Comment: Mental Events and the Brain Paul K. Feyerabend The Journal of Philosophy, Volume 60, Issue 11 (May 23, 1963), 295-296. Stable URL: hup:/Minks jstor-org/sici?sici=0022-362X %2819630523%2960%3A 1 1%3C295%3 ACMEATB%3E2.0.CO%3B: ‘Your use of the ISTOR archive indicates your acceptance of ISTOR’s Terms and Cooditions of Use, available at bbtp:/www.jstor.org/about/tenms.htnl. ISTOR’s Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the ISTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Each copy of any part ofa JSTOR transmi printed page of such transmission, jon must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the sereen or ‘The Journal of Philasophy is published by Journal of Philosophy, Ine.. Please contact the publisher for further permissions regarding the use of this work. Publisher eontaet information may be obtained at bbnp:seww stor org/joumalstphil. hem The Journal of Phitasephy (©1963 Journal of Philosophy, Inc. ISTOR and the JSTOR logo are trademarks of JSTOR, and are Registered in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. For more information on JSTOR contact jstor-info@unich.edu, ©2002 JSTOR, hup:thrww stor. orgy Mon an 21 14:35:35 2002COMMENTS AND CRITICISH 295 If it is construed as ‘There is a true universal sentence in some language . . . ,"” the analysis is inadequate, since it commits us to the existence of that language while the truth of the original counterfactual docs not. If it is not so constrned, then laws are presumably propositions, which raises problems of Sts own. Also, on this account, the paraphrase is no lenger metalinguistie. Bavoe GonopeRa Masnaten Cotunar, OxFo39 COMMENT: MENTAI, BVENTS AND TEE BRAIN HAFFER’S note (this Jovssat, 60, 0: 160) and the preceding discussion to which it refers show very clearly the dilemma of any identity hypothesis concerning mental events and brain processes. Such hypotheses are usually put forth by physiologi- cally inclined thinkers who want also to be empiricists. Being physiologically inclined, they want wo assert the material character of mental processes. Being empiriciste, they want their assertion to be a testable statement about mental processes, ‘They try to combine the two tendencies in an empirical statement of the form X is a mental process of kind A = ¥ isa canteal process of kind a (H} But this hypothesis backfires, Tt not only implies, as it is in- tended to imply, that mental events have physical features; it also seems to imply (if read from the right to the left) that some physical events, viz. central processes, have nonphysical features, Tt thereby replaces a dualism of events by a dualism of features. Moreover, this consequence seems to be the result of the way in which the physiologist. has formulated his thesis. Tiven if he is a convinced monist he seems to be forced, by the very content of his thesis of monism, to acknowledge the correctness of a dualistic point of view. For a dualist this predicament is proof of the untenability of monista. But surely he is too rash in drawing this conclusion! HK implies duelism. Hence, dualism will be true provided 1 is true, However, if monism is correct, then IT is false: there are then no mental processes in the usual (nommaterialistic} sense ‘his shows that the discussion of the content of Ht regarded as an ‘empirical hypothesis is uot at all suficent for deciding the issue between mozisin aud dualism, It also shows that the monist mis- states his case when defending H. ‘The proper procedure for him ta adopt is to develop his theory without any recourse to existent terminology. If he wants to use296 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Hat all, he ought to use it for redefining ‘mental process’ (if he intends ta perpetuate ancient terminology, that is). The empirical character of his theory is not endangered thereby. After all, @ physiological theary of epilepsy does not become an cmpty ‘tautology on account of the fact that it does not make use of the phrase—or of the notion—‘possessed hy the devil’, ‘devil’ here oceurving in its theological sense. There are enough independent predictions available, many more predictions in fact than the mentalist could ever provide—or would even be willing to provide (think only of the tremendous field of the physiology of pereep- tion). However, so it is usually objected, unless a conneedion is estab- lished with previous language, we do not know what we are talking about, and we are therefore not able to formulate our observa- tional results, ‘This objection assumes that the terms of a general point: of view and of a corresponding language can obtain meaning ‘only by being related to the terms of some other point of view that is familiar and known by all Now if that is indeed the case, then hhow did the latter point of view and the latter language ever ob- tain its familiarity And if it could obtain its familiarity without, help ‘from outside," as it obvionsly did, then there is no reason to asmme that a different point of view camnot do equally well. (Besides, we learn the ordinary idiom when we are swall children is if assumed that a grown-up physiologist will be incapable of doing weat a small child does quite well?) Moreover, observational resulis always have to be formulated with respect to a certain background of theory (with respect to a certain language game, to uuse more fashionable terminology). ‘There is no reason why physi- ology should not by itself be capable of forming such a background. ‘We have to conclude, then, that the reasonableness—ard the suc- ceat—of a purely physiologieal approzch to human beings is not at all dependent on the outcome of an analysis of H. ““Bridge-laws" such as H play a most important role within the current theory of explanation and feduction, If our comments above are correct, then it follows that these theories are inadequate as measures of the success of theory construction, Pau K. PRYERABEND Uscvenser oF Causromsia Mpoiusors CaNtER You TEE Putonoeay oF Bouxon ON THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF THRORIES OF MEANING J STAGE examine in this paper common philosophic theory concerning meaning, which I shall label “theory ALO.” ‘Theory ALO is a special form of what then might be labeled