CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA’S DISCOVERY OF STOIC AND ROMAN JURISPRUDENCE IN ST.

PAUL
(The Discovery of Ulpian’s Sources in Paul of Tarsus and Clement of Alexandria)
Introduction
Clement of Alexandria, born –probably in Athens– around 150 AD, enjoys the acclaim
for being the first speculative theologian among the Church Fathers. As an author falling within
the period of the apologists, Clement produced a number of works that have survived until
present. These serve as a testament to the philosophical acumen of catechetical teachers in
Alexandria, Egypt.1 Taught in Alexandria by the Pantaenus the Sicilian (Strom. I.1.11.2) –
Attested to be a “Stoic philosopher”2– Clement located his greatest teacher in Christianity “hiding
in Egypt” (Strom. I.1.11), initiating him into the deepest mysteries of Christianity. Among his
presumably earliest works are the Protreptikos and Paidogôgos, the Stromateis must rank as a
posterior, mature production within Clementine corpus,3 which was written c. 190–215 AD. The
Stromateis might be translated as “carpets” or layers, but the title merely applies a metaphor to
what, during Hadrian’s reign, was a standard term for describing a non-systematic or hodgepodge
treatise.4 Although the nature of the Stromateis, in relation to the Protrepticos and Paidogôgos,
remains an open question, the Paidogôgos (Paid. I.1.3.3) outlines a progression of Christian
learning from “the protreptic” or exhortatory, to the pedagogic or training, into a final stage,
which is designated as didactic or διδασκαλία. It may or may not be the case that Stromateis
fulfills this final mission of initiating the Christian into the deeper mysteries of mature doctrine.
I am principally interested in Clement’s theological approach to Stoic and Roman
philosophy of law as key to exegete St. Paul’s epistles. I am particularly going to concentrate on
book I of the Stromateis, which is datable from the terminus a quo of 190 AD.5 Furthermore,
Stromateis, books I–7, may be catalogued as Clement’s approach to “ethics” (versus the
“physics” of the Hypotyposeis [not to mention Platonic “dialectics”]).6 What is more, within
Clement’s Stromateis, our author clearly posits a familiar point of departure for philosophically
inclined Jews and Christians; namely, Moses had been the earliest philosopher, or rather super-
philosopher, predating atomists, influencing Plato, and subsequent schools. This alleged history
of philosophy positions Clement to argue that Hellenic philosophy is reconcilable to Christian
theology as its propedeutic, insofar as it had been handed down –though not perfectly– as
something taken from Moses. More interesting than the mythical origins of Greek philosophy,
Clement sets up a justification for comparison of Moses with the philosophers. Clement drew
copiously from Philo of Alexandria for his Moses-as-philosopher par excellence theory. In this
vein, scholars already note Clement’s Stoicizing “ethics,” like his predecessor Philo, which are
connected to Moses’ legislative acts or “the law” in the Septuagint (LXX).7 In the traditional

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ethics-physics-dialectics schema, Moses the lawgiver served as the remote foundation for
philosophical ethics. What is more, both Alexandrians supposed the Mosaic liturgical texts of the
LXX to correspond with pagan physics. Finally, Philo’s prophetic and Clement’s theological
class of teachings, as taken from their respective Scriptures, allegedly provided the historical
inspiration for pagan dialectics.
Because books I–VII of Clement’s Stromateis are concerned with Mosaic law-ethics,
should it be surprising to discover Roman law in book one of the Stromateis? Granted that Stoic
ethics exercised an important influence on Roman lawyers and statesman, as for instance on
Cicero, it is nonetheless the case that Roman legislation and Roman jurisconsultants of the first
and second centuries CE have generally been considered non-philosophical or only superficially
philosophical in their legal commentaries. Ulpian lays claim to the title of being a great Roman
jurist of the third century, as the first peritus to write as a “philosopher of law.” As some scholars
assert, Ulpian was concretely responsible for theorizing about Roman law in Latin (and in Greek),
but with a more Stoic and philosophical bent. My present discovery of Ulpian’s definition of
law within the Stromateis of Clement of Alexandria puts Ulpian’s “genius” alive and well
in Alexandria, decades prior to Ulpian’s famous definition of justice (Iustitia) as “a
constant and perpetual desire to grant to each his right (ius).” My recent finds in Text 01
cannot help but call into question Ulpian’s role as the alleged creator of a philosophical
theory of Roman law. If we take a look of our Text 01, Ulpian’s theories prove to have
been already in play in prior centuries. While it is interesting to discover how little
originality Ulpian seemed to possess, more important –for us– is Clement, who provided
solid evidence of a fusion between Stoic ethics and Roman law, as something already
theorized in texts (from Athens or Alexandria); Clement must have copied his definition
from somewhere. Let us turn to our first chart [cf. infra Text 01, P]:

