^ Academy oi Management Review

1999. Vol. 24. No. 2. 286-307.

MULTILEVEL THEORIZING ABOUT CREATIVITY

IN ORGANIZATIONS: A SENSEMAKING
PERSPECTIVE
ROBERT DRAZIN
MARY ANN GLYNN
ROBERT K. KAZANIIAN
Emory University

In this article we explore assumptions about the levels oi analysis embedded in the
extant literature on creativity in organizations. Uncovering and then relaxing these
assumptions allow us to extend the literature with an alternative but complementary
model of how creativity unfolds in complex, large-scale, and long-duration organiza-
tional projects. We build on the paradigm of sensemaking and propose a multilevel
model of creativity that, as its defining feature, examines how periodic organizational
crises reframe the negotiated order of belief structures about creativity.

Early research on creativity centered, to a
large extent, on discovering and describing the
nature of creative people (e.g., Barron, 1955;
MacKinnon, 1965). While noteworthy in its own
right, its nearly exclusive focus on the individ-
ual level of analysis eclipsed more macro expla-
nations of creativity (Slappendel, 1996). Am-
abile, working with her colleagues (e.g.,
Amabile, 1983, 1996; Amabile, Goldfarb, & Brock-
field, 1990), enlarged the scope of creativity re-
search from its origins at the individual level to
the group or social-psychological level and,
eventually, to the organizational level (Amabile,
Conti, Coon, Lazenby, & Herron, 1996). In gen-
eral, scholars in the field have followed this
approach, and multilevel models of creativity in
organizations are now emerging.
Woodman, Sawyer, & Griffin (1993) proposed
one of the first multilevel models; they linked
individual-, group-, and organizational-level
variables to creative outcomes. Glynn (1996) pre-
sented a theoretical model that related intelli-
gence at both the individual and organizational
levels to creativity, and Ford (1996) integrated
multiple levels of analysis to explain engage-
ment in creative behavior. Oldham and Cum-
mings (1996). in a rare and important empirical
test, demonstrated that factors at multiple levels
of analysis (i.e.. individual, job. and organiza-
Authors are listed alphabetically. All authors contributed
equally to this project. We thank Katherine Klein and the
anonymous AMR reviewers for their help.
286
tional) affect creativity. Drazin and Schoon-
hoven (1996) urged the development of multi-
level models that link a firm's strategic focus to
the behavior of its senior managers and, in turn,
to individuals' commitment to the creative pro-
cess.
Given the recent focus on multilevel ap-
proaches to creativity, a timely question is one
concerning how level-of-analysis (LOA) issues
have been modeled. The choice of focal levels of
analysis is profound and central to the develop-
ment of any model; it affects the conceptual
framework, research methods, locus of interest,
and, consequently, the full measure of a theoret-
ical and empirical approach to a phenomenon.
All too often, however, institutionalized, taken-
for-granted assumptions about LOA issues be-
come incorporated, unquestioned, into a model.
Because these assumptions are the foundation
upon which theory rests, they both enable and
constrain further theory development. Exposing
these LOA assumptions allows for their modifi-
cation and, thus, for new and alternative ways
of theorizing about organizational creativity.
Drawing from the works of multilevel theorists
(DiMaggio, 1991; Giddens, 1994; House, Rous-
seau, & Thomas-Hunt, 1995; Klein, Dansereau, &
Hall, 1994; Rousseau, 1985), we examine how the
creativity literature addresses LOA issues. We
review relevant creativity research to reveal
theoretical assumptions about the analytical
levels to which generalizations are made; ag-
gregation and composition issues across levels
of analysis; treatment of subunits as heteroge-
 1999 Drazin, Glynn, and Kazanjian
neous, homogeneous, or independent of higher-
level influences; and dynamic change over time.
Following this, we explore the consequences of
altering LOA assumptions and propose an illus-
trative model. In our review of the literature, we
find that a particular set of assumptions domi-
nates the current literature on creativity. These
assumptions center on a definition of creativity
as an oufcome and generalization primarily to
the small group or project level of analysis. Our
goal is to address the gap in multilevel theoriz-
ing that such assumptions may have inadver-
tently created.
In contrast to existing models, we define cre-
ativity as the process of engagement in creative
acts, regardless of whether the resultant out-
comes are novel, useful, or creative (Amabile,
1988, 1996; Ford, 1996). This process orientation
focuses our inquiry on how individuals attempt
to orient themselves to, and take creative action
in, situations or events that are complex, ambig-
uous, and ill defined. In other words, this is an
issue of how individuals engage in sensemak-
ing in organizations (Greenberg, 1995; Louis,
1980; Volkema, Farquhar, & Bergmann, 1996;
Weick. 1995).
A sensemaking approach to creativity affords
a fresh perspective on LOA issues. Tradition-
ally, creativity research has depicted the key
levels of analysis as being individual, group,
and organizational, with creativity at higher lev-
els typically being an aggregation of creative
output at lower levels (e.g., Glynn, 1996; Wood-
man et al., 1993). A sensemaking perspective
enriches this LOA perspective by pointing to
cross-level, systemic, and embedded effects that
may arise from idiosyncratic and/or communal
interpretations of what it means to be creative.
This implies that conflict, political influence,
and negotiated order may operate at more
macro-organizational levels (Walsh & Fahey,
1986; Weick, 1995) and over time in organizations
to influence creative processes.
A process-orientation and sensemaking per-
spective leads us to contexts that are expansive
enough to allow a full exploration of multiple and
different levels of analysis. We examine how cre-
ative thought and action unfold in an exemplar
setting: an interdependent, complex, large-scale,
long-duration organizational project. These
projects present an "extreme situation" in which
the "processes of interest are transparently ob-
servable" (Eisenhardt, 1989: 537). In addition to its
287
theoretical significance, this setting has practical
importance as well. Projects marked by interde-
pendence, long duration, and large scale have
become increasingly common in practice (e.g..
Clark & Fujimoto, 1988; DeMaio, Verganti, & Corso,
1994; Hoffman, 1997; Ouinn & Pacquette, 1988; Sab-
bagh, 1996) but, to date, have been relatively un-
derstudied in creativity research.
Thus, a model of the creative processes in
such a setting can coexist as a companion to the
individual and small group models that have
dominated the literature. Our setting allows us
to make a set of logical arguments that are in-
ternally consistent with respect to this exemplar
(Doty & Glick, 1994). Other contexts may vary
systematically from the one we describe, but we
believe that similar processes may operate in
other cells of a typology that describe related
creative processes in organizations.
We begin by reviewing the literature on cre-
ativity to answer the question "How have cre-
ativity researchers approached the LOA issue in
developing their models?" We analyze the cur-
rent literature to extract underlying themes and
assumptions about levels of analysis. From the
outset, we recognize that not all creativity stud-
ies are of the same bent; our objective is to
identify the dominant approaches to LOA issues
that have framed the study of creativity, to un-
cover their limitations, and to suggest alterna-
tives that might extend multilevel theorizing.
LOA ISSUES IN THE CREATIVITY UTERATURE
Creative behavior often is modeled as the re-
sult of individual characteristics and propensi-
ties (Amabile, 1996; Mumford & Gustafson, 1988),
including personality factors (Barron & Har-
rington, 1981; Singh, 1986) and cognitive skills,
such as linguistic ability, expressive fluency,
convergent and divergent thinking, and intelli-
gence (Barron & Harrington, 1981; Basadur &
Finkbeiner, 1985; Basadur, Graen, & Green, 1982;
Gardner, 1993; Glynn, 1996; Helson, Roberts, &
Agronick, 1995; Sternberg. 1988). Scholars have
found individual creativity to be highest when
individuals are motivated by intrinsic engage-
ment; challenge; task satisfaction; and goal-
oriented, self-regulatory mechanisms (Amabile.
1988; Amabile, Hill, Hennessey, & Tighe, 1994;
Glynn & Webster, 1993; Kanfer. 1990; Kanfer &
Ackerman. 1989).
288 Academy of Management Review
From this individual level of inquiry, creativ-
ity researchers have extended their perspective
to include contextual variables. They have
found that settings that provide opportunities,
absence of constraints (Amabile, 1988; Amabile
& Gryskiewicz, 1987; Oldham & Cummings.
1996). and rewards (Mumford & Gustafson. 1988)
foster creativity. A number of multilevel studies
have revealed that leader style, cohesiveness,
group tenure, and degree of cooperation are an-
tecedents to creativity (King & Anderson, 1990)
and research team effectiveness (Payne, 1990).
Further, Andrews (1979) has found that the
composition of groups is a determinant of
recognition and effectiveness, as well as of pub-
lications, for research and development teams.
