Global Food Security 4 (2015) 24–29

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Global Food Security

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/gfs

Food safety in developing countries: Moving beyond exports

Laurian Unnevehr n
Agricultural and Consumer Economics, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, United States

art ic l e i nf o a b s t r a c t

Article history: Food safety is linked to food security through health and livelihoods, and improving food safety is
Received 14 September 2014 necessary to address food security. An international consensus has emerged that the best way to address
Received in revised form food safety is through a risk-based, farm-to-table approach that focuses on cost-effective prevention.
1 December 2014
In developing countries, this approach has been implemented in supply chains for high-value markets,
Accepted 8 December 2014
particularly exports. Evidence shows that improvements are possible where market incentives exist, and
where market institutions can ensure that risk reduction practices are followed. To address food safety
Keywords: for food insecure consumers in developing countries, public efforts should focus on the most important
Food safety risks and cost-effective controls, provide support for capacity building and supply chain coordination,
Supply chain
and improve incentives for food safety management.
Risk analysis
& 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Market development

1. Introduction
Food safety is recognized as an integral part of food security.
As stated in the 1996 World Food Summit declaration, “Food
security exists when all people, at all times, have physical, social
and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet
their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy
life” (UN/FAO, 1996). Food safety is recognized as part of the
enabling environment for reducing hunger and malnutrition in the
2014 Framework for Action adopted at the Second International
Conference on Nutrition (WHO/FAO, 2014).
The inclusion of food safety as one supporting element in
addressing food security and nutrition results from the complex
relationship between food and health. Unsafe food causes both
acute and chronic illness, and reduces the bioavailability of
nutrients, particularly for vulnerable consumers (Chan, 2014).
The presence of food hazards can also lead to food losses and
reduced food availability for food insecure populations. In addi-
tion, food safety also increasingly plays a role in producer liveli-
hoods, as smallholders seek to meet requirements in high value
markets. In recognition of food safety's importance to sustainable
development, WHO has dedicated the 2015 Global Health Day to
food safety (Chan, 2014).
Given the recognized importance of improved food safety for food
security, it is relevant to understand how it can be addressed for food
insecure populations. The last two decades have seen remarkable
progress in the application of science and management to this issue,
n
Correspondence address: 680 Deer Park Ct, Grand Junction, CO 81507, United
States. Tel.: þ 1 217 390 7887.
E-mail address: lunnevehr.professional@gmail.com
but these achievements have yet to be fully realized for domestic
food supplies in developing countries. This article reviews what is
known about best practices for addressing food safety in order to see
how they may be utilized to address food safety for food insecure
populations.
1.1. Food safety has received growing international attention during
the past two decades
Food safety has received increased international attention in
public regulation, private supply chain coordination, and interna-
tional trade for the past two decades. The emergence of new
and more stringent food safety standards in most industrialized
countries is the result of several factors, including the growth in
trade of perishable and high value products; advances in hazard
detection and epidemiology; high profile health scares; scientific
and regulatory consensus on best approaches to risk management;
and the recognition of global standards and approaches under the
WTO. More stringent regulatory standards have emerged in high
income countries alongside more rigorous private requirements
for food suppliers to high income retail markets. Growth in high
value exports from developing countries has been accompanied by
increased attention to food safety standards in high income
markets (Maertens et al., 2009).
At the same time, food safety has received increased attention
as an important public health issue in developing countries. Food
safety risks contribute to the burden of illness in developing
countries. For example, foodborne pathogens are an important
cause of diarrheal disease, which is estimated to cause 2.2 million
deaths every year (WHO, 2014). While the understanding of
foodborne risk exposure and incidence of illness is still limited,
various studies suggest that microbial hazards are important in

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.gfs.2014.12.001
2211-9124/& 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
 L. Unnevehr / Global Food Security 4 (2015) 24–29
a wide range of foods, eg. kale in Kenya (Kuto et al., 2012) and milk
in East Africa (Grace et al., 2008a). Another important food hazard
is mycotoxins, the naturally occurring toxins associated with fungi
on many important food staples. For example, aflatoxin exposure
through food consumption, which is more prevalent in many
tropical countries, is associated with liver cancer, immune sup-
pression and higher rates of illness, as well as child stunting
(Unnevehr and Grace, 2013). WHO is engaged in a multi-year
process to estimate the global burden of illness from foodborne
disease, with results expected in 2015 (Chan, 2014).
