> The Serious Play of Plato's Euthydemus Davin Roocanix, oa Stare Universe Plato's Euchytemus is 2 srrange dialogue." In it two old. but not very experi- enced, sophiss, the brothers Euthydemus and Dionysodorus. show off theit “erst” abilities, They bombard their audience with fallacy after fallacy. many fof them quite absurd. (Example: that dog is a father: that dog is yours: there: fore, that dog is your father [ste 298.) The dislogue is loaded with wort play, and throughout Socrates is transparently ironic in his praise of his sophis- tic competitors. When they finish their show. he says. “oo one of those present could praise highly enough the argument and the two men, und they nearly died {aughing and clapping with joy” (3036). ‘As & result of its almost farcical quality. commentators often feel cone strained to begin theit work on the Eurhidemus by asking whether itis even serious enough to merit analyss.* The task of the commentator is then to show ‘that enough serious material can be extracted to justify the commentary. Typ- ically the sophistical fallacies, which represent about half of the work, have ‘been taken as the most significant portion of the dialogue. (Including the itro- duction and conclusion the dialogue has seven pars. thee of which are filled ‘vith the sophiss’eristc.). Even if they are occasionally absurd. itis obvious that arguments concerning the nature of learning (2754-774) ot the ambiguity of the verb “to be” (2836-e) or the issue of seifspredication (300e—301e) should be seriously analyzed. Kuelen. for example, claims that there is an important relationship between the learning fallacies and the doctrines of the Meno; Peck argues sivilarly about the “to be” arguments and the Sophist: Sprague interprets a passage from the Eushydemus as an objection to the theory ‘of Forms similar to one articulated in the Parmenides (see Keulen, Peck, Sprague [1967], and also Mobr). The fallacies have also been examined from a historical perspective. Since they are closely related to many 6f the examples Aristotle uses in his On So- Phistical Refwation (SE) the following sors of questions fave been asked: ‘What is the relationship between Aristotle's treatment of the fallacies and Plato's? (Keulen asks this question, as does Praechter.) Was there an original source that supplied both the Euthydemes and the SE with its esstic arguments? Was there, for example,'a historical igure, named Euthydemus who actualy compiled 2 handbook of fallacies (as is perhaps suggested at SE 17712 and Rhetoric 1401226)? (This is the main quéstion in Pracchter's essay.) |A similar historical question is this: What is the relationship between Plato's ‘C orinmmeraTion. Winer 1990-1991. Vo. 18. No, 2212+ Interpretation distogue and the “Dissoi Looi" manual, possibly written at the end of the fitthcentiry (see Sprague 1968], pp. 160-61)? Whatever the answer, clear that the Euthydemus provides valuable information about the sate of Greek logic during this period, andi is likely that 2 great deal of serious work is both refeced in and was inspired by the sophisical arguments of the dia- Joguc. The Kneales suggest an example: “It is proboble then that the carly Megarians tok pat in, and were stimulated to logical discovery by, such ds putes a5 we find satirized in Plato's Ewhydemus”(p. 15). “There is thas no dovbt thatthe fallacies deserve attention from both bisto- rians of logic and, philosophers concemed with Plato's development. In this tssty, however, 1 propose a diferent approach to the serious side ofthe Euthy- dems, Instead of Totsing on its thre ernie sections (2754-774, 2836-886, 3930-3036), 1 shall conoentate largely on Socrates’ “protic” speeches (27Re-83a, 2884-932). Commentators (6g. Stewart, Friednder, and Prach- ter) frequently dismiss, simply paraphrase, or ignore these arguments. M. A Stewart desrbes the argument a5 “an extravagant induction” and “equivocal.” P. Friedlinder says almost nothing about these arguments. Praecher describes the philosophical side of the dialogue as essentially negative and Socrates’ ar- ‘guments as “unmitebar ohne fracht" (p.9). By contrast, { hope to show that if Bnalyzed carefully, these speeches employ some of Plato's most crucial terme—ieclne and arete ae the prime examples—and they raise philosophical «questions of the highest oder “The two proteptic speeches together form a continuous argument whichis indeed quite serious. However, pccsely because its protec. the argument js also ininsclly problematic. Prtreptc. ax explained by Socrates, i a frm of argument designed to persuade is audicnce that “one ought to philosophize Sand care about avec” (27586. For «compan sec tserates To Nicoeles ST Vs Evogoras 17.1, Antdosis 04, 84.2, and 6.2, and Arise’ Rhetoric 1358 {1 It