Scribd Logo
Upload

Welcome to Scribd!

  • 416 views

    An Introduction To The Theology of Rudolf Bultmann. II

    Uploaded by

    José Castañeda
    Bultmann

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as PDF or read online from Scribd
    Flag for inappropriate content

    You might also like

    An Introduction To The Theology of Rudolf Bultmann. II

    Uploaded by

    José Castañeda
    416 views16 pages
    Bultmann

    Original Title

    An Introduction to the Theology of Rudolf Bultmann. II

    Copyright

    © © All Rights Reserved

    Available Formats

    PDF or read online from Scribd

    Did you find this document useful?

    Is this content inappropriate?

    Report this Document
    Bultmann

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as PDF or read online from Scribd
    Flag for inappropriate content
    Download as pdf
    416 views16 pages

    An Introduction To The Theology of Rudolf Bultmann. II

    Uploaded by

    José Castañeda
    Bultmann

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as PDF or read online from Scribd
    Flag for inappropriate content
    Download as pdf
    of 16
    An Introduction to the Theology of Rudolf Bultmann WALTER SCHMITHATS SCM PRESS LTD ‘Trasalated by John Bowden from the German % Die Thole Rolf Bultmenns, Hine Vnfhring J.C.B. Moh [Paul Sebel, Tubingen Suan ition, 1967 ‘To the parish of Reumland ‘with grtafel memories 03334 007194 Firat pubibed 2958 by SCM Pre Led ‘56 Blosnbary Steet London WC (© SCM Press Led 2568, Pineda Gres Brita by Westen Printing Series Ee ‘Bristol 2 Theology as Talk of God BuLraann writes: “The subject of theology is God eae. ‘where he puts it ‘Ta his stution he thelogan has now, in ‘ur view, th imposible ask oftsking of Gd. Whatever cae vould be talk of?" These sentences clery expres he tank of theology. They do not say anything surprising oF unvaual. ‘The concept ‘theology’, ‘hee’ fa Gres, simply means “Goda, and f would obvinunly Be acacen te fll i sich was not of God ‘theslgy, ‘The concept occurs in ‘arious forms in Gresk philosophy after the ime of Pat in {his vent of talk of Go the god, or the divine. The Churc ‘manfred it at fet hesitating But after the Contatine era without hesitation, w Christian tlk of God, which now emerged victorious over pagan theology athe te theslogy God is thus the subject ofall theology, and to this extent, of Christian theology too. As Bulsmann fa doing thology, iis auite cea that he 00, want to tall of Gods ‘Whatever ee ‘ould het of? ‘But Bultmann fel that fis not unimportant to sts the fact that theology mean tlk of God for in is view Christin theslogy has aot always kept cfs abject, and thus hes led itaelf into abwurdity Bultmann's charge aginst liberal theo: logy, for example, shat ‘thas not desi with God, but with sat! "Thin ita grave charge. Bue if Uberal theslogy seek Theology as Talk of God God's salvation realized in and through human personalities, and the formation of personaly is presented to man as task that he can fulfil, chen the charge i evidently not unjustified. ‘Such eiticism makes it clea chat Buleman is concerned that God should be thought ofa the only meaningful subject of ll, theological work. in that case of course, the theologian who wants to do theology as ‘theolga, thats as ‘God-all, i faced with the inevitable question how one can thea speak of God, indesd how one can speak of im at all Bltasna wed this question in 1925 a9 the tile for significant and much-read article: “What Sense Does it Make to Talk of God?’ In the light of this formulation, we may remember tat in the words quoted atthe beginning of this chapter Bultmann calls theoiogy’s task of talking of God an ‘impossible’ one, and therfore atk: In what way i this tok “mmposible"? How far ait enjoined on us finan impowible tank? And finally, how far doe ie make sense, even though it is imposible?” Fist of all, it must be pointed out that Bultmann often wees ‘biblical expresions to talk about an inappropriate concep of God. “Gad is nota datum’, that i, not an object, ‘which we ean recognize in more or less the sume way ss other objects." The ‘question of the appropratenes (adequacy) of our knowledge of God, which has at times occupied theology a great deal, is thus tobe rejected completely; for in any case i imagines God as an object, ‘of which direct knowledge is ponble.* But ‘whatever the form in which such knowledge may be asserted, ‘iteould sil not take us to Gad, who can never be something siven, something remaining steady, as it wer, for the obser~ vee" Anyone who imagines God at an object which i directly scceasible to human understanding or tothe human hear, is still moving in the context ofthe Greek view of Go, fr which npp36 8. Nib, peo Nib. 3 Introduction to the Theolegy of Bltrann God lke man, is part of one single world, This world, the conros, has for the Greeks a well-ordered form; itis bounded snd complete in tel. The unity ofthe coumoe embraces gods and men. There is no place for any transcendent ephete’ Burana is fond of quoting Plato, Gorgias so7e-soBa, second ing to whieh the wise men say: ‘Heaven and earth and gods ‘and men are held together by communion and friendship, by ‘ordedinese, temperance and justice; and that is the eason why ‘they eal he whole of this world by the name of order (coemos), not of disorder or disoluteneas.... Now you have filed to ‘observ the great power of geometrical equality amonget both igode and men. If gods and men belong to the are order, are subjext tothe same cosmic Inws and both ahare in the one nature, the gods are naturally the object of rational human, knowledge, and this reason recognizes thatthe transcendence of the divine isto be understood ‘as transcendence over every~ thing concrete and individual, overall coming to be and pass ing away,” everything that is characteristic of the human clement in the cosmos Tn Judaism, however, ‘a wholly diferent conception of God’ prevala® "The transcendence of God is not thought of