The remainder of this article explores how to address food
safety in developing country food supply chains through three
perspectives. First, the internationally accepted frameworks that
inform food safety policy design are reviewed, as these provide the
foundation for any actions in developing countries. Second, the
evidence regarding developing country food safety management
for high value markets is reviewed for the lessons it provides
regarding expansion of food safety improvements. Third, the
prospects for food safety improvement that addresses domestic
public health in developing countries are considered. Concluding
comments consider research needs.
2. Food safety policy design
Unsafe food contains hazards that can make people sick, either
immediately or by increasing the likelihood of chronic disease.
Some hazards that have been addressed by public policies include:
microbial pathogens; zoonotic diseases; parasites; adulterants;
mycotoxins; antibiotic drug residues; pesticide residues; and
heavy metals. Each of these potential hazards has different
sources, poses different kinds health risks, and carries different
challenges for identification and control. Yet there are common
paradigms used to design policy interventions and management
systems.
2.1. An economic perspective can inform food safety policy design
The economic perspective on food safety provides an important
foundation for policy design. The justification for government
intervention to address food safety is the market failure arising
from imperfect information. For most food safety hazards, con-
sumers have no information about their presence in specific food
products, and thus cannot reward producers for supplying safer
food. For naturally occurring hazards, producers may also have
little idea of what hazards are in their products, and thus may not
be able to respond to demand for improved safety. This informa-
tion problem leads to a market failure in the provision of food
safety. In the absence of effective market incentives for the
provision of safe food, public intervention may be warranted to
protect public health. Such intervention may take the form of
minimum safety standards enforced through monitoring and
penalties for non-compliance.
Market failure alone does not justify public intervention, as
these must also pass a cost-benefit test. The economic benefits of
improved food safety are reduction in lost productivity and life
from foodborne illness. For example, recent estimates suggest that
foodborne illness results in between $14 and $152 billion in lost
productivity and life in the U.S. (Hoffmann and Anekwe, 2013).
These can be compared to the industry costs of meeting food
safety regulatory requirements. For example, Crutchfield et al.
(1997) showed that U.S. industry costs of controlling microbial
pathogens in meat were much smaller than the value of improved
human health resulting from these mandated controls. Thus,
public intervention to improve food safety can result in net
economic benefits.
25
Control measures may also have consequences that vary by
firm size, and which policy makers must consider. Such variance
occurs because the fixed costs of establishing food safety manage-
ment can be substantial (Unnevehr and Jensen, 2005). Fixed costs
may include the costs of setting up a management or quality
control system, training staff in new procedures, and investments
in new equipment for reducing risks or monitoring outcomes.
A high initial fixed investment can be a heavier burden on small
firms or farms, as they will have higher per-unit costs of adoption
than larger firms or farms. Thus, smaller producers or processors
may find costs prohibitive, and may be at a disadvantage relative
to larger producers. Thus, the introduction of food safety controls
may influence market structure (ie., the market share of different
size firms).
Enforcing standards may not be feasible without improvements
in identifying food safety hazards and providing incentives for
improved management (or penalties for lack of compliance)
(Hennessy et al., 2001). Given the nature of many hazards, which
may originate at the farm level or first handler, and may multiply
or spread as products are mingled and moved downstream
towards the consumer, improved supply chain coordination is also
frequently required. That is, it will be necessary for buyers or
regulators to verify that risk reduction practices are followed
throughout the supply chain. Such verification may require new
market institutions such as cost-sharing between buyers and
producers, third-party auditing and certification, and improved
testing for hazards and diversion of hazardous products to lower
risk uses. These kinds of market changes support a risk-based,
farm to table approach, which is discussed next.
2.2. There is international consensus that food safety risks are best
approached through a risk analysis framework
Although food safety regulation in high income countries
dates back to the early twentieth century, reforms since the
1990s reflect better scientific understanding of foodborne risks
and approaches to risk management. In the 1980s and early 1990s,
the U.S. National Academies issued a series of reports outlining a
risk-based approach to food safety management and regulation,
beginning with one on meat inspection in 1985 (National Research
Council, 1985). Advances in foodborne illness epidemiology along
with a better understanding of risk assessment informed this new
approach.
