 2001 led to the election of Alejandro Toledo, arguably the winner of the 2000 election.

4. Hypotheses
The crisis of democracy in both Peru and Ecuador coincide with crises in their
respective party systems. Meanwhile, Bolivia’s democratic stability has coincided with a
relatively stable and institutionalized party system. Differences in institutional design
may explain the different outcomes among the three cases. More specifically, this paper
looks at the role of electoral system in shaping each country’s party system. Three
hypotheses follow from the electoral rules highlighted above.

Hypothesis 1: A smaller effective district magnitude is associated with a

stable political party system.

Hypothesis 2: Legislative election of the executive is associated with a stable

political party system.

Hypothesis 3: Concurrent executive and legislative elections are associated

with stable political party systems.

5. Data and Method

This paper relies on election data and descriptions of each country’s electoral
system gathered from a variety of sources. In order to make the data comparable, this
paper uses legislative election results. For Bolivia 1980-1997, legislative data are for the
House of Deputies. Data for Ecuador 1979-1998 come from the unicameral National
Congress. Peru 1980-1990 data are for the Chamber of Deputies; 1992-2001 data are for
the unicameral National Congress. Data for the 1978 Peruvian constituent assembly is not
used because it was not an election that also produced a government. Data from the 1980
Bolivian general election is used, however, since that election was used to constitute the
1982-1985 government.2 Analysis includes each country legislative election year for a

2
The 1980 Bolivian election and the 1982–85 UDP government are considered a single
observation.
 Miguel CENTELLAS 13

total of 20 observations.3
This paper also uses presidential election data. For comparability, election results
from presidential elections are used. For Ecuador and Peru, first-round electoral results
are used. Though Bolivia’s fused ballot makes presidential and legislative election results
synonymous, the results are comparable to compare votes for major parties and the
effective number of presidential candidates. Analysis includes each country presidential
election year for a total of sixteen observations.4

5.1. Party System Measures

The degree of multipartism was calculated using the formula for the effective
number of parties developed by Laakso and Taagepera (1979). The effective number of
parties is calculated from legislative seat shares from the lower chamber (Bolivia, Peru
1980-90) or the unicameral legislature (Ecuador, Peru 1992-2001). Although calculating
the effective number of parties using seat shares does count a smaller number of parties
than using vote shares would, it produces values more easily comparable across cases.5 In
some cases, the number of parties was calculated using two corrective mechanisms. In
cases where some legislative seats were lumped into “Other” or “Independent”
categories, an estimation procedure proposed by Taagepera (1997) was used. For Peru
1992 and 1995 Fujimori’s party group (Cambio 90) held more than fifty percent of the
legislature. In those cases, the corrective procedure outlined by Taagepera (1999) was
used.
A look at Table 5.1.1 shows that the effective number of parties has been most
stable in Bolivia than in Ecuador or Peru (see especially the standard deviation from the
mean). Remarkably, even though Bolivia’s electoral system clearly links presidential and
legislative votes for all elections, the effective number of parties for both presidential and
legislative elections were close for all elections in all countries. The significant exception

3
The 2000 Peruvian legislative election is not included in this analysis.
4
This analysis includes the 2000 Peruvian elections.
5
Because of differences in electoral systems, calculating the effective number of parties using vote
shares is problematic. Ecuador provides two difficulties: Its two-tiered unicameral legislature makes it
difficult to calculate the number of parties using vote shares (one tier is elected nationally, the other from
provincial districts). The provincial legislative districts vary in size from district magnitudes of one, two,
or more seats, with electoral formulas varying accordingly.
 Miguel CENTELLAS 14

was the smaller mean effective number of parties for presidential elections in Peru when
compared to legislative elections. Most of this variation, however, comes from the
elections under Fujimori, where opposition candidates did slightly better in legislative
elections than in the presidential contests.

Table 5.1.1. Average, lowest, and highest effective number of political parties since the
first year of democratic rule.
Standard
Mean Lowest Highest
Deviation
Legislative
Bolivia 4.4 3.9 5.5 0.54
Ecuador 5.7 4.2 7.8 1.11
Peru 3.2 1.8 5.9 0.76
Presidential
Bolivia 4.9 4.4 5.0 0.54
Ecuador 5.3 4.1 7.6 1.20
Peru 2.5 1.2 3.7 0.97

The degree of party system stability was calculated by adding the vote share for
each country’s most significant political parties from the first election after
democratization. For Bolivia, the two major parties considered were MNR and ADN.6
For Ecuador, the two major parties used were ID and CFP. For Peru, the two major
parties were APRA and AP. If the party system remains stable, the additive vote share for
the two major parties should remain fairly constant. A look at Table 4.1.2 shows that only
Bolivia’s party system has remained stable when measured as the vote share for the two
major parties.
Although stability of votes for major parties and degree of multipartism are
related, they still reflect different dimensions of the party system. As legislative