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TEXT 01: Author Definition of Justice 3
(A.) Plato, Republic, 331e3, 335e1–4 (d. 346 τί φῂς τὸν Σιµωνίδην λέγοντα ὀρθῶς λέγειν περὶ δικαιοσύνης; [. . .] τὰ
BCE) ὀφειλόµενα ἐκάστῳ ἀποδιδόναι δίκαιόν ἐστι
(B.) Plato, Republic, 335e1–4 Παντάπασί µοι δοκεῖς ἀληθῆ λέγειν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες. Εἰ ἄρα τὰ ὀφειλόµενα
ἑκάστῳ ἀποδιδόναι φησίν τις δίκαιον εἶναι, τοῦτο δὲ δὴ νοεῖ αὐτῷ τοῖς µὲν
ἐχθροῖς βλάβην ὀφείλεσθαι παρὰ τοῦ δικαίου ἀνδρός, τοῖς δὲ φίλοις
ὠφελίαν, οὐκ ἦν σοφὸς ὁ ταῦτα εἰπών.
(C.) Ps.-Plato, Definitiones, 411e2 & Chryssipus Δικαιοσύνη [. . .] ἕξις ἀπονεµητικὴ τοῦ κατ᾽ἀξίαν ἑκάστῳ
(d. 204 BCE) (7x in Fragmenta Moralia)
(D.) Cicero,
(E.) Cicero, De De inventione,
legibus, 1.45 (scripsit2.160
c. 54–c.(scripsit
51 BCE) c. Constans
Iustitia estet habitus
perpetuaanimi communi
ratio vitae, quaeutilitate conservata suam cuique tribuens
virtus est
95–c. 82 BCE)
(F.) Cicero, De re publica, 3.24 (scripsit c. 52 BCE) dignitatem
Iustitia autem praecipit [. . .] suum cuique reddere
(G.) Cicero, De finibus bonorum et Animi affectio suum cuique tribuendi [. . .] iustitia dicitur
malorum, 5.65 (scripsit c. 45 BCE)
(H.) Cicero, De natura deorum, 3.38 (scripsit 45 BCE) Nam iustitia, quae suum cuique distribuit, quid pertinet ad deos
(I.) Cicero, De officiis, 1.42 (scripsit 44 BCE) Ut pro dignitate cuique tribuatur; id enim est iustitiae fundamentum
(J.) Philo of Alexandria (c. 19; d. 45 CE) αὕτη δέ ἐστιν ὁ τῆς φύσεως ὀρθὸς λόγος, ὃς κυριωτέρᾳ κλήσει προσονοµάζεται
θεσµός, νόµος θεῖος ὤν, καθ’ ὃν τὰ προσήκοντα καὶ ἐπιβάλλοντα ἑκάστοις
ἀπενεµήθη.8
(K.) Paul, Epistle to the Romans, 2:14–15 ὅταν γὰρ ἔθνη τὰ µὴ νόµον ἔχοντα [ἔγγραπτον] φύσει τὰ τοῦ νόµου ποιῶσιν,
(scripsit c. 60) οὗτοι νόµον [ἔγγραπτον] µὴ ἔχοντες ἑαυτοῖς εἰσιν νόµος [ἄγραφος]· οἵτινες
ἐνδείκνυνται τὸ ἔργον τοῦ νόµου γραπτὸν ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις αὐτῶν,
συµµαρτυρούσης αὐτῶν τῆς συνειδήσεως καὶ µεταξὺ ἀλλήλων τῶν λογισµῶν
κατηγορούντων ἢ καὶ ἀπολογουµένων [. . .]
(L.) Musonius Rufus (d. c. 100 CE), καὶ µὴν προσήκει µὲν τῷ βασιλεῖ, µᾶλλον δ’ ἀνάγκη ἐστὶν αὐτῷ, τὰ δίκαια
Discourse VIII βραβεύειν τοῖς ὑπηκόοις, ὡς µήτε πλέον ἔχειν µήτε ἐλαττοῦσθαι µηδένα παρὰ
τὴν ἀξίαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τιµῆς καὶ τιµωρίας τυγχάνειν τοὺς ἀξίους. ταῦτα δὲ πῶς
ποτε δυνηθείη ἄν τις δίκαιος οὐκ ὤν; δίκαιος δὲ πῶς ἂν εἴη τις µὴ ἐπιστάµενος
δικαιοσύνην, ὁποῖόν τί ἐστιν; πάλιν οὖν καὶ ταύτῃ φιλοσοφητέον τῷ βασιλεῖ, ὅτι
δικαιοσύνην καὶ τὸ δίκαιον οὐκ ἂν ἄλλως φαίνοιτο γνούς, εἰ µὴ
φιλοσοφήσειεν.9
(M.) Marcus Aurelius, Med. (scripsit c. ἴδιον δὲ λογικῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τὸ φιλεῖν τοὺς πλησίον καὶ ἀλήθεια καὶ αἰδὼς καὶ τὸ
161–c. 180 CE) µηδὲν ἑαυτῆς προτιµᾶν, ὅπερ ἴδιον καὶ νόµου· οὕτως ἄρ’ οὐδὲν διήνεγκε λόγος
ὀρθὸς καὶ λόγος δικαιοσύνης10
(N.) Clement of Alexandria, Strom. ὁ νοµοθετικὸς δέ ἐστιν ὁ τὸ προσῆκον ἑκάστῳ µέρει τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τοῖς
I.26.167.3 (scripsit c. 190) τούτων ἔργοις ἀπονέµων11
(O.) Clement, Strom. VI.17.159. 3–4 ἔµπαλιν δ’, οἶµαι, νόµου ἴδιον καὶ λόγου παντὸς ὀρθοῦ τὸ προσῆκον ἑκάστῳ
καὶ τὸ ἴδιον καὶ τὸ ἐπιβάλλον ἀποδιδόναι.
(P.) Domitianus Ulpianus of Tyre, Inst. I.1 Iustitia est constans et perpetua voluntas ius suum cuique tribuens.
(scripsit c. 203–c. 233) 12 Jurisprudentia est divinarum atque humanarum rerum notitia: justi atque injusti
scientia.
(Q.) Domitianus Ulpianus of Tyre, Dig. Ius gentium est, quo gentes humanae utuntur. Quod a naturali recedere
I.I.6. facile intellegere licet, quia illud omnibus, hoc solis hominibus inter se
commune sit.13 [. . .] Hoc igitur ius nostrum constat aut ex scripto aut sine
scripto, ut apud Graecos: τῶν νόµων οἳ µὲν ἔγγραφοι, οἳ δὲ ἄγραφοι.

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Notice, the history of Greek and Roman notions of justice allows us to chart the progress
juristic science from Plato to Ulpian. Obviously, Ulpian’s late definition is partly Roman in its
form (with the emphasis on “rights and obligations” [ius] or “what is one’s lawful due”). I briefly
note that Cicero varied his definitions between a more Stoic and more Roman theory. “Dignitas”
or ἀξία was typical of Greek-Stoic philosophy of law, while “[ius] suum” classically implied the
Roman concept of a legal right-obligation. Scholars who have spent time in Clement’s works
readily concede that Clement –in customary fashion– made use of anthologies, select notes
(ὑποµνήµατα), and a (perhaps) Christian library in Alexandria to compose his Stromateis.14
Granted Clement’s oft-times slavish dependence on preexisting sources, Alexandria –a city very
much engaged in the business of Roman law since at least the time of St. Paul– was the perfect
station for philosophers to absorb Greco-Roman law, or the Greek translation of imperial
documents, into their works. After all, Roman law had itself become –since before Cicero– an
every increasing synthesis of Latin-Roman rights and obligations with Stoic philosophy of right
reason.
The fuller Clementine passage (Strom. I.25.166.5; cf., infra, Text 02) contextualizes
Clement’s pre-Ulpianic definition of justice [in letter “P” of Text 01] begins by lifting block
quotes from the Stoic Chryssipus on his theory of law in relation to nature and reason. Instead of
naming Chryssipus as his source –after all, the Greeks had merely taken their philosophical ideas
from the Hebrews (!)– Clement renamed this Stoic philosopher “Moses.” In a similar vein, book
one and two of Clement’s Stromateis can be somewhat misleading, if we reduce Clementine
“philosophy” to Stoic ethics. As we can see already, in our Text 01, Clement included
“legislating” as a concern of philosophy. This not only took its ancient inspiration from Plato [cf.
supra, Text 01, A] with Stoics, calling the discerner of justice “the wise man,” but Stoicizing
Ulpian translated Greek ἐπιστήµη of law (cf. Musonius Rufus) into Latin “scientia,” making the
philosopher (similar to Musonius Rufus) a lawgiver and lawmaker by virtue of being a wise
philosopher. This is explicitly held up in Roman Stoicism. For instance, Seneca argued forcefully
that Zeno and Chryssipus had set down the terms of natural law and the law of nations (ius
gentium). 15 Evidently, for Seneca (ab esse ad posse valet illatio!), a legislator can be a
philosopher, for the greatest lawgivers of states never held a public office! Let’s look at
Clement’s larger passage [Text 02], again, where he interprets Paul’s Galatians:

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TEXT 02: Clement, Strom. I.25.166.5– My Translation

