WAS HITLER
A WEAK
DICTATOR?
David Williamson examines two seemingly irreconcilable schools of thought.
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Perhaps of all the exam questions set
on the Third Reich, 'Was Hitler a Weak
Dictator,· is the most difficult. It leads
to the heart of the complex
lntentionalist-Structuralist debate. On
the one hand, there are the
lntentionalist historians who argue
forcefully in the words of Norman Rich
that 'Hitler was master in the Third
(ltl11\�1,-t1u etrtq ,n h2' 11� ,. 1a. Ban J•I).
Reich', while the Structuralists stress
the many constraints on Hitler's power
which range from his own personal
inadequacies to the limits imposed
upon him by the structure of the Nazi
party and state. Mommsen , for
instance, argues that he was 'in many
ways a weak dictator', 1 and David
Irving in one of his earlier and less
Talking Points
outrageous books even goes so far as
to desuibe him as 'probably the
weakest leader Germany has known
this century'. 2
The weak dictator/leader argument
is paradoxical and is bitterly contested
by a formidable array of historians
who include, amongst many others.
Bullock, Bracher, Dawidowicz,
Hildebrand, and Jackel, who argue
that Hitler had a programme and
possessed the necessary powers to
implement it Bracher and Bullock, fm
instance. see Hitler as an immensely
cunning politician who would use any
tactic to further his aims. Bullock
stresses that his foreign policy is only
explicable if seen as a combination of
'consistency of aim with complete
opportunism in method and tactics' .3
It is certainly hard to make out a case
for Hitler being a weak leader in the
period 1925-33. He was able to
consolidate his position at the
Bamberg meetrng in February 1926,
and during the crucial years of 1930-
32 he resisted being manipulated
prematurely into a coalition where his
party could be used as lobby fodder by
Bruning or von Papen. Similarly he was
able to restrain the SA from putting his
pseudo-constitutional tactics in
jeopardy by hazarding everything by
risking an armed uprising in 1932. It
may be, as Gregor Strasser argued,
that these tactics showed a dangerous
indecision and that Hitler was only
saved from failure by the notorious
'backstairs intrigues' of von Papen and
the banker Schroder; but at least they
were held to consistently, and the
Party was forced to follow them.
Hitler said that the key question in life is
'Hammer or Anvil?' Should historians ask of
him a similarly polarised question, 'Weak or
Strong?'
Hisiory Re\'iiw M,1rch ZOO 9
 WXHLT KOM·MUNISTEN
... ...
. .;:
In power once he had consolidated
his position by the autumn of 1934
Hitler was. theoretically at least, omni­
potent. He was both Chancellor and
Head of State, and, to quote Hans
Frank. 'supreme judge of the nation '. 4
10 History Rtview March 2 002
After 1937 Cabinet meetings ceased.
Legal principles such as equality
before the law and civil rights were
suspended by a series of arbitrary laws
such as the Decree for the Protection
of the Nationalist Movement. He had
too the means to enforce this power.
The Gestapo, reinforced by the SS,
prison camps and informers,
effectively broke any opposition. It
was not surprising then that von
Weiszacker, the State Secretary in the
• Hitler relied on charisma, not rational organisation, to buttress his leadership

Foreign Office, believed his diametrically opposed conclusions. For

:omnipotence ex�sted to a large extent . �}�;' r
:-, � L
1n fact and was highly effectiv_ e'. 5 How .• :·�M:1ltstm. -ZL ',,rf;fr},tj.s.
. , J;.:1r,/\(Ei_ , instance, at an inter-ministerial meeting
is it then that, despite this very visible . i rw.
evidence of Hitler's power, he can .', ,l'j. -:lf.
r�:
_!,:;
L �r" TN· t
E �·MA � �� .
on 17 November 1935 on the question
of Jewish emigration, one official from
the Ministry of the Interior argued
still be called a weak dictator? :· :. 't;'�·�,:'- H I , 'c � R I ·· that Hitler wished all Jewish
��t,ptR·O D U C E D T ·H :£ ./ �r�. emigration to be halted and the
Definitions of weakness 1;:?· .: ' B I G G ES T
In exploring this problem Ian ·5f°-:;'i CON FU S ION I �·- ·.! -V:: hostages in the event of war, while
1 : '�- ;, Jews instead to be kept as potential

Kershaw has produced what he t. GOVE RN M ENT >� .,,. :,'.. Hess, the Deputy Fuhrer, again
calls 'three categories of possible � T HAT HAS ', ::.� · quoting Hitler, insisted that he
weakness': 6 EV E R EX IS T E D \! wanted them to emigrate from
• Hitler's reluctance to make J N A CIV I L I ED z Germany as soon as possible.
