Professional Documents
Culture Documents
01 - Safety Concepts & Accidents in Plants (24.02.2018)
01 - Safety Concepts & Accidents in Plants (24.02.2018)
Safety
ECH5504
Lessons from Major Accidents & Their Application
in Traditional Workplace Safety & Health
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Why Safety?
• Why is safety
important?
• Why bother with it?
• Isn’t it just another
government or
company program?
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A Good Health & Safety
Program Can Reduce Injuries...
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More About The Injuries
4,365,200 injuries resulted in:
– lost work time
– medical treatment (other than 1st aid)
– loss of awareness
– restriction of work or motion or
– transfer to another job
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More About The Injuries
More than 2.2 million injuries were serious
enough to require recuperation away from work
or to restrict duties at work or both
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More About The Injuries
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Overview
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The Rising Case for Change
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The Rising Case for Change
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The Rising Case for Change
HAZARD:
Flammable
Hydrocarbon Vapors
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The Rising Case for Change
• 1989 – Pasadena, TX – Explosion
and Fire
– 23 fatalities, 130 injured; damage $800M+
HAZARD:
Flammable
Ethylene/isobutane
Vapors In A 10” Line
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What Can Go Wrong? Where Do We Start?
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The Process for Managing Risk
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Hazard Scenario
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Hazard Scenario – Osaka Milk Factory
(June, 2000)
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Hazard Scenario (Accident Scenario)
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Four Layers in The “Safety Hierarchy”
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Protection Layers
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What is the Basis or Goal for
Engineering Design?
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Why Should We Study Past Accidents in
Technological Systems?
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Relative Risks of Fatal Accidents in The
Work Place of Selected Occupations
Fishers (as an occupation) 35.1
Timber cutters (as an occupation) 29.7
Airplane pilots (as an occupation) 14.9
Garbage collectors 12.9
Roofers 8.4
Taxi drivers 8.2
Farm occupations 6.5
Protective services (fire fighters, police guards, etc.) 2.7
“Average job” 1.0
Grocery store employees 0.91
Chemical and allied products 0.81
Finance, insurance and real estate 0.23
Sanders, R.E, J. Hazardous Materials 115 (2004) p143, citing Toscano (1997)
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Incident Pyramid:
1
Serious/Disabling/Fatalities
600
Near Misses
10,000
Unsafe Behaviors/
Conditions
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Terminology
• Process Hazard
– A physical situation with potential to cause
harm to people, property or the environment
• Risk (Acute)
– probability x consequences of an undesired
event occurring
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They Thought They Were Safe
• “Good” companies can be
comforted into a false
sense of security by their
performance in personal
safety and health
• They may not realize how
weak they are to a major
accident until it happens
• Subsequent investigations
typically show that there
were multiple causes, and
many of these were known BP Deepwater Horizon
long before the event
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Why & How Defenses Fail
• People often assume systems work as
intended, even with warning signs
• Examples of good performance are cited as
representing the whole, while poor ones
are overlooked or soon forgotten
• Analysis of failure modes and effects
should include human and organizational
aspects as well as equipment, physical
and IT systems
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Process Safety Management (PSM)
• Recognition of seriousness of
consequences and mechanisms of
causation lead to focus on the process
rather than the individual worker
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Functions of A Management System
Planning
Measurement Direction Organizing
Structure
Leadership
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Consider Targets in Groups
• Those who:
– Don’t care
– Don’t know (and perhaps don’t know that they
don’t know)
– Did know, but may have forgotten or could
have gaps in application (and perhaps don’t
realize it)
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Excellent guidance
exists – but how is it
being used?
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Accountability
• Management commitment at all levels
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Management of Change
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Process & Equipment Integrity
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Realization of significance of sociocultural
factors in human thought processes and
hence in behaviours
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Human Behaviour Aspects Familiarity to
engineers
• People, and most organizations, don’t More
intend to get hurt (have accidents)
• To understand why they do leads us
eventually into understanding human
behaviour, both at the individual and
organizational level, and involves:
– Physical interface
• Ergonomics
– Psychological interface
• Perception, decision-making, control actions
– Human thought processes
• Basis for reaching decisions
• Ideal versus actual behaviour
– Social psychology
• Relationships with others
• Organizational behaviour
Less
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Human Behaviour Modes
• Instead of looking at the ways in which people can fail, look at how they
function normally:
• Skill-based
– Rapid responses to internal states with only occasional attention to
external info to check that events are going according to plan
– Often starts out as rule-based
• Rule-based
– IF…, THEN…
– Rules need not make sense – they only need to work, and one has
to know the conditions under which a particular rule applies
• Knowledge-based
– Used when no rules apply but some appropriate action must be
found
– Slowest, but most flexible
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The ‘Swiss cheese’ model of
organisational accidents 2
• Active
– Immediately adverse effect
– Similar to “unsafe act”
– Active failures encompass the unsafe acts that can be directly
linked to an accident, such as (in the case of aircraft accidents) a
navigation error
• Latent
– Effect may not be noticeable for some time, if at all
– Latent failures include contributing factors that may lie inactive
for days, weeks, or months until they contribute to the accident
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A Classic Example of A Latent
Failure
• Hazard of material
known, but lack of
awareness of potential
system failure mode
leads to defective
procedure design
through management
decision
Epichlorhydrin fire,
Avonmouth, UK
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Another
Standard
of Safety
Time
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But The Rate Of Improvement Is Not Steady
Standard
of Safety
x 10
Time
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In Fact, The Curve Can Be One Of Periodic Rapid Gains
Followed By Gradual But Increasing Declines
x 100
Time
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Safety Engineering -
Some Terms to Know
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Hazard Identification
1. Check Lists
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Hazard Identification
2. Relative Ranking
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Hazard Identification
2. Relative Ranking: Dow Index
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Hazard Identification
2. Relative Ranking: Dow Index
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Hazard Identification
2. Relative Ranking: Dow Index
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Hazard Identification
2. Relative Ranking: Dow Index
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Hazard Identification
2. Relative Ranking: Dow Index
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Hazard Identification
3. Hazard & Operability: HAZOP
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Hazard Identification
3. Hazard & Operability: HAZOP
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Hazard Identification
3. Hazard & Operability: HAZOP
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Hazard Identification
3. Hazard & Operability: HAZOP
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Hazard Identification
3. Hazard & Operability: HAZOP
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Hazard Identification
3. Hazard & Operability: HAZOP
Class Example: Fired Heater
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Hazard Identification
3. Hazard & Operability: HAZOP
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Hazard Identification
3. Hazard & Operability: HAZOP
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Hazard Identification
3. Hazard & Operability: HAZOP
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Hazard Identification
3. Hazard & Operability: HAZOP
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Hazard Identification
3. Hazard & Operability: HAZOP
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Hazard Identification
3. Hazard & Operability: HAZOP
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Hazard Identification
3. Hazard & Operability: HAZOP
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Hazard Identification
3. Hazard & Operability: HAZOP
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Questions?
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