invites its auience into the project of philasophy and promises, either ly or expliciy, that auch a quest will be rewarding, But protreptc is incomplete: it only promis and does not itseif deliver “what comes next.” “This pase, "what cores next” lo meta tour) comes fom Clitphon 40847, a dialogue devoted to the question of protepic. | have commented on this ‘work at length in “The Riddle of Plato's Clewophon.” It urges its audience 10 love wisdom but docs nt itself provide, or clearly aiculae the nature of, that wisdom. As a result, proueptc forces the reader to consider some of the most pressing question aed by the dialogues: Do they consi a “positive” cach- ng? Can Socrates’ promise of wisdom be failed? s there a theoretical doc: ine, an episteme oF techno, that actually does “come next” of is Socratic protrptic merely promissory? Does Socrates only refute and exhort his iter, Tocutors, of does he actually teach them? “Answering soch questions would ali tly require a comprehensive inter- pretation ofthe dialogues. This the essay to follow wil hardly supply. Instead ‘The Serious Play of Plato's Buthydemes * 213 sealed oe ae oon in at ele tangy eo a Seen pertorming a not serious tk: oining the questions tht must BS Tear aypody else” @21348-). The first question that Soeats poses i 16> sponse is this the should «man god who ie soeady enone thts Sm yo ar ean yo lo each hat mom who oe oni rarer docs ot believe that in general acc is teachable oF ‘wom ‘eats We Come ons the werk ofthe sre techne to persed sch 4m parece teachable and that you ar the ones fom whom someone Tear ri thatthe work of some ater techne?(27487-e5) a ms te oe aes at Se i ah esa ge, race arta [Ace you only able wo make246 + Interpretation “This argument has occasioned much debate. It is not clear, for example, exactly where the foee ofthe ambiguity falls. “Does the sophism depend upon an equivocation on maruhanein.. oF en an equvocation on sophot and uma- theis Cknowledgeablevignorar’ and ‘cleverstupid')?" (Hawtey, pp. 58 ff). it is also possible that rather than equivocation the fallacy is better described as, “the one known traditionally as a dito secundam quid ed dictum simpliciter. ‘This fallacy consists in taking absolutely what should be taken only aci- Sentaly, e.g.» 10 go from “knowing one's letters’ to simply ‘knowing’ (prague 11962). p” 6) Since the focus of this essay is on Socrates", and not the sophists' argu: ‘ments, | shall simply assert that some form of equivocation is going on. What is clear is that, whatever the exact stats ofthe argument, its consequences if taken seriously, would call into question the very possibifity of learning. “the one who learns” cannot be identified, then the process of learning itself cannot be rationally explained, end it becomes legitimate to ask whether itis even possible, Clay the sophistc arguments echo Meno's famous learning, part ox. (Again, Keulen makes this» major issue.) Alter explaining that te fallacy rests on an cquivocation, Socrates seems to dismiss the sophiss” arguments as follows: "These are stadent games (pada) and thus tll you tat these fellows replaying, (qrospaizein) with you—and I call this play (paidam) because even if someone should lear ether many or all of such things a they teach, he Would have 0 ‘more kaowledge of how things really are, but he would ony be abl to play with ther men. ppg up and overturing them, by his ust of he difeence of names. They are like boys who take pleasure in palling a chair away (rom people ‘who are about sit down apd laugh whe they sec them speawled upside down. You shoud think of what these fllows do as pay @278bt~<2) Socrates proposes that instead of such play, the sophists shoud full their [promise to engage in the serious wark (ta spoudaia: 2783) of protreptic. A Series of dichotomies thus suggests itself: Sophistry is the mere playing with words; it is concerned only with appearances and refutation, and not with in struction in how things really are it is superficial, manipulative, and bad. By contrast, philosophy uses words to understand things; itis serious, protreptic (or “dialestcal") and geod, ("Dialectical is Sprague's word in Plato's Use of Fallacy, p. 3, and ber interpretation is a good example of what I'm talking, about. The eclstionship berween dialectic and proteptic would coostiute an issue in itself, and 1 shall not broach it here. See aso Srlezak, p. 8t.) While such comfortable dichotomies are attractive, I suggest that they are ot as easily sustgined as commentators wish to thik. Despite their lack of perspicacity, the sophists have a position which is potentially quite serious Whatever the exact status of the argument concerning learning, there is no doubt that overcoming Meno's paradox is not easy. Let us assuine