This work notwithstanding, organizational-
level variables have been incorporated into rel-
atively few models of creativity. Some studies
demonstrate that organizational policies, struc-
tures, climate (Burkhardt & Brass, 1990; Tushman
& Nelson, 1990), and training (Basadur, Graen, &
Scandura, 1986; Wheatley, Anthony, & Maddox,
1991) affect creative output. To date. Woodman
et al. (1993) offer the most comprehensive theo-
retical model, linking culture, resources, tech-
nology, strategy, and rewards to organizational
creativity. We concur with Oldham and Cum-
mings' statement: "Unfortunately, little is known
about the conditions that promote the creative
performance of individual employees in organi-
zations" (1996: 607; emphasis added).
From this overview, we observe that the levels
of generalization and construct definition em-
ployed by researchers are the most consequen-
tial factors governing the composition of creativ-
ity theories. The level of generalization is
important because it specifies the focal unit to
which the theoretical and empirical statements
of the research apply (Rousseau, 1985). Tradi-
tionally, creativity researchers have concen-
trated on the small group (or independent
project team) as their focal level of analysis and
have emphasized project-level outcomes that
combine the talents of team members into
project-level efforts. With some exceptions
(Glynn, 1996; Woodman et al., 1993), little has
been done to extend research beyond the level
of the small-group project.
Similarly, we see construct definition as con-
sequential for theory building. In general, schol-
ars have defined creativity as an important out-
come to a system, with independent variables
April
treated as factors to be manipulated in order to
improve these outcomes. Rousseau (1985) terms
this approach to multilevel theorizing function-
alist-reductionist. Functionalist and reductionist
arguments allow researchers to model the func-
tional contribution of units at lower hierarchical
levels to outcomes at higher levels.
This functionalist perspective dominates both
the creativity and innovation literature (Drazin.
1990). For instance. Amabile (1988) defines cre-
ativity as the production of novel and useful
ideas. Similarly, Oldham and Cummings (1996)
define creativity as products, ideas, or proce-
dures that are (1) novel or original and (2) rele-
vant and useful. Ford (1996) also adopts an out-
put orientation and views creative outcomes as
those that are novel and valuable. Woodman et
al. (1993) define creativity as the generation of a
valuable, useful new product, service, idea, pro-
cedure, or process by individuals working to-
gether in a complex social system. Following
the functional tradition, the research question
posed explicitly or implicitly in most creativity
studies is "How do you increase creative outputs
in organizations?"
The level of generalization (to small groups)
and the definition of creativity (as a novel and
useful outcome) govern other critical LOA as-
sumptions in creativity research. Rousseau
(1985) offers a framework that categorizes
theories into three general types of multilevel
models: (1) compositional, (2) cross-level, and
(3) multilevel. Compositional models are con-
cerned with specifying the similarity of a pro-
cess across multiple levels (Rousseau, 1985) or
determining whether macrolevel processes are
consistent with underlying microlevel processes
(DiMaggio, 1991). In the creativity literature,
there seems to be an implicit assumption that
the creative process is alike at all levels of anal-
ysis—that is, for individuals, groups, and organ-
izational systems (Amabile. 1988; Woodman et
al.. 1993). Creativity researchers readily ac-
knowledge that there are differences among in-
dividuals that can impact creativity, but they
tend to adopt a set of assumptions that allow
them to treat cross-level effects (between indi-
vidual and organizational levels, for instance)
as homogeneous in nature (Klein et al., 1994).
For example, Amabile assumes that "major
corporations select individuals who exhibit rel-
atively high levels of these personal qualities,
[and that] the variance above this baseline may
1999 Drazin, Giynn. and Kazanjian
well be accounted for primarily by factors in the
work environment" (1988: 128). Amabile later af-
firms this view in her statement that "whatever
an individual's talents . . . the conditions under
which he or she works . . . can significantly in-
crease or decrease the level of creativity pro-
duced" (1996: 17). Support for this notion can be
found in Oldham and Cumming's (1996) study.
These authors hypothesized a person-by-situa-
tion interaction effect on creativity and found
statistical support for an ordinal relationship.
That is, individuals whose dispositions make
them more likely to be affected by a favorable
work environment are more creative, but the
creativity of all individuals is raised by a sup-
portive environment. Thus, one assumption in
creativity research, made explicitly or implic-
itly, is the homogeneity of higher-level (or situ-
ational) effects on individuals.
The degree of inclusion of individuals in a
hierarchy of levels is an important construct in
cross-level research (House et al., 1995; Rous-
seau, 1985). Total inclusion implies that only the
group in which an individual has formal mem-
bership is influential (e.g., a functional depart-
ment or an assigned project team). Partial inclu-
sion means that an individual occupies multiple
organizational roles and is influenced by mem-
bership in all of them; situational attributes can
cue or make salient membership in a particular
group to the exclusion of other groups (Ashforth
& Mael, 1996). As Fine observes, "The assump-
tion of a dominant [occupational] identity overly
limits people's choices in constructing their
work relations" (1996: 92).
Although individuals may be members of an
organizational work unit and a cross-functional
team, they may also situate themselves in terms
of an occupational identity (Trice, 1993; Van
Maanen & Barley, 1984). Partial inclusiveness
complicates cross-level research because ef-
fects can no longer be attributed to membership
in a single hierarchical group; researchers need
to account for multiple, and often competing,
influences that cause individuals to situate
themselves in accord with this complexity (Ash-
forth & Mael, 1996). The assumptions adopted by
most creativity researchers seem to imply total
inclusion; in many ways, this may have been a
natural outgrowth of the contexts in which they
have studied creativity.
Much of the research on individual creativity
has been conducted in behavioral laboratories
289
(Oldham & Cummings, 1996)—occasionally with
children as subjects (Koestner. Ryan, Bernieri, &
Holt, 1984; Stahl & Koser, 1978). Although some
models include variables such as job design
(Amabile. 1988; Hackman & Oldham. 1980;
Kanter. 1988), supervisory style (Stahl & Koser.
1978; West, 1989), or performance feedback (Car-
son & Carson, 1993), most tend to assume total
inclusiveness of an individual in a small group.
Consistent with this LOA focus, scholars tend
to model creativity as a discrete task, conducted
by individuals or small groups who are isolated
from broader organizational and occupational
pressures. This perspective applies to some or-
ganizational situations, particularly for "skunk-
works" types of small, team-based new-product
development that can be found in such compa-
nies as 3M, Sony, or Thermos (Dumaine, 1993;
Peters, 1988). However, large, complex initia-
tives, characterized by long time horizons and a
project management structure composed of mul-
tifunctional, interdependent teams, are increas-
ingly more common venues for creative action
(DeMaio et al., 1994). Examples include the de-
velopment of new aircraft by Boeing (Sabbagh.
1996), new automobiles (Clark & Fujimoto, 1988;
Ouinn & Pacquette, 1988), space projects at
NASA (Hoffman, 1997; Sayles & Chandler, 1971).
and defense contracting (Scudder. Schroeder.
Van De Ven, Seiler, & Wiseman, 1989). In all of
these cases, creativity was critical to the suc-
cess of the effort, but the organizational context
was not that of an isolated individual or a small
group unit—rather, a large-scale, long-term
project. The assumption of total inclusiveness of
individuals in these large, complex organization-
al systems seems questionable.
Finally, we note that much of the creativity
literature has ignored the dimension of time.
This is likely the result of a tendency of re-
searchers to define creativity as an outcome,
rather than a process (see Ford. 1996. for an
important exception). This definition leads re-
searchers toward static models that emphasize
explaining variance in the dependent variable
(creative outcomes), rather than examining how
the dynamic process of creativity unfolds over
time (Mohr, 1982).
The most explicit consideration of the role of
time in understanding micro-macro relation-
ships is contained in Giddens' (1994) theory of
structuration. Central to his model is the concept
of the duality of structure. His thesis is that hu-
290 Academy of Management Review
man agency and structure cannot be understood
apart from each other.
Knowledgeable individuals understand the
workings of their society; in turn, they both react
to and participate in their reproduction and re-
direction. Because individuals can intervene in
events and take action to influence events, time
is accorded a central role in understanding the
interplay between individual and structure
(Peterson, 1998). In the organizational literature,
Klein et al. (1994) suggest that individuals may
react homogeneously to the influence of mac-
rolevel factors within one period of time, but
they react heterogeneously across multiple pe-
riods of time.
Where Giddens differs from Klein and col-
leagues is in allowing for the possibility that
individuals will use time to influence and
change structure. This suggests that creativity
may not proceed in linear, hierarchical paths
but, rather, in uneven, chaotic bursts that are
responses to problems that erupt over time (Ka-
zanjian, 1988; Peterson, 1998; Quinn. 1985). As
such, a model of creativity in these contexts
would acknowledge the interplay between indi-
viduals and structure over time (Giddens, 1994).
Uncovering such processes and understanding
how they shape patterns of creative effort in
large-scale projects is the impetus for our pro-
posing a multilevel, sensemaking perspective
on creative processes in organizations.