decisions S T AT E ' All this undoubtedly weakened the
• The extent to which his decisions T hird Reich, but does it mean that Hitler
were either ignored or altered by was a weak dictator? The lntentionalists
his subordinates· argue that this confusion, and lack of
• The degree to which his policy was habits at the centre of the decision- clarity, was in reality a calculated policy
ultimately determined, or at least making process did inevitably make to protect his position as Fuhrer so that
influenced, by such factors as the the conduct of state business slow, he could carry out his preconceived
international situation, pressures from casual and inefficient. One of the aims. On the other hand, the
the Party, the threat of social unrest problems for his ministers was how Structuralists point out that this system
from the workers and the decisions could be obtained from him. was merely the consequence of the way
inadequacies of the German economy. After February 1938 cabinet meetings Hitler had led and controlled the Nazi
ceased and there was no such thing as Party since 1925. Hitler relied on
Decision-Maker and Source of a proper government machine charisma, not rational organisation, to
Authority provided with relevant information by buttress his leadership.
Hitler's eccentric working habits have the civil service. Increasingly Hitler was
been well described by Albert Speer, inaccessible in his remote chalet in The Chaos of Competing Agencies
his favourite architect and later Berchtesgaden. Consequently as Carl Another aspect of Hitler's regime which
Minister of Munitions and Schmitt, a leading constitutional undermined efficient government was
Armaments, iil his memoirs: lawyer, and Ernst von Weiszacker the increasingly confused lines of
recalled after the war: authority. When Hitler came to power
'lwould often ask myself did he he left the Civil service and the
really work? Little was left of the 'Ministers in charge of traditional ministries intact. but as he
day; he rose late in the morning departments might for months went along he allowed an ever­
and conducted one or two on end, and even for years, have increasing number of rival committees,
official conferences; but from no opportunity of speaking to groups and offices to be set up. For
the subsequent dinner on he Hitler ... Ministerial skill instance, the Economics Ministry had
more or less wasted his time consisted in making the most of much of its work taken over by the Four
until the early hours of the a favourable hour or minute Year Plan Organisation, while the
evening. His rare appointments when Hitler made a decision, Foreign Office was undermined first of
in the late afternoon were this often taking the form of a by all Rosenberg's Foreign Affairs Office
imperilled by his passion for remark thrown out casually, and then by Ribbentrop's bureau. In
looking at building plans. The which then went its way as an David Schoenbaum's graphic
adjutants often asked me: order of the Fuhrer.' 8 description, 'new institutions grew,
"please don't show any plans flourished or died, spawned mutations,
today." '7 Because of this lack of clarity officials struggled for survival and thrust their
on the ground often had little option offshoots under the doors of the
Hitler was. then, obviously not a but to interpret Hitler's vague and established ministries' . 9
workaholic like, say, Frederick the elastic decisions themselves. The lntentionalists see this again
Great of Prussia, who would in the Consequently leading Nazis and as a calculated attempt to divide and
summer rise at five in the morning to government departments vied with rule. The classic analysis of these tactics
start working on state papers. To have each other to provide their own is by Otto Dietrich, Hitler's former press
somebody with such lax working interpretation, often coming to chief, in his memoirs written in 1955:

History Review Mardi 2002 11


'In the twelve years of his rule in
Germany Hitler produced the
biggest confusion in
government that has ever
existed in a civilized state.
