Chapter 9-1
of work and the reversion to the eight-hour shift apparently
ILAW AT BUKLOD NG MANGGAGAWA vs. NLRC
et. al.
G.R. No. 91980 June 27, 1991
NARVASA, J.
FACTS: The controversy at bar had its origin in the "wage
distortions" affecting the employees of respondent San
Miguel Corporation allegedly caused by Republic Act No.
6727, otherwise known as the Wage Rationalization Act.
Upon the effectivity of the Act, the union known as "Ilaw
at Buklod Ng Manggagawa (IBM)" said to represent 4,500
employees of San Miguel Corporation, more or less,
"working at the various plants, offices, and warehouses
located at the National Capital Region" presented to the
company a "demand" for correction of the "significant
distortion in . . . (the workers') wages." In that "demand,"
the Union explicitly invoked Section 4 (d) of RA 6727
which reads as follows: xxx xxx xxx
(d) . . .Where the application of the increases in
the wage rates under this Section results in distortions as
defined under existing laws in the wage structure within an
establishment and gives rise to a dispute therein, such
dispute shall first be settled voluntarily between the parties
and in the event of a deadlock, the same shall be finally
resolved through compulsory arbitration by the regional
branches of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) having jurisdiction over the workplace…
The Union claims that demand was ignored. In
this connection, the workers involved issued a joint notice
reading as follows:
SAMA-SAMANG PAHAYAG: KAMING
ARAWANG MANGGAGAWA NG POLO BREWERY
PAWANG KASAPI NG ILAW AT BUKLOD NG
MANGGAGAWA (IBM) AY NAGKAISANG
NAGPASYA NA IPATUPAD MUNA ANG EIGHT
HOURS WORK SHIFT PANSAMANTALA HABANG
HINDI IPINATUTUPAD NG SMC MANAGEMENT
ANG TAMANG WAGE DISTORTION.
That decision to observe the "eight hours work
shift" was implemented on October 16, 1989 by "some 800
daily-paid workers at the Polo Plant's production line of
SMC] joined by others at statistical quality control and
warehouse. There ensued thereby a change in the work
schedule which had been observed by daily-paid workers at
the Polo Plant for the past five (5) years, i.e. "ten (10)
hours for the first shift and ten (10) to fourteen (14) hours
for the second shift, from Mondays to Fridays . . ; (and on)
Saturdays, . . eight (8) hours for both shifts" a work
schedule which, SMC says, the workers had "welcomed,
and encouraged" because the automatic overtime built into
the schedule "gave them a steady source of extra-income,"
and pursuant to which it (SMC) "planned its production
targets and budgets.
This abandonment of the long-standing schedule
caused substantial losses to SMC. It is SMC's submittal that
the coordinated reduction by the Union's members of the
work time theretofore willingly and consistently observed
by them, causing financial losses to the employer in order
to compel it to yield to the demand for correction of "wage
distortions," is an illegal and "unprotected" activity.
ISSUE: Whether or not the strike is illegal?
RULING: YES. Among the rights guaranteed to
employees by the Labor Code is that of engaging in
concerted activities in order to attain their legitimate
objectives. The more common of these concerted activities
as far as employees are concerned are: strikes- the
temporary stoppage of work as a result of an industrial or
labor dispute. On the other hand, the counterpart activity
that management may licitly undertake is the lockout- the
temporary refusal to furnish work on account of a labor
dispute, Article 263 provides that the "right of legitimate
labor organizations to strike and of employer to lockout,
consistent with the national interest, shall continue to be
recognized and respected." The legality of these activities is
usually dependent on the legality of the purposes sought to
be attained and the means employed therefor.It goes
without saying that these joint or coordinated activities may
be forbidden or restricted by law or contract.
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 6727 prescribes a
specific, detailed and comprehensive procedure for the
correction thereof, thereby implicitly excluding strikes or
lockouts or other concerted activities as modes of
settlement of the issue. The provision states that:
xxx … the employer and the union shall negotiate
to correct the distort-ions. Any dispute arising from wage
distortions shall be resolved through the grievance
procedure under their collective bargaining agreement
and, if it remains unresolved, through voluntary
arbitration…
Furthermore, Section 16, Chapter I of the
implementing rules of said law… declares that, "Any issue
involving wage distortion shall not be a ground for a
strike/lockout."
Moreover, the worker’s concerted refusal to
adhere to the work schedule in force is a slowdown, an
inherently illegal activity even in the absence of a no strike
clause because while the employees continue to work and
remain at their positions and accept their wages, they at the
same time select part of the work they care to perform at
their own volition or in their own terms.
Chapter 9-2
FIRST CITY INTERLINK TRANSPORTATION vs.
MA. NIEVES ROLDAN-CONFESOR
1
 GRN 106316, 272 SCRA 124 (May 5, 1997)
Facts: Petitioner First City Interlink Transportation Co, Inc
is a public utility while respondent Nagkakaisang
Manggagawa ng Fil Transit-National Federation of Labor
is the labor union of Fil Transit employees. The union filed
a notice of strike with the BLR for ULP against petitioner.
The parties failed to reach an agreement so that the union
went on strike. Consequently, several workers were
dismissed. The union filed another notice of strike alleging
ULP, massive dismissal of union officers and members,
coercion of employees and violation of workers' rights to
self-organization. Conciliation conferences were held but
the union again went on strike. The MOLE ordered the
striking workers to return to work. Only 66 employees were
accepted by petitioner conditioned on the submission of
certain requirements. The Secretary of Labor ruled for the
legality of the strike and awarded backwages and
separation pay to the strikers. Petitioner alleged that no
strike vote was obtained, the result thereof was not reported
to the MOLE, the strikers engaged in violent, illegal and
criminal acts, and it complied with the return to work order.