Although the approach is now well-known, it is useful to give
a brief review here. Risk analysis includes risk assessment, risk
management and risk communication (FAO/WHO, 2006). Risk
assessment includes hazard identification and exposure character-
ization which results in a quantitative estimate of the adverse
effects that are likely to occur in a given population. Comparative
risk assessment identifies the most important risks, so as to better
focus policy efforts. Risk assessment provides the basis for risk
management, which involves making decisions about where to
reduce risks. Identification of where and how risks are likely to
occur shows what kind of intervention might reduce risk most
effectively. Risk management also involves making decisions about
acceptable levels of risk, which will depend on social norms,
public perceptions, and economic costs. The final step is risk
communication, which involves public education regarding what
is known about hazards and their risks, uncertainties, and the
rationale for interventions to reduce risk.
This general risk analysis approach as applied to food safety has
evolved to address the unique aspects of food hazards. In parti-
cular, food safety policy has embraced the need for a farm to table
preventative approach, often characterized as application of the
Hazard Analysis Critical Control Points framework to evaluating
and controlling risks. The HACCP system was first developed by
26 L. Unnevehr / Global Food Security 4 (2015) 24–29
the food processing industry in the 1960s. The approach has been
adapted for more general application and widely adopted as a
regulatory tool (Unnevehr and Jensen, 1999). It implies a focus is
on determining where risks enter the food supply chain, where
they are likely to reach unacceptable levels, and what specific
control measures will prevent risk. Focusing on “critical control
points” provides a scientific basis for food safety management, and
improves economic efficiency by focusing control efforts where
they will be most effective.
2.3. The risk analysis paradigm has had a profound impact on
regulation and global governance of food trade
The risk analysis paradigm was reflected in the 1990s reform of
U.S. meat and seafood regulation. Similar regulatory developments
took place in other high income countries, with major reforms of
food safety regulation in Australia, France, and the United King-
dom, among others (Hoffmann and Harder, 2010). In most coun-
tries, the adoption of a risk analysis approach was accompanied by
institutional reform to consolidate authority for food safety in one
agency, so as to better focus efforts towards public health. In the
European Union, the new approach includes traceability as an
important aspect of risk management, so as to better identify and
address the sources of risk in the supply chain. The most recent
regulatory developments in the U.S. under the 2010 Food Safety
Modernization Act also emphasize increased traceability and
responsibility throughout the supply chain from farm to table.
The risk analysis paradigm has also informed the global
governance of international agricultural trade (Josling et al.,
2004). The 1995 SPS agreement (Agreement on the Application
of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures) under World Trade
Organization (WTO) utilizes a risk assessment framework to
establish rules for trade that allow countries to manage risk with
minimal disruption or barriers to trade. These include the provi-
sions that countries can chose their own acceptable levels of risk,
but they must justify food safety standards through risk assess-
ment. The risk assessment framework also provides a conceptual
foundation for determining equivalence of food safety standards
among countries, to enable mutual recognition. The SPS agree-
ment recognizes the Codex Alimentarius as the global standard
setting agency, where standards are developed through an inter-
national consensus process, in order to foster greater harmoniza-
tion of standards among countries. All of these elements of the SPS
agreement have contributed to greater transparency and reduced
barriers to trade.
As the international consensus on this approach to food safety
emerged, the risk-based approach to food safety regulation was
codified under the Codex Alimentarius (WHO/FAO, 2007) as the
best practice for food safety regulation. As Hoffmann and Harder
(2010, p. 6–7) state: “at the heart of this new generation of food
safety reform is a growing international consensus on the need for
risk-based, scientifically supported policies that prevent food
contamination and foodborne illness through integrated risk
management from farm-to-table.”
2.4. Private standards are of growing importance to food safety
management and are based on the same risk paradigm
Alongside the renewed regulatory efforts to address food
safety, consumer awareness of food hazards and demand for safer
products led to growth in private standards in food markets.
Several factors have led to the increased importance of private
standards for food safety during the past decade. Henson (2008),
Henson and Humphrey (2010), and Fulponi (2006) discuss how
private standards emerged from European retail chains as a
response to concerns from consumers and civil society, and to
address a perceived vacuum in public regulation following high
profile food safety incidents, (eg., “mad cow” disease). Market
power exercised by multinational retailers allowed them to use
such standards to establish brand identity and reputation, and to
make the standards de facto mandatory requirements for market
access.
