Weaker than Classical Logic[edit]

Intuitionistic logic is weaker than classical logic. Each theorem of

intuitionistic logic is a theorem in classical logic. Many tautologies in
classical logic are not theorems in intuitionistic logic. Examples
include the law of excluded middle p ∨ ¬p, Peirce's law ((p → q) → p)
→ p, and double negation elimination ¬¬p → p. But double negation
introduction p → ¬¬ p is a theorem.
Rejecting excluded middle may seem strange to those more familiar
with classical logic. To prove it in intuitionistic logic, it is necessary to
prove the truth or falsity of all possible propositional formulae, which
is impossible for a variety of reasons.
Sequent calculus[edit]
Main article: Sequent calculus
Gentzen discovered that a simple restriction of his system LK (his
sequent calculus for classical logic) results in a system which is
sound and complete with respect to intuitionistic logic. He called this
system LJ. In LK any number of formulas is allowed to appear on the
conclusion side of a sequent; in contrast LJ allows at most one
formula in this position.
Other derivatives of LK are limited to intuitionistic derivations but still
allow multiple conclusions in a sequent. LJ'[4] is one example.
Hilbert-style calculus[edit]
Intuitionistic logic can be defined using the following Hilbert-style
calculus. This is similar to a way of axiomatizing classical
propositional logic.
In propositional logic, the inference rule is modus ponens

• MP: from ϕ


{\displaystyle \phi } 



and ϕ
→
ψ


{\displaystyle \phi \to \psi } 


 infer ψ


{\displaystyle \psi } 



and the axioms are

• THEN-1: ϕ
→
(
χ
→
ϕ
)


{\displaystyle \phi \to (\chi

\to \phi )} 


• THEN-2:
(
ϕ
→
(
χ
→
ψ
)
)
→
(
(
ϕ
→
χ
)
→
(
ϕ

→
ψ
)
)


{\displaystyle (\phi \to (\chi \to \psi ))\to
 ((\phi \to \chi )\to (\phi \to \psi ))} 


• AND-1: ϕ
∧
χ
→
ϕ


{\displaystyle \phi \land \chi \to \phi

} 


• AND-2: ϕ
∧
χ
→
χ


{\displaystyle \phi \land \chi \to \chi

} 


• AND-3: ϕ
→
(
χ
→
(
ϕ
∧
χ
)
)


{\displaystyle \phi

\to (\chi \to (\phi \land \chi ))} 



• OR-1: ϕ
→
ϕ
∨
χ


{\displaystyle \phi \to \phi \lor \chi }




• OR-2: χ
→
ϕ
∨
χ


{\displaystyle \chi \to \phi \lor \chi }




• OR-3:
(
ϕ
→
ψ
)
→
(
(
χ
→
ψ
)
→
(
ϕ
∨
χ
→
ψ

)
)


{\displaystyle (\phi \to \psi )\to ((\chi \to \psi )\to

(\phi \lor \chi \to \psi ))} 



• FALSE: ⊥
→
ϕ


{\displaystyle \bot \to \phi } 


To make this a system of first-order predicate logic, the generalization
rules

• ∀


{\displaystyle \forall } 

 -GEN:

from ψ
→
ϕ


{\displaystyle \psi \to \phi } 



infer
ψ
→
(
∀
x

ϕ
)


{\displaystyle \psi \to (\forall x\
 \phi )} 

 , if x


{\displaystyle x}



 is not free in ψ


{\displaystyle

\psi } 



• ∃


{\displaystyle \exists } 

 -GEN:

from ϕ
→
ψ


{\displaystyle \phi \to \psi } 


 infer
(
∃
x

ϕ
)
→
ψ


{\displaystyle (\exists x\ \phi

)\to \psi } 

 , if x


{\displaystyle

x} 

 is not free in

ψ


{\displaystyle \psi } 


are added, along with the axioms
a PRED-1:
 (
∀
x

ϕ
(
x
)
)
→
ϕ
(
t
)


{\displaystyle

(\forall x\ \phi (x))\to \phi (t)} 

 , if

the term t is free for substitution for the variable x in

ϕ


{\displaystyle \phi } 

 (i.e., if

no occurrence of any variable in t becomes bound in
ϕ
(
t
)


{\displaystyle \phi (t)} 



)
b PRED-2:
ϕ
(
t
)
→
(
∃
x

ϕ
(
x
)
)


{\displaystyle
 \phi (t)\to (\exists x\ \phi (x))} 

 ,
with the same restriction as for PRED-1
Optional connectives[edit]

