Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Safety Studies
Safety Studies
Safety Studies
Based on industry practices
Introduction
Chemical Process Industries (CPI) are top Safest Performers
Fatal Accident Frequency Rate (FAFR) – No. of fatalities in a group of
1,000 people per 100 million hours over their working lifetimes for a
variety of occupations
Construction: 67 Road travel: 57 CPI: 4 Stay at home: 3
Bureau of Labor Statistics 2006, US Department of Labor
Boat hit
Hurricane hit
Pressure 1) Pump NPSH not met – suction cavitation 2) Blocked inlet 3) Suction strainer fouled 4) Blocked 1) Loss of pump and operational
outlet 5) Pumped fluid density different 6) Water hammer issues
Others 1) Changes in feed composition or flows 2) Ingress of air, water, steam, corrosion products
Feed to Distillation
sources
Column Spare Pump
150 #/ 300# Start-up Bypass
Auto start of
Spare Pump
Suction PSLL
HAZOP
Discussions are recorded/ tabulated as below
Guide word & Cause Consequence Risk Safeguards Action On
Deviation Ranking
High Level in 1) LCV failure 1) Tank overflow 1) 2 separate LAHH
V3010 2) LIC sensor failure 2) Environ Impact 2) 1 hour storage above
2) Outlet SDV or block 3) Pool fire LAHH
valve closed
3) More inflow
4) Sandjet valve open
SDV open Wrong indication of valve Wear and tear Commissioning and test Correct position indication is
position position to control system. procedures to ensure that required in compressor start-
indicator switch Incorrect controller all compressor SDV up logic. All position indicators
fail sequence initiated indicators are wired should be function tested in
correctly to PLC vendor shop
and
Maintenance and shutdown details; Relevant operational
information
List of Safety Instrumented Functions (SIFs) based on above
or
SIL Classification or target values
SIL 1 - between 10-1 and 10-2 (0.1 to 0.01) Once in 10–100 years Logic Solver
SIL 2 - between 10-2 and 10-3 (0.01 to 0.001) Fails
SIL 3 - between 10-3 and 10-4 (0.001 to 0.0001). That is once
LAHH ‘B LAHH ‘A’
in 1,000 or 10,000 years. Maxm. This is as good as a PSV Fails Fails
SIL 4 - between 10-4 and 10-5 Not practical
SIL Achieved
Fault Tree Analysis based on sensors, final elements, logic
solvers; redundancy; their reliability and testing intervals
Proof test interval is key to get high SIL
SIL – Layers of Protection
Control system maintains stable operation – 1st layer
Trip & shutdown system provides primary protection, when
control system fails – 2nd layer
Relief system provides secondary protection, when control &
trip systems fail – ultimate protection or last line of defense –
3rd layer
PIC
T0 Flare
PAHH
PALL
T0 Compressor
SDV
Consequence
High Medium High High
Risk of a hazard:
its probability x severity of its consequence. Medium Low Medium High
How likely and how bad it would be if it happened Low Low Low Medium
1 2 4 5 6
Rare Unlikely Infrequent Occasional Frequent
< 1 in 10,000 1 in 1,000- 1 in 100-1,000 1 in 10-100 y 1 in 10 year
years 10,000 years years
Frequency
High: Risk - Not tolerable – additional protection/ design changes required
Medium: Risk – Tolerable with controls – evaluate additional control/ design changes
Low: Risk – Tolerable. Do nothing!
How do we mitigate risks
Risk = Probability x Severity
Reduce probability, severity, or both
Hazard: LPG tank farm. LPG leakage
Risk: Vapor cloud Explosion
Mitigate probability: Proper isolation before swinging blind
Mitigate severity: (1) Install remote operable valves (ROV)
to isolate spill or transfer contents to another tank and (2)
install F& G detectors to close ROV
Usher in a safety culture. Empower operators to
believe that they can deduct a hazard and act on it
Safety Culture Identify hazards
Analyze Risks Internal Auditing
Prioritize Risks Safety Risk Safety External Auditing
Treat Risks Management Assurance Good testing & maintenance
Safety Management System
(SMS) Building Blocks Training & Education
Report all incidents
Safety Policy Safety Toolbox Meeting
(non-punitive)
Communicate Safety Alerts
Identify Responsibilities & Objectives Promotion
BEFORE AFTER
Safety is a priority for me but I can’t I can ensure safety is a priority at my
translate that to my plant plant
Accidents may happen once in a while in I take care of hazards before they turn
my plant into accidents
I don’t know what is the greatest risk in I can classify every risk in my plant and
my plant know how to mitigate it
What should I do to improve safety? I have a risk-based prioritized list of
things that I should do to improve safety
I don’t know how safely my workers are My workers are trained and they help
doing their job keep the plant a safe place
How safe is my plant? How will I know? I measure safety performance and know
the trends
Hazop worksheets with well documented scenarios are never looked at after the safety studies are over. A tabulation of
equipment based deviations and causes given to plant operators may help them in real situations – to identify less apparent
contributory causes that may cut across plant boundaries and develop operators’ analytical skills
Accidents
Do they happen or do we let them happen
Your every action in a day, considering its impact on you, your family,
your colleagues and friends, will make it a way of life!