inthe ‘Bible in terms of the sprit which i beyond the sphere ofthe ‘mateil and the sensible, as timeleseness in contrast to coming to be and pasting eway, but simply as authority, the indi posablty and constant Futurity of God. ‘In his relation to the wld, God is... the creating wil. He commands, and it happens; he decrees, and it exists (Pa. 33.9). For his glory he ‘reated the world, and all bis works must praise him. Tn ‘his elation to mar, God isthe sovereign Lord who deals with san sccording to hia will a the potter with the clay, who ejects whom he wil and has mercy on whom he wil. His wil Dis Urcvistetom, pp. 128 & inate 1 rite, mie hint «Sou. ead Wot 9). "Ginter and Vetch, 3 pcp "Jeu. 04 ous aed he Ward. 9) 4 Tiology at Talk of God thas presribed for man whats good and evil" Man does not sake God the objec of his reson: ‘Man has only to an what ‘the Lord requires ‘eis exactly the same in the New Testament, "That God's existence is not an objectively perceptible, mere exating like ‘hat ofa thin, is indicated by 1 Cor. 84-6. At the beginning ‘ofthis pasage, Poul ret assets that theres no God but one’ “If God were being spoken of as only @coumic Thing” rune ‘Bultmana’s interpretation, ‘the statement, “there i no God ‘but one”, would not be right at all; for in this sense of “ia”, ‘other gods and lords are as Paul explicitly declares in the ‘verses mentioned. Bu or us the spostie asserts, ‘there is only ‘one God, the Father..." Pau in thus obviously apeaking of the one true God aot ae af a ‘higher being’ a an object that is tohand. The real Godi rather our God, the God with whom ‘man has unconditionally to reckon, But we must move on. Bultmann writes: ‘Nor i God “self= _actualizing" or “enacualized” in the sense of an ideale philo- ‘sophy." God appears 20 self-actualisng, for instance, in Hegel's philosophy and among the theological Hegelian, according to whom he realizes himself in the continuing ‘process in which the ‘Spi’ finds the way to itself. As the “unactualzed, God inreal inthe Logos, which les atthe roote ‘of rational human life!” God occur in this way, for example, ‘in the pantheam of Stoic philosophy ‘ss the law ruling in the ‘universe which gives form to all phenomens—law which differs from the mocern natural Inw because itis not wholly land eosatally dened by th concept of cause and effect but rather by the concept of a creative, active, formgiving power’ which is identical ith man reason. In the light bid. (bid peteo) Bid, 95 id, 9 (Thole, 299 Gash ted Feather mi "Soh pp. 991 Gent ond the Word 9.9): 35 Introduction tothe Theology of Bultman ‘ofthe biblical concept of God, such tk of God seems to be jt God represents the total eub- Tination of man, his negation, his questioning, indeed judg ment for man." The biblical God stands over agsinet the ‘world and isnot immanent in it So we do net have God in any form asthe given, the self-actualizing or the ‘unactualzed’ ‘whom we could have at our digposlin thought oration. It is clear that all these cemarks do not present statements ‘which are characteristic only of Bulemann’s cheology. What Ina been suid so far simply expresses a fundamental recog- nition of ell proper biblical theology, that God isthe “wholly other’. Man can speak of him, ony if he makes him an object of knowledge, only by the eia negations, by denying him the properties ofthe cosmos. ‘This certainly leads the way t0 an appropriate concept of God, But it need hardly be said that in thi process one sll does not come up agnnst God himself For a8 God isnot in any way a datum, he isnot a datum for ‘ou conceptual thought. God is there aly when he gives him ‘al So Batman fally agrees with Karl Bart in claiming that Ged in only known ‘when he reveals himeel?:% and thie elation, a8 God's revelation, is necesurily contingent, that tan event introduced by God slone, a fre act of God. ‘Theology as tlk of God is possible only in “talking of the relation of God a2 a. event—an eternal event, but all a9 vent.§! Without revelation, would in fact and without ‘question be an ‘impossible tsk’ to tlk about God. ‘This is noe the place to discuss the understanding of rev tion in Bukmann’s theology; that wil be done a the appro- prise time. Even without further discusion of the concept of revelation, it seems clear that if God revesle himeel, if he -mues himtelf known, it becomes pomible to speak of God by speaking of his revelation. (God ie never there aallepar from Gabe nd Vereen 1,9 18 ‘Die Page der “dllchen Thesoge’ 4. 6 ‘Theolgy as Talk of God sevelaion’* but ‘in the event of revelation... God is sccesible to man'** At this point, however, where our introdvetory questions neem have found an answer, the reel probiem for Bultmann ‘begins When he cll tll of God an ‘impossible tack’, he doce so. Christian theologian, that it 60 theologian who wants ‘otalkof God on the basis of revelation and only on tis basis. ‘He thus calls the very talk of God enjoined by revelation an Smpomibiliy! Dut ia that case, how fs even tlk of the God ‘who reveals imself an ‘impossible task’? T shall begin by quoting the fret paragraph from the 1925 article ‘What Sente Does it Maks to Talk of God? which T Ihave already mentioned. Bultmana writes: If we understand talking of God” to mean “ealking about God!” then such talk ‘has no meaning at all, for the moment it tke place it ha lost ite object, God. Wherever the thought of “God” comes to ‘mind, i suggests that God is the omaipotet, that i, the ‘reality that determines everything. But this i not the thought ‘tat is expreed when I tlk about God, Le. when I regard God ss an object of thought about which I can take my bear- §ngs, fT occupy a standpoint from which T an approach the ‘question of God in neutral way and make hypotheses sbout God's reality and his nature, which I can either reject or, if they ae illuminating accept. Anyone who has been infuenced, by particular considerations to accept the realty of God can be quite certain that he has grasped nothing of the reality of God; and