These private standards are also based on a farm to table
preventative approach. As such, they increase the need for supply
chain coordination in markets where such standards are a require-
ment for access. As part of the development of private standards,
the articulation of “Good Agricultural Practices” or GAPs has
evolved to address practices that include pesticide application
and the control of microbial pathogens at the farm level. Other
standards have evolved to address food processing, all based on
the HACCP paradigm. In high income countries, several studies
have examined the increased vertical coordination as well as how
third party certification supports compliance (eg., Hobbs et al.,
2001; Henson and Hooker, 2001).
Several observers have noted the shift in “governance” of the
supply chain from public to private with the growth in use of
private standards. Benchmarking organizations have emerged to
harmonize private standards, such as the GlobalGAP and the
Global Food Safey Initiative (GFSI). Henson (2008) notes that the
proliferation of private standards initially increased transactions
costs, leading to efforts to harmonize private standards, eg.
GlobalGAP. Henson et al. (2005, p. 376) explain: “GlobalGAP is a
collective private standard for the implementation of generally
agreed principle of GAP [Good Agricultural Practices] in primary
production, initially in fruit and vegetables and now in a wide
range of plant and animal products.” As a result, there are now
substantial private incentives for food safety management in
markets where products are branded, certified, and production is
vertically coordinated.
These global developments in private markets and in regulation
provide a strong foundation for food safety improvement. Next,
this article considers whether these new approaches are feasible
for developing countries.
3. Food safety compliance for high value markets provides
lessons for future efforts in developing countries
As new food safety regulations were implemented in the 1990s
in high income countries, concerns emerged about the impact of
these standards on developing country exporters. In concert with
new regulations, the growth areas for high value exports were in
perishable products that posed more challenges for food safety
management (Unnevehr, 2000). In developing countries, efforts to
improve food safety have been focused on market access require-
ments associated with high value products, particularly exports.
Most policy concerns as well as the economics literature have
addressed these market access issues for exports to high income
countries.
The experiences in these markets illustrate how improved food
safety can be achieved, and how this supports improved liveli-
hoods. Compliance with food safety standards in high-income
countries demonstrates the costs and feasibility of such improve-
ments in developing countries. It also demonstrates how and
whether such compliance leads to higher incomes for developing
country smallholders, and thus supports improved food security
such farm households.1
1
The discussion in this section draws on a recent review of studies of food
safety compliance (Unnevehr and Ronchi, 2014).
 L. Unnevehr / Global Food Security 4 (2015) 24–29
3.1. The economic literature provides evidence that improved food
safety is feasible in developing countries, and can result in improved
incomes for smallholders
It is clear that higher public standards have posed challenges
for developing countries. Studies of trade flows consistently find
that when importing countries have higher standards than expor-
ters, it tends to reduce traded quantities, and also diverts trade to
other import markets with lower standards (eg., Ferro et al., 2013;
Wilson, 2007; Beghin and Orden, 2012). Higher standards imposed
by importers had serious economic consequences for some
developing country industries. Examples include the EU bans on
imports of fishery products from Bangadesh in 1997; from Kenya
in 1997–2000; from Malaysia in 1998; and the U.S. ban on
raspberry imports from Guatemala in 1997–1998. These bans
resulted in substantial losses for the industries involved (Cato
and Subasinge, 2003; Henson and Mitullah, 2004; Calvin et al.,
2002). New U.S. seafood regulations in the 1990s imposed sig-
nificant costs on exporting firms and limited market participation
in two major exporting countries, the Philippines (Ragasa et al.,
2011) and Brazil (Donovan et al., 2001).
Given the growing importance of private standards, far more
studies have considered their impact on developing country
producers. As private markets tend to reward compliance, findings
are more positive regarding income impacts. Compliance with
private food safety standards is found to lead to higher export
sales or prices, revenues, and incomes in 10 studies of high value
horticultural exports in at least 10 different countries in a review
by Unnevehr and Ronchi (2014). In many cases there are other
benefits, such as adoption of improved technology with spillover
benefits for staple crops (Minten et al., 2009), higher or more
stable labor income (Maertens and Swinnen, 2009; Minten et al.,
2009), or improved health through reduced on-farm exposure to
pesticides (Kersting and Wollni, 2012; Asfaw et al., 2009; Okello
and Swinton, 2009).
Whether smallholders can participate in high-value markets is
a persistent policy question that extends beyond compliance
issues for food safety standards (eg. Barrett et al., 2012; Reardon
et al., 2009). In terms of food safety standards, a number of studies
have examined directly whether smallholders were excluded. In
Peru, stringent standards in export supply chains led to greater
vertical integration and exclusion of smallholders over the long
run of 19 years (Shuster and Maertens, 2013), although the authors
note that this might not be expected in other country contexts.