6
Although the most important party in the 1978-1980 elections was Democratic Popular Union
(UDP), it was essentially a mega-coalition of leftist parties. The next two important parties in all three
elections were MNR and ADN. Calculating measures using UDP would reduce the share of votes for
major parties in Bolivia and bring its mean to levels comparable with Ecuador and Peru. A third major
Bolivian party, Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), was a member of the UDP alliance,
however, and continues to do well in national and local elections. Calculating the vote share for major
parties using MIR and either MNR or ADN produces a slightly reduced mean, but still significantly
larger than the mean for Ecuador or Peru.
 Miguel CENTELLAS 15

multipartism increases, of course, the vote share for major parties tends to decrease as
well. But the level of multipartism can hide important information. The effective number
of parties can remain relatively constant while electoral support for the major parties
declines (if traditional parties are being replaced by new parties). In this case the number
of parties remains essentially the same, but the system is not stable. Similarly, the rate of
decline in vote share for major parties and in effective number of parties may happen at
different rates. In Peru, for example, the number of parties remained relatively low (and
declined substantially after 1992) even as the vote share for the major parties dropped
considerably.

Table 5.1.2. Average, lowest, and highest vote share (as percent) for two major parties
since the first year of democratic rule.
Standard
Mean Lowest Highest
Deviation
Legislative
Bolivia 47.8 40.5 63.2 9.3
Ecuador 22.5 9.0 46.5 11.9
Peru 29.9 0.0 66.6 24.5
Presidential
Bolivia 48.0 36.9 63.2 9.7
Ecuador 22.6 0.0 42.2 16.1
Peru 29.7 1.8 72.6 25.2

Table 5.1.2 also highlights the stability of Bolivia’s political party system when
compared to Ecuador and Peru. Bolivia’s two major parties, MNR and ADN, earned a
relatively consistent number of votes. In contrast, the virtual collapse of the two major
parties in Peru and Ecuador is stark. Only Peru’s APRA seems to be making a comeback
(it won 25.8 percent of the valid vote in the 2001 presidential election); no other major
party in Ecuador or Peru is doing well at the close of the 1990s.
The degree of political competition was measured using the index of
competitiveness developed by Altman and Pérez-Liñán (1999). Using weighted means
for the government and opposition, political competition is measured along a scale from
zero (when either the government or the opposition controls the legislature) to one (when
 Miguel CENTELLAS 16

the government and opposition are balanced).

Table 5.1.3 shows Bolivia’s political stability even while its levels of competition
have remained relatively high. While Peru was the least competitive, Ecuador was also
relatively stable, suggesting that the level of competitiveness in a political system can be
distinguished from the vitality of its party system. Nevertheless, a caveat is in order: By
using a weighted average of government and opposition parties, the measure for
competition obscures the degree to which competition is due to fragmented multipartism.
Although Ecuadorian presidents have often enjoyed very limited legislative support, the
opposition is splintered. Thus, the Altman and Pérez-Liñán measures for “typical”
government and opposition parties are similar, producing high competition values.

Table 5.1.3. Average, lowest, and highest level of political competition since the first
year of democratic rule.
Mean Lowest Highest Deviation
Bolivia 0.90 0.74 0.97 0.09
Ecuador 0.85 0.72 0.99 0.10
Peru 0.69 0.51 1.00 0.17

5.2. Electoral System Measures

The effective district magnitude was calculated following Taagepera and Shugart
(1989) and Jones (1995). With two exceptions, the average district magnitude is used. For
Ecuador’s two-tiered electoral system the effective district magnitude was calculated
using the geometric mean of the magnitude of each tier. Bolivia 1989 also required a
correction for the electoral quota system (essentially a threshold) used that election.
The use of concurrent election and majoritarian congressional presidential
election formula were measured using dummy variables. For majoritarian congressional
formula, Bolivia is coded “1” while Ecuador and Peru are coded “0” for every election
year. Bolivia and Peru both use concurrent electoral systems and are coded “1” (along
with Ecuador 1979 and 1998 because of changes from and back to a concurrent electoral
system) while Ecuador is coded “0” for 1984-1996.

5.3. Control Variables

 Miguel CENTELLAS 17

This study includes two additional control variables for Peru. The first control
variable is a dummy variable for guerrilla war. Peru is coded as “1” (presence of guerrilla
war) for 1980-1995 and “0” (absence of guerrilla war) for subsequent years. Bolivia and
Ecuador are coded as “0” for all years. Since the decline of Peru’s party system is
sharpest, we must consider whether it was a product of the guerrilla war waged by
Shinning Path and the urban Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA).
The second dummy variable is also used to account for Fujimori’s autogolpe.
Although elections where still held in Peru during the Fujimori years, few would call
them free elections. A dummy variable for Fujimori is necessary to control for the
dramatically poor showing by Peru’s traditional parties during those years. Peru is coded
as “1” (after Fujimori’s autogolpe) for 1992-2000 and “0” (before the autogolpe) for
1980-1990; Peru is also coded as “0” for the 2001 election which took place after
Fujimori fell from power and fled into exile. Bolivia and Ecuador are coded as “0” for all
years.