anyone who thinks that he can say something about ‘the retity of God by means of proofs for the existence of God i arguing overaphastom. For any kindof “tlking about” prenuppotes «standpoin: outside the object of the diacoure. ‘There is, however, no standpoint outside God, and 20 God cannet be spoken of in general statement, general truths, 8 Ginuben und Vote 19142 a7 Introduction tothe Theology of Bultmars hich are trae without reference to the concrete existential situation of the person who ie speaking" ‘These statements can be understood in themselves without any great dificulty. Fiat of all they repeat what we have already outlined 8 the ‘wholly other’, God cannot become an abject at the digpossl of our thought and our knowledge But they go fir beyond an atsertion of this kind. Wherever "God! is mentioned inthis paragraph we could subatiute'God's revelation’, and perhaps we shoul; for Bultmann speaks of no ‘other God than the God of the Christian revelation. But the problems of the statements remain the same. It isa meaning- lesa to speak sbout God's revelation a it isto speak about God. "To want to prove the reality of God's revelation ns folah as to want to prove the existence of Gad. And if there iano stand point outside God, then ofcourse theres no standpoint outside God's reoelation, ia 0 fr as this realy ia Gad’ revelation. ‘But how is that I have nothing todo with God or God's revelation when I talk about God, tht i, about God's revela- tion? Bultmann's assertion that Iam not speaking about God stall when I peak about him, is nots easy to understand ashi assertion that God, asthe ‘wholly othe’, eannot immediately, ‘hati, without his revelation, be the object of my thought and speech, OF courte, if there can be no standpoint outde God, then we cannot i Gust tall about Cody ory we ean only tll shout God in such a way that we are atthe sane ime talking about ourelves. But why cannot we have a standpoint ouside God? Bultmann does not want to aay that God i immanent in ‘the world of men or the human spit. On the contrary! He streates—as we have seen—very strongly that God sands over ‘against man. So according to Bultmann, man eannot ¢<3py any standpoint outside the God who encounters him as the ‘wholly othe’ from beyond all that is human. “Here we come up against one of the basic phenomena of Bultmann’s theology, which is not only significant for the dy p36. Phelgy at Th of God _queon of meningfl tak bout Gd but alo permeates all Te theological thnght. We muse therfore segue an ade- Gute prop of ik, The pheaomenon is that of the subject Ghjec pattern of thought andthe overcoming aft. According te idich Gagan, the uber object patra i instio= tbly linked with the Cartesian view of the world and of Tealty'#¥ Daltmana ia of the sume opinion, that, ‘since the Renaicance and the Enlightenment it has dominated our though, under theinfuene ofthe view ofthe world eld by Geek ence The abject objec pater thus a modern form of thought In this pattern Descartes, by means of the capt, pos an bolted subject and thus, incritably, an ‘uly bolted obec and betmeenebjet and objet there Si gep. Thistlaton of abject and object does not, however, correspond tothe origcal muthentie understanding of ran, wrrld and God. Wheres for modern thought ‘encounter Treas the groping of objects by me, encounter’ eiginlly that hn a mrt medi at oe, F xample i inpnble fc the Bible to regard man a8 an foteed being overpense God andthe worl, or God and the wrocld a object fer human consideration and at human dis- onlin other worst ‘ojetvie’ them. Anyone who, 82 Ertan theologian thinks and speak within the subject jes pattern mo longer in harmony eth what mean a the Bible, Christin theology thus ha he urgent tk of over- coming the subjeceobject pater. ‘Since our thinking, ‘Speci inthe incr, han been conducted in accordance Sw els ptt for he pnt es banded year o 0) the Ibjecebjecr patern aanot be overcome except by a very considerable efor, an effort which requires ime™™—a sate- trent the truth of which wil cersinly and unfortunately?) be "nh Corten,Barothaiienng wad Kick, pp. 3 expt te Hy, 2) Tih Pensa ps = 1 Goguten Bongo Rice p45 Deming ool fstn. 39" 39 Introduction to he Theology of Bulmer, confirmed duting the course of this study. Gogarten, who made the statement in an stampt to defend Bultmann agrnst attacks on his theology, ers some hope i the fat that modern science, which stamped the eubject-object pattern on our consciousness in the ninetenth century, ix at present in pro- cess of overcoming this putern, Bultmnan derives his recog nition of the danger of thesubject-object pattern and his view of ways of overcoming it fom his time asa pupil of Wilhelm Hlerrmana, and has conatntly made full use ofthis recog- nition In his encounter wih Karl Barth and Martin Heideg ter, hin concern van intinsfied and his concepts further elarifed, ‘Bultmann is fond of elucidating the problems involved here by refering to the phenomena of love, ftiendahip or tru. Can I, as subject, preset ove to myelf as an object, ‘objee~ tivize’ it, eo that becomes the object of my thought, epecch and judgment? Or, can I make the person Ilove the object of ‘an investigation into the phenomenon of love? Jf I do this, 1 min any cae puting myeelf outside love. But that ito deny love itself for lave i there ony where someone i loved, where Tam ‘in love’, and not where T talk about love. Asan object of ry consideration, love hasalready come to an end, whatever [may say about it; the loved one is no longer my’laved one however much I might lke wo have it otherwiee. One can leo look ati this way: I cannet love another person after I have established tht they deserve my love; ony i love ite do I perceive that they are worthy of my love. Bultmann write: ‘Love is no datum, in respat of which ie would be possible to ‘ac of not to act, to speak ort to speak. It exists only as @ ‘determination of life itslt itis there only if Tlove or am loved, not alongside this orbehind it!" Love, therefore, is