for & mo- The Serious Play of Plato's Buthydemus + 217 ‘ment that she process of learning cannot ih fact be rationally articulated and that its possibility should therefore be called into question, If that were the case, thea the verbal combat of sophistry, the manipulation of words whose goal is only to achieve victory in any given contest of speeches, should be taken very seriously. Since the use of language could promise no higher goa, i¢., know edge, there would be no reason not to became a sophist This postion that I here propose atcibuting to the sophists is roughly equiv- lent to that often ascribed to Gorgias. In his "On Nature” and Section 11 ofthe "raise of Helen he presents a form of scepticism. This in tim provides him ‘with a warrant for his commitment to rhetoric, wherein truth is only an “adorn ment” (Kamas) of “logos.” It is extremely difficult to translate “kasmas.” the first word of the “Praise of Helen.” See Diels, pp. 288 f., for the Greek text “The Key point i this: The sophiss who oppose Socrates are no doubt comic figures, This does not imply. however, that their postion should be dismissed ‘as 2 farcical "Gegenbild” (Szleaak's word, p. 81) to the serious work of Socra- tic philosophy. It is possible to abstract the sophistic view from its playful context and the result is troubling. and perhaps formidable. “The sense in which the sophistic view can seriously oppose Socrates’ will he made clear ax we examine the first protreptic argument. As we shall see, the Conclusion Socrates purports to establish is, atthe least, precerious. In other words, it will not be clear that good reasons are provided as to why Kleiias, the target ofthe protreptic, should accept the invitation td philosophize rather than join the sophistic camp, Indeed, we shall se inthe following section that Socrates’ argument roquires prior agreement with, and does not itself cen, at least one of its premises; and it is precisely this prefnise that the sophistic scepticism concerning learning would call into question m ‘The following is an outline of the argument | extract from Socrates’ ques tions and Kleinis" answers, and which Socrates describes as genuine protrep- tie: 1. Al hurnan beings wish wo do well ew prattein: 278), i.c., wish to be ‘pp (adamant: 206. 2. In order to do well. the possession of good hings is required (279a3 fT.) 2A. A sample list of good things: wealth, health, physical beauty, good family, power and honor in one's community, temperance, justice, courage, wisdom (27987~c%) 2B. Good fortune (eutuchia: 2797) is a subsequent addition to the list. However, because “wisdom i good fortune” (27946) the same item is acu ally listed twice ‘To bring happiness. good things must benefit their possessor (2806-8).218 + Jnterpretation 4. To benefit, gond things must be used (280e1~<7), 3. To benefit, good things must he used correctly (280034) 6. Knowledge (episteme: 28182) leads to correct use. 7. All tenis onthe sample ist (2A) are actually neural (28he3-4). Knowledge (or "good sente: {phronesis: 28106) oF “wisdom” (sophia: 28166] or “intel {igence” {nows: 28167) is the only intrinsic good and should be sought at any cost. (omit that portion which argues that those with litle sense show Tess in order to ert less [2810 |.) ‘This isa classical protreptic argument. traces of which probably appear in Aristotle's Protrepicus (see Daring, p. 19). ts conclusion, “that itis necessary to love wisdom” (philasophein: 282d2), if seriously accepted, would demand a {otal commitment on the part of anyone wha agrees. Indeed, the conclusion is $0 serieus and, with its use of the word “necessary” (anagkaion), so apparently ‘unconditional in its,admonition, that the premises deserve the closest serutiny. Unfortunately, they are. as we shall see, quite vague. (This has fed Stewart 0 describe this argument as an example of “Plato's sophisty.”) A similar vague ness is found in the conclusion itself: Even if Kleinias were to agree that he ‘ought to love wisdom, Sverates uses several words 10 describe the kawwledge towards which the argument dicets him. Two related questions, What exactly is this knowledge and How might Kleinia attain it? are thus let distessingly ‘open. Finally. the principal examples used to illustrate knowledge or wisdom ‘come from "the typical technai.” It is not clear, however, whether these can actually provide an adequate theoretical model for the type of knowledge the argument encourages Kleinia to seek. ‘The first premise contains a famous ambiguity in the phrase “ew prattin,” Does it mean “to do well.” ia the sense of being viruous, or "wo succeed.” in the sense of achieving one's goal. whatever that may be? Both Hawtrey and Gitord comment on the pointed ambiguity of “eu prattein,” The fatter