Issue: WON the strike was illegal.
Held: Yes. It was not shown in the pleadings that a strike
vote was obtained before the declaration of strike. The
statement in the same order of the Labor Secretary that a
notice of strike had been filed because several conciliation
conferences failed due to management's consistent refusal
to appear is contrary to evidence because management was
duly represented during the conciliation proceedings prior
to the strike. Further, the union failed to comply with the
required 7-day strike ban. The union was in bad faith when
it conducted the strike because instead of attending the
conciliation meetings with petitioner, it went on strike. The
strike was attended by pervasive and widespread violence
such as the hijacking of Fil-Transit buses, barricading of
the terminal in Alabang, puncturing of tires, cutting of
electric wirings, water hoses and fan belts, use of Molotov
bombs, and theft of expensive equipment such as fuel
injections. The commission of these illegal acts was neither
isolated nor accidental but deliberately employed to
intimidate and harass the employer and the public.
However, only the union officers and strikers who engaged
in violent, illegal and criminal acts against the employer are
deemed to have lost their employment status. Union
members who were merely instigated to participate in the
illegal strike should be treated differently. Some
requirements in the reinstatement of the striking workers
were unreasonable considering that the strikers were not
being hired for the first time but merely being reinstated.
These are the P1T cash bond, birth/baptismal certificate,
residence certificate, high school diploma or transcript of
records, certification of employment, and marriage
contract. But the requirement to submit NBI, Police and
Barangay clearances is reasonable to enable management to
determine whether the returning employees have pending
charges of illegal acts especially those committed during
the strike. The driver's and conductor's/conductress' license
is also reasonable to enable them to perform their tasks.
The pictures are necessary for the employer's personnel
records. The medical examination is justified to ensure that
the employees are physically fit to resume the performance
of their duties since it has been 2 years from the time of
their dismissal. The imposition of such requirements did
not amount to a refusal to admit workers back or an illegal
lock-out so as to entitle them to payment of backwages. In
fact, none of such employees was refused readmission.
Chapter 9-3
[G.R. No. 153664. July 18, 2003]
GRAND BOULEVARD HOTEL (formerly known as
SILAHIS INTERNATIONAL HOTEL, INC.),
petitioner, vs. GENUINE LABOR
ORGANIZATION OF WORKERS IN
HOTEL, RESTAURANT AND ALLIED
INDUSTRIES (GLOWHRAIN), respondent.
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
FACTS:
On June 15, 1990, the petitioner and the
respondent union entered into and signed a third CBA
covering the period of July 10, 1988 to July 9, 1991. On
September 27, 1990, the respondent union filed a notice of
strike. The matter was referred to the NCMB for resolution.
Meanwhile, on October 16, 1990, Michael Wilson,
the petitioner’s general manager, wrote the Secretary of
Labor informing him of the petitioner’s decision to retrench
seventeen less senior employees to lessen the daily
financial losses being incurred by the petitioner.
The next day, the respondent union, through its
president, informed the DOLE-NCR that the union will
conduct a strike vote referendum on October 23 and 24,
1990. The members of the respondent union voted to stage
a strike. On October 25, 1990, the respondent union
informed the DOLE-NCR of the results of the strike vote
referendum. On October 31, 1990, the SOLE issued
another status quo ante bellum order certifying the case to
the NLRC for compulsory arbitration and enjoining the
parties from engaging in any strike or lockout.
The petitioner wrote the SOLE of its decision to
implement its retrenchment program to stem its huge
losses. It terminated the employment of sixty employees
and two officers of the respondent union effective
December 6, 1990. On November 7, 1990, the respondent
union protested the actions of the petitioner invoking
Section 15, Article VI of the CBA. The respondent union
filed an urgent motion for a reconsideration by the SOLE of
the Certification Order dated October 31, 1990. On
November 14, 1990, the petitioner terminated the
employment of eighty-six more employees effective
December 14, 1990. The remaining employees were also
informed that it will close in six months. On November 14,
1990, the petitioner terminated the employment of
Kristoffer So, effective December 14, 1990.
By way of riposte, the respondent union filed on
November 16, 1990 another notice of strike because of
what it perceived as the petitioner’s continuing unfair labor
practices (ULP). On the same day, at about 12:00 noon, the
officers of the respondent union and some members staged
a picket in the premises of the hotel, obstructing the free
ingress and egress thereto. At 3:00 p.m., the police
operatives of the Western Police District arrived and
2
dispersed the picket line. Police officers detained the
respondent union’s president Rogelio Soluta, Henry
Baybay and Dennis Cosico. On November 17, 1990, the
petitioner sent identical letters to the officers and members
of the respondent union terminating their employment.
On February 1, 1991, the petitioner filed a
complaint with the Regional Arbitration Office of the
NLRC for illegal strike against the union, its members and
officers
The respondents denied the material allegations of
the complaint and alleged that the petitioner committed
unfair labor practices prior to the filing of the November
16, 1990 notice of strike. Hence, there was no need for the
respondent union to comply with Articles 263 and 264 of
the Labor Code, as the notice filed by the union on
September 27, 1990 was sufficient compliance with the
law.