nat ‘an object. A father who talks about love to his child ean in 90 doing deny lve to his child, oven if he ays the right thing. T do not have control over lve an I do, for example, over an © Glaabon ed Vetche,t 7. ° Theology as Talk of God apple, which I can eave hanging on a te or pluck off and ‘at. Whatever I do or da nat do withthe apple, iis» dure for me, before all my action. Not to love; that is real only in ite accomplishment. ‘A young man who wants to find out about this (Future) bride by means of a detective agency will not get toknow her atall as ahe i, becaute that doesnot disclose itself to objective inapection, but only to existential encounter.” jun the ame wth rut Fendaip the reatin of ftber and child: Lean tak about feendshlp and ino doig nya good deal dat [Sto the prints an writen peychology of fendi, Nevertheless, inal hia Tencounter no real fiendshp. Feendblp does no happen this way Here Tam nobody's dead and do sot have or me a feed ‘nla thin writing ting abou iendahipheppena By chance to be fief an ac of fndship,pechap Beene Iu aceeding tothe equst of «fiend fe communicating ny oughta But tat fuel ‘le clear that endship someting other than an objet of my feflecion, Were 1, for example, to investigate the tokens of my ‘ene fiendhip with a view to dacoverng wether or nat they ‘wee genuin, theron of fendsip would leady have ben ‘destroyed. So cannot bjetve endship in a meaningful way 1 an only live it and experience i. Nov the experience of Tends dou aay with the subjes-objec pater; fr ia that eae Tam 0 longer evi ny fiend or indahip over agsnat myoelf a an ob- jet am in rendaip, Cam ‘mye only ath the Gren, wheter Tam eoiving or showing fendaip [Now itis jst the same with God and our relationship to hh, Bultmana poines out that Luther, in his lectures on Genesis, sar that the real sin of Adam was not that he ate the forbidden fruit, but that he allowed himself to ask: ‘Did not God say?” In so doing he made God, or his word, his fevelation, a matter for dispute, He set himself up against God's demand, ia order to pass judgment on it. This ds- ‘putare de Deo, in which man makes God his object, brings About the division into subject and abject, which is inappro- pate tothe reality of God. The objected God is no longer Gann and Vereen 3,286. Mb, 2, 7. * Introduction tthe Theoley of Bultrann the true God, but an idol; the revetation whichis reduced to the satus of an object is no longer God's revelation, but contin in its denying the existence of God with ecientie ‘means. A discipline which asserts or proves the realty of God i no leas atheistic; for in both cases God is made the object of Tnuman thought; man imagines him at an object and en- counters him in just the same way as a heavenly body or an atom—in other words, he no longer encounters God, ‘Martin Heidegger calls the age in which man objecties everything that encounters him ‘the age of aubjectiy’. Bult- ‘mann cal this understanding of reality ‘the disposition of en entire epech to the world and history, a disposition which is ‘now takea for granted’¥ In this age God is teen and talked bout in salogy to the world. But anyone who talks in this way has already lost the object of his discourse, God, for God cannot properly be spoken of within the aubject-oject pat ‘tern if hes te reality that governe man in his concrete situa= tion, If God is portrayed as one entity among others even the suprene entity in the world or as an entty beyond the ‘world, ‘God? may of course be the object of though and die- course. But according to Bulemann’s interpretation of biblical statements, God isin no way the supreme entity, but the all- determining power, so that we are still a long way fom, the notioe of ‘God’ if we conceive of God as aupreme being. “The Bible doesnot portray God and his revelation apart ofthe world of entities, indeed it eannot do so, forthe ubjectobject ‘paternal lien ot, The distinction of subject and object "ust therefore be kept quite separate from the question of our ‘existence (before God) '8'Det Goteagedanke und der moderne Mensch’, pp. 335 (The gg of Got and Modem Sten’ p80). Pa Thalogy at Tal of Cod ‘We ean now understand why for Bultmana thee can be no standpoint outside God. Not becsuse God wold be immanent in the worl or in man, but because God is only real where he determine the existence of man, where his claim on us is per- ceived in auch a way that ‘or anyone to put himeelf outside God would bea repudiation of God's claim onus, It would be sodlesnen, sin. The situation would only be diferent if there ‘could be « neutrality towards God. ‘That, however, would be the end ofthe ides of God. “Encounter with God a the ‘wholly other’ ia therfore not the isolated encounter ofthe subject which portays the werd for itself cof the object, which man portrays for himself it represents man’s being determined from beyond himelf, and that relly does mean his Being determined by ths encounter from beyond. Here is something which he ia notin himself: he encounters it, and indeed only encounters it where be is {elated tothe encounter in all i ealiy. As the wholly other’, God is ot reached by religious exateton to a sphere beyond rman, but is revealed to the man who lives in the midst of his ‘world in encounter with him. Thus if one separte the etate- ment that God is the ‘wholly othe' from the other efatement that hei "the reality chat determines our existence’ the eate- ‘ment can only mean that God i something quite diferent from ‘man, a metaphysical being, some sort of eherel world, some sort of complex of mysterious forces, a creative source or, finally, the Irational’* To talk of God in this way i, how- veri era of tlh ofthe seal Gud, yullesnen; for when L “alk in this way T return to my interest, my understanding, my {fecling and my imagination, but I do not venture my lie, my ‘concrete existence. I cannot know of God outside myeell “without exposing myself to the els of God. The God whois Jomethng wholly other aan idl; only the God