During his period of government
he removed from the
organization of the state all
clarity of leadership and
produced an opaque network of
competencies. It was not laxness
or an excessive degree of
tolerance which led the
otherwise so energetic anp
forceful Hitler to tolerate this
real witch's cauldron of
struggles for position and
conflicts over competence. It
was intentional. With this
technique he systematically
disorganized the upper echelons
of the Reich leadership in order
12 History Rev iew March 2002
to develop and further the
authority of his own will until it
became a despotic tyranny'. 10
On balance, as Kershaw in the Nazi
Dictatorship points out, this chaos
does not necessarily make Hitler a
weak dictator. He may not have
consciously planned the divide and
rule scenario described above by Otto
Dietrich, but there is no evidence that
he wanted any other system or that, if
he did, he was thwarted in obtaining
it. He took immense care to preserve
his authority. By the autumn of 1934
he had destroyed all institutional
qmtrols on his position and
substituted for them an almost feudal
system of personal loyalty. This was
essentially what the FOhrerprinzip
meant. He viewed the Gauleiter,
especially, as loyal 'barons' who must
be supported in any conflict with the
A scene from the Nuremberg rally of 1934.
Images like this made Nazi Germany seem
efficient and invincible. The reality was in
many ways different.
traditional central or local government
authorities. Of course this structure
was to a certain extent determined by
Hitler's style of charismatic leadership
and the way he had controlled his
party before coming to power. To
safeguard his charisma and popularity
he frequently remained in the
background and allowed decisions to
emerge. In that sense the structure he
brought with him as party leader to
the Chancellorship did determine how
Nazi Germany was governed. This
point was made clearly by Ernst Rudolf
Huber, the leading constitutional
theorist of the Third Reich:
'The office of Fuhrer has
developed out of the National
Socialist Movement. In its origins
it is not a state office. This fact
must not be forgotten if one
wishes to understand the
current political and legal
position of the Fuhrer. The office
of the Fuhrer has grown out of
the movement into the Reich,
firstly through the Fuhrer taking
over the authority of the Reich
Chancellor and then through his
taking over the position of Head
of State. Primary importance
must be accorded to the
position of " Fuhrer of the
movement" . '11
Yet this picture of a charismatic, god­
like Hitler acting like a 'remote umpire'
12 did not stop him from making
decisions where his interests were fully
engaged, particularly in matters of
foreign policy, rearmament and
strategy, as we shall see below.
The Pressures on Hitler
Kershaw has observed that Hitler 'if
not a "weak dictator" ... was not
" master in the Third Reich" in the
implied meaning of omnipotence' . 13
I
To understand H itler's role in Nazi Germany and how he tried to implement his pol icies a synthesis of both
the l ntentiona list and Structuralist approach is needed .
No ruler is ever total ly master of events
and H itler, too, did come u nder
pressures from both withi n the Nazi
movement and as a result of
economic, socia l and i nternational
factors.
The Nazi Party lacked the clout of
the Bolsheviks i n the USSR and
arguably, at least up until the last
stages of the Third Reich, had to l ive
with the Army, big business and the
bureaucracy; but nevertheless it could
put pressure on H itler. The Gauleiter,
who, as we have seen, were fiercely
loyal to H itler, could exert considerable
i nfluence on h i m . Rauschning pointed
to the paradox that ' Each one of these
men was in his power, but together
they held him i n theirs. They resisted
with robust unanimity every attem pt
to set limits to their rights of
sovereignty' . 14 It was above all i n the
area of his policy towards the Jews
that he came u nder the greatest
pressu re from the i m patience and
crude prejudices of his party. The party
activists were a nxious to settle what
they regarded as old scores with the
Jews, whereas H itler had to take some
note of the i nternational or domestic
situation, particularly in the period
1 933-36. The Structuralists arg ue that
H itler was forced to appease the Party
i n order to stop it from taking the law
i nto its own hands and com m itting
atrocities which might lead to an
i nternational trade boycott of Nazi
Germany. Hence such token policies
as the boycott of Jewish shops on 1
April 1 93 3 . Similarly they point out
that the N u remberg Laws of
September 1 93 5 were again a
response to party pressu re and did not
go nearly as far as the activists wished .
I n short, they do not see these
measures as part of a plan ned
programme but rather as concessions
to Party pressure. The l ntentionalists,
on the other hand, see H itler as a
' stage manager' or 'skilful tactician
waiting u ntil the time was ripe before
making the next move · . 1 s
The events leading u p to the
Holocaust are crucial i n determining
H itler's ' power' in the Thi rd Reich . The
Structuralists aga i n stress that it was
j ust as much the resu lt of m uddle and
improvisation as of any clear planning.