Both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC declared the
strike held on November 16, 1990 illegal for failure of the
union to comply with the requirements laid down in Article
263 and 264 of the Labor Code. However, the Court of
appeals reversed the decision and held, taking into account
the observation of the Solicitor General, that the petitioner
retrenched employees pending the resolution of the
certified cases respecting the alleged illegal suspension and
dismissals effected by the petitioner during and prior to the
notices of strike filed by the union. The Solicitor General
opined that even if the strike was staged without the proper
notice and compliance with the cooling-off period, resort
thereto was simply triggered by the union’s belief in good
faith that petitioner was engaged in ULP.
ISSUE:
Was the strike held on November 16, 1990 illegal?
RULING:
YES. In this case, the respondent union filed its notice
of strike with the DOLE on November 16, 1990 and on the
same day, staged a picket on the premises of the hotel, in
violation of the law. Police operatives of the Western
Police District had to disperse the picketers and take into
custody Union President Rogelio Soluta and the other
officers of respondent union, Henry Babay and Dennis
Cosico. The respondents cannot argue that since the
notice of strike on November 16, 1990 were for the same
grounds as those contained in their notice of strike on
September 27, 1990 which complied with the
requirements of the law on the cooling-off period, strike
ban, strike vote and strike vote report, the strike staged
by them on November 16, 1990 was lawful. The matters
contained in the notice of strike of September 27, 1990 had
already been taken cognizance of by the SOLE when he
issued on October 31, 1990 a status quo ante bellum order
enjoining the respondent union from intending or staging a
strike. Despite the SOLE order, the respondent union
nevertheless staged a strike on November 16, 1990
simultaneously with its notice of strike, thus violating
Article 264(a) of the Labor Code of the Philippines.
While it may be true that the petitioner itself barred
the officers of the respondent union from working and had
terminated the employment of Kristoffer So, and sent out
circulars of its decision to retrench its employees effective
December 16, 1990, the same were not valid justifications
for the respondents to do away with the statutory
procedural requirements for a lawful strike. It behooved
the respondents to avail themselves of the remedies under
the CBA or file an illegal dismissal case in the office of the
Labor Arbiter against the petitioner or by agreement of the
parties, submit the case to the grievance machinery of the
CBA so that the matter may be subjected to voluntary
arbitrary proceedings instead of resorting to an immediate
strike.There was no immediate and imperative need for the
respondents to stage a strike on the very day that the notice
of strike on November 16, 1990 was filed because the
retrenchment envisaged by the petitioner had yet to take
effect on December 14, 1990. The grievances of the
respondent union could still very well be ordered and acted
upon by the SOLE before December 14, 1990.
The respondents’ claim of good faith is not a valid
excuse to dispense with the procedural steps for a lawful
strike. Hence, the need for a union to adhere to and
comply strictly with the procedural conditions sine qua
non provided for by the law in staging a strike.
Chapter 9-4
Association of Independent Unions
in the Philippines vs NLRC
305 SCRA 219
FACTS: In CENAPRO Chemicals Corporation,
the collective bargaining representative of all rank and file
employees was CENAPRO Employees Association
(CCEA) with which respondent company had a collective
bargaining agreement. Their CBA excluded casual
employees from membership in the incumbent union. The
casual employees who have rendered at least one to six
years of service sought regularization of their employment.
When their demand was denied, they formed themselves
into an organization and affiliated with the Association of
Independent Unions of the Philippines. Thereafter, AIUP
filed a petition for certification election, which petition was
opposed by the respondent company. The CCEA anchored
its opposition on the contract bar rule.
The union filed a notice of strike, minutes
of strike vote, and the needed documentation with the
DOLE. The notice of strike cited as grounds there for the
acts of respondent company constituting unfair labor
practice, more specifically coercion of employees and
systematic union busting.
The union proceeded to stage a strike, in
the course of which, the union perpetrated illegal acts. The
strikers padlocked the gate of the company. The areas
fronting the gate of the company were barricaded and
blocked by union strikers. The strikers also prevented and
coerced other non-striking employees from reporting for
work. Because of such illegal activities, the respondent
company filed a petition for injunction with the NLRC,
which granted a Temporary Restraining Order, enjoining
the strikers from doing further acts of violence, coercion, or
intimidation and from blocking free ingress and egress to
company premises.
3
 The respondent company filed a
complaint for illegal strike. The petitioners filed a
complaint for unfair labor practice and illegal lockout
against respondent company.
In a consolidated decision, the Labor
Arbiter declared as illegal the strike staged by the
petitioners, and dismissed the charge of illegal lockout and
unfair labor practice. The officers who participated in the
illegal strike and declared to have lost their employment
status. CENAPRO is directed however to reinstate the other
workers and CENAPRO is being absolved from the charges
of illegal lockout and unfair labor practice.
The respondent company appealed the
decision insofar as it ordered the reinstatement of some of
the strikers. The petitioners also appealed the same decision
of the Labor Arbiter.
NLRC affirmed in toto the Labor
Arbiter’s decision. Respondent company moved for
reconsideration of that portion of the NLRC’s decision
ordering the reinstatement of the said strikers. Acting
thereupon, the NLRC modified its decision, by ordering the
payment of separation pay in lieu of the reinstatement of
the petitioners, deleting the award of backwages, and the
declaring the loss of employment status of one petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether or not the strike is valid.
HELD: No. When they filed the notice of strike,
petitioners cited as their grounds there for unfair labor
practice, specifically coercion of employees and systematic
union busting. But the said grounds were adjudged as
baseless by the Labor Arbiter.
It is undisputed that at the time the
petition for certification election was filed by AIUP, the
petitioner union, there was an existing CBA between the
respondent company and CCEA, the incumbent bargaining
representative of all rank and file employees. The petition
should not have been entertained because of the contract
bar rule.