who encounters ‘me as the one oho is the wholly other, s God. TR ae 2 Intreduction tothe Theology of Bultmann In common iss of Cod a rare ot be valid cy brane ye ing a et SSE wae Sepul Tae apne oho ls stn Gol ‘acenune unor pag Mi eames be a ‘Sur he nc pl ef Go the hati bear bey th chat ants et ‘tg at a's apn Ton ene if Gov tmcndece 1 ato wlch two tuys Gots ‘cadence tndrond a pal ture concede ana ‘Siro Golan secterty botnet ease npc, 2 dates ined Got be aennga ‘aber nphndon oft of Godin abot God ss pro htc Gods ange ts nee ilgSoh dtu the et Gd ester fx cater ips ponent Gat ray ea ally whhenhunien me Acsing Balsa ‘anng Jams te bgaing we te Word andthe Wd ur wih Gotan te Won we Gol Thu God Word asa Etsy acs fa oly eye he eed promi el pest Wee. "A Inpho hn re f Gi te ing at he cena of Go cosy ot oem sey fod en ‘Seay he ps ca, cso cc 1 Ged ie Eneane ant rn St en ort ede tnd nth ig nat he ms new Geant ‘iy te hen we deo th yo tl thn nme, Hein ng life from himself. =m ‘What we have said results ina principle fo all legitimate ‘tll about God. We ean only talk about Godin talking sbout ourselves: ‘Any tll about reality which ignore the element in ‘which alone wean have what i real, Le. our ov existence, is self-deception. God is never something tobe seen from out” side, something at our disposal, an “objective".** God's reve- lation would net be Gal's revelation if we apoke of it in general statements, general truths, which are true without reference to the concrete existential situation ofthe epenker.** ‘Or: "The Christan faith speaks ofa revelation which ft under- es ‘Theology ex Tall of God stands to mean God's act as an event which isnot visible to ‘the objectvizng thought of reason, an event which an revela- ‘tion doesnot communicate doctrines, but concerns the exist- fence of man and teaches im, or better, authorizes him, to “Gnderstand himself us sustained by the transcendent sower of God?" That is why theologieal discoure is in tel anthro- pologcal discourse, talk about God is tak sbout maa, know= fede of man is 2 necessary condition of the posobility of legitimate talk about God or about revelation as the ation of God. ‘The docuine of exeation ny onc pin serve isa ti, Butuan wate ‘The affemaon that od i etor exnct be & Sorel ements God rat mada eet, ‘The fimaton can oly bea personal eaefenion tha we ‘uaftobes teatro tence 9 Gorm be ‘Rude aee metal water, but only an thanking and wu ede ‘The fatowing pargraph from Baleana's Tole of the New "ata, for enone that in Bane onc, the Mew Testament rover apeiaimone wap about God and in & onlay diferent way soot ec! "Pouline theology in 08 & ‘Spelane pte dot with God not ae nin ac but only Picinignicant for man, for man's eaponiityand for me's ‘Simin, Conspondigly dos no del is the wore ad an rein henley, but sonny ses the or asd anf ist vlan to God very sutton about God i sinutaneousy {i auertionsbout man, advice ver, For thi reson mod in ha hoe Pras thosngy ia at the sane tine, stron” More ‘Siti, cvery neon abo Godan nate Sos man hd wtachedermnde of kim: An, comely tery seronsbout funspehs ot Cola deed nd demandor about man ae qual Tad iy the divine deed sed Somand and by hs sacs towerde thee Ina aimfar way, Bloneaninerpes Paine logy ltely a wteogy tht a bout Chr oly ewnngl sper Gotteygedante und der moderne Mens’, ps 342 (The denat God and Modern Man 8) “Sena Crt ond eho. 6 Trot ppt (Thole, rp. 1906). 35 Introduction to the Theology of Bulemana ‘talk about a's sleton. Eten Jeus alla of God aly taf ‘hat man's wl claimed by God and is determined in hia present ‘rstene trough God's demand, bis judgment his grace The dis. ‘it God isthe sme ne the God eat at had, whose realy i tot tobe raped when aman se to eseape fom his own concrete ‘xutence, but precisely when he old fat. For discourse about God which transcends the subject- jet division, Dltmann i fond of referring to the Re- formers’ understanding of scripture. He quotes Luther: ‘And here we alao sce that to believe in Christ does not mean to ‘believe chat Christ is a person who is God and man; for that ‘would never help anyone; but that the same person is Christ, that that for our sakes he went out from God and eame into the world...” He often takes up Melanchthon's well-known saying "Christo copnoscere id et benfcia eis capnoscer' ("To know Christo know his benefits’) He further refer to his teacher, Wilhelm Herrmana, who stacked the separation of the act of thinking and the act of living and untiring seed that God ia experienced only in the totality of living, At one point he quotes him: ‘We cannot make a picture of him (the ‘Almighty) for ourselves. For what an almighty being isin him- ‘elf remains hidden from vs. But he han appeared tou in what Ihe has done for us. We can only say of God what he does for ‘us Tn his fet publication, a review of afew lines in the Cristian Word, in x910, Bultmann praises the book he is reviewing along the Knes hie teacher would take, because teaches the reader “to consider what is more important to him about Jesus, thoughts about him or the fe that he kindle Bulemann, of coare, feels tha the decision must be made for the later, Today he quotes younger theologians ike Detrich Bonhoefer: ‘God is the beyond in the midst of our life; or “The transcendent isnot the infiitely remote but the nearest Je 9 104 (Je and th Wards 210) i Ege tet en Te © Rec and Myth 36 Theology ex Talk of God st hand’; Gabriel Vahanian: ‘Faith ian attenpt o reconcile subject and object, eubjetive truth and objective realty, with- fut overwhelming either one of the terme/¥and others. He Understands all there quotations ata more or less precise and ‘explicie expresion of the one intention: ‘If we are fo speak of Gd, we mist evidently speak of ourelees. ‘To sum up: theology a talk of God ia possible for Bultmann only ie takes place onthe bass of revelation. Theology as tlle ‘of God on the basis of his revelation is possibl only if in talk ing of God it doesnot talk about God but of man. ‘But in that cae it poableto alk of