CREATIVITY AS A SENSEMAKING PROCESS
Our review reveals that two significant as-
sumptions have governed existing multilevel
approaches to creativity. First, creativity has
been defined as an outcome judged by others to
be novel and useful. Second, creativity theories
have been primarily built at one level of gener-
alization—that of the small project group or
team—with the assumption of individual inclu-
siveness in a hierarchy of work units embedded
in an organization. Individual and small group
creativity have been assumed to be similar in
composition (Amabile. 1988. 1996). and organiza-
tional creativity typically has been considered
to be the accumulation of individual or small
group creativity (Glynn. 1996). These assump-
tions have driven a prototypical treatment of
other LOA issues. In this section we propose an
alternative multilevel model of creativity that
builds on a different set of assumptions regard-
April
ing construct definition and level of generaliza-
tion.
Construct Definition: Creativity As a Process
We define creativity as a process, rather than
an outcome. This distinction is not unique to us
(Mohr, 1982); Amabile (1988) has modeled cre-
ativity as an individual-level cognitive process
consisting of multiple stages. To Torrance (1988),
individual creativity is a process of sensing
problems, making guesses, formulating hypoth-
eses, communicating ideas to others, and con-
tradicting conformity or "what is expected."
At the individual level, we define creativity as
the engagement of an individual in a creative
act (Ford, 1996; Torrance. 1988). Creative engage-
ment is a process in which an individual behav-
iorally, cognitively, and emotionally attempts to
produce creative outcomes (Kahn, 1990). For ex-
ample, engineers working on a project may at-
tempt to design an apparatus that is creative;
they may collect data, consult past solutions,
contemplate alternatives, propose inventive
ideas, and become emotionally invested in their
work. Their ideas may or may not be considered
by others as creative, but the process of gener-
ating those ideas logically can be called "cre-
ativity;" in effect, creativity as a process is a
necessary, but not sufficient, condition for cre-
ative outcomes. In the creativity literature,
scholars generally assume, but do not explicitly
model, the occurrence of such a creative pro-
cess. Extant models tend to adopt a variance
analysis framework (Mohr, 1982) that seeks to
explain the relationship between context and
outcomes, presuming that a creative process un-
derlies the generation of creative outcomes.
Creativity is a choice made by an individual
to engage in producing novel ideas; the level of
creative engagement can vary from person to
person and from situation to situation. An indi-
vidual may choose minimal engagement, pro-
posing simple solutions that may not be novel or
useful—a behavior Ford (1996) refers to as "ha-
bitual action." Alternatively, an individual may
choose to engage in a full manner, using all of
his or her abilities in an effort to produce cre-
ative outcomes. To Kahn (1990), such processes
of engagement (and disengagement) vary over
time, ebbing and flowing from moment to mo-
ment and from day to day.
 1999 Drazin, Glynn, and Kazan;ian
Creativity also can be defined as a group-
level process. The complex, creative projects
taken on by large organizations require the con-
certed engagement of many individuals, rather
than just one or a few. Amabile (1988, 1996) con-
siders group and individual processes of cre-
ativity to be of similar composition, because
both involve cognitive processes of idea gener-
ation and idea testing. In settings where the
object of creativity is complex and requires
skills from multiple bases of expertise, it may be
difficult to separate out individual- from group-
level contributions. For example, in their study
of brain storming at a product design firm, Sut-
ton and Hargadon (1996) found that when groups
address complex problems, many individuals
contribute to the process, and it is difficult to
assign credit to any one individual for the de-
sign outcome. Groups also go through stages
that mirror the processes of individuals—that is,
developing criteria, generating alternatives,
modifying those alternatives, and amplifying
and extending original ideas.
Individuals and groups participate in creative
processes in an iterative fashion. Individuals
develop ideas, present them to the group, learn
from the group, work out issues in solitude, and
then return to the group to further modify and
enhance their ideas. The iterative, interactive
nature of group creativity requires that individ-
uals first choose to engage in individual-level
creativity. We make the assumption that indi-
viduals act homogeneously within groups as
they engage in creative behavior (Klein et al.,
1994).
Creative processes at the organizational level
may not simply aggregate from individual or
group efforts; rather, they may emerge from a
process of negotiating multiple and potentially
competing interests between different commu-
nities or groups within the organization (e.g.,
those technically responsible for creative activ-
ity and those managing the creative process). At
the organizational level, creativity can be de-
scribed in terms of a process that maps when
creative behavior occurs and who engages in
creative behavior. Such issues are pursued to
best advantage in contexts in which there are
communities of actors engaged interdepen-
dently in large-scale creative pursuits over time.
Thus, situations that allow us to relax the as-
sumption of total inclusiveness become our fo-
291
cal level of analysis and the context in which we
examine creative processes.
Level of Generalization: Large-Scale, Long-
Duration Creative Projects
Creativity increasingly occurs in the context
of large-scale, long-term projects that employ
multiple, interdependent teams. Sabbagh's
(1996) account of the development of the Boeing
777 aircraft provides a detailed example. The
project was large and of long duration: the 777
ultimately required the development of over four
million discrete components and was priced at
$100 million per aircraft; it took 5V2 years to com-
plete.
The organization design used to complete the
Boeing 777 was equally complex. A hierarchy of
teams, embedded in a complex project manage-
ment structure, designed and built the aircraft.
Each of the major systems of the plane, such as
the wings, empennage, and fuselage, had a ded-
icated "design-build" system team. These teams
were further broken down into smaller teams
responsible for each subsystem, resulting in 250
separate but highly interdependent design-
build subteams.'
We use large. long-term, complex organiza-
tional projects as an exemplar setting for sev-
eral reasons. First, they represent a frequently
occurring, real-world phenomenon, operating at
a level of analysis in between that of the project
team and the entire organization (House et al..
1995). Creativity at this level consists of the ebb
and flow of creative engagement among differ-
ent communities of individuals involved in the
project. Second, because organizations are mov-
ing away from traditional hierarchical struc-
tures, multilevel research needs to examine or-
ganizational forms that exhibit more complex
types of interdependence (House et al., 1995). In
these settings, communication and coordination
' Projects similar in scope and complexity, if not size,
occur in the auto industry as well (Clark & Fujimoto, 1988).
Quinn and Pacquette's (1988) case study of the development
of the Ford Taurus captures a similar challenge in the de-
velopment of a new car. Here again, a nested hierarchy with
a large number of interdependent teams pursued the design
in parallel. Similar examples can be found at NASA (Ring &
Rands, 1989: Sayles & Chandler, 1971), with the SST (Hor-
witch, 1982), or more currently with the development of en-
terprise-wide software conversions by such firms as SAP
and PeopleSoft.
292 Academy oi Management Review
are handled directly between communities of
individuals assigned to project teams. Third,
large-scale, long-time-duration projects may be
characterized by considerable situational ambi-
guity; the ability of a new product or service to
perform as anticipated may not be known well
in advance, and there may be considerable
change to product specifications as the project
progresses and reveals untoward obstacles.
Further, the horizontal and highly interactive
nature of project work may break down individ-
uals' inclusiveness in their home functional de-
partments, in response to numerous subproject
assignments over the long life of a large project.
Situations characterized by high levels of am-
biguity and low levels of inclusiveness provide
individuals little in the way of guidance con-
cerning what is correct behavior. According to
House et al., such psychologically weak situa-
tions "stimulate groups to engage in collective
sense making and construct their own version of
reality" (1995: 94). Different communities come to
a project team with different professional
frames; in turn, these influence team members'
interpretations of events that occur during the
process of project work. In the face of situational
ambiguity, individuals within different commu-
nities will consult one another to develop an
interpretation of events in lieu of crossing com-
munal boundaries.
A Sensemaking Perspective on Creativity
The goal of theory building in the interpretive
or sensemaking perspective is to describe organ-
izational life. The focus is less on understanding
how to manipulate a system (so as to increase
the level of creativity) than it is on understand-
ing the processes through which individuals
and organizations develop systems of meaning
about creative action. With its focus on the de-
velopment of meanings and how they motivate
engagement and action, a sensemaking per-
spective is well suited to our focus on creativity
as a process. Thus, our central research ques-
tion becomes "How does the process of creativ-
ity unfold in organizations?"
Although functionalist perspectives dominate
organizational research (Gioia & Pitre. 1990). a
sensemaking perspective has made significant
headway (Burrell & Morgan. 1979). A sensemak-
ing approach has been invoked to explain a
diversity of topics, including issue and agenda
April
formation (Dutton & Dukerich. 1991; Dutton &
Jackson. 1987). strategy formation in top man-
agement teams (Porac, Thomas, & Baden-Fuller,
1989), change management (Gioia & Chittipeddi.