Borsht i ndeed cal ls it a 'way out' of a
blind ally i nto which the National
Socialists had manoeuvred
themselves' . 1 6 G iven the horror of
what happened, it is not surprising
that Lucy Dawidowicz should dism iss
this as a ' mechanistic i nterpretation ' 1 7
which comes near to seeing H itler as
the victim of events. I n fact, to
u nderstand the Holocaust a synthesis
of both the l ntentionalist and
Structuralist approaches is needed
to stri ke the rig ht balance
between H itler's u ndoubted
overal l intentions to destroy
E u ropean Jewry i n one way or
a nother and the way this
actually happened withi n the
context of the war on the
Eastern Front.
Agai n similar questions
a rise with both H itler's
economic and foreign policy.
Tim Mason in his essay 'The
Legacy of 1 9 1 8 for National
Socialism' 1 8 argued strongly that
economic tensions prevented h i m
from pressing on with his rearmament
programme as q uickly as he wished .
Fearful of a repeat of the strikes and
riots of the autumn of 1 9 1 8, H itler
treated the workers with kid gloves
and avoided creati n g an effective war
economy which would have i mposed
hardshi ps on them. Mason d rew on
evidence from post-war studies of the
German economy by Klein and others
that suggested that the ' scale of
Germany's economic mobilization for
war was real ly q u ite modest' . 1 9 There
is certa i n ly plenty of evidence to show
that H itler was concerned to placate
the workers. H itler observed to Otto
Strasser in 1 930 that 'the mass of the
working classes want nothing but
bread and games' . 20 To defuse
i ncreasing tension i n the Ruhr and
other industrial areas i n 1 93 5-36 H itler
actually agreed on a temporary basis
to g ive priority to food imports over
armament prod uction . In this sense
there were i nevitably restrai nts on
H itler, which, while not making him a
'weak dictator', at least showed that
he was not omnipotent. However,
later studies on the German war
economy indicate that Mason
probably overestimated 'the stu bborn
despairing refusal of the worki ng
classes to become the selfless servants
of the regime'. 2 1 In fact, as Overy has
shown, H itler had made giant strides
towards developing a large-scale
defence-based economy, but even
here there were serious problems, and
by 1 939 the German economy was
stil l in the process of transformation
i nto a n effective war economy. 22 This
aga i n i l l u strates that H itler l i ke any
other politician worked under
practical restrai nts.
A sim i lar picture emerges with his
foreign policy. There is no shortage of
documents showing that H itler's a i ms
were the destruction of Bolshevik
Russia and the creation of Lebensraum
i n the former Soviet territories. The
i ntentionalist ' Programme Schoo l '
a rg ues that H itler's policy was drawn
up in the m i d 1 920s and remained
' remarkably consistent . . . in spite of
History Review March 2002 1 3
 his flexible approach to details' .2 3 This
presupposes naturally that Hitler was
without any shade of doubt 'master in
the Third Reich'. Yet here too the
Structuralists seek to modify this
picture. Mason argues that by the end
of 1 937 the economic problems
facing Hitler were so grave that they
Could only be solved in the context of
a brief but victorious war. Certainly the
financial and industrial assets and the
sources of manpower gained through
the occupation of Austria in March
1 938 and Czechoslovakia a year later
were very welcome in easing the
financial, industrial and military
bottlenecks in Germany; but there is
no evidence that Hitler's awareness of
an impending economic crisis actually
pushed him into war in September
1 939. He had, after all, long been
convinced that only the acquisition of
Lebensraum would solve Germany's
economic problems.
Hitler certainly dominated German
foreign policy, but, as with his
economic and Jewish policies he could
not escape the pressure of
circumstances. Contrary to his earlier
intentions he ended up in 1 939
fighting the British Empire, which he
originally hoped to have as an ally, and
in a relationship of benevolent
neutrality with the power he was
pledged to dismember, the USSR. In
the summer of 1 940 the refusal of the
British Empire to surrender caused him
further problems. When he eventually
reverted to his original intentions and
invaded the USSR in Juhe 1 94 1 , Britain
still remained undefeated. He was
thus trapped in what he· had always
wanted to avoid - a war on two fronts.