says, “In its usual acceptation it would rather mean “faring well” than “acting well” (p.20). The reformulation the phrase receives. “eudsimonein,” typically but fever quite adequately translated as “to be happy,” only recaptulates the prob- Tem. 1 does not seem to be the case that all people wish to be virtuous. We ‘may all wish fo succeed. that i. attain what we deem to be worth attaining, Ba praticin covers both situations. lx ambiguity, however, may not be entirely vicious; the first (as well as the second) premise expresses a basic, and (yp- ically Socratic, opinion about human behavior: All harman beings desire what seems to them to be good. We make value judgment, pursue goals. attempt to ‘nove from here to there wih an eye towards attaining what we want and deem, ven if inarticulately, to be good (see, e.g.. Symposium 2060), The argument ‘assumes, and does not prove, that human beings are free agen!s whose rational ‘oie of what is good determines ther action. Iti vague and undefended. but rot without some basis in ordinary observation. Premise (2) implies that human action is inspired by epidhumia, the desire The Serious Play of Plato's Euthydemus * 219 for and consequent pursuit of abjects. Again, although the premise is vagus it reflects broad and (to some) compelling perception of human behavior: Peo: ple go after what they want, and what they want is what they think is good. {ideseribe the lst of good things Socrates proposes as “sample” because the specific items on it arent ia themselves that important. The point is only that such alist can in principle be drawn. The items on this lst (which have been ‘accused of fluctuating “between the causes and the constitvents of success” [Stewart p. 23)) cover a very broad spectrum, ranging (rom bodily beauty to justice. Nevertheless, in keeping withthe kind of analysis made so far the list is plausible it sigifies again something basic about ordinary behavior. Each of fas has a set of goals that energize our desires, a sample lst of good things we ‘ink are worh pursuing. ‘To summarize: The assumptions initiating Socrates’ argument are vague and questionable. Nevertheless, they express a plausible conviction about human ‘action, namely that itis caused by fee and rational choices. More serious problems with the argument are yet to come, ‘Alter placing wisdom on the fist of sample goods. Socrates digresses. He states that he and Kleinias have left out “the greatest of the good things . {good fortune (eutuchia: 2797)." He cannot, however, add eutuehia tothe list, for it would repeat an iter already there, namely sophia. By means of a series ‘of examples, Socrates argues that good forwne and wisdom are really the sume, {In the mater of flue playing skilled flautists have the best fortune; in reading, and writing letters, itis the writing masters; in warfare itis the wise generals, in times of sickness one would always prefer to try one’s luck with the wise doctor. (About eutuchia Gifford says it means both “an accideatal concurrence of favourable circumstances, and success resulting from the agent's judicious ‘choice of means” Ip. 22}. Note that at 2791 the word used is eupragia. So- crates generalizes: “Wisdom everywhere makes human beings have good for- tune" [28036], This same point is made about eutuchia and techne in the Hip- pocratic writing, “Peri Tecines,” section 1V.) ‘Why does Socrates go off on this tangent and is this identification of eutuc- bhi and sophia realy as “disastrous” as Stewart thinks (p. 23)? The purpose of this digression, I suggest, isto focus attention on the character of techne, AS has often been stated, techne ig the mode of knowledge that best overcomes, and enables its possessor to control, che, luck (see, e.g., Nussbaum, 95~ 100), The pilot, for example, fares well when facing the contingencies of the sea. In this passage Socrates relies exclusively on the for kis model of wis- dom, soon to be defined as that knowledge of the corect use of neutral items which beings ite possessor happiness. But is wisdom best modeled by techne? In Section | we noted the features of arete that would distinguish its being taught from instruction inthe ordinary technai. For Socrates aete is equivalent to sophia; therefore, this digression should be read with an eye towards the possibility of irony. Jn other words, despite its superficial identification of220+ Interpretation shh, of pw ol aap eg eater tree rin cotta Waant t erer sec tions will be returned to shortly. - ee pote one on ee nop a i ce i ie ete me ut mp pt lca eS pam Sate leaner co eee eee ao een bringing possessions into the human spher f ee re, i,¢., of applying them. oe ee sos ot SE ote Scene tangas mooltan pes ee oe Sentence aoa See te ee incorrect, good or bad. = ey yaa a