I.26.167.1–3
φησὶν ὁ Μωυσῆς. ᾗ τινες ἀκολούθως δηλονότι Moses says [dicit] as some others subsequently;
“τῇ χρηστῇ δόξῃ λόγον ὀρθὸν τὸν νόµον ἔφασαν, namely: “They were accustomed to say, by the useful
προστακτικὸν µὲν ὧν ποιητέον. ἀπαγορευτικὸν δὲ opinion, that the law is right reason, which is directive
ὧν οὐ ποιητέον.”16 Ὅθεν ὁ νόµος εἰκότως εἴρηται of what must be done, but prohibitive of what must
διὰ Μωυσέως δεδόσθαι, “κανὼν τυγχάνων not be done.” Whence, the law has been said
δικαίων τε καὶ ἀδίκων” [Cf. Ulpian, Inst. I.1]17 reasonably to be handed on through Moses, “as a rule
καὶ τοῦτον κυρίως θεσµὸν ἂν εἴποιµεν τὸν ὑπὸ touching on the lot of the just and unjust.” We also
θεοῦ διὰ Μωυσέως παραδεδοµένον.18 ἔχει γοῦν might principally call this, what was handed from God
τὴν ἀγωγὴν εἰς τὸ θεῖον. 19 λέγει δὲ καὶ ὁ through Moses, divine law. So, it contains a discipline
Παῦλος· 20 “ὁ νόµος τῶν παραβάσεων χάριν in relation to the divine. Paul, too, says “The law was
ἐτέθη, ἄχρις ἂν ἔλθῃ τὸ σπέρµα ᾧ ἐπήγγελται” established because of transgressions, until the
[Gal 3:19]. εἶτα οἱονεὶ ἐπεξηγούµενος τὴν offspring should come through whom it has been
διάνοιαν ἐπιφέρει· “πρὸ τοῦ δὲ ἐλθεῖν τὴν πίστιν promised.” Accordingly, as if he additionally adjoins
ὑπὸ νόµον ἐφρουρούµεθα συγκεκλεισµένοι” 21 in explanatory fashion his meaning: “Before faith
[Gal 3:23], φόβῳ δηλαδὴ ἀπὸ ἁµαρτιῶν, “εἰς τὴν came, we were under a guardian sub lege, as immature
µέλλουσαν πίστιν ἀποκαλυφθήσεσθαι. ὥστε ὁ children in the womb” from fear, that is to say from
νόµος παιδαγωγὸς ἡµῶν ἐγένετο εἰς Χριστόν, ἵνα sins, “until the coming faith about to be revealed
ἐκ πίστεως δικαιωθῶµεν” [Gal. 3:24]. ὁ [from the womb], so as the law was become our
νοµοθετικὸς δέ ἐστιν ὁ τὸ προσῆκον ἑκάστῳ pedagogue unto Christ, so that we have been justified
µέρει τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τοῖς τούτων ἔργοις from faith.” The legislator is someone who
ἀπονέµων [Cf. Ulpian, Inst., I.1] distributes what is due to each part of the soul and
to works of these parts.
There, you see that Clement detected the Stoic and Roman law within St. Paul’s philosophy of
law in Galatians (and elsewhere in Romans). If Clement is correct, then it comes as no surprise
that Paul’s theory of law in in Romans [cf. supra Text 01, K] can obviously –it seems to me– be
reduced to similar Stoic-Roman sources that Clement and Ulpian shared in common. It looks as if
Paul simply reformulated –to some extent– the terms of Roman jurisprudence that had become
commonplace in the East by the first century AD.
Regarding St. Paul, he was apparently under the influence of (i) either Stoics who
philosophized on law, or (ii.) Greco-Roman legislation, granted that the latter was read in a Stoic-
friendly manner. I argue that Paul produced a mixture of both i & ii. I wish now to prove my case
by providing multiple dependencies of Paul on Roman documentation, i.e., imperial constitutions
and their Roman law. Clement’s larger quote [cf., supra, Text 02] has him very concerned with
carrying through St. Paul’s analogy and allegory of the two sons born of Abraham, Isaac and
Ishmael, standing for freedom in Christ and slavery (as infants with no rights) to the Mosaic Law
(not to mention the literal slavery “to elements of the world” among pagans). 22 In Paul’s
Galatians, chapters three and four, Clement correctly picked up on Paul’s use of the importance
of the metaphor of the womb in LXX stories of sterile women giving birth. However, like Philo,
Abraham’s inheritance customs and law were outmoded for the Roman Jew.23 For example,
Rabbis of the period were often more Roman in their establishing of marriage contracts
(paralleling their practices of marriage with Roman connubium).24 Although they did not typically

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imitate Roman law in declaring a child born of a free Father and a slave mother to be a slave, this
only goes to show just how Roman is Paul’s interpretation of Ishmael’s status in utero.25 Let’s
look at Text 03:
Text 03: Paul, Galatians chap. 4: My translation
Λέγω δέ, ἐφ’ ὅσον χρόνον ὁ κληρονόµος 1 Yet, I declare that the heir, as long as he is a child, is
νήπιός ἐστιν, οὐδὲν διαφέρει δούλου no better than a slave,26 even while he is the lord
κύριος πάντων ὤν, (2) ἀλλὰ ὑπὸ (κύριος) of all [the estate]; 2 but he is under tutors
ἐπιτρόπους ἐστὶν καὶ οἰκονόµους ἄχρι [until 14 yr. old]27 and trustees [until 25 yr. old]28
τῆς προθεσµίας τοῦ πατρός. (3) οὕτως until the [lawful] date of the father [usque ad tempus
καὶ ἡµεῖς, ὅτε ἦµεν νήπιοι, ὑπὸ τὰ patris].29 [We fall under this group before baptism:] 3
στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσµου ἤµεθα So, as with us, when we were children, we were
δεδουλωµένοι· (4) ὅτε δὲ ἦλθεν τὸ enslaved under the elements of the world [Epicurean
πλήρωµα τοῦ χρόνου, ἐξαπέστειλεν ὁ superstition]. 30 [Oppositely, Jesus falls in another
θεὸς τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ, γενόµενον ἐκ grouping:] 4 But when the [legally decreed] time had
γυναικός, γενόµενον ὑπὸ νόµον, (5) ἵνα fully come, God sent forth his Son, born of woman,31
τοὺς ὑπὸ νόµον ἐξαγοράσῃ, ἵνα τὴν born under law,32 5 to redeem those who were under
υἱοθεσίαν ἀπολάβωµεν. (6) Ὅτι δέ ἐστε law [Thus, he buys and sells immediately with
υἱοί, ἐξαπέστειλεν ὁ θεὸς τὸ πνεῦµα τοῦ paterfamilial power], so that we might receive
υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ εἰς τὰς καρδίας ἡµῶν, adoption as sons. 6 And because you are sons, God
κρᾶζον, Αββα ὁ πατήρ. (7) ὥστε οὐκέτι has sent the Spirit of his Son into our hearts, crying,
εἶ δοῦλος ἀλλὰ υἱός· εἰ δὲ υἱός, καὶ “Abba! Father!”33 7 So through God you are no longer
κληρονόµος διὰ θεοῦ a slave but a son, and if a son then an heir.
First, the literary background to this section of Galatians has for some time been known
as a partial imitation of Roman-Stoic rhetoric, as displayed in Epictetus and Arrianos. Paul
coincided, word for word, with Epictetus, when he proclaimed: “Tell me, you who wish to be
under law, which you do not hear, for it was written that Abraham had two sons, one from a
slave-girl and on from a freewoman. But the son of the slave girl was born according to the flesh,
while the son of the freewoman through the promise” (Gal 4:21–22).34 Paul’s Q & A imitated a
rare rhetorical device found in his contemporary Epictetus.35 Shocking, however, is Paul’s legal
principle behind his ahistorical interpretation of the legal status of Hagar’s child, Ishmael. It is
practically a summary of Gaius, Institutes, I.80: “A slave is born from a freeman and a slave-girl,
but contrarily a freeborn is from a slave and a freewoman.”36 Clement hinted at this Roman
interpretation by noting the parallel vocabulary (in reference to a law of the womb) surrounding
slavery of those born “under the elements” or Mosaic Law (as quasi-slaves or immature children),
as if born of the slave (δούλη) Hagar.37 Romans regarded the mother’s slave or free status as
determining the slave or free status as a rule of the ius gentium, derived from natural law. More
Proof of Roman source texts lies in a peculiar turn of phrase taken verbatim from Roman law:
“[The child] is under tutors and trustees until the lawful-date of the father” (Gal 4:2)38 [cf., infra,
Text 04]:

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Text 04: Source English Translation Roman phrase