Restrictions due to export quotas in Madagascar limited the
benefits of certification to farmers with size and location advan-
tages (Subervie and Vagneron, 2013). In contrast, studies in
Zimbabwe, Chile, Thailand, and India found that smallholders
were able to successfully adapt, scale effects were modest, and
transactions costs in supply chains declined over time (Henson et
al., 2005; Handschuch et al., 2013; Kersting and Wollni, 2012; Roy
and Thorat, 2008). In Senegal, a shift to estate production excluded
smallholders, but these households then benefited from wage
labor opportunities that led to higher incomes (Maertens and
Swinnen, 2009). Low income workers in exporting firms also
benefited in Senegal from higher wages and longer employment
periods (Colen et al., 2012). Taken together, these results show that
livelihood impacts of food safety compliance tend to be positive.
3.2. There are different models for achieving improved supply chain
coordination to facilitate food safety management
The literature also provides evidence regarding what kind of
market changes are necessary to facilitate improved food safety.
Large numbers of smallholders increase transactions costs of
monitoring and certifying compliance for buyers. Various market
27
institutions to overcome these costs have evolved, including
highly monitored, controlled contract production; buyer subsidies
for input or certification costs; use of farmer groups to enforce
compliance, or public–private partnerships to support initial costs
of training. Intensive farmer monitoring, training, and pre-planting
contracts with inputs provided on credit were all found to
facilitate compliance in Zimbabwe (Henson et al., 2005), Kenya
(Okello and Swinton, 2007), Peru (Lemeilleur 2013) and for the
smallholders still operating in Senegal (Maertens and Swinnen,
2009). In Kenya and India, farmer groups play an important role in
facilitating compliance, through extension efforts and group mon-
itoring (Roy and Thorat, 2008; Okello and Swinton, 2007). Cost-
sharing by exporters or public agencies facilitates farmer compli-
ance in several countries (Kersting and Wollni, 2012; Handschuch
et al., 2013; Leimeilleur, 2013; Subervie and Vagneron, 2013;
Henson et al., 2011). For example, in Thailand exporters and
donors pay for over 90% of all costs of GlobalGAP certification
(Kersting and Wollni, 2012).
3.3. Market experiences in meeting food safety standards provide
three useful lessons
The literature regarding developing country compliance with
high-income country food standards provides three useful lessons.
First, costs of compliance are significant, as would be expected.
This means that improvements in food safety will not occur
without significant market incentives (or significant capacity to
enforce penalties). Second, compliance requires coordination
along the supply chain, to ensure that risk-reducing practices are
followed. In some cases, new market institutions (eg., farmer
groups) have evolved to facilitate coordination. Such institutions
may also serve other purposes, such as smallholder inclusion or
improved technology diffusion, which may motivate their crea-
tion, aside from food safety demands. Third, there are now many
cases of successful compliance with food safety standards in
different countries and contexts, including cases where small-
holders or poor households participated and benefited. Such
experiences provide a foundation for addressing food safety to
benefit domestic consumers.
4. Improving food safety to address public health in
developing countries faces significant challenges
It is clear that the most important linkage between food safety
and food security will be through the reduction of hazards and
foodborne illness. While the livelihood impacts from high value
markets are positive, ultimately these will only accrue to a
relatively small number of households. And, the public health
spillovers for the domestic food supply can be expected to be
limited (eg., Donovan et al., 2001), at least in the short run.
Meeting high-income country pesticide standards has been found
to have a positive impact on farmer heath (Okello and Swinton,
2009), but food safety improvements in high-value markets
cannot be relied upon to address the most pressing food safety
concerns for domestic consumers.
In many developing countries, there is a perceived need to
adopt Codex Alimentarius standards as an important step towards
full participation in the global economic community. Adoption of
such standards has the advantage of precluding “dumping” of sub-
standard products into the local market. However, while develop-
ing country participation in Codex standard setting has improved
(Clarke and Fattori, 2013), it is still the case that Codex standards
may not reflect local risk conditions or risk management capabil-
ities in many poor countries. In other words, they may not pass a
cost-benefit analysis. Furthermore, adoption of such standards can
28 L. Unnevehr / Global Food Security 4 (2015) 24–29
be counter-productive if enforcement is infeasible (Grace and
Unnevehr, 2013). Most developing countries cannot move imme-
diately to the same standards and outcomes as high-income
countries, due to limited public capacity, as well as limited
effective consumer demand.