1991; Poole, Gioia, & Gray, 1989), and technology
diffusion (Barley, 1986). Researchers have stud-
ied the general innovation process using a sen-
semaking framework (Dougherty. 1992; Hill &
Levenhagen, 1995; Ring & Rands, 1989), but we
know of only limited work that applies an inter-
pretive framework specifically to the study of
creativity (Ford, 1996; Ford & Gioia, 1995).
Those with a sensemaking perspective ap-
proach LOA issues somewhat differently from
those with traditional perspectives. First, al-
though researchers recognize that individuals
are the center of organizational life, those indi-
viduals are accorded a different role: they create
meanings about their social setting through in-
teractions with others (Weick, 1979). But individ-
uals also have agency and take actions that
shape their environments (Giddens, 1994; Gioia
& Pitre, 1990); thus, the interpretation process is
inherently dynamic.
Because individuals develop and maintain
subjective interpretations of their roles in organ-
izations, different levels of analysis emerge
(Weick, 1995):
1. an infrasuhjecfive (or individual) level;
2. an intersubjective level, between two or
more individuals, that represents shared
frames of reference (which may transcend
formal groups or subunits): and
3. a collective level that represents the unfold-
ing of change across intersubjective levels.
We examine how each of these levels, indepen-
dently and interactively, affects creative pro-
cesses over time in large-scale organizational
projects. In particular, we allow for the possibil-
ity that events, which are viewed as crises, oc-
cur and how these, in turn, reframe meanings so
as to shift the balance of power to favor creative
activity by certain groups over others.
The Intrasubjective Level: The Development of
Sensemaking Frames
When individuals are confronted with an
equivocal set of events, they struggle to make
sense of them (Dutton & Jackson, 1987; House et
al., 1995; Peterson. 1998; Weick, 1979). According
to Goffman (1974). individuals pose to them-
selves the question "What is it that is going on
 1999
Drazin, Giynn, and Kazanjian
here?" Their answer determines how they will
engage in that situation (Kahn. 1990). Mean-
ing— or sense—develops about the situation,
which allows the individual to act in some ra-
tional fashion; thus, meaning—or sensemak-
ing—is a primary generator of individual action.
Scholars have labeled the meanings that in-
dividuals hold as frames (Bateson, 1972; Goff-
man, 1974), enacfmenfs (Weick, 1979), schemata
(Poole et al., 1989), and cognitive maps (Porac et
al.. 1989). What is central to all of these defini-
tions is that an individual (1) develops an intra-
subjective cause-and-effect map of events, ac-
tions, and consequences; (2) places himself or
herself in this map; and (3) takes action accord-
ing to this map as events unfold. Frames organ-
ize meaning, motivation, and subsequent in-
volvement and action; during any experience of
work activity, an individual not only develops a
sense of what is going on but also a sense of
how to engage.
According to Goffman (1974), all primary
frames play an important role in governing the
extent to which an individual becomes involved
in the activity organized by the frame; frames
link events to meanings and meanings, in turn,
to ensuing action. Involvement can range from
complete boredom and abstention to full en-
gagement in the activities at hand. Thus,
frames, and the process of framing, can impact
significantly the extent to which an individual
engages in the process of creativity. For exam-
ple, testing the performance of a product com-
ponent could be construed to mean different
things to an engineer. Depending upon his or
her frame of reference, the test might be re-
garded as a critical step in developing an im-
portant prototype and, thus, worthy of creative
engagement; conversely, it might be viewed as
"make work" imposed by management and,
thus, less inviting of creative engagement.
Individuals "bracket" the unpunctuated expe-
riences of the moment using their best available
frames; however, events, actions, and frames
are linked together in an iterative cycle of per-
ception (Weick, 1979). Frames are subject to
modification and renewal in the face of actions
taken by an individual. Accordingly, they medi-
ate between the stream of behavior that con-
fronts an individual and his or her actions; as
mediators, they determine how an individual
responds to a context.
293
Frames include beliefs about how situations
and individual actions are tied together to
achieve goals (Ford, 1996). These goals can
include intrinsic satisfaction with the task (Am-
abile, 1996) or extrinsic rewards associated with
creative outcomes, including recognition. Indi-
viduals respond to situations with intentionali-
ty—that is. they predict how their actions will
affect them. If the situation and desired out-
comes come together in a meaningful way, a
person will respond by engaging in creative
acts (Ford, 1996; Kahn, 1990); otherwise, the per-
son will limit or refrain from engaging in cre-
ative behavior. Thus, we posit the following:
Proposifion 1: An individual forms an
intrasubjective frame of reference for
creativity: this frame mediates be-
tween events and engagement (or dis-
engagement) in creative acts.
The Intersubjective Level: The Construction of
Shared Meaning Within Communities
An individual's development of a creative
frame of reference does not take place in social
isolation; it is shaped by interactions with oth-
ers who are engaged directly or indirectly in
similar endeavors. When faced with an equivo-
cal situation, an individual reduces equivocality
by seeking out the interpretations of others
(Volkema et al., 1996). It is through these inter-
actions that schemata, scripts, and categoriza-
tions diffuse throughout communities (Poole et
al., 1989; Poole, Gray, & Gioia, 1990), occupa-
tional groups (Trice, 1993), third parties in re-
lated work, or networks of weaker ties
(Granovettor, 1973). When interdependence is
high, a collective mind can emerge (Weick &
Roberts, 1993) and, with it, a communal sense of
what makes sense. The result is a shift from the
self-referential "I" to the more inclusive "we"
(Weick, 1995).
In the organizational literature, authors cap-
ture intersubjective frames in such constructs as
organizational memory (Walsh & Ungson, 1991).
organization mind (Sandelands & Stablein.
1987), collective mind (Weick & Roberts, 1993).
and organizational intelligence (Glynn, 1996). In
recognizing that mental maps are shared and
belief systems converge, scholars assume an
intersubjective level of analysis that differs from
traditional conceptualizations of the individual.
294 Academy oi Management
group, or organizational levels (Daft & Weick,
1984).
However, although shared frames of reference
may develop within communities, they can dif-
fer across communities. As Goffman (1974) notes,
even though two actors share a similar set of
experiences, their frames of reference may differ
based on their positions with respect to that
activity. As a result, sensemaking may not be
neat, tidy, and polite but, rather, may be marked
by divergent and sometimes antagonistic
frames of reference, as different communities
argue their respective beliefs (Trice, 1993; Walsh
& Fahey, 1986; Walsh. Henderson. & Deighton.
1988; Weick, 1995).
Fine explains:
By the placement of an occupation within an or-
ganizational field, workers provisionally create
occupational meanings, given the real con-
straints under which they work and in light of the
evaluations of other actors who impinge on their
claimed expertise (1996: 111)
Thus, even in a single organization, a multitude
of diverse frames can exist, arising from and
characterizing different job categories, occupa-
tions, positions, status, ideologies, and para-
digms (Trice. 1993; Weick. 1995). Creative activ-
ity, undertaken in large-scale organizations, is a
particularly ripe context for the development of
divergent frames of reference. Creativity typi-
cally involves tension between innovation and
control (Weick. 1995) and. thus, can engender a
natural dialectic between different, and perhaps
opposing, intraorganizational communities
(Huff. 1988). Dougherty (1992) and Trice (1993) are
instructive to understanding how different inter-
pretive frameworks embed and affect creativity.
Dougherty (1992) notes that innovation re-
quires the insights of multiple "thought
worlds"—that is. the interpretive schemas of dif-
ferent communities of specialists who literally
think differently from each other. She identifies
four competing thought worlds—technical, field,
manufacturing, and planning—and argues that,
at best, each thought world views the other as
esoteric and. at worst, meaningless. The cre-
ative setting that serves as our exemplar (com-
plex, interdependent, large-scale projects) cre-
ates a context in which there is likely to be
conflict between two of the thought worlds
Dougherty (1992) describes: (1) technical special-
ists who create product design (e.g.. engineers,
scientists, marketers, and manufacturing per-
Review April
sonnel) and (2) administrative specialists who
plan, manage, and implement the design (i.e..
those responsible for budgeting, for scheduling,
and for interfacing with clients). These two com-
munities—technical and managerial—likely
have different views of what makes sense and,
therefore, different views of what constitutes
creativity.
Similarly, Trice (1993) views organizations as
collections of diverse subcultures that subscribe
to different systems of meanings. For him, there
are two dominant subcultures—administrative
and occupational—that compete over the con-
trol of work, access to power and resources, and
credit; their inevitable clashes are resolved
through adaptation and negotiation.
Daft and Becker (1978) demonstrate explicitly
the link between different communities of mean-
ing and creative endeavors. In their study of
high schools, they found that 71 percent of the
administrative innovation proposals (e.g.,
changes in community/school relationships,
registration systems, human resource manage-
ment systems, and systems to control costs) orig-
inated from administrators and, conversely, 70
percent of the teaching innovation proposals
(e.g., curriculum changes, new teaching tech-
niques, and equipment to support instruction)
were initiated by teachers. Daft's (1978) finding
that different groups promulgated different
types of innovations led him to conclude that
there was a dual-core nature to the innovation
process.
