Section 5 – Freedom of Religion

1. Aglipay v Ruiz

FACTS: The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the

Philippine Independent Church, seeks the issuance from this court of a
writ of prohibition to prevent the respondent Director of Posts from issuing
and selling postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third
International Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic
Church. Respondent issued the postage stamps in question under the
provisions of Act. No. 4052 appropriating sum of sixty thousand pesos for
the cost of plates and printing of postage stamps. It is alleged that this
action of the respondent is violative of the provisions of section 13, Article
VI, of the Constitution, which provides that "No public money or property
shall ever be appropriated, applied, or used, directly or indirectly, for the
use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian
institution, or system of religion…” The prohibition herein expressed is a
direct corollary of the principle of separation of church and state.

HELD: The Court ruled that while the issuance and sale of the stamps in
question may be inseparably linked with an event of a religious character,
the resulting propaganda, if any, received by the Roman Catholic Church,
was not the aim and purpose of the Government. The issuance of the
postage stamps in question was not inspired by any sectarian feeling to
favor a particular church or religious denominations. The stamps were not
issued and sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church nor were
money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church. On the
contrary, it appears that the only purpose in issuing and selling the
stamps was “to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourists to this
country." The officials concerned merely took advantage of an event
considered of international importance "to give publicity to the Philippines
and its people.” The main purpose should not be frustrated by its
subordination to mere incidental results not contemplated.

2. Garces v Estenzo

FACTS: On March 23, 1976, the barangay council of Valencia, Ormoc City
adopted Resolution No. 5, "reviving the traditional socio-religious
celebration" every fifth day of April "of the feast day of Señor San Vicente
Ferrer, the patron saint of Valencia.” It provided for the acquisition of the
image of San Vicente Ferrer and construction of a waiting shed as the
barangay's projects which will be funded through "selling of tickets and
cash donations.” On March 26, 1976, Resolution No. 6 was adopted
specifying that, in accordance with practice, Councilman Tomas
Cabatingan, the chairman of the fiesta, would be the caretaker of the
image of San Vicente Ferrer. Both resolutions were submitted to a
plebiscite and were duly ratified by 272 voters of the barangay general
assembly. On April 5, 1976, the image was temporarily placed in the altar
of the Catholic church of Barangay Valencia so that the devotees could
worship the saint during the mass for the fiesta. After the mass, Father
Sergio Marilao Osmeña refused to return the image to the barangay
council on the pretext that it was the property of the church because
church funds were used for its acquisition. Father Osmeña together with
Garces, a member of the Aglipayan Church, and two Catholic laymen,
Edullantes and Dagar filed petition contending that the resolutions
contravene the constitutional provisions that "no law shall be made
respecting an establishment of religion" and that “no public money or
property shall ever be appropriated, applied, paid, or used, directly or
indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church,
denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion…”

HELD: The Court ruled that the questioned resolutions do not directly or
indirectly establish any religion, nor abridge religious liberty, nor
appropriate public money or property for the benefit of any sect, priest or
clergyman. The image was purchased with private funds, not with tax
money. Moreover, it was purchased in connection with the celebration of
the barrio fiesta honoring the patron saint, San Vicente Ferrer, and not for
the purpose of favoring any religion nor interfering with religious matters
or the religious beliefs of the barrio residents. One of the highlights of the
fiesta was the mass. Consequently, the image of the patron saint had to be
placed in the church when the mass was celebrated. As noted in the first
resolution, the barrio fiesta is a socio-religious affair. Its celebration is an
ingrained tradition in rural communities.