Mathematical constructivism[edit]
In the semantics of classical logic, propositional formulae are
assigned truth values from the two-element set
{
⊤
,
⊥
}
{\displaystyle \{\top ,\bot \}}

("true" and "false" respectively), regardless of

whether we have direct evidence for either case. This is referred to as
the 'law of excluded middle', because it excludes the possibility of any
truth value besides 'true' or 'false'. In contrast, propositional formulae
in intuitionistic logic are not assigned a definite truth value and are
only considered "true" when we have direct evidence, hence proof.
(We can also say, instead of the propositional formula being "true"
due to direct evidence, that it is inhabited by a proof in the Curry–
Howard sense.) Operations in intuitionistic logic therefore preserve
justification, with respect to evidence and provability, rather than
truth-valuation .
Intuitionistic logic is one of the set of approaches of constructivism in
mathematics. The use of constructivist logics in general has been a
controversial topic among mathematicians and philosophers (see, for
example, the Brouwer–Hilbert controversy). A common objection to
their use is the above-cited lack of two central rules of classical logic,
the law of excluded middle and double negation elimination. These
are considered to be so important to the practice of mathematics that
David Hilbert wrote of them: "Taking the principle of excluded middle
from the mathematician would be the same, say, as proscribing the
telescope to the astronomer or to the boxer the use of his fists. To
prohibit existence statements and the principle of excluded middle is
tantamount to relinquishing the science of mathematics altogether." [3]
Despite the serious challenges presented by the inability to utilize the
valuable rules of excluded middle and double negation elimination,
intuitionistic logic has practical use. One reason for this is that its
restrictions produce proofs that have the existence property, making it
also suitable for other forms of mathematical constructivism.
Informally, this means that if there is a constructive proof that an
object exists, that constructive proof may be used as an algorithm for
generating an example of that object, a principle known as the Curry–
Howard correspondence between proofs and algorithms. One reason
that this particular aspect of intuitionistic logic is so valuable is that it
enables practitioners to utilize a wide range of computerized tools,
known as proof assistants. These tools assist their users in the
verification (and generation) of large-scale proofs, whose size
usually precludes the usual human-based checking that goes into
publishing and reviewing a mathematical proof. As such, the use of
proof assistants (such as Agda or Coq) is enabling modern
mathematicians and logicians to develop and prove extremely
complex systems, beyond those which are feasible to create and
check solely by hand. One example of a proof which was impossible
to formally verify before the advent of these tools is the famous proof
of the four color theorem. This theorem stumped mathematicians for
more than a hundred years, until a proof was developed which ruled
out large classes of possible counterexamples, yet still left open
enough possibilities that a computer program was needed to finish
the proof. That proof was controversial for some time, but it was
finally verified using Coq.
Syntax[edit]

The Rieger–Nishimura lattice. Its nodes are the propositional formulas in one
variable up to intuitionistic logical equivalence, ordered by intuitionistic logical
implication.
The syntax of formulas of intuitionistic logic is similar to propositional
logic or first-order logic. However, intuitionistic connectives are not
definable in terms of each other in the same way as in classical logic,
hence their choice matters. In intuitionistic propositional logic (IPL) it
is customary to use →, ∧ , ∨ , ⊥ as the basic connectives, treating ¬A
as an abbreviation for (A → ⊥). In intuitionistic first-order logic both
quantifiers ∃, ∀ are needed.

Intuitionistic logic
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
(Redirected from Constructive logic)
Jump to: navigation, search
Intuitionistic logic, sometimes more generally called constructive
logic, refers to systems of symbolic logic that differ from the systems
used for classical logic by more closely mirroring the notion of
constructive proof. In particular, systems of intuitionistic logic do not
include the law of the excluded middle and double negation
elimination, which are fundamental inference rules in classical logic.
Formalized intuitionistic logic was originally developed by Arend
Heyting to provide a formal basis for Brouwer's programme of
intuitionism. From a proof-theoretic perspective, Heyting’s calculus is
a restriction of classical logic in which the law of excluded middle and
double negation elimination have been removed. Excluded middle
and double negation elimination can still be proved for some
propositions on a case by case basis, however, but do not hold
universally as they do with classical logic.
Several systems of semantics for intuitionistic logic have been
studied. One of these semantics mirrors classical Boolean-valued
semantics but uses Heyting algebras in place of Boolean algebras.
Another semantics uses Kripke models. These, however, are
technical means for studying Heyting’s deductive system rather than
formalizations of Brouwer’s original informal semantic intuitions.
Semantical systems with better claims to capture such intuitions, due
to offering meaningful concepts of “constructive truth” (rather than
merely validity or provability), are Gödel’s dialectica interpretation,
Kleene’s realizability, Medvedev’s logic of finite problems,[1] or
Japaridze’s computability logic. Yet such semantics persistently
induce logics properly stronger than Heyting’s logic. Some authors
have argued that this might be an indication of inadequacy of
Heyting’s calculus itself, deeming the latter incomplete as a
constructive logic.[2]