The strike staged by the petitioner union
was illegal for the reasons that (1)the strikers committed
illegal acts in the course of the strike. (2)And violated the
TRO enjoining the union and/or its members from
obstructing the company premises and ordering the
removal there from of all the barricades.
Even if the strike is valid because its
objective or purpose is lawful, the strike may still be
declared invalid where the means employed are illegal.
The dismissal of the officers of the
striking union was justified and valid. Their dismissal as a
consequence of the illegality of the strike staged by them
finds support in Art. 264(a) of the Labor Code, pertinent
portion of which provides: “x x Any union officer who
knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts
during a strike may be declared to have lost his
employment status. x x”.
Union officers are duty bound to guide
their members to respect the law. If instead of doing so, the
officers urge the members to violate the law and defy the
duly constituted authorities, their dismissal from the service
is a just penalty or sanction for their unlawful acts. The
officers’ responsibility is greater than that of the members.
An ordinary striking employee can not be
terminated by mere participation in an illegal strike. There
must be proof that he committed illegal acts during the
strike and the striker who participated in the commission of
the illegal act must be identified.
Chapter 9-5
LAPANDAY WORKERS UNION, ET AL. vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,
ET AL.
G.R. No. 95494 September 7, 1995; 248 SCRA 95
PUNO, J.:
FACTS:
Private respondents are sister companies engaged
in the production of bananas. Their agricultural
establishments are located in Davao City.
On the other hand, petitioner Lapanday Workers'
Union (Union) is the duly certified bargaining agent of the
rank and file employees of private respondents. The Union
is affiliated with the KMU-ANGLO. The other petitioners
are all members of the Union.
Petitioner Union has a collective bargaining
agreement with private respondents, covering the period
from December 5, 1985 to November 30, 1988. A few
months before the expiration of their CBA, private
respondents initiated certain management policies which
disrupted the relationship of the parties.
Issues were discussed during a labor-management
meeting held on August 2, 1988. After private respondents
explained the issues, the Union agreed to allow its members
to attend the HDIR seminar for the rank-and-filers.
Nevertheless, on August 19 and 20, the Union directed its
members not to attend the seminars scheduled on said
dates. Earlier on, or on August 6, 1988, the Union, led by
petitioners Arquilao Bacolod and Rene Arao, picketed the
premises of the Philippine Eagle Protectors to show their
displeasure on the hiring of the guards.
Worse still, the Union filed on August 25, 1988, a
Notice of Strike with the National Conciliation and
Mediation Board (NCMB). It accused the company of
unfair labor practices consisting of coercion of employees,
intimidation of union members and union-busting.
The NCMB called a conciliation conference. With
the apparent settlement of their differences, private
respondents notified the NCMB that there were no more
bases for the notice of strike.
Danilo Martinez, a member of the Board of
Directors of the Union. The gunman was later identified as
Eledio Samson, an alleged member of the new security
forces of private respondents.
On September 9, 1988, the day after the killing,
most of the members of the Union refused to report for
work. They returned to work the following day but they did
not comply with the "quota system" adopted by the
management to bolster production output. Allegedly, the
Union instructed the workers to reduce their production to
thirty per cent (30%). Private respondents charged the
Union with economic sabotage through slowdown.
4
 On September 14, 1988, Private respondents filed
separate charges against the Union and its members for
illegal strike, unfair labor practice and damages, with
prayer for injunction.
On October 3, 1988, a strike vote was conducted
among the members of the Union and those in favor of the
strike won overwhelming support from the workers. The
result of the strike vote was then submitted to the NCMB
on October 10, 1988. Two days later, or on October 12,
1988, the Union struck.
Labor Arbiter Antonio Villanueva ruled that the
Onion staged an illegal strike.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the strike staged on October 12,
1988 was illegal.
HELD:
Paragraphs (c) and (f) of Article 263 of the Labor
Code, as amended by E.O. 111, provides:
xxx. In every case, the union or the employer shall
furnish the Ministry the results of the voting at least seven
(7) days before the intended strike or lockout subject to the
cooling-off period herein provided.
We rule that strike conducted by the union on October 12,
1988 is plainly illegal as it was held within the seven (7)
day waiting period provided for by paragraph (f), Article
263 of the Labor Code, as amended. The haste in holding
the strike prevented the Department of Labor and
Employment from verifying whether it carried the approval
of the majority of the union members. It set to naught an
important policy consideration of our law on strike.
Considering this finding, we need not exhaustively rule on
the legality of the work stoppage conducted by the union
and some of their members on September 9 and 23, 1988.
Suffice to state, that the ruling of the public respondent on
the matter is supported by substantial evidence.
We affirm the decision of the public respondent limiting
the penalty of dismissal only to the leaders of the illegal
strike. especially the officers of the union who served as its
major players. They cannot claim good faith to exculpate
themselves. They admitted knowledge of the law on strike,
including its procedure. They cannot violate the law which
ironically was cast to promote their interest.
We, likewise, agree with the public respondent that the
union members who were merely instigated to participate
in the illegal strike should be treated differently from their
leaders. Part of our benign consideration for labor is the
policy of reinstating rank-and-file workers who were
merely misled in supporting illegal strikes. Nonetheless,
these reinstated workers shall not be entitled to backwages
as they should not be compensated for services skipped
during the illegal strike.