3. American Bible Society v City of Manila

FACTS: Plaintiff-appellant is a foreign, non-stock, non-profit, religious,

missionary corporation distributing and selling bibles and/or gospel
portions throughout the Philippines and translating the same into several
Philippine dialects. On May 29, 1953, the acting City Treasurer of the City
of Manila informed plaintiff that it was conducting the business of general
merchandise since November, 1945, without providing itself with the
necessary Mayor's permit and municipal license, in violation of Ordinance
No. 3000, as amended, and Ordinances Nos. 2529, 3028 and 3364, and
required plaintiff to secure, within three days, the corresponding permit
and license fees, together with compromise covering the period from the
4th quarter of 1945 to the 2nd quarter of 1953, in the total sum of
P5,821.45. Plaintiff protested against this requirement but to avoid closing
of its business, paid under protest and on the same day filed a complaint
assailing constitutionality of the ordinaces. Plaintiff-appellant contends
that Ordinance No. 2529 (there shall be paid to the City Treasurer for
engaging in any of the businesses or occupations, quarterly, license fees
based on gross sales or receipts realized during the preceding quarter)
and Ordinance No. 3000 (making it unlawful to conduct business without
first obtaining permit from mayor and livens from city treasurer), as
respectively amended, are unconstitutional and illegal in so far as its
society is concerned, because they provide for religious censorship and
restrain the free exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession, to wit:
the distribution and sale of bibles and other religious literature to the
people of the Philippines.

ISSUE: W/N said ordinances are inapplicable, invalid or unconstitutional if

applied to the alleged business of distribution and sale of bibles to the
people of the Philippines by a religious corporation like the American Bible
Society, plaintiff herein.

HELD: The constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and enjoyment of

religious profession and
worship carries with it the right to disseminate religious information. Any
restraint of such right can only be justified like other restraints of freedom
of expression on the grounds that there is a clear and present danger of
any substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent". In the case
at bar the license fee herein involved is imposed upon appellant for its
distribution and sale of bibles and other religious literature.

The Court ruled that it could not be said that petitioners were engaged in
commercial rather than a religious venture. Their activities could not be
described as embraced in the occupation of selling books and pamphlets.
It may be true that in the case at bar the price asked for the bibles and
other
religious pamphlets was in some instances a little bit higher than the
actual cost of the same, but this cannot mean that appellant was engaged
in the business or occupation of selling said "merchandise" for profit. For
this reason We believe that the provisions of City of Manila Ordinance No.
2529, as amended, cannot be applied to appellant, for in doing so it would
impair its free exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and
worship as well as its rights of dissemination of religious beliefs. With
respect to Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, which requires the obtention
of the Mayor's permit before any person can engage in any of the
businesses, trades or occupations enumerated therein, We do not find that
it imposes any charge upon the enjoyment of a right granted by the
Constitution, nor tax the exercise of religious practices.

4. Iglesia ni Cristo v Court of Appeals

FACTS:
Petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo, a duly organized religious organization, has a
television program entitled "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" aired on Channel 2
every Saturday and on Channel 13 every Sunday. The program presents
and propagates petitioner's religious beliefs, doctrines and practices often
times in comparative studies with other religions. Petitioner submitted to
the Board of Review for Motion Pictures and Television the VTR tapes of
its TV program. The Board classified the series as "X" or not for public
viewing on the ground that they "offend and constitute an attack against
other religions which is expressly prohibited by law.” Petitioner appealed
to the Office of the President who reversed the decision of the respondent
Board: “The television episode in question is protected by the
constitutional guarantee of free speech and expression under Article III,
section 4 of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner also filed with RTC and
alleged that the respondent Board acted without jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion in requiring petitioner to submit the VTR tapes of its
TV program and in x-rating them. RTC ordered respondent Board to grant
the necessary permit for all the series of program and directed petitioner
to refrain from offending and attacking other existing religions in program.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration praying for the deletion of the second
part of the Decision, and for the Board to be prohibited from requiring
petitioner to submit for review the tapes of its program. The respondent
Board opposed the motion but the trial court granted it. Respondent Board
appealed to the Court of Appeals who reversed the decision of trial court.