(A.) Cicero (1st BC): Until the lawful time for his judging usque ad illius iudici tempus
(B.) Nickolaus Payment in accord with the very lawful ἀποδώσειν κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν τοῦ
Damascenus (1st BC): time of the loan δανείου προθεσµίαν
(C.) Galatians (58/9): Until the lawful time ἄχρι τῆς προθεσµίας τοῦ
πατρός
(D.) Scaevola (fl. 175) After birth, if she exposed the son: he prior enixa filium exposuit: hic
was taken and educated by another man, sublatus ab alio educatus est
having been called by the name of his nomine patris vocitatus usque ad
father as long a time as the father’s vitae tempus patris ab eo quam a
lived, from such man rather than by the matri
mother [. . .]
(E.) Paulus (c. 200) Tutors were given [. . .] until the time of tutores dati sunt [. . .] usque ad
puberty tempus pubertatis.
(F.) Sopater (4th CE): Until the lawful time µέχρι τῆς προθεσµίας
Similar legislation, with word-for-word correspondence, exists between St. Paul and the
jurisconsult Paulus (Just., Dig., XXI.1.12) [Compare Text 04, C to E]. Can we suppose a
mistaken Greek translation/transcription led to confusion in light of passage in Scaevola
(Just., Dig., XXX.4.29)? Numerous scenarios might explain Paul’s version that is not
exactly correct, since the Roman paterfamilias does set the age of a child’s maturity in
Roman law (for instance, imperial concessions might have been granted to southern
Galatia). Paul’s legal and technical terminology precisely agrees with Cicero’s attestation
(Text 04, A), which is equally found in the context of Roman legal wills/testaments . This is
precisely the context of Paul’s own use. Furthermore, Greek authors, who were either familiar
with Roman legal institutions, or who translated Roman law into Greek, agree entirely with
Paul’s phraseology.39 Significantly, Paul’s precise phrase (preposition + genitive) is unknown
outside the legal description of the Roman-imperial official Sopater.40 Paul is using a clearly
Latin expression either translated directly, or copied, from a Greco-Roman document. Scholars
already concede that Paul’s reference to tutors and trustees likely refers to Roman institutions. On
the whole, therefore, these passages represent Paul’s use of Roman legal jargon about the Roman
family (familia) and the power (potestas) of its paterfamilias. Paul’s method may be reduced, at
this point, to addressing a Roman audience familiar with their legal rights (iura) of conubium and
testamentum. I suspect that one of Paul’s Greco-Roman source texts for his knowledge of Roman
sonship of the familia being a Roman institution akin to slavery in Gal 4:1 is Dionysios of
Halicarnassus: [cf. infra TEXT 05]

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TEXT 05: Sources English Translation Greek Original

Galatians 1:1, 4–5
This scenario envisions the
son not being sold, but a new
paterfamilias going through a
buying ceremony to adopt a
son in a transaction were the
Spirit acts as a legal witness
Dionysios of Halicarnassus,
Roman Antiquities, 2.27.1–3
NB, This regards the 12
Tables on selling a son 3x
before he is given his liberty
from the power of the Father
I assert that the heir, as long as
he is a child, is no better than
a slave, even while he is the
lord of all…born under the
law to redeem those who
were under the law [sub
lege], so that we might
receive adoption as sons
The power, given to fathers by
the Roman lawgiver…allowed
the father also to sell his son
without regarding the
imputation of cruelty and of
severity, inconsistent with
natural affection, which this
allowance might be liable to;
and (what anyone…educated
in the loose manners of the
Greeks may wonder at
above all things, and look
upon the harsh and
tyrannical) he even gave
leave to the father to make
an advantage of selling his
son, as far as three times;
giving, by this means, a
greater power to the father
over his son than to the
master over his slave
Λέγω δέ, ἐφ’ ὅσον χρόνον ὁ
κληρονόµος νήπιός
ἐστιν, οὐδὲν διαφέρει δούλου
κύριος πάντων ὤν,
ἐξαπέστειλεν ὁ θεὸς τὸν
υἱὸν, γενόµενον ἐκ γυναικός,
γενόµενον ὑπὸ νόµον, ἵνα
τοὺς ὑπὸ νόµον ἐξαγοράσῃ,
ἵνα τὴν υἱοθεσίαν
ἀπολάβωµεν.
ἔστη τῆς ἐξουσίας ὁ τῶν
Ῥωµαίων νοµοθέτης, ἀλλὰ
καὶ πωλεῖν ἐφῆκε τὸν υἱὸν τῷ
πατρί, οὐδὲν ἐπιστραφεὶς εἴ τις
ὠµὸν ὑπολήψεται τὸ
συγχώρηµα καὶ βαρύτερον ἢ
κατὰ τὴν φυσικὴν συµπάθειαν.
καὶ ὃ πάντων µάλιστα
θαυµάσειεν ἄν τις ὑπὸ τοῖς
Ἑλληνικοῖς ἤθεσι τοῖς
ἐκλελυµένοις τραφεὶς ὡς
πικρὸν καὶ τυραννικόν, καὶ
τοῦτο συνεχώρησε τῷ πατρί,
µέχρι τρίτης πράσεως ἀφ’
υἱοῦ χρηµατίσασθαι, µείζονα
δοὺς ἐξουσίαν πατρὶ κατὰ
παιδὸς ἢ δεσπότῃ κατὰ
δούλων.

We learn accurately from Dionysios –a plausible source for Paul’s assertion (unless both authors
cite a common source)– that the paterfamilias exercises total power over a legal son, not very
different from the power over a slave. Paul’s metaphors of the God-the-Father and Jesus, each
styled as head (caput) of the Roman-Christian household (familia), are described by Paul as
slaves, or as sons, indifferently. In the case at hand, Paul addressees the fact that humans in
general have been born as slaves (of sin/idolatry/elements of this world), yet they have gone
through the Roman process of manumission. Then, as if a sui juris person, each future Christian
is adopted by being bought by a new father (through baptism) as in Roman law.41 Jesus purchased
Christians into his familia, acting as a paterfamilias of the godly family, having received the
familial inheritance from the Father, given to Abraham and passed down through David (cf. Rom
1:3). Importantly, Paul is thoroughly and consistently Roman in his mentality and metaphor. His
legal focus is at least partially determined by his audience, as it is becoming obvious that Paul is

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writing to the southern Galatians, among whom, I suppose, are a goodly number of Roman
citizens under Roman laws. Paul’s application of Roman inheritance law and the status of a
filiusfamilias or family-son as a metaphor to understand Christian adoption into the godly family-
familia makes good on the Pauline assertion in Gal 3:15 (and Rom 6:19) that he plans to speak:
“using an everyday example” (= κατ᾽ἄνθρωπον).
While a Greek and one Roman source can account for Paul’s “ὑπὸ νόµον,” each is a case
of legal convention, sub lege is fairly rare in pre-Pauline Roman jurisprudence. Greeks knew the
phrase: ὑπὸ νόµον, as far as I know, uniquely from the Definitiones of Ps.-Plato. The Greek
mention proves propitious insofar as the Roman jurist Ulpian (170–c. 233) relied on this tradition
for his own definition of justice (δικαιοσύνη).42 In St. Paul’s case, his use of law does not merely
refer to a city-state, but –like the Roman Ulpian– is grafted into his a wider sense of natural (lex
naturalis) or universal Roman law of the cosmos.43
Next, notice that Paul describes a Roman child, who is put under legal tutors until the
coming of age, eventually established at age 14, whereby a boy clothed himself with the toga
virilis. Still, the family-father or paterfamilias might provide an heir (in a ratified will/testament),
along with a trustee, to make sure that the heir did not economically ruin himself before reaching
physical and mental maturity. This regulation generally lasted until reaching twenty-four years of
age. Thus, the legal prescriptions on legislation for wills, to which Paul correctly refers,
references the only valid testator in such a case; namely, the paterfamilias: “until the [lawful] date
set by the father.” This is meant to parallel God the Father providing Abraham and, subsequently,
his child-Israel (a nation & an historical person) with a patrimony and, in its youth, in need of a
pedagogue (viz., the Torah). Additionally, Roman gentiles are compared to a family-member of
the household (familia) who need a tutor and trustee by divine law. In the Roman mind, the
legally inherited son, when coming of age, would inherit full rights to the patrimony of a Father’s
legally ratified will.
Conclusions
Using St. Clement’s indications, I have been fortunate enough to find word-for-word
citations from St. Paul corresponding to Roman legislation. At present, I have presented only a
few of the finds that can in fact be multiplied in Galatians and Romans, as elsewhere. To answer
the riddle of what drove Paul to cite and exploit Roman law in his theology, I have a few
provisional ideas that I’d like to put forward in today’s presentation. First: the Archives of
Antioch.44 Like Egypt, Asia Minor had regional metropolises that served as excise centers for
gathering Roman taxes. As it happens, relying on the studies of Georgy Kantor, documents
concerning Jews, issued by Rome, were assuredly stored in Roman archives in such places.