Chapter 9-6
SAMAHAN NG MANGGAGAWA SA MOLDEX
PRODUCTS, INC. VS. NLRC
324 SCRA 242
1 February 2000
FACTS:
After the negotiations for the renewal of the collective
bargaining agreement between petitioner union and private
respondent Moldex Products, Inc. ended in a deadlock,
petitioner filed a notice of strike before the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB). A strike vote
was conducted, but the results thereof were never submitted
to NCMB. Petitioner went on strike. On private
respondent’s petition, it was declared as illegal by the
Labor Arbiter. On appeal to the NLRC, the case was
remanded for the Labor Arbiter for reception of additional
evidence, thus this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the strike staged by petitioner was illegal.
RULING:
Yes, the strike was illegal.
Article 264 of the Labor Code provides in part that no
strike shall be conducted without first having filed a notice
of strike or without first having filed a notice of strike, or
without the necessary lockout or strike vote first having
been obtained and reported to the Ministry.
In this case, the result of the strike vote was not submitted
to the NCMB making the strike staged illegal. Also, they
committed acts of violence, threats, coercion and
intimidation during the strike.
The employment of the officers and of the members who
committed prohibited acts in the course of the strike were
declared forfeited.
The NLRC resolution was set aside.
Chapter 9-7
National Federation of Sugar Workers vs. Ovejera
GR No. L-59743, May 31, 1982 ; 114 SCRA 354
PLANA, J:
FACTS:
National Federation of Sugar Workers (NFSW) has
concluded with Central Azucarera de la Carlota (CAC) a
CBA effective February 16, 1981 to February 15, 1984
which provided that the parties agree to maintain the
present practice on the grant of Christmas bonus, milling
bonus, and amelioration bonus to the extent as the latter is
required by law. The Christmas and milling bonuses
amount to 1 ½ months' salary. On November 28, 1981,
NFSW struck allegedly, to compel the payment of the 13th
month pay under PD 851, in addition to the Christmas,
milling and amelioration bonuses being enjoyed by CAC
workers. On January 22, 1982, NFSW filed with the
Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE) a notice of
strike based on non-payment of the 13th month pay. Six
days after, NFSW struck. One day after the commencement
of the strike, a report of the strike-vote was filed by NFSW
5
with MOLE. CAC filed a petition with the Regional
Arbitration Branch of MOLE to declare the strike illegal,
principally for being violative of BP 130, that is, the strike
was declared before the expiration of the 15-day cooling-
off period for ULP strikes, and the strike was staged before
the lapse of seven days from the submission to MOLE of
the result of the strike-vote After the submission of position
papers and hearing, Labor Arbiter Ovejara declared the
strike illegal. On February 26, 1982, the NFSW, by passing
the NLRC filed the instant Petition for prohibition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the strike declared by NFSW is
illegal, the resolution of which mainly depends on the
mandatory or directory character of the cooling-off period
and the 7-day strike ban after report to MOLE of the result
of a strike-vote, as prescribed in the Labor Code.
HELD:
When the law says "the labor union may strike" should the
dispute "remain unsettled until the lapse of the requisite
number of days (cooling-off period) from the filing of the
notice," the unmistakable implication is that the union may
not strike before the lapse of the cooling-off period.
Similarly, the mandatory character of the 7-day strike ban
after the report on the strike-vote is manifest in the
provision that "in every case," the union shall furnish the
MOLE with the results of the voting "at least seven (7)
days before the intended strike, subject to the (prescribed)
cooling-off period." It must be stressed that the
requirements of cooling-off period and 7-day strike ban
must both be complied with, although the labor union may
take a strike vote and report the same within the statutory
cooling-off period.
If only the filing of the strike notice and the strike-vote
report would be deemed mandatory, but not the waiting
periods so specifically and emphatically prescribed by law,
the purposes for which the filing of the strike notice and
strike-vote report is required would not be achieved, as
when a strike is declared immediately after a strike notice is
served, or when as in the instant case the strike-vote report
is filed with MOLE after the strike had actually
commenced Such interpretation of the law ought not and
cannot be countenanced. It would indeed be self-defeating
for the law to imperatively require the filing on a strike
notice and strike-vote report without at the same time
making the prescribed waiting periods mandatory.
Chapter 9-8
UNION OF FILIPINO EMPLOYEES vs. NESTLE
PHILIPPINES, INC.
GR NO. 88710-13. December 19. 1990
MEDIALDEA, J.;
Facts: UFE filed a notice of strike with the BLR against
Filipro (now, Nestle) and later filed a complaint for ULP
for violation of the Labor Code on Holiday Pay, non-
implementation of the CBA provisions and others. The
Minister of Labor and Employment Blas Ople assumed
jurisdiction over the dispute. UFE assailed the same by
filing a petition for certiorari with a prayer for the issuance
of TRO. Notwithstanding the automatic injunction and an
absence of a restraining order, the union members staged a
strike and continued to man picket lines. The union officers
and members distributed leaflets to employees and passers-
by advocating a boycott. Hence, Nestle filed a petition to
declare the strike illegal. The Labor Minister Ople issued
another return to work order but the officers and members
of UFE continued with the strike.
Issue: Whether or not the strike is legal.
Held: No. A strike undertaken despite the issuance by the
Secretary of Labor of an assumption or certification order
becomes a prohibited activity and thus, illegal, pursuant to
Article 264 (a) of the Labor Code. Moreover, the union
officers and members who have participated in the said
illegal activity, are, as a result, deemed to have lost their
employment status. Thus, we held that:
UFE completely misses the underlying principle embodied
in Art. 263 (g) on the settlement of labor disputes and this
is, that assumption and certification orders are executory in
character and are to be strictly complied with by the parties
even during the pendency of any petition questioning their
validity. This extraordinary authority given to the Secretary
of Labor is aimed at arriving at a peaceful and speedy
solution to labor disputes, without jeopardizing national
interests.