God? Does this cease tobe a impossible tak'? ‘Not at all says Butmann, Even as talk of man, tlk of God wil remsins impossible all, and the ‘ask of theology remains an imposible task! How is that? ‘ltmann'sasertion wil become clear as on 28 We grasp what it means to tll about man, about one's elf. That, Bule- ‘mana think, is not slays understood properly, end is very often completely misunderstood. Te would be a misunderstanding, for insane, if I were to conclude from the statement that ‘to talk of God! means ‘to talk of mysel, chat God isnot ouside mysel, That could be a correct conclusion i 'to tall of mysel!” meast ‘to talk of my experiences’, But it dose not mean that at al Anyone who talks about his celigious experiences, his inner life his con- ‘ition, his faith, and thinks that he ia talking about God ‘would at est have to ask how the ‘wholly otherness! of God is revealed of can be made visible in such talk. Could these ex= periences not be an illusion? Te not doubt perhaps a more Sppropriate wide? Ta that caso) oi not acldeception iin temptation « man consoles himself with his enperiences? How can T be certain that Tam not giving somesne else a stone "Der Goneageanke und der moderne Mena, pe 242 ("The dag of Ged end Modern Man's p99) ‘hip 39 Ohi, . 9 Gabe ad Veriton 5 8 ” Introduction tothe Theology of Batman Instead of bread when I want to help him with my expeti- exces? My experiences are never aafeguarded agunst the large that God is only my cipher for proceases that go on, ‘within my soul, which has no reality apart from these pro- ceeet, Talking of oneelf fn taking of Ged can only make tense if what we mean is talking of God’ ston towarde us, Te that cate, it i ofcourse posnble that we ae talking of God ‘when we confess, when our inner hfe apeske, when our Tepes Weed “tsar when ha Consaanan ee tet of encounter with God, when itis tel God's act in us ‘But what happens ‘when we consider our confesion, our inner life, our experience, a something onthe basis of which ‘we trusted in God, as what we commended to others some- thing on he bai of which they should be sureof God’? Bult- ‘mann replies: ‘At that momeat we speak abwt our existence, sand have detached ourselves from it" We no longer live in God, but make our life in God the object of reflection, Once gun we fall vitim tothe eubject-objectpattrn. For our life, afout which we peak, i obviously a phantom or a pas reality bt nat lived, genuine, authentic life. Tn the life about which we speak, we ourselves are dead. God isnot tbe found in this ‘objetivized T, which no longer represents ourselves; for God is presen ony inthe accomplishment of existence. God ‘is event. When I speak about the occurrence of God ia my existence, the same thing happens as when I speak about God 1 ebjectivize the ooeurrence, become removed from it and thus ‘from God himself. The God outside my conerete existence is ‘an ido. IFT find « place for God in ny existence once it ha ‘became the object of my reflection, I show mreelf tobe infact godless. It is therefore the case that since Goo a fith knoe, in no higher being, but the power which determines our reality, tard since we therfore do not really exist without God, we ‘cannot talk about our existence any mare tan we can tall ‘abut God. The existence about which I tai is golem, and a8 ibid, pean. ibid, i # Theology at Talk of God such it ia no longer authentic human existence. If our exst- tence is grounded in God, i fs not to hand outside God, then to grasp our existence means to grasp God,’ writes Bult- ‘mann, and he would agre if we added: thus the objectfca- tion of our existence amounts tothe objectification of God and ‘thus tothe loss of our existence, i, the los of God. Nor can wwe really speak sbout our sin; for ‘otherwise should be able to distinguish myself from my sin, whereas in realty T am myself the sinner’. "Now, however, we are up agninat an sppareuty insoluble Aificolty whieh helpe va to understand Bultmann’s remark ‘thatthe tak of theology, to speak about God, isan imposible ‘one, We eannat speak about God because he isnot at our die- posal we must peak about ourselves if we want tospeak about God, Bu we cannot really epeak about ourelve, for as soon as swe do that we separate ourclves from ourselves, we make the Caperiences in which God encounters us the object of our con- ‘eration and thos become removed from God, namely, from ‘eacounter with God, and oo no longer deal with our authentic ‘selfhood, ‘A man bas na contol in his ideas over this existential ‘self for he cannot stand to one side and observe it he it" ‘So: "We cannot talk about our existence because we cannot talk about God; and we cannot talk about God because we ‘cannot talk about our existence."# We could only do both at the sume time, and infact we can do neither. Ofcourse we ean ‘ay-—as we did at the beginning of this chapter—what the general significance of the idea of God i and what faith in God would have to mean; in other words, that the concept of "God, wed meaningfully, embraces the concepts of ‘teri’, ‘omnipotence’, ndisposability’, that God isthe realty which determines me, that e isnot part of the world of enite, that the cannot be abjectifed, ets. But in such talk God is only « iid, p36 Jena. 135 Stat end the Word, 148. ‘bi ptt id 4 2 Ginn ena Veto, 8-33 » Introduction tothe Thecogy of Bult pomibility, presupposed in thought. IL want to encounter his realty, talk ebout him is meaningles; for T do not have his realty in any word about him, but only in my existence—and fot in any talk about my existence but inthe concrete act of Cnistng, Thus according to Baltmann the paradox of theology tan “imposible tak’ does not consist in the fact ‘that—tke ‘ll eciences—it must speak objectively of fit, i the know. Tedge tha al tale finds fs meaning only in the transcending of objectification’. Tn that eis, is talk about God in fact impossible? Are we Jefe with nothing but lence? Bultmann puts this question and ‘adds ‘OF courte, at the same time thet