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Antioch, where Paul spent quite a bit of time, was just such a center. This was the likely place for
him to locate Greco-Roman legislation (e.g., imperial edicts) written to various Roman and/or
Jewish communities. Paul may have been able to speak to both the Greco-Roman polis and
peculiar Jewish culture of each city by looking at its rights and privileges granted it by Rome.
Second: the political fortunes of Jews. While the political rights and privileges of Jews were
greatly augmented by Julius and Augustus Caesar, by Paul’s time –it goes without saying–
Tiberius, Caligula, and Claudius had done just the opposite for Jews of the empire. Roman
decrees on Jewish questions were profoundly affecting the relations between the Jews and Rome.
Their formerly advantageous relationship with the ecumene of Rome was in doubt for the
foreseeable future. In these circumstances, use of Roman law was especially au courant, since
Rabbis and Jewish statesmen alike, not to mention (as with famous case of Babbatha) everyday
Jews, were becoming increasingly familiar and dependent on Roman law. Third: Stoicism.
When surveying the available studies of Paul (especially on Romans), it’s clear that elements of
Stoicism cannot be excluded from his writings.45 However, by this time, Roman Stoicism had
synthesized, to a greater degree than in the Republic[an empire], Roman law into philosophy.
Clement, under the clear influence of Stoicism, found in Paul a forbearer. For Clement, like
Marcus Aurelius, Stoic Philosophy, and Roman natural law were already fused into one system.46
Paul had occasionally supplied scholia on pagan literature in a Stoic allegorizing fashion. Paul’s
pagan sources had included: Epimenides & Aratus (Acts 17:28), Euripides (or Menander) (1 Cor
15:33), and Epimenides (Tit 1:12). Furthermore, he supplied his readers with bits of Stoic ethics,
to whatever degree, in his epistles. Similar to the heavily Stoicizing Philo in Alexandria, Roman
Paul was comfortable with the practice of synthesizing Roman legal, Greek Stoic, and
Hellenistico-Jewish Rabbinic culture –albeit in a more moderate degree. In this scenario Paul
might simply reflect a kind of Jewish-Stoic synthesis, as presumably practiced among educated
Jews of (Antioch, Tyre, and) Tarsus, versus a more heavily Stoicizing and Platonizing school of
scriptural exegesis and Jewish philosophy in Alexandria and its environs.47 Whatever the case
may be, I hope the evidence brought forward has been convincing enough to consider identity of
“the Roman Paul” central to understanding his writings, in no small part thanks to the hints in
Clement of Alexandria.

First Draft: May 01, 2017
Endnotes:
1
For the debates about the formality of the school, its connection to bishop Alexander, and its organization,
see Itter 2009, 9–17.
2
Euseb. Hist. Eccl.. V.10.1–4.
3
Quasten 2005, 2:12.
4
Claude Mondésert, Introduction to Strom., bk. I.

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5
Itter 2009, 30.
6
Itter 2009, 70–71.
7
Hoek 1998, 61.
8
Philo of Alexandria, De opificio mundi, in Philonis Alexandrini opera quae supersunt, vol. 1, ed. L. Cohn
(Berlin: Reimer, 1896), sec. 143.
9
Musonius Rufus, Dissertatioum a Lucio diagestarum reliquiae, Musonius Rufus "The Roman Socrates"
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1947), discourse VIII.
10
Marcus Aurelius, The meditations of the emperor Marcus Aurelius, vol. 1, ed. A.S.L. Farquharson
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1944), XI.1.3.
11
Cf. Philo of Alexandria, De specialibus legibus, in Philonis Alexandrini opera quae supersunt, vol. 5, ed.
L. Cohn (Berlin: Reimer, 1906), bk. 3 sec. 164: “ἤδη δὲ καὶ οἱ τῶν δικαίων ὅροι καὶ κανόνες, αὐτοὶ οἱ
νοµοθέται, πρὸς δόξαν µᾶλλον ἢ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν ἀπιδόντες, τῶν ἀδικωτάτων ὑπέµειναν γενέσθαι,
κελεύσαντες τοῖς µὲν προδόταις τοὺς παῖδας συναναιρεῖσθαι, τοῖς δὲ τυράννοις τὰς ἐγγυτάτω πέντε
οἰκίας.” Cf. Chryssipus, Stoicorum veterum fragmenta, ed. J. von Arnim, vol. 3 (Leipzig: Teubner, 1903),
Frag. 314:
Marcianus libro I institut. (Vol. I p. 11, 25 Mommsen) sed et philosophus summae Stoicae
sapientiae Chrysippus sic incipit libro quem fecit περὶ νόµου: ὁ νόµος πάντων ἐστὶ βασιλεὺς
θείων τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνων πραγµάτων· δεῖ δὲ αὐτὸν προστάτην τε εἶναι τῶν καλῶν καὶ τῶν
αἰσχρῶν καὶ ἄρχοντα καὶ ἡγεµόνα, καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο κανόνα τε εἶναι δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων καὶ τῶν
φύσει πολιτικῶν Ζῴων προστακτικὸν µὲν ὧν ποιητέον, ἀπαγορευτικὸν δὲ ὧν οὐ ποιητέον.
Cf. Euripides, Tragicorum Graecorum fragmenta, ed. A. Nauck (Leipzig: Teubner, 1889), frag. 303:
“οὐδέποτ’ εὐτυχίαν κακοῦ ἀνδρὸς ὑπέρφρονά τ’ ὄλβον βέβαιον εἰκάσαι χρεών, οὐδ’ ἀδίκων γενεάν· ὁ γὰρ
οὐδενὸς ἐκφὺς χρόνος δικαίους ἐπάγων κανόνας δείκνυσιν ἀνθρώπων κακότητας ἐµοί.”
12
Marcus Aurelius influenced Ulpian’s works, as explained in Fergus Miller, 72.
13
Justinian, Digest, I.I.1, pr. 4. Cf. Cod. Just. 9.41.11: “the most wise man, Domitius Ulpianus, established
in his books of Publicae Disputationes for the permanent record of scientia.” For references to Justinian
and Ulpian, see http://droitromain.upmf-grenoble.fr.
14
Annewies van den Hoek, “Techniques of Quotation in Clement of Alexandria: A View of Ancient
Literary Working Methodos,” Vigiliae Christianae 50 (1996): 223–243.
15
Seneca, De otio, Sap. 8.6:
Nos certe sumus qui dicimus et Zenonem et Chrysippum maiora egisse, quam si duxissent
exercitus, gessissent honores, leges tulissent. Quas non uni civitati, sed toti humano generi
tulerunt. Quid est ergo, quare tale otium non conveniat viro bono, per quod futura saecula ordinet
nec apud paucos contionetur, sed apud omnis omnium gentium homines, quique sunt quique
erunt? Ad summam quaero, an ex praeceptis suis vixerint Cleanthes et Chrysippus et Zenon. Non
dubie respondebis sic illos vixisse, quemadmodum dixerant esse vivendum. Atqui nemo illorum
rem publicam administravit. “Non fuit,” inquis, “illis aut ea fortuna aut ea dignitas, quae admitti
ad publicarum rerum tractationem solet.” Sed idem nihilo minus non segnem egere vitam;
invenerunt, quemadmodum plus quies ipsorum hominibus prodesset quam aliorum discursus et
sudor. Ergo nihilo minus hi multum egisse visi sunt, quamvis nihil publice agerent.
16
Moses replaces Chrysippus, whose is attested as Clement’s source in the critical edition of Strom., and
numerous other fragments.
17
This is a typical Stoic use of Socrates-friendly Euripides with certain scholia added from Chryssipus.
18
This is taken from Philo’s example, whereby the Stoic use of celebrated authors or works are mined for
moral teachings (since there is no need for allegory on these points). Divine law and right reason form law,
which Socrates and subsequent Stoic followers allegedly took from their knowledge of Moses teaching
(who is the summit of philosophy in De opificio mundi 2.8).
19
Cf. Plato, Leges, 659c9 –659d2.
20
Paul used several classical Stoic playwrights and allegorized scandalous events of the Old Testament, as
Stoic philosophy with Greek myths. Like Moses, Socrates, and the Stoics, Paul dicit/legei a new law (in
Roman fashion), for Torah is “written” law (“Moses γράφει”).
21
This point anticipates Mary’s pregnancy as bearing the child of promise. Wombs of wives and
handmaids were shut up in Abimelech’s family after he nearly committed adultery with Sarah. This
sterilization of womb, prevented a mature Israel from being conceived and born. It is applied to the women
of Israel before Jesus’ mother gives birth, because of whose womb a legitimate heir is brought forth. See