Regardless therefore of their motives, or the validity of
their claims, the striking workers must cease and/or desist
from any and all acts that tend to, or undermine this
authority of the Secretary of Labor, once an assumption
and/or certification order is issued. They cannot, for
instance, ignore return-to-work orders, citing unfair labor
practices on the part of the company, to justify their
actions. . . .
One other point that must be underscored is that the return-
to-work order is issued pending the determination of the
legality or illegality of the strike. It is not correct to say that
it may be enforced only if the strike is legal and may be
disregarded if the strike is illegal, for the purpose precisely
is to maintain the status quo while the determination is
being made. Otherwise, the workers who contend that their
strike is legal can refuse to return to their work and cause a
standstill on the company operations while retaining the
positions they refuse to discharge or allow the management
to fill. Worse, they will also claim payment for work not
done, on the ground that they are still legally employed
although actually engaged in the activities inimical to their
employer's interest.
This is like eating one's cake and having it too, and at the
expense of the management. Such an unfair situation surely
was not contemplated by our labor laws and cannot be
justified under the social justice policy, which is a policy of
fairness to both labor and management. Neither can this
unseemly arrangement be sustained under the due process
clause as the order, if thus interpreted, would be plainly
oppressive and arbitrary.
6
Chapter 9-9
REFORMIST UNION OF R. B. LINER, INC., HEVER
DETROS, ET AL., vs. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION
G.R. No. 120482. January 27, 1997
DAVIDE, JR., J
FACTS:
Petitioner union was organized in May
1989 "by affiliating itself with Lakas
Manggagawa sa Pilipinas (hereinafter Lakas)."
Lakas filed a notice of strike on 13 November
1989 because of alleged acts of unfair labor
practice committed by the private respondents.
Despite conciliation hearings held on 4 and 6
December 1989, the parties failed to reach an
agreement. Later, another act of unfair labor
practice allegedly committed by the private
respondents impelled Reformist, with the
authorization of Lakas, to go on strike on 13
December 1989 even as conciliation proceedings
continued.
On 21 December 1989, R.B. Liner, Inc.
petitioned then Secretary Fanklin Drilon of the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE)
to assume jurisdiction over the ongoing dispute
or certify it to the NLRC. Secretary Drilon
determined that "[t]he ongoing work stoppage in
the company . . . . adversely affects an industry
indispensable to the national interest;" thus on
28 December 1989, he certified the dispute to
the NLRC for compulsory arbitration and issued
a return-to-work order.
The certified case (NLRC Certified case
No. 0542, entitled In Re: Labor Dispute at RB
Liner, Inc.) was dismissed on 13 February 1990
after the union and the company reached all
agreement on 19 January 1990 providing,
among other matters, for the holding of a
certification election.
On 31 January 1990, a certification
election was held where Lakas won as the
collective bargaining agent of the rank-and-file
employees. On 13 February 1990, Lakas
presented a proposal for a collective bargaining
agreement to Bernita and Rodelia Dejero, but
they refused to bargain. Meanwhile, as admitted
by private respondents' witness Arcile
Tanjuatco, Jr., eight R.B. Liner buses were
"converted" to Sultran Lines, one "became
MCL," and another "became SST Liner."
The petitioners filed with NLRC a case charging the private
respondents with unfair labor practice, i.e., illegal lock out.
The private respondents countered with NLRC Case, which
sought to declare as illegal the union's 13 December 1989
strike, as well as other "work stoppages/boycotts" staged by
the petitioners. The two cases were consolidated and
simultaneously tried.
In his decision, the Labor Arbiter ruled that the evidence
indicated against an illegal lockout while finding that
Reformist staged an illegal strike. On appeal, the NLRC
affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s finding. Reformist and its
members moved to reconsider the NLRC decision, which
was however, denied. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was in this case a waiver of the issue
on the illegality of the strike by the employer.
HELD:
YES. The private respondents can no longer contest
the legality of the strike held by the petitioners on 13
December 1989, as the private respondents themselves
sought compulsory arbitration in order to resolve that very
issue, hence their letter to the Labor Secretary read, in part:
This is to request your good office to
certify for compulsory arbitration or to assume
jurisdiction over the labor dispute (strike
continuing) between R.B. Liner Inc . . . . and the
Lakas Manggagawa sa Pilipinas . . .
The current strike by Lakas which started
on December 13, 1989 even before Certification
Election could be held could not be resolved by
the NCR Conciliation-Mediation Division after
six meetings/conferences between the parties.
The dispute or strike was settled when the company
and the union entered into an agreement on 19 January
1990 where the private respondents agreed to accept all
employees who by then, had not yet returned to work. By
acceding to the peaceful settlement brokered by the NLRC,
the private respondents waived the issue of the illegality of
the strike.
The very nature of compulsory arbitration makes the
settlement binding upon the private respondents, for
compulsory arbitration has been defined both as "the
process of settlement of labor disputes by a government
agency which has the authority to investigate and to make
an award which is binding on all the parties," ] and as a
mode of arbitration where the parties are "compelled to
accept the resolution of their dispute through arbitration by
a third party." Clearly then, the legality of the strike could
no longer be reviewed by the Labor Arbiter, much less by
the NLRC, as this had already been resolved. It was the
sole issue submitted for compulsory arbitration by the
private respondents, as is obvious from the portion of their
letter quoted above. The case certified by the Labor
Secretary to the NLRC was dismissed after the union and
the company drew up the agreement mentioned earlier.
This conclusively disposed of the strike issue.
7

Chapter 9-10
MSF Tire and Rubber, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
G.R.No. 128632, August 5, 1999
Mendoza, J.