en tirely clear. In order for the conclusion to be ll ht ers ae a eee cee ee ee eter cy on See ee pl erent Seer er ee Moet another) wha conecognd wr ct eee et Sea een reat naar a ee ce a eae ae plete erin erp Se oe ee however, agree with Premise (5). Their scepticism as dscloed in the fest Sauce le ss See ay a cee. eee ee eee The Serious Play of Plato's Buthydemus - 221 opposite, narnely objective knowlege ofthe comet or good ui of a oS aPetmabte, Ir oer words, Socrates assumes that the “practical” question, How ratid we tive ou fives and apply oF use obr possessions? cane answered From this assompton he concludes that such answers should be sought Ty neformulate: Hf Socrates’ premises arc. granted, then it follows that notege of how to use one's possessions would be the mast desirable posses rrmvmnh is needed in order to be happy (which everybody wishes t0 be) Terayunc therefore. ought to seck knowledge of the comect use of nega) tame I is, in ether words, “necessary to philosophize.” But Premise (5), 1 propose, is question-begzing, ee ding to Socrates, a item tke health s nether good nor ba, fri an tbe sad well or badly. A strong body can beat up innocent weak bodies ot built espa, Socrates asses that one of these aplication ofthe body i and ras tnown as correct. This assumption begs the crucial question, If comes) Sari a property belonging to neutral items, and if neta tems span the Brod vege thatthe sample Hist indicates, then Knowledge of cores use would be rereed for happiness. The conclusion is dus tiff the premise: If thers anthing av correct use, then knowledge of it should be sought.” But on he Pere mat should this assumption be granted? Its not self-evident: What if There is no such thing a corect use. if use is simply in he eyes of the Be, pges? What force would the protrepiic argument then have? Can the Hiving of weet liebe directed by knowledge? Perhaps so. This, however, is pocsely ‘Mhat the argument should show, and not assume. re a co signal distress. the conclusion is stated with a lum of differen terms: “episteme” (28162), “phronesis” (28166), “sophia” (28146), and "nos {GBTDT) reall sed to label that which should be sought, This terminologies {fox helps to raise decisive problem withthe conclosion of Socrates) 7B Trent lust what i tis knowledge, assuring it exists chat Kicinias is being Tited to seck? Throughout the discussion, most clearly in the eutuchial eis digression (279-808) typical techai such as ute playing, reading see ating. piloting a ship, being a general, and medicine ae cited as exary ates of knvedge. Furtbennor, its carpentry that prides the example of Pre et one in Promise (5) (281a). Is it atypical techn then, one wise subject coffer ie the good use of neural items, that Kleinia should seek? The mere fresence of 90 many “echnical” examples woold scm fo suggest fat Hi seer conclusion, however, is dificult (0 maintain. Exactly why ean be made ‘lear by futher examining Socrates’ use of the example of the carpenter. vA topical tecye has a determinate subject matter. The carpenters subject is the peauetion of frit fom wood (281a5), He knows, says Soerates, bow Pee tools and wood (2808-9), Socrates makes an analogy between the ca: frat and his tots and a man with money. The carpenter uses hi ols and Pete dowledgesbly (or “technically”) and is therefore benefited by them. Conespondingly, the man sith money should use his wealth knowledgesbly i224+ Interpretation ‘odes to be benefited and be made happy by it (2804). “In the working and use concerned with wood, is there anything other than the episteme of carpentry that effects the right use?” (281a2-4). The answer ig no. Analogously, says Socrates, itis episteme that should direct the postessor of the items om the sample fst, such 28 wealth, towards the corret and therefore beneficial use of bis possessions; towards. in other words, happiness. ‘There is a problem with this analogy which only becomes explicit in So- crates" second protreptic speech. There are Wo Senses of the word “use.” Fits the carpenter knows how to use his tools an! woe, With them he knows haw to build furniture. Bur he does nor know how to use the funiture. The eampenter knows how to buikd a chair; but to what end will the chair be put? Will it be used fo seat someone comfortably at a symposiunn, of will it be used as an insteument for torturing a politiel prisoner? I is this second sense of “use” that would be required for “using” the neutral items on the sample lst correctly and for the good. The first sense is technical and value neutral: the carpenter uses the tool correctly to produce the chair. The second sense is value laden the chair is used correctly and for the good in order to achieve happiness, The ‘carpenter, qua possessor of a techne, knows