would mena that we Should not act at all" by which he does not mean that we ‘cannot do anything more at all, The fact that we cannot talk about God doce not mean tht we cannot talk any more a ll. Rather, Bultmann apparently meant: if there is no longer any possibilty of talk of God, then the possibility of authentic human action, that i, conscious action from God, is exhausted. In that exte, quietam in speech and action would be the appropriate attinude. But “anyone who thought in this way ‘would be making the old mistake; he would be regarding the idee of God as something on the bans of which a particular ststude was possible or appropriate; the mistake cht the fof God can in fact be takan into account for our conduct as fomething given which we have at our dspowal’# Who, then, fan tell me that God commands me not to talk about him ‘because it ean impossible task’ from a human point of view, ‘because he wants to make thin tak x meaningful one? My Fellection swat Gun in longer centres on God if excludes this posriblity. Te fo thus the eame thing whether I old that God is accessible to my knowledge and act and speak accord ingly, or fel that he i inaccesible and therefore refrain from acting and speaking. In both cases I make God my object and ‘+ Dulonana sn Japes, Die Fre derEnomythlaierang . 72 1 Gabe and Varsha 33 oh, ° Theology at Talk of God am thus no longer with God. Silence asa resultof reflecting on ‘the impossibility of speaking about God would thus in fact ‘Simply be silence before an idol which wis regarded 8 ‘God. Silence about God is no nearer to him than talk about him, ‘Bolkmann’s positive view is that: “To sensunce theology ‘would be to renounce faith." He doesnot mean by this eate- ‘neat that if theology ended faith would eventually come to an ted-—though this might well be trie; his argument is that to eoounce theology would itself be an act of unbelief and is {Herefore impermissible, becruse such a renunciation ‘would fat recognize the significance of jutifcation for the paticu- far man snd his undertaKings—in this case the undertaking of theology—and would make the promise for him and his work ‘all and vok.** That is statement which might badly have ‘been expected at this point in our study, and it eannot be understood without further explanation. Our attempts to ‘understand it will a che same time help us t sce what Bult- ‘mann means when he regards tak of God ast the same time both impossible and yet required of theology. ‘To recapitulate: according to Bultmann we cannot speak ther about God oF about our existence; for God determines ‘ar existence. If we make our existence the object of reflection, ‘ye make God the object of refection, too, ané we loe God. If ‘ve reflect about God, we reflect about our ovn existence, and tb we have already aurrendered that, We havencither God nor cureeves as abject. "We could only speak meaningfully of God—and that mesns shout ourelves before God—if we could speak about him from God; in other words, f speaking of God or our authentic ‘alatence an determined by God were conerete act of existing ff encounter with God, That might happen if God encoun- fered usin such a way that our acknowledgment of hum took, ‘Due Problem ene theologichen Exegee’p 355. "ii " Introduction tothe Thacogy of Bultman place this encounter, rif hewo encounteredthehearef our ‘words that they le im toa concrete encounter with God by God himeelf encountering him in our words. Put in degiatic ‘term: tall about God from God is talk which is brought bout through the Holy Spirit, and is itself a'demonatstion of the spirit and of power. In sich talk, God changes ta about, ‘him into tlk from him, by making man's word about him into his word to man, Talk. from God is therefore God's own talkin the inadequate form of human talk about him. Tn this talk from God, the ecbject-object pattern is overcome throcgh the Spirit of God; God ie no more the object of my relectcn than is my existence; rather, by such talk T know myself excoune tered by God; Ido not experience something new, whether about God or myself, but something new happens to me through the adds of God. ‘Telkabout God from God istherefore meaningful, sndtothis extent also legitimate talk sbout God, But does thisrecog- tition make talk about God become possible for mer? Ob iouly not! Talk from God is talk ofthe Holy Spirit, is God's own talk. So how could it be posible fr us to talk from God! God and his Spirit are not at our disposal. So what ae we to do? To be len shout God instead of to talk about God is, es ‘we have seen, ne solution to the problem. On the contry! Silence avoids impoasble alk about God, bu atthe sare time it prevents talk fom God; talk of God makes tlk fron God. potsble, but as we do not have control over tll from God it an only be undertaken by us a impouible talk: about God. ‘The only way out of this dilemma isthe cecgaiton ‘that neither a tentative question nor carefully thought aut de- cision whether we speak or keep silent is within our power; this decision is God's decision, and for us thee is only oving-to-speak or a havig-to-Leepailent, x having-todo of 'shving-not-to-d. And in fact that in the only anaes tothe ‘question ifand wien we cinepeskof God: when we have to," labman Verse, 3.34 # Theolegy as Talk of God tn cae we ae aleved ofthe renponuilty wher our {alee Goal ror Go ota abot i Tuts contet we may sere as who writin Co gate Forifl preach the Govpel that ges meno pound fr Boaning. for {have to, Woe t me iT donot preach the Govjlf Balinan, of out, dosnt understand ‘have ty iy more than Paulas compalon sth secur fect of aya cnneuene of exthonnumor pan nother Sioa naturel proces. Thi "have 1 rather mera Thedne to God's demand td ar ach aes a which ronedsin Gof cin. een bv oan that mean a th ume Une: may capa of Gol! How and where do Texpedene God's Command to eto epeat?Bulmans ec that one can never purinas gener qution and now before. The have fy enly emerge in and fom the cones situate; i rounded any the moment