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LXX Gen 20: 17–18: “προσηύξατο δὲ Αβρααµ πρὸς τὸν θεόν, καὶ ἰάσατο ὁ θεὸς τὸν Αβιµελεχ καὶ τὴν
γυναῖκα αὐτοῦ καὶ τὰς παιδίσκας αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἔτεκον· ὅτι συγκλείων συνέκλεισεν κύριος ἔξωθεν πᾶσαν
µήτραν ἐν τῷ οἴκῳ τοῦ Αβιµελεχ ἕνεκεν Σαρρας τῆς γυναικὸς Αβρααµ.” Mary, too, as a virgin, had a
closed womb (as her type in Anna), which miraculously gave birth due to prophecy. See LXX Kings 1:5–7
καὶ τῇ Αννα ἔδωκεν µερίδα µίαν, ὅτι οὐκ ἦν αὐτῇ παιδίον· πλὴν ὅτι τὴν Ανναν ἠγάπα Ελκανα
ὑπὲρ ταύτην, καὶ κύριος ἀπέκλεισεν τὰ περὶ τὴν µήτραν αὐτῆς· ὅτι οὐκ ἔδωκεν αὐτῇ κύριος
παιδίον κατὰ τὴν θλῖψιν αὐτῆς καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀθυµίαν τῆς θλίψεως αὐτῆς, καὶ ἠθύµει διὰ τοῦτο, ὅτι
συνέκλεισεν κύριος τὰ περὶ τὴν µήτραν αὐτῆς τοῦ µὴ δοῦναι αὐτῇ παιδίον. οὕτως ἐποίει ἐνιαυτὸν
κατ’ ἐνιαυτὸν ἐν τῷ ἀναβαίνειν αὐτὴν εἰς οἶκον κυρίου [. . .]”
Application of allegory to a “closed womb” is not original to Paul, but applied to the divine production of
philosophy in the soul. Similarly, Paul contrasted the subjection to the elements of the world (i.e., false
Epicurean philosophy), or pagans as slave-children, as if the offspring of Hagar. Cf. Philo, Philonis
Alexandrini opera quae supersunt, vol. 2, ed. P. Wendland (Berlin: Reimer, 1897), sec 34–35:
τὸ ἐµαυτοῦ πάθος, ὃ µυριάκις παθὼν οἶδα, διηγούµενος οὐκ αἰσχύνοµαι· βουληθεὶς ἔστιν ὅτε
κατὰ τὴν συνήθη τῶν κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν δογµάτων γραφὴν ἐλθεῖν καὶ ἃ χρὴ συνθεῖναι ἀκριβῶς
εἰδώς, ἄγονον καὶ στεῖραν εὑρὼν τὴν διάνοιαν ἄπρακτος ἀπηλλάγην, τὴν µὲν κακίσας τῆς
οἰήσεως, τὸ δὲ τοῦ ὄντος κράτος καταπλαγείς, παρ’ ὃν τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς ἀνοίγνυσθαί τε καὶ
συγκλείεσθαι µήτρας συµβέβηκεν. ἔστι δὲ ὅτε κενὸς ἐλθὼν πλήρης ἐξαίφνης ἐγενόµην
ἐπινιφοµένων καὶ σπειροµένων ἄνωθεν ἀφανῶς τῶν ἐνθυµηµάτων, ὡς ὑπὸ κατοχῆς ἐνθέου
κορυβαντιᾶν καὶ πάντα ἀγνοεῖν, τὸν τόπον, τοὺς παρόντας, ἐµαυτόν, τὰ λεγόµενα, τὰ γραφόµενα.
22
Clement correct in supposing this to refer to sectarians of Epicurean philosophy. “Λέγετέ µοι” is
extremely rare. Epictetus’ diatribe was directed against Epicureans, as was a speech of Paul in Acts of the
Apostles. Wherefore those “those under the elements of this world” appear as those whom Epictetus rejects.
Epictetus rejected their presumption that one must be a “free[dman]” to study philosophy, analogous to
Paul’s assertion that slaves of Jesus have access to his teaching. Epictetus’ equivocal use of “to err,” versus
“to sin,” is similarly applied to the Mosaic Law and sin in Paul. Clement takes this reading as well, for he
identifies Paul’s slaves “under the elements of the world” as “the [Epicurean] philosophers” in Clement,
Strom., I.11.53.1–2:
ἐπεὶ “ὅτε ἦµεν νήπιοι,” φησὶν ὁ αὐτὸς ἀπόστολος, “ὑπὸ τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσµου ἦµεν
δεδουλωµένοι. ὁ δὲ νήπιος, κἂν κληρονόµος ᾖ, οὐδὲν δούλου διαφέρει ἄχρι τῆς προθεσµίας
τοῦ πατρός” (Gal 4:3) νήπιοι οὖν καὶ οἱ φιλόσοφοι, ἐὰν µὴ ὑπὸ τοῦ Χριστοῦ ἀπανδρωθῶσιν. εἰ
γὰρ “οὐ κληρονοµήσει ὁ υἱὸς τῆς παιδίσκης µετὰ τοῦ υἱοῦ τῆς ἐλευθέρας” (Gal 4:30).
23
See LXX Gen 21: 8–14. Being the seed of Abraham, God declared Ishmael to have a share in Abraham’s
inheritance. Furthermore, the threat of Ishmael having a share led to Sarah despising Hagar, as a slave
woman, but she was unable to insult Ishmael as a slave.
24
See Aline Rousselle, “Vivre sous deux droits: la pratique familiale poly-juridique des citoyens romains
juifs,” Annales, Histoire, Sciences Sociales 45 (1990): 851. A proper reading of Josephus reveals his term
γυνή, with respect to the wife of a Jew, to mean “a legitimate-citizen spouse.” By the first century CE, Jews
appear accommodating Jewish law to Roman law such that their rules on monogamy considered the first
wife to be official (legal, for Romans), while all others were treated (vis-à-vis Rome) as concubines. The
Romanized Dionysios of Halicarnassus parallels Paul’s ‘born of woman’ and Dionysios’ description of one
Cicero’s legitimate daughters, as in St. Paul’s exact phrase. Numerous parallels exist between Paul’s &
Dionysios’ idiom/vocabulary. See, for example, Martin Hengel and Anna Schwemer, Paul between
Damascus and Antioch: the Unknown Years (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 1997), 494.
25
Rabbinic jurisprudence, with respect to the Mishna around Paul’s time, seems to have treated and
interpreted children of bigamy as equally sons and heirs as with the first marriage. See Rousselle, “Vivre
sous deux droits: la pratique familiale poly-juridique des citoyens romains juifs,” Annales, Histoire,
Sciences Sociales 45 (1990): 851–852.
26
Cf. Dionysios of Halicarnassus, Roman Antiquities, trans. and ed. Edward Spelman (London: London
and Westminster, 1758), 274–275.
27
David Johnston, “Succession,” in The Cambridge Companion of Roman Law, ed. J. Johnston
(Cambridge: CUP, 2015), 162–163.
28
Ibid. A difficulty arises here, in that the curator might be appointed by the tutor, whom the paterfamilias
appointed, albeit not directly. Otherwise, if Papianus (c. 200) reflects pristine institutions of the first