ISSUE:
1. W/N respondent Board has the power to review petitioner's TV program
"Ang Iglesia ni Cristo,"
2. W/N gravely abused its discretion when it prohibited the airing of
petitioner's religious program, for the reason that they constitute an
attack against other religions and that they are indecent, contrary to
law and good customs

HELD:
1. Yes. The law (PD No. 1986) gives the Board the power to screen, review
and examine ALL “television programs.” Petitioner contends that the term
"television program" should not include religious programs so as not to
contravene section 5, Article III of the Constitution. The Court reiterated
that: the right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect,
viz., freedom to believe and freedom to act on one's beliefs. The first is
absolute as long as the belief is confined within the realm of thought. The
second is subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external
acts that affect the public welfare. It is error to think that the mere
invocation of religious freedom will stalemate the State and render it
impotent in protecting the general welfare. The exercise of religious
freedom can be regulated by the State when it will bring about the clear
and present danger of some substantive evil which the State is duty bound
to prevent. For when religion divides and its exercise destroys, the State
should not stand still.
2. Yes. First, any act that restrains speech is presumed invalid and it is the
burden of the respondent Board to overthrow this presumption which it
failed in the case at bar. Second, an examination of the evidence show
that the so-called "attacks" are mere criticisms of some of the deeply held
dogmas and tenets of other religions. The ruling of the Board clearly
suppresses petitioner's freedom of speech and interferes with its right to
free exercise of religion. It misappreciates the essence of freedom to
differ. Under our constitutional scheme, it is not the task of the State to
favor any religion by protecting it against an attack by another religion.
Religious dogmas and beliefs are often at war and to preserve peace
among their followers, especially the fanatics, the establishment clause of
freedom of religion prohibits the State from leaning towards any religion.
Respondent board cannot squelch the speech of petitioner INC simply
because it attacks other religions. Third, Board cannot also rely on the
ground "attacks against another religion" in x-rating the religious program
of petitioner as it is not among the grounds in PD. 1986 to justify an order
prohibiting the broadcast of television program. Such ground was merely
added by the Board in its Rules. This rule is void for it runs smack against
the hoary doctrine that administrative rules and regulations cannot
expand the letter and spirit of the law they seek to enforce. It must be
emphasized that E.O. 876, the law prior to PD 1986, included "attack
against any religion" as a ground for censorship. The ground was not,
however, carried over by PD 1986. Its deletion is a decree to disuse it.
There can be no other intent. Fourth, the respondents failed to apply the
clear and present danger rule. Prior restraint on speech, including
religious speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only by the
showing of a substantive and imminent evil which has taken the life of a
reality already on ground.

5. Ebralinag v Division Superintendent of Cebu

FACTS: Petitioners are high school and elementary school students

(assisted by their parents who belong to the religious group known as
Jehovah's Witnesses) expelled from their classes by the public school
authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem
and recite the patriotic pledge as required by Republic Act No. 1265 of
July 11, 1955, and by Department Order No. 8 dated July 21, 1955 of the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) making the flag
ceremony compulsory in all educational institutions. Jehovah's Witnesses
admittedly teach their children not to salute the flag, sing the national
anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge for they believe that those are
"acts of worship" or "religious devotion" which they "cannot
conscientiously give . . . to anyone or anything except God.” They consider
the flag as an image or idol representing the State. Petitioners stress that
while they do not take part in the compulsory flag ceremony, they do not
engage in "external acts" or behavior that would offend their countrymen
who believe in expressing their love of country through the observance of
the flag ceremony. Since they do not engage in disruptive behavior, there
is no warrant for their expulsion.

HELD: Petition is granted. Religious freedom is a fundamental right which

is entitled to the highest priority and the amplest protection among human
rights, for it involves the relationship of man to his Creator. "The right to
religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect, vis., freedom to
believe and freedom to act on one's belief. The first is absolute as long as
the belief is confined within the realm of thought. The second is subject to
regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the
public welfare” (Cruz)

We are not persuaded that by exempting the Jehovah’s Witnesses from

saluting the flag, singing the national anthem and reciting the patriotic
pledge, this religious which admittedly comprises a "small portion of the
school population" will shake up our part of the globe and suddenly
produce a nation “untaught and uninculcated in and unimbued with
reverence for the flag, patriotism, love of country and admiration for
national heroes.” Expelling or banning the petitioners from Philippine
schools will bring about the very situation that this Court had feared in
Gerona. Forcing a small religious group, through the iron hand of the law,
to participate in a ceremony that violates their religious beliefs, will hardly
be conducive to love of country or respect for duly constituted authorities.
Moreover, the expulsion of members of Jehovah's Witnesses from the
schools where they are enrolled will violate their right as Philippine
citizens, under the 1987 Constitution, to receive free education, for it is
the duty of the State to "protect and promote the right of all citizens to
quality education . . . and to make such education accessible to all"