Differences in occupational frames are likely
to lead to differences in the creative solutions
proposed by each community. Technical staffs
are likely to emphasize technical creativity as
critical to the success of the project. Technical
creativity involves the proposal of solutions that
have technical foundations; it also involves the
use and extension of the knowledge base held
by technical personnel. For example, a materi-
als engineer might propose the use of a new
composite material, and a software engineer
might propose the development of a computer-
ized system to automate tasks previously done
by system operators. Alternatively, creative
project administrators might propose novel sys-
tems in any of a series of project managerial
domains, including managing risk, satisfying
customers, building political skills, staffing
project teams, estimating costs, measuring
 1999 Drazin, GJynn, and Kazanjian
project performance, and developing project
feedback and evaluation systems (Frame, 1994).
In large-scale organizational projects, there is
an inherent contest between the sensemaking
frames of the administrative and technical com-
munities, as each invokes their own referent
framework to make sense of tasks or events
(Thomas & McDaniel, 1990; Trice, 1993). Techni-
cal staff members, because they deal with tasks
that have both heavy mental and material com-
ponents (Barley, 1996), have a vested interest in
developing reputations of creativity in science
and engineering. In their study of a product-
design consulting firm, Sutton and Hargadon
(1996) give a vivid example of how technicians
seek reputational capital in brainstorming ses-
sions. To engineers, brainstorms are "status
auctions" in which they bid for prestige based
on their ideas; as one industrial designer put it,
"You are probably going to ask me about how
brainstorms lead to creative products, but what
strikes me is that those engineers treat it as a
competition. It's a competition!" (Sutton & Har-
gadon, 1996: 706).
Conversely, project managers compete for a
different sort of reputational capital. In his study
of occupational "rhetorics," Fine notes that the
ideal of "business" is linked to "images of ra-
tionality. . .particularly as linked to control over
the work process, long- and short-term planning,
and an awareness of the economic placement of
the workplace" (1996: 104). Project management
is responsible for meeting preestablished goals
of cost, schedule, and functionality imposed by
senior managers; their creativity takes the form
of finding ways to impress these executives and
develop reputations of meeting goals success-
fully.
Finally, because the technical and manage-
rial communities have higher within-group than
between-group contact, their referent frames are
supported by behavioral interaction patterns
that reinforce one belief system over the other.
Thus, we propose that intersubjective frames
will likely be homogeneous within a given com-
munity but heterogeneous across different com-
munities.
Proposifion 2: Technical staffs and
project management will differ in the
frames of reference they use to under-
stand and engage in a large-scale cre-
ative project.
295
Proposition 2a: The frames of techni-
cal staff will emphasize the need to
experiment and the centrality of tech-
nical creativity to the success of the
project.
Proposition 2b: The frames of project
managers will emphasize the need to
satisfy senior management and cli-
ents and the centrality of administra-
tive creativity to the success of the
project.
The Collective Level: Negotiated Order Among
Differing Communities
Because the referent frames of the managerial
and technical communities can differ from each
other, discord can ensue. Ambiguity over the
relative authority of managers and technicians
in a single creative project is a manifestation of
deeper conflict between the two occupational
subcultures (Barley, 1996; Trice, 1993). The issue
is fundamentally one of the separation of posi-
tion from expertise (Barley, 1996). Managers may
accept technicians (begrudgingly) because they
solve problems useful to the manager's goals;
conversely, technicians may accept managers
(begrudgingly) because they can provide the re-
sources needed to create technical designs.
Because they face different goals and tasks
and value different forms of creative engage-
ment, project managers and technical staff are
likely, at least on occasion, to have opposing
views of creativity. These views clash in organ-
izational settings, with each group representing
its opinions to the other in the form of an argu-
ment that stands for its unique model of what
makes sense. These argumeiits reveal to the
other parties the sensemaking perspective each
holds. Although one outcome might be mutual
accommodation (Poole et al., 1989), another
might be that each party sees the other as not
making any sense (Dougherty, 1992).
How conflicts are adjudicated between the
technical and managerial staffs determines the
process and direction of project creativity. Dis-
putes are resolved politically (Walsh & Fahey.
1986), and whoever has the power to resolve a
dispute owns the belief system that carries the
day (Hickson, Hinings, Lee, Schneck. & Pen-
nings, 1971; Pfeffer &. Salancik. 1978). The cumu-
lative resolutions of many disputes, in turn, be-
296 Academy oi Management Review
come events for interpretation themselves. As
managerial and technical staffs witness a dis-
pute resolved in favor of one party over another,
interpretations develop about how the organiza-
tion's political system affects creativity. These
interpretations guide the extent to which each
group sets creative goals for itself and the de-
gree to which the groups become engaged in
their own form of creative process.
A negotiated order is likely to emerge from the
opposing frames of managers and technicians
(Walsh & Fahey, 1986), with occupational spe-
cialists doing "whatever is necessary within
their ability to achieve the ends of the organiza-
tion" (Fine, 1996: 111). Consistent with Weick
(1995), we use the term collective structure to
reflect the simultaneous cognitive and sociopo-
litical underpinnings of the process. Sensemak-
ing may not be completely shared, but political
compromise between opposing groups will
nonetheless guide creative behavior. We find it
useful to regard collective structure as a sliding
scale that shifts to reflect the relative balance of
power between the project management and
technical staffs. For a particular point in time,
the scale indicates which interpretive scheme
controls the process of creativity. Following this
line of logic, we propose the following:
Proposition 3: At any given point in
the history of a project, a balance of
power will exist between project man-
agers and the technical staff. This bal-
ance will determine the extent to
which each community engages in
creative behavior.
Crises and the Possibility of Temporary
Reframings
Sensemaking frames are fragile and subject
to change. Sensemaking requires individuals
and communities to enact their environment—a
process that is reinforced through interactions
with others in an attempt to reduce uncertainty.
But even the solidarity of intersubjectivity may
not be enough to sustain a frame in the face of
inconsistent information. When individuals are
involved in a stream of behavior (such as cre-
ativity), they always sustain some check upon
their total involvement (Goffman, 1974). At the
cognitive level, there is always a trace of hesi-
tancy about past interpretation and a willing-
April
ness to consider the need to reframe. When a
disruptive event occurs, a frame may be broken
and what once made sense no longer does; the
individual experiences temporary disorganiza-
tion (Goffman, 1974; Poole et al., 1989). If, be-
cause of new information, enough individuals
experience interpretative disorganization, then
an entire intersubjective frame may shift. Thus,
there is the potential for a new set of frames to
emerge, at least temporarily.
When a project experiences an event signifi-
cant enough to be called a "crisis" (Dutton &
Jackson, 1987; Peterson, 1998; Tyre 8f Orlikowski,
1994), the negotiated order between managerial
and technical staff may shift to establish a new
collective order to resolve the crisis. We draw
upon Habermas (1975) to develop our definition
of crisis; to us, a crisis occurs when the structure
of a social system allows for fewer possibilities
for problem solving than are necessary for the
continued existence of the system. Crises arise
from exogenous environmental changes but
also in "structurally inherent system-impera-
tives that are incompatible and cannot be inte-
grated" (Habermas, 1975: 2). A crisis occurs when
the negotiated order of a collective system does
not allow a problem to be resolved. Accordingly,
we posit this:
Proposifion 4: During a crisis, mem-
bers of the technical and managerial
staffs of a creative project will feel
cognitive disorganization in their re-
spective sensemaking frameworks for
creativity.
Crises have sociopsychological effects; Poole
et al. (1989: 273) term these critical incidents or-
ganizafionai breakdowns. When a crisis occurs,
it causes project members to suspend their ex-
isting frames of reference and look at the world
differently; Goffman (1974) terms this set of
events re-keying. Whereas keying involves a
transformation or transcription of experience
from one meaning into another, re-keying
means to reorganize meaning parenthetically
by modifying (and not totally transforming) a
current frame. Opposing frames of reference
may become united through the common expe-
rience of a crisis. Each side, usually carrying its
own set of meanings, can alter or drop these
meanings in recognition of the need to resolve
the crisis.
 1999
Drazin, Giynn, and Kazanjian
In the life of a project, crises can occur that
can shift the negotiated order between project
management and technical staff to allow for
crisis resolution. The types of crisis are defined
by the major goals of the project: functionality,
cost, and schedule. A crisis of functionality oc-
curs when a major design goal of the project is
in jeopardy. Design goals, developed to meet
strategic objectives or the specific needs of a
client, spell out the performance of all or part of
the product or service being developed. Exam-
ples of functionality crises are a plane that is
overweight or fails to meet efficiency goals, a
car that does not pass a crash test, or an oper-
ating system that is unstable. If a project falls
short in meeting a design criterion that is essen-
tial for the project's success, a crisis ensues.