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century CE, Paul’s assertion agrees with the Roman law of Just., Dig., XXVI.3.6 “Si filio puberi pater
tutorem aut impuberi curatorem dederit, citra inquisitionem praetor eos confirmare debebit.”
29
Johnston, “Succession,” 161: “A paterfamilias [. . .] was able to make provision in his will for a tutor to
the son.” A quasi-pagan imperial witness attests to this legal terminology in Sopater, Διαιρέσεις
ζητηµάτων, C. Walz, Rhetores Graeci, vol. 8, Stuttgart: Cotta, 1835: 8:345–346:
καὶ σωφροσύνην πολλὴν, καὶ ὅλως ἀνδρεῖον τὸ φρόνηµα, πανταχοῦ ταύτης ὑποστήσασθαι δεῖ.
“Ἀριστεὺς ἀπὸ πολέµου ἐπανελθὼν εὗρε τὴν πόλιν λοιµώττουσαν· νόµος ἐντὸς ἡµερῶν τριάκοντα
τὸν ἀριστέα λαµβάνειν τὸ γέρας· παυσαµένου τοῦ λοιµοῦ µετὰ τὴν προθεσµίαν αἰτεῖ τὴν δωρεὰν
ὁ ἀριστεύς.” Ἔλεος τὸν ἀριστέα καὶ λαµπρὰ τύχη µερίζεται, καὶ τὰ µὲν ἔξω ζηλωτὸς τοῖς
κατορθώµασι· ταῖς δὲ λοιµοῦ συµφοραῖς τὴν ποµπείαν ἀφῄρηται. τὸ γὰρ ἅµα τῷ τροπαίῳ
συµπεπτωκέναι τῶν ἀναγκαίων τὴν ἔνδειαν, καὶ µέχρι τῆς προθεσµίας τῆς κατὰ τὸν νόµον
ἐπικεῖσθαι τῇ πόλει, καὶ τὴν χάριν τῆς νίκης ἀµβλυτέραν ἐργάζεται.
30
Cf. Rom 1:8, 10:18.
31
Whether ἐκ γυναικὸς is taken in a Greek, or in a Roman sense, it expresses “wife,” hardly a nondescript
woman. Relevant for Roman addressees, Paul needed to avoid the tawdry association with the theater,
where slaves absurdly attempted so-called marriage (connubium). See Max Radin, “Greek Law in Roman
Comedy,” Classical Philology 5 (1910): 365. For example, Plautus isespecially quotable for the laughable
scene: “sunt hic inter se quos nunc credo dicere: quaeso hercle quid istuc est? serviles nuptiae?” Yet, this
reflects long-lasting jurisprudence, as in Ulpian’s “Conubium est uxoris iure ducendae facultas. Conubium
habent cives Romani cum civibus Romanis: cum Latinis autem et peregrinis ita, si concessum sit. Cum
servis nullum est conubium” (Just. Dig. V.3–5). The inhospitable social reality would have proved an
embarrassing distraction, if Paul had claimed Jesus to be born of someone without legitimate con[n]ubium.
Paul would have been unlikely to call Mary an ancilla, or an unmarried woman, to bear the child Jesus,
considering his legal arguments for Jesus’ rights, rank, and legitimacy. See Josiah Osgood, “‘Nuptiae Iure
Civili Congruae’: Apuleius’s Story of Cupid and Psyche and the Roman Law of Marriage,” Transactions of
the American Philological Association 136 (2006): 427. Romans were accustomed to gods entering into
unequal marriages with mortals. Only if a mortal had some sort of equality (par) can the child not be
putatively of a spurius (spurii) father. Otherwise, Paul would have clumsily introduced Mary into
honorable wife of a Roman citizen. However, Paul was not dishonest (especially in light of Lk 1:35), for
Mary did not need sexual intercourse to contract connubium, as per Ulpian: “Nuptias [. . .] non concubitus,
sed consensus faciat” (Just., Dig., XXXV.1.15, L.17.30). Strictly speaking, consent did not require a
written contract per Papianian: “neque enim tabulas facere matrimonium” (Just., Dig., XXIX.5.31). Still,
the societal norm was to consider marriage between a peregrine and a citizen to be of no value. See Seneca,
De beneficiis, 4.35.1: “Promisi tibi in matrimonium filiam; postea peregrinus adparuisti. Non est mihi cum
externo conubium; eadem res me defendit, quae vetat.”
32
Cf. the very rare, if not unique, antique witness to either Greek or Roman law with the “sub lege/ὑπὸ
νόµον” in Just., Dig., XXV.2.28 (Lex Falcidia de legatis [40 BC]): “Statuliber heredis non auget familiam.
1. Communes servi in utriusque patrimonio connumerantur. 2. Cuius usus fructus alienus est, in dominio
domini proprietatis connumeratur, pignori dati in debitoris, sub lege commissoria distracti, item ad diem
addicti in venditoris.”
33
See an incident attributed to Rabbi Gamliel in Catherine Hezser, “The Social Status of Slaves in the
Talmud Yerushalmi and in Graeco-Roman Society,” in The Talmud Yerushalmi and Graeco-Roman
Culture, Texts and Studies in Ancient Judaism 93, ed. P. Schafer (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2002), 3:119:
“It has been taught: The male and female slaves, one does not call them ‘Abba So-and-So’ and ‘Imma So-
and-So’. Those of the house Gamliel did call their male and female slaves ‘Abba Tabi’ and ‘Imma Tabit’”
(y. Nid. 1:5, 49b). Gamliel was named Paul’s teacher in Acts 22:3. Gamliel acts as the ideal master to his
slave Tabi in the vignette. Hezser suggests Gamliel transgressed the au courant Jewish practice of calling
only the paterfamilias “pater,” (Abba in Aramaic). This conveniently explains Paul’s context and meaning
so that “Abba” denotes a Jewish reception of Roman law.
34
“Λέγετέ µοι, οἱ ὑπὸ νόµον [= sub iure gentium] θέλοντες εἶναι, τὸν νόµον οὐκ ἀκούετε; γέγραπται γὰρ
ὅτι Ἀβραὰµ δύο υἱοὺς ἔσχεν, ἕνα ἐκ τῆς παιδίσκης καὶ ἕνα ἐκ τῆς ἐλευθέρας. ἀλλ’ ὁ µὲν ἐκ τῆς παιδίσκης
κατὰ σάρκα γεγέννηται, ὁ δὲ ἐκ τῆς ἐλευθέρας δι’ ἐπαγγελίας [. . .]”
35
Epictetus, Dissertationes ab Arriano digesta, ed. H. Schenkl (Leipzig: Teubner, 1894), II.1.23: “οἳ
λέγουσι µόνους τοὺς παιδευθέντας ἐλευθέρους εἶναι. — Πῶς τοῦτο; — Οὕτως· νῦν ἄλλο τί ἐστιν ἐλευθερία
ἢ τὸ ἐξεῖναι ὡς βουλόµεθα διεξάγειν; ‘οὐδέν.’ λέγετε δή µοι, ὦ ἄνθρωποι, βούλεσθε ζῆν ἁµαρτάνοντες.”