Conclusion
Hitler was in many areas a lazy dictator
and his methods of government were
chaotic, but this is not to say that he
was a weak ruler as such. By the end
of 1 934 there was little· real opposition
to his regime. He was therefore able to
press on with rearmament and, at the
latest by the spring of 1 936, to pursue
his own foreign policy objectives. It
was he who gave the orders for the
14 History Rrnew March 2002
occupation of the Rhineland, for the
Anschluss, the occupation of Bohemia
and the attack on Poland. Throughout
the war he made the major strategic
decisions as his refusal to pull back
from Stalingrad showed only too
clearly. On the other hand Hitler, like
any other politician, was often
susceptible to pressure from his party,
as his policy towards the Jews shows.
He also very evidently felt that there
was a point beyond which he could
not push the workers. for fear of
provoking strikes and unrest. He came
up, too, against intractable factors in
the economy and in the international
situation. To understand Hitler's role in
Nazi Germany and how he tried to
implement his policies a synthesis of
both the lntentionalist and
Structuralist approach is needed.
References
1 . Both quoted in Ian Kershaw, The
Nazi Dictatorship: Problems and
Perspectives of Interpretation (3rd
edition, London, 1 999), p. 60.
2. D. Irving, Hitler's War (London,
1 977), Introduction.
3.A. Bullock, 'Hitler and the Origins of
the Second World War' in The Origins
of the Second World War, ed. E. M.
Robertson (London, 1 97 1 ), p. 193.
4. Nazism, 7 9 1 9-45, Vol.2. State,
Economy and Society, 1933-39, ed. , J .
Noakes, and G. Pridham (Exeter,
1 984), p. 200
5·. Ibid., p. 1 96.
6. Kershaw, Nazi Dictatorship; p. 68.
7. A. Speer, Inside the Third Reich
(London, 1 970), p. 1 3 1 .
8. Pridham and Noakes Vol.2 . p. 197.
9. D. Schoenbaum, Hitler's Social
Revolution {London, 1 967), p. 209.
1 0. Pridham and Noakes, Nazism; vol.
2, p. 205.
1 1 . Ibid., pp. 1 98-9.
1 2. E.N. Petersen, The Limits of Hitler's
Powers (Princeton, 1 969), p. 4.
1 3. Kershaw, Nazi Dictatorship, p. 79.
1 4. Quoted in Ibid., p. 72 .
1 5. D. Bankier, ' Hitler and the Policy­
making Process on the Jewish
Question' in Holocaust and Genocide
Studies, Vol.3, no. 1 , 1988, pp. 4-5.
1 6. M. Broszat, ' Hitler and the Genesis
of the · " Final Solution '" in Aspects of
the Third Reich, ed. H.W. Koch
(London, 1985), p. 405.
1 7. L. Dawidowicz, The War Against
the Jews (Penguin, 1 986),
Introduction.
18. T. Mason, 'The Legacy of 1 9 18 for
National Socialism' in A. Nicholls and
E. Matthias, eds., German Democracy
and the Triumph of Hitler (London,
1 97 1 ), pp. 2 1 5-39.
19. B. H. Klein, Germany's Economic
Preparations for War (Harvard, 1959),
p. 78.
20. Nazism, 1 9 1 9- 1 945, Vol. 1 , The
Rise to Power, 7 9 7 9- 7 934, ed.
Pridham and Noakes, (second edition,
Exeter, 1 998), p. 66.
2 1 . T. Mason, ' Labour in the Third
Reich, 1 933-39' in Past and Present,
Vol 33, 1 966, p. 1 37.
22 . See R. Overy, 'The Nazi Economy'
in History Review, no. 3 1 , pp. 4-8.
23. A. Hillgruber, 'England's Place in·
Hitler's plans for World Dominion' in
Journal of Contemporary history, Vol .
9, No. 1 , 1 974, p . 7 .
Further Reading
Ian Kershaw, The Nazi Dictatorship:
Problems and Perspectives of
Interpretation ( 1 999)
M. Broszat, The Hitler State ( 1 98 1 )
H. Mommsen, ' National socialism:
Continuity and Change', in Walter
Laqueur, ed. Fascism, A Reader's
Guide ( 1 979)
E. N. Peterson, The Limits of Hitler's
Power ( 1 969)
D.G . Williamson, The Third Reich
( 1995)
David Williamson was Head of History
and Politics at Highgate School,
London, until 1 999. He has recently
completed a book on the Cold War for
Hodder and a third and expanded
edition of his Longman Seminar Study,
The Third Reich.