If the crisis is framed as one of functionality,
the effect will be to shift power to those capable
of solving the crisis, because those subunits
most capable of dealing with an organization's
critical problems are the ones that acquire
power (Hickson et al., 1971; Pfeffer & Salancik,
1978). The ability to solve a problem and, conse-
quently, to help the organization cope with un-
certainty creates dependence on the subunit. In
the case of a functionality crisis, power accrues
to the technical staff, and the result is a shift in
the negotiated order of the collective structure
so that the creative frame of the technical staff
becomes primary. This results in management's
willingness to search for and accept technically
creative solutions that solve the design problem.
Alternatively, crises can arise in response to
cost or schedule problems. These crises will
shift power toward the project management
staff, and, as a result, that staff's sensemaking
frame will dominate during the period of crisis.
Project managers may refocus the organiza-
tion's attention on "the conservation of re-
sources and tight control mechanisms" and the
"maintenance of the status quo" (Thomas, Clark,
& Gioia, 1993: 244). The effect on creative behav-
ior will be to favor simpler cost-effective solu-
tions and to be biased against elaborate
searches for creative technical alternatives.
Such a classification may be oversimplified,
for a crisis might involve collaboration between
administrative and technical staffs (Daft, 1978).
A cost problem might be solved by alternative
technologies and a technical problem by a
project manager's creative interface with a cli-
ent. Further, depending on the nature of the cri-
297
sis, project managers and technical staff might
simultaneously engage in creative behavior.
Our overall point is that crises shift structures of
power and meaning. Although we focus on com-
peting models, we recognize that the specifics of
the setting will govern the direction of the shift.
Thus:
Proposition 5: The type of crisis a
project encounters will shift the nego-
tiated order of the collective structure
to favor the referent frames of those
capable of resolving the crisis.
Proposition 5a: When a crisis in func-
tionality occurs, the collective struc-
ture of the project organization will
shift to favor the referent frames of the
technical staff. The technical staff will
engage more in creative behavior.
Proposition 5b: When a crisis in cost or
schedule occurs, the collective struc-
ture of the project organization will
shift to favor the referent frames of the
project managers. The project man-
agement staff will engage more in
creative behavior.
Following Goffman (1974) and Trice (1993), we
expect that crisis-engendered reframings are re-
versible and temporary. They are likely to be
bounded in time by recognition of the crisis and
its subsequent resolution. The collective struc-
ture may revert to its previous balance of power
and meaning (Trice, 1993), or a new collective
structure may emerge that rewards the side that
resolved the crisis by according it relatively
greater status. Lasting change may occur when
repeated crises leave organizational members
with altered interpretive schemes (Poole et al..
1989). The effects may be cumulative over the
course of the life of a project, and the histories
that develop may spill onto future projects.
Based on this logic, we propose the following:
Proposition 6a: After a crisis has
passed, a project will revert to its pre-
vious negotiated order and the bal-
ance of creative engagement (admin-
istrative or technical) that order
implies.
Proposition Gb: Repeated crises of one
type will shift the negotiated order of
the project permanently in favor of the
298 Academy oi Management Review
affected group, and that group will
engage more in creative behavior.
Crises may occur naturally, but they also may
be staged intentionally to suit the purposes of
an individual or group (Goffman, 1974; Poole et
al., 1989). An actor may manipulate the organi-
zation by reframing as crises events and issues
that occur during the life of a project. Several
studies in the sensemaking literature demon-
strate that how an organization labels an issue
determines how it responds to that issue (Dutton
& Jackson. 1987; Staw, Sandelands, & Dutton,
1981; Thomas & McDaniel, 1990). Influential rep-
resentatives of the project or technical staff may
use periodic episodes of sensemaking that occur
in a project (e.g., project milestones, interim
project test dates, and meetings with stakehold-
ers) to create a condition of crisis. For example,
during periodic project testing, the technical
staff may seek to push its group's agenda by
demonstrating that a key part of the project is
failing to meet its design criteria. If the refram-
ing is effective and a crisis is declared, the tech-
nical staff may be free to engage in the creative
activities it wishes to pursue.
A second, less Machiavellian, possibility ex-
ists for using crises to manage a community's
goals. It is likely that members of both the tech-
nical and project staffs recognize and under-
stand the structure of meaning in which they
operate (Giddens, 1994). It may be that the cur-
rent negotiated order would prevent them from
having an idea funded or accepted. Knowing
that crises occur periodically, these parties
would time the introduction of their idea to an
occurring crisis that would favor its acceptance.
The research of Burgelman and Sayles (1986)
on internal corporate venturing provides some
support for this possibility. In their case study,
the authors note that a research scientist had
been working on new types of insulation for
years but was having trouble getting the work
supported. With the coming of oil embargoes in
the 1970s and the dramatic increase in the price
of energy, the scientist's company faced a crisis
in developing new products. The scientist then
used these events as an opportunity to introduce
a proposal for added research on insulation. The
proposal was accepted.
It is likely that individuals engage in staging
crises, or in timing the introduction of ideas to
periodic crises, when their efforts to introduce
April
creative solutions have been thwarted by their
organizations' dominant political order. Our
model of periodic crises fits the work of Tyre and
Orlikowoski (1994). Based on three intensive
case studies, these authors conclude that effec-
tive firms and managers take advantage of the
"lumpiness" of organizational change. They ex-
ploit natural opportunities for change that ap-
pear in periodic, discontinuous bursts to intro-
duce ideas and keep the process of innovation
fresh. We summarize our expectations as fol-
lows:
Proposifion 7a: Individuals or commu-
nities may stage crises fo shift the ne-
gotiated order in favor of the type of
creative engagement (administrative
or technical) that order implies.
Proposition 7b: Individuals or commu-
nities may time the introduction of
creative solutions to match the timing
of periodic crises.
A Process Model of Creativity over Time
Our framework on creativity is composed of
four interrelated concepts: (1) individual sense-
making, (2) intersubjectively shared frames of
reference, (3) a collective structure that repre-
sents a negotiated belief structure between par-
ties that have different frames of reference, and
(4) a shift in the negotiated belief structure that
results from crises. With this multilevel sense-
making model of creativity, we seek to address
the question of how creativity unfolds over time.
We summarize our model graphically in Figure
1 as a series of potential paths a creative project
could take. We emphasize that these paths are
potential, because each project organization
would be subject to the influences of its own
particular history of crises. The challenge to cre-
ativity researchers is to apply this model in
studies of individual organizations.
The figure depicts the history of one potential
project as it unfolds over time (shown on the
X-axis). The history is broken down into different
time episodes, labeled A through E. The y-axis
represents a sliding scale depicting the relative
dominance of the technical or project manage-
ment staff in the negotiated order. Greater cre-
ativity on the part of the technical staff is repre-
sented in the upper half of the figure, and
greater creativity on the part of the project man-
 1999
Drazin, Giynn, and Kazanjian
HGURE 1
A Representative Model of Creativity over Time in a Large-Scale Project
Technical staff
(Higher technical creativity)
C.
A. A crisis of
Negotiation functionality
Negotiated
order
Emergence of
negotiated order D.
A crisis of
time/budget
Project management staff
(higher manager creativity)
agement staff is represented in the lower half of
the figure.
The outset of the project is marked by ambi-
guity and negotiation between competing belief
systems (time period A). As individuals come
together for the first time, they face great uncer-
tainty and seek to reduce that uncertainty by
making sense of the project and its creative de-
mands (Huff, 1988). When the members of the
project experience sufficient time together, in-
tersubjective frames of reference begin to
emerge.
As a result of this period of vacillation and
uncertainty, a negotiated belief structure
emerges in time period B. This time period is
marked by relative stability, which will persist
until a crisis appears. The relative balance be-
tween the technical and managerial belief
structures determines the extent to which each
side engages in creativity. There is a parallel
between the collective and individual levels
that determines the energy project members put
into creative action or habitual action (Ford,
1996).
Time periods C and D represent crises of func-
tionality and time/budget, respectively. In both
cases, when a crisis occurs, the organization
experiences a discontinuous and sudden shift to
a different balance in the negotiated order. This
shift persists until the crisis is resolved, at
which point the organization reverts quickly to
its prior negotiated order.
299
Time
E.
Repeated
time/budget
crises
During a period of functional crisis (period C).
the negotiated belief structure abruptly
switches in favor of the technical staff. At this
time management is more solicitous of creativ-
ity from the technical staff. Technical solutions
that previously might have been considered too
risky, expensive, or aggressive management
now favors, and the technical staff engages in
creative behavior. When the crisis is resolved,
presumably owing to the generation of creative
technical solutions, the negotiated order reverts
back to its prior level.