nothing ofthis. ‘This problem discloses the difficulty of identifying what type of knowledge itis that the target audience of the proteptic is being urged to seek. cannot be an ordinaty techne. But technai have been the sole supplicr of examples of knowledge. Then what is i? The second part of the protreptic explicily takes, ‘up this issu, w Socrates begins this ection be restating the conclusion ofthe first part ofthe protreptic: Human beings should seck wisdom, i.c., philosophize (2886-1) ‘But what knowledge should we seek {see 2899-10)? To elit an answer, he suggests as possibilities the ability to discover gold (or alchemy), in other words the ability 10 produce wealth (2886-8943); medicine the ability to prow ‘duce immorality (2891). None of these cpistemai, however, ean really bring happiness. for they do not understand how to use their results. (“Episteme” is Plato's word at 28808, 49, 289a1. ad, bI and b4. “Techne” returns at 269e4, As is often the case, the two ate synonymous.) An immortal life, even one supplied with indefinite wealth, can still he wretched. The type of knowledge that is needed is one in which the knowledge of how (o produce it combined with knowledge of how fo use what is produced (2894-7), in which the mak- ing is united withthe using techne (285¢2. See Republic 6DNe for more on the lsing techne.). Clearly. the sense of “use” here isnot technical and value neu tral, but value laden ‘Ordinary techni, exemplified next by instrument making. this test. 8: aE The Serious Play of Plato's Euthydemus * 223 crates then rather enthusiastically asks, “By the gods, what if we should learn the techne of making speeches (logopoiiken)? Is this what is required to make tus happy” (2896-9)? Klcinias answers no, and be offers as evidenee the fact tha this techne can easily suffer the same split as any othe: It is possible for speechmakers not to know bow to use the speeches they make (2894). Socrates indicates some disappointment atthe failure of the speechmaking {echae. On the one hand, he is surely being ironic, for “speech making” imme: diately connotes the werk of men like the very sophists with whom he is argu ing (see 304-6. I think, for example, of Lysias, See Phaedrus 257e. Also, the close ofthe Eurhydemus, 304d-306b, returns to this issue.) On the oer hand, his disappointment hints a something more positive: “Logos” is surely part of the right ansiver tothe question, What knowledge should be sought? for what i required is a logos of how to use all objects of desire. What is required is sophia, understood not as an ordinary techne, but as a comprehensive account fof what is good in the human sphere. (Sclezak believes that what is being referred to here isthe scientific rhetoric ofthe Phaedrus (p. 86.) However, as ‘we shall now see, identifying the sort of knowledge that can provide such an account is intrinsically problematic Socrates offers the “general's techne” (29061; mentioned eater at 279e) as bis next proposal, He does so apparently because the general, who knows how to command. other human beings, knows how to orgenize, and in this sense use, the various technicians under his sway. Kleinias, however, immediately ‘counters with an objection: The general's techne, he says, isa kind of hunting (29005). Therefore, just asthe hunter of game bands over his catch to a cook, 0 the general hunts and acquies cities and "then hands them over tothe politi= cal men, for [the generals] themselves do not know how to use that which they Jnunt” (29042~3), In fact, Kleinias gives a quite detailed description ofthis type ‘of knowledge: [No part of hunting iat covers moce than chasing and overcoming. And when the fumes overcomes athe is chasing he isnot abe to use i. Inead, ters and Fishermen hand over thse exch o cooks, Analogously, geometers and astronomers tnd mathematicians —for these algo are huoters since none of them make their ‘lags, they discover what is—rince they themselves do ot know how fo use these things, but only how to catch them, they hand them overt those men ‘sceomplished in ialetic 2 that they can use what these hunters have dscov- tred—at fat they can use however many of thei discoveries that are wot entirely senseless (25007-£6), ‘This is an impressive litte speech, for it succinctly presents an entre con- ception of techoe. As if (0 signal its remarkable character, Plato places speech in an extrioclinary dramatic context: He has Krito intemupt the narra tion and ask whether young Kleinias was actually its author (290el). This is a {good question; How did mere boy learn about dialectic? Socrates responds by224 Interpretation Productive Nonliving (Honing) (Mathematics) Dialectic Cooks Political Men saying that he does aot remember who the author was: pethaps it was