6. Estrada v Escritor (See printed copy)

7. Perfecto v Esideria

FACTS: On July 15, 2010, Eladio Perfecto filed an administrative Complaint

against Judge Alma Consuelo Desales-Esidera of Branch 20 of the
Regional Trial Court of Catarman, Northern Samar for falsification of public
document and dishonesty. Perfecto alleged that Judge Desales-Esidera
was first married to Richard Tang Tepace then gave birth to a daughter
with Renato Verano Esidera. Her marriage to Richard Tang Tepace was
later declared void. Based on her certification of marriage records, Judge
Desales-Esidera married Renato Verano Esidera on June 3, 1992. Perfecto
further alleged that Judge Desales-Esidera falsified her daughter's birth
certificate to make it appear that she and Renato Verano Esidera were
married on March 18, 1990 and that their daughter was a legitimate child.
Perfecto prays for Judge Desales-Esidera's dismissal from office for her
alleged dishonesty.
Judge Desales-Esidera: certificate was accomplished by husband Renatol
the date of marriage (March 18, 1990) was the date they received the
Sacrament of Holy Matrimony (purely sacramental marriage rite, without
legal effect but definitely valid and recognized by the Roman Catholic
Church). Planned to correct it but decided against it, not because
lawbreaker, dishonest or immoral, but because not to disturb birth record
will serve best interest and welfare of daughter.

HELD:

Judge Desales-Esidera is not guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct

under the Code of Professional Responsibility. Morality refers to what is
good or right conduct at a given circumstance. In Estrada v. Escritor, this
court described morality as "'how we ought to live' and why.” Morality may
be religious, in which case what is good depends on the moral
prescriptions of a high moral authority or the beliefs of a particular
religion. Religion is "a profession of faith to an active power that binds and
elevates man to his Creator." Morality may also be secular. What is good or
right at a given circumstance does not derive its basis from any religious
doctrine but from the independent moral sense shared as humans. The
non-establishment clause bars the State from establishing, through laws
and rules, moral standards according to a specific religion. When it forms
part of our laws, rules, and policies, morality must be secular. In the same
way, this court, in resolving cases that touch on issues of morality, is
bound to remain neutral and to limit the bases of its judgment on secular
moral standards. There is the danger of "compelled religion" and,
therefore, of negating the very idea of freedom of belief and non-
establishment of religion when religious morality is incorporated in
government regulations and policies. This court may not sit as judge of
what is moral according to a particular religion. We do not have
jurisdiction over and is not the proper authority to determine which
conduct contradicts religious doctrine. We have jurisdiction over matters
of morality only insofar as it involves conduct that affects the public or its
interest. Thus, for purposes of determining administrative liability of
lawyers and judges, "immoral conduct" should relate to their conduct as
officers of the court.

We cannot conclude that, for purposes of determining administrative

liability, respondent judge disobeyed the law against bigamy when she and
her second husband conducted a marriage ceremony on March 18, 1990 as
it was merely a sacramental marriage entered into only to comply with the
requirements of their religious beliefs. It was valid only under the Roman
Catholic Church but has no legal effect. Under our law, respondent judge's
marriage in 1990 was invalid because of the solemnizing officer's lack of
authority. This court ruled that in religious freedom cases, the test of
benevolent neutrality should be applied. Under the test of benevolent
neutrality, religious freedom is weighed against a compelling state
interest. We find that there is no compelling state interest that may limit
respondent judge's right to participate in religious and merely ceremonial
acts that are non-violative of other people's rights and with no legally
binding effect. The institution of marriage is not threatened when we
accommodate respondent judge's freedom to participate in such
ceremonies even if they have secular counterparts under our laws