Similarly, in time period D the organization
experiences a crisis of budget or schedule. This
results in a shift of the negotiated belief struc-
ture temporarily in favor of project managers.
Project managers engage in creative behavior
in their search for solutions to project-related
problems that may be solved by securing more
resources or extending deadlines, or by devel-
oping administrative systems that help the or-
ganization regain control over its targets. When
this crisis is resolved, the organization once
again reverts to its prior negotiated order.
Time period E represents a series of repeated
and frequent crises of budget/schedule. The
project experiences a series of reframings in
quick succession, which gradually results in a
new belief structure that permanently favors the
belief systems of project managers. Should such
a permanent shift occur, the organization is
likely to experience a pronounced reduction in
300 Academy oi Management Review
creative engagement on the part of the technical
staff and an accompanying increase in creativ-
ity on the part of the project manager staff.
We note that, at first glance, this model might
be interpreted as a variant of a punctuated equi-
librium approach to change (Gersick, 1991). Our
model shares with Gersick's work the notion
that a crisis can have a critical impact on the
unfolding nature of a project. However, her work
focuses on crises that occur as a result of the
passage of time; more specifically, she found
that crises occur at roughly the midpoint of
projects and are generated by anxiety over
project completion.
Our model differs in that we propose that cri-
ses can occur periodically throughout the length
of a project and are initiated by events both
internal and external to the project. Gersick sug-
gests that all members of a project are mobilized
by the midpoint milestone, whereas we focus on
how crises shift power, mobilize communities,
and affect creativity throughout the life of a
project. Although we recognize that crises can
result in permanent change, as depicted in time
period E of the figure, our model allows and
even expects that the history of a project will be
marked by multiple crises of varying types,
which result in only temporary reframings of a
stable negotiated order. Thus, our model has
more in common with switching structure mod-
els of change (Duncan, 1976) than with punctu-
ated equilibrium models.
DISCUSSION
Socrates reportedly said at his trial that an
unexamined life was not worth living. We be-
lieve that the same holds true for theories. All
theories contain assumptions; assumptions are
necessary because they allow researchers to
proceed without constant introspection and jus-
tification. But, at least occasionally, an exami-
nation of the dominant assumptions of a theo-
retical domain is warranted. It has been over 15
years since Amabile (1983) introduced her book
on the role of context in generating creativity.
Since then, multilevel theories on organization-
al creativity have appeared.
Our goals in this article have been twofold:
(1) to examine assumptions about levels of anal-
ysis embedded in this literature and (2) to exam-
ine how relaxing or altering some of those as-
sumptions leads to alternative perspectives on
April
multilevel theorizing. In doing so. our aim is not
to criticize or supplant existing creativity theory
but, rather, to illustrate the possibility of other,
perhaps complementary, theoretical ap-
proaches. As such, our ideas are generalizable
beyond the domain of creativity. In the following
we describe three theoretical realms to which
our multilevel model might apply: (1) assump-
tions about inclusiveness. (2) process models
and the dimension of time, and (3) a sensemak-
ing perspective on defining levels of analysis.
Assumptions About Inclusiveness
In our review of the creativity literature, we
found that most researchers adopt a common set
of LOA assumptions concerning two key choic-
es: (1) the definition of the creativity construct
and (2) the level about which generalizations
are made. We have shown that most creativity
researchers define creativity as an outcome that
is judged by others as novel and useful and
focus on the level of the individual or work unit/
small project team. Taken together, these
choices lead researchers to make further as-
sumptions about the relationships of individu-
als to project teams.
In general, we have discovered that creativity
researchers tend to adopt a functionalist-
reductionist approach (Rousseau, 1985),
whereby individuals are modeled as entities
that contribute to project or work group out-
comes, which, in turn, ultimately define the
overall organizational outcome. What each
lower level of analysis contributes to the next
higher level is creativity. Thus, individuals' cre-
ativity aggregates to become work group cre-
ativity, and work groups' creativity aggregates
to become organizational creativity. The result
is that organizational creativity is defined in
terms of a part-whole relationship so that
smaller or microlevel entities contribute to the
functioning of the whole macrolevel system
(Rousseau, 1985).
A logical extension of the functionalist-
reductionist approach is to model individuals as
an inclusive part of the groups for which they
work. That is, individuals are assumed to be
influenced solely by the characteristics of the
formal hierarchy to which they report. Because
the hierarchy has a captive influence on indi-
viduals' creative behavior, researchers implic-
itly assume homogeneous effects of higher-level
 1999
Drazin, Giyjin, and Kazan;ian
units on individuals. Although individual differ-
ences are acknowledged, group or contextual
effects are assumed to override those differ-
ences.
By focusing on more complex organizations,
characterized by high levels of horizontal inter-
dependence, we have been able to relax the
prevailing assumption of inclusiveness. In-
stead, we have proposed that individuals are
influenced significantly by their occupational
subculture. By using large-scale projects as an
exemplar, we can assume significant numbers
of both administrators and technicians to allow
for meaningful occupational subcultures to de-
velop. According to multilevel theorists (House
et al., 1995; Rousseau, 1985), this amounts to an
assumption of partial inclusiveness. Partial in-
clusion complicates multilevel theories; it sug-
gests that individuals are subject to influence
from a multiplicity of groups in which they hold
membership (e.g., occupational, organizational,
or task). Specifically, we have proposed that or-
ganizational-level creativity can be described
as an order negotiated between administrators
and technicians that occurred at the level of the
entire project.
One potential avenue for future research on
creativity might be to investigate the degree of
inclusiveness present in different organization-
al or project contexts (House et al., 1995). We
chose to focus our theory building on a setting
where membership in occupational groupings
would have a substantial impact on the frames
held by individuals. It is possible that occupa-
tional membership would also have a similar
impact on smaller project teams or work groups.
However, in these settings the influence of for-
mal organizational membership may be stron-
ger because cross-functional and cross-team in-
terdependence and interaction would be
minimized. Such small-group settings might be
characterized by a higher degree of inclusive-
ness.
Our model also suggests that multilevel the-
ories should incorporate sociopolitical pro-
cesses. We maintain that various subcultures in
organizations compete with each other and that
this competition has significant effects on an
organization's behavior. The principle of partial
inclusion allows for the influence of overlapping
role membership and occupational identities
(DiMaggio, 1991; Fine, 1996). Our discussion of
differences between technical and administra-
301
tive staff could easily be extended to other forms
of role and/or social identity overlap. These
might include work versus family roles, func-
tional versus project team roles, and multiple
occupational and professional roles and identi-
ties.
Organizations are complicated entities. An
assumption of inclusiveness has allowed cre-
ativity researchers to reduce complexity. This is
particularly useful when the goals of research-
ers have normative implications; inclusiveness
implies influence and control over valued out-
comes. However, if the goal of the researcher is
to describe complex organizational behavior,
then relaxing the assumption of inclusiveness
seems warranted.
Process Models and Time
We have focused on creativity as a process,
rather than as an outcome. At the intrasubjec-
tive (or individual) level, we have defined cre-
ativity as a person's psychological engagement
in creative activity. At the level of an entire
organizational project, we have shown that cre-
ativity involves not only individual engagement
but the emerging structuration of who engages
and when they engage. At the project level, we
have illustrated that creativity consists of the
ebb and flow of creative engagement among
different occupational subcultures—that is,
managerial versus technical staffs. We have
posited that the political dynamics of such cre-
ative engagement leads to the emergence of a
negotiated order, with shifts in the balance of
power over the history of the project. Thus, given
this dynamic perspective, time and timing are
what we have sought to explain.
One of the most salient ways in which we
have captured time is in noting how the organi-
zation responds to crises, particularly those of
functionality, cost, and schedule. When an event
occurs that an organization (or its membership)
interprets as a crisis, the negotiated order of
creative engagement can shift from one occupa-
tional subculture to another. This shift occurs
through multilevel dynamics that are systemic
and sociopolitical in nature. We have argued
that the classification of an event as a crisis
causes subcultures to reframe—at least tempo-
rarily—their shared, intersubjective causal
maps. The crisis parenthetically alters the pri-
mary frames of subcultures (and member indi-
302 Academy of Management Review
viduals) in a profound way that shifts the bal-
ance and determines which subculture (or
individual) engages in creative behavior. Crises
are time-bound events. Without explicitly in-
cluding time as a variable in our model, crises
would have no meaning.
By explicitly considering the role of time, our
model extends previous work on levels of anal-
ysis, specifically that of Klein et al. (1994). We
suggest that members of occupational subcul-
tures (administrative and technical) are rela-
tively homogeneous in their frames of reference
at any given point in time. However, when a
crisis occurs, it has the effect of reframing these
primary frames of reference and causing them
to shift. Within each occupational group, the
resultant reframing is likely to be relatively ho-
mogeneous. Thus, the interpretative schemas an
occupational culture maintains are homoge-
neous and internally consistent within each
time period, but they may be considered heter-
ogeneous across time periods.