6. Analysis
A simple comparative analysis combining the method of agreement and method
of difference suggests that Bolivia’s stable party system was the product of congressional
election of the president (see Table 6.1). The role of concurrent elections is less clear;
Peru also used concurrent elections but did not have a stable party system. Of course, the
role of concurrent elections may have been undermined by the presence of guerrilla war
and Fujimori’s role. For this comparison, Ecuador was considered as using non-
concurrent elections since this was the pattern for all but two of its elections (the first
election and the most recent election).

Table 6.1. Comparative matrix for Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru.

Congress
Stable Party Concurrent Guerrilla
Elects Fujimori
System Election War
President

Bolivia Yes Yes Yes No No

Ecuador No No No No No
 Miguel CENTELLAS 18

Peru No No Yes Yes Yes

A statistical test of each of the five independent variables (electoral system

variables and Peru control variables) allows for more vigorous tests of the hypotheses.
Using legislative election data, each of the three dependent variables was tested against
all five variables in multivariate analysis (see Table 6.2 and Table 6.3).

Table 6.2. Ordinary least squares estimates of determinants of political party systems in
legislative elections.
Dependent Variables
Effective Number
Votes for
Independent Variables of Legislative Competition
Major Parties
Parties
Concurrent Election -1.247** 30.119 * -0.072**
Congressional election of the
-0.325* 1.146 0.102**
president
Effective magnitude -0.004* -0.178 * 0.000
Guerrilla war -0.916** 5.349 -0.039*
Fujimori -1.640** -28.700 ** -0.243**
Constant 6.026** 19.559 ** 0.874**
R-square 0.6596 0.8192 0.5493
Number of observations 20 20 20
Regression with robust standard errors clustered by country.
* p < 0.05
** p < 0.01

Concurrent elections had the most profound impact on legislative elections,

followed by congressional election of the president. When controlling for all other
variables, concurrent elections reduced the number of political parties by just more than
one full party (1.247) and increase the vote share for major parties by more than 30
percent. Interestingly, however, they also tended to reduce competition slightly.
Congressional election of the president had no significant effect on votes for the major
parties. It did significantly reduce the number of parties by about one third of party and
 Miguel CENTELLAS 19

increase the level of competition by just over ten percent. Though statistically
significant, the effective district magnitude seemed to have little effect on party systems.
Interestingly, the impact of Peru’s guerrilla war was not very strong. The guerrilla
war did reduce the effective number of parties by about a full party while slightly
decreasing competition. But the impact of the Fujimori dummy variable was much more
profound and statistically significant for all three dependent variables. Fujimori reduced
the number of parties by more than one and a half, reduced the votes for major parties by
just under 30 percent, and decreased competition by almost 25 percent. Still, Fujimori’s
rise to power signaled the collapse of Peru’s new democracy and may have been a
product of the collapse of the party system (especially of APRA and AP) before the 1990
elections.

Table 6.3. Ordinary least squares estimates of determinants of political party systems in
presidential elections.
Dependent Variables
Effective Number of Votes for Major Parties
Independent Variables
Presidential Parties (Presidential)
Concurrent Election -1.8 4.429
Congressional election of the
0.833 20.324**
president
Guerrilla war -1.1 16.775**
Fujimori -2.167* -33.983**
Constant 5.867 24.867
R-square 0.7967 0.5474
Number of observations 16 16
Regression with robust standard errors clustered by country.
* p < 0.05
** p < 0.01

Table 6.3 shows the results of similar analysis for the presidential elections. Here,
the most important electoral variable was for congressional election of the president,
which significantly affected the percentage of votes for major parties (increasing votes by
more than 20 percent). Neither concurrent election nor congressional election of the
president significantly affected the effective number of presidential parties.
 Miguel CENTELLAS 20

As expected, the Fujimori variable decreased the number of presidential parties

(as a factor of his hegemonizing the valid votes) and dramatically decreased the votes for
major parties (reducing it by more than 33 percent). Interestingly, the guerrilla war
seemed to have no negative impact on the party system. It only significantly affected the
percentage of votes for major parties, in the opposite direction, by increasing votes by
just over 16 percent.

7. Conclusion
If stable, institutionalized party systems are essential for democracy, then efforts
to strengthen the role of political parties and party systems are necessary. A strong case
can be made for Bolivia’s system of congressional election of the president, especially
when coupled with concurrent election (or better yet, a fused ballot) as a way to produce
stable, moderated multiparty systems. In contrast to the second-round runoff election (as
used in Ecuador and Peru), congressional election of the president is associated with a
stable and competitive party system with a moderate number of parties. It is important to
note that district magnitude (which is a function of the electoral system’s proportionality)
had only limited impact on the nature of party systems. Much more significant were two
macro-institutions—whether elections were concurrent or not and whether congress
elected the president or not. It is possible that instituting similar reforms in new
democracies that are facing difficulties (such as Ecuador and Peru) may help strengthen
not only political parties and party systems, but also democratic stability.
 Miguel CENTELLAS 21

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