FACTS: Respondent Union filed a notice of strike
in the National Conciliation and Mediation Board charging
Philtread Tire and Rubber Corporation (Phildtread) with
unfair labor practice. Thereafter, they picketed and
assembled outside the gate of Philtread’s plant. Philtread,
on the other hand, filed a notice of lockout. Subsequently,
the Secretary of Labor assumed jurisdiction over the labor
dispute and certified it for compulsory arbitration. During
the pendency of the labor dispute, Philtread entered into a
Memorandum of Agreement with Siam Tyre Public
Company Limited (Siam Tyre) whereby its plant and
equipment would be sold to a new company, herein
petitioner, 80% of which would be owned by Siam Tyre
and 20% by Philtread, while the land on which the plant
was located would be sold to another company, 60% of
which would be owned by Philtread and 40% by Siam
Tyre. Petitioner then asked respondent Union to desist from
picketing outside its plant. As the respondent Union refused
petitioner’s request, petitioner filed a complaint for
injunction with damages before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati. Respondent Union moved to dismiss the complaint
alleging lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court.
The trial court denied petitioner’s application for injunction
and dismissed the complaint. However, on petitioner’s
motion, the trial court reconsidered its order and granted an
injunction. Without filing a motion for reconsideration, the
respondent Union filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition before the Court of Appeals. The Appellate
Court ruled in favor of respondent Union. Hence, petitioner
filed this petition asserting that respondent Union’s petition
should be dismissed for its failure to disclose in its
certification of non-forum shopping the pendency of the
labor dispute involving both parties and for its failure to file
a motion for reconsideration. In addition, petitioner claimed
that its status as an “innocent bystander” entitled it to a writ
of injunction.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is an “innocent
bystander”.
HELD: In affirming the decision of the Court of Appeals,
the Supreme Court found that petitioner’s own certification
before the lower court suffered from the same omission for
which it faulted the respondent Union. It is therefore not in
keeping with the requirements of fairness for petitioner to
demand strict application of the prohibition against forum-
shopping, when it, too, was guilty of the same omission.
An “innocent bystander,” who seeks to enjoin a
labor strike, must satisfy the court that aside from the
grounds specified in Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, it is
entirely different from, without any connection whatsoever
to, either party to the dispute and, therefore, its interests are
totally foreign to the context thereof. Petitioner cannot be
said not to have such connection to the dispute. As such, it
cannot be considered as an “innocent bystander.” The
Court therefore ruled that the trial court’s order was a
patent nullity, the trial court having no jurisdiction to issue
the writ of injunction. Hence, no motion for reconsideration
need be filed where the order is null and void.
Chapter 9-11
SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,
SECOND DIVISION, AND SAN MIGUEL
CORPORATION EMPLOYEES UNION (SMCEU) �
PTGWO, respondents.
G.R. No. 99266 March 2, 1999
FACTS:
PURISIMA, J.:
In July 1990, San Miguel Cooperation, alleging the need to
streamline its operations due to financial loses, shut down
some of its plants and declared 55 positions as redundant
listed as follows: seventeen (17) employees in the Business
Logistics Division ("BLD"), seventeen (17) in the Ayala
Operations Center (AOC), and eighteen (18) in the
Magnolia-Manila Buying Station ("Magnolia-MBS"). 3
Consequently, the private respondent union filed several
grievance cases for the said retrenched employees, praying
for the redeployment of the said employees to the other
divisions of the company.
The grievance proceedings were conducted pursuant to
Sections 5 and 8, Article VIII of the parties' 1990
Collective Bargaining Agreement. During the grievance
proceedings, however, most of the employees were
redeployed, while others accepted early retirement. As a
result only 17 employees remained when the parties
proceeded to the third level (Step 3) of the grievance
procedure. In a meeting on October 26, 1990, petitioner
informed private respondent union that if by October 30,
1990, the remaining 17 employees could not yet be
redeployed, their services would be terminated on
November 2, 1990. The said meeting adjourned when Mr.
Daniel S. L. Borbon II, a representative of the union,
declared that there was nothing more to discuss in view of
the deadlock. 5
On November 7, 1990, the private respondent filed with the
National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) of the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) a notice of
strike on the following grounds: a) bargaining deadlock; b)
union busting; c) gross violation of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA), such as non-compliance
with the grievance procedure; d) failure to provide private
respondent with a list of vacant positions pursuant to the
parties side agreement that was appended to the 1990 CBA;
8
and e) defiance of voluntary arbitration award. Petitioner
on the other hand, moved to dismiss the notice of strike but
the NCMB failed to act on the motion.
On December 21, 1990, petitioner SMC filed a complaint
with the respondent NLRC, praying for: (1) the dismissal
the notice of strike; (2) an order compelling the respondent
union to submit to grievance and arbitration the issue listed
in the notice of strike; (3) the recovery of the expenses of
litigation. On April 16, 1991, respondent NLRC came out
with a minute resolution dismissing the complaint
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT IT IS THE POSITIVE LEGAL
DUTY OR RESPONDENT NLRC TO COMPEL
ARBITRATION AND TO ENJOIN A STRIKE IN
VIOLATION OF A NO STRIKE CLAUSE.