Time also plays a role in giving individuals
agency. Giddens (1994) proposes that an integra-
tion of macrolevel variables (structure) and mi-
crolevel variables (agency) can occur only in a
dynamic framework. Our model allows individ-
uals to understand the constraints under which
they operate and to take action to change those
constraints. This requires that time explicitly be
incorporated into a model to allow for interpre-
tation, action, and the emergence of a new or
modified interpretation. Incorporating time into
multilevel models increases the ability of a the-
orist to propose alternative, and possibly more
robust, models.
Sensemaking and Levels of Analysis
In constructing our multilevel model of cre-
ativity, we adopted Weick's (1995) framework of
intrasubjective, intersubjective, and collective
levels of analysis. Although this parallels the
traditional tripartite classification of individual,
group, and organization levels, it differs in the
important respect of focusing on the processes
of sensemaking and interpretation in organi-
zations. This focus on cognitive frameworks of
sensemaking has allowed us to model the re-
framing that occurs during crisis, and to model
how reframing shifts the negotiated order be-
tween administrative and technical frames to
April
engender political contests over how the organ-
ization defines and solves problems creatively.
Thus, a primary contribution of a sensemak-
ing perspective is that it alerts us to alternative
ways of modeling multilevel influences in organ-
izations. A principal theme we uncovered in the
creativity literature was the use of an aggrega-
tion model to describe how individual actions
can produce patterns of behavior at the organi-
zational level. An alternative view, emerging
from a sensemaking perspective, is that individ-
uals may influence and, in turn, be influenced
by cross-level effects (Rousseau, 1985) to affect
the intersubjectively derived sensemaking
frames that subcultures can share. For example,
an individual may impact creativity at the col-
lective level by actively seeking to frame events
as crises. If successful, a reframing may result,
and the negotiated order may shift to motivate
subgroups, as well as individuals in those sub-
groups, to engage in creative acts.
At more macro levels, then, organizational
creativity can result not only from activities born
of a single individual but, rather, from dynamic
and changing processes of sensemaking that
emerge and establish themselves as a negoti-
ated order for a point in time. Interpretive pro-
cesses thus occur simultaneously at multiple
levels of analyses in organizations, with effects
at one level interacting with, and embed-
ding, other levels of organizational analysis and
sensemaking.
Implications for Research
Empirically testing the multilevel theory on
creativity we advance here calls for methods
that go beyond static or cross-sectional inquiry.
Researchers interested in studying sensemak-
ing processes in organizations need to adopt "a
set of methodological tactics that enables them
to deal with meanings rather than frequency
counts" (Weick, 1995: 173). As a starting point for
future research, we offer ideas on operation-
alizing three key features of our model: (1) as-
sumptions about individual inclusiveness in or-
ganizations; (2) the importance of frames of
reference and their shifts over time; and (3) the
measurement of engagement in creative behav-
ior at the individual and collective levels. In all
of these arenas, incorporating dynamic models
of change, evolution, and responsiveness to or-
 1999
Drazin, Glynn, and Kazanjian
ganizational events and crises are important
techniques.
Researchers could examine assumptions
about individuals' inclusiveness in occupa-
tional, organizational, or other communities by
adopting methods from the burgeoning litera-
ture on organizational identification, which
Mael and Ashforth (1992) define as the "per-
ceived oneness with or belongingness to" the
organization of which one is a member. One
might posit that the degree to which an individ-
ual identifies with a collective might be an in-
dicator of the degree to which that person feels
included in, or influenced by, the collective.
Thus, the degree of individuals' inclusiveness
might be gauged by the strength of their identi-
fication. Organizational identification can be
measured with the Mael and Ashforth (1988)
scale, which has been adapted across different
types of membership contexts (e.g.. Bhatta-
charya, Rao, & Glynn, 1995). Shifts in individu-
als' identification over time could be detected by
assessing members' identification at different
points in the life of a project team, in individu-
als' tenure with the organization, and/or in terms
of crises or other punctuation points. Research-
ers, thus, could test whether individuals who
strongly identify with their occupational com-
munity might correspondingly be more respon-
sive to situational factors designed to affect
their creative engagement.
A central feature of our multilevel model of
creativity is that cognitive frames shift over time
in response to crises. The successful testing of
our propositions, therefore, requires that these
referent frames be measurable. One demon-
strated technique for examining individuals'
causal maps and the extent to which they may
be shared within a collective is that of cognitive
mapping (Barr, Stimpert, & Huff, 1992; Fiol &
Huff, 1992). This approach has been applied to
process research on organizational innovation
(Swan, 1995). Cognitive maps represent individ-
uals' schema or interpretations about concepts
and cause-and-effect relationships in their in-
formation environment (Fiol & Huff, 1992). Data
for cognitive maps can be generated through
interviews (Bougon, 1983); causal grids (Swan &.
Newell, 1994); or the content analysis of text,
interview transcriptions, or statements (see Huff,
1990. for an overview of techniques).
Cognitive mapping techniques have been
used to study changes in managers' mental
303
models over time in response to key environ-
mental events or shifts (Barr et al.. 1992), as well
as managers' beliefs about technological inno-
vation (Swan & Newell, 1994). Building on work
in organizational decision making (Ford & He-
garty, 1984) and strategy (Barr et al., 1992;
Daniels, deChernatony, & Johnson, 1995). those
using cognitive mapping techniques might test
our propositions on the development of and
change in referent frames for creativity in organ-
izations. Of necessity, such study would benefit
from a field-based case study of a single organ-
ization and the unfolding of processes over time;
Dutton and Dukerich's (1991) seminal study of
sensemaking at the New York Port Authority is
an instructive model.
To measure the creative engagement of indi-
viduals and groups, researchers might employ
procedures used by Kahn (1990) in his study of
psychological engagement and disengagement.
Adopting qualitative methodologies, Kahn used
multiple strategies, including participant obser-
vation, interviews, and content analysis of ar-
chival documentation. Such qualitative methods
might be employed, or paired with nonqualita-
tive methods (e.g., survey analysis), to study cre-
ative engagement at work.
Another strategy for assessing engagement
might be the adaptation of the Experience Sam-
pling Method (ESM): a "quasi-naturalistic
method that involves signaling research sub-
jects at random times during the day, frequently
for a week or longer, and obtaining a report of
the nature and quality of their experience"
(Kubey, Larson, & Csikszentmihalyi, 1996: 99).
Used extensively to assess whether a person is
in "flow"—a condition of high challenges and
skills (Csikszentmihalyi 8f LeFevre, 1989)—it is a
technique that can be harnessed to examine
whether an individual is in the process of cre-
ative engagement. The ESM strategy yields data
that can be used in hierarchical linear modeling
of experience (Moneta & Csikszentmihalyi, 1996)
and can illuminate how and when individuals
engage in creativity, as well as the factors that
govern the process and its outcomes. Such qual-
itative, in-depth analyses of how creative pro-
cesses unfold and change over time, and in re-
sponse to crises, can begin to explicate the
ecology of creative engagement in organiza-
tions and. thus, test some of the propositions
advanced here.
304 Academy oi Management Review
CONCLUSION
Multilevel theories are emerging as powerful
models for researchers to employ in mapping
organizational phenomena. Because they simul-
taneously and interactively examine how
agency at one level of analysis can interact
with, and influence, that at other levels, they
afford a means of describing the ever-more-
complex and ever-changing organizational
landscape. We have focused on how assump-
tions about levels of analysis, embedded in
models as institutionalized norms, can be
changed so as to refocus and illuminate organ-
izational processes differently. We have pro-
posed an illustrative model, to complement
those in the extant literature, that emphasizes
how individuals, communities, and organization-
al systems can create meanings that impact the
direction and flow of creativity in organizations.
We now invite future organizational scholars to
continue the Socratic tradition of leaving no
assumptions unquestioned—even ours; it is
such crises of meaning that propel the creative
processes, for organizational practice and
theorizing.
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Robert Drazin is an associate professor of organization and management at the

Goizueta Business School of Emory University. He received his Ph.D. from the Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania. His research interests focus on organizational innovation, organ-
ization design, and organizational creativity.
Mary Arm Glynn is an associate professor of organization and management at the
Goizueta Business School of Emory University. She received her Ph.D. from Columbia
University. Her primary research interests focus on creativity, innovation, organiza-
tional cognition, learning and intelligence, and organizational identity and identifi-
cation processes.
Robert K. Kazanjian is an associate professor of organization and management at the
Goizeuta Business School of Emory University. He received his Ph.D. from the Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania. His primary research focus is on the strategy and design of
growing high-technology firms.