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36
“Illud quoque his consequens est, quod ex ancilla et libero iure gentium seruus nascitur, et contra ex
libera et seruo liber nascitur.”
37
Clement. Strom. I.11.53.2–3: “νήπιοι οὖν καὶ οἱ φιλόσοφοι, ἐὰν µὴ ὑπὸ τοῦ Χριστοῦ ἀπανδρωθῶσιν. εἰ
γὰρ “οὐ κληρονοµήσει ὁ υἱὸς τῆς παιδίσκης [ἐκ τῆς δούλης τῆς Αἰγυπτίας (cf. Clement, Extraits de
Théodote, infra, sec. 3)] µετὰ τοῦ υἱοῦ τῆς ἐλευθέρας,” ἀλλὰ γοῦν σπέρµα ἐστὶν (3) Ἀβραὰµ τὸ µὴ ἐξ
ἐπαγγελίας, τὸ ἴδιον εἰληφὸς δωρεάν.” The meaning of ἀπανδρωθῶσιν is restricted to healing of the womb,
making it fruitful by male insemination, and bringing fruit of the womb to maturity. Clement’s correct
inference in opposition (ἀντιδιαστολή; Cf Paid. I.6.34) to the Jewish συγκλείω of a womb in Genesis and
Paul (Gal 3:22–23). See Clement Clément d'Alexandrie: Extraits de Théodote, 2nd ed., Sources chrétiennes
23, ed. F. Sagnard, (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1948), sec. 1 extr. 21 ex. 3: “Τὰ οὖν ἀρρενικὰ µετὰ τοῦ Λόγου
συνεστάλη· τὰ θηλυκὰ δὲ ἀπανδρωθέντα ἑνοῦται τοῖς Ἀγγέλοις καὶ εἰς Πλήρωµα χωρεῖ”; While the term is
rare, the Stoics are among the few recorded to use it in an extended sense of being brought to maturity in
training as in Diogenes Philosophos, Stoicorum veterum fragmenta, vol. 3, ed. J. von Arnim (Leipzig:
Teubner, 1903): frag. 74. The medical use of this term refers to the womb in Aretaeus Medicus, De causis
et signis diuturnorum morborum libri duo, in Aretaeus, 2nd ed., Corpus medicorum Graecorum 2, ed. K.
Hude (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1958): 1.6.4.
38
For uses of προθεσµία in Roman documents, see An Index to Roman Imperial Constitutions from Greek
Inscriptions and Papyri, ed. V. Anastasiadis and G. Souris (Berlin, Gruyter, 200), 152.
39
The term is was technically rendered into Latin as terminum by post-Justinianic antecessores in M.T.
Fögen (ed.), Das Lexikon zur Hexabiblos aucta, Forschungen zur byzantinischen Rechtsgeschichte 17
(Frankfurt: Löwenklau Gesellschaft, 1990), s.v. “προθεσµία.” For the dating of this Byzantine lexicon and
the source of its vocabulary, see Bernard Stolte, “Codification in Byzantium from Justinian to Leo VI,” in
Diverging Paths? The Shapes and Institutions in Medieval Christendom and Islam, ed. J. Hudson and A.
Rodríquez (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 67.
40
The difference between Paul’s choice of the preposition ἄχρι and Sopater’s µέχρι is trivial. Umberto
Laffi, In Greco per I Greci: Ricerche sul lessico Greco del processo civile e criminale romano nelle
attestatzioni di fonti documenarie romane (Pavia: IUSS Press, 2013), 2–5, convincingly argues that: (1.)
there existed notable latitude in choosing legal vocabulary in Republican and early imperial translations of
documents, and (2.) there was some variation in vocabulary, among other things, due to the emperor’s
curial office for translation, whose skills varied from one time to another, and from one administration to
another. His findings are extraordinarily important: (a.) Quality of graecitas varies, let alone the question of
the translator being official, (b.) Passage of time results in new vocabulary for old words, (c.) This renders
textual equivalence by recourse to lexicons risky, decontextualizing and deluding readers about allegedly
proper translations.
41
Gaius, Institutes, I.134.
42
Similarly, might Paul utilize Ps.-Plato’s: “The city [= Roman civitas] is the dwelling of a multitude of
people who use the same laws: the multitude of people are under law (ὑπὸ νόµον) itself”? Cf. [Ps.-]Plato,
Definitions, 415c3: “Πόλις οἴκησις πλήθους ἀνθρώπων κοινοῖς δόγµασιν χρωµένων· πλῆθος ἀνθρώπων
ὑπὸ νόµον τὸν αὐτὸν ὄντων.” Granted Paul’s Roman legal jargon (cf., infra, Rom 5:16–17), his use of
δικαιόσυνη (infra) is unsurpringly related to δικαίωµα (ius).
43
Rom 1:5 calls “all Gentiles” to obey Paul’s κήρυγµα (edict); Rom 1:19: “What may be known about God
is plain to them, because God has made it plain to them.” Like Cicero, De legibus, I.7–9 (infra) and later
Roman jurists, Paul holds communion of knowledge and reason between the divinity and men; Rom 1:20–
21, like Cicero, supposes they have access to virtue by this communion; Rom 1:22–23: “Although they
claimed to be wise, they became fools and exchanged the glory of the immortal God for images made to
look like a mortal human being and birds and animals and reptiles.” It seems to answer Cicero’s claim that
recta ratio brings gods and men in communion, and that beasts and other things are inferior. Cicero asks if
the product of this reason a relationship is Plato’s wisdom (sapientia). Still, Paul can claim that the gentiles
worship elements and inferior beings contradicting their own wisdom. Rom 2:12–15 supposes gentiles
perish, though they have not a written law, they can obey it, for this kind of law is known by nature (lex
naturalis as reflected in the Roman ius gentium). While Paul placed the law in the conscience (Rom 2:16),
Cicero placed it in “right reason.”
44
Antioch was a conventus and assize center of its province. Josephus has lead scholars to this conclusion
about Roman legal collections on diaspora Jewry served as in Jewish Antiquities. See Georgi Kantor, “
‘Decide their controversies with one another’: Jewish Courts in the Province of Asia,” Vestnik drevnej

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istorii 282 (2012): 31–32, 35–37. Penalties were attached to lawyers getting access to these archives, being
restricted by law. This presupposes an endemic problem of preventing access. Ibid., 33. As an example, the
imperial constitution of Sardis in comparison with Paul is auspicious, for such would have been in the
archives during Paul’s research and writing of Galatians and Romans. Given discussion on the nature of
compromissum or arbitration granted to Jewish communities in Asia minor (ibid., 37–40), Paul’s use of it in
his theory of law (mesites in Gal) comes as no surprise if he had accessed Roman archives.
45
E.g., John Martens, “Romans 2:14–16: A Stoic Reading,” New Testament Studies 40 (1994): 55–67.
46
Clem. Strom. II.4.18.4: “βασιλεῖ βασιλεῖς καὶ οἱ Χριστοῦ Χριστιανοί. εἶθ’ ὑποβὰς ἐπιφέρει σαφῶς· “τὸ
µὲν ὀρθὸν ἂν εἴη νόµιµον καὶ νόµος φύσει ὢν ὁ λόγος ὁ ὀρθὸς καὶ οὐκ ἐν γράµµασιν οὐδὲ ἑτέροις.” NB,
“nomos physei” of Paul and Ulpian (supra), along with Chrysippus’ and Marcus Aurelius’ convictions that
law is natural product of right reason.
47
Potential likes of Paul with Stoic philosophy abound. Cicero was plausibly dependent on Antipater of
Tarsus (d. c. 130 BCE) for his De finibus bonorum et malorum. See Runar Throsteinsson, Roman
Christianity and Roman Stoicism: A Comparison Study of Ancient Morality (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2010), 5. Zeno of Tarsus (c. 150 BCE) and Athenodorus of Tarsus (1st c. BCE), an instructor of
Augustus returned to Tarsus as governor of the city were possible influences. One can speculate about the
nature of Paul’s education in both imperial law and Stoicism from someone who was a friend of the
emperor. Se David Sedley, “The School, from Zeno to Arius Dydimus.” in The Cambridge Companion to
the Stoics, ed. Brad Inwood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 31.

©Christiaan Kappes 2017