The question is how can developing country food systems
evolve more quickly and more efficiently towards improved food
safety? In other words, how can the process of market moderniza-
tion, which includes improved food safety management, be
supported and encouraged? This article suggests three take-away
from the above review of the literature. These are necessarily
speculative, and thus also imply areas for future research.
First, there is a need to develop public capacity for risk
prioritization to inform any public interventions. Risk assessment
can be resource intensive, but application of risk assessment
principles can help to focus public attention on the key issues
and objective evaluation of risk management options (Cahill and
Jouve, 2004). Building capacity, which is currently supported by
the FAO, can assist countries to better utilize their own existing
resources or to adapt assessments from other countries (Cahill and
Jouve, 2004). Methods to adapt the risk assessment approach to
informal markets have also been explored, through the use of
participatory risk assessment (Grace et al., 2008b), as another way
to identify the most important hazards. Furthermore, for some of
the most pervasive hazards, simple guidelines exist (eg., see WHO
guidance for street foods: WHO, 2010). Identifying how to improve
food safety does not always require a sophisticated risk
assessment.
The second take-away is that effective market rewards (or
penalties) will be important for improved food safety. This is
especially true where public capacity for enforcement is limited.
The emergence of market rewards will depend on both consumer
knowledge as well as ability to pay. There is also the potential for
fraud where private certification systems arise that are not
effective. But consumer demand for food safety is growing with
urbanization, rising incomes, and greater awareness spilling over
from high-income countries (eg., Ortega et al., 2012; Lagerkvist
et al., 2013). As markets develop, there is a public role in risk
communication so that consumers understand which risks are
important and which risk avoidance behaviors are effective.
The third take-away is to foster partnerships with the private
sector to support supply chain coordination. The above examples
from high value markets show what is feasible, and also reveal
that a strong public role has been important in many cases (see
Narrod et al., 2009 for examples in Kenya and India). Public–
private partnerships may offer the opportunity to achieve greater
efficiency in moving to higher standards through adoption of
approaches that are acceptable to the private sector and viable
in practice (Martinez et al., 2007). Such partnerships also have the
potential to address weak enforcement capacity in developing
countries, through leveraging industry incentives.
Examples of such partnerships are emerging in pilot projects, such
as those addressing aflatoxin risks in markets for commercial feed in
Africa (IITA, 2013), where the public sector is supporting an initial
price premium to encourage adoption of an aflatoxin-control technol-
ogy. The private sector is also involved in adapting standards to local
market conditions and training producers, through entry-level stan-
dards such as GlobalGAP's Localg.a.p. program for producers selling
into local markets, and the GFSI's Global Markets Program for small
processors (GlobalGAP, 2014; GFSI, 2014). These initiatives can provide
a defined path for progress towards improved food safety manage-
ment, and where appropriate, could be recognized or supported by
the public sector. The economics literature to date has focused
primarily on export markets, but much more could be done to
evaluate the potential of these efforts in domestic markets in order
to identify best practices.
5. Concluding comments
Successful food safety improvements will strengthen food
security through improving the health and nutrient uptake of
food insecure populations, as well as supporting improved pro-
ductivity and livelihoods. Developing countries should be able to
utilize the international framework for designing food safety
policy. And, in doing so, they can build on successful experiences
in meeting high-income country standards. The risk analysis
paradigm provides a framework for identifying priorities and
focusing public policy efforts. But this paradigm must also be
combined with a realistic market-based approach. The elements
for success include effective consumer demand, mechanisms to
identify and reward quality, and supply chain coordination. Public
support needs to be targeted to supporting these elements and
encouraging market development in partnership with the private
sector.
While these international developments provide encourage-
ment regarding the feasibility of addressing food safety, there
are still very few examples of viable models for addressing per-
vasive risks where costs of compliance are high and enforcement
capacity is weak. Thus, critical research needs remain in two broad
areas. First, risk analysis is needed at the regional or country level
in order to fully understand risk exposure, and to determine the
most important public health targets for policy intervention.
Second, research is needed to find the best models for intervention
that can leverage market incentives. Refocusing research on these
needs, rather than on export supply chains, can support improved
food safety, and ultimately improved food security.
Acknowledgments
Portions of this work were supported by the International Food
Policy Research Institute, Washington DC.
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