However, benevolent neutrality and claims of religious freedom cannot

shield respondent judge from liability for misconduct under our laws.
Respondent judge knowingly entered into a civil marriage with her first
husband and had sexual relations with her second husband while her first
marriage was subsisting. Respondent judge cannot claim that engaging in
sexual relations with another person during the subsistence of a marriage
is an exercise of her religious expression. Moreover, respondent judge, as a
lawyer and even more so as a judge, is expected to abide by the law. Her
conduct affects the credibility of the courts in dispensing justice. Thus, in
finding respondent judge administratively liable for a violation of her
marriage obligations under our laws, this court protects the credibility of
the judiciary in administering justice. Lawyers are officers of court,
expected to care about and sustain the law. This court's jurisdiction over
their actions is limited to their acts that may affect public confidence in
the Rule of Law. Our state has secular interests to protect. This court
cannot be expected to condone misconduct done knowingly on account of
religious freedom or expression. Judge Desales-Esidera is SUSPENDED
from judicial service for one (1) month

8. Imbong v Ochoa

9. RE: LETTER of TONY Q. VALENCIANO HOLDING of RELIGIOUS RITUALS

at the HALL of JUSTICE BUILDING in QUEZON CITY (A.M. No. 10-4-19)

FACTS: Tony Q. Valenciano wrote letters addressed to then Chief Justice

Reynato S. Puno reporting that the basement of the Hall of Justice of QC
had been converted into a Roman Catholic Chapel, complete with offertory
table, images of Catholic religious icons, a canopy, an electric organ, and
a projector. He believed that such practice violated the constitutional
provision on the separation of Church and State and the constitutional
prohibition against the appropriation of public money or property for the
benefit of a sect, church, denomination, or any other system of religion.
The matter was referred to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for
evaluation, report and recommendation. OCA believed that the practical
inconveniences cited by Valenciano were unfoundedand recommended
that his letter-complaints be dismissed for lack of merit as there was
nothing constitutionally abhorrent in allowing the continuation of the
masses.
HELD: The Court agrees with the findings and recommendation of the OCA
and denies the prayer of Valenciano that the holding of religious rituals of
any of the world’s religions in the QC Hall of Justice or any halls of justice
all over the country be prohibited.

The State recognizes the inherent right of the people to have some form of
belief system,. Allowing religion to flourish is not contrary to the principle
of separation of Church and State. Allowing the citizens to practice their
religion is not equivalent to a fusion of Church and State. Religious
freedom, however, is not absolute. "The right to religious profession and
worship has a two-fold aspect — freedom to believe and freedom to act on
one's beliefs. The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined within
the realm of thought. The second is subject to regulation where the belief
is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare.” It cannot
have its way if there is a compelling state interest. To successfully invoke
compelling state interest, it must be demonstrated that the masses in the
QC Hall of Justice unduly disrupt the delivery of public services or affect
the judges and employees in the performance of their official functions. As
reported, the masses were being conducted only during noon breaks and
were not disruptive of public services. As there has been no detrimental
effect on the public service or prejudice to the State, there is simply no
state interest compelling enough to prohibit the exercise of religious
freedom in the halls of justice.

In order to give life to the constitutional right of freedom of religion, the

State adopts a policy of accommodation. Accommodation is a recognition
of the reality that some governmental measures may not be imposed on a
certain portion of the population for the reason that these measures are
contrary to their religious beliefs. They take religion specifically into
account not to promote the government’s favored form of religion, but to
allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion without hindrance.
As long as it can be shown that the exercise of the right does not impair
the public welfare, the attempt of the State to regulate or prohibit such
right would be an unconstitutional encroachment. On the opposite side of
the spectrum is the constitutional mandate that "no law shall be made
respecting an establishment of religion," otherwise known as the non-
establishment clause which reinforces the wall of separation between
Church and State: State cannot set up a Church, nor pass laws which
prefer one religion, punish a person for entertaining or professing religious
beliefs or disbeliefs, etc. It is our considered view that the holding of
Catholic masses at the basement of the QC Hall of Justice is not a case of
establishment, but merely accommodation as there is no law, ordinance or
circular issued by any duly constitutive authorities expressly mandating
that judiciary employees attend the Catholic masses at the basement;
judiciary employees attend the masses to profess their faith at their own
initiative; no government funds are being spent; basement has neither
been converted into a Roman Catholic chapel nor has it been permanently
appropriated for the exclusive use of its faithful; allowance of the masses
has not prejudiced other religions.