HELD:
Yes.The Petition is impressed with merit.The Rules and
Regulations Implementing Book V the Labor Code,
provides that a strike or lockout may be declared in cases of
bargaining deadlocks and unfair labor practices. Violations
of the collective bargaining agreements, except flagrant
and/or malicious refusal to comply with its economic
provisions, shall not be considered unfair labor practice and
shall not be strikeable. No strike or lockout may be
declared on grounds involving inter-union and intra-union
disputes or on issues brought to voluntary, or compulsory,
arbitration. In the case under consideration, the grounds
relied upon by the private respondent union are non-
strikeable. The issues which may lend substance to the
notice of strike filed by the private respondent union are:
collective bargaining deadlock and petitioner's alleged
violation of the collective bargaining agreement. These
grounds, however, appear more illusory than real.
Collective Bargaining Deadlock is defined as "the situation
between the labor and the management of the company
where there is failure in the collective bargaining
negotiations resulting in a stalemate" This situation, is non-
existent in the present case since there is a Board assigned
on the third level (Step 3) of the grievance machinery to
resolve the conflicting views of the parties. Instead of
asking the Conciliation Board composed of five
representatives each from the company and the union, to
decide the conflict, petitioner declared a deadlock, and
thereafter, filed a notice of strike. For failing to exhaust all
the steps in the grievance machinery and arbitration
proceedings provided in the Collective Bargaining
Agreement, the notice of strike should have been dismissed
by the NLRC and private respondent union ordered to
proceed with the grievance and arbitration proceedings
As regards the alleged violation of the CBA, we hold that
such a violation is chargeable against the private
respondent union. In abandoning the grievance proceedings
and stubbornly refusing to avail of the remedies under the
CBA. Private respondent violated the mandatory provisions
of the collective bargaining agreement. Abolition of
departments or positions in the company is one of the
recognized management prerogatives. Noteworthy is the
fact that the private respondent does not question the
validity of the business move of petitioner. In the absence
of proof that the act of petitioner was ill-motivated, it is
presumed that petitioner San Miguel Corporation acted in
good faith.
So also, in filing complaint with the NLRC, petitioner
prayed that the private respondent union be compelled to
proceed with the grievance and arbitration proceedings.
Petitioner having evinced its willingness to negotiate the
fate of the remaining employees affected, there is no
ground to sustain the notice of strike of the private
respondent union.
Chapter 9-12
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. vs. SECRETARY OF
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, FRANKLIN M.
DRILON
193 SCRA 223
FACTS: The 1986-1989 Collective Bargaining Agreement
(CBA) between the Philippine Airlines (PAL) and the
Philippine Airlines Employees Association (PALEA) in
addition to pay increases also provided for the formation of
a PAL/PALEA Payscale Panel. Accordingly, the
PAL/PALEA Payscale Panel was formed in due time and
went to work. During the conferences of the panel
however, there was no meeting of minds between the
parties.
As a result, PALEA accused PAL of bargaining in
bad faith and consequently filed with the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) a notice of
strike on account of: (1) bargaining deadlock; and (2)
unfair labor practice by bargaining in bad faith.
The PAL filed with the NCMB a motion to dismiss
PALEA's notice of strike for being premature as the issues
raised were not strikeable since there still existed a PAL-
PALEA CBA which would not yet expire until September
30, 1989 or with nine (9) more months to run.
On January 6, 1989, the NCMB-NCR Executive
Conciliator/Mediator, advised PALEA president, George
Pulido, that the issues raised in the notice of strike were
"appropriate only for preventive mediation," hence, not
valid grounds for a lawful strike. However, when
subsequently a representative of NCMB supervised the
conduct of PALEA'S strike vote, PAL's counsel was
baffled for it was inconsistent with the NCMB order
treating the strike notice as preventive mediation. PAL's
counsel sought clarification from the NCMB. He assured
PAL that the NCMB representatives could not certify the
strike vote.
On January 12, 1989, PALEA submitted the strike
vote results to the NCMB. The next day, January 13, 1989,
PAL petitioned the Secretary of Labor Franklin Drilon to
immediately assume jurisdiction over the dispute in order
9
to avert the impending strike. Inexplicably, the Secretary
failed to act promptly on PAL's petition for his assumption
of jurisdiction.

Seven (7) days passed with no reaction from

Secretary Drilon. Thus, on January 20, 1989, PALEA
declared a strike paralyzing PAL's entire operations the
next day, resulting in serious inconvenience to thousands of
passengers who were stranded in 43 airports throughout the
country, and the loss of millions of pesos in unearned
revenue for PAL. Late in the day, at 7:50 P.M., Secretary
Drilon issued an order assuming jurisdiction over the labor
dispute which had already exploded into a full-blown
strike, ordering the strikers to lift their pickets and return to
work, directing management to accept all returning
employees, and resolving the issues subject of the strike, by
awarding the monetary benefits to the strikers, while
prohibiting the company from taking retaliatory action
against them.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Labor has

authority to order the petitioner Philippine Airlines, Inc. to
reinstate officers and members of the union who
participated in an illegal strike and to desist from taking
any disciplinary or retaliatory action against them?

HELD: The Labor Secretary exceeded his jurisdiction

when he restrained PAL from taking disciplinary action
against its guilty employees, for, under Art. 263 of the
Labor Code, all that the Secretary may enjoin is the holding
of the strike, but not the company's right to take action
against union officers who participated in the illegal strike
and committed illegal acts. The prohibition which the
Secretary issued to PAL constitutes an unlawful
deprivation of property and denial of due process for it
prevents PAL from seeking redress for the huge property
losses that it suffered as a result of the union's illegal mass
action.

Under Art. 263 of the Labor Code, the Labor

Secretary's authority to resolve a labor dispute within 30
days from the date of assumption of jurisdiction,
encompasses only the issues in the dispute, not the legality
or illegality of any strike that may have been resorted to in
the meantime.

10