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External links
Mathematical constructivism[edit]
In the semantics of classical logic, propositional formulae are
assigned truth values from the two-element set
{
⊤
,
⊥
}
{\displaystyle \{\top ,\bot \}}

("true" and "false" respectively),

regardless of whether we have direct evidence for either case.
This is referred to as the 'law of excluded middle', because it
excludes the possibility of any truth value besides 'true' or
'false'. In contrast, propositional formulae in intuitionistic logic
are not assigned a definite truth value and are only considered
"true" when we have direct evidence, hence proof. (We can also
say, instead of the propositional formula being "true" due to
direct evidence, that it is inhabited by a proof in the Curry–
Howard sense.) Operations in intuitionistic logic therefore
preserve justification, with respect to evidence and provability,
rather than truth-valuation .
Measure theory[edit]
Classical measure theory is fundamentally non-constructive, since the classical definition
of Lebesgue measure does not describe any way to compute the measure of a set or the
integral of a function. In fact, if one thinks of a function just as a rule that "inputs a real
number and outputs a real number" then there cannot be any algorithm to compute the
integral of a function, since any algorithm would only be able to call finitely many values of
the function at a time, and finitely many values are not enough to compute the integral to any
nontrivial accuracy. The solution to this conundrum, carried out first in Bishop's 1967 book, is
to consider only functions that are written as the pointwise limit of continuous functions (with
known modulus of continuity), with information about the rate of convergence. An advantage
of constructivizing measure theory is that if one can prove that a set is constructively of full
measure, then there is an algorithm for finding a point in that set (again see Bishop's book).
For example, this approach can be used to construct a real number that is normal to every
base.

The place of constructivism in mathematics[edit]

Traditionally, some mathematicians have been suspicious, if not antagonistic, towards
mathematical constructivism, largely because of limitations they believed it to pose for
constructive analysis. These views were forcefully expressed by David Hilbert in 1928, when
he wrote in Grundlagen der Mathematik, "Taking the principle of excluded middle from the
mathematician would be the same, say, as proscribing the telescope to the astronomer or to
the boxer the use of his fists".[3]
Errett Bishop, in his 1967 work Foundations of Constructive Analysis, worked to dispel these
fears by developing a great deal of traditional analysis in a constructive framework.
Even though most mathematicians do not accept the constructivist's thesis, that only
mathematics done based on constructive methods is sound, constructive methods are
increasingly of interest on non-ideological grounds. For example, constructive proofs in
analysis may ensure witness extraction, in such a way that working within the constraints of
the constructive methods may make finding witnesses to theories easier than using classical
methods. Applications for constructive mathematics have also been found in typed lambda
calculi, topos theory and categorical logic, which are notable subjects in foundational
mathematics and computer science. In algebra, for such entities as toposes and Hopf
algebras, the structure supports an internal language that is a constructive theory; working
within the constraints of that language is often more intuitive and flexible than working
externally by such means as reasoning about the set of possible concrete algebras and
their homomorphisms.
Physicist Lee Smolin writes in Three Roads to Quantum Gravity that topos theory is "the
right form of logic for cosmology" (page 30) and "In its first forms it was called 'intuitionistic
logic'" (page 31). "In this kind of logic, the statements an observer can make about the
universe are divided into at least three groups: those that we can judge to be true, those that
we can judge to be false and those whose truth we cannot decide upon at the present time"
(page 28).

Mathematicians who have made major contributions to

constructivism[edit]
 Leopold Kronecker (old constructivism, semi-intuitionism)
 L. E. J. Brouwer (forefather of intuitionism)
 A. A. Markov (forefather of Russian school of constructivism)
 Arend Heyting (formalized intuitionistic logic and theories)
 Per Martin-Löf (founder of constructive type theories)
 Errett Bishop (promoted a version of constructivism claimed to be consistent with
classical mathematics)
 Paul Lorenzen (developed constructive analysis)

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