Section 8 – Right to Form Association

1. SSS Employees Association v Court of Appeals

FACTS: SSS filed with RTC of QC a complaint alleging that on June 9, 1987,
the officers and members of SSSEA staged an illegal strike (for failure of
SSS to act on their demands) and barricaded the entrances to the SSS
Building, preventing non-striking employees from reporting for work and
SSS members from transacting business with the SSS and that the
strikers refused to return to work after being ordered to do so. SSS
suffered damages as a result of the strike

ISSUE: W/N employees of the Social Security System (SSS) have the right
to strike

HELD: While there is no question that the Constitution recognizes the right
of government employees to organize, it is silent as to whether such
recognition also includes the right to strike. A reading of the proceedings
of the Constitutional Commission that drafted the 1987 Constitution would
show that in recognizing the right of government employees to organize,
the commissioners intended to limit the right to the formation of unions or
associations only, without including the right to strike. “The right to form
an organization does not carry with it the right to strike.”

On June 1, 1987, to implement the constitutional guarantee of the right of

government employees to organize, the President issued E.O. No. 180
which provides guidelines for the exercise of the right to organize of
government employees. In Section 14 thereof, it is provided that "[t]he
Civil Service law and rules governing concerted activities and strikes in
the government service shall be observed, subject to any legislation that
may be enacted by Congress." The President was apparently referring to
Memorandum Circular No. 6 which, "prior to the enactment by Congress of
applicable laws concerning strike by government employees…enjoins
under pain of administrative sanctions, all government officers and
employees from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs
and other forms of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or
disruption of public service.”

The Court is of the considered view that SSS is covered by the prohibition
against strikes. SSS is agovernment-controlled corporation with an
original charter, having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees
are part of the civil service and are covered by the Civil Service
Commission's memorandum prohibiting strikes. This being the case, the
strike staged by the employees of the SSS was illegal.
Government employees may, therefore, through their unions or
associations, either petition the Congress for the betterment of the terms
and conditions of employment which are within the ambit of legislation or
negotiate with the appropriate government agencies for the improvement
of those which are not fixed by law. If there be any unresolved grievances,
the dispute may be referred to the Public Sector Labor-Management
Council for appropriate action. But employees in the civil service may not
resort to strikes, walkouts and other temporary work stoppages, like
workers in the private sector, to pressure the Government to accede to
their demands. As now provided under Sec. 4, Rule III of the Rules and
Regulations to Govern the Exercise of the Right of Government Employees
to Self-Organization, which took effect after the instant dispute arose,
“[t]he terms and conditions of employment in the government, including
any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof and government-owned
and controlled corporations with original charters are governed by law and
employees therein shall not strike for the purpose of securing changes
thereof."

2. Victoriano v Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union

FACTS: Benjamin Victoriano (INC), in the employ of the Elizalde Rope

Factory, Inc., was a member of the Elizalde Rope Workers' Union which had
with the Company a collective bargaining agreement containing a closed
shop provision which reads as follows "Membership in the Union shall be
required as a condition of employment for all permanent employees
workers covered by this Agreement.”

On June 18, 1961, however, RA No. 3350 was enacted, introducing an

amendment to Sec 4(a)(4) of RA No. 875, as follows: “such agreement shall
not cover members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their
members in any such labor organization.”

Being a member of a religious sect that prohibits the affiliation of its

members with any labor organization, Victoriano presented his resignation
to appellant Union. The latter wrote a formal letter to the Company asking
to separate Victoriano from the service in view of the fact that he was
resigning from the Union as a member. Company notified Victoriano that
unless the could achieve a satisfactory arrangement with the Union, the
Company would be constrained to dismiss him. Victoriano filed an action
to enjoin the Company and the Union from dismissing him. Trial court ruled
in favor of Victoriano.