aay asec: uch ¢ fev happew’ans concrete tt ol ath a Obedeze tothe demand oft concrete etaton’s* The have tis wot there Sete and cus bar bit al of Go bat inl en tag ihe Bom a Crs nf ew terre the realy ah “ve tam only bebe tat me thet there ution tebe which Sin hving ope” procs tal convincingly to me, 20 hit ere and ten T Seal accep itor withdraw from e ath ths ve is Cxptzncl ex uch only where acept it where Tver to fa of God in obedience. Talk of Goda» oman wok is mpi ana ae of abedince ie comtaly 2 verte. "The have ett Bulan ans ont the ave! when the ptr hs fo preston Sunday morning a tenth re- fee of tesngy aso estar rn ef be ean, ad the ache a gv slows inmracon soda tthe ‘nab; but eae hs of hs Kind cn nd te gnuine ‘Kae then tak of God ie wear at a ve act of ids ae 4 Introduction tothe Theology of Bultmann obedience towards God, obedience which trusts God to make Jnuman talk of God is tal, his word from God. [Now what do all these remarks abou talk of God add up to? Nor, at any rate—to repeat what has alrendy boon end—ehat itis ever posibleas human talk. Talk of God which takes place in faith or in the power of the Holy Spirit, that in talk from God, is, feom the human point of view, also impoaibe tale ‘bout God, or abut man. If God lets man speak from God, that doss not mean ‘that something specs ing veri fiable happens in our lve, that we ate imbued with special qualities and car do special things or speak speci words which are not human by nature. What could we ever do and sy that was not human?” That such human words about God are words from God cannet be demonstrated by the per on who utters thm; the claim, explicitly raised, chat particu lar words are words from God, at most means thatthe person ‘who speaks in this way has not understood hove talk of God and understanding of euch tal is posible at all, namely, only ‘when God himse plays a part. The perion who hears these it plentes God’ to encounter him; thet is, not when he learns something new from them by which he arranges his speaking and acting, but when he understands himself anew, ‘hen he becomes new through God's grace (II Cor. 5.17) [Even the talk of God tha huppens because man has todo js because itis haman tall, sinful tal. Te is talk about God, snd will possibly be understood by all only a this: a talk about an object, even though itis about the supreme being. "Te slays remains sinful, in so far aa itis alwayn something ‘undertaken by us. Buti trust in the Holy Spit, who alone ‘can make my talk about God into talk from God, iti a the i, pe 366 ‘Di Frge der “lekichan” These’ Glsbortnd Verihen,£,837. Theology as Talk of God same time justified, ‘as iis God's wil to justify the sinnes ‘Theology thus produces under all circumstances 1 movernent of unbelief, "And iti only justified if it knows what iis doing tnd docs not dee ieelf chat it can ever in any way be any- thing but a movement of unbelief, which ean ony be juste’ ifit recognizes itzlf for what tin" I talk of God taken place ‘under the sign, ‘Woe ia me iT preach not the gospel’, under the thas to! of faith, then Luther's pecce fotter applies here ‘too, and to renounce theology beeause T do not have firm tsourances that it beppens from God and lead the hearer into fn encounter with God himself ‘would be to renounce faith, ‘because it would not recognize the significance of justification for the particular man and his underakings—in tis ease the undertaking of theology—and would make the promise for fhm and his work null and void.” From a human point of ‘view, then, the undertaking of theology constantly remains a id meaningful talk of God is for men an “impossible {tis only posible in view of the justification ofthe ‘er, rho ventures the imposible in trust that God wil justify the venture ai pleases him, "This isthe perspective from which Bultmann occasionally defines the concept ‘dialectical theology Christan theology cuentially dislctc in the character which has been de seribed in this chapter It speaks of God in its insight that fan eannot speak of God; in this talk it takes control of God, ff whom it speaks ax the one who cannot be controlled it resolves to work in the obedience of fith and a the eame time ‘ith fs talk departs from the existence of faith; it means to wake faith and is a demonstration of unbelief, That is its ineein in which Ht punt persevere Hf iia not to fall into ‘ther objectification ofits subject or silence. “Das Problem ene theolgiachen Enea’. 353 Glenn nd Verchen 8 B31 "Das Problem sa teiogachen Ege’ p. 252 ‘tie 4s Introduction othe Theolegy of Bultmana ‘Even what we have set out todo by thinking about end ds cuming Bultmann's theology, that i, his talk of God, is thus, to put it ia Bulemann’s words, ‘alk about God and therefore, if there is a God, sin, and if there is no God, nonsens ‘Whether itis meaningful and whether it is justifed is not snatter for any of use [At the beginning of this chapter, we asked why Bultmana talled theology an impouibe ta che anawer i: beceuse it is Impossible for man to speak about God. We Further aked to ‘what degree this impossible task remained incumbent on us; the answer an so far at we have o speak about God. Finally we asked how the impossible task of theology isto be realized ‘meaningfully: Bultmann replies: ifr pleases God to make tlk tout him into tlk from him. All that has been said i, of course, trve not only about ‘theology in the arrow sense but also about the proclamation af the Word in genera, in whieh the problem of talking about God become particularly clear and at the same time significant. Bulmann distinguishes beeween theology and preaching with: ‘ut separating the two, The two have in common abore all the fact that theology and proclamation have no other orno higher knowledge than that which is given to every believer—the preicher and the theologian do not stand above the so-called ‘Nayman’, rather, theology and presching ace ‘nothing but » movement of fith'® in the dialectical way that we have

    You might also like