the older Ktessipus. The situation is then made even more miysterious when he adds, "Good Krito, perhaps one of the higher beings was present and uttered these 12s" (2913-4). Such mystery is. 1 believe, unparalled in the dialogues, What isthe point of such dramatic tension? I suggest itis to highlight the fecundity of this succinct epistemological proposel, which the accompanying diagram schematizes. ‘Although somewhat awkward, this diagram schematizes an important epis- temological conception which finds parallels in several other dialogues. (or parallels, see Charmides 165c~-1660. Gorgias 450b-d, Philebus 554-583, Sophist 28te~294, Stazesman 2586-260. The diagram is awkward because some branches give genus and species and others do oot.) First, it represents the fact that tere are two basic Forms of techne, the productive and the acqusi- ive. The former are the most ordinary ofall forms of knowledge, 8. earpen- tay, pottery, medicine, et. the latter is itself divided into two parts, the second ‘of which, I propose, is metaphorical: the acquisition of nonliving beings repre- sents what Aristotle cals “theoretical knowledge.” (That this sso is made clear in the Sophist, 291e1~7. See Rosen, pp. 91-92.) This type of knowledge does ‘not produce its object, which it only studies and does not alter or bring into being. Aristotle's examples are mathematics, physics, and frst philosophy: for Plato the single best example is mathematics (see Aristotle's Metaphysics 102628-22), ‘A mathematical techne, such as geometry, “hands over” its “catch” (0 the ialetician. Dialectic inthis passage refers to some form of meta-mathematical The Serious Play of Plato's Euthydemus + 225 reflection, e.g, the study of “number itself.” Iti not possible, given the single ‘what Plato here had in mind. It ean only be Stated that the passage posts the existence of some theoretical disciping that is higher than ordinary mathematics. (Of course, Republic VI discusses dialectic in these terms and at length. For an interesting discussion of this issue see Klein, pp. 21-49.) : ‘Analogous tothe handing over of theoretical entities tothe ialectician isthe hunter of men, ie.. the general, who hands over his acquisitions to the pos sessor of the political techne, who presumably knows how to use them. AS such, the politial techne seems to he “the one we were secking and the eause of correct acting in the city. And just (aiechnds) as Aeschylus says, it alone ‘would sit atthe helm of the city, Steering everything and commanding every- thing and making everything useful” (291c10-3). Atechnos again appears at 291d!. See n. 3. ‘This knowledge, the putative goal towards which the pro- lweptic urges. Is then named “the kingly (basilike) techne” (29147). On the “kingly art” see Statesman 30Se {f_ and Xenophon's Memorabilia WV.2.2 ff). ‘The serious work of protreptic now seams over, for the knowledge that Socrates has been exhorting Klefias to seck appears to have been idemtlied. Unfortunately, this hopeful appearance is soon shattered. When he and his mysterious interlocutor reconsidered the basilike techne, Socrates tels Krito, we were totally ridiculous, just like children cunning after binds” (291bI-2), Why? Because the attempt to identity the structure and specific object of this type of knowledge leads fo an aporia, First itis agreed thatthe basilike and the politike techne are the seme and that to it “the general's techne and all the rest hand over their results of which they ate the producers for it to rufe on the grounds that it alone knows how to (291¢7-9). But a question then arises: What result (ergon) does the lechne itself produce (29161)? The assumption here is that it has determinate and therefore identifiable result ic, that it is analogous to an fordinary techne. But the assumption is faulty. A spokesman for medicine (2915) or farming (291e8) for example, can identify that which results from his knowledge (health or food from the earth). Ifthe basilike techne is tuly analogous, then its spokesman should be able 10 do the same, But this Krito at Teast cannot do (29286). Because they agreed that the dasiltke techne is beneficial, Socrates next asks, “Isn't i necessary that it supply us with some good?” (292at I). Since the first protreptic argument established that “nothing else is good except know! edge” (292b1-2), all the results that one would typically point to when consid ering the politike techne, such as wealth for the citizens, freedom, and the absence of factionaism, are “neither good nor bad.” Only if it can make the citizens wise (ar good or happy) can ths techne be considered truly benef (292b4~c1). Once again, however, this description of the basilike techne fa to satisty. for as Socrates next asks, In what specific sense