Union alleged the unconstitutionality of RA No. 3350 contending that the

Act infringes on the fundamental right to form lawful associations. On the
other hand, Victoriano contended that it does not violate the right to form
lawful associations, for the right to join associations includes the right not
to join or to resign from a labor organization, if one's conscience does not
allow his membership therein, and the Act has given substance to such
right by prohibiting the compulsion of workers to join labor organizations.

HELD: Union's contention that RA No. 3350 prohibits and bans the
members of such religious sects that forbid affiliation of their members
with labor unions from joining labor unions appears nowhere in the
wording of RA No. 3350; neither can the same be deduced by necessary
implication therefrom.

A right comprehends at least two broad notions, namely: first, liberty or

freedom (the absence of legal restraint, whereby an employee may act for
himself without being prevented by law); and second, power (whereby an
employee may, as he pleases, join or refrain from joining an association). It
is, therefore, the employee who should decide for himself whether he
should join or not an association; and should he choose to join, he himself
makes up his mind as to which association he would join; and even after
he has joined, he still retains the liberty and the power to leave and cancel
his membership with said organization at any time. It is clear, therefore,
that the right to join a union includes the right to abstain from joining any
union.

The assailed Act, far from infringing the constitutional provision on

freedom of association, upholds and reinforces it. It does not prohibit the
members of said religious sects from affliating with labor unions. It still
leaves to said members the liberty and the power to affliate, or not to
affliate, with labor unions. If, notwithstanding their religious beliefs, the
members of said religious sects prefer to sign up with the labor union, they
can do so. If in deference and fealty to their religious faith, they refuse to
sign up, they can do so; the law does not coerce them to join; neither does
the law prohibit them from joining; and neither may the employer or labor
union compel them to join. Republic Act No. 3350, therefore, does not
violate the constitutional provision on freedom of association.

3. In re: IBP Membership Dues Deliquency of Atty. Marcial Edillon

FACTS: The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing

attorney in the Philippines. On November 29, 1975,IBP Board of Governors
unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in an admin case
recommending to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent
from its Roll of Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to pay his membership
dues" to the IBP since the latter’s constitution notwithstanding due
notice.
The obligation to pay membership dues is couched in the following words
of the Court Rule:
“SEC. 9. Membership dues. — Every member of the Integrated Bar shall
pay such annual dues as the Board of Governors shall determine with the
approval of the Supreme Court…”

The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above provisions

constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he is
being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer
in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding
dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the
said organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is
being deprived of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by
the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the above provisions
of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and
effect.

HELD: The Court ruled that the provisions of Rule of Court 139-A and of the
By-Laws of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines complained of are neither
unconstitutional nor illegal. Respondent Marcial A. Edillon should be as he
is hereby disbarred, and his name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll
of Attorneys of the Court.

Organized by or under the direction of the State, an integrated Bar is an

official national body of which all lawyers are required to be members.
They are, therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance
of the Bar, including the requirement of payment of a reasonable annual
fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar. It must be
stressed that all legislation directing the integration of the Bar have been
uniformly and universally sustained as a valid exercise of the police power
over an important profession. The State, in order to promote the general
welfare, may interfere with and regulate personal liberty, property and
occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to restraints and
burdens in order to secure the general prosperity and welfare of the State.
Thus, when the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his
practice of law and his exercise of the said profession, which affect the
society at large, were (and are) subject to the power of the body politic to
require him to conform to such regulations as might be established by the
proper authorities for the common good, even to the extent of interfering
with some of his liberties.

To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of

his constitutional freedom to associate. Integration does not make a
lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member. He
became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. All
that integration actually does is to provide an official national organization
for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which every
lawyer is already a member. Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to
associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of
his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its
elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is
the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the
State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal
services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this
fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory
program — the lawyers. Assuming that